Expert Evidence, Opinion Evidence and Toolmark Evidence re: Disclaimers, Qualified Opinions & Opinions Without an Author

Appealed
HH92-07 : PHAROAH B. MUSKWE vs DOUGLAS NYAJINA and MUNHUWEI G.T. and MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT N.O.
Ruled By: KUDYA J

This trial is concerned with the identification of the correct house between two of the three houses that are eligible to ascend to the Nyajina Chieftainship of the vaZumba clan in the Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe district of Mashonaland East province of Zimbabwe.THE PLEADINGSOn 26 August 2005, the plaintiff issued summons ...

THE PLEADINGS

On 26 August 2005, the plaintiff issued summons out of this court seeking an order setting aside the appointment of the first defendant as Chief Nyajina-designate; directing that the second and third defendants take into account and abide by the values, traditions, and customary principles of succession of the VaZumba people in selecting a chief and a declaratur that the next chief be selected from the Mukonde house.

The first defendant filed his plea on 28 October after the second and third defendants had filed their joint plea on 24 October 2005.

The pre-trial conference was held on 17 January 2006 and the parties filed a joint pretrial conference minute which referred two issues to trial.

I set down the matter for trial on 19 April 2006 for 22 May 2006.

In the meantime, on 2nd May 2006, the first defendant filed a court application, case number HC2427/2006, to amend his plea. It was opposed by the plaintiff on 17 May 2006. The result was that the trial was postponed indefinitely pending the determination of the application.

The first defendant proceeded to file his answering affidavit on 24 May 2006 and his heads of argument on 3 November 2006. The plaintiff filed his heads on 23 November 2006.

I consolidated the opposed application and the trial and set both for 22 May 2007.

At the conclusion of the oral submissions on the interlocutory matter, I granted the amendment and indicated that my reasons for doing so would appear in this judgment.

CASE NO. HC2427/06

The first defendant sought to amend his plea to reflect the averment that Nyamukapa of the Mukonde House had acceded to the chieftainship. The amendment would have the effect of demonstrating that the Mukonde House had acceded to the chieftainship four times and not three times as averred in the plaintiff's declaration.

He averred that he only accessed the documents, which showed that Nyamukapa was a chief, after the pre-trial conference had been held.

He prayed for the grant of the amendment on the basis that it was not driven by bad faith; would not cause injustice to the plaintiff; would not prevent, but, would provide a full inquiry into the disputed issue; and was not excipiable as in Cross v Ferreira 1950 (3) SA 443 (C).

The plaintiff opposed it on the basis that it was driven by bad faith.

The bad faith arose from the admission by the first defendant, at the meeting held on 15 October 2003, that, the Kawoko House had acceded to the chieftainship four times while the other two Houses had done so three times apiece, respectively.

It also arose from the fact that on 28 January 2005, the Kawoko House produced a document from the National Archives which indicated that Nyamukapa had been a chief. He therefore contended that the amendments were prejudicial to him and prayed for their dismissal with costs.

Order 20 Rule 132 and 135(3) of the Rules of Court gives this Court a wide discretion to allow amendments at any stage of the proceedings for the purpose of determining the real controversy between the parties.

See also The Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa, 3rd edition by HERBSTEIN and Van WINSEN…,; Moolman v Estate Moolman and Another 1927 CPD 27; Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101…,; Angelique Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd v Albco (Pvt) Ltd 1990 (1) ZLR 6 (H)…,: and Copper Trading Co. (Pvt) Ltd v City of Bulawayo 1997 (1) ZLR 134 (S)…,.

I was satisfied that the amendments were not driven by bad faith;

(i) Firstly, because in his plea the defendant had disputed the number of turns that the plaintiff averred his House had acceded to the throne; and

(ii) Secondly, the first issue referred to trial also sought a determination of the number of turns that each House had had on the throne.

While the first defendant was at the meeting of 15 October 2003, he was absent at the meeting of 28 January 2005.

In my view, no injustice would be caused to the plaintiff by the amendment, which would provide a platform for a full enquiry into the disputed issue of the number of turns that the Mukonde House acceded to the chieftainship. I saw no prejudice to the plaintiff's case from the amendments sought, especially in the light of the fact that the onus of proof lay on the defendant to show that Nyamukapa was a chief.

THE EVIDENCE

The second and third defendants did not attend trial. On the strength of their counsel's assurances that they would appear, I allowed him to participate in the proceedings up to the close of the first defendant's case. No evidence was adduced on their behalf. The reality of the matter was that the two were in fact in default.

Their fate is however intertwined with that of the first defendant.

The plaintiff did not testify. He called the evidence of Tayengwa Dugmore Muskwe, Farai Joseph Muskwe, Isaac Kavhu Nyamukapa, Tapera Musekiwa, and Dzikaunda Chimbwanda.

The first defendant gave evidence and further called Cry Murowa and Felix Joseph Kandemiri to support his version.

The parties agreed to the production of a 73 page document by the plaintiff as exhibit 1. It incorporated various documents which they relied on in their respective versions.

The plaintiff's version

Tayengwa Dugmore Muskwe (“TD”), born 24 January 1958, is a legal practitioner of this Court. He portrayed himself as the eye of the VaZumba clan. He gave a brief historical account of his clan from its migration from Southern Sudan to Uzumba via Mavuradonha, Mazowe, and Shamva. He stated that the movement from Mavuradonha to Uzumba was necessitated by palace intrigue in the Munhumutapa Empire. Sororo Ziome, the patriarch of the clan, first settled in the Mazowe area but was forced to relocate by the superior spirit medium of the area, Nehanda. He had one son, Nyanhewe, who dislodged Tumbare from the chieftainship of the area in the Chikwira Hills of Uzumba.

Nyanhewe, the first chief of the clan, believed that he would reign forever and thus killed all his male issue. One of them, Nyahuma, survived by the craftiness of his mother who pretended that he was a girl before she ran away with the infant to Kandeya in the Dotito area of Mount Darwin. When he was older, he returned as a wealthy man. He held a feast where he revealed his identity to his father, who, in shame and fear, left his palace and disappeared in the Marowe Hills, where his remains were later found by Nyahuma, who became the second chief of the clan.

In death, Nyanhewe assumed spiritual significance to the VaZumba clan. He became the guardian spirit of the clan and assumed the name Bvukufpuku or Bvukura. He arrogated to himself the right to select his successors in title. Murderers, wizards, and those who indulged in black magic and other offences against the community were disqualified from acceding to the throne. His successors traced their lineage from the three eligible sons of Nyahuma. These were the eldest Mukonde, the middle Kawoko and the youngest Chikuwe. There was another son, who was younger than Mukonde but older than Kawoko, who was called Kanodzirasa - the Bambo of the Madzimbahwe. He was disinherited and relegated the menial function of chief caterer to his brothers at court. The derogatory title of Nyambudzi became his alias and that of all his male descendants in perpetuity.

He stated that the above history of his clan emerged from the deliberations and research that was conducted by a committee set for the purpose during the legal battle that the clan fought with the Hombiros in 1990, which culminated in the case of Amon Gadaga Chipfuyamiti v Phineas Bere Nyajina and Another HH175-92.

The plaintiff's house, Mukonde, was represented by Noah Denhere Muskwe, born 21 September 1894, who was the eldest at the time, Muyati Eliah Muskwe, whom he claimed was the most educated of his peers having done secondary education in the 1940s, Denford Muskwe, and the witness.

The Kawoko House, from which the first defendant comes from, was represented by the first defendant's father, Wilton Nyajina, Marongo Nyajina, who was an uncle to Wilton, headman David Nyajina, and the first defendant.

Lastly, the Chikuwe House was represented by Lazarus Manyika, who, at one time, acted as a chief for 4 years when his father was ill and Mutarimanja Jemwa, who was the eldest person in that house at the time.

The committee relied on Government papers on file at the Ministry of Local Government, National Housing and Urban Development; papers from the National Archives; and oral history.

The first white man to record the history of the clan was the first Native Commissioner for the area, William Edwards. He testified that Kanodzirasa was dis-inherited because he took the meat of the Guardian Spirit, and was, together with his descendants, forever banned from partaking in chieftainship deliberations and discussions.

He relied on the genealogy chart that he alleged was produced by the Committee to set out the chiefs who reined from Sororo Ziome to the last incumbent, Bere. He alleged that Mukonde predeceased his father and so could not become chief. Kanodzirasa had been disinherited, so he was superseded by Kawoko, the third chief of the clan. Kawoko was succeeded by his younger brother Chikuwe, the fourth chief. The throne jumped the Mukonde House and went back to Kawoko's Nyajina, the fifth chief, who was succeeded by Chikuwe's Manyika, the sixth chief. Manyika was succeeded by Muskwewebga, the seventh chief, who was succeeded by his brother Chikoso as the eighth chief. Muskwe and Chikoso were both from the Mukonde House. Chikoso was succeeded by Kanemadadu, the ninth chief, of the Kawoko house. When Kanemadadu died, his son Dyora took over in terms of the VaZumba tradition as an acting chief. The white man then colonized the area and Dyora clung to the throne, which should have gone back to the Mukonde House, as the tenth chief. When Dyora died he was succeeded by Kapita, the eleventh chief, of the Chikuwe House. The chieftainship should have devolved to the Mukonde House.

The witness averred that Kapita was not eligible to ascend to the throne because he belonged to a sub-house of the Shava nematombo totem of the Chimbwandas, who were ritual friends of the Chikuwe House.

