Costs re: Self Actors, Witness Expenses and Compensation to Third Parties for Legal Advice Rendered to Self-Actors

HB179-11 : SAMUEL KUFANDADA vs SUPERINTENDANT PILATE MOYO and CHIEF SUPERINTANDANT MATANGE and SUPERITENDANT MOYO and SUPERINTENDANT ZULU and COMMISSIONER GENERAL POLICE
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

1….,. 2. …,. 3. …,. 4. The respondents shall bear proved costs, if any, incurred by the applicant.

SC40-19 : SHINGIRAI PHILIP KATSANDE vs ANGELINA KATSANDE (NEE NYAHEMWA)
Ruled By: PATEL JA

Because of the applicant's failure to prosecute the matter diligently and timeously, he should be mulcted with an order for costs on a punitive scale, such costs to be paid as a pre-condition to his being allowed to proceed with his appeal. Indeed, the applicant himself was not averse to such order being made so as to ...

SC07-20 : FARAI BWATIKONA ZIZHOU vs THE TAXING OFFICER and RITA MARQUE MBATHA
Ruled By: MAKARAU JA

This is a review of taxation in terms of Rule 56 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2018.

The Rule provides that any party aggrieved by the taxation of a bill of costs shall give notice of review setting out his or her grounds of objection. Thereafter, the matter shall be set down before a judge in chambers.

I will refer to the parties as the applicant, first and second respondents respectively for convenience.

The applicant raised three grounds of objection;

(i) He alleged, firstly, that the first respondent had erred in denominating the taxed bill in United States dollars in light of the provisions of S.I.33 of 2019.

(ii) Secondly, he argued that the first respondent erred in allowing the second respondent's travelling expenses from Bulawayo to Harare when the second respondent is resident in Harare.

(iii) Finally, he argued that the first respondent erred in allowing costs for legal services rendered to the second respondent in contravention of the Legal Practitioners Act [Chapter 27:07].

The second respondent opposed the review.

In the main, she contended that the parties agreed to the bill as well as to two other bills relating to other matters. The draft bill agreed to in casu was simply presented to the first respondent for his endorsement. She further argued that it was quite proper for the parties to agree to a bill denominated in United States dollars at the time of taxation as the prohibition against charging for goods and services in foreign currency came into force after 28 September 2019 when S.I. 213/19 was published.

In compliance with Rule 56(3), the Registrar filed a report.

The report was compiled by the first respondent. It states that when the parties appeared before him, they advised that they wanted to discuss the bill between themselves before engaging him. When they finally did, they presented to him a bill for endorsement. The issue of the denomination of the bill in United States dollars was never discussed with him.

I note, at this stage, that it was this endorsement of the bill by the first respondent that has given rise to this review.

The applicant regarded the endorsement, and correctly so in my view, as adoption of the bill by the first respondent.

The first respondent cannot distance himself from the denomination of the bill in United States dollars. By affixing his signature to the draft that was presented to him and lending the authority of his office to the draft, he effectively passed the bill under his hand.

For this reason, both parties regarded the bill as having been taxed by the first respondent, hence, the second respondent took out a writ of execution to recover the amount of the taxed costs.

The issue that falls for determination in this review is whether the bill of costs, as taxed in this matter, is proper.

The court is very slow to interfere with the exercise of the Taxing Officer's discretion. It will not readily do so unless it is satisfied that the Taxing Officer acted on some wrong principle or did not exercise his or her discretion at all.

The bill was presented for taxation on 8 July 2019. By that date, S.I.33 of 2019 was part of the law, having been published on 22 February 2019.

The statutory instrument introduced the RTGS dollar as a currency and legal tender, and placed it on par with the bond note and the United States dollar.

Although not of direct relevance to the determination of this review, S.I.33 of 2019 also decreed that all assets and liabilities denominated in United States dollars, prior to the publication date, were to be deemed to be in RTGS dollars at a rate of one-to one with the United States dollar. It also declared that every enactment in which an amount was stated in United States dollars was to be construed as stating the amount in RTGS dollars at parity with the United States dollar.

In addition, and more relevant to the determination of this matter, at the time the draft bill was presented for taxation, S.I.142 of 2019 was also in force, having been published on 24 June 2019. Whilst S.I 33 of 2019 introduced the RTGS dollar as legal tender alongside the bond note and other currencies, S.I 142/19 made the local currency, as set out in S.I.33 of 2019, the sole legal tender in all transactions in Zimbabwe.

The second respondent argued that it was not illegal to have the costs awarded in United States dollars where the parties had agreed to the amount being denominated in the currency of their choice. The illegality of the denomination of the bill in United States dollars only arose on 28 September 2019, she argued, when S.I.213 of 2019 was published. In her view, it was this instrument that made it illegal to sell goods and services in any other currency save the local currency.

With respect, the second respondent is in error. S.I.213/19 amended the Exchange Control Act to enforce the exclusive use of the Zimbabwean dollar in domestic transactions by creating civil offences and penalties. The Statutory Instrument merely provided sanctions for contravening the law that had decreed the local currency as the sole legal tender in all domestic transactions. The law that declared the local currency as the sole legal tender in all domestic transactions was S.I.142/19 and not S.I. 213/19.

In light of the prevailing legal position at the time the bill was taxed, its denomination in United States dollars was in contravention of the law. The first respondent therefore erred in passing under his hand a bill that contravened the law.

Accordingly, and on this basis alone, the bill cannot stand. It is the settled position at law that anything done in direct conflict with a statute is a nullity.

In making the above finding, I am aware that the second respondent averred that the denomination of the bill in United States dollars was with the consent of the applicant.

Such consent, which is disputed, would have been of no import even if proven to be true. The parties could not, by their consent to act against the clear letter of the law, confer legality upon a bill of costs denominated in United States dollars.

It is therefore my finding that the bill of costs taxed in SC211/19 should be set aside for the reason that it was in contravention of the law.

Whilst the above finding disposes of the proceedings before me, there is one issue that I wish to advert to briefly and in passing.

It is common cause that the second respondent was a litigant in person in Case No. SC211/19.

The bill under review for that matter indicates that the second respondent received legal advice from an entity called T. S. Labour Specialists.

By the second respondent's own admission, this entity is not a firm of registered legal practitioners. It is therefore not entitled to charge fees for legal services rendered.

