This is an application brought under section 24(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (hereinafter “the Constitution”) on the basis that the applicant's rights, enshrined in sections 18(1) and 18(1a), have been contravened.
The Parties
The applicant is a citizen of Zimbabwe domiciled in this country and has always regarded this country as his only and permanent home. He is a registered voter in Zaka East Parliamentary Constituency and also a member of the non-governmental organisation, the Centre for Election Democracy in Southern Africa, based in Harare.
The first respondent is the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, who is cited in his official capacity and as the office-bearer responsible for fixing the date for Parliamentary, Presidential, and local authority elections (hereinafter called “the harmonised elections”). He is also cited in his capacity as a principal of the Inter-Party Political Agreement (commonly referred to as the Global Political Agreement (“GPA”) between his political party, the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ("ZANU-PF") and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change ("MDC"), referred to in Schedule 8 to the Constitution.
The second respondent is Morgan Richard Tsvangirai, who has been cited in his capacity as the Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, who also is a signatory to the Global Political Agreement (GPA), representing his formation of the MDC.
The third respondent is Arthur Guseni Oliver Mutambara, who has been cited as the Deputy Prime Minister of Zimbabwe and also due to the fact that he is a signatory to the Global Political Agreement (GPA).
The fourth respondent is Welshman Ncube, a Minister in Government and cited herein in his capacity as the representative of the other formation of the MDC, which organisation is a party to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and is represented in the current coalition government.
The fifth respondent is the Attorney-General, who has been drawn into these proceedings in view of their constitutional nature and in his capacity as the principal legal advisor to the Government.
Background
On 2 May 2013, the applicant issued an urgent Court Application against the above five respondents.
Before any opposition was filed to the court application, the applicant was, on 6 May 2013, directed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe to file a separate urgent Chamber Application seeking leave for the urgent hearing of his Court Application, if such was his wish.
The application proceeded to do so in case Number SC157/2013. This urgent Chamber Application was subsequently heard on 15 May 2013. On 17 May 2013, the order sought by the applicant in the urgent Chamber Application was granted.
The principal application was opposed by the first, second, and fourth respondents.
The applicant subsequently filed a replying affidavit as well as a notice of an amendment of the draft order to his principal application.
The amended order sought is as follows:
"(1) The First Respondent be and is hereby directed to forthwith proclaim an election date for a Presidential election, general election, and elections for members of the governing bodies of local authorities in terms of section 58(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.
(2) The elections referred to in paragraph 1 hereof shall be conducted no later than the 30th day of June 2013.
ALTERNATIVELY
The elections referred to above shall be conducted no later than (the) 25th day of July 2013.
(3) Any party (parties) who oppose(s) this application shall bear the costs of this suit jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved."
Read together, the papers filed of record seem to pose the following as issues which fall for determination:
(a) Whether the applicant has locus standi to approach this Court in terms of section 24(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe;
(b) When do harmonised general elections fall due in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe?
(c) Whether the applicant has made out a case for the order sought.
Each issue will now be dealt with in turn....,.
(b) When do harmonised general elections become due?
It is common cause amongst all the parties that Parliament shall stand dissolved, by the effluxion of time, on 29 June 2013.
Whilst the papers before this Court are voluminous and at times unnecessarily argumentative, the issue before this Court is in fact a simple one, which can be reduced to one question: When, after the accepted dissolution of Parliament, by the effluxion of time, in terms of the Constitution, should the harmonised elections be held?
The response to this rather simple and straightforward question has elicited contradictory responses from the second and fourth respondents on the one hand, and the applicant, on the other. The responses from the second and fourth respondents also show a serious divergence of opinion between them.
According to the second respondent, who is the Prime Minister and an important part of the Executive:
“What is plain from section 58(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, as read with other relevant sections, is the fact that if the terms of Parliament, local government authorities, and of the President expire on 29 June 2013 through the natural passage of time (as opposed to induced dissolution or prorogation) elections must be conducted within four (4) months of the automatic dissolution of Parliament.”…,.
The fourth respondent, who himself is a Minister of Government and leader of a party to the Global Political Agreement, takes the following similar position when he states:
“Alternatively, if the President does not dissolve Parliament and allows it to automatically dissolve by operation of law on the last day of its five year term, in that event, the President must cause an election to be held within four months of the date of the automatic dissolution of Parliament.”…,.
