At the conclusion of the hearing of this matter in the High Court, the court, inter alia, granted absolution from the instance in respect of the appellant's claim for general damages, future expenses, and replacement value for his motor vehicle.

It is only against that portion of the judgment that the appellant has appealed to this Court.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On 23 July 2006, the appellant was involved in a serious road accident with the respondent at the intersection of Breach Road and Kingsmead Road in Borrowdale, Harare. As a result of the accident, the appellant sustained serious injuries. He was conveyed to Parirenyatwa Hospital whilst in a coma. Thereafter, he was detained in the High Dependency Unit for seventeen (17) days. He spent seven-and-a-half months at St. Giles Rehabilitation Centre. He spent a total of about one-and-half years undergoing hospitalization.

It was accepted, during the trial, that, prior to the accident, the appellant had been active in sport and that he had been in charge of sport and discipline at St Johns College, Borrowdale. In particular, he was in charge of rugby, swimming, hockey, and athletics at the school.

The court a quo found, on the evidence, that the accident was the result of gross negligence on the part of the respondent.

In considering the appellant's claim for general damages, the court a quo found, as a fact, that the appellant will require surgical operations, regular physiotherapy, and medication for the rest of his life. The court also found that he experiences weaknesses of the forearm and arm on the left side and that he will suffer from pain for a very long time.

A report prepared by Professor Kalangu stated that the lower plexus should show good improvement but did not indicate to what extent he was likely to improve. The court was of the view, that, in the absence of evidence from the two doctors who attended to the appellant, the extent of his disability was debatable.

On that basis, the court a quo granted absolution from the instance.

On the question of future medical attention, the court accepted that the appellant will require transport to attend physiotherapy and rehabilitation and that he will require future medical attention. However, the court reached the conclusion that the plaintiff had failed to show how many sessions he would be required to undertake to enable the court to assess the future expenses that he was likely to incur.

On that basis, the court also granted absolution from the instance.

On the question of the replacement value of the motor vehicle, the court a quo came to the conclusion that since delictual damages are calculated as at the time of the delict, the appellant had failed to explain, satisfactorily, the delay between the time of issuance of the summons and the time when quotations were obtained.

In particular, the court was of the view that consideration of factors such as inflation in the calculation of delictual damages would amount to altering the quantum of the debt and would be in conflict with the principle of currency nominalism.

As a result, the court a quo also granted absolution from the instance.

In his grounds of appeal, the appellant has attacked the decision of the court a quo on three bases. These are:

1. That the court a quo erred in failing to consider the evidence placed before it and thereafter to exercise its discretion to make an award for general damages in favour of the appellant.

2. The court a quo erred in failing to consider the evidence placed before it and thereafter in exercising its discretion to make an award for future medical expenses in favour of the appellant.

3. The court a quo erred in applying the principle of currency nominalism and in failing to exercise its discretion to make an award in favour of the appellant for the replacement value of his motor vehicle.

The appellant seeks an order that paragraph 2 of the order of the court a quo be set aside and that the respondent be ordered to pay;

(a) The sum of US$50,000, being the equivalent of Z$1 billion as at the date of judgment, as general damages together with interest thereon at the rate prevailing in the United States of America from the date of judgment to date of payment in full;

(b) The sum of US$5,000, being future medical expenses together with interest thereon at the rate prevailing in the United States from the date of judgment to the date of payment; and

(c) The sum of US$8,000 being the replacement value of the appellant's motor vehicle.

It is appropriate, at this stage, to consider the approach that has been followed by the Courts in the assessment of damages in general, and special damages in particular.

In Hersman Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367, 379-80 STRATFORD J observed:

“…, monetary damage having been suffered, it is necessary for the Court to assess the amount and make the best use it can of the evidence before it.

There are cases where the assessment by the Court is very little more than an estimate; but, even so, if it is certain that pecuniary damage has been suffered, the Court is bound to award damages. It is not so bound in the case where evidence is available to the plaintiff which he has not produced; in those circumstances, the Court is justified in giving, and does give, absolution from the instance.

But, where the best evidence available has been produced, though it is not entirely of a conclusive character and does not permit of a mathematical calculation of the damages suffered, still, if it is the best evidence available, the Court must use it and arrive at a conclusion based upon it…,.”

In Ebrahim v Pittman N.O. 1995 (1) ZLR 176H, 187C-D BARTLETT J quoted with approval the remarks of BERMAN J in Aarons Whale Rock Trust v Murray & Roberts Ltd & Anor 1992 (1) SA 652 (C), 655H-656F that:

“'Where damages can be assessed with exact mathematical precision, a plaintiff is expected to adduce sufficient evidence to meet this requirement. Where, as is the case here, this cannot be done, the plaintiff must lead such evidence as is available to it (but of adequate sufficiency) so as to enable the court to quantify his damage to make an appropriate award in his favour. The court must not be faced with an exercise in guesswork; what is required of a plaintiff is that he should put before the court enough evidence from which it can, albeit with difficulty, compensate him by an award of money as a fair approximation of his mathematically unquantifiable loss.…,.'

There must of course be sufficient evidence before the court for it to be in a position to make a proper assessment of damages; for '…, it is not competent for a court to embark upon conjecture in assessing damages where there is no factual basis in evidence, or an inadequate factual basis, for an assessment, and, it is not competent to award an arbitrary approximation of damages to a plaintiff who has failed to produce available evidence upon which a proper assessment of the loss could have been made': per ROSE INNES AJ in Monumental Art Co v Kenston Pharmacy (Pty) Ltd 1976 (2) SA 111 (C) at 118E. See also Mkwananzi v Van der Merwe & Anor 1970 (1) SA 609 (A) at 630.

Thus, where evidence is available to a plaintiff to place before the court to assist it in quantifying damages, and this is not produced, so that it is impossible for the court to do so, or there is no, or quite insufficient evidence which can be produced by an unfortunate plaintiff, he must fail and the defendant must be absolved from the instance…,.”

In, The Quantum of Damages in Bodily and Fatal Injury Cases, 3ed by CORBETT, BUCHANAN & GAUNTLETT, the learned authors state as follows…,:

“In the case of damages which are capable of exact mathematical computation, such as, for example, medical and hospital expenses, proper evidence establishing the loss and substantiating the precise amount of the claim must be tendered.

Where, on the other hand, mathematical proof of the damages suffered is in the nature of things impossible, then, provided that there is evidence that pecuniary damage in this regard has been suffered, the court must estimate the amount of the damages as best as it can on the evidence available and the plaintiff cannot be non-suited because the damages cannot be exactly computed.

However, the application of this principle is dependent upon the plaintiff having adduced the best evidence available to him. Where he has not done so, and the difficulties in assessing the quantum of damages are due to the manner in which he has conducted his case, then the court is justified in ordering, and does order, absolution from the instance.”

The remarks made in the authorities cited above no doubt correctly reflect the law on the approach to damages in bodily and fatal injury cases both in this country and South Africa.

The first ground of appeal that falls for determination by this Court is whether the court a quo erred in failing to consider the available evidence, and, thereafter, making an award for general damages in favour of the appellant.

The amount claimed as general damages before the court a quo was the sum of Z$1 billion as at the date of judgment. The Z$1 billion claimed represented damages for pain and suffering, disability, bodily disfigurement, shock, discomfort, loss of amenities of life, and shortened life expectancy.

The court a quo delivered its judgment on 16 April 2009, and, in respect of this particular claim, granted absolution from the instance. The basis for that decision was that the remark by Dr Kalangu, in his report, that, “lower plexus should show good improvement”, was imprecise. The court a quo was of the view that it was not clear to what extent the improvement would affect the degree of disability. Further, although the report alluded to the need for a repeat study after six months, no such examination appears to have been undertaken. In view of the medical opinion that the appellant's condition could improve with rehabilitation and treatment, the court concluded that the extent of the disability was debatable, and that, therefore, the appellant had not placed sufficient evidence before the court to enable it to make a proper assessment.

It is correct, as the court found, that no further tests were done to ascertain the degree to which the appellant was likely to recover. The fact that the appellant had sustained very serious injuries from which he could never fully recover was common cause. The court accepted, that, following the accident, he had had to be hospitalized for about one-and-a-half years. The court accepted the report by Dr Kalangu, that, the appellant had sustained “complete paralysis of the left and complete paralysis of both lower limbs” (sic). The radiological investigations had revealed a fracture of the left clavicle, fracture of the spine in C5 and C6 and dislocation of the vertebra in C5-6 associated with spinal cord compression. Dr Kalangu estimated the percentage of disability at 60%. He further found that the appellant will have pain for a long time and he will require physiotherapy.

The court also accepted the report by Professor Meikle, of the Clinical Neurophysiology Laboratory, Harare Hospital, that the appellant had weakness of all the muscle groups in the left arm with no movement in the shoulder and elbow muscles. The Professor found the upper plexus to have been seriously injured with no sign of recovery “at present” but the lower plexus was expected to show good improvement.

Although the Professor recommended repeat studies in six months, as already noted, nothing further appears to have happened after the preparation of that report.

The court a quo found that the accident had had a serious effect on the appellant, who, before the accident, had been in charge of sport at St Johns College, Borrowdale, and had generally been active in short. His condition, after the accident, had also affected his relationship with his daughter, who, it appeared, simply could not understand why her father could no longer engage in the activities he used to.

The court a quo further accepted, as fact, that the appellant will, for the rest of his life, require medical attention, including operations, regular physiotherapy, and medication.

It certainly would have helped had the appellant undergone further examination thereafter so that the exact degree of his injuries could have been ascertained. This notwithstanding, the evidence placed before the court, in my view, was sufficient to enable the court to make an award.

As WATERMEYER JA aptly put it in Sandler v Wholesale & Coal Supplies Ltd 1941 AD 194, 199:

“…, it must be recognized that though the law attempts to repair the wrong done to a sufferer who has received personal injuries in an accident by compensating him in money, yet, there are no scales by which pain and suffering can be measured, and there is no relationship between pain and money which makes it possible to express the one in terms of the other with any approach to certainty. The amount to be awarded as compensation can only be determined by the broadest general considerations and the figure arrived at must necessarily be uncertain, depending upon the judge's view of what is fair in all the circumstances of the case.”

The extent of the injuries sustained was substantiated.

The doctors suggested that there was some possibility of improvement but this could only be determined if a repeat study was carried out at a later stage. During the trial, the appellant said nothing about such a repeat study. The court itself did not ask in order to clarify the situation.

The failure to lead evidence on this should not have resulted in the appellant being non-suited.

As stated in The Quantum of Damages in Bodily and Fatal Injury Cases, 3ed by CORBETT, BUCHANAN & GAUNTLETT…, in a case such as the present, a Court does not grant absolution but may tend towards conservatism in assessing the damages. The learned authors state:

“The general attitude of the court has been that if there if evidence upon which an estimate, not unfair to the defendant, can be made, it should not refuse to make an award merely on account of the deficiencies in the case presented upon the plaintiff's behalf. Nevertheless, the failure to adduce such evidence would normally operate to the disadvantage of the plaintiff, in that, in its absence, the court would normally tend towards conservatism in computing the damages.”

In my view, this is the approach that the court a quo should have adopted.

I would agree with the appellant that the finding of absolution in these circumstances resulted in an injustice.

