Recusal re: Approach, Presumption of Judicial Impartiality, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and the Doctrine of Necessity

CC02-22 : MUTUMWA MAWERE and OTHERS vs TICHAONA MUPASIRI and OTHERS
Ruled By: MAKARAU JCC

Under case no CCZ10/2022, the applicants (Mutumwa Mawere, SMM Holdings Ltd, Africa Resources Ltd, Africa Construction Ltd, Tap Building Products Ltd and Friends of Shabanie Mashava Mines Trust) applied to intervene in certain ongoing proceedings brought by the first respondent (Tichaona Mupasiri) against the second and third respondents (the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and Edwin Manikai).

The essence of the order sought in these ongoing proceedings is a declaration that the second respondent failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation, the precise nature of which is yet to be determined.

I shall hereafter refer to these ongoing proceedings as “the main matter.”

The application for intervention was placed before me for determination. Before the hearing of the application, the applicants made an application for my recusal.

After hearing submissions from the parties and counsel, I dismissed the application for recusal with no order as to costs. I indicated that reasons for the order would follow in a written judgment.

This is the written judgment.

The application for recusal was filed by the first applicant, who alleged that he was bringing it in his own right and on behalf of the other applicants (SMM Holdings Ltd, Africa Resources Ltd, Africa Construction Ltd, Tap Building Products Ltd and Friends of Shabanie Mashava Mines Trust). He deposed to the founding and only affidavit in the matter.

In purporting to act on behalf of the other applicants, the first applicant relied on the authority that he had been granted by the other five, purportedly authorising him to file the application for intervention in the main matter.

Authority to bring the application for recusal on behalf of the other applicants was not furnished - an observation correctly made by the second respondent.

As a consequence, for want of authority on the part of the first applicant to represent them, the other applicants were not before me.

In addition, the applicant purported to act for two companies incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and a third incorporated in Zambia. These are the third (Africa Resources Ltd), fourth (Africa Construction Ltd) and fifth (Tap Building Products Ltd) applicants respectively.

Being foreigners, the three companies ought to have furnished security for costs in accordance with the rules of court.

Not having done so, the three companies were, in addition to the want of authority on the part of the first applicant, also not properly before me.

The application was however not defeated by the above non-compliance with the rules of procedure as the first applicant could bring and motivate the application in his own right.

Background

The first applicant is the founder member of the sixth applicant (Friends of Shabanie Mashava Mines Trust) which is described in the founding affidavit as a networking association of persons who share a common interest to promote, protect, and uphold unwavering respect for constitutionalism.

However, the sixth applicant's Constitution was not attached to the affidavit to show the ambit of its powers, and, in particular, that it has the power to participate in proceedings such as were before me.

There is an intricate relationship between the second applicant (SMM Holdings Ltd) and the three foreign companies (Africa Resources Ltd, Africa Construction Ltd and Tap Building Products Ltd).

For the purposes of this application, it was not necessary for me to unpack the layers of shareholding that link the four companies to each other and to the first applicant.

Clearly, the first applicant has an interest, in varying degrees, in the other five applicants.

As the basis for the application, the applicants relied on two decisions of the High Court that were handed down in 2005 and in 2007 respectively.

I was the presiding judge in respect of both matters.

Both High Court applications were dismissed on the preliminary issues that arose before the merits of the applications could be related to. It is thus common cause, that, in both matters, the merits of the applications were neither argued nor pronounced on.

Notwithstanding that, the applicants are of the firm belief, that, it was because of the two decisions that the State was able to acquire the second applicant (SMM Holdings Ltd) and other companies in which the first, third, fourth and fifth applicants held investments.

The application was opposed by the second and third respondents.

They jointly submitted, that, recusal had been sought on an improper basis because the matters that fell for determination in the High Court were distinct from the application for intervention that was before me. It was their further contention, that, the applicants had failed to rebut the presumption of judicial impartiality that attaches to each judicial officer.

Although the first respondent had not filed any papers in the application, he was granted an opportunity to make submissions in respect of the issue that was before the court - which opportunity he used to solidly support the position of the applicants.