The bill of costs is therefore also improper to the extent that it purports to compensate the second respondent for the outlays she made to this entity as fees for legal services rendered.

SC57-20 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LIMITED
Ruled By: GARWE JA, BHUNU JA and MAKONI JA

This is a court application filed in terms of Rule 449 of the High Court Rules, 1971 in which the applicant seeks an order rescinding the order granted by this court on 27 November 2019. In terms of the Supreme Court Rules, 2018 the High Court Rules apply whenever there ...

THE BACKGROUND TO THE APPLICATION

The applicant was employed by the respondent at its Bulawayo depot in the capacity of a Laboratory Technician Quality Control Analyst, Grade 3. In July 2015, the respondent introduced an incentive scheme in terms of which employees were to be paid a monetary incentive half yearly. The scheme was non-contractual and was introduced by the respondent to improve the morale of employees at the workplace and to motivate the employees during the performance of their duties. The incentive was payable at the discretion of the respondent's Internal Remuneration Committee and was to be tabled before the Managers' Works Council for its input before it could be operationalised.

One of the conditions of the incentive scheme was that it was not payable to an employee who would have been convicted of misconduct during the period covered by the scheme.

The scheme was to be paid half-yearly for the period January to June, and, thereafter, from July to December. The company under-performed during the period July–December 2015, and, consequently, no incentive was paid for that period. The company however did a lot better in the period January–June 2016 and some employees were paid the incentive bonus. The applicant was however not paid, the reason being that during that period he had been found guilty of misconduct and given a written warning.

The applicant raised a grievance in terms of the company's Code of Conduct, querying the decision not to pay him the incentive bonus. The grievance went through the three stages provided for in the employment Code and eventually came up before the Managing Executive–Stock Feeds, who was the last hearing officer. He found that the matter was pending on the Works Council agenda, and that, until the Council resolved the matter, the policy was to remain operational. In the result, the Managing Executive decided that the grievance was to await the determination of the Works Council and that Human Resources was to look into the cases of bonuses that had been paid in error.

Unhappy with the decision of the Managing Executive – Stock Feeds, the applicant appealed to the Labour Court on two grounds;

(i) First, that the respondent had erred in considering his past disciplinary record in justifying its decision not to pay him the incentive bonus.

(ii) Second, that the respondent had, in any event, erroneously relied on an invalid scheme which was yet to be debated at the level of the Works Council.

The Labour Court found that the applicant had been convicted of misconduct and given a written warning which was valid for three months. This had happened in January 2016. The court found that for the period January–June 2016, during which the incentive bonus was payable, the applicant had an existing misconduct case and that he was therefore ineligible to get the incentive bonus in terms of the conditions of the scheme. The court also found that the incentive scheme was not an entitlement and that it was non-contractual. It therefore found that, as a court, it could not, in these circumstances, impose an obligation on the employer to pay the incentive bonus in all cases as that would be tantamount to re-writing the contract of employment for the parties. The court further found that there was a contradiction in that, whilst the applicant was seeking an order for the payment of the incentive bonus to himself, he was, at the same time, impugning its validity. The court was therefore not persuaded by the argument that the scheme was invalid. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal with costs on the ordinary scale.

APPEAL TO THIS COURT IN CASE SC599/18

Dissatisfied with the ruling of the Labour Court, the applicant, as appellant, appealed to this Court seeking an order setting aside the judgment of the Labour Court and substituting the same with an order that the appeal succeeds and that the respondent pays him the incentive bonus. His grounds of appeal were formulated as follows:

“1. The judge a quo erred and grossly misdirected herself when upholding disqualification of payment of an incentive bonus on the basis of disciplinary record whose evidence was not explained or presented in court.

2. The court a quo erred on a point of law when upholding an illegal contract.

3. The court a quo grossly erred when it ruled that the court could not intervene in an agreement between the parties whereas the agreement is not dictated by good law or by fairness or good faith thereby giving reasons that are bad at law constituting failure to hear and determine according to law.

4. The judge a quo erred and grossly misdirected herself when she allowed disciplinary issues to overarch remuneration.

5. The learned judge erred and grossly misdirected herself by not ruling on Negotiating Framework document, a decision that ignores other issues that bring it for resolution is unreasonable and does not achieve finality.”

The appeal was opposed by the respondent who submitted that the payment of the incentive bonus was regulated by the Staff Incentive Scheme and not the respondent's Code of Conduct. The applicant could not, therefore, seek to enforce an incentive bonus that was not part of his employment contract and which was payable at the discretion of the employer. The incentive bonus was not remuneration due to the applicant as a right but was a discretionary payment to those employees who were not disqualified by the set terms and conditions of the scheme. The respondent accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the appeal together with costs on the higher scale, arguing that the appeal was an abuse of court process.

At the hearing of the earlier matter before this court, on 20 November 2019, the applicant appeared in person whilst the respondent was represented by a legal practitioner. After hearing submissions from both parties, the court had made the following order:

“It is ordered, by consent, that:

The appeal is dismissed with costs.”

I pause here to note that the order was by consent of the parties. Consequently, there are no reasons for the order made by this Court on the day in question.

THE PRESENT APPLICATION

The present application is for the rescission of the above order. The application states that it has been filed in terms of Rule 449(1)(b) of the High Court Rules, 1971. In his draft order, the applicant is seeking the following order:-

“Pending the finalisation of negotiations purposed on ratification of FY16 Staff Incentive Scheme following which either party may approach the court to rule on the contract of employment.”

It is his further submission that the order by this court did not spell out the fate of the incentive scheme following the dismissal of the appeal. He further poses the question whether “negotiations are now in futility and the incentive scheme is binding to the extent that any subsequent impeachment of the incentive scheme is res judicata.” He further submits that the above order will interfere with the negotiations that are to be negotiated by a task force set up by the Works Council for purposes of negotiating the incentive scheme.

The respondent opposes the application and the relief sought. It has submitted as follows:

“The application is incompetent and is an attempt to have this court review its previous decision. Further, there is nothing vague or ambiguous in the order that this Court made in November 2019. The respondent therefore prays for the dismissal of the application with costs on the higher scale for the reason that the application has not been instituted with a genuine desire to seek justice, but, rather, to harass the respondent.”