It is not uncommon, in claims for general damages, for a plaintiff to claim, and a Court to award, individual damages for pain and suffering, disfigurement, loss of amenities of life, and shortened life expectancy: see The Quantum of Damages in Bodily and Fatal Injury Cases, 3ed by CORBETT, BUCHANAN & GAUNTLETT…,.

The finding of absolution must therefore be set aside.

The amount claimed, as at the date of commencement of the trial in October 2008, was the sum of Z$1 billion.

Judgment was given six months later, in April 2009.

At the time, the country was gripped by a hyperinflation environment which quickly eroded the value of money. In February 2009, however, the multiple currency system was introduced. Whilst the Zimbabwean dollar remained legal tender, it is a fact that transactions in the local currency ceased effectively rendering the Zimbabwean dollar valueless.

At the time that the court was asked to make its determination, the appellant was seeking the sum of Z$1 billion. It is that claim that should have been considered by the court a quo.

In terms of section 6 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations S.I.6 of 2009 financial institutions were instructed to accept, between 2 February 2009 and 30 June 2009, Old Zimbabwean currency at the rate of one trillion dollars for one dollar of the new currency system.

In terms of section 8 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations S.I.6 of 2009, debts incurred before 2 February 2009 were deemed to have been incurred, entered, created, or transferred in terms of the old currency system and were to be settled, discharged, or liquidated in terms of the old currency system provided, however, that, on or after 1 July 2009 every debt was to be settled, discharged, or liquidated in terms of the new currency system only.

In the definition section, “debt” includes anything which may be sued for or claimed by reason of any obligation arising from statute, contract, delict, or otherwise.

By operation of the law, therefore, the claim by the appellant, for general damages, in the sum of Z$1 billion stood to be dealt with in terms of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations.

The one billion dollars claimed under the old currency equated to a fraction of a cent under the new currency system.

Considering the extent of the injuries sustained by the appellant, the claim for damages in the sum of Z$1 billion may not have been an unreasonable sum at the time of commencement of the trial proceedings. However, the law, through the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations (Statutory Instrument 6/09), has converted what would otherwise have been a substantial claim to a most trivial one.

The result is obviously a most unfair one and the appellant, and the general public, would be excused for thinking that there is something seriously wrong with the law or at least the way it works.

The legislature should have been alive to the obvious injustices that were to follow especially because, on 1 February 2009, the Government introduced the multiple currency system under which it became possible to enter into transactions denominated in other currencies: see section 17 of the Finance (No.2) Act 2/09.

The Finance (No.2) Act 2 of 2009 regularized the introduction of other foreign currencies as legal tender with effect from 1 February 2009.

The plaintiff issued summons against the defendant on 19 May 2007 seeking an order for the payment of damages in the sum of $20 billion.

In her declaration, she averred that she had purchased, from the defendant, certain immovable property situate in the district of Kariba for the sum of $180 billion which she paid in full. At the time of the agreement of sale, the defendant had already sold the same property to a company going by the name of Woolwork Investments (Pvt) Ltd. On account of this prior sale, the plaintiff further averred that the sale to her was a fraud as the defendant knew he had disposed of his rights in the property and had none to sell to the plaintiff. Thus, she claimed damages from the defendant.

The claim was defended.

The matter proceeded to a pre-trial conference where, due to the plea that had been taken by the defendant, the issues for trial were settled as follows:

1. Whether the plaintiff and the defendant entered into an agreement of sale in respect of House No.52 Beira, Mahombekombe, Kariba;

2. Whether the defendant breached the agreement of sale by failing to transfer the property to the plaintiff;

3. Whether, as a result of the breach, the plaintiff is entitled to consequential damages, and, if so, the quantum thereof;

4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.

At the trial of the matter, the parties advised that the defendant was no longer defending the claim and that the sole issue that fell for determination in this matter is the quantum of damages due to the plaintiff.

The parties further narrowed down the issue between them to one of establishing the current market value of the property. The defendant agreed that such would represent the quantum of damages due to the plaintiff.

It is pertinent at this stage to note that prior to the matter being set down for hearing, the plaintiff had applied to amend her declaration to increase the amount of damages sought to US$35,000=. No objection having been raised against the amendment, I duly granted it with the consent of the defendant.

The plaintiff called the evidence of one Emmanuel Mutambirwa. He is employed by the City of Harare as a Chief Valuations Officer. He holds a Diploma in Quantity Surveying, a Bachelor of Banking and Commerce degree and an MBA, amongst his qualifications, all of which are set out in the report that he compiled on the value of the property in dispute. In or about October 2008, he visited the property in question and formed the opinion as to the value of the property. He revisited his opinion on 12 February, and, taking into account the trends in the property market, revalued the property at US$35,000=.

The witness, who, in my view is well qualified to give values of properties, gave his evidence well. He was understandably excited in having to be the first to testify in the matter and at times would be unnecessarily argumentative in his responses to questions put to him in cross-examination. All in all, I have little difficulty in accepting that he gave me his honest opinion on the value of the property in dispute.

The defendant also testified as to the value of the property.

He averred that he purchased the property from his employer, on a date that he cannot recall, for the sum of $150,000=. In his opinion, if he were to sell the property on the date of the trial, he would not ask for more than US$5,000=.

Clearly, the defendant is not an expert in the field and his opinion, as to the value of the property, is of marginal probative value.

The issue that has exercised my mind in this matter is not so much the current market value of the property in dispute, but, rather, whether, in the circumstances of this matter, I can award damages sounding in foreign currency.

In his address, counsel for the plaintiff was of the view that I can, following the decision in Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC). On his part, counsel for the defendant confined himself to arguing that the plaintiff had not sufficiently proved her claim.

Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC) was a ground breaking decision seeking to reconcile two conflicting judgments of this court.

In 1985, MFALILA J, in National Food Distributors v Weltman 1985 (2) ZLR 310 (HC), had held that in the face of exchange control restrictions, Zimbabwe courts could not freely give judgments in foreign currency even where the proper law of contract is foreign law. Anyone seeking redress in Zimbabwean courts would have to state their claim and have their judgment in Zimbabwean currency. In 1988, ADAM J took a different position in the Makwindi Oil Procurement Company matter, a decision that was then taken on appeal.

After reviewing the trend in English and South African cases on the issue, GUBBAY CJ was of the view that in the absence of any legislative enactments which require our courts to order payment in local currency only, the innovative approaches taken in England and in South Africa, in making orders in foreign currency had to be adopted. This would bring Zimbabwe into line with many foreign legal systems.

Specifically regarding the award of damages in foreign currency, the learned judge appears to have fully endorsed the approach taken by the House of Lords in two appeals held concurrently were unanimous that that the approach taken earlier would also apply to claims for damages.

In allowing the appeal that was before them, GUBBAY CJ held, on the facts of the matter before the court, that the plaintiff, a company that conducted business in this country and was subject to exchange control regulations, and had to purchase its foreign currency using local currency, had failed to persuade him that its loss was in United States Dollars. He was of the view that the loss of foreign currency was felt or borne by the national foreign currency reserve and not by the plaintiff itself.

From his judgment, it appears to me that GUBBAY CJ was approving the approach by LORD WILBERFORCE in Owners of the MV Eleftherotria v Owners of the MV Despina R [1971]1 All ER 421 (HL)…, where he stated:

“It appears to me that the plaintiff, who normally conducts his business through a particular currency, and who, when other currencies are immediately involved, uses his own currency to obtain those currencies, can reasonably say that the loss he sustains is to be measured not by the immediate currencies in which the loss first emerges but by the amount of his own currency, which, in the normal course of operation, he uses to obtain those currencies. This is the currency in which his loss is felt, and is the currency which it is reasonably foreseeable he will have to spend.”

In the same year that the Supreme Court handed down its judgment in Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC), a similar approach was taken in South Africa in Elgin Brown and Hammer v Dampskibsselskabet Torm Ltd 1988 (4) SA 671 (NPD).

After citing the passage I have cited above from Owners of the mv Eleftherotria v Owners of the mv Despina R [1971]1 All ER 421 (HL), the learned judge in that matter proceeded to hold that the court has a discretion which currency to award the judgment in, and, with refreshing clarity, had this to say about claims for damages…,:

“Where a loss is in fact suffered in a foreign currency, there is, as I see it, no reason not to assess and quantify the damages in that currency; indeed, not to do so might be to deny a plaintiff the amount of his actual loss.”

In the matter before him, the learned judge observed that the main heads under which the loss suffered by the plaintiff were either in the sense of money actually expended or money not received. These amounts were all in foreign currency, and, in the opinion of the learned judge, the plaintiff's loss was felt in foreign currency. That being so, the only way the plaintiff could be compensated properly for its loss was to grant judgment in foreign currency.

A review of the authorities on the matter appears to me to indicate that where there is no statutory bar, the courts can award judgments sounding in foreign currency. For damages claims, the plaintiff must prove that his or her loss was suffered in foreign currency, or, put in the language of LEON J in Elgin Brown and Hammer v Dampskibsselskabet Torm Ltd 1988 (4) SA 671 (NPD), the plaintiff must prove that he or she felt the loss in a foreign currency.

In casu, the plaintiff has approached the court for damages arising out of the failure of the defendant to transfer to her certain immovable property. I am persuaded that the property may command a purchase price of the amount of the claim by the plaintiff. However, it has not been argued before me that the property does not have a value in local currency. I would want to believe that it still has, but, as implicit in counsel for the applicant's submissions, the United States Dollar and other foreign currencies from the region have become the de facto currencies of Zimbabwe. The local currency has been rendered valueless by inflation.

In my view, the facts of this matter and the challenges posed by the hyperinflationary environment that Zimbabweans find themselves operating under present a res nova that was not envisaged by the decisions that I have referred to above. The issue that arises is whether a claim for delictual damages may be redressed in foreign currency where it has been felt in both the local and the foreign currency but the local currency has been ravaged by inflation and is de facto valueless.

The authorities seem to suggest that where the loss has been suffered in a particular currency, there is no good reason why the court should not award damages in that currency. They do not seem, to me, to proceed further to hold that where a loss has been suffered, the plaintiff may choose that currency in which he or she would like the loss to be redressed.

In my view, the facts of this matter present a situation where a loss has indeed been suffered. The loss so suffered has been calculated in one foreign currency as opposed to the local currency for the reasons given by counsel for the applicant.

It appears to me that the issue I have to determine is whether to extend the approach that has been taken in Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC) and be innovative enough to suggest that where a loss has been suffered and can be calculated in both the local and in a foreign currency, the court has a discretion to award judgment in that currency that will redress the injury suffered and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the loss. It would then follow that where that currency is the foreign currency as opposed to the local currency, then judgment should be in the foreign currency - for, to award damages in the local currency, where the local currency has been rendered valueless by inflation might be to deny a plaintiff the redress that he or she seeks.

I must confess that I find this approach attractive.

It is not in violation of any statutory provision governing exchange control. It does not render the local currency any less legal tender than do other judgments expressed in foreign currency. It is simply an act of applying the approach to a situation that has arisen due to the ravages of inflation and one that could not have been anticipated when Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC) was decided. Like the Law Lords in 1975, I am merely opting for a more realistic approach to the current economic conditions prevailing in the country, and, as GUBBAY CJ observed in Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC)…,:

“That the majority of the Law Lords succeeded in surmounting (such) an obstacle and opted for a more realistic approach to modern economic conditions, is strongly illustrative of the concept, never to be overlooked, that the law is a living system that adapts to the necessities of present times and is to be given new direction, where, on principle and in reason it appears right to do so.”