On his death, the throne passed to Bere, the twelfth chief, of the Mukonde House. He stated that it should remain in that house and should not devolve to the Kawoko House.

It is interesting to note that he firmly believes that after Kanemadadu, the throne should have gone back to the Mukonde House. It is a chorus he repeated after the death of each succeeding chief. He based this chorus on two principles which he alleged found the core basis of the traditions, customs, and values of the VaZumba clan. He put them as follows:

“Our chieftainship is based on collateral succession in order of seniority and equal number of turns.”

He alleged that collateral succession forms the lynchpin of the clan's tradition. When a chief dies, his successor, if he has surviving younger brothers, devolves to these on the basis of seniority. Only after all have assumed the throne does it move to the eldest male issue of the eldest brother. It then moves laterally across the subsequent generations. Each eligible house must accede to the throne in turn. All things being equal, the number of turns should be equal.

He averred that until Muskwe became chief, the Mukonde House had missed the throne for 136 years. Even at that time, the Guardian Spirit realized the iniquity of this and decided to provide the Mukonde House with two chiefs in a row. After Chikoso, each house had had two turns on the throne. An equal number had been achieved. Dyora came onto the scene and spoiled the broth.

He reasoned that an objective analysis of these facts, from antiquity, demonstrate that succession is collateral and is based on seniority and on an equal number of turns. He pointed out that the number of turns is an important consideration as shown by the attempts by the first defendant's house to reduce the turns of their house by the ridiculous suggestion that Nyajina and Kanemadadu were one person in the meeting of 15 October 2003, which suggestion was only dropped after Dyora's son, David Nyajina, pointed out that the two were separate individuals.

He also averred that the use of CJKL's document of 20 May 1965, on page 10 of exhibit 1, which was touted as a recent discovery, to the extent that it attempted to show that Nyamukapa was a chief, also confirms the traditional significance of the number of turns in the quest for the throne by any of the three eligible Houses.

He tore the document apart.

It provided, contrary to known folklore and written history, that, Ziome had two sons Nyahuma and Nyakushama, and that Chikuwe was the son of Nyakushama. It stated that Mukonde was part of the Magadu family and that Chikuwe ascended to the throne before his elder brother Kawoko. The Magadu family is given as originating from Kamutimbikwa, who, in reality, was an illegitimate son of Dyora's sister.

The document desecrates the traditions of the VaZumba as it seeks to give matrilineal eligibility to the throne. Further, it portrays Kanodzirasa and Nyambudzi as two separate persons. It further suggests that Chikoso became chief before his predecessor Muskwe.

To the extent that the document was in conflict with accepted wisdom, it was clearly unreliable.

He testified that Nyamukapa was never a chief. He suggested that he was a contemporary of Dyora who was chief in Uzumba at the time that Chinyerere was chief in Pfungwe and Chirinda in Maramba. He found support in the second and third defendant's plea that the Mukonde House had 3 turns, Kawoko 4 and Chikuwe 3. He alleged that all the VaZumba chiefs were buried in Marowe Hills while the grave of Nyamukapa was known to be in a different hill called Denje.

Nyamukapa had a daughter who gave birth to Denga. This Denga would testify as to whether his maternal grandfather was ever a chief.

He further challenged PLOWDEN's 1965 paper, on page 16 of exhibit 1 and stated that Nyamukapa should not be confused with his later day grandson who bore the same name but also used the name Makwembere who was a headman in 1965.

He also relied on a meeting that was chaired by Munakira, an assistant Provincial Administrator for Mashonaland East, on 28 January 2005, at which it was agreed that the Mukonde and Chikuwe houses had 3 turns each while the Kawoko house had 4 turns. Munakira had requested the Mukonde and Kawoko houses to deliberate and choose the eligible house between them. This was in line with their tradition for the eligible Houses to choose the house from which the chief would emerge without consulting the guardian spirit, which he averred had last manifested in the 1890s.

There was a general belief that the one that died during Kapita's rein in 1945 was an impostor.

The houses agreed to dispense with the role of the Guardian Spirit, which was merely to vet a candidate of good character.

He was surprised that when the last meeting was convened, on 18 June 2005, this official position was abandoned and the whole issue was revisited.

At this meeting, the Mukonde House laid claim to the throne but the second defendant selected the Kawoko House.

He stated that the manner in which that meeting was conducted desecrated the VaZumba customs and traditions:

(i) The first desecration was that the Kanodzirasa House, represented by Zungunde and Farisi, was permitted to contribute to the discussion.

(ii) The second was that the second defendant abandoned the principle of the equality of turns and stated that this was not a consideration in Buhera where he came from. He even boasted that even if he did not follow the VaZumba tradition, the Attorney-General would defend him in any suit launched by the Mukonde House.

(iii) Thirdly, after an hour of deliberations, the second defendant adjourned the meeting in preparation of choosing the eligible house. He went and conferred, in private, with acting chief Chirinda, a stranger, acting chief Nyajina a biased member of the Mukonde House, acting headman Nyajina, and headman Magadu, of the Kawoko House, and left out headman Muskwe.

The second defendant also took irrelevant issues into consideration, falsely labelling the Mukonde House as an MDC sympathizer.

It appeared to him that the Mukonde House was jumped because it boasts of the most educated persons in the clan.

He was adamant that the genealogy on page 8 of exhibit 1 was a correct reflection of the family tree of the clan. It was compiled by eminent oral historians of the clan from the three eligible houses.

It was handed, by Joseph Kandemiri, DB Muskwe, Eliah Muskwe, Lazarus Chikuwe Manyika, and the first defendant, to the former District Administrator of Uzumba, Gwizo, in 2001, though it bears a 2003 date stamp. This was before there was any contemplation that the Houses would come before this Court in the present dispute.

He was cross-examined at great length.

His father was born in 1919 and died in 2005. His grandfather died in 1922 and was the second son of Maiyagoto whom he alleged was poisoned by Dyora in 1893. He gave the source of the history that he related as Noah Denhere Muskwe who was on born 1 September 1894 and died in 2002 and Lazarus Manyika who died in 1989 who were both born during Dyora's reign.

He maintained that the genealogy on page 8 of exhibit 1 was written by the committee appointed to record the clan history. It was handed to Gwizo and his deputy Mlambo. There was no need, at the time, for any minutes or signatures to verify its adoption.

He knew of two versions on the Kanodzirasa disinheritance.

The first version was that he volunteered to be the meat sharer while the second was that he tampered with meat meant for the guardian spirit.

He was not the eldest of Nyahuma's sons. He did not make war with Chikuwe for the throne after the death of Nyahuma as Kawoko ascended to the throne as the older of the two.

He accepted that the Kanodzirasa house chaired the meeting of 16 August and confirmed the minutes on 15 October 2003. He alleged that this happened because he was not present. He objected to their presence on 16 November 2003 and Gwizo removed them. He suggested that their presence was an exception which did not make the rule just as one sparrow does not make a summer.

He knew that collateral meant side by side, that is, from brother to brother as opposed to from father to son. Seniority was based on birth right.

He suggested that this was at play in the choice of the first defendant.

Even though he was younger than some members of his house, who were in their 80s, he was chosen because he was from the Kamukanya sub-house which was senior to the Mutanda sub-house. The older ones were traditionally disqualified because of their mothers' status.

In his own house, Bere, who descended from a younger sub house assumed the throne ahead of the elder Maiyagoto subhouse because there were no older sons in the elder houses who were Bere's contemporaries.

He denied that he appointed himself as the eye of the clan.

He accepted that the genealogy on page 8 did not show any acting chiefs before Dyora although it was their custom for a son to act for a year after the death of his father, the chief.

He denied that the letter of 10 April 2003 and the minutes of 28 February and 22 May 2003 that were written by the Maiyagoto sub-house to the District Administrator depicted a power hungry house.

He denied that his sub-house was positioning itself for succession and declaring its right as the elder house to chair the meetings as it had done in the past.

It was apparent, from the minutes of 16 August and 15 October 2003, that, the eligible houses unanimously abandoned the involvement of the Guardian Spirit in the selection of a chief. The collective modern mind of the representatives of the houses could no longer trust the impartiality of the human agents of the Guardian Spirit.

He maintained, by reference to the visit to the spirit medium Nyashawa on 1 June 1971 on page 57-60 as confirmed by RC PLOWDEN on 11 November 1982, in paragraph 5 of page 15 that the role of the Guardian Spirit was to vet the candidate identified by the eligible house.

Farai Gilbert Muskwe was born on 15 May 1939. He testified, that, in the event of the death of a chief, the most senior house calls a meeting of the three eligible houses of Mukonde, Nyajina and Chikuwe. The fourth house, of Nyambudzi, is involved to the extent that it slaughters the goats and serves food consumed at the meetings.

A series of meetings were held to select a chief after the death of Bere. He alleged that the Nyambudzi house attended one meeting. It was chaired by Zungunde and Kandemiri. An objection over their presence was raised but it was not minuted in the meeting of 16 August 2003. These two attended the meeting of 15 October 2003 but not of 28 January 2005 and were present on 18 June 2005.

He said Nyamukapa was not a chief. He was buried in Denje Mountain and not in Marowe Mountain where chiefs are buried.

He averred that a spirit medium did not choose a chief. People in the eligible house sat and selected a candidate who was then vetted by the spirit medium.

He averred that their tradition accepts collateral succession based on seniority and equal number of turns.

