One of the crucial elements of the new constitutional dispension ushered in by the 2013 Constitution is to make a decisive break from turning a blind eye to constitutional obligations. To achieve this goal, the drafters of the Zimbabwean Constitution Amendment (No.20) Act 2013 (“the Constitution”) adopted the rule of ...
One of the crucial elements of the new constitutional dispension ushered in by the 2013 Constitution is to make a decisive break from turning a blind eye to constitutional obligations. To achieve this goal, the drafters of the Zimbabwean Constitution Amendment (No.20) Act 2013 (“the Constitution”) adopted the rule of law and supremacy of the Constitution as some of the core founding values and principles of our constitutional democracy.
For this reason, public office bearers ignore their constitutional obligations at their own peril. Left unchecked, those clothed with State authority, or public power, may quite often find the temptation to abuse such powers irresistible, as Lord Acton famously remarked:
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely!”
John Emerich Dalberg-Acton, 1st Baron Acton, coined the proverbial saying in 1857 using similar ideas expressed by several of his contemporaries. The fuller expression reads:
“Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority; still more when you super-add the tendency of the certainty of corruption by authority.”
Mechanisms to oversee how public power and State authority is exercised by those so entrusted must be tightened and strengthened. More importantly, if such mechanisms are by command of the supreme law of the land, the Constitution, they must be put in place within a reasonable time to actualise the Constitution as a living document.
To this end, the State, its organs, and functionaries cannot, without consequence, be allowed to adopt a lackadaisical attitude, at the expense of the public interest, in bringing into operation institutions and mechanisms commanded by the supreme law: see the case of Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2016 (3) SA 528 (CC)…,.
However, this case also illustrates the need, on the part of the litigants, to move away from old fashioned Private Law habits when it comes to Constitutional Law litigation. While constitutional litigation may entail the vindication of a private right, it differs from Private Law litigation in that over and above that it seeks to entrench legality and the deepening of the constitutional order for the benefit of the broader public.
This is why it has been said that:
“Where a matter concerns the constitutionality of a law…, the need for certainty may require the court to decide the matter irrespective of whether or not the party advancing the challenge had standing:” MAX du PLESSIS et al 'Constitutional Litigation' Juta, 2013 quoting the South African cases of Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 2004 (4) SA 125 (CC)…, and South African Liquor Traders Association v Chairperson, Gauteng Liquor Board 2006 (8) BCLR 901 (CC)…,.
This application seeks to enforce the enactment of the law envisioned in section 210 of the Constitution to provide for “an effective and independent mechanism for receiving and investigating complaints from members of the public about misconduct on the part of members of the security services, and for remedying any harm caused by such misconduct.”
It also seeks a declarator that the respondents have breached the Constitution by failing to enact such a law timeously after the coming into operation of the new Constitution and a mandamus for the respondents to gazette the Bill envisioned in section 210 of the Constitution thereof within forty-five days.
At the time of hearing of the application, a period of two years and four, five months had lapsed from the time of coming into operation of the rest of the Constitution, on 22 August 2013, when the President-elect, under the Constitution, assumed office. That delay, of less than two and a half years, might not have been sufficient to satisfy a finding of violation of the Constitution and the application might have failed on that score, with a period of, say, three being deemed to be the sufficient one.
However, post-hearing, intimations or overtures that the matter might be settled by consent of the parties were made necessitating the holding of three Court-presided meetings of the parties over time on the basis that both sides were agreed that the envisaged legislation had to be enacted; and, indeed, both sides agreed that the application was essentially not opposed, but differed slightly on the appropriate timelines for the enactment of the law.
Herein lies the nub of this matter.
Had the constitutional legality principle been put above all else, the application could have been granted immediately with immense public benefit. However, the Private Law litigation habit of “winner takes all” of wanting the other side to be declared a violator of the Constitution stood in the way as did the attitude on the other side of not wanting to make any move unless so ordered.
Had the Court appreciated, then, how deeply entrenched these arcane positions were, relics of Private Law litigation habits, a different approach could have been adopted of immediately issuing the order, with reasons to follow.
It is regretted that this approach was not followed.