In his answering affidavit, the applicant points out that he has approached the court to rescind its order because it is vague and ambiguous. It is “vague on the applicability of the incentive scheme and legality of the contract of employment.” He further avers that the order is vague “as to the future rights of the parties and their privies with respect to clauses of the incentive scheme” and that the order “omits to express a position on the binding nature of incentive scheme leaving parties to guess. That vagueness is surely a compelling reason for rescission.” He has further submitted that “the order is unspecific” and “creates vagueness and ambiguity and is sound ground for rescission.”

PURPOSE OF RULE 449 OF THE HIGH COURT RULES

In general, once a court pronounces its decision it becomes functus officio, and cannot tinker with its decision except to correct typographical or other obvious mistakes. The High Court Rules, however, allow the court or a judge, under Rule 449(1)(b), whether mero motu or on application of any party affected, to correct, rescind or vary any judgment or order in which there is an ambiguity or patent error or omission – but, only to the extent of such ambiguity.

The purpose of Rule 449 is to enable the court to revisit its orders and judgments, to correct or set aside its orders and judgments where, to allow such orders to stand on the basis that the court is functus officio, would result in an injustice that may destroy the very basis upon which the justice system rests. It is an exception to the general rule and must be resorted to only for the purposes of correcting an injustice that cannot otherwise be corrected in any other way. The Rule goes beyond the ambit of mere formal, technical, and clerical errors and may include the substance of the order or judgment. It is designed to correct errors made by the court itself and is not a vehicle through which new issues and new parties are brought before the court - Tiriboyi v Jani & Anor 2004 (1) ZLR 470 (H)…,.

An ambiguous judgment would be one that is unclear and capable of more than one interpretation. This can happen because of the language used by the court. In such a case, relief can be granted where, because of the language, the ambiguity has the effect of obscuring the true intention of the court or judge. On the other hand, a patent error or omission is one which is clearly obvious to anyone reading the judgment or order. Examples include clerical errors on figures, dates, or spellings - Masamba v JSC and Another HH283-17.

WHETHER THERE WAS AN AMBIGUITY OR PATENT ERROR OR OMISSION IN THE ORDER OF THIS COURT DATED 20 NOVEMBER 2019

In its decision of 20 November 2019, this Court was asked to determine the appeal noted against the decision of the Labour Court that had, in turn, dismissed the appeal noted by the applicant. That decision, by the Labour Court, had dealt with the applicant's complaint that he had been improperly excluded from benefiting from the incentive scheme and that the scheme was, in any event, unlawful. The Labour Court had found that the decision to exclude the applicant was not improper. The Labour Court was not persuaded that the scheme was invalid and noted that the two reliefs sought by the applicant in the appeal were contradictory.

The appeal from the Labour Court to this Court raised three basic issues;

(i) First, that the Labour Court had misdirected itself in upholding the decision to disqualify the applicant from getting the incentive bonus.

(ii) Second, that the court erred in upholding an illegal contract.

(iii) Third, that the court erred in not ruling on the negotiating framework document.

These were the issues that fell for determination before this Court when it sat on 20 November 2019.

When this Court dismissed the appeal, on 20 November 2019, the findings and order previously made by the Labour Court remained extant. In other words, the findings that the incentive scheme was not unlawful and that the applicant was not eligible to be paid the incentive bonus in terms of the incentive scheme's terms and conditions remained extant.

After carefully considering the present application, I am in no doubt that the applicant has not shown any ambiguity or patent error or omission in the order made by this Court, with his consent, on 20 November 2019. The order is very clear and allows of no ambiguity. There is no patent error or omission in that order. The order is clear that it is dismissing the appeal filed against the judgment of the Labour Court.

The present application has not been filed in order to correct an ambiguity or a patent error or omission. To the contrary, it seeks to re-argue the issue of the incentive scheme (which was one of the issues that fell for determination before this Court on 20 November 2019) and also to introduce new issues. The draft order to the application seeks an order that:

“The whole order of court under SCB599/19, dated 27 November 2019, be and is hereby rescinded till notification of finalization of Works Council negotiations or ratification of FY16 Staff Incentive Scheme. Consequent to those negotiations the court will convene to rule on the contract of agreement.”…,.

The draft order therefore evinces an intention to have the order set aside, not because it is ambiguous or contains a patent error or omission, but because the applicant considers it necessary that it be rescinded until the negotiations before the Works Council are finalised after which this Court can then sit again and rule on the legality of the scheme.

It is apparent from the submissions made by the applicant, and from the draft order, that he believes that the order of this Court, of 20 November 2019, has short-circuited negotiations that are pending before the Works Council.

In paragraph 5 of his founding affidavit, the applicant states:-

“…, the final order usurps the statutory rights of the parties in the negotiations and interferes with the decision making process of the Works Council. It is for this reason that the final order must be rescinded to give effect to the statutory rights of the Works Council following which the final order may take effect.”

In paragraph 15 of his founding affidavit he states that:-

“…, the final order interferes with negotiations. The order may even trammel the outcome of the negotiations. The earlier final order is therefore not in the interests of justice.”

In paragraph 18 of the same founding affidavit, he says that the order:-

“…, gives effect to a unilateral draft document with no signatures and the document contains patent error in duties (as observed by the justice) with clauses yet to be negotiated at later dates while other clauses are expressly illegal.”

I agree with the respondent's submission that the gravamen of the complaint by the applicant is that he is unhappy with the order of this Court, made in November 2019, and that the intention is to change the complexion of that order.

There can be no doubt that, in these circumstances, the applicant has not demonstrated that there is any ambiguity or patent error or omission in the order made by this Court on 20 November 2019. What the applicant is seeking, therefore, is an order setting aside the previous order of this Court and substituting in its place an order that any decision of this Court should await the conclusion of the negotiations taking place before the Works Council.

Clearly, Rule 449(1)(b) was not intended to cater for the above situation.

The issues now raised should more properly have been raised in the appeal that was heard by this Court on 20 November 2019. Indeed, the allegation that the incentive scheme was unlawful was made in the grounds of appeal, but, as already noted, the appeal was, by consent, dismissed, thereby bringing to an end the argument that there was something wrong with the scheme.

COSTS

Whilst this Court accepts that, as a self actor, the applicant is entitled to his day in court in appropriate circumstances, it is clear in this case that the applicant could not have held the genuine belief that he could properly use Rule 449 in order to have the previous order of this Court set aside. He had consented to the dismissal of the appeal with costs. That order cannot, in any way, be said to be ambiguous nor can it be said that it contains a patent error or omission.