In the result, I make the following order:

Judgment with costs is hereby entered for the plaintiff in the sum of US$35,000=.

In the alternative, the plaintiff claimed payment of the sum of $29,793,200= being the value of the property that allegedly went missing.

That value, however, is inclusive of items of property for which the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence specifying such items. In any event, the change of the Zimbabwe currency, as published in Statutory Instruments 199/2006 to 6/2009, S.I.199 of 2006 to S.I.6 of 2009, renders the amount claimed non-existent. No attempt was made by the plaintiff to amend its claim in any way.

The plaintiff, a former financial director of the defendant company, filed summons on 8 July 2009 seeking payment of the capital sum of US$72,334 and interest at the rate of 10% per annum from the date when the amount fell due to the date of the issue of summons in the sum of US$12,658, payment of interest on the capital amount at the rate of 10% from the date of the issue of summons to the date of payment in full and costs of suit.

The defendant contested the matter.

The plaintiff's cause of action was disclosed in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of its declaration in these terms:

“3. The defendant became indebted to the plaintiff in respect of arrear salaries and other benefits arising from a contract of employment concluded between the parties on or about 21 September 2004 that was terminated by the plaintiff's resignation from employment on 7 March 2007.

4. During the month of April 2007, the defendant partly liquidated the amount claimed by the plaintiff by delivering to the plaintiff a motor vehicle and a laptop computer whose agreed values totalled US$30,000.

5. On or about 18 July 2007, the Group Chief Executive Officer of the defendant, Mr Hamish Rudland acknowledged liability for the sum as at that date of US$70,000 which would attract interest at the rate of 10% per annum.”

The defendant raised a plea in bar based on two grounds before pleading over to the merits. Its plea reads as follows:

“1. As appears from the plaintiff's declaration:-

1.1 The cause of action is predicated on a contract of employment concluded by the parties on 21 September 2004.

1.2 The claim is for payment of alleged arrear salaries and benefits consequent upon resignation.

1.3 The payment of salaries and benefits during and upon termination of a contract of employment is governed by the provisions of the Labour Act [Cap 28:01].

1.4 Accordingly, and in terms of section 89(6) of the Labour Act, this Honourable Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine this claim.

2. Additionally, but without prejudice to the above, the defendant avers that:

2.1 The contract of employment between the parties provided for payment of salaries and benefits in Zimbabwe dollars, being the lawful legal tender.

2.2 The plaintiff's claim is denominated in foreign currency, namely, the United States dollars.

2.3 At the material time, the payment of salaries and benefits in foreign currency, without exchange control approval, was illegal and unenforceable by virtue of:

2.3 1. The Exchange Control Act [Cap 27:05].

2.3.2. Exchange Control Regulations, 1996, SI 110/1996.

2.3.3. The Labour Act [Cap 28:01].

2.4. In the premises, the plaintiff's claim is bad and unsustainable at law and ought therefore to be dismissed with costs.”

In pleading over to paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the plaintiff's declaration, the defendant denied these averments and put the plaintiff to the proof thereof and reiterated that the mode of payment sought was unlawful.

In his replication, the plaintiff averred that his cause of action was premised on an acknowledgment of debt signed by a representative of the defendant and not on the terms of employment.

He also averred that the defendant was obliged to obtain the necessary foreign currency exchange approvals to pay him in foreign currency using its free funds.

At the pre-trial conference that was held on 8 April 2010, the following four issues were referred to trial:

(a) Whether or not this Honourable Court, and in the light of section 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], has jurisdiction to adjudicate over the dispute between the parties;

(b) Whether the contract of employment between the parties provided for payment to the plaintiff in United States dollars and the amount thereof;

(c) Whether the plaintiff's claim was lawful at the material time; and

(d) What amount, if any, is due to the plaintiff.

The trial in this matter was held on 14 June 2010. The plaintiff called the evidence of two witnesses and produced a 40-paged bundle of documents as exhibit 1.

After the close of the plaintiff's case, the defendant elected to open and close its case without calling any evidence.

My findings of fact are based on those aspects of the evidence called by the plaintiff that survived cross examination.

The plaintiff holds a Bachelor of Law (Honours) degree from the University of Zimbabwe (1983) and is a Chartered Accountant (1988). He was the Group Financial Director of the defendant from 1 June 2004 until his resignation on 7 March 2007. His contract of employment with the defendant is covered in pages 2 to 6 of exhibit 1. The relevant sections fall under the headings Remuneration and Benefits. I set them out below:

“3. REMUNERATION

As remuneration for services rendered, the Contractor shall pay the contracted person, during the subsistence of this agreement, the sum of $21 million per month, payable monthly in arrears. The salary will be subject to taxation in line with the rules and regulations of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority. As you are on a fixed term contract, the company is not liable to pay any further sums of money which may be required of you by operation of law. This shall be reviewed every quarter.

4. BENEFITS

In addition to the salary stated above, you will be entitled to the following:

4.1 Cimas Medexec Medical Aid for you and your family.

4.2 Use of a company vehicle and 200 liters per month. Such allowance is for monthly usage and shall not accrue.

4.3 School fees for two children, but any change in school requires the authority of the CEO.

4.4 Cafeteria/entertainment allowance to be agreed annually by CEO.

4.5 Any other amounts will be deducted from the cafeteria allowance.”

The plaintiff indicated that his claim was based on the contents of pp7 and 8 of exhibit 1. It is an e-mail dated 13 July 2006 which the plaintiff dispatched to himself and copied to his website. It was signed and dated at the bottom of each page by Hamish Rudland, the acting Chief Executive Officer of the defendant at the time. The purported acknowledgment of debt was sandwiched between a set of seven action plans on the first page and another set of seven action plans on the second page. The acknowledgments read:

“HR acknowledges outstanding balance to KPM of US70K subject to update of figures.

HR acknowledges 10% interest per annum calculated monthly.

HR acknowledges salary US6K per month inclusive of local salary.”

The plaintiff stated that HR referred to Hamish Rudland while KPM referred to the plaintiff.

He stated that the defendant was to promote a company in Mauritius which would be used as the vehicle to pay top management in Zimbabwe in foreign currency and pay his outstanding debt.

It was common cause that the vehicle and laptop were sold to the plaintiff as indicated in the letter by Hamish Rudland (HR) of 10 September 2007 on p18 of exhibit 1. He averred that the two items were valued at US$30,000 and abated the outstanding capital sum and interest.

On pages 19 and 20 are the purported minutes that he wrote on 15 January 2008 of a meeting he held with Hamish Rudland (HR) and the plaintiff's wife in which he recorded, inter alia, his demand for payment of the outstanding debt by Pioneer Corporation Africa (PCA) and the reluctance to pay by Hamish Rudland (HR) until he had received a return on his investment and an undertaking that payment would be made at a later date.

He was the only one who signed those minutes.

He also relied on the minutes he authored on 18 March 2009 between Hamish Rudland (HR), EM Warhurst (EMW) and himself on pp 29-30 of exhibit 1. They were signed by EM Warhurst (EMW) and the plaintiff only.

They indicate that Pioneer Corporation Africa (PCA) owed EM Warhurst (EMW) US$15,000 and the plaintiff just over US$80,000.

While they show that Hamish Rudland (HR) was unwilling to pay the debt, they record that he had signed the plaintiff's contract of employment and acknowledgment of debt in July 2006.

Pages 38-39 show that, from October 2003 to February 2007, the plaintiff was entitled to receive from the defendant US$215,000 in salary. He was paid a total of US$157,251 between October 2003 and March 2007. The capital outstanding in salary arrears was US$57,749. The amount due as interest, from December 2005 to June 2009 was in the sum of US$26,462.

He was cross-examined.

He based his claim on an acknowledgement of debt of 17 July 2006. The acknowledgment arose from the failure to pay salaries during the period extending from October 2003 to February 2007.

He stated that he did not sue the defendant for arrear salaries that were incurred between October 2003 and July 2006 because during that period he was a member of the plaintiff's management team.

He accepted that, at that time, legal tender in Zimbabwe was the local dollar.

He was referred to section 12A of the Labour Act.

He was evasive on whether his claim was founded on a contract of employment or not. He was evasive on whether payment in United States dollars was payment in kind or not. He stated that in 2006 there were no exchange control prohibitions against the payment of salaries in foreign currency but conceded that during the period of his employment with the defendant he was never paid in United States dollars. He further acknowledged that at that time the defendant did not pay any of its employees in foreign currency.

He said the United States dollar was used to index the payment in kind in the form of air tickets that he received for holidays outside Zimbabwe.

He admitted that he could not claim in United States dollars before February 2009....,.

(c) Whether the plaintiff's claim was lawful at the material time

The time referred to is the period from October 2003 to 7 March 2007.

Counsel for the defendant submitted that it was unlawful, at the time, for a Zimbabwean-registered company to pay its employees in foreign currency for work performed in Zimbabwe without exchange control authority. He relied on the provisions of section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Exchange Control Regulations S.I.109 of 1996.

Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the exchange control legislation was not violated by an agreement to pay a salary in foreign currency to the plaintiff in Zimbabwe for work done in Zimbabwe. He relied on a case in which the claim was based on an acknowledgment of debt that the defendant did not sign but was reduced to writing by the plaintiff's legal representative which reflected the terms of the oral agreement reached of Macape (Pty) Ltd v Executrix Estate Forrester 1991 (1) ZLR 315 (SC)…, where McNALLY JA, dealing with sections 7 and 8 of the Exchange Control Regulations 1977, the precursor to the present sections 10 and 11 of the Exchange Control Regulations 1996, stated:

“The essential point to be noted is that there is a clear difference between sections 7 and 8. The former proscribes only the actual payment. The latter proscribes both payment and the underlying agreement to pay.

In other words, when one is concerned with payments inside Zimbabwe it is perfectly lawful to enter into the agreement to pay. But, without authority from the Reserve Bank, the actual payment may not be made. By contrast, when dealing with payments outside Zimbabwe, it is unlawful even to enter into the agreement to pay, without first obtaining the authority of the Minister, whose powers have been delegated to the Reserve Bank.”

The case dealt with the payment, in local currency in Zimbabwe, of a foreign resident by a Zimbabwean resident.

The facts in Macape (Pty) Ltd v Executrix Estate Forrester 1991 (1) ZLR 315 (SC) differ with those in the present case in that in the former case payment was made by a local resident for the account of a foreign resident in local currency. In the present case, a local resident was to pay another local resident in foreign currency. The former concerned an outflow of foreign currency while the present matter concerned the inflow of foreign currency.

It seems to me that the payment of an employee's salary in foreign currency, at the time, would have contravened section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Exchange Control Regulations.

Both CHINENGO J and GOWORA J held, in separate cases of Jumvea Zimbabwe Ltd & Anor v Matsika 2003 (1) ZLR 71 (H)…, and Gambiza v Tavaziva HH109-08…, that payment of foreign currency, whether inside or outside Zimbabwe, would amount to an exchange and thus be in violation of section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Exchange Control Regulations.

In the present case, the defendant did not make any payment but entered into an agreement to pay.

Counsel for the plaintiff was therefore correct that such an agreement was not prohibited by the Exchange Control Regulations.