He then goes on to say:
“The Constitution permits that an election be held anytime within four months after the dissolution of Parliament by operation of law at the expiration of its five year term, and, hence, that Constitution, by so providing, contemplates and allows that there may be no Parliament between its automatic dissolution and the holding of an election within four months of that dissolution.”…,.
The first respondent disagrees with the interpretation by the second and fourth respondents, saying it is not supported by the Constitution or the canons that govern its interpretation. Instead, the first respondent agrees with the interpretation placed by the applicant on sections 58 and 63 of the Constitution.
Section 58(1) of the Constitution simply states:
"(1) A general election, and elections for members of governing bodies of local authorities, shall be held on such day, or days, within a period not exceeding four months after the issue of a proclamation dissolving Parliament under section 63(7) or, as the case may be, the dissolution of Parliament under section 63(4) as the President may, by proclamation in the Gazette, fix.”
Now, it is clear that section 58(1) of the Constitution, read in its ordinary sense, deals with the timing of elections or the fixing of dates for elections by proclamation.
If one were to pose the question “when are harmonised general elections to be held?” and seek an answer from the above quoted provisions of section 58(1) of the Constitution, two possible answers emerge, depending on punctuation and emphasis and are juxtaposed below as READING 'A' and 'B':
READING 'A'
"PART 6
Elections and Sessions
58 Elections
(1) A general election, and elections for members of the governing bodies of local authorities, shall be held on:
(i) Such day or days within a period not exceeding four months after the issue of a proclamation dissolving Parliament under section 63(7); or
(ii) As the case may be, the dissolution of Parliament under section 63(4) as the President may, by proclamation in the Gazette, fix."
READING 'B'
"PART 6
Elections and Sessions
58 Elections
(1) A general election, and elections for members of the governing bodies of local authorities, shall be held on such day, or days, within a period not exceeding four months after:
(i) The issue of a proclamation dissolving Parliament under section 63(7); or
(ii) As the case may be, the dissolution of Parliament under section 63(4) as the President may, by proclamation in the Gazette, fix."
There could be any number of other variations the section 58(1) of the Constitution text can be broken into, but, the two scenarios above will suffice for the purpose of this case.
Both Reading 'A' and Reading 'B' answer to the question when elections are to be held but with one putting the emphasis on the preposition 'on' and the other on 'after'.
Both interpretations are compelling.
Adopting one interpretation or the other results in starkly different outcomes. In one case, elections must be held within the life of Parliament. In the other case, elections may be held up to four months after the dissolution of Parliament.
A Court faced with competing possible interpretations of a constitutional provision must call into aid principles or canons of construction. In this regard, FIELDSEND CJ had this to say in Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1981 ZLR 571:
“…, in general, the principles governing the interpretation of a Constitution are basically no different from those governing the interpretation of any other legislation. It is necessary to look to the words used and to deduce from them what any particular section, phrase, or word means, having regard to the overall context in which it appears.”
Accordingly, section 58(1) of the Constitution must be examined, not in isolation, but having regard to the overall context in which it appears.
In this regard, it is important to immediately quote section 63 of the Constitution referred to in this provision, emphasizing the key subsections 63(7) and 63(4):
"63 Prorogation or Dissolution
(1) The President may at any time prorogue Parliament.
[Subsection substituted by section 6 of Act No.23 of 1987 (Amendment No.7)]
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the President may at any time dissolve Parliament.
[Subsection substituted by section 6 of Act No.23 of 1987 (Amendment No.7)]
(3)…,.
[Subsection repealed by section 6 of Act No.23 of 1987 (Amendment No.7)]
(4) Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall last for five years, which period shall be deemed to commence on the day the person elected as President enters office in terms of section 28(5) after an election referred to in section 28(3)(a), and shall then stand dissolved:
Provided that, where the period referred to in this subsection is extended under subsection (5) or (6), Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall stand dissolved on the expiration of that extended period.
[Subsection inserted by section 14 of Act No.11 of 2007 (Amendment No.18)]
(5) At any time when Zimbabwe is at war, Parliament may from time to time extend the period specified in subsection (4) by not more than one year at a time:
Provided that such period shall not be extended under this subsection for more than five years.