Under cross examination, he stated that tradition arrogated to the Mukonde House the duty to call such meetings. To his knowledge TD Muskwe was just a son of the clan. He did not regard him as the eye of the clan. He alleged that TD was mandated by Eliah and Denhere Noah Muskwe of the Mukonde House to record the clan history.

He attended the meeting chaired by the Nyambudzi two. He objected but was overruled by the eldest Mukonde at the time, David Dombodzvuku Muskwe. He averred, by reference to the meeting of 15 October, that, Nyambudzi could attend and contribute at the meetings but could not chair.

He remained adamant that succession was collateral and was based on seniority and equality of turns.

Isaki Kavhu Nyamukapa was born in 1930. His father was Nyamukapa's second son.

He stated that his grandfather never assumed the chieftainship. The only Nyamukapa who was once a headman was Makwembere, a cousin to the witness (their fathers are brothers). Their grandfather was buried in Denje Mountain and not in Marowe where all chiefs of the clan are buried.

On the appointment of chiefs, he stated that the house whose turn it was to accede to the chieftainship would select a candidate and take him to the spirit medium for vetting. He stated that the houses would have an equal number of turns. He was not able to provide a solution where one house had more turns than the others.

He knew the Nyambudzi sub-house, which is called Madzibaba, was responsible for slaughtering goats and serving food consumed during the deliberations of the eligible houses. He did not know the effect of their attendance on the discussions.

Under cross-examination, he stated that he only saw two chiefs, Kapita and Bere. His father told him there were three chiefs from the Mukonde House. These were Muskwe, Chikoso, and Bere. He maintained “madzoro” turns were a sign of equality.

He maintained that it was proper for a member of the Mukonde House to accede to the chieftainship for the equality of turns to be achieved as it was the senior house.

In his view, thereafter, a member of the Chikuwe House would succeed to the chieftainship for equality of turns to be achieved.

He could not say why this was not done when Kanemadadu became chief.

He spoke of “doo”(hide in which a chief is wrapped in for burial) and “tsika” (fire-friction sticks). The latter was given during the installation of a chief to the house of his successor.

Tapera Musekiwa was born 1922. His paternal grandmother, Gumbate, was Nyamukapa's daughter.

He was adamant that Nyamukapa did not ascend to the throne. He is buried in Denje as opposed to Marowe. He has been to the grave to check on its upkeep.

Under cross examination, he maintained his version and logically asserted that his grandmother would have known had her father been chief.

Dzikaunda Chimbwanda is the man tasked with the burial of chiefs in the clan, interchangeably called the Chikari or Nechombo.

He took the job from his grandfather. He refused to bury Kapita because he did not supply two beasts for the funeral of the witness' grandfather. Kapita was buried by his own nephews (vazukuru), children of Sori. He buried Bere. He confirmed that all the clan's chiefs are buried in Marowe, without exception. He did not know about Nyamukapa. He was not versed in the method used to rotate chieftainship from one house to the other but he knew that they took turns (majana/madzoro). The eligible house chose their candidate.

He knew the Nyambudzi as the father figure who were food caterers and who did not ascend to the throne. He did not know if they were permitted to participate in the regal discussions.

On the basis of the equality of turns, he believed that the next chief should be from the Mukonde House.

Under cross-examination, his national identity card gave his date of birth as 13 August 1920.

He knew of the graves of the last three chiefs only. They are not marked. The chieftain families did not go to Marowe Hill.

He believed that in line with “majana”, Dyora took over from a member of the Mukonde House. He believed that after Bere it should go to the Kawoko House.

The first “doo” was done wrongly and Magadu, who supplied the first, provided the second one, which the witness approved.

The first defendant's version

The first defendant testified. He was born on 2 June 1954. He is the son of Muchabaiwa Nyajina the son of Bopoto Nyajina the son of Kamukanya the son of Kanemadadu. Kamukanya was the elder brother to Dyora.

At first, he stated that after Bere died, the VaZumba sat down to determine which House was entitled to assume the throne and unanimously agreed that it was the turn of the Kawoko House.

He was wrong on this aspect as there was never unanimity amongst the eligible Houses.

The Kawoko House deliberated over the issue. Kanemadadu had three sons; that is, Kamukanya, Dyora and Mutanda. Dyora had assumed the chieftainship ahead of his elder brother. It was decided, by the Kawoko House, that, the throne should go to the descendants of Kamukanya ahead of Mutanda as Kamukanya was the older of the two. The Kamukanya descendants chose the witness.

He could not explain why Dyora superseded Kamukanya save to state that, at the time, the mhondoro appointed whomsoever it pleased to be chief without regard to age or seniority.

At least in the Kawoko House, they agreed that seniority entitled Kamukanya over Mutanda.

The fact that Kawoko decided to follow seniority seems to my mind to suggest that seniority is part of the VaZumba tradition in selecting chiefs.

He was asked to comment on page 9, an unsigned document produced by the plaintiff in exhibit 1, which is written in Shona, which shows the chiefs who reigned since the inception of the clan from Nyanhewe to the last substantive incumbent, Bere. It sought to portray that Nyanhewe ruled from 1589.

TD Muskwe was at pains to explain how he estimated this year on the probability matrix based on the average number of years of Dyora, Kapita, and Bere. He gave each chief a period of 34 years. The witness attacked the formula and thus the document on five (5) grounds:

(i) Firstly, the document, to his mind, did not state who had commissioned and compiled it and the source of the contents therein;

(ii) Secondly, it started in 1589, a period during which the clan was not able to write;

(iii) Thirdly, it does not provide for the acting chiefs who ruled between chiefs as known in custom, that, after the death of a chief, and before the appointment of another, a caretaker acting chief is appointed;

(iv) Fourthly, the recorded history provided by the white man showed that Dyora ruled for 33 years, Kapita for 37 years, and Bere for 29 years. He supposed that the earlier chiefs must have ascended to the throne at different ages, that is, some when young, others in their middle ages, and yet others in old age. It therefore did not make sense to attempt to give a uniform duration of chieftainships; and

(v) Fifthly, he disputed that the Mukonde House had had 3 turns of the chieftainship in the history of the clan. He denied that the chieftainship was based on seniority on the basis that though Mukonde was eldest, his descendants tasted the throne for the first time in chief number 7. It had rotated between Kawoko and Chikuwe's descendants. To his knowledge, Mukonde and Kawoko had 4 turns each while Chikuwe had 3 turns.

The spirit mediums who were responsible for appointing chiefs in the past could appoint young children who then were assisted by regents.

He did not point out which of the chiefs had been assisted by regents.

He was asked to relate the traditions, customs, and norms of the VaZumba.

He stated that Nyanhewe was the first chief. He was succeeded by Nyahuma. Nyahuma had four sons, that is, Nyambudzi, also known as Kanodzirasa, Mukonde, Kawoko and Chikuwe. When Nyahuma was about to die, or was dead, Chikuwe, the last son, was appointed chief. This angered Nyambudzi who stabbed his younger brother to death. Members of the Chikuwe House then fled from Uzumba. Nyambudzi did not assume the throne but was disqualified in person and through him all his descendants were barred from acceding to the throne in perpetuity.

The first tradition was that the chieftainship rotated among the three houses of Mukonde, Kawoko and Chikuwe. The mhondoro in charge was the re-incarnation of Nyanhewe called Bvukura. It provided two fire-making sticks “tsika” to the House that would be the next in line to accede to the throne. The “tsika” was not given to the ruling chief or his House but to the House of his successor. When the chief died, the House with the “tsika” was obliged to supply the beast that was slaughtered and whose hide “doo” was used to inter the chief in. The House was also responsible for choosing the site of the grave of the dead chief.

The last chief who was appointed by Bvukura was Kapita. Bere was appointed by Bvukura's nephew (paternal sons born of Nyanhewe's sister) Nyashawa of the Bushu clan. Thereafter, the two spirit mediums disappeared and the VaZumba agreed, that, in their absence, they would select their chief-designate from amongst themselves on their own following the rotational system.

He was asked to comment on page 8 of exhibit 1. This is the genealogy of the male issue of Nyanhewe to 3 November 2001. It indicates that it was compiled by Batsirai Denford Muskwe from information supplied by Denhere Noah Muskwe; Muyati Eliah Muskwe; Douglas M. Nyajina; and the Manyika family.

It was revised at the Chief's Hall- Muskwe in Uzumba on 3 November 2001.

In his view, it did not show that the issue of seniority was part of the VaZumba tradition.

He said in the Kawoko House, Dyora took over the chieftainship over his elder brother Kamukanya. In the Chikuwe House, Manyika acceded to the throne ahead of his elder brother Chiwara.

He did not explain why he believed that the two elder brothers were still alive.

When the throne returned to the Chikuwe House, Kapita of the Katsande sub house superseded his contemporaries Manjera and Mutarimanja the sons of Chidyamatiyo who was Katsande's elder brother. He superseded the descendants of Chiwara the son of Chikuwe and the elder brother of Manyika (the 6th chief).

In the Mukonde House itself, the genealogy chart showed that Bere was the son of Nyajambwa. Nyajambwa was the youngest of Muskwewebga's sons Maiyagoto and Nyamukapa. Bere superseded his contemporaries who were descendants of his two elder brothers.

He disputed that the absence, through death, of his contemporaries from his elder brothers' descendants meant that Bere had to be nominated because he was the eldest survivor of his generation. He maintained that age did not matter at all as long as the House had male issue.

He stated that oral history passed down to him had it that Nyamukapa was a chief.