This is what McNALLY JA had in mind in Macape (Pty) Ltd v Executrix Estate Forrester 1991 (1) ZLR 315 (SC)…, when he said…,:

“The contract to pay is lawful. Actual payment in pursuance of the contract is unlawful without permission. There is no reason why the court should not order payment; subject to the condition that authority is obtained. I must make it clear that this judgment in no way inhibits the Reserve Bank in the exercise of its discretion. It is entirely for the Reserve Bank to decide whether or not to authorise the payment. If it decides not to do so the payment may not be made. The contract remains lawful. Payment will then have to await a change either in the law or in the policy of the Reserve Bank.”

I hold that the contract to pay the plaintiff in foreign currency did not contravene any Exchange Control Regulations.

Counsel for the respondent further contended that payment in foreign currency contravened section 12A(1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. Counsel for the plaintiff countered by arguing that section 12A(2) of the Labour Act allowed for the payment of employees in foreign currency.

Section 12A(1) and (2) of the Labour Act read:

“12A Remuneration and deductions from remuneration

(1) Remuneration payable in money shall not be paid to an employee by way of promissory notes, vouchers, coupons or in any form other than legal tender.

(2) Remuneration may be payable in kind only in industries or occupations where such payment is customary, and shall be subject to the following conditions —

(a) Any such payment shall be appropriate for the personal use and benefit of the employee and the employee's family;

(b) The value attributed to such payment shall be fair and reasonable;

(c) Equipment or clothing required to protect the health and safety of the employee shall not be computed as part of the remuneration of the employee;

(d) No payment shall be made in the form of liquor or drugs;

(e) Remuneration in kind shall not substitute entirely for remuneration in money.”

Counsel for the defendant argued, that, at the time of employment, legal tender was constituted by local banknotes and coins. He submitted that though foreign currency was money, at the time, it was not legal tender in Zimbabwe.

Counsel for the plaintiff did not controvert this argument.

Rather, he ingeniously contended that the fact that the Exchange Control (Payment of Salaries by Exporters in Foreign Currency for Critical Skills Retention) Order S.I.127 of 2008 introduced for the first time the need for an exporter to seek exchange control authority to pay salaries in foreign currency showed that the payment of salaries in foreign currency was not proscribed before its promulgation. He went on to argue, that, as this subsidiary legislation did not have retrospective effect, it did not affect the plaintiff whose contract of employment ended in March 2007

I, however, agree with counsel for the defendant's rebuttal that the introduction of S.I.127/08 into our law was the first inroad made against the restrictive provisions of section 12A(1) of the Labour Act against the payment of salaries in any currency other than local currency.

Subsections (1) and (2) of section 12A of the Labour Act recognize the payment of remuneration in cash or in kind.

Subsection (1) restricts those employers who remunerate their employees in money to the use of legal tender to the exclusion of other modes of payment such as promissory notes, vouchers, coupons or any form other than legal tender.

I understand the phrase 'any form other than legal tender' to be of wide application.

In my view, it restricts payment to the use of legal tender and excludes payment in kind or money that is not legal tender.

Subsection (2) permits employers who are in occupations or industries that customarily pay remuneration in kind to do so.

Paragraph (e) of subsection (2) of section 12 puts it beyond doubt that remuneration in kind is not the same as remuneration in money. This same paragraph, in my view, is clear proof that in the mind of the legislature legal tender, in section 12A(1) of the Labour Act, was another euphemism for money: see Rhodes Motors (Pvt) Ltd v Pringle-Wood NO 1965 (4) SA 40 (SRA)…, where legal tender is considered and treated as money; S v Zakana 1976 (2) SA 248 (R) where SMITH J, by reference to The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, defined legal tender to be, inter alia, “the money of a country in actual use.'”; and McNALLY JA in S v Bennett-Cohen 1985 (1) ZLR 46 (SC)…, defined legal tender as currency or money. The same LEARNED JUDGE OF APPEAL, in S v Mafarachisi 1990 (1) ZLR 118 (SC)…, approved the definition by COWEN in The Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa, 5ed, Vol I…, that legal tender was “the medium legally authorised by the State for the payment of debts.”

Counsel for the defendant's submission, that foreign currency did not constitute legal tender at the time of the plaintiff's contract of employment with the defendant, is borne out by the views of textbook writers and case law. The definition of legal tender is provided by MANN in The Legal Aspect of Money, 4th ed, at p41, in these words:

“Legal tender is such money, in the legal sense, as the legislator has so defined in the statutes organizing the monetary system. Chattels, which are legal tender have, therefore, necessarily the quality of money, but, logically, the converse is not true…; not all money is necessarily legal tender. The question what money is to be considered legal tender is usually answered by the statutes organizing the monetary system.”

Again, at p186, the learned author states:

“Where these principles lead to foreign money being regarded as money, the conclusion is in no way affected by the established rule that foreign money is not legal tender, for not all money is legal tender, but all legal tender is money. Legal tender is such money as is 'current coin of the realm'. This does not mean more than that foreign money cannot be tendered in discharge of a debt to pay pounds sterling, but it does not touch the question of the manner of discharging, in England, a debt expressed in foreign money.”

WILLIS in Banking in South African Law, Juta 1981, at p200, observes that in terms of the SA Mint and Coinage Act 75 of 1964 the South African Reserve Bank has the power to issue and make bank notes and coins and that these coins and banknotes constitute legal tender in South Africa. At p191 WILLIS confirms that, in South Africa, foreign money is not legal tender. He writes:

“The definition of foreign currency has since been amended to mean 'any currency which is not legal tender in the Republic.'”

CHRISTIE, in The Law of Contract in South Africa, 3rd ed…, is in agreement with the observations made by WILLIS.

MORSE, in Vol 1 of A Treatise on the Law of Banks and Banking, 3rd ed (1888)…, recognizes the sovereign right of every State to define what is legal tender within its jurisdiction in these words:

“The right of the depositor is not, however, necessarily to the gold or silver coin of the country; but only to such money as is, by the law of the land, legal tender at the time.”

In Vol 2…, the learned author defined legal tender in these words:

“At present, in our country, the treasury notes of the United States have been made by Act of Congress a legal tender, and payment, or offer of payment, in them satisfies the duty of the Bank; though it has bound itself by a specific agreement to pay in gold or silver coin.”

And, in para 637…, he wrote:

“Bank bills are not money, in the strict sense of the term; that is to say, they are not legal tender, even to pay debts due to the bank itself.”

The textbook writers have equated legal tender with currency and noted that what constitutes legal tender in any country is governed by the legislation of that country.

In Zimbabwe, the term is used, inter alia, in section 12A of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]; section 41(1), 42(1), 44(2) and section 44A of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15], and in the definition sections of the Balance of Payments Reporting Act [Chapter 22:16] (Act No.4/2004) and the Exchange Control Regulations S.I.109 of 1996.

At the time the acknowledgment of debt was entered into, the legal tender for the payment of salaries in Zimbabwe was local currency and not foreign currency. The defendant could not, under section 12A(1) of the Labour Act, agree to pay the plaintiff in foreign currency.

That the plaintiff was aware that it was unlawful is shown by his failure to invoke the provisions of section 13 of the Labour Act for the payment of the purported arrear salaries when he left employment; and his failure to write into the terms of his contract of employment payment of part of his salary in foreign currency.

Formal acknowledgments of debt that are usually prepared by legal practitioners contain renunciation clauses such as the one highlighted by YOUNG J in Caltex (Africa) Ltd v Trade Fair Motors (Pvt) Ltd & Anor 1963 (1) SA 36 (SR)…, like non numeratae pecuniae, non causa debiti, errore calculi, revision of accounts, de duobus vel pluribus reis debendi.

There were no such renunciation clauses in the acknowledgment of debt in issue.

In Macape (Pty) Ltd v Executrix Estate Forrester 1991 (1) ZLR 315 (SC)…, McNALLY JA held that a court could go behind the making of an acknowledgment of debt to test its legality. He stated that:

“There is no evidence before the court to show that the underlying cause of the acknowledgement of debt was illegal and the acknowledgment itself was not illegal.”

I am satisfied that the underlying cause of the acknowledgment of debt that was relied upon by the plaintiff was illegal. A court cannot enforce an illegal contract: see Dube v Khumalo 1986 (2) ZLR 103 (SC)…,.

On 29 July 2008, the plaintiff issued summons against the defendant for the following relief:-

“(a) Payment of the sum of US$750,000.

(b) Interest a tempore morae at the London Interbank rate for United States dollars, 3.5% per annum, from 1 September 2005 to date of payment.

(c) Costs of suit.”

The background to the relief sought can briefly be narrated as follows:-

The plaintiff is a manufacturer and supplier of exclusive range of cables for the transmission and distribution of energy and communications involving entities like the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, the Rural Electrification Agency, and Tel-One.

The plaintiff's business caters for both domestic and export markets. As at end of 2003, 50% of its sales volumes were largely in exports.

In October 2004, the plaintiff approached the defendant for assistance. The defendant was then operating a foreign currency auction system. Through that system, the defendant made available, each week, from 25% of export proceeds, an amount of foreign currency for which commercial banks would submit bids for their customers. On the basis of those bids, allocations would then be made to the highest bidder(s).

In line with the auction system, on 24 October 2004, the defendant, through its Governor, informed the plaintiff, that, if it (plaintiff) submitted bids to the auction, the defendant would ensure that it (plaintiff) succeeded to the extent of US$150,000 per week to enable it to pay for essential inputs in its operations.

That process was indeed put into place on a weekly basis as from 14 January 2005 up to June 2005.

This was a special arrangement where the plaintiff would, instead of placing a bid, it would merely be advised, through a telephone call, each week, from the defendant's officials, that, the said allocation of US$150,000 was ready. All the plaintiff was required to do, in turn, was to pay the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent within 24 hours. The plaintiff would then, in turn, transfer, through a Commercial Bank, the requisite Zimbabwean dollar amount and details of the foreign suppliers to be paid in foreign currency (i.e from the US$150,000 allocated to the plaintiff).

The allocation of US$150,000, was, with effect from 16 June 2005, increased to US$250,000.

Weekly allocations, at that new level, were made to the plaintiff until the end of July 2005.

The allocation system was continued in August 2005 resulting in the plaintiff making three transfers of undisputed payments in Zimbabwe dollars for the equivalent of the amount of US$750,000 - now being claimed by the plaintiff.

The payments were, in each case, accompanied by details of external creditors to be paid by the defendant.

Notwithstanding the payment of the equivalent amount in Zimbabwe dollars by the plaintiff, the defendant has, to date, not forwarded the foreign currency to the plaintiff's external creditors or refunded the plaintiff with the said amount of US$750,000. In fact, the plaintiff has already, through other sources, paid its suppliers.

The above, in brief, explains why the plaintiff has resorted to this court action claiming the said amount of US$750,000.

With both the plaintiff and the defendant having amended their pleadings at the pretrial conference, it was agreed that the issues for trial were:-

“(a) Whether defendant is contractually obliged to pay plaintiff the sum of US$750,000;

(b) Whether defendant is estopped from denying its obligation to pay plaintiff the sum of US$750,000;

(c) Whether defendant's tender to repay the sums of Zimbabwean currency paid to it by plaintiff is a proper tender which plaintiff is obliged to accept.”

At the commencement of the trial, I indicated to both parties that, given the fact that both parties were generally agreed on what transpired, my view was that the matter could be determined through merely hearing arguments from both sides.

The plaintiff was, however, opposed to that approach and preferred to lead evidence. The defendant then also adopted the same stance.

I therefore had no option but to allow the parties to lead viva voce evidence.