(6) At any time when there is in effect a declaration under section 31J(1), Parliament may from time to time extend the period specified in subsection (4) by not more than six months at a time:
Provided that such period shall not be extended under this subsection for more than one year.
[Subsection amended by section 26 of Act No.23 of 1987 (Amendment No.7)]
(7) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4), any prorogation or dissolution of Parliament shall be by proclamation in the Gazette, and, in the case of a dissolution, shall take effect from the day preceding the day or first day, as the case may be, fixed by proclamation in accordance with section 58(1) for the holding of a general election.
(8) On the dissolution of Parliament, all proceedings pending at the time shall be terminated, and, accordingly, every Bill, motion, petition, or other business shall lapse."…,.
Although on the face of it sections 58 and 63 of the Constitution deal with distinct but related constitutional matters, the fixing of dates for elections on the one hand and the life of Parliament on the other, the inter-relatedness of these matters creates a maze of back and forth cross-referencing between section 58(1) and sections 63(4) and 63(7) of the Constitution.
These provisions are also subject to stipulations in the Constitution itself and the Electoral Act, especially with regard to time limits.
However, there are some conclusions that can be teased out of this maze to aid the interpretation of the provision in question:
(a) There must be a proclamation fixing the dates for elections which is issued by the President in the Gazette according to sections 58(1) and 63(7) of the Constitution.
(b) Section 63(7) is subjected to the provisions in section 63(4) in the sense that the President may not dissolve Parliament and fix dates which fall outside the life of Parliament. In other words, elections following a Presidential dissolution of Parliament must be held before the expiry of the life of that Parliament.
There are other provisions in section 64(4) of the Constitution which might have necessitated the subjection of section 63(7) to it, viz: that dissolution of Parliament, following expiry of its extended period, is automatic, whereas section 63(7) requires all other dissolutions to be by proclamation.
(c) The fixing of election dates must take into account the mandatory time limits set out in the Constitution and the Electoral Law.
From the above conclusions, one can now pose a number of useful questions and try to answer them.
What is this proclamation that is required for both the Presidential and the automatic dissolution of Parliament? What is its purpose?
From a common sense position, one could say a proclamation is issued in advance, giving a period of notice and time, prior to the Presidential or automatic dissolution, in order to afford the electoral authorities and the public time to prepare for the elections.
That appears to also coincide with the legal requirements teased above.
However, to get a real life 'feel' of this phenomenon called 'proclamation' I dug up Statutory Instrument 7A of 2008, which, of course, the Court is perfectly entitled to take judicial notice of.
It was issued on 24 January 2008, dissolving Parliament “with effect from midnight, the 28th March 2008” thus giving the electoral authorities and the public slightly over two months to prepare for the elections.
In that case, the night of dissolution was perfectly followed by the day, or days, of elections as stipulated in section 63(7) of the Constitution. The proclamation goes on to fix the dates, places, and times of the sitting of the nomination courts and the presiding officials thereof throughout the country for Presidential, Parliamentary, and local government elections.
This proclamation was issued by the President using his discretion to dissolve Parliament and call for elections in terms of section 63(7) of the Constitution.
It is important to note, that, the proclamation is prospective, not retrospective, pointing to a date in future when Parliament will stand dissolved and complying with all statutory time limits.
Since the date for the automatic end of the life of Parliament is known in advance, it would be perfectly feasible for a President to anticipate such a date and issue a similar proclamation announcing that Parliament shall stand dissolved by midnight of that day, followed by elections on the following day, or days, and complying with all statutory time limits.
Not only would it be feasible, but, in my view, it would be the proper, constitutional, and legal thing to do.
In fact, the question may be asked: since the date of automatic dissolution is known in advance, what is the purpose of granting the President an additional four months within which to proclaim the dates for elections after dissolution of Parliament?
Is it to shield that decision from Parliamentary scrutiny or to reward the President for having allowed Parliament to run its full course, by granting the Executive four months to rule by decree?
The mind boggles at this strange effect of adopting Reading 'B' of section 58(1) of the Constitution.
The second scenario of interpreting section 58(1) of the Constitution also implies that the President must wait until the life of Parliament would have expired in terms of section 63(4) and then issue a proclamation recognising that fact and fixing dates within four months of the event.