He went to the District Administrator's office at Mutawatawa and was given page 16 of exhibit 1. It is the genealogy of the VaZumba chiefs compiled from Head Office records by R.C. PLOWDEN in Harare on 11 November 1982.

PLOWDEN further recorded that “it may not be accurate” - Nyamukapa is shown as the 10th chief....,.

It seems to me, that, after the amendment by the first defendant of his plea, I am obliged to determine the number of turns that each House has acceded to the throne.

It was common cause that the Chikuwe House has had three turns on the throne while the Kawoko House, to which the first defendant belongs, has had four turns. The dispute on turns centers on the number that has been enjoyed by the Mukonde House to which the plaintiff belongs.

The plaintiff stated that his House has provided three chiefs to the clan. These were chief number 7, Muskwewebga; chief number 8, Chikoso, and Chief number 12, Bere. The first defendant averred that it, in addition, provided chief number 10, Nyamukapa.

The onus lies on the first defendant to show that Nyamukapa was a chief.

He relied on the documents on page 10 and 16 of exhibit 1, which he retrieved from the National Archives and the Mutawatawa District Administrator's office. It is in these documents that Nyamukapa is depicted as having acceded to the throne as chief number 10 after Kanemadadu but before Dyora.

The first defendant was prepared to relegate his House's oral history to the primacy of the two documents.

The earlier document was written by CJKL on 20 May 1965. The writer gave a disclaimer on the accuracy of the genealogy chart that the first defendant relied on.

He wrote that he relied on data available in the field as there were no existing records in the District Commissioner's office. He did not name his sources in the field.

He referred to the incumbent chief, Kapita, in passing by averring that the chief claimed that the tribe was spewed out of a crater in the Chavazumba Hill. He did not state that he was provided with the history and genealogy that he wrote by the chief.

The second document was prepared by Plowden, on 11 November 1982, from Head Office records. He also placed a disclaimer on its accuracy. He did not disclose the source documents he reviewed at Head Office.

I am not able to draw the inference that the two authors obtained their information from the incumbent chiefs because of the agreement between the first defendant, given half-heartedly, and the plaintiff, that, the genealogy charts were a gross distortion of the accepted oral history of the clan....,.

The first defendant accepted that these documents were at variance with the oral history that had been passed on to him by his father and other elders in his family. His witness, Cry Murowa, also accepted that the two documents that were produced by the white men were inaccurate.

It seems to me that both Kapita and Bere, being repositories of their clan's history, would not have distorted it in the manner suggested in the two documents.

Indeed, the first defendant stated that even his own father, who passed away in 2005, never told him that Nyamukapa was a chief....,.

The first defendant and his two witnesses relied on the documents produced by CJKL and Plowden which he knew contained serious distortions of his clan's history....,.

In the end, he grudgingly accepted that Nyamukapa was not a chief of the VaZumba people. This admission proved the reliability of Farai Muskwe, Isaki Nyamukapa and Tapera Musekiwa's evidence on the point....,.

The first defendant's demeanor, as he dealt with the obvious conflict between the documents and his oral history, painted him as a devious and unreliable witness who sought to capitalize on information he knew was false.

HH141-09 : OLIVER CHIBAGE vs KUDZAI SIBUSISO NDAWANA
Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

The plaintiff is a Commissioner in the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The defendant, a duly qualified dental surgeon, was, at the material time, also a member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. She practiced her dentistry at the Police Camp Hospital and also at her surgery in town. In June 2007, the plaintiff consulted the defendant complaining of sensitivity to ...

In June 2007, the plaintiff consulted the defendant complaining of sensitivity to his teeth. She examined him at the police hospital and later invited him to her surgery where she carried out some work on him. The work entailed extracting a tooth that was embedded in his gum. The extraction was not successful and she referred him to Professor Chidzonga, a specialist in the field, who finally extracted the tooth and also found out that, in the process, the plaintiff had suffered a fractured jaw. When the plaintiff's superiors visited him at his house, a decision was made that he be flown to South Africa for further management and treatment. He was duly attended to in South Africa and the fracture was reduced.

On 24 January 2008 the plaintiff issued summons out of this court against the defendant. He alleged that she had been negligent and had caused the fracture in his jaw. He claimed against her the sums of R10,000= for pain and suffering, R10,000= for loss of comfort and R78,000= as special damages.

The suit was defended.

In her plea, the defendant denied that she was negligent as alleged or at all. She further denied knowledge of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, and, in particular, that she fractured his jaw and suggested that this occurred at Professor Chidzonga's surgery where the tooth was extracted.

At the pre-trial conference of this matter, the parties settled the issues for trial as follows:

1. Whether or not the defendant undertook to perform surgery on the plaintiff with such professional skill as is reasonable for a qualified dentist?

2. Whether or not the defendant carried out the surgery on the plaintiff negligently as alleged by the plaintiff?

3. Whether or not the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the defendant's negligence, and, if so, the quantum thereof.

At the trial of the matter, the plaintiff gave evidence. His evidence was as follows.

In early 2007, he visited the Police Camp Hospital. He was complaining of sensitivity in his teeth. He sought professional assistance from the defendant. She advised him that he required a dental cleaning session and that she needed to examine the exposed roots of his teeth. On the first visit, she applied some medication to his gums. She did not have adequate equipment at the hospital and could offer him treatment at her surgery. He accepted the offer. A week later he visited her surgery and she requested him to have an x-ray. A week later she called him and advised him that she had discovered a buried molar on the right side of his mouth. The tooth had to be extracted. On 26 June, he attended at her surgery for the tooth to be extracted. After taking him through the process, the defendant attempted to extract the tooth using a variety of tools. After some time he grew tired and was also in pain. She advised him that she had almost exposed the tooth. He then felt a sharp pain and told her to stop. He had been on her chair for two and a half hours. She advised him that he now required theater and she would refer him to Professor Chidzonga. She telephoned Professor Chidzonga's surgery and explained to them what she had already done. She wrote him a letter of referral and he left her surgery. He could feel that his jaw was heavy. It was painful.

At Professor Chidzonga's place he was taken into the consulting room, and, by that time, he could not talk. Professor Chidzonga took a small x-ray of the area. He then extracted the tooth in about 20 minutes. He suspected that the plaintiff had fractured his jaw. He could not develop the xray at that time and allowed the plaintiff to go home on a prescription for a mouth wash, a pain killer, and some antibiotics.

As he was driving home, he sent a message on his mobile phone advising the defendant that he was in terrible pain and was suspected of having fractured his jaw. His mouth was now quite heavy and he had to keep on holding his lower jaw. He was also bleeding profusely.

When he reported back to Professor Chidzonga's rooms the following day, the fracture was confirmed. Professor Chidzonga cleaned his mouth and immobilized the jaw. He placed him on a special diet and prescribed more medication.

The Commissioner-General of police visited him at home. At this time his entire face was swollen. He was incoherent. Arrangements were made for him to be flown to South Africa where he was accompanied by his wife.

In South Africa, the wires that had been used by Professor Chidzonga to immobilize his lower jaw were removed and replaced by bracelets. He was placed on a liquidized diet. On 29 July, he returned to the clinic in South Africa where a few of the bands holding his jaw together were removed. He could open his mouth by a fraction and could now use a spoon to eat porridge and yoghurt. In August, all the bands were removed and he was referred for physiotherapy. Around September, he returned to have all the bracelets removed. He was still on physiotherapy. He had to return for reviews in September and December 2007. In January 2008, he attended the final physiotherapy session here in Zimbabwe.

At the time of testifying, he could not chew hard things with his right hand side. He still felt some numbness in the side which he hoped would go away after some time.

The witness then applied to have affidavits by the three medical practitioners who attended to him in South Africa adduced into evidence. Also adduced were various documents, including air tickets from Harare to Johannesburg and invoices for the services rendered him in South Africa.

The witness gave his evidence well. He is fairly articulate. His responses to questions put to him under cross-examination were forthright. He did not seek to exaggerate. It is my finding that the witness was honest and truthful.

The plaintiff called Professor Median Chidzonga. He holds qualifications in dentistry and is a professor in maxillo-facial, oral and dental surgery. He has specialized in facial surgery and has thirty years experience under his belt. His evidence was as follows.

The plaintiff was referred to him by the defendant who wrote a note to him explaining that he should continue with the removal of a wisdom tooth that she had started working on as the plaintiff was now in severe pain.

After sitting the plaintiff in the chair, he took a radiograph of the site and then proceeded to examine him. He saw a socket where an incision had been made. He attempted to remove the tooth and it was during this process that he noticed that the jaw was not moving in unison. He requested the plaintiff to go for an x ray of the jaw. The following day the plaintiff brought back the x-ray and it showed that there was a fracture passing through the socket where he had removed the tooth. He reduced the fracture by wiring. He also obtained the results of the first radiograph he had taken when the plaintiff first visited him. It also showed that there was a fracture. Based on that radiography, he was of the view that the jaw was fractured before he started working on the plaintiff.

He further testified that it is not normal for jaws to be broken during tooth extractions. It is however possible. The possibility of this happening can be assessed through x-rays of the area taken before the extraction.

He was aware that the plaintiff later sought medical attention in South Africa. He was also aware that what was done in South Africa is similar to what he did on the plaintiff in reducing the fracture. The equipment used in South Africa is not available in this country but the expertise is.

Under cross-examination, the witness testified that the breaking of a jaw during a tooth extraction does not, in itself, denote negligence. Each case must depend on its facts. Even where a practitioner exercised all due care, at times, a jaw could still break.