The plaintiff's only witness, Mr E.W. Turina (Turina) said he was the Chief Executive Officer of the plaintiff at the time of the purchase of US$750,000 from the defendant. He had, however, left the employ of the plaintiff in June 2006.

Mr Turina's evidence was, in the main, a confirmation of what was already contained in the pleadings.

He said due to the scarcity of foreign currency, the plaintiff had reached an agreement with the defendant whereby bids from the plaintiff would be given preferential treatment.

He confirmed, that, the information on the allocations was done telephonically and that once an allocation (ie the initial US$150,000 rising to $250,000) was made, the plaintiff was required to pay the equivalent in Zimbabwe dollars within twenty-four hours (24) hours.

The arrangement had worked well from January 2005 until August 2005 when the defendant failed/neglected to disburse US$750,000 to the plaintiff's customers/suppliers despite the fact that the plaintiff had paid the defendant the equivalent in Zimbabwe dollar as per the standing arrangement.

The Zimbabwe dollars had been paid in three transfers on 1, 11, and 19 August 2005. This was to cater for the increased weekly allocation of US$250,000.

He said when the first allocation was not released, after payment of the equivalent Zimbabwe dollars, the plaintiff had asked for an explanation but was promised that the money would be released.

The same had happened with respect to the two subsequent payments.

After failure by the defendant to forward payment to its suppliers, the plaintiff had then borrowed money from other sources so as to meet supplier requirements. This had led to the withdrawal of invoices from the defendant, which invoices were produced as exhibits 1, 2 and 3.

Mr. Turina confirmed, that, before he left the employ of the plaintiff, in 2006, negotiations for settlement were in progress and that the defendant had indicated that it would secure the US dollars at a later stage for the plaintiff or reimburse the plaintiff in Zimbabwe dollars.

He said some of the discussions were not directly conducted with him.

He had, however, later learnt, that, the defendant was not going to pay the US$750,000.

It was his view, that, once the plaintiff effected payment of the equivalent Zimbabwe dollar amount of the allocated foreign currency “the contract was completed.”

He said the company had opted to wait because the Zimbabwe dollar had become worthless.

Mr Turina stuck to his story under cross-examination.

The defendant also called only one witness, a Mr B. Musoso (Musoso).

The witness said he was employed by the defendant as its Head of Treasury Operations. He said the Treasury Division was responsible for settlement and payment of allocations. The auction system, he said, was run by a separate unit which was responsible for the allocations. The role of his department was to communicate with companies and advise them on foreign exchange rates.

He was aware of a list of special allotees who received payment on a weekly basis. These were companies considered key to the national economy. These included the plaintiff.

He said there were thirty-six (36) companies on the special list and the allocations were made by the auction unit. Some of these were Boc Gases, Quest Motors, Unilever, Olivine Industries, Dunlop, National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM) and the fertilizer companies.

Mr. Musoso said there were no formal contracts with the companies on the special list.

The role of his department was to effect payment when funds were made available.

The witness said his department dispatched foreign exchange quotations to various interested companies. The quotations were meant to enable companies to mobilize the necessary funds before allocations were made. He said payment to allotees depended on instructions from what he called “the front office” and the availability of foreign currency.

He said the non-availability of foreign currency explained why the three payments made by the plaintiff, in August, were not honoured.

Mr. Musoso said when the auction system ceased, in August 2005, there were many unpaid beneficiaries from the special list and the defendant decided to reimburse them in Zimbabwe dollars.

He said he had heard that the plaintiff wanted reimbursement in US dollars instead of the Zimbabwe dollar. It was his evidence, that, in reimbursing beneficiaries, the defendant did not take into account the devalued value of the Zimbabwe dollar because there was no financial obligation: “We were just returning whatever had been paid,” he said.

Under cross examination, Mr. Musoso maintained, that, the successful execution of the arrangement relied solely on the availability of foreign currency.

In addition to Mr. Musoso's evidence, the defendant also relied on responses by Dr G. Gono (Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe) and Patience Aisam (Manager Compliance–Treasury Division) to the plaintiff's interrogatories filed on 29 September 2009.

Both responses to interrogatories were filed on 17 November 2009.

In his response, Dr Gono stated that he had, upon the specific request and representations from the plaintiff, advised that he would endeavour to source foreign currency for the plaintiff in the amounts mentioned (i.e initially US$150,000 rising to US$250,000).

He said this was in recognition of the strategic role played by the plaintiff in the national economy.

There was, however, no formal binding agreement.

He said he had indeed been advised that “the plaintiff had made payments totaling Z$13,535,110 being the quoted equivalent at the auction rate of US$750,000”, now being claimed by the plaintiff.

However, he said “due to many other competing and pressing national requirements, the defendant was unable to avail the foreign currency not only to the plaintiff but to many other companies in a similar situation who then accepted an offer for immediate refund. Plaintiff declined the refund.”

It was his evidence that his officers had informed him, that, during August 2005, no disbursements were made to any applicant for foreign currency under the auction system.

In response to the plaintiff's interrogatories, Miss Patience Aisam confirmed, that, from “14 January 2005 to August 2005, she would, on a weekly basis, telephone or instruct that plaintiff be telephoned advising it that its application for foreign currency allocation had been approved.”

She also confirmed, that, the approved amounts were US$150,000 per week from 14 January 2005 to mid-June 2005. Thereafter, the amount was increased to US$250,000 per week….,.

Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff's case was clear and did not warrant argument.

He submitted, that, the undisputed evidence of Mr. Turina had confirmed, that, upon approaching the Governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr Gono, for assistance in obtaining foreign currency, the plaintiff had been granted the status of a permanently successful bidder at the weekly foreign currency auctions.

The plaintiff, with that status, did not need to place bids at the auction, but, was merely telephonically advised of the agreed weekly allocations.

The practice, it was submitted, had been successfully operational from January 2005 to July 2005.

Payment(s) requirements were availed to the plaintiff who complied at all times by effecting the payment(s) of the equivalent amount of the foreign currency in Zimbabwe dollars.

The only condition was that “foreign currency will only be released after receipt of Zimbabwean dollars.”

Counsel for the plaintiff submitted, that, after the foreign currency amounts were not paid, in August 2005, the Deputy Governor, Mr Ncube, of the defendant, offered the plaintiff the choice of having the money paid by the plaintiff refunded in local currency or waiting for the foreign currency to be made available. That evidence was not contradicted.

I agree.

Counsel for the plaintiff further submitted, that, in practice, there were two initial contractual arrangements:

(i) The first was the undertaking by the defendant that the plaintiff would be allocated foreign currency without the need to make bids at the auction system.

(ii) The second was that once the plaintiff effected payment of the Zimbabwean dollars within twenty-four hours (ie equivalent of the foreign currency) the foreign currency allocated would be made available.

The plaintiff had, in all three instances in August 2005, complied with the payment requirements.

Counsel for the plaintiff said the third contractual arrangement, novating the August contracts, occurred when the defendant promised to pay the plaintiff the foreign currency when it became available.

The plaintiff had, in turn, agreed to wait for payment until it became necessary to institute these proceedings.

In support of the need for the plaintiff to institute legal proceedings, counsel for the plaintiff quoted from Asharia v Patel 1991 (2) ZLR 276 where the relevant part of the judgment of the former Chief Justice reads as follows:

“The general applicable rule is that where time for performance has not been agreed upon by the parties, performance is due immediately on conclusion of their contract or as soon as thereafter as is reasonably possible in the circumstances.

But, the debtor does not fall into mora ipso facto if he fails to perform forthwith or within a reasonable time. He must know that he has to perform.

This form or mora, known as mora ex persona, only arises if, after a demand has been made calling upon the debtor to perform by a specified date, he is still in default.

The demand or interpellatio, may be made either judicially by means of a summons or extra-judicially by means of a letter of demand or even orally; and to be valid it must allow the debtor a reasonable opportunity to perform by stipulating a period for performance which is not unreasonable. If unreasonable, the demand is ineffective….,.”

The promise to refund was made in 2005 and summons was issued on 29 July 2008.

It was counsel for the plaintiff's submission, that, the evidence of the defendant's witness (Mr. Musoso) was irrelevant since he had no direct dealings with the auction system. He said the defendant had failed to call witnesses who could have given meaningful testimony as to what actually happened.

The only credible evidence available was that of Mr Turina, he argued.

Counsel for the plaintiff concluded by submitting as follows:

“1. That, it was the uncontradicted and unchallenged evidence on plaintiff that Deputy Governor Ncube gave an undertaking to pay plaintiff US$750,000 at a future unspecified date.

2. That, this undertaking was accepted by plaintiff and formed a binding contract.

3. That, the binding contract so formed created an obligation on defendant to perform within a reasonable time.

4. That, after the lapse of a time, that defendant has never claimed is unreasonable, plaintiff made interpellation by the issue of summons, calling for the enforcement of the contract.

5. That, in the alternative, the second contractual event is binding on the parties.

6. In any event, defendant so conducted itself between January2004 and July 2005 as to cause plaintiff to believe that it had a contractual relationship on an occasion by occasion basis; that plaintiff did so believe, and, as a result of defendant's actions and words, plaintiff altered its position to its detriment.

7. That, in enforcing specific performance of a contract, the court is to treat the State like any other individual.

8. That, in the circumstances, defendant has done nothing to prevent plaintiff from being granted a judgment in terms of the summons.”

Counsel for the defendant submitted, that, due to the scarcity of foreign currency, the plaintiff and thirty-six (36) other complainants were placed on a list of companies considered as strategic in the national economy.

Depending on availability, the defendant then agreed to allocate foreign currency to these companies – which included the plaintiff.

He said no formal contracts were drawn in respect of the arrangements.

He said the plaintiff had been offered a refund of the money it had paid upon failure by the respondent to source the requisite foreign currency.

Counsel for the defendant emphasized the point, that, the arrangement between the parties was always subject to the availability of foreign currency which the defendant could disburse.

Arguing that there was no contractual obligation, on the part of the defendant, to pay the plaintiff the amount claimed, counsel for the defendant said it was never the consensus of the parties that the payment of the Zimbabwe dollars sealed the contractual arrangements.

The payment, he said, was subject to the availability of foreign currency.

The defendant, he submitted, could not have guaranteed payment because it did not know how much foreign currency would be generated from the auction system.

Counsel for the defendant said the defendant's witness had confirmed that his department had not been allocated with foreign currency for disbursement.

In the main, counsel for the defendant submitted, “the plaintiff had been favoured with an allocation that it be given foreign currency of US$250,000 per week if the same was available. There was no intention to create contractual obligations.”

He said quotations sent to the plaintiff were not offers.

Counsel for the defendant further submitted, that, the plaintiff had failed to prove that foreign currency was available at the time the allocations were made.

He blamed the plaintiff for refusing to accept a refund in Zimbabwean dollars as had been done by the other companies.

In conclusion, counsel for the defendant had this to say:

“The issue of who was a better witness between plaintiff and defendant's witness is, with respect, of no great moment.

Material facts are common cause. The court should take a holistic approach in the matter and determine what the intentions of the parties were and what relationship was created.

It is submitted, that, it could not have been within the contemplation of the parties, that, a failure by the defendant to disburse foreign currency to the plaintiff due to non-availability would ground a cause of action for specific performance.

In all the circumstances, the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed with costs and it is noted it has refused the tender of the refund in Zimbabwe dollars.”