The expiry of the life of Parliament would have passed silently without notice to all concerned, but, with a dramatic effect of creating a deformed State without Parliament for up to four months.
As would be shown below, this would lead to an absurdity and glaring anomalies.
There are two approaches open to a Court faced with apparent absurdities in the construction of statutes - the narrow and the wider approach.
The narrow approach was articulated in The Queen v Judge of the City of London Court [1892] QBD 273 by LORD ESHER as follows:
“If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. In my opinion, the rule has always been this, if the words of an Act admit of two interpretations, then, they are not clear and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the Court will conclude the legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity and will adopt the other interpretation.”
Under the narrow approach, the Court chooses between the two possible interpretations, the one which does not lead to an absurdity.
In this case, it would be the first interpretation or Reading 'A' of section 58(1) of the Constitution.
In Venter v Rex 1906 TS 910…, INNES CJ expressed the wider approach thus:
“That being so, it appears to me that the principle we should adopt may be expressed somewhat in this way: that, when to give the plain words of the statute their ordinary meaning would lead to absurdity so glaring that it could never have been contemplated by the legislature, or where it would lead to a result contrary to the intention of the legislature, as shown by the context or by such other considerations as the Court is justified in taking into account, the Court may depart from the ordinary effect of the words to the extent necessary to remove the absurdity and to give effect to the true intention of the legislature.”
According to the “wider approach” the Court has a broad discretion in removing an absurdity, being guided, ultimately, by the intention of the Legislature, or, in constitutional terms, by the intention of the framers of the supreme law.
Once an ambiguity or absurdity has been established, it would appear that the proper approach to adopt would be the wider one, where the Court calls into aid historical, schematic, teleological, and purposive approaches to interpretation.
In the case of Buchanan & Co v Babco Ltd (C.A.) [1977] QBD 208…, LORD DENNING followed precisely this method of interpretation, long adopted by the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg, thus:
“They adopt a method which they call in English by strange words, at any rate they were strange to me, the 'schematic and teleological' method of interpretation. It is not really so alarming as it sounds. All it means is that the judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words, or by the grammatical structure of the sentence.
They go by the design or purpose which lies behind it.
When they come upon a situation which is, to their minds, within the spirit, but not the letter, of the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and purpose of the legislation - at the effect which it was sought to achieve.
They then interpret the legislation so as to achieve the desired effect.
This means that they fill in gaps, quite unashamedly, without hesitation. They ask simply: what is the sensible way of dealing with this situation so as to give effect to the presumed purpose of the legislation?
To our eyes, shortsighted by tradition, it is legislation, pure and simple. But to their eyes, it is fulfilling the true role of the courts. They are giving effect to what the legislature intended, or may be presumed to have intended. I see nothing wrong with this. Quite the contrary.”
If the framers of the Constitution wanted Zimbabwe to function without a Parliament for four months, as suggested by the second and fourth respondents, they surely would have said so in clear and explicit terms and they would not have left this to speculation and interpretation. The Constitution itself states emphatically in section 52:
“Provided that…, no law shall be deemed to amend, add to or repeal any provision of this Constitution unless it does so in express terms.”
Therefore, the only interpretation that can be given to this section is one that favours constitutionalism.
It is common cause that the current Constitution is based on the fundamental principles of separation of powers between the three arms of State: the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. This principle is entrenched in the Constitution in the various sections which state, in peremptory terms, that there shall be a President, a Parliament, and a Judiciary.
Nowhere in the Constitution is there an excuse to function without any one of these branches for an extended period of time.
Whatever exceptions are dictated by transitional imperatives of the going out and coming in of governments, these are always kept at the minimum possible.
In fact, so important are the tripartite pillars of State, that, even in a time of emergency or war, these three institutions are preserved: see sub-sections 63(5) and (6) of the Constitution.
The principle of constitutionalism, which we referred to earlier, is embodied in section 3 of the Constitution which states:
“This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe, and, if any other law is inconsistent with this Constitution, that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void.”
If one applies both the doctrine of separation of powers and constitutionalism, it is inconceivable that an interpretation that permits or allows for any extended period without one or other arms of State, in this case Parliament, can be sustainable.
To exist too long without a Parliament would be tantamount to shredding the Constitution and inviting a state of lawlessness and disorder.