Whilst I stand by the observations made by this Court in Mupungu v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & Ors CC07-21 that an application for recusal is, in essence, a conversation between the apprehensive litigant and the court and in which conversation the other party can listen in, I was grateful for the points and observations made by the second and third respondents and their counsel.

In coming to my decision, I however did not seek to rely on these.

I also did not make a definitive ruling on the issue raised by the applicants that the second respondent (the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe) was not properly before me, he being represented by a private law firm as opposed to being represented exclusively by the office of the Attorney-General.

I left that issue open for determination in the main matter if at all that becomes necessary.

As indicated above, at the centre of the application for recusal are two matters determined in 2005 and 2007 respectively.

The first matter was THZ Holdings Limited v ZIMRE Holdings and Another HC542/05 whose hearing was consolidated, by consent, with that of ZIMRE Holdings Limited v the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange and Another HC632/05. The two matters concerned approval of an amendment to the rights offer by ZIMRE Holdings Limited, a company in which THZ Holdings Limited had an interest. The first applicant had interests in THZ Holdings Limited.

A preliminary point arose in both matters as to the capacity of the first applicant herein, Mutumwa Dziva Mawere, to depose to an affidavit on behalf of THZ Holdings Limited, a company incorporated in the United Kingdom. It was contended by ZIMRE Holdings Limited, and correctly so in my view, that, the deponent to the founding affidavit was disabled from doing so by virtue of the provisions of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Reconstruction of State Indebted Insolvent Companies) Regulations 2004, the applicable law at the time. The order of the High Court accordingly upheld the preliminary point and dismissed the application by THZ Holdings Limited on that basis.

The second matter was SMM Holdings Limited v The Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs HC12064/05. This was a review application in which the second applicant sought to have reviewed the decision of the respondent in that matter to issue a reconstruction order against it. The application was filed outside the time limited by the rules of court for a review application. As a consequence, the review was not properly before the court and was accordingly dismissed on that basis. This made it unnecessary to determine the merits of the application.

The issue that then fell for determination in the application for recusal was whether or not the High Court orders, detailed above, disabled this court from determining the application for intervention by the applicants in the main matter.

The Law

The law of recusal is settled. It is the law against bias.

Quite apart from the constitutional guarantees in favour of the right to a fair trial before an independent and impartial court, provided for in section 69 of the Constitution, the common law practiced in this jurisdiction has long recognised and applied the law against bias. The constitutional provision may be viewed to have been enacted in abundance of caution so as to locate the law against bias in the supreme law of the land. It is an additional safeguard to that which the common law has long provided.

The law against bias seeks to balance two equal positions at law. These are the duty of every judge to sit and determine all matters allocated to him or her unless, in the interests of justice, recusal is necessary.

Expressing himself on the two competing positions, in South African Commercial Catering and Allied Workers Union and Others v Irvin & Johnson Ltd (Seafoods Division Fish Processing) 2000 (3) SA 705 (CC) 2000 (8) BCLR 886 CAMERON AJ had this to say:

“On the one hand, it is vital to the integrity of our courts and the independence of judges and magistrates that ill-founded and misdirected challenges to the composition of a bench be discouraged. On the other, the courts very vulnerability serves to underscore the pre-eminent value to be placed on public confidence in impartial adjudication. In striking the correct balance, it is 'as wrong to yield to a tenuous or frivolous objection' as it is 'to ignore an objection of substance.'”

Recusal is therefore not to be had for the mere asking. It has to be validly taken.

In President of the RSA and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) 1999 (7) BCLR 725, the following approach was recommended when considering applications for recusal:

“It follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this application for the recusal of members of this Court is objective and the onus of establishing it rests upon the applicant. The question is whether a reasonable, objective, and informed person would, on the correct facts, reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case; that is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel.

The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath of office taken by the Judge to administer justice without fear or favour; and their ability to carry out that oath by reason of their training and experience. It must be assumed, that, they can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or pre-dispositions. They must take into account the fact that they have a duty to sit in any case in which they are not obliged to recuse themselves.”