I am satisfied, on the papers before me, that the application was intended to achieve a result not contemplated by Rule 449 of the High Court Rules.

In the circumstances, whilst the courts are generally reluctant to mulct self-actors by ordering them to pay costs, and, in particular, costs on the higher scale, it seems to me that in a case, such as the present, where the self actor, as applicant, abuses the Rules of this Court in order to achieve his own purposes, an order that the self-actor pays costs on the higher scale is warranted.

DISPOSITION

The applicant has not demonstrated any ambiguity or patent error or omission in the order made by this Court on 20 November 2019. It is apparent from the papers that the purpose of the application was not so much to seek a correction or rescission of the order, but, rather, to have the order, granted by consent, set aside for the totally different purpose of having negotiations at the Works Council concluded on the incentive scheme. The application therefore is without merit and must fail.

It is accordingly ordered as follows:

“The application is dismissed with costs on the scale of legal practitioner and client.”

SC25-09 : AIDAN BECKFORD vs ELIZABETH BECKFORD
Ruled By: SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA and GWAUNZA JA

On 20 December 2006 the High Court granted a decree of divorce and other ancillary relief in a divorce action in which Mr Beckford was the plaintiff and Mrs Beckford the defendant. Aggrieved by part of the Order, Mr Beckford appealed to this Court. The Notice of Appeal, in relevant part, reads as follows:

“The appellant appeals against paragraphs 2, 3, 9, 10, 12 (only insofar as it relates to the respondent), 14, 15 (insofar as the time for payment by the appellant is required), 16, 17, 18, 19 (only insofar as it imposed upon the appellant the obligation to deliver such property to the respondent at his cost), 22 and 23 of the Order given by the High Court of Zimbabwe.”...,.

The parties were married to each other in Blackpool, Lancashire, England, on 26 November 1994. Two children were born of the marriage. These are Elsbeth Bridie Beckford, born on 7 August 1996, and Theodore Hugh Beckford, born on 9 February 1999. Both children were born in the United Kingdom.

At the pre-trial conference, the issues were identified as follows –

“1. Whether it is in the best interests of the minor children that custody be awarded to (the) plaintiff or (the) defendant, or that an award of joint custody be made.

2. Dependent upon the award of custody, the quantum of maintenance payable in respect of the children.

3. What order should be made in respect of the children's schooling?

4. The quantum of maintenance payable by (the) plaintiff to (the) defendant and the period thereof.

5. What assets constitute the matrimonial estate?

6. The apportionment thereof.

7. Costs.”

After a trial which lasted eight days the learned trial Judge prepared a long judgment in which he carefully considered the issues before him. I now wish to consider those paragraphs of the order of the court a quo which are challenged on appeal, and determine whether the learned trial Judge erred in any way....,.

PARAGRAPHS 22 AND 23

These paragraphs read as follows:

“22. The plaintiff's claim be and is hereby dismissed.

23. The plaintiff shall pay the defendant's costs of suit including any costs reserved for determination in this matter, and the qualifying fees and expenses of Mr de Marigny.”

The reasons for granting these two orders were set out by the learned trial Judge…, as follows:

“It seems to me that the two most contentious issues between the parties revolved around custody and the disclosure of matrimonial assets.

The defendant's case, on both these issues, has largely been vindicated. She has not been in employment for the past nine years and has been dependent on the plaintiff for her livelihood except for the period from April 2003 to July 2005 when she survived on the largesse of her parents and grandmother. It was also essential that she call the expert opinion of Mr de Marigny, which was invaluable to this court in the determination of the custody issue.

In my view, she is entitled to her costs of suit for both the main and counter-claims, including the qualifying expenses of Mr de Marigny.

It is for these reasons that I would dismiss the plaintiff's claim.”

In my view, the learned trial Judge's reasoning cannot be faulted. In any event, as far as the issue of the costs of suit is concerned, this is a matter within the discretion of the learned trial Judge.

SC82-20 : YAKUB MAHOMED vs JOHN BREDENKAMP and TANYARADZWA MASHAYAMOMBE N.O.
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MAKONI JA and BERE JA

Rule 307 provides:

“With a view to affording the party who has been awarded an order for costs a full indemnity for all costs reasonably incurred by him in relation to this claim or defence, and to ensure that all costs shall be borne by the party against whom such order has been awarded, the Taxing Officer shall, on every taxation, allow all such costs, charges and expenses as appear to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for defending the rights of any party, but, save as against the party who incurred the same, no costs shall be allowed which appear to the taxing office to have been incurred or increased through over caution, negligence or mistake, or by payment of a special fee to another legal practitioner, or special charges and expenses to witnesses or other person or by other unusual expenses.”

In terms of the above Rule, a Taxing Officer is expected to conduct an enquiry into the reasonableness of fees and disbursements that a successful litigant claims from his adversary.

To discharge that obligation, the Rule confers upon a Taxing Officer a discretion to allow costs, charges, and expenses incurred by a party which appear to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or defending the rights of any party. Such taxation is made in consonance with an existing order of costs granted by a court which specifies the party to be indemnified and the extent of such indemnification in general terms....,.

It follows that, in exercising the discretion conferred upon him, a Taxing Officer may not allow the costs which have been incurred or increased through over-caution, negligence or mistake, or by payment of a special fee to another legal practitioner, or special charges and expenses to witnesses or other persons or by other unusual expenses.

Therefore, a Taxing Officer can only allow bona fide and necessary costs on every taxation.

While allowing costs is the preserve of a Taxing Officer, Rule 314 provides that if a party is aggrieved by the decision of the Taxing Officer, made in terms of Rule 307, it may apply to the High Court for a review of such taxation.

The court may interfere with the decision made by a Tax Officer in certain circumstances. The principles applicable in review matters, in terms of Rule 314, are the same as apply to reviews in general.

HH485-16 : PUWAYI CHIUTSI LEGAL PRACTITIONERS vs THE REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT and THE TAXING OFFICER
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J

The taxation of a Bill of Costs is provided for in terms of Order 38 Rule 307 of the Rules of the High Court 1971, as follows:“ORDER 38 TAXATION OF COSTS AND REVIEW OF TAXATION307. Costs allowedWith a view to affording the party who has been awarded an order for ...