It would, with respect, be tantamount to an “annihilation” of the Constitution, in the words of MALABA JA…, in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Another v Minister of Lands and Another 2008 (1) ZLR 17 (S).
If section 58 of the Constitution is a repeal or amendment of the peremptory requirement that “there shall be a Parliament" it should have said so explicitly.
It does not do this.
It is also instructive to note, that, in terms of section 158 of the new incoming Constitution, the timing of elections is such that they must be held before the expiry of the life of Parliament, thus:
"158 Timing of Elections
(1) A general election must be held so that polling takes place not more than –
(a) Thirty days before the expiry of the five-year period specified in section 143."…,.
The submission that the mischief of rule by decree, consequent upon no elections being held by 29 June 2013, is obviated by the continuation in office of both the President and Cabinet, in terms of section 29(1) of the Constitution, totally misses the point, that, what is at issue is rule by the Executive in the absence of the checks and balances of a Parliament.
It matters not whether the rule by decree is that of a single individual or that of a group, such as a Cabinet. The purpose of this section is to allow a smooth handover between the retiring and the incoming Executive in the shortest possible time.
Its existence is also further proof of the need to ensure that the period between the dissolution of one Parliament and the inauguration of the next is as short as possible.
Furthermore, the applicant is correct in submitting, that, the fourth respondent fails to appreciate that the over-arching philosophy in section 31E(2) of the Constitution is in fact constitutionalism and not proof that governance without Parliament is acceptable.
The section is an exhortation to anyone appointed as Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister (from outside Parliament) to become Members of Parliament within three months.
The only time when such officials are allowed to exceed those three months is when during that period Parliament is dissolved (thus frustrating him or her from becoming a member). Only then can the period be extended to “until Parliament first meets after dissolution”.
In fact, this provision pre-supposes the prior existence of Parliament and not its wholesale absence, and caters for a few desired members of the Executive who may not have made it to Parliament.
It is also instructive to have recourse to the history of this provision.
The original provision stated that the terms of office of Vice-Presidents, Ministers or Deputy Ministers terminated on their ceasing to be Members of Parliament, thus emphasising the centrality of an extant Parliament in the composition and functioning of the Executive in a democratic dispensation.
Section 31E of the Constitution reads:
“31E Tenure of office of Vice-Presidents, Ministers and Deputy Ministers
(1) The office of a Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister shall become vacant –
(a) If the President removes him from office; or
(b) If he resigns his office by notice in writing addressed and delivered to the President; or
(c) Upon the assumption of office of a new President.
[Subsection amended by section 9 of Act No.15 of 1990 (Amendment No.10)]
(2) No person shall hold office as Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister for longer than three months unless he is a Member of Parliament:
Provided that if during that period Parliament is dissolved, he may continue to hold such office without being a Member of Parliament until Parliament first meets after the dissolution.
[Subsection substituted by section 2 of Act No.31 of 1989 (Amendment No. 9)]"
In the context of the GPA-based Government of National Unity (GNU), not to be confused with the animal gnu with an ox-like head and a tufted tail, and, ironically, also an inhabitant of the Savannas of Africa, whose existence is premised on political parties represented in Parliament, the question arises as to what the justification, constitutionally, of its continued existence becomes once Parliament is no more.
It becomes a Government made up of political parties previously represented in Parliament! And what would that say to other political parties patiently waiting for their chances at the polls?
In conclusion, therefore, the proper construction of section 58(1) of the Constitution is that election dates should be fixed and notified, whether pursuant to Presidential dissolution or automatic dissolution of Parliament, in such a way that elections are held within the life of Parliament on a day/days immediately following its dissolution.
The setting of these dates has to take into account the requirements of the Constitution and the Electoral Act, which stipulate a period of at least forty-four days between proclamation and actual holding of elections.
In terms of the provisions of the new Constitution, which came into force on publication day, section 157(3) of the Constitution, the minimum period is forty-four days, thus:
"157(3) The Electoral Law must provide for the nomination of candidates in any election to take place at least fourteen days after the publication of the proclamation calling for that election. Polling must take place at least thirty days after the nomination of candidates.”