This is the approach that guided me in this matter.

Analysis

The two matters that came before the High Court, in 2005 and 2007 respectively, were both disposed of on preliminary points. This is common cause.

The law against bias prohibits a judicial officer who has already expressed himself or herself on the merits of the matter at hand, in or out of court, from sitting in determination of such merits. It prohibits a judicial officer who will not bring an open mind to bear on the matter to be determined to sit in adjudication of such a matter. Mere exposure, without comment, to the merits of the matter is not an adequate and valid basis for seeking recusal.

Per contra, the prohibition does not extend to judicial officers who make findings on preliminary issues only.

This is so because, borrowing the language of NGCOBO CJ in President of the RSA and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) 1999 (7) BCLR 725, a judicial officer who limits himself or herself to disposing of a matter on procedural issues remains of a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel on the merits.

The above position at law applies where the court that disposed of the matter previously on preliminary issues is called upon to determine the matter on the merits. Such a court is not disabled from proceeding to pronounce itself on the merits of the matter at a future date.

In addition to the above position, and, in any event, I was not called upon to determine the merits of the two applications that were determined in the High Court in 2005 and 2007 respectively. I would have no jurisdiction to do so as this Court can only determine constitutional issues.

It appears, with respect, that, the first applicant conflated the causes of actions that were before the High Court in 2005 and 2007 respectively and the cause of action that he seeks to intervene in.

The two applications in the High Court were all brought on common law causes of action. The application that he and the other applicants seek to intervene in can only raise constitutional issues. The two are as similar as chalk is to cheese. They call for different jurisdictions which jurisdictions are triggered differently. Different legal considerations are brought to bear in the determination of each.

It also occurred to me, that, the merits of the conduct of the second respondent, the purported cause of action in which the applicants sought to intervene, did not and could not have arisen in the two applications that were before the High Court in 2005 and 2007 respectively.

This is so because the law creating the special jurisdiction of this Court, under which the conduct of the President can be reviewed, was not in place then - it being a creature of the Constitution adopted in 2013.

Any remarks by the High Court, in 2005 or 2007, regarding the constitutional validity of any action that the President may have taken in relation to the interests of the applicants, if any were made by that court, would have been grossly irregular as the High Court, then, did not have the special jurisdiction that this Court has now been endowed with.

It still does not have such jurisdiction.

Notwithstanding the above, I anxiously perused the two judgments to establish whether, in an unguarded moment, the High Court may have adverted to the merits of the matter that fall to be determined in the application for intervention or in the application against the second and third respondents in the main matter.

I was satisfied that it did not.

Indeed, the first applicant, who has been most uncomplimentary and openly contemptuous of my reasoning capacity and legal acumen, agreed with me on this single score, that, the High Court did not go beyond the preliminary issues. He gratuitously went on to suggest, that, my conduct in the High Court should be investigated for failing to deal with the merits of his grievances as both applications were on matters of immense importance to him and others who had invested in the second applicant.

Disposition

Regarding costs, I saw no reason for departing from the general position not to award costs in a constitutional matter.

This was so notwithstanding the invective language that the first applicant employed in both his written application and oral submissions which provoked the second and third respondents into entreating the court to make a punitive award of costs.

The language did not distract the court from the issue at hand.

The above therefore constitute the reasons for the order made on 9 March 2022 dismissing the application with no order as to costs.

View Appeal
HH264-21 : MUSA KIKA vs MINISTER OF JUSTICE LEGAL & PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS and THE CHIEF JUSTICE HONOURABLE LUKE MALABA N.O. and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZHOU J, CHAREWA J and MUSHORE J

IntroductionThis judgment is in respect of two matters, HC2128/21 and HC2166/21. The two matters were heard together because the substance of their complaints is the same.Both matters were brought by way of application. HC2128/21 was instituted as an urgent court application while HC2166/21 was brought as an urgent chamber application.Both ...