HH928-15 : ABC BANK LIMITED vs MACKIE DIAMONDS BVA and THE DEPUTY SHERIFF HARARE, N.O.
Ruled By: HUNGWE J

By reason of Order 38 Rule 307, the Taxing Officer may allow all such costs, charges, and expenses as appear to him to have been necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for defending the rights of any party....,.The purpose of an award of costs to a successful ...

HH97-17 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs SECRETARY – JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION
Ruled By: MANGOTA J

The applicant abused the court and its process in an inexcusable manner. His conduct should be visited with serious censure....,.The application is, accordingly, dismissed with costs on a higher scale.

HH283-17 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs THE SECRETARY – JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION and MERCY GORONGOZA
Ruled By: CHITAPI J

For abusing the judge and court as well as for unnecessarily citing the Judicial Services Commission in circumstances where the reasons thereof are not clear other than to bring it to the Commission's attention how the applicant had little regard for the judge, a punitive costs order as prayed for ...

HH390-18 : MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY vs ALOIS MATONGO
Ruled By: MUZOFA J

HERBSTEIN and Van WINSEN in The Civil Practice of the High Court Vol. 2, 5th ed…, succinctly set out the purpose of an award of costs as follows:“…, to indemnify him for the expense to which he has been put through having been unjustly compelled to initiate or defend litigation, ...

HH978-15 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs SECRETARY-JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION
Ruled By: MUNANGATI-MANONGWA J

Whilst it is a constitutional right to be able to approach the courts to obtain relief, self-actors must know that the practice of law is a very specialised area which requires deep knowledge and skill. Simply reading law books at random does not equip one with the requisite knowledge. Legal ...

HB189-18 : CLAUDIUS MANAMELA and BRIGHTON NANGA and SIBONGILE MANAMELA vs ROSEWELL ZULU and APOSTOLIC FAITH MISSION OF AFRICA INTL and CLEMENT NYATHI and APOSTOLIC FAITH MISSION OF AFRICA
Ruled By: MABHIKWA J

The court will re-iterate my brother MATHONSI J's warning, that, a litigant or litigants cannot be allowed to enjoy filing frivolous applications at the same time abusing the court and other litigants.This court will add a warning, to the first applicant in particular, that, it cannot allow a situation where ...

HH44-10 : JOHN STRONG (PVT) LTD and TOBS STRONG (PVT) LTD vs WILLIAM WACHENUKA
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

The applicants asked for costs on a higher scale.It was contended that the applicants have had to approach this court on numerous occasions because of the respondent's defiance of court orders. This has resulted in additional and unwarranted expenses to the applicants.The court has been asked to express it displeasure ...

SC11-21 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LTD and LOVEJOY NYANDORO [as Chairman of Appeals Committee] and CHIPO NHETA [as Chairman of Works Council]
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

In respect to costs, the first respondent sought costs in the event that it was successful. I find no basis to deny the first respondent its costs as prayed.

SC91-21 : ELPHAS MAPHISA vs CITY OF BULAWAYO
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

The appellant's appeal has no merit. The appellant has unfortunately continued with vexatious litigation. The respondent is entitled to costs at the legal practitioner and client scale.The appeal is dismissed with costs on the legal practitioner and client scale.

SC93-21 : RINOS TERERA vs GEORGE LOCK and CK HOLLAND t/a HOLLAND ESTATE AGENT and ZIMBABWE HOUSING COMPANY (PVT) LTD and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE AJA

The respondents counsel, in seeking costs on the higher scale, alluded to the litigious nature of the applicant in spite of extant court orders against him which he has not challenged and the fact that the property in question was transferred to the third respondent in 2016 to his knowledge.

Transfer to the third respondent was effected more than three years ago yet the applicant still drags the respondents to court on unsustainable claims.

In this regard, they submitted, that, the applicant has been constantly in and out of the courts in a plethora of matters, some of which were referred to as case numbers HC1236/17, HC8602/17, HC1377/19, HC2042/19, MUTP 3015-16/18, Mutare Magistrates Court 2102/17, not to mention open files before the Anti-Corruption Court, the Law Society of Zimbabwe, and the Judicial Service Commission Secretariat.

The applicant clearly is very litigious and unrelenting despite advice that his complaints were not sustainable.

It is in the interests of justice that court proceedings be brought to finality.

Competent orders affording real rights to the third respondent remain extant as the applicant has not appealed against them.

They thus submitted that the applicant be mulcted with costs on a higher scale.

I am inclined to agree with the respondents on this point.

The applicant's Achilles heel is his failure to seek appropriate legal advice in pursuit of litigation. In the result, he has pursued wrong causes, just as in this case, whereby, instead of appealing against the findings by the court a quo on the special plea, he opted to attack issues that were not determined by the court a quo.

In this regard, during the hearing, effort was made to direct him to the real issues at hand as he had submitted heads of arguments unrelated to the findings on the special plea.

The applicant seems to be confused as to the extent of the issues he can raise on appeal. He appears headstrong that this Court, if it is to condone his non-compliance, should proceed to hear his cause on the issues the court a quo did not hear at all.

The inevitable consequence is that he has caused the respondents to defend the spurious processes thus incurring unnecessary costs. The respondents were thus justified in seeking costs on a punitive scale....,.

The application for condonation of non-compliance with the Rules, and extension of time within which to appeal, be and is hereby dismissed with costs on the legal practitioner and client scale.

CC05-21 : RITA MBATHA vs CONFEDERATION OF ZIMBABWE INDUSTRIES and THE SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: GARWE AJCC, GOWORA AJCC and PATEL AJCC

The first respondent has prayed that the applicant be mulcted with an order for costs.In constitutional matters, it is not the norm that costs be awarded against the unsuccessful litigant. The first respondent has not suggested that the applicant is guilty of vexatious conduct or an abuse of court process. ...

SC86-14 : W. CHOMUREMA and E. MUZOKOMBA vs TELONE
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

In chambers in terms of Rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1964.

The applicants are appearing before a judge of this Court for the third time, their earlier applications having been dismissed on procedural grounds.

Essentially, in this, and the previous two applications, the applicants are requesting this Court to give to them leave, which they perceive to have been denied by the Labour Court, to file a belated appeal against their dismissal from employment with the respondent.