Regarding the plaintiff's subsequent visit to South Africa to seek medical attention, he was of the view that this was not necessary as he could have attended to the plaintiff himself had the deteriorating condition of the plaintiff been brought to his attention.

The evidence of this witness was of great benefit to the court and great reliance shall be placed upon it in the resolution of the matter. He is an expert in his field and I would have been unable to form some of the conclusions I formed in this matter without his expert opinions.

After the evidence of this witness, the plaintiff closed his case.

The defendant testified. She narrated most of the facts that are common cause in this trial as to how the plaintiff approached her for assistance and what she did up to the time she referred the plaintiff to Professor Chidzonga. Regarding the allegation that she was negligent, her evidence was as follows;

The plaintiff's tooth was a difficult one. She did the best that she could to extract it without resorting to surgery. During the process, the plaintiff did not bleed profusely as he alleges. She however was putting water into his mouth during the process.

She was not aware that she had fractured the plaintiff's jaw during the extraction. Had she known, she would have put it in her referral letter to Professor Chidzonga. She only received a report from Professor Chidzonga who stated that, during the time he was extracting the tooth, he felt an abnormal movement to the jaw. She personally did not feel such movement.

The witness also gave her evidence well. Her evidence was, in the main, common cause with that of the plaintiff up to the time the plaintiff left her surgery. I have no reason to disbelieve her.

The defendant also called one Lewis Chidzambwa. He is a Dentist, holding a degree from a university in Finland. He has ten years experience.

The testimony of this witness was of a very general nature. He gave the court his views on what can cause pain to a patient undergoing tooth extraction, how each case is unique, and how fractures can occur in patients.

I found the evidence of this witness to be educative in a very general way.

After this witness was stood down, the defendant closed her case....,.

The plaintiff alleges that the defendant fractured his jaw during a tooth extraction. He further alleges that the fracturing of the jaw was as a result of negligence on the part of the defendant. Finally, the plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the fracture to his jaw, he suffered the various damages whose heads appear in his summons.

The factual issues that fall for determination in this matter present themselves to me as;

(i) Firstly, whether it was the defendant who fractured the plaintiff's jaw; and

(ii) If so, whether such fracturing was as a result of negligence on her part; and, again

(iii) If so, what damages did the plaintiff suffer?

I now turn to the first issue. It is to determine whether the fracture in the plaintiff's jaw was caused by the defendant.

I do not have any direct evidence in answer to this issue. The x-ray that was taken of the tooth area, after the defendant had referred the plaintiff to Professor Chidzonga, was not produced to show whether or not the jaw was fractured before Professor Chidzonga started working on the plaintiff. What was adduced into evidence was a photocopy of the x-ray which did not show anything. The copy of the x–ray was not accompanied by any report explaining the picture, and, as was correctly stated by Professor Chidzonga in his evidence in chief, the photocopy was not useful at all.

The plaintiff was of the firm belief that he suffered the fracture whilst receiving attention from the defendant. He is of this belief because he felt a sharp pain after an hour of drilling and wedging and he stopped the defendant from further proceeding. When he left the defendant's place, he was now holding his lower jaw. He urges me to infer that the sharp pain marked the point when his jaw fractured.

This is a reasonable belief on the part of the plaintiff but it is not the only reasonable inference that one can draw from the facts.

It is common cause that the plaintiff was under a local anesthetic that was now wearing off. The tooth extraction was causing him a lot of pain. The sharp pain could have been pain from the process which would have otherwise been masked by the anesthetic had it been working.

Professor Chidzonga testified that it was during the process of extracting the tooth that he noticed that the jaw was not moving in unison. He did not notice this during the examination of the plaintiff before he commenced the extraction. He then informed the plaintiff that he suspected a fractured jaw. The fracture was only confirmed the following day from xrays.

As indicated above, it would have made my task easier had the plaintiff produced the original x-ray that was taken prior to Dr Chidzonga commencing work on him. The absence of the x- ray and the evidence by Dr Chidzonga that he only noticed the irregular movement of the jaw during the extraction places me in a position where I cannot confidently hold that the jaw was broken at the defendant's surgery. This is compounded by the fact that neither Professor Chidzonga nor the plaintiff asked for leave to and opportunity to replace the useless photocopy with the original x-ray and no explanation was tendered for this omission.

Further, it was Professor Chidzonga's evidence that the x–ray that he took would only show the tooth and nothing much. He was not asked whether it would show the jaw and the fact that he referred the plaintiff to another facility for a bigger picture that would show the jaw seems to suggest to me that the radiograph that he took did not. In any event, neither the plaintiff nor Professor Chidzonga asked for time and opportunity to have the original radiograph adduced into evidence and no explanation was tendered for this omission.

I am unable to come to a conclusion as to where and when the fracture occurred from the evidence adduced before me. It could have occurred at the defendant's surgery. It could have occurred at Professor's Chidzonga's.

On the one hand, I have the testimony of the plaintiff feeling the sharp pain and the testimony of Professor Chidzonga that when he looked at the radiograph that he had taken in his surgery, he observed a fracture. This evidence seems to suggest that the fracture may have occurred at the defendant's. On the other hand, I have the missing radiography and the testimony of the defendant that she did not notice the irregular movement of the plaintiff's jaw when she was working on his tooth or else she would have included that in her written report to Professor Chidzonga.

Further, I have the testimony of Professor Chidzonga that he only noticed the irregular movement of the plaintiff's jaw when he was in the process of extracting the tooth. I also have his evidence that the x-ray he took in his surgery is of a localized nature, showing the tooth area, hence his request to the plaintiff for him to attend the Avenues Clinic for a bigger picture showing the jaw area as well. The learned professor was not asked on whether the localized x-ray he took would show the jaw area as well and to what extent. In my view, the fact that he referred the plaintiff for a bigger picture tends to suggest his one would not show the fracture to the jaw.

I have no crystal ball to gaze into for an answer to this issue. In my view, the balance of probabilities tilts in favour of no party and remains even to the detriment of the plaintiff who bears an onus to establish the facts that he relies on for his claim.

Assuming that I have erred and there is ample evidence upon which a superior court will find that the defendant did indeed fracture the plaintiff's jaw, I will proceed to give my opinion on the next issue which arises. This is to determine whether the defendant was negligent, as alleged, or at all, assuming she did fracture the plaintiff's jaw.

In his declaration, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent in that she failed to remove the tooth with such skill as is reasonable for a qualified dentist; that she tried to remove the tooth in a way that caused the plaintiff to suffer severe bleeding and unbearable pain; and that she fractured the plaintiff's lower jaw.

In his testimony, the plaintiff confined himself, and correctly so in my view, to narrating the events leading to his visit to Professor Chidzonga's surgery, and, thereafter, to him seeking treatment in South Africa. When asked how the defendant had been negligent, he simply gave his opinion that she must have been unprofessional by failing to extract the tooth in two (2) hours when Professor Chidzonga managed to do so in about 20 minutes.

The difficulty that the plaintiff had in articulating the particulars of the defendant's alleged negligence is, in my view, understandable. He is not a dental surgeon. I understand the plaintiff to have taken the simple approach to this whole matter that because an accident occurred whilst the defendant was in charge, she must have been negligent.

In my view, the particulars of negligence alleged against the defendant can only be validating by making reference to the standard operating procedures of dentists. This is so because to test the negligence of a professional, one has to first establish what an average reasonable professional in the shoes of the defendant would have done. See S v McGowan 1995 (1) ZLR 4 (HC).

The average reasonable professional is not one who is an ace or an expert in his or her field. Thus, the skills exhibited by Professor Chidzonga cannot be used to measure whether or not the defendant was negligent. She may not have been as adept at extracting teeth as the professor was. This, however, does not automatically translate into negligence on her part. An average professional is not one who is so careful that he or she will weigh each and every risk attendant upon the task at hand and advise the client of all such risks before proceeding. He or she will weigh the obvious risks and advise the client of the same.

In casu, it was Professor Chidzonga's testimony that the likelihood of a fracture during a tooth extraction can sometimes show in an x-ray taken before the extraction. It is not in dispute that the defendant caused an x ray of the plaintiff's mouth to be taken before she started working on him. It was not suggested that this x-ray showed that possibility of the plaintiff fracturing his jaw, and, notwithstanding clear evidence of this likelihood, the defendant proceeded with the extraction without taking any steps to guard against the occurrence.

It further appears to me that the reasonable professional is one who will bring their training to bear on the task at hand to assess the attendant risks and proceed with alertness. He or she has a certain degree of confidence in their capacity and skill that allows them to proceed without undue timidity and is, to a large extent, a practical person who wishes to achieve a specified result.

As I have indicated above, to establish what a reasonable dentist would have done in the circumstances of this matter, the evidence of the plaintiff was not material. It would only have been material in showing what the defendant actually did. The evidence of another dentist was imperative to set the standards that are average in the profession and against which the conduct of the defendant would have been measured to show the deviation relied upon to form a cause of action in delict.

The evidence of Professor Chidzonga, called by the plaintiff, did not sufficiently set out the average professional standards expected of a dentist extracting a tooth. His evidence was also largely narrative of the steps he took to extract the tooth after the defendant referred the plaintiff to him. He did not testify that what the defendant had done prior to her referring the plaintiff to his surgery was negligent. He was not examined on this aspect of the matter. The only portion of his evidence-in-chief that I regard as relevant on this issue is when the professor testified that it is not normal that a jaw will fracture during a tooth extraction.