Introduction

This judgment is in respect of two matters, HC2128/21 and HC2166/21. The two matters were heard together because the substance of their complaints is the same.

Both matters were brought by way of application. HC2128/21 was instituted as an urgent court application while HC2166/21 was brought as an urgent chamber application.

Both applications are opposed by some of the respondents.

Opposing papers, answering affidavits, and heads of argument were filed following a case management meeting with the parties representatives at which the dates for filing the papers were set by consent.

In case no. HC2128/21 the applicant, a legal practitioner and director of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, cited the Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs, and all the judges of the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court as well as some of the judges of the High Court, on the basis that they are acting judges of the Supreme Court or have been called upon to act as such.

The judges were cited in official capacities.

The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) was joined in the proceedings, at its instance, at the case management conference.

In HC2166/21 the respondents cited are the Judicial Service Commission (JSC), the Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, Honourable Luke Malaba N.O. and the Attorney General N.O. The applicants in that case are Young Lawyers Association of Zimbabwe and Frederick Charles Moses Mutanda, a liberation war veteran.

Background

On 7 May 2021, the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.2) Act 2021 became law after being assented to by the President. The contentious aspects of the Amendment Act which are the subject of the instant applications are found in its section 13.

That section repealed section 186 of the Constitution 2013 and substituted it with a new section 186.

Upon gathering that section 186 of the Constitution, introduced by the Amendment, would apply to the second to eighteenth respondents (Luke Malaba, Elizabeth Gwaunza, Paddington Garwe, Rita Makarau, Anne-Mary Gowora, Ben Hlatshwayo, Bharat Patel, Antonia Guvava, Susan Mavangira, Chinembiri Energy Bhunu, Tendai Uchena, Nicholas Mathonsi, Charles Hungwe, Felistus Chatukuta, Alfas Chitakunye, Samuel Kudya and Lavender Makoni) the applicants instituted the two applications. The applicant in Case No. HC2128/21 seeks the following relief:

“IT IS DECLARED THAT:

1. In accordance with provisions of sections 186(1)(a) and 186(2) (of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013) in their original form and notwithstanding provisions of Constitutional Amendment Number 2, second to eighteenth respondents hold office they reach the age of seventy years, whereupon they must, by operation of law, retire.

2.The attempt to subvert the position encapsulated in the "original" section 186(1)(a) and 186(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013 is contrary to law and therefore in breach of applicant's right to the protection of the law as set out in section 56(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe 2013.

IT IS CONSEQUENTLY ORDERED THAT:

3. LUKE MALABA, must or did, at midnight on 15 May 2021, cease to hold the office of CHIEF JUSTICE OF ZIMBABWE.

4. Any action, conduct, or deed of LUKE MALABA post the 15th of May 2021, purportedly as CHIEF JUSTICE OF ZIMBABWE, is null and void and of no effect.

5. ln accordance with the provisions of section 181 of the Constitution 2013, with effect from midnight on the 15th of May 2021, ELIZABETH GWAUNZA became/becomes the ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE OF ZIMBABWE until such a time as a substantive CHIEF JUSTICE OF ZIMBABWE is appointed.

6. In accordance with the provisions of section 181 of the Constitution 2013, with effect from midnight on the 15th of May 2021, PADDINGTON GARWE became/becomes the ACTING DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE OF ZIMBABWE until such a time as a substantive DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE OF ZIMBABWE is appointed.

7.There shall be no order as to costs."

During argument, counsel for the applicant abandoned the relief sought in paragraph 6 of the draft order and moved that the draft be amended accordingly.

We point out, that, notwithstanding the statement suggesting that what is being sought in paragraphs 3-7 of the draft order is consequential relief, the relief is clearly in the form of a declaration.

The second to eighteenth respondents did not file opposing papers.

They will therefore be taken not to have opposed the application: see Prosser & 35 Others v Ziscosteel Company Ltd HH201-93 and Panganai and 20 Others v Kadir & Sons (Pvt) Ltd HH26-95.