In this quest, the two have made tracks back and forth between the Labour Court and this Court, with the result that the matter is now hopelessly entangled in procedural niceties.

It became evident to me that this 'tangle' had to be unravelled first before a way forward could be ascertained. This is particularly so given that the legally unrepresented, but determined, applicants are pressing to have their day in court, albeit, they complicated matters further by filing lengthy and repetitive submissions with each application they brought before both the courts.

Accordingly, after hearing the parties, and, in order to enable me to properly determine the matter, I directed them to re-construct the record and arrange all the applications, and other papers, in the order they had been filed. I indicated I would then peruse the record and give any directions that may be necessary to unlock the process and have the matter move forward.

This would, at the same time, point the applicants to any options that may be open to them in terms of the way forward.

Chronicled below, in conveniently numbered paragraphs, are the relevant facts of the matter, as well as the sequence of events, in so far as I have been able to make them out. I have interspersed the narration/analysis with relevant observations or findings of my own;

1. The applicants are former employees of the respondent; they were dismissed on misconduct charges of theft and fraud in 2009.

2. Having unsuccessfully pursued all internal remedies for redress, they appealed to the Labour Court, on the 30th of October 2009 against their dismissal. In a detailed judgment, the Labour Court dismissed the appeal having found that the two had been properly charged, convicted, and dismissed.

3. The two resolved to appeal to this court but failed to apply to the Labour Court for leave to appeal within the 30-day period which is stipulated in that court's rules.

This, in my view, is where their problems started.3. The two resolved to appeal to this court but failed to apply to the Labour Court for leave to appeal within the 30-day period which is stipulated in that court's rules.

This, in my view, is where their problems started.

4. On the 16th of March 2010, some sixty-six days beyond the stipulated time limits, the applicants filed an application in the Labour Court titled “APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT.”

The relief sought, according to their draft order, mirrored the same title.

A look at the founding affidavit shows that the applicants appreciated the fact that their application would be filed out of time, and that, therefore, they would need to secure condonation of the late filing of the application.

This is evidenced by paragraph (viii) of the founding affidavit, which reads as follows;

“I humbly urge this Honourable Court to condone the delay in this application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on the basis that:

(i) I travelled to my rural home ending up in too much delay of noting an appeal (sic).

(ii) As a self-actor, I took too long to find the Labour Court Rules that I can prepare my application.” (sic)

The request for condonation, apart from not being reflected in the title of the application, was, in addition, not incorporated into the draft order.

As indicated later in this judgment, the Judge a quo took the view, that, no application for condonation was before the court.

5. Nevertheless, the Judge issued the following order on the 23rd of June 2010;

“The application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court be and is hereby denied on the basis that it was out of time and the reason for the delay was not a reasonable one.”…,.

I find this order to be incomprehensible in a number of respects;

(a) Having taken the view that there was no proper application for condonation of the late application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, it is not clear why or how the court could have proceeded to 'dismiss' the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

(b) The reasons given for the 'dismissal' of the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court are reasons properly associated with an application for condonation of failure to comply with the rules of the court;

(c) While the reasons might have suggested that the Labour Court had in fact entertained an application for condonation of the late filing of the application for leave to appeal, the court dispelled this notion by specifically stating in its order, that, it had dismissed the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court; and

(d) Even were it to be taken that the court entertained the application for condonation, the absence of an order specifically granting such condonation establishes otherwise.

6. What is evident, though, is that the Labour Court did not consider the merits of the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. Indeed, it could not have properly done so without first condoning the late filing of such an application. The applicants were barred, and, at that point in time, out of court.

The applicants should have filed a composite application;

(a) For condonation of the late filing of the application for leave to appeal; and

(b) For leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Because they did not do so, the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court was not properly before the Labour Court.

7. I am of the firm view, that, instead of dismissing the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court for the reasons it gave, the Labour Court should have properly struck the application off the roll.

It is also my opinion, that, since a court cannot dismiss what is not before it, the Labour Court's order of 23 June 2010, was incompetent.

8. Had the Labour Court struck the matter of the roll, the applicants would most likely have been alerted to the need to file a proper application with the same court, for condonation, together with one for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

9. As this did not happen, the applicants, who felt aggrieved by the decision 'dismissing' their application for leave to appeal, and had no reason to believe the order to be incompetent, mistakenly, but understandably (being legally unrepresented), filed a chamber application before this court on the 19th of July 2010, under case number SC175/10.

They sought the leave of a Judge to appeal to it (purportedly) in terms of section 92F(3) of the Labour Court Act (“the Act”).

10. The application was dismissed in chambers by GARWE JA on the 14th of December 2010, without considering the merits thereof. This was on the basis, that, this Court could not consider the application for leave to appeal to it before:

(i) Condonation for the late filing of that application in the Labour Court had been obtained; and

(ii) The leave of the Labour Court had been properly sought and denied.

11. After the dismissal of their application by a Judge of this Court, significantly, not on the merits, as indicated in paragraph 9, the applicants approached the Labour Court on the 21st of December 2010 and filed a composite application for -

(i) Condonation of the late filing of the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the Labour Court's order of 30 October 2009; and

(ii) Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

12. On the 21st of February 2011, the Labour Court made a ruling that it could not 'plough the same road' as it had already made a decision on that particular issue. It made the following order;

“1. The Court has dealt with the application for leave to appeal and dismissed it on 23 June 2010;

2. The court is thus functus officio and must dismiss the present application;

3. The application is accordingly dismissed.”…,.

13. It is my considered view, based on the foregoing analysis, that the Labour Court was misguided in its view that it had already heard and determined the application for leave to appeal to this Court. As stated above, and despite the wording of its order of 23 June 2010, the court had NOT properly heard nor determined the application for leave to appeal against its decision of 30 October 2009.

14. In stating this, I am fully cognisant of the fact, that, I am not sitting as an Appeal Court to consider this matter.

Accordingly, as a single judge in chambers, I cannot make, and indeed, should not be taken to be making, a final pronunciation on the matter.

Such a task would properly be within the preview of an appeal bench of this Court.

With this in mind, I nevertheless hazard to express the view, that, contrary to its finding, the Labour Court was, in effect, not functus officio and should properly have entertained the application filed by the applicants on 21 December 2010.