He qualified that by testifying that the possibility of a fracture can be assessed by taking an x- ray before the extraction.

As stated above, the defendant did cause an x-ray to be taken before she discovered the embedded tooth. The x-ray so taken was not adduced into evidence.

HH174-10 : SAMSON MARTIN MEKI vs VHURAMAYI VHUSHANGWE and OTHERS
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

The plaintiff issued summons on 23 July 2007 claiming the following relief:

“(a) An order declaring that the only families entitled to the Mapanzure chieftainship are the following families:

1. Chimbuya.

2. Magwirokona.

3. Mavhengere.

4. Bwangundoga.

5. Mupandasekwa.

6. Gwenhamo.

7. Shumbayaonda.

(b) An order declaring that according to customary principles of succession to the Mapanzure chieftainship, the 1st defendant, a descendent of the Rushangwe/Vusangwe family, has no title or claim to the Mapanzure chieftainship;

(c) An order removing the 1st defendant from his position as Chief Mapanzure;

(d) An order declaring the 8th to the 10th defendants (the District Administrator, the Provincial Administrator, and the Minister of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing respectively) acted contrary to custom when they recommended the appointment of 1st defendant as Chief Mapanzure; and

(e) An order of costs against any of the defendants who may oppose this application.”

On 12 October 2009, the plaintiff amended his prayer by the deletion of the first three claims.

Therefore, the only main issue for determination is whether or not the recommendation for the appointment of the current chief, the first defendant, was in compliance with the customs of the Mapanzure people.

The action was only defended by the first defendant.

The History of the Mapanzure Chieftainship

The plaintiff produced, as part of his exhibits, a copy of an extract of a report prepared on the chieftainship in 1965. It is not clear who the author of the report was.

The first defendant produced a copy of minutes of a meeting held in the District Commissioner's office on 5 December 1973. The then District Commissioner, who chaired the meeting, was one W.E.J. Henson. Present at the meeting from the Mapanzure people were Mangwande from the Chihava House, Mutubuki and Tafunda from the Chatikobo House, Mbombe from the Mutukwa House, Rawasindadi from the Zingoni House, Manyoka (Acting Chief) and Mazorodze from the Gwenhamo House.

Both documents contain the genealogy of the Mapanzure chieftainship.

The parties were in agreement that the genealogy reflected the chieftainship. They both relied extensively on the documents in support of their respective positions....,.

The plaintiff's evidence, that there were only seven royal houses, is also not supported in the 1965 report that he produced as an exhibit. At p17 of Exhibit I, it is stated that:

“The order of birth of Mazorodze's sons, as given here, is probably not 100 percent accurate; Sister Aquina, in her article 'The Tribes in Victoria Reserve' (NADA 1965) records: Eight out of the twenty sons of Mazorodze…, became chiefs. This implies that there were twenty sons of Mazorodze. As can be seen from the genealogy given here, I have now established there were no less than 30 sons and probably more…,.”

It therefore follows, that, in 1965, when Sister Aquina did her own research, eight and not seven of Mazorodze's sons had become chiefs.

HH324-13 : DOMINION TRADING FZ-LLC vs VICTORIA FOODS (PVT) LIMITED
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

Counsel for the respondent further sought the exclusion of annexures attached to the applicant's answering affidavit, running into 110 pages, being a Pre-acquisition Due Diligence report dated 26 March 2012 prepared by Ernst and Young, but is referred to as the audited accounts of the respondent on the papers, and a Business Valuation report dated 16 ...

Regarding the annexures to the answering affidavit, counsel for the respondent's gripe with them was twofold, namely, that the authors of the reports made it clear that they were not to be used in this court and that they are misleadingly referred to in the answering affidavit as the audited accounts of the respondent when they are demonstrably not.

In respect of the “Pre-acquisition Due Diligence Report” prepared by Ernst and Young, dated 26 March 2012, the erstwhile auditors added an endorsement on the face of that draft report that “Reliance Restricted”. Ernst and Young went on to qualify their report in the following:

“This draft report was prepared on the specific instructions of the directors of Holbud Limited (”Holbud”) solely for the purpose of assisting them in connection with the proposed acquisition of an equity stake in Victoria Foods and should not be relied upon for any other purpose. For the reason that others may seek to use it for different purposes, this report should not be quoted, referred to or shown to any other parties unless so required by court order or regulatory authority, without our prior consent in writing.”

They went on to say:

“This report is based on a limited review of Victoria Foods and may not capture certain aspects that a full scale commercial due diligence investigation would reveal.”

The valuation report of the respondent by Banc ABC contains similar qualifications which counsel for the applicant argued is standard procedure in the preparation of financial reports of that nature.

In my view, the objection to the production of the two reports made on behalf of the respondent cannot sustain an exclusion of the reports in question. To my mind, the qualifications I have alluded to above speak to their evidentiary value, what reliance can be placed on them in determining the dispute between the parties, and whether they sit in a higher pedestal than the financial record relied upon by the respondent.

I am only prepared to go that far and look at them in that light and not to exclude them from the record as the applicant is entitled to rely on whatever evidence it has at its disposal in seeking to persuade the court to grant the relief that it seeks.

SC03-21 : AFRITRADE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: PATEL JA, BHUNU JA and BERE JA

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Fiscal Appeal Court dismissing an appeal against the determination of the respondent requiring the appellant to pay value added tax (VAT) on the importation of certain goods into Zimbabwe.BackgroundThe appellant is a foreign company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and ...

Background

The appellant is a foreign company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands and operating from Guernsey in the Channel Islands. The respondent is a body corporate responsible for the collection of VAT and other imposts in Zimbabwe.

The appellant was a supplier of basic commodities to local companies, including the West Group of Companies (West Group). In 1992, it concluded an agency agreement with Douglas and Tate (Pvt) Ltd (Douglas & Tate), a subsidiary of West Group. By 1999, it was supplying basic commodities to West Group and other local customers under a US$10 million line of credit registered with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (the RBZ).

On 1 October 2007, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) unveiled the Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI), a facility designed to end the chronic shortages of basic commodities in Zimbabwe. After negotiations between the appellant and the RBZ, the latter purchased certain non-BACOSSI goods, valued at US$7,987,207=54, that were in the Douglas & Tate warehouse. The appellant also supplied BACOSSI goods, valued at US$11,698,174, to the RBZ in 2008.

After conducting investigations, the respondent raised taxation schedules against the appellant for outstanding value added tax (VAT), on both BACOSSI and non-BACOSSI transactions, initially on 17 March 2009 and later on 15 July 2009. The total charge raised was US$6,302,712=13, inclusive of interest and penalties. This was subsequently corrected, on 13 October 2009, by reducing the charge to US$6,249,496=70.

The appellant lodged an objection to the assessment on 25 September 2009. It also applied for condonation for the late filing of the objection.

The respondent dismissed the application for condonation and disallowed the objection.

The appellant appealed against both decisions to the Fiscal Appeal Court on 12 October 2009. The respondent filed its reply on 12 November 2009. At a pre-trial hearing on 17 September 2014, the delay by the appellant in filing its Notice of Objection as well as the failure by the respondent to file its documents timeously were both condoned by consent.

Judgment of the Fiscal Appeal Court

At the hearing of the matter, the appellant called the evidence of one Kenneth Sharpe, who was the founder and Chairman of West Group and a director of Douglas & Tate.

He confirmed the foreign status of the appellant. His evidence was that West Group, Douglas & Tate, and the appellant were not related companies.

The court a quo found that he was not a credible or reliable witness. This was because he contradicted material parts of his evidence-in-chief under cross-examination. Furthermore, his evidence left gaps that could only be filled by the directors, employees, officials, or agents of the appellant itself.

On the merits, the court a quo relied on the documentary evidence, i.e. the unsigned agreement between the appellant and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the relevant documents generated in South Africa, to find that it was the appellant that imported the goods in question into Zimbabwe. It was the appellant who beneficially owned and possessed the goods before they entered Zimbabwe and brought or caused them to be brought into the country.

It was accordingly held that the appellant was the importer of both the BACOSSI and non-BACOSSI goods.

The court further found that the activities of the appellant in Zimbabwe, from 2004 onwards, which were carried on continuously and regularly, constituted trading in the country for the purposes of VAT liability. The appellant was not a registered operator, but, every trader is liable to be registered for VAT purposes and is deemed to be a registered operator as the principal for goods supplied or imported on its behalf by its agent.

The appellant was carrying on the business of supplying goods through the agency of Douglas & Tate, which released the goods only on the instructions of the appellant after the latter had received payment in accordance with the relevant waybills and invoices.

The court held that the appellant was the importer of the goods in question and was therefore liable for the payment of VAT in both the pre-BACOSSI and BACOSSI eras when it supplied goods in furtherance of its business activities.

Furthermore, the appellant was required to be registered and had to be treated as a registered operator. Its failure to charge or receive VAT did not exonerate the appellant as VAT is deemed to be included in the purchase price. Additionally, it bore the obligation to remit VAT in foreign currency in accordance with the legislation in force at the relevant time.

As regards the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of West Group as the public officer of the appellant, the court found that this was above board. In terms of the governing provisions, the respondent was allowed to compulsorily appoint the CEO of West Group, the holding company of Douglas & Tate, which was the agent of the appellant in Zimbabwe, as its public officer and representative registered operator for the collection of VAT.