We do not accept the submission by their counsel that they oppose the application without filing opposing papers. This is because the directions issued on 12 May 2021 required the respondents to file opposing papers if they were opposing the application. Their grounds of opposition would have to be contained in the opposing affidavits.

ln Case No. HC2166/21 the applicant sought declaratory relief as follows:

“IT IS DECLARED THAT:

1. The first respondent (Judicial Service Commission) in failing to activate the provisions of section 180 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20) Act 2013 and/or the provisions of section 180 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended by Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.2) Act 2021 (No.2 of 2021) diligently and without delay violated section 324 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe as amended.

2. The second respondent (Chief Justice Luke Malaba) cannot, by virtue of section 328(7) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as amended, benefit from the term limit extension as introduced by an amendment of section 186 by the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.2) Act 2021.

3. As a consequence of 2 above, the second respondent shall vacate office as the Chief Justice of Zimbabwe on (sic) midnight of 15 May 2021.

4. Any action, conduct, act, or deed of second respondent post the 15th of May 2021, purportedly as Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, is null and void and of no force or effect.

5. Any attempt to continue in office by second Respondent as Chief Justice of Zimbabwe and/or any continuation in office by second respondent, purportedly as Chief Justice of Zimbabwe, violates applicants right of access to a court of law established by law and applicants right to protection of the law in accordance with section 69(4) and section 56(1) of the Constitution 2013 as amended.

6. The second respondent, in any event, can no longer be a judge of the Constitutional Court for more than 15 years in violation of section 186(1) of the Constitution 2013 as amended.

7. ln the alternative, section 14 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.2) Act 2021 (No.2 of 2021) is invalid for violating section 56(3) of the Constitution 2013 and is accordingly struck down.

8. There shall be no order as to costs."

The relief set out in the first paragraph was not persisted with as it was predicated upon a misreading of the Constitutional provisions pertaining to the appointment of a Chief Justice in Zimbabwe.

The applicants were under the mistaken belief that the first respondent, the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) had the mandate to call for candidates to participate in an interview.

Section 180 of the Constitution provides that the Chief Justice is appointed by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).

The relief sought in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 is the same one being sought by the applicant in HC2128/21 save for the reference to section 69(4) of the Constitution.

The relief sought in paragraph 6 of the draft order was abandoned during argument. Also, the applicant did not make any submissions in support of the alternative relief being sought in paragraph 7 of the draft order.

We take it that this relief, seeking the declaration of invalidity in respect of section 13 (which was incorrectly referred to as section 14) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.2) Act 2021, is not being persisted with.

Preliminarv Issues and Obiections

The parties raised preliminary issues and objections:

The first issue pertained to the recusation of the judges sitting in this matter. We dismissed the application and advised that the full reasons would be contained in the final judgment. Brief reasons were given in the ex tempore judgment that we delivered on 15 May 2021....,.

Application for Recusal

The application on behalf of the 2nd to 19th respondents pertained only to ZHOU J.

As already noted, the 2nd to 18th respondents have not opposed the applications. The grounds advanced are that the judge is conflicted in that he was a Commissioner of the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) for a period of six (6) years, and, secondly, that, he participated in the interviews for the selection of Constitutional Court judges which were held in September 2020.

There was also the submission, that, the entire High Court bench, or, alternatively, the judges who constitute the panel in casu would be biased.

An application for the recusal of a member of a court or tribunal, based on interest, has its foundations in the principle of natural justice known as nemo judex in sua causa. The test for bias is an objective one. The applicant must show a reasonable possibility of bias.

ln the case of Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd 2011 (3) SALR 92 the Constitutional Court of South Africa held, that, in the context of an allegation of judicial bias the "double requirement of reasonableness" must be satisfied, that both the person who apprehends bias and the apprehension itself must be reasonable.

When one considers that there is a presumption of impartiality, the need for genuine evidence or facts upon which the allegations of bias are founded is enjoined.

On the other hand, it is understood, that, an application for recusal of a judge necessarily places the party making it, particularly the legal practitioner, in an unenviable position. For this reason, courts must not be over-sensitive to such an application being made for their recusal as the rules of natural justice are an important feature of the right to a fair hearing.