It seems to me, that, the Labour Court judge failed to appreciate the fact, that, the applicant's seemingly repeated filing of the same application was traceable, in part, to the court's failure from the onset (i.e. 16 March, 2010) to indicate to the applicants (by striking the matter off the roll) that they could not apply to it for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court without first seeking its condonation of the late filing of such application.

That the court fully appreciated that this was the correct sequence of events to be followed, is evident from the following observations contained in the judge's reasons for the decision in the question;

“The reason (for dismissing the application of 21 December 2010, for condonation and for leave to appeal) are that on 23 June 2010 an application for leave to appeal was dismissed because it was filed out of time. At that time, no application for condonation was made….,.

The two applications that were filed sought to resuscitate a matter that had been dealt with to finality - at least before this Court. Should I condone the application for leave that has already been denied? I could not consider the second application for leave to appeal because I had already denied it. It was water under the bridge. I could not deal with the application because it was ill timed. It ought to have preceded the first application for leave which I had already dismissed.”

15. A couple of pertinent observations can be made from this rather unclear reasoning.

(i) Firstly, the judge a quo properly realised that the first application by the appellants needed to be preceded by an application for condonation of its late filing. The learned judge, however, then fell into the error of not fully appreciating the implication of this default vis a vis the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

This was that, absent an application for condonation of late filing of the application for leave to appeal, there was nothing before the court to dismiss.

The later application could not stand on its own, being premised on nothing.

(ii) Secondly, since the dismissal in question was, in my view, incompetent, there would have been nothing to prevent the court from hearing the two applications.

Thus, nothing was dealt with 'to finality'.

16. Be that as it may, the applicants did not, as they may have done, take the requisite steps to appeal to this Court against the Labour Court's finding that;

(i) It was functus officio; and

(ii) That, it had already dealt with the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

17. The applicants, instead, came back to this court seeking an order for leave to appeal against the court a quo's decision on the main dispute.

18. Needless to say, this application was repetitive and therefore improper.

The ground upon which the first application had been dismissed, that is, absence of condonation by the Labour Court, was still in point.

19. The application was heard and dismissed by GARWE JA on 17 November 2011. As a mark of its displeasure, this Court ordered that the applicants pay costs on the higher scale.

20. To the extent that this court had earlier dismissed the same application, albeit, and also without considering the merits, it could have been argued that the matter was res judicata and that this court was functus officio.

The judge, however, did not make a pronouncement nor issue an order to this effect.

21. The appellants apparently felt they could still pursue the dispute, and, in a manner suggestive of their now being totally confused and entangled in a true web of procedural technicalities, the relentless applicants went back to the Labour Court on 7 December 2011 and filed an application with this somewhat confusing title;

“CHAMBER APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION FOR LATE FILING OF AN APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST THE DENIAL OF CONDONATION AND APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST THE DENIAL OF CONDONATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT”

What immediately becomes evident from this title is the fact, that, the application in question was premised on the view, that, an application for condonation of the late filing of an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court had been heard and refused by the Labour Court.

The opposite was in fact the case.

The learned judge, in the excerpt from her judgment that is cited in paragraph 14 above, made it very clear why she was not going to entertain such an application. Nor did she, in the end, do so.

The application was therefore misguided.

22. Having, again, found no satisfaction from the Labour Court, the applicants have now, yet again, approached this Court with this application, which is no less misguided than the last one they made before the Labour Court (see above).

The application brings nothing new to this Court unless it is to demonstrate the applicants sheer determination to pursue the matter to what they perceive to be its logical conclusion - whatever pitfalls may stand in their way.

As this Court has entertained the same matter several times, it is my view, that, the court is now functus officio.

The dispute has gone round in circles for a period of over five years and there must be finality to litigation.

The application now before me is, in any case, not sustainable in its current form.

Accordingly, the application is dismissed with costs.

HH335-14 : ZUWA DAMSON vs LINCOLN USHAMBA
Ruled By: TSANGA J

(a)...,.(b) I made no order as to costs since the parties were both self-actors.

HMT58-19 : EVANS MULAUZI vs RUSAPE TOWN COUNCIL and SOLOMON GABAZA and TARISAI MANZONZO
Ruled By: MWAYERA J and MUZENDA J

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety. The appellant has to pay the respondents wasted costs....,.The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs.

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HB179-11 : SAMUEL KUFANDADA vs SUPERINTENDANT PILATE MOYO and CHIEF SUPERINTANDANT MATANGE and SUPERITENDANT MOYO and SUPERINTENDANT ZULU and COMMISSIONER GENERAL POLICE
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

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Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MAKONI JA and BERE JA

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Ruled By: MUZOFA J

HH978-15 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs SECRETARY-JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION
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Ruled By: MABHIKWA J

HH44-10 : JOHN STRONG (PVT) LTD and TOBS STRONG (PVT) LTD vs WILLIAM WACHENUKA
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Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

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Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

SC93-21 : RINOS TERERA vs GEORGE LOCK and CK HOLLAND t/a HOLLAND ESTATE AGENT and ZIMBABWE HOUSING COMPANY (PVT) LTD and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE AJA

CC05-21 : RITA MBATHA vs CONFEDERATION OF ZIMBABWE INDUSTRIES and THE SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: GARWE AJCC, GOWORA AJCC and PATEL AJCC

SC86-14 : W. CHOMUREMA and E. MUZOKOMBA vs TELONE
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

HH335-14 : ZUWA DAMSON vs LINCOLN USHAMBA
Ruled By: TSANGA J

HMT58-19 : EVANS MULAUZI vs RUSAPE TOWN COUNCIL and SOLOMON GABAZA and TARISAI MANZONZO
Ruled By: MWAYERA J and MUZENDA J

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Costs re: Self Actors, Witness Expenses and Compensation to Third Parties for Legal Advice Rendered to Self-Actors

HB179-11 : SAMUEL KUFANDADA vs SUPERINTENDANT PILATE MOYO and CHIEF SUPERINTANDANT MATANGE and SUPERITENDANT MOYO and SUPERINTENDANT ZULU and COMMISSIONER GENERAL POLICE Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

SC40-19 : SHINGIRAI PHILIP KATSANDE vs ANGELINA KATSANDE (NEE NYAHEMWA) Ruled By: PATEL JA

SC07-20 : FARAI BWATIKONA ZIZHOU vs THE TAXING OFFICER and RITA MARQUE MBATHA Ruled By: MAKARAU JA

SC57-20 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LIMITED Ruled By: GARWE JA, BHUNU JA and MAKONI JA