(c) Whether the applicant has made out a case for the Order sought
The essence of the applicant's case is that the first respondent has failed to fix and proclaim a date for Presidential, Parliamentary, and local government elections as required by section 58(1) of the Constitution, and, failure by the first respondent to do so is unconstitutional in general, and, in particular, is in violation of the applicant's rights as a voter and his legitimate expectation of protection of the law as enshrined in sub-sections 18(1) and (1a) of the Constitution.
As can be deduced from what is concluded above, the first respondent is already out of time in fixing and proclaiming dates for the harmonised general elections to be held before the expiry of the life of the current Parliament.
The applicant's rights, as already stated above, have already been infringed and continue to be violated with each passing day.
The applicant is entitled to the declaration of such infringement and an order correcting or rectifying, as far as is possible, such infringement: see Commercial Farmers Union v Minister of Lands & Ors 2000 (2) ZLR 469…,.
When the first respondent failed to fix and proclaim a date for Presidential, Parliamentary, and local government elections, as required by section 58(1) of the Constitution, to enable elections to be held on the dissolution of Parliament on 29 June 2013, not only did he violate the applicant's fundamental right as protected by section 18 of the Constitution, he thereby derailed the electoral process.
From then onwards, the rule of law, as regards the electoral process, was no longer extant.
It is imperative that the rule of law be restored to the electoral process and the applicant be afforded some relief.
The first respondent has placed himself in a serious legal quandary or predicament by his failure to issue the said proclamation timeously.
The first respondent cannot remedy the situation by issuing the proclamation for elections to be held by 29 June 2013, as doing so will inevitably contravene the time-lines set out in section 38 of the Electoral Act.
Prospective Parliamentary candidates are entitled, in terms of section 38 of the Electoral Act, to fourteen days to organise their nominations and thirty days to campaign before the date of the elections.
Thus, affixing the date of the elections now, in terms of section 58(1) of the Constitution, in anticipation of the dissolution of Parliament on 29 June 2013, will have the effect of violating the fundamental right of aspiring Parliamentary candidates, entitling them to bring similar applications to that of the applicant.
Apart from this, the coming into operation of the new Constitution of Zimbabwe has further complicated the situation.
The new Constitution has introduced new time lines and necessitated amendments to the Electoral Law, making the immediate issuance of a proclamation, fixing the date for harmonised elections on the dissolution of Parliament on 29 June 2013, legally impossible.
The Court, in my view, is compelled to take into account the exigencies of this situation in the order that it makes.
Thus, compliance with the Court order must not, of necessity, compel the first respondent to contravene another electoral provision.
The applicant must have appreciated the first respondent's legal predicament.
In his draft order, the applicant asked for the immediate issuance of a proclamation fixing the date of the harmonized elections upon the dissolution of Parliament on 29 June 2013. In the alternative, the applicant asked for the issuance of a proclamation forthwith setting the date of the harmonised elections by no later than 25 July 2013.
I have no doubt that the applicant's alternative relief is out of the realization and appreciation of the first respondent's legal predicament.
I am inclined to grant the alternative relief sought by the applicant, and add six days to 25 July 2013 to compensate for the period between the hearing of this appeal and the handing down of this judgment.
The first respondent, while not explicitly consenting to the alternative relief, indicated that he had no objection to such relief.
The main litigants in this matter, namely, the applicant and the first respondent, are accordingly in agreement over the alternative relief. This relief also accords with the Court's desire to issue an order that will help restore legality to the electoral process as quickly as possible....,.
It is my hope, that, although the order of the Court is not against the second and fourth respondents, they will use their good offices to assist the first respondent to restore the rule of law to the electoral process.
(e) Order
In the result, the Court makes the following order:
1. It is declared that the harmonised general elections, in terms of section 58(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, are due upon the dissolution of Parliament on 29 June 2013. However, due to the first respondent's failure to issue a proclamation fixing the date for the harmonized elections timeously it is no longer legally possible to hold the harmonised elections on that date.
2. It is declared that the failure by the first respondent to fix and proclaim date(s) for harmonized general elections to take place by 29 June 2013 is a violation of the first respondent's constitutional duty towards the applicant to exercise his functions as a public officer in accordance with the law and to observe and uphold the rule of law in terms of section 18(1a) of the Constitution.