ZHOU J, having left the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) in February 2020, a period of about 15 months has passed. The matters in this case do not arise from what happened up to mid-February 2020. Counsel for the second to nineteenth respondents referred to a resolution by which the deponent to the 19th respondent's (JSC) affidavit was authorized to act. He submitted that the resolution was made during the period prior to February 2020, and that some of the applicants had challenged the authority of the Secretary of the JSC.

The resolution speaks for itself, and no evidence outside it or pertaining to how it came into existence was debated in this case. The challenge pertained to whether the Secretary had been authorized by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC) to apply for its joinder and to defend the applications. No interest arising out of previous membership of the JSC has been shown which would suggest a reasonable possibility of bias.

The issue of the interviews for appointment to the Constitutional Court does not arise in this case. The provisions which are the subject matter of these applications introduce a new regime for appointment of sitting judges to the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court. No interest can be imputed arising out of the interviews which would have a bearing on the present applications.

The move for the recusation of the entire panel of judges was predicted upon two grounds as advanced by counsel for the first respondent and the Attorney General:

(i) The first ground was that the amendments which were introduced by section 186 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.2) Act 2021 disadvantage High Court judges because their retirement age limit was not extended to 75 years.

The submission was that the High Court should not therefore hear the instant applications.

This startling submission, which was directed at all the High Court judges, including those who are not on this, panel, assumes that extension of working age to 75 years is a benefit.

That is a misapprehension not based on an interview of any of the High Court judges.

(ii) The additional ground was that the judges sitting in this matter were constituted by the Judge President who is a commissioner of the Judicial Service Commission, and would be conflicted.

The allocation of cases to judges is an administrative function which judges have no control over. The involvement of the office of the Judge President is purely in the discharge of his administrative function. The insinuation by counsel for the first respondent, that the judges may have been picked for some other improper purpose in this matter is not based on evidence, and is a reckless submission by a legal practitioner who is an officer of this court.

The suggestion that the panel of judges was biased because they truncated the deadline for filing papers is unsound. The dates were discussed and agreed upon, having regard to the basis of the urgency, which was that the second respondent was turning 70 years old on 15 May 2021.

The court has inherent power to control its processes and procedures.

Secondly, the dates were established with the involvement and consent of those who instructed counsel for the first respondent. The directions issued in respect of the filing of papers could therefore not be evidence of bias or an interest in the matter as suggested.

For these reasons, we dismissed the application for recusal of the judges.

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Recusal re: Approach, Presumption of Judicial Impartiality, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and the Doctrine of Necessity

CC02-22 : MUTUMWA MAWERE and OTHERS vs TICHAONA MUPASIRI and OTHERS
Ruled By: MAKARAU JCC

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HH264-21 : MUSA KIKA vs MINISTER OF JUSTICE LEGAL & PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS and THE CHIEF JUSTICE HONOURABLE LUKE MALABA N.O. and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZHOU J, CHAREWA J and MUSHORE J

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Recusal re: Approach, Presumption of Judicial Impartiality, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and the Doctrine of Necessity

CC02-22 : MUTUMWA MAWERE and OTHERS vs TICHAONA MUPASIRI and OTHERS Ruled By: MAKARAU JCC

View Appeal HH264-21 : MUSA KIKA vs MINISTER OF JUSTICE LEGAL & PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS and THE CHIEF JUSTICE HONOURABLE LUKE MALABA N.O. and OTHERS Ruled By: ZHOU J, CHAREWA J and MUSHORE J

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CC02-22 : MUTUMWA MAWERE and OTHERS vs TICHAONA MUPASIRI and OTHERS
Ruled By: MAKARAU JCC

View Appeal
HH264-21 : MUSA KIKA vs MINISTER OF JUSTICE LEGAL & PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS and THE CHIEF JUSTICE HONOURABLE LUKE MALABA N.O. and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZHOU J, CHAREWA J and MUSHORE J