SC25-09 : AIDAN BECKFORD vs ELIZABETH BECKFORD Ruled By: SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA and GWAUNZA JA

SC82-20 : YAKUB MAHOMED vs JOHN BREDENKAMP and TANYARADZWA MASHAYAMOMBE N.O. Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MAKONI JA and BERE JA

HH485-16 : PUWAYI CHIUTSI LEGAL PRACTITIONERS vs THE REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT and THE TAXING OFFICER Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J

HH928-15 : ABC BANK LIMITED vs MACKIE DIAMONDS BVA and THE DEPUTY SHERIFF HARARE, N.O. Ruled By: HUNGWE J

HH97-17 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs SECRETARY – JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION Ruled By: MANGOTA J

HH283-17 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs THE SECRETARY – JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION and MERCY GORONGOZA Ruled By: CHITAPI J

HH390-18 : MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY vs ALOIS MATONGO Ruled By: MUZOFA J

HH978-15 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs SECRETARY-JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION Ruled By: MUNANGATI-MANONGWA J

HB189-18 : CLAUDIUS MANAMELA and BRIGHTON NANGA and SIBONGILE MANAMELA vs ROSEWELL ZULU and APOSTOLIC FAITH MISSION OF AFRICA INTL and CLEMENT NYATHI and APOSTOLIC FAITH MISSION OF AFRICA Ruled By: MABHIKWA J

HH44-10 : JOHN STRONG (PVT) LTD and TOBS STRONG (PVT) LTD vs WILLIAM WACHENUKA Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

SC11-21 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LTD and LOVEJOY NYANDORO [as Chairman of Appeals Committee] and CHIPO NHETA [as Chairman of Works Council] Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

SC91-21 : ELPHAS MAPHISA vs CITY OF BULAWAYO Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

SC93-21 : RINOS TERERA vs GEORGE LOCK and CK HOLLAND t/a HOLLAND ESTATE AGENT and ZIMBABWE HOUSING COMPANY (PVT) LTD and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE AJA

CC05-21 : RITA MBATHA vs CONFEDERATION OF ZIMBABWE INDUSTRIES and THE SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE Ruled By: GARWE AJCC, GOWORA AJCC and PATEL AJCC

SC86-14 : W. CHOMUREMA and E. MUZOKOMBA vs TELONE Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

HH335-14 : ZUWA DAMSON vs LINCOLN USHAMBA Ruled By: TSANGA J

HMT58-19 : EVANS MULAUZI vs RUSAPE TOWN COUNCIL and SOLOMON GABAZA and TARISAI MANZONZO Ruled By: MWAYERA J and MUZENDA J

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HB179-11 : SAMUEL KUFANDADA vs SUPERINTENDANT PILATE MOYO and CHIEF SUPERINTANDANT MATANGE and SUPERITENDANT MOYO and SUPERINTENDANT ZULU and COMMISSIONER GENERAL POLICE
Ruled By: KAMOCHA J

SC40-19 : SHINGIRAI PHILIP KATSANDE vs ANGELINA KATSANDE (NEE NYAHEMWA)
Ruled By: PATEL JA

SC07-20 : FARAI BWATIKONA ZIZHOU vs THE TAXING OFFICER and RITA MARQUE MBATHA
Ruled By: MAKARAU JA

SC57-20 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LIMITED
Ruled By: GARWE JA, BHUNU JA and MAKONI JA

SC25-09 : AIDAN BECKFORD vs ELIZABETH BECKFORD
Ruled By: SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA and GWAUNZA JA

SC82-20 : YAKUB MAHOMED vs JOHN BREDENKAMP and TANYARADZWA MASHAYAMOMBE N.O.
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MAKONI JA and BERE JA

HH485-16 : PUWAYI CHIUTSI LEGAL PRACTITIONERS vs THE REGISTRAR OF THE HIGH COURT and THE TAXING OFFICER
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J

HH928-15 : ABC BANK LIMITED vs MACKIE DIAMONDS BVA and THE DEPUTY SHERIFF HARARE, N.O.
Ruled By: HUNGWE J

HH97-17 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs SECRETARY – JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION
Ruled By: MANGOTA J

HH283-17 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs THE SECRETARY – JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION and MERCY GORONGOZA
Ruled By: CHITAPI J

HH390-18 : MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY vs ALOIS MATONGO
Ruled By: MUZOFA J

HH978-15 : IGNATIUS MASAMBA vs SECRETARY-JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION
Ruled By: MUNANGATI-MANONGWA J

HB189-18 : CLAUDIUS MANAMELA and BRIGHTON NANGA and SIBONGILE MANAMELA vs ROSEWELL ZULU and APOSTOLIC FAITH MISSION OF AFRICA INTL and CLEMENT NYATHI and APOSTOLIC FAITH MISSION OF AFRICA
Ruled By: MABHIKWA J

HH44-10 : JOHN STRONG (PVT) LTD and TOBS STRONG (PVT) LTD vs WILLIAM WACHENUKA
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

SC11-21 : TENDAI BONDE vs NATIONAL FOODS LTD and LOVEJOY NYANDORO [as Chairman of Appeals Committee] and CHIPO NHETA [as Chairman of Works Council]
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA

SC91-21 : ELPHAS MAPHISA vs CITY OF BULAWAYO
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

SC93-21 : RINOS TERERA vs GEORGE LOCK and CK HOLLAND t/a HOLLAND ESTATE AGENT and ZIMBABWE HOUSING COMPANY (PVT) LTD and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE AJA

CC05-21 : RITA MBATHA vs CONFEDERATION OF ZIMBABWE INDUSTRIES and THE SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: GARWE AJCC, GOWORA AJCC and PATEL AJCC

SC86-14 : W. CHOMUREMA and E. MUZOKOMBA vs TELONE
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

HH335-14 : ZUWA DAMSON vs LINCOLN USHAMBA
Ruled By: TSANGA J

HMT58-19 : EVANS MULAUZI vs RUSAPE TOWN COUNCIL and SOLOMON GABAZA and TARISAI MANZONZO
Ruled By: MWAYERA J and MUZENDA J