With respect to the appellant's argument that the respondent had used an arbitrary exchange rate to convert Rand denominated transactions to United States dollar values, the respondent averred that the relevant invoice values, together with the appropriate conversions, were supplied by the appellant's own agents.

The court found that the onus was on the appellant to establish that the conversions were arbitrary. However, it did not lead any evidence in this regard and the respondent's averments were not denied.

In the event, the court held that the appeal before it was not sustainable in its entirety. However, the appellant's objections raised important legal points and its grounds of appeal were not frivolous. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

Grounds of Appeal and Relief Sought

There are six grounds of appeal in casu. They impugn the judgment of the court a quo in the following respects:

(i) Rejecting the evidence given on behalf of the appellant as being unreliable.

(ii) Holding that the appellant, and not the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), was the importer of the goods in question.

(iii) Holding that the respondent was entitled to go behind the contents of the bills of lading which it had processed and approved to find that the appellant was the importer of the goods into Zimbabwe.

(iv) Finding that the appellant operated a business in Zimbabwe.

(v) Holding that the appellant was to be treated as a registered operator and finding that the appellant was liable to pay VAT on the imported goods.

(vi) Considering the issue of whether or not any company had been lawfully appointed as an agent to pay any tax due by the appellant, and in finding that such an appointment had in fact been lawfully made.

The appellant prays that the appeal be allowed with costs and that the judgment of the court a quo be set aside and substituted with an order allowing the appeal a quo with costs and directing the respondent to withdraw the contested VAT assessments issued by it against the appellant in this matter....,.

Identity of Importer: Zimtrade or Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)

The second and third grounds of appeal pertain to the identity of the importer of the goods in question. Was it the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), as is contended by the appellant, or was it the appellant itself?

Also relevant in this context are the contents of the bills of entry that had been submitted for processing and approval by the respondent's Department of Customs and Excise.

Counsel for the appellant submits that a bill of entry is a document that is filed by the importer.

In casu, one such bill of entry filed and approved in August 2008 identifies the appellant as the exporter/consignor, based in Guernsey. The importer/consignee is identified as the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ). All the other relevant bills of entry in this case contain the same information as to the identities of the exporter and the importer.

The bills of entry were issued in terms of the Customs and Excise Act.

Counsel for the appellant relies on the provisions of sections 37(1)(e), 39(1) and 40(1) of the Customs and Excise Act in support of his submission that the entries in question were made by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) as the importer.

The respondent incorrectly took the position that the appellant was the importer of the goods concerned because it owned the goods before they entered into Zimbabwe from South Africa.

The respondent, which bore the evidentiary burden in this respect, did not place any evidence before the court a quo to disprove the correctness of the bills of entry.

Counsel for the appellant also relies on other documentary evidence to buttress the appellant's position.

In particular, he refers to an opinion by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's lawyer, dated 17 June 2009, a letter of 1 July 2009 from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to the appellant's lawyers, and the minutes of a meeting held on 7 October 2009 between the RBZ and representatives of West Group. These documents, so he submits, make it clear that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) was the importer, the only unresolved issue being the currency in which VAT was to be paid....,.

With reference to the alleged admissions of liability by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), counsel for the respondent argues that the opinion tendered by its lawyer on 17 June 2009 is not binding. Again, the letter from the RBZ, dated 1 July 2009, was rejected by the Advisor to the RBZ Governor at a meeting held with the respondent's officials on 20 August 2009. Furthermore, the RBZ's expression of its willingness to pay the VAT invoices in Zimbabwe dollars, at its meeting with West Group, on 7 October 2009, was conditional on seeking legal opinions on the matter....,.

Counsel for the appellant submits that the opinion of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's lawyer, dated 17 June 2009, were based upon facts given to him by the RBZ itself. The Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) clearly relied upon that opinion in order to accept liability to pay the VAT claimed in Zimbabwe dollars....,.

The next issue concerns the legal opinion submitted to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and its subsequent stance relating to the payment of VAT claimed by the respondent.

In their letter to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), dated 17 June 2009, its lawyers took the following position:

“From the documentation we were shown, the Reserve Bank imported the Bacossi goods. The imported goods are VAT taxable and the tax is charged on the importer (RBZ in this case)…,. The VAT payable on the importation of goods into Zimbabwe is payable by the importer and not by the supplier of those goods. Accordingly, if ZIMRA were to rely on the provisions dealing with imports, the Reserve Bank would have to pay the VAT….,. We therefore advise the Reserve Bank to urgently pay Zimra in local currency. This should be done before Parliament resume [sic] and pass the Finance Bill which may have changes on the currency to be paid on all outstanding taxes….,. Government departments cannot take each other to court…,. We do not therefore believe that ZIMRA can go to court against the Reserve Bank.”

Three things emerge from the legal advice contained in this letter:

(i) The first, based on the importation documents, presumably the relevant bills of entry, is that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) was the importer of the BACOSSI goods and was therefore liable for any VAT leviable on those goods;

(ii) The second is that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) should pay that tax in local currency before any legislative change was introduced; and

(iii) Thirdly, even if the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) were to be levied for payment of the VAT due, ZIMRA would not be able to pursue its claim against the RBZ through the courts.

Pursuant to this opinion, its addressee (Dr Mombeshora) wrote on behalf of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) to the appellant's lawyers. The nub of this letter, dated 1 July 2009, was to confirm that the RBZ “imported BACOSSI goods” from the appellant and that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) “accepts liability to ZIMRA for this VAT.”

However, this purported admission of liability to pay the VAT was subsequently condemned and rejected at a meeting held on 20 August 2009 between officials of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and ZIMRA.

The lead Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) representative (Dr Kereke) “opposed the writing of the letter by Dr Mombeshora; in fact, it was shocking to him and the Governor…,. It was not proper to write such a letter to take responsibility of payment of tax of a supplier….,. The letter was not RBZ policy….,. The Bank will revoke point number three of the letter which gave liability of Afritrade International to RBZ.”

Following this volte-face by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), a meeting was held between the RBZ and representatives of West Group.

The meeting, held on 7 October 2009, was chaired by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) Governor. It was noted that “a Bank employee erred in assuming the liability on behalf of the Bank without the express authority of the Governor.”

It was further noted that “there could perhaps be some business transactions held between Dr Mombeshora and Afritrade that he [the Governor] could not verify or vouch for.”

At any rate, “the Governor had no problem paying the VAT invoice as long as it was stated in Zimbabwe Dollars….,. However, he had asked Dr Mombeshora to seek legal opinion on the matter internally and externally.”

At the conclusion of the meeting, “the Governor suggested to West Group to obtain all the invoices and have them assessed by an accounting firm and advise on the correct VAT due. The records should cover pre-bacossi and bacossi importations.”

What is evident from all of the foregoing is that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's acceptance of liability to pay the VAT due on the BACOSSI goods, albeit in Zimbabwe dollars, was not unequivocal or unqualified. It was conditional upon the re-assessment of the relevant records and the need to seek further legal opinion.

Very significantly, this qualified acceptance of liability was largely predicated on the legal advice given to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) on 17 June 2009 - not all of which advice was necessarily correct.

The basic premise of that advice hinged upon the contents of the importation documents that were shown to the RBZ's lawyers.

HH424-13 : HONEY AND BLANCKENBERG vs LOURENCE ERASMUS VERMAAK and OTHERS
Ruled By: TSANGA J

The BackgroundThe applicant, Honey and Blanckenberg, instituted interpleader, in terms of Rule 30 of the High Court Rules, for the court to declare to whom it should pay an amount of $70,000 currently held in trust as rentals for certain companies.According to the applicant's affidavit, the companies in question are ...

The Background

The applicant, Honey and Blanckenberg, instituted interpleader, in terms of Rule 30 of the High Court Rules, for the court to declare to whom it should pay an amount of $70,000 currently held in trust as rentals for certain companies.

According to the applicant's affidavit, the companies in question are being laid claim to by nine different respondents (Lourence Erasmus Vermaak, Terence Cobden Rhodes, Gideon Hwemende, Valentine Mushore, Alfred Chademana, Joel Tandera, Oliver Chibage, Farai Mutizwa and Calisto Vengesai).

The tenth respondent (the Registrar of Companies) was cited to throw light on the question of ownership by virtue of certain statutory returns that have been filed with it.

Despite the assistance that the court would indeed have obtained from the tenth respondent's comments, none were availed as the tenth respondent (the Registrar of Companies) did not participate at all in these proceedings.

The companies in question, namely, Beverly East Properties and Karoi Properties (the companies) were established by the late Brian James Rhodes who died on 29 July 2006.

At least this much is not in dispute.

The companies own commercial premises described as 184 Mutare Rd; 186 Mutare Rd; 188 Mutare Rd; 194 Mutare Road, all in Msasa.

These premises are leased.

Until October 2011, the rentals were being collected by an estate agent, namely, Robert Root and Company. They discontinued agency and accounted to the applicants for rentals held by them.

Certain tenants have continued paying rentals to the applicants.

The applicant averred, in its affidavit, that, it is currently holding $70,000 in trust by way of accumulated rentals from these tenants.

In its affidavit, the applicant lays out the conflicting claims that it has been saddled with as emanating from triple sources:

(i) The first set of claimants for the rentals is a Trust called Phoenix Trust which the deceased is said to have established in 1998. The first and second respondents (Lourence Erasmus Vermaak and Terence Cobden Rhodes) are identified by the applicants as Trustees asserting that the Trust is the lawful owner of the entire share capital in the companies and to whom the applicants should account for the rentals held as representatives of the companies.