3. It is further declared, that, by failing to act as stated in paragraph 2 above, the first respondent has violated the applicant's rights as a voter and his legitimate expectation of protection of the law entrenched in section 18(1) of the Constitution.
4. Accordingly, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered and directed to proclaim, as soon as possible, a date(s) for the holding of Presidential election, general election and elections for members of governing bodies of local authorities, in terms of section 58(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, which elections should take place by no later than 31 July 2013....,.
Turning to the substantive merits of the matter, the principal issue for determination is the meaning of and inter-relationship between sections 58(1), 63(4) and 63(7) of the former Constitution.
On this aspect, I fully endorse the principle of constitutionalism that informs the approach taken by the learned CHIEF JUSTICE and the majority of the Court. However, I am constrained, with the utmost respect, to disagree with the construction that they place on the provisions under review, in particular, on section 58(1) of the Constitution.
The tripartite structure of the State is the keystone of every constitutional democracy and the need to safeguard the attendant separation of powers is unquestionably paramount.
However, as was recognised in Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Anor v Minister of Lands and Anor 2008 (1) 17 (S)…, the clear words of a Constitution must be construed to override any doctrine of constitutionalism predicated on essential features or core values.
In general, the principles governing the interpretation of a Constitution are basically the same as those governing the interpretation of statutes. One must look to the words actually used and deduce what they mean within the context in which they appear: see Hewlett v Minister of Finance 1981 ZLR 571 (S)…,.
If the words used are precise and un-ambiguous, then, no more is necessary than to expound them in their natural and ordinary sense: see The Sussex Peerage (1843-1845) 65 RR 11…,.
In essence, it is necessary to have regard to the words used and not to depart from their literal and grammatical meaning unless this leads to such an absurdity that the Legislature could not have contemplated it: see, in this regard, the case authorities cited by the learned CHIEF JUSTICE.
Section 58(1) of the Constitution, as amended by Act No.11 of 2007 to accommodate harmonised elections, prescribes when general elections are to be held and the fixing of election dates, as follows:
“A general election, and elections for members of the governing bodies of local authorities, shall be held on such day or days within a period not exceeding four months after the issue of a proclamation dissolving Parliament under section 63(7) or, as the case may be, the dissolution of Parliament under section 63(4) as the President may, by proclamation in the Gazette, fix.”
The prorogation and dissolution of Parliament are dealt with in section 63 of the Constitution. For present purposes, sub-sections (4) and (7) are the pertinent provisions and they provide as follows:
“(4) Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall last for five years, which period shall be deemed to commence on the day the person elected as President enters office in terms of section 28(5) after an election referred to in section 28(3)(a), and shall then stand dissolved:
Provided that, where the period referred to in this subsection is extended under subsection (5) or (6), Parliament, unless sooner dissolved, shall stand dissolved on the expiration of that extended period.
(7) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4), any prorogation or dissolution of Parliament shall be by proclamation in the Gazette, and, in the case of a dissolution, shall take effect from the day preceding the day or first day, as the case may be, fixed by proclamation in accordance with section 58(1) for the holding of a general election.”
The first point to note is that both section 58(1) and sub-sections 63(4) and (7) of the Constitution have remained unaltered in substance since they were first enacted in 1980.
The second more critical point is that they deal with two distinct, though related, constitutional processes, viz. the fixing of elections on the one hand and the life of Parliament on the other.
These two processes, and their objectives, have been unnecessarily conflated by the applicant in casu.
The approach adopted by the learned CHIEF JUSTICE, in relation to section 58(1) of the Constitution, is to read it so that the two separate scenarios for the dissolution of Parliament are taken to follow after the words “shall be held on” rather than the phrase “within a period not exceeding four months after”.
In my respectful view, dividing section 58(1) of the Constitution in this fashion detracts from its grammatical structure and leads to an inchoate rendition of the provision.
In particular, in the situation where Parliament is dissolved by operation of law, under section 63(4) of the Constitution, the literal result is that elections are to be held “on the dissolution of Parliament”.
Does this mean that elections are to be held simultaneously with the dissolution of Parliament, or immediately thereafter, or at some later stage?
More importantly, this reading has the peculiar effect that no actual “election day or days” are fixed, contrary to the very purpose of section 58(1) of the Constitution.