I fully agree with counsel for the defendant, that, in casu, the material facts are common cause and I made that observation at the commencement of the hearing of this matter.

My assessment is that, apart from merely confirming what is already contained in the pleadings, nothing much turns on the oral evidence from the witnesses called by both parties.

However, my view, on the one hand, is that the evidence of the defendant's witness was totally irrelevant because he was clearly a distant player in what took place in the actual allocation process.

On the other hand, I find that Mr. Turina's evidence buttressed the respondent's responses to the interrogatories.

The responses do not deny the practice that operated smoothly from January 2005 to July 2005. The only issue highlighted is that the arrangement was anchored on the availability of foreign currency.

That is undeniable, and, indeed, no allocation could have been made without the availability of foreign currency.

However, the main issue, in my view, is whether by allocating to the plaintiff US$150,000 and later US$250,000, from the auction system, the defendant then became obligated to release the money to the plaintiff upon payment by the plaintiff, within twenty four (24) hours, of the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent at the defendant's instruction.

In interrogating that issue, one has to consider the following undisputed facts:-

(a) Every week, Patience Aisam, of the defendant, would telephone the plaintiff to advise on what had been allocated to the plaintiff and what had to be transferred through a Commercial Bank in Zimbabwe dollars - in fact, it was confirmation of the sale to the plaintiff of the allocated amount, in this case US$250,000.

(b) Upon advise from Patience Aisam, the plaintiff would, within twenty four (24) hours, transfer the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent. Indeed, in response to the interrogations, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe says:

“I am advised that during the month of August 2005, plaintiff made payment totaling Z$13,535,110 being the quoted equivalent, at the auction rate, of US$750,000 which the defendant had hoped to pay to the plaintiff. Due to many other competing and pressing national requirements, the defendant was unable to avail the foreign currency, not only to plaintiff but to many other companies in a similar situation who then accepted an offer for immediate refund. Plaintiff declined the refund.”

This is supported by paragraph 4 of the defendant's plea which reads:

“The defendant admits that the sums of money, as set out in paragraph 2 of the plaintiff's further particulars, were deposited with the defendant. The amounts would have exchanged for US$750,000 once this money had been successfully sourced by the defendant. The foreign currency was not availed to the plaintiff because the defendant was unable to mobilize the same.”

It becomes crucial for the defendant to explain the reasons for Patience Aisam to set in motion the process, if foreign currency was unavailable.

My view is simply that the allocation was only made against funds that were already available from the auction.

Patience Aisam states:

“I confirm that during the period referred to, that is to say, from about the 14th January 2005 to August 2005 (the month of August included) I would, on a weekly basis, telephone or instruct that plaintiff be telephoned advising that its application for foreign currency had been approved.”

It is important to note that Patience Aisam spoke of an “approved allocation and not successful bid.” This was so because the plaintiff was on a special list that was not required to bid.

There could, in my view, be no approval or allocation of what was not already available.

Given the condition that the completion of each transaction was totally dependant upon the availability of foreign currency, the possibility of Patience Aisam confirming allocation and asking for payment of the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent, within 24 hours, when there was no foreign currency already earmarked for the plaintiff, is, in my view, very remote.

In addition to the above, it is important to determine at what stage a contract would be concluded between the parties.

The scenario in the operation was as follows:

(a) The Governor agreed to accord the plaintiff special treatment.

(b) The Governor allocated a specific amount to the plaintiff on a “permanent” basis.

(c) Patience Aisam would confirm the allocation and indicate the Zimbabwe dollar component to be paid within 24 hours; and

(d) The plaintiff would, within 24 hours, comply and then forward a list of its customers to the defendant for disbursement of funds.

The above scenario clearly fits into counsel for the plaintiff's submission, that, there were initially two contractual events (ie the Governor's undertaking and then the actual allocation accompanied by compliance on the part of the plaintiff).

I am therefore unable to accept that the above scenario did not create binding obligations on the part of the defendant.

To that end, I am of the view, that, upon compliance by the plaintiff, a binding contract was concluded and what remained was the release of the foreign currency purchased by the plaintiff.

The case of F.C. Hume (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of Natural Resources & Tourism 1989 (3) ZLR 55 indeed supports this view.

With the plaintiff having complied with all the requirements, the contract was already in place and the defendant was obliged to meet its obligation.

The existence of the contract is further strengthened by the fact, that, the defendant admits, that, in August 2005, the plaintiff bought from it US$750,000 for a sum of Z$13,535,110.

However, what the defendant is now saying is simply this:-

“Yes, you bought US$750,000 but give us time to mobilise it. We seem to have sold you what we did not have at the time.”

The defendant then places before the plaintiff two choices, namely, reimbursement in the actual amount paid in Zimbabwe dollars or waiting until it mobilizes the amount of foreign currency already purchased by the plaintiff.

That, in my view, is not to deny contractual obligation.

The plaintiff elected to wait until litigation became the only option.

The plaintiff's election is based on the basis that devaluation has rendered the Zimbabwe dollar worthless.

The defendant's witness confirmed, that, the refund was to be the actual Zimbabwe dollar paid without taking into account the issue of inflation and devaluation.

It would, in the circumstances, be unreasonable to fault the plaintiff's election to await payment of what it actually purchased.

Relying on the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures)(Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations, 2009 (S.I.6 of 2009), (“the Regulations”), the appellant also sought to advance the argument that between 2006 and 2009 successive revaluations of the Zimbabwe dollar removed twenty-one (21) zeros from all monetary values and instituted a new currency system in which Z$1 in the old system was an un-pronounceable fraction of the Z$1 in the new system. The appellant contended that the award of the Labour Court was contrary to public policy as the court had not taken the provisions of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures)(Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations, 2009 (S.I.6 of 2009) into account in its assessment of the backpay due to the respondent.

Section 8 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures)(Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations, 2009 (S.I.6 of 2009) reads:

“(2) Subject to subsection (3), every debt, contract, security and or other legal instrument whatsoever involving any obligation to pay or any right to receive money in terms of the old currency system and which continues to subsist or be valid on the 28^th February, 2009, shall, on and after that date, be construed in accordance with the new currency system.

(3) Debts incurred, contracts entered into or securities created or transferred before the 2^nd February, 2009, shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered, created or transferred in terms of the old currency system and may be settled, discharged, sold or liquidated in terms of the old or the new currency system on and between the 2^nd February 2009 and the 30^th June 2009:

Provided that-

1….,.

2. On and after 1^st July 2009, every debt, contract not referred to in proviso (1) or security shall be settled, discharged sold, or liquidated in terms of the new currency system only.”

The learned Judge in the court a quo gave a chronology of events in respect of this matter.

The order of the Labour Court, which was the subject of the appeal in Case No. SC79/10, was granted on 27 November 2009. At that juncture, the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures)(Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations, 2009 (S.I.6 of 2009) were already law having been promulgated on 2 February 2009. The appellant did not find it necessary to bring the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures)(Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations, 2009 (S.I.6 of 2009) to the attention of the Labour Court judge who presided over the matter on 27 November 2009.

An appeal was noted in 2010.  

In my view, this is not an issue that falls for determination. The amount in respect of which the Labour Court considered the back-pay is res judicata.

In this appeal, the appellant does not argue that the computation by the court a quo of the amount of USD12,575=78 was wrong. The appellant does not challenge the rate of exchange utilised in the assessment of the backpay. What is challenged is the date at which the rate of exchange should apply as against the sum of Z$692,118=.

Needless to say, this is one of the issues determined by this Court on 15 March 2011, when the Court determined the effective date of conversion as 9 September 2002.

Accordingly, in view of the above observations, the issue of the base amount in local currency and the applicability of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures)(Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations, 2009 (S.I.6 of 2009) to such sum are not matters for determination in this appeal. These are issues that should have been placed before the court when it considered the appeal under Case No. SC79/10. In my view, the respondent has correctly submitted that any issue not concerned with the conversion of Z$692,118= into foreign currency is res judicata….,.

Import and Impact of the Monetary Policy Statement and the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, S.I.6 of 2009

The arbitrator found that the use of the Zimbabwe Dollar had been nullified by Government directive with immediate effect, from 3 February 2009, and that the appellant had therefore paid unusable currency into the respondents' bank accounts. The Labour Court also adopted the position that the local currency had become defunct and valueless in February 2009.

Contrary to the findings of the arbitrator and the court a quo, the Zimbabwe Dollar had not been demonetised with the introduction of the multi-currency regime, whether by the Monetary Policy Statement or by any other Government directive. Both the arbitrator and the court clearly misconceived the import and effect of the Monetary Policy Statement issued on 2 February 2009. As part of the new currency reforms to be applied, paragraph(s) 5.1 and 5.2 of the Monetary Policy Statement explicitly preserved the Zimbabwe Dollar as “the nations' currency”. In terms of paragraph 5.3, the local currency was to be re-valued with immediate effect, accompanied by the introduction of new currency denominations. Thereafter, as prescribed in paragraph(s) 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6, the old currency was to co-circulate with the new currency until 30 June 2009.

These policy measures were duly codified in sections 3 and 8 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, S.I.6 of 2009, which were also promulgated on 2 February 2009.

The Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, S.I.6 of 2009 were made under section 2 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act [Chapter 10:20]. In terms of section 5 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act [Chapter 10:20], regulations made thereunder are to prevail over any other law to the contrary, to the extent of any inconsistency. In any event, by virtue of section 6(1) of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) Act [Chapter 10:20], such regulations, unless they are earlier repealed, expire and cease to have any effect after 180 days following the date of their commencement. Thus, the Regulations in casu would have lapsed at or around the end of July 2009.

Section 3 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, S.I.6 of 2009 provided for the issue of new currency, the saving in force of certain coins and banknotes at the re-valued rate and the co-circulation of the old and new currencies.  The effect of conversion on debts, contracts, securities, etc. was spelt out in section 8, which in its relevant portions stipulated as follows:

“(1) The conversion to the new currency system in terms of these regulations shall not prejudice the subsistence or validity of debts, contracts, securities or any other legal act or instrument whatsoever made, done, executed, incurred, entered or created before the 2^nd February 2009.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), every debt, contract, security or any other legal act or instrument whatsoever involving any obligation to pay or right to receive money in terms of the old currency system and which continues to subsist or be valid on the 28^th February 2009, shall, on and after that date, be construed in accordance with the new currency system.

(3) Debts incurred, contracts entered or securities created or transferred before the 2^nd February 2009, shall be deemed to have been incurred, entered, created or transferred in terms of the old currency system and may be settled, discharged, sold or liquidated in terms of the old or the new currency system on and between the 2^nd February 2009 and the 30^th June 2009…,.”

Whether Retrenchment Package Paid on Time

It probably cannot be doubted that when the matter was first argued before the arbitrator, and at the time that he rendered his award, i.e. in August 2009, the Zimbabwe Dollar had effectively become moribund.  However, there is no evidence on record to show that the local currency had completely ceased to be a medium of exchange at the time of payment by the appellant, between 11 and 13 February 2009. That being the case, it seems to me that the appellant was entitled, as it did at that time, to settle and discharge its obligations under the retrenchment agreement in Zimbabwe Dollars, in accordance with section 8(3) of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, S.I.6 of 2009. It would then follow that the question referred for determination by the arbitrator and the court a quo must be answered in the affirmative: that the appellant effectively paid the mutually agreed retrenchment package in time. Moreover, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, there would have been nothing to prevent the respondents, at that time, from accessing and utilising their respective packages in Zimbabwe Dollars, instead of waiting for 4 months to raise their complaint before a Labour Officer.