(ii) The second claimant, also laying claim to the rentals is said to be Gideon Hwemende, the third respondent (a former employee of the deceased) whom the applicant indicates in its affidavit as having made diverse claims to shareholdings in the companies ranging from 40%, to 60%, as well as to the entire ownership of the companies.

(iii) The third set of claimants are the fourth to ninth respondents (Valentine Mushore, Alfred Chademana, Joel Tandera, Oliver Chibage, Farai Mutizwa and Calisto Vengesai), who, in their capacity as Directors appointed by the third respondent (Gideon Hwemende), lay claim to interests in the companies.

The affidavits and various annexures filed by the different claimants bear the hallmarks of a dramatic 'corporate soap opera' characterised by intrigue; alleged chicanery; resultant grievance.

It is necessary to set out the facts somewhat fully from the papers filed of record as they have a bearing in determining in whose favour the balance emerges in terms of this interpleader application.

The Facts

Mr Lourence Vermaak, the first respondent, initially submitted an opposing affidavit on 12 March 2013 which was later withdrawn and expunged from the record by court order obtained as a result of a default judgement.

From the correspondence on file, the reason for the seeking that this initial opposing affidavit be withdrawn was because it had been obtained through coercion.

However, by the time of its withdrawal, the third to ninth respondents had filed their own opposing affidavits in which they drew heavily, in asserting their claims, on this initial affidavit. Even after the first and second respondents had filed their new affidavits, the third to the ninth respondents appear to have ignored the fact that this document was obliterated by an order of this court.

Whilst bearing in mind that the document was wiped out, it is necessary to set out, briefly, its contents in order to give some context to the election by the third to ninth respondents to hang on its every word despite the court order stating that it is expunged from the record.

In the expunged affidavit, the first respondent averred that he had resigned as Trustee of Phoenix Trust and Director of Beverley East Properties - which is not in dispute.

He denied having laid claim to owning or representing the companies.

He asserted that he had appointed himself as Director when he saw that the companies were lying idle. He also swore that the second respondent, Terence Cobden Rhodes, had been appointed fraudulently by him (with one Kenny Regan) without his knowledge and that the second respondent was not even aware that he is a director or was a director.

In a dramatic twist to the applicant claim of a dispute, the first respondent refuted that the shareholdings in the companies were in dispute in any way. He also stated that the third (Gideon Hwemende) and the ninth (Calisto Vengesai) respondents are current directors and shareholders of Beverly East Properties and that he had no problems with this nor did he have any interest in the matter.

Attached as annexures were letters of withdrawal as Director of Beverly East Properties.

The eighth respondent, Farai Mutizwa, in his purported capacity as Director of Beverly East Properties, deposed to an affidavit in which he essentially embraced the first respondent's affidavit as embodying the correct position. He confirmed that the first and second respondents had resigned and had not laid any interest in the companies as they had resigned as both directors and company secretaries. He also stated that ownership and control are in the hands of the remaining respondents and that there are no contradictory or competing interests.

He also said that the third respondent (Gideon Hwemende) is a director in the company.

He referred to the only dispute as that pertaining to Directorship of Karoi Properties, a case which he said they were making frantic efforts to resolve.

In that case, which I will allude to later, JUSTICE ZHOU ordered tenants of Karoi Properties to deposit rentals into the account of the Registrar until the matter of ownership is resolved.

The fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and ninth respondents submitted affidavits in support of the eighth respondent's averments.

The third respondent (Gideon Hwemende), who was separately represented, initially deposed to his own affidavit on 18 March 2013. He withdrew, through a letter from his legal practitioners to the Registrar of the High Court, two days after its submission on 20 March.

In its place, he submitted an affidavit stating that he too was embracing the affidavit deposed to by the eight respondent.

It is necessary to state, briefly, the contents of this affidavit as its contents have a bearing on why it was withdrawn.

In addition, its contents also have some bearing on the first respondent's later affidavit.

In his initial affidavit, he gave a totally different picture of the share ownership pertaining to the company compared to that deposed to by the first respondent. He did not assert full ownership, but, instead, claimed that he had acquired 60% of the shareholding, with the remaining 40% belonging to the estate of the late Brian James Rhodes. He sought to shed light on how he came to own what he asserted as 60% of the company.

In essence, his claim was that he had been employed as clerk by Brian James Rhodes in 1990 who was the sole shareholder of the companies. He was elevated to controlling all the accounts for the companies in 1992 which included mining companies. He said that when Brian James Rhodes became old, he proposed that he buy shares in Beverly East Properties in 1999 so that he could become the majority shareholder. His claim was that the deceased said he would work out a plan since the third respondent did not have money.

He asserted, that, in 2002, the said Brian Rhodes indicated that he was handing him 60% of the company and drew up shareholding agreements. He also gave him the title deeds of three properties Lorely, Beverly East, and Karoi Properties.

He further averred, that, by 2006, had paid up for the 60% shareholding in each of the two companies, and that, at the time of his death, Brian Rhodes owned 40% of the company. He further submitted that he himself had fallen ill, and, for seven years, and could not control the two companies.

It was during this time, he said, that the companies had been left with no Directors and that the first and second respondents had illegally appointed themselves.

He alleged that there is no record of how Phoenix Trust came to own 80% or 100% of the shareholding in the two companies.

He had submitted documents to support his claim in the form of receipts from a petty cash book to show purchase. He also attached annexures of the Share Agreements in Beverly East and Karoi Properties.

Also among the annexures was a copy of a letter, purportedly by Brain James Rhodes, offering the third respondent the properties in 2002.

Also included was a company resolution, also from 2002, appointing the estate agents as managers of the property.

Turning back to the first respondent, he withdrew his initial opposing affidavit on 27 May 2013.

Having the court's blessing to breathe freely again and file new papers on the basis of a court order granted by JUSTICE MATHONSI, under case No. HC3889/13, he filed a new opposing affidavit on 12 July 2013.

Equally unfettered by the first respondent's initial affidavit, the second respondent (Terence Cobden Rhodes) also filed his own opposing affidavit.

In his new opposing affidavit, the first respondent disputed the third respondent's (Gideon Hwemende) claim to shareholding on a number of grounds:

He asserted, that, from the evidence produced by the third respondent, he could not be owner as he had failed to produce proof of actually paying for the shares, neither had he shown any proof of paying any capital gains tax on the shares as required by the Capital Gains Tax Act [Cap 23:01]. He also stated that no such share transfers were ever processed by the first respondent's company that was at the time managing the two companies as company secretaries.

In addition, he attached a number of annexures which included a document examiners report disputing the signatures to the Share Agreements that had been produced by the third respondent.

The examiner opined that the signatures could have been forged but that he required to see the originals....,.

Whilst admittedly not conclusive, the forensic report suggests that the signatures to the Share Agreements may have been forged.

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Zimbabwe

Expert Evidence, Opinion Evidence and Toolmark Evidence re: Disclaimers, Qualified Opinions & Opinions Without an Author

Appealed
HH92-07 : PHAROAH B. MUSKWE vs DOUGLAS NYAJINA and MUNHUWEI G.T. and MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT N.O.
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH141-09 : OLIVER CHIBAGE vs KUDZAI SIBUSISO NDAWANA
Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

HH174-10 : SAMSON MARTIN MEKI vs VHURAMAYI VHUSHANGWE and OTHERS
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

HH324-13 : DOMINION TRADING FZ-LLC vs VICTORIA FOODS (PVT) LIMITED
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

SC03-21 : AFRITRADE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: PATEL JA, BHUNU JA and BERE JA

HH424-13 : HONEY AND BLANCKENBERG vs LOURENCE ERASMUS VERMAAK and OTHERS
Ruled By: TSANGA J

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Law Portal Zimbabwe

Expert Evidence, Opinion Evidence and Toolmark Evidence re: Disclaimers, Qualified Opinions & Opinions Without an Author

Appealed HH92-07 : PHAROAH B. MUSKWE vs DOUGLAS NYAJINA and MUNHUWEI G.T. and MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT N.O. Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH141-09 : OLIVER CHIBAGE vs KUDZAI SIBUSISO NDAWANA Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

HH174-10 : SAMSON MARTIN MEKI vs VHURAMAYI VHUSHANGWE and OTHERS Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

HH324-13 : DOMINION TRADING FZ-LLC vs VICTORIA FOODS (PVT) LIMITED Ruled By: MATHONSI J

SC03-21 : AFRITRADE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: PATEL JA, BHUNU JA and BERE JA

HH424-13 : HONEY AND BLANCKENBERG vs LOURENCE ERASMUS VERMAAK and OTHERS Ruled By: TSANGA J

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Zimbabwe

Appealed
HH92-07 : PHAROAH B. MUSKWE vs DOUGLAS NYAJINA and MUNHUWEI G.T. and MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, NATIONAL HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT N.O.
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH141-09 : OLIVER CHIBAGE vs KUDZAI SIBUSISO NDAWANA
Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

HH174-10 : SAMSON MARTIN MEKI vs VHURAMAYI VHUSHANGWE and OTHERS
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

HH324-13 : DOMINION TRADING FZ-LLC vs VICTORIA FOODS (PVT) LIMITED
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

SC03-21 : AFRITRADE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: PATEL JA, BHUNU JA and BERE JA

HH424-13 : HONEY AND BLANCKENBERG vs LOURENCE ERASMUS VERMAAK and OTHERS
Ruled By: TSANGA J