Such a construction surely cannot reflect what the Legislature would have intended.
A plain reading of section 58(1) of the Constitution makes it clear, that, elections must be held after the dissolution of Parliament on such day, or days, as the President may fix by proclamation.
This applies to both scenarios for the dissolution of Parliament.
Where it is dissolved by the President under section 63(7) of the Constitution, elections must take place within four months after the issue of a proclamation dissolving Parliament. Where Parliament stands dissolved by operation of law, in terms of section 63(4) of the Constitution, elections must be held within four months after the dissolution of Parliament.
In my considered view, the wording used is unambiguous and does not admit of any other interpretation, nor does it entail any absurdity. Consequently, there is no need to invoke any teleological or purposive approach in the construction of section 58(1) of the Constitution.
The apparent ambiguity that might emerge arises from the wording of section 63(7) of the Constitution and its juxtaposition of the dissolution of Parliament with the first election day fixed under section 58(1).
Read in their context, however, there is no real ambiguity as between sections 58(1) and 63(7) of the Constitution.
What the latter provision means is this:
Any prorogation or dissolution of Parliament by the President must be effected by proclamation in the Gazette. In the case of a dissolution, this must take effect from the day preceding the day, or days, fixed by proclamation under section 58(1) of the Constitution for the holding of a general election. This would apply, in particular, where the President dissolves Parliament, in terms of section 63(2), well before the expiration of its five year tenure.
However, this is subject to section 63(4) of the Constitution, so that the automatic dissolution of Parliament, by operation of law, may, but need not, take effect on the day preceding the day fixed for the holding of elections.
In other words, the prescribed tenure of Parliament cannot be extended beyond five years in the event that the date fixed for elections falls outside that period. In that case, the dissolution of Parliament cannot immediately precede the election date fixed under section 58(1) of the Constitution.
Reading all of the relevant provisions together, the relationship between the holding of elections and the life of Parliament is resolved as follows:
Where Parliament is dissolved by the President, acting under section 63(2) of the Constitution, elections must be held within four months after the issue of the proclamation dissolving it in terms of section 63(7).
In this case, the two events must be synchronised so that the dissolution of Parliament takes effect on the day preceding the day, or days, fixed for elections in terms of section 58(1) of the Constitution.
Conversely, where Parliament is dissolved by operation of law, after the effluxion of five years, in terms of section 63(4) of the Constitution, elections must be held within a period not exceeding four months after the dissolution of Parliament.
In this case, elections need not be held immediately after such dissolution, so long as they are held on a day, or days, within the four month period after dissolution.
In short, different time frames apply to the two forms of dissolution.
Does this differentiation necessarily entail an absurdity? I am inclined to think not.
Where the President takes a deliberate decision, for whatever reason, of political or practical expediency, to dissolve Parliament before the expiry of its prescribed five year tenure, that decision involves the exercise of an extraordinary executive power: and, in that extraordinary eventuality, Parliament has deemed it fit to ensure that there should not be any delay between its dissolution and the holding of general elections.
However, the need for such urgency or immediacy does not arise where Parliament continues in existence and operation throughout its ordinary term of five years.
Of course, it is a matter of concern that the plain reading of section 58(1) of the Constitution invites the “spectre” of rule by Executive Decree for a maximum period of four months without the restraint of Parliamentary oversight.
While the possibility of this hiatus may be undesirable from a democratic perspective, it is not necessarily absurd or unconstitutional.
That scenario, unpalatable as it may be, is explicitly contemplated in section 31E of the Constitution dealing with the tenure of office of members of the Executive.
More specifically, section 31E(2) of the Constitution provides that:
“No person shall hold office as Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister for longer than three months unless he is a Member of Parliament:
Provided that if during that period Parliament is dissolved, he may continue to hold such office without being a member of Parliament until Parliament first meets after the dissolution.”
This provision was substituted by Parliament through Act No.31 of 1989, in tandem with the advent of the Executive Presidency.
It constitutes a clear recognition and acceptance by Parliament itself of the possibility of its abeyance for the duration of at least three months. In effect, it unequivocally fortifies the plain and unqualified construction of section 58(1) of the Constitution vis-a-vis the provisions of subsections 63(4) and (7).
For all of the aforestated reasons, I would dismiss the present application on its merits.