As I have already indicated, considerations of equity, as enunciated and applied in Madhatter Mining Company v Tapfuma SC51-14 cannot be brought to bear upon the disposition of the present matter for two reasons. Firstly, the facts herein are distinguishable in that the respondents' retrenchment packages have already been paid in a currency that was extant and realisable at the time of payment. Secondly, the appellant has duly fulfilled its obligations under the retrenchment agreement, not only as contemplated in the agreement itself but also in compliance and in accordance with the governing law, viz section 8 of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, S.I.6 of 2009. I would add, for the sake of completeness, that there is nothing contained in that section that can be said to be inconsistent with any provision of the Labour Act so as to be overridden by virtue of section 2A(3) of the Labour Act  [Chapter 28:01].

The continuing operation and application of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, S.I.6 of 2009, after February 2009 and until they expired at the end of July 2009, is obviously questionable. Each case necessitating the payment of employment debts in realisable currency would have to be considered and determined on its own facts and in light of the changing commercial environment that prevailed during that period.

Disposition

In the result, the appeal must be upheld…., It is accordingly ordered that:

1. The appeal be and is hereby allowed.

2. …,.

3. The judgment of the court a quo is set aside and substituted as follows:

“(i) The appeal is upheld with no order as to costs.

One morning, in February 2009, Zimbabweans woke up and found themselves subjected to a 'multi-currency system'. The Zimbabwean dollar was no longer accepted as legal tender. A basket of other currencies, such as the United States dollar and the South African Rand, were introduced into our society.

The truth of the matter is that these currencies had been circulating on what had been dubbed a 'parallel market' for quite some time. There are those who welcomed the formal adoption of those currencies as legal tender in this country which had been ravaged by the knock-on effects of super hyper inflation. Others bemoaned the symbolic annihilation of our currency which they associated with a corresponding perception of the annihilation of our national sovereignty. The majority of the people were perturbed by the effect of the introduction of the multi-currency system on their pensions, insurance policies, and life savings.

This case is about a group of workers who, between them, gave more than twenty years of loyal service to their employer. In terms of the pension policy that was in operation at the outset both employer and employees diligently contributed monthly to a pension fund.

The issue that falls for determination, put simply, is whether all sixty seven employees are entitled to challenge the determination by the employer as to what constitutes their basic annual salary for purposes of calculating their pension benefits. Depending on the answer to this question, the court will have to determine, further, whether these employees are entitled to demand further payments by the employer towards their eventual pensions.

At the heart of these issues lies the contentious issue of the effect of the introduction of the 'multi currency' system on the calculation of pension contributions which had previously been based on our local currency, and were now set to be calculated on the basis of the United States dollars, the currency that the employees were now remunerated in.

Should our courts be courts of law or courts of justice?

One would pre-suppose that the law is justice and that justice is the law. To the ordinary man, i.e. one who is un-tutored in the practice of the law and the pursuit of justice, it would appear that law and justice have a symbiotic relationship; one is nothing without the other. Yet, those who practice the law, will know that, often times than not, the rigid application of the law may lead to a palpable injustice. That is why the law is fluid, meaning that its application depends on the circumstances before the court.

The law must be applied to avoid perpetrating an injustice, especially where the extent of the injustice would be the non-suiting of a litigant, leaving the litigant with nowhere else to turn as it were. That is not to say that non-deserving litigants should be shielded from the inevitable consequences that flow from a correct application of the law. On the contrary, it is my view that our courts should be courts of law that derive their authority and legitimacy from a fair and impartial application of the law in the pursuit of justice and fairness.

The applicant filed a court application before this court on 8 May 2011 seeking an order for the amendment of the judgment handed down by this court on 23 January 2008 under case number HC4252/2001. The order of January 2008 reads as follows:

“Judgment is entered in favor of the plaintiff as follows:

That Defendant pays;

(a) BP63,750 as replacement value for his damaged vehicle.

(b) 83,717=09 for medical expenses.

(c) BP1,800,000 for loss of income.

(d) $3.50 for towing charges.

(e) BP12,000,000 for car hire charges.

(f) $2,000,000 for pain and suffering.

(g) $850,000 for disability.

(h) $1,000,000 for future medical expenses.

(i) Costs of suit.”

The order sought by the applicant in this matter relates to the Zimbabwe dollar component of that order. The applicant seeks an order that the judgment of this Honorable Court, in case number HC4252/2001, dated 23 January 2008 be amended as follows:-

“That the Defendant pays to the Plaintiff:

1. USD$2,790=60 for medical expenses.

2. USD$116=66 for towing charges.

3. USD$66,666=67 for pain and suffering.

4. USD$28,333=30 for disability.

5. USD$66,666=67 for future medical expenses.

6. Interest at the prescribed rate of 5% per annum calculated from the date of judgment to the date of payment.

7. Costs of suit.”

It is common cause that the respondent has paid in full for the component of the 2008 judgment which provides for payment in Botswana Pula, in terms of the order of the Supreme Court dated 28 February 2012. It is common cause that payment of the Zimbabwe dollar component of the 2008 judgment remains outstanding - although the respondent has tendered this payment to the applicant. It is common cause that the applicant did not attempt to execute in respect of the Zimbabwe dollar component at the date of the judgment in 2008, and that, in 2009, Zimbabwe adopted a multi-currency regime. It is also common cause that after the accident the applicant was disabled.

The applicant has come before this court and avers that he requires urgent medical attention.

He has attached a quotation from a medical specialist, Mr. Bijay B. Garach, dated 23 March 2012, to show that he requires an estimated USD$279,400= for surgery in Durban South Africa. The purpose of the surgery is to correct a condition of stiffness in the right knee which is possibly related to a fracture and muscle tightness and to an associated knee joint injury. Mr. B.A.V. Ncube, a specialist orthopedic surgeon, certified that the applicant is in pain and gross discomfort in his right foot, on 4 June 2012, and that he needs further surgery to remove the implants and to fuse his mid-foot and correct his mal-aligned toes.

The applicant is currently unemployed and has urgent need for funds in order to access the medical assistance he requires.

On 24 October 2012, the applicant's legal practitioners addressed a letter to the respondent to which they attached the judgment of 23 January 2008. In the letter, the respondent was reminded that the Zimbabwe dollar component of the judgment remained unpaid in a total of ZWD$4,937,217=09. It is common cause that the Zimbabwean dollar has fallen into disuse. The respondent was advised that the applicant had approached the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe which had confirmed that as at 23 January 2008 one United States dollar was equivalent to ZWD$30,000=. Converting ZWD$3,937,212=10 to USD translates into USD$164,573=90. Interest at the prescribed sum translates to USD$41,143=47. The total demanded from the respondent is USD$205,717=38.

In a letter dated 8 November 2012, the respondent, through its legal practitioners, tendered the ZWD$ to the applicant on the basis that the Zimbabwean dollar was still valid currency, and that, it being the currency of the judgment which the applicant was seeking to enforce, that is the currency in which the applicant should be paid. The computation of the interest was brought into question.

In a letter dated 19 November 2012, the applicant's legal practitioners explained that interest had been calculated at the prescribed rate of interest from February 2008. In paragraph 12.1-14 of the founding affidavit the applicant avers that:

“I need to execute against the respondent. I need to have the judgment in my favor sounding in Zimbabwe dollars amended to reflect United States dollars so that I am paid in a currency that I will be able to use. I submit that the Zimbabwe Dollar is now moribund and has fallen into disuse. It is no longer the currency in use at the moment. There is no point in giving me, as respondent contends, the Zimbabwe dollars as I will not be able to use them to access the medical attention that I so badly and urgently require. I submit that I am entitled to effective remedies and giving me Zimbabwean dollars is hardly such effective remedies.”…,.

The notice of opposition was filed of record on 30 May 2013. Mr. Charles Stewart Gardiner deposed to the opposing affidavit on behalf of the respondent. He is a son of the Managing Director of the respondent, and himself a director of the respondent company. He averred that the applicant should apply to the court which granted the judgment in question for the judgment to be corrected in accordance with the rules of this court.

Mr. Gardiner denied that the applicant had a right to correct the judgment in terms of the rules of this court. He denied that the applicant was permanently disabled, although he accepted that the applicant was injured in the accident. He emphatically declared that the applicant was dishonest and that he had fraudulently exaggerated his injuries and allegations of disability. He denied that the applicant is in urgent need of medical attention. He reiterated that the applicant has already received a sum of USD$90,332=24 from the respondent and averred that this amount ought to have been more than sufficient to fund whatever medical attention the applicant allegedly requires.

It was admitted that the respondent is bound by the terms of the Supreme Court order.

The respondent expressed certainty that the applicant's awards which emanated from this court were based on fraud, fraudulent documents and perjured evidence, and referred the court to its application for leave to adduce further evidence which it filed before the Supreme Court simultaneously with its appeal under case number SC19-2008.

Mr. Gardiner averred that the court should have regard to the independent expert evidence that was filed before the Supreme Court to prove the allegations of fraud against the applicant. He re-iterated that the respondent believed that it was obliged to effect payment in the amount claimed by the applicant and awarded to him by the court. It was denied, on behalf of the respondent, that it was to blame for the applicant's hardship because the basis of the liability of the respondent arises entirely from a finding of vicarious liability for the negligence of its former employee.

Three issues fall for determination by this court;

(a) The first one is whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this matter.

(b) The second issue for determination is whether it is competent for this court to award payment in United States dollars in respect of a judgment sounding in Zimbabwean dollars.

(c) Finally, we must determine whether it is competent to determine the rate of exchange by which the conversion may be made.

(a) Jurisdiction

It was submitted, on behalf of the applicants, that the High Court has jurisdiction to deal with any matter that is placed before it and that there is nothing amiss in this court dealing with a matter arising out of a judgment of this court. The court was referred to the case of Fleximail (Pvt) Ltd v Gift Bob David Samanyau & 3 Ors SC21-14 as authority for this proposition.

The court perused the judgment of the court a quo HH108-11/ HC5710-09.

The issue for determination, as it was understood by that court, was that the applicants had approached that court since it was the only court with inherent jurisdiction seeking a declaratur that the principle of currency nominalism has no place in Labour Law (i.e. a common law principle) as it would be at variance with the Labour Act's aim of achieving social justice. The applicants sought a further declaratur that to the effect that damages in lieu of reinstatement have to be paid in an effective manner, that is, in an amount, currency, and quantity that achieves fairness as required by the Labour Act. A further order compelling the respondent to pay damages in USD was sought. The principle relied on by the applicants was that a successful appellant ought to have the discretion to choose payment of damages in the currency that will redress the injury suffered and adequately compensate him for the loss as well as fulfill the objectives of the Labour Act.

The respondent had opposed the relief sought by the applicants before the High Court on the basis that the matters raised had been canvassed and dismissed by the Labour Court and were therefore res judicata; that this matter was purely a labour issue by virtue of section 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28;01]; that the court was being asked to usurp the role of Parliament by repealing the common law principle of currency nominalism and that the court was being asked to 'overrule” those decisions of the Supreme Court which had already made the point that in quantifying damages in labour disputes, the rates that are applicable are those that applied at the time of dismissal or suspension.

The High Court took the view that it was the only court with power to issue declaratory orders. On the issue of usurping the role of Parliament, the High Court took the view that 'it is not impermissible for the judiciary to make law by way of decided cases if an opportunity presents itself to plug a legislative gap especially where not to do so will leave many an unlawfully dismissed employee languishing in an asylum of financial misery'.

On page 5 of the judgment, the High Court postulated the question of whether, in the circumstances of the case before it, it ought to declare that 'in the realm of employment relations, the principle of nominalism has, for now, no place until economic normalcy has been restored.'…,.

Clearly, the High Court limited the application and scope of its judgment to the realm of employment relations and to the period during which there was lack of economic normalcy. It applied the principles of equity and enjoined itself to 'tread a path that will avoid iniquity and injustice where legislative intervention is not forthcoming.'

The High Court ordered the respondent to pay damages in USD using the official exchange rate obtaining as at 5 July 2007.

The respondent appealed.

The appeal and cross appeal came before a five member bench of the Supreme Court on 11 September 2013. The judgment of the Supreme Court was to allow the appeal to the extent of setting aside the judgment of the High Court for lack of jurisdiction. It was held, with the consent of both parties, that the matter should have been determined by the Labour Court.

It is this court's view that it would not be proper to rely on principles which were enunciated in the context of labour disputes, which differ materially from the matter under consideration, and in respect of which certain principles underline their conduct, which are not applicable here, such as social justice and equity. The court is bolstered in its view by the recent judgment of the Supreme Court, Madhatter Mining Company v Marvelous Tapfuma SC51-14, where the court stated that Fleximail (Pvt) Ltd v Gift Bob David Samanyau & 3 Ors HH108-11 had been overturned on appeal and could no longer be cited as authority or as a basis on which a court can convert damages awarded in Zimbabwe dollars to United States dollars.

The vexing question of whether the USD amount would give true value to the damages that the respondent would be entitled to was posed by the court.

True value was defined as a value that would 'neither over-compensate the respondent nor inadequately do so'. Other pertinent considerations for a court faced with the question of converting Zimbabwe currency to US$ were the issue the two main Zimbabwe dollar to USD$ exchange rates which obtained prior to 2009, i.e. the official and the unofficial rates….,. Finally, the Supreme Court emphasized that it is the Labour Court - and not the Supreme Court - which in endowed with jurisdiction to apply principles of equity in its determination of labour disputes based on the provisions of section 2A of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01].

See Horace Nzuma & 2 Ors v Hunyani Paper & Packaging SC137-11.

I accepted the submission made on behalf of the respondent that this court has no similar jurisdiction to that of the Labour Court, to determine disputes on the basis of social justice or principles of equity.

The Labour Court, in Madhatter Mining Company v Marvelous Tapfuma SC51-14, was then given guidance by the Supreme Court and the matter was remitted back to it for the determination of the following issues:

(a) What is the effect of the change of currency effected in February 2009 on debts occurring before the effective date?

(b) Does the Labour Court have power to order payment in the operational currency (the United States dollar) of debts incurred under the Zimbabwe Dollar currency which, though not demonetized, is no longer in use?

(c) Has the principle of currency nominalism any application to the circumstances of this case?

(d) The method of calculating the quantum of the debt in current realizable currency if the conclusion of the above issues is in favor of payment in United States dollars.

These questions given for the guidance of the Labour Court are regurgitated here in the realization that these are the same questions that this court may have to determine if the question of jurisdiction in this matter before it is resolved in favor of the applicant.

In defence of this claim, the respondent raised the main point of the absence of jurisdictional basis on which the court can 'change' or 'convert' a judgment that was given by it in January 2008.

I am grateful to counsel for the respondent for the extensive heads of argument filed of record, which appeared to have been tailored to respond to the questions for guidance which were issued by the Supreme Court, as listed above, for the guidance of the Labour Court.

It was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that if there is such a jurisdiction, there is a dispute as to whether it can be exercised five years after the original judgment and one year after the judgment of the Supreme Court in which the matter was not raised; whether the conversion is to take place on the date of the judgment or on the date on which payment is made; what the proper rate of exchange would be; whether the conversion can be made in respect of those heads of damages which were incurred and paid for in Zimbabwe dollar currency and awarded as special damages at trial; and, finally, the bona fides of the applicant.

The respondent submitted that medical expenses and towing charges are special damages which were incurred in Zimbabwe dollars not United States dollars. The loss was incurred 15 years ago in Zimbabwe dollars, the damages were alleged and proved seven years ago in Zimbabwe dollars. The respondent disputed the applicant's entitled to interest at the prescribed rate, or at any rate, on the basis that the prescribed rate of interest sought to be relied on was only introduced on 23 October 2009 by S.I.164 of 2009 and backdated to 23 October 2008.

Finally, the respondent submitted that, in respect of the three heads of general damages that the applicant now seeks payment for in foreign currency, which was not available to him, and which he did not seek, at the time of the trial, those damages are not due to him in any other currency other than the currency that he claimed them in.

It is trite that the cause of action for the relief being sought must be found in the founding affidavit. See Poseidon Ships Agencies (Pty) Ltd v African Coaling and Exporting Co (Durban) (Pty) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 313 (D); Director of Hospital Services v Mistry 1979 (1) SA 626 (A)…,.; Dajen (Pvt) Ltd v Durco (Pvt) Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 235 (SC)…,.; Mangwiza v Ziumbe NO & Anor 2000 (2) ZLR 489 (SC)…,.

It was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that the founding affidavit does not disclose the cause of action to support the relief sought. It was submitted, correctly in my view, that the applicant's need for urgent medical attention is not a jurisdictional basis for the relief sought. It was contended that the fact that the Zimbabwe dollar is now moribund and has fallen into disuse, and that, there is no point making payment in it, again affords the applicant no jurisdictional basis for the relief sought. Finally, it was submitted that to plead ad misericordiam that he is entitled to an effective remedy does not assist the applicant at all.

It is common cause that upon the introduction of the multi-currency basket in January 2009, Parliament did not see fit to introduce any legislation to enable this court to look at judgments given before January 2009.

It was contended that, in the absence of legislative authority that enables this court to look at judgments given in Zimbabwe dollars before dollarization in January 2009, we must be guided by the usual common law Rules. I find myself in full agreement with these statements of the law as it currently stands.

However, in case I am wrong in my view that there is no jurisdictional basis on which this court may grant the relief sought by the applicant, I will proceed to deal with the merits of the matter.

The law that underlies the legal principle of functus officio was summarized in the case of Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro 1977 (4) SA 298 (A)…, as follows:

“The general principle, now well established in our law, is that once a court has duly pronounced a final judgment or order, it has itself no authority to correct, alter, or supplement it. The reason is that it thereupon becomes functus officio, its jurisdiction in the case having been fully and finally exercised, its authority over the subject matter has ceased.

See West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 1926 AD 173 @ p176, 178,186-7 and 192; Estate Garlick v Commissioner of Inland Revenue 1934 AD 499 @ p502…,. There are, however, a few exceptions to the rule which are mentioned in the old authorities and have been authoritatively accepted by this court…, provided the court is approached within a reasonable time of its pronouncing the judgment or order, it may correct, alter or supplement it in one or more of the following cases:

(i) The principal judgment or order may be supplemented in respect of accessory or consequential matters, for example costs or interest on the judgment debt which the court overlooked or inadvertently omitted to grant…,.

(ii) The court may clarify its judgment or order, if, on a proper interpretation, the meaning thereof remains obscure, ambiguous, or otherwise uncertain, so as to give effect to its true intention, provided it does not thereby alter 'the sense and substance' of the judgment or order…,.

(iii) The court may correct a clerical, arithmetical or other error in its judgment in order to give effect to its true intention…,.

(iv) Where counsel has argued the merits and not the costs of a case…, but the court makes an order granting costs…, it may thereafter correct, supplement or alter the order…,.”

The submission that none of these exceptions apply to the applicant was accepted by the court, as well as reference that the principle of finality in litigation (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium) is a part of our law.

See Matanhire v BP Shell Marketing Services (Pvt) Ltd 2005 (1) ZLR 140 (SC)…,; Maheya v Independent Africa Church 2007 (2) ZLR 319 (SC)…,.

This court also accepted as correct, the submission made on behalf of the respondent, that the present application is not intended to supplement, clarify, or correct the judgment of January 2008 - but to alter its substance. The alterations are not incidental or consequential corrections - but go to the very heart of the orders made.

In respect of towing charges and medical expenses already incurred, the purpose of the application is to change the very basis of the currency in which those special damages were incurred. In respect of the three headings of general damages, the application intends to change the basis on which those damages were sought, when those damages were suffered in Zimbabwe, in the currency of payment then prevailing.

It is common cause that there was a considerable delay by the applicant in bringing this application, the original judgment having been handed down in January 2008 and the use of the United States dollar having been authorized by January 2009. The appeal was heard in October 2010 and the Supreme Court judgment handed down in February 2012. Nearly 15 years have passed since the accident in question and four and half years since dollarization. No explanation was given by the applicant for the inordinate delay in making this application. Any application to correct or supplement an order, whether in terms of the common law or under Rule 449 of the High Court Rules 1971, must be brought as soon as possible, or at the very least within a reasonable period. See West Rand Estates Ltd v New Zealand Insurance Co Ltd 1926 AD 173…,.

The leading cases on currency nominalism in this court merit discussion.

In Shava v Bergus Investments (Pvt) Ltd 2011 (2) ZLR 340 (HC), a full bench of this Court, through my brother MUTEMA J and CHIWESHE JP concurring, held that a party cannot revalue a judgment debt for purposes of execution. Citing Mukorera v Ocean Breeze Engine and Cooling Systems HH13-08…, the court held it to be trite that the principle of currency nominalism was part of the law of Zimbabwe. The court held that, to allow a party to change the currency of the judgment was 'not only incompetent for arbitrariness but offended against the time honored principle of currency nominalism'. The court said the following…,:

“That principle holds that a debt sounding in money has to be paid in terms of its nominal value irrespective of any fluctuations in the purchasing power of the currency.”

The court also said…,:

“It is beyond argument that the first respondent's debt sounded in money and the judgment was given in March 2008 with the specific directive that the values of whatever was damaged by the appellant were to be as at the time of judgment. The values were in Zimbabwe dollars and not in US dollars. The principle of currency nominalism was therefore still applicable. It was accordingly idle for the first respondent to revalorize its claim on execution. It ought to have made a court application for the conversion of the currency.”….,.

Counsel for the respondent…, submitted that, before this court came to above underlined conclusion, it ought to have examined, in greater detail, the impact of the 'once and for all rule' and of the submission that the court cannot 'convert' the currency on application because it will be functus officio.

I found this view persuasive.

It was submitted, further, that reliance on Mukorera v Ocean Breeze Engine and Cooling Systems HH13-08 should not have led the court to the conclusion that it came to, because, in that case, the court was emphatic in its view that:

“…, the distortions caused by inflation in the economy should not lead to the wholesale distortion of legal principles that have withstood the test of time in a bid to find legal solutions to a problem that is not legal in nature and origin and may prove to be transient. I am yet to be persuaded that revalorization is part of our law of debt collection.”

In conclusion, this court's opinion on the issue of currency nominalism, in the circumstances of this case, is that, while on the whole this court has inherent jurisdiction to ensure that the process of execution is neither abused nor unfair, it does not have jurisdiction to rewrite an order in the manner sought by the applicant. I hold the considered view that this court cannot revalue an order for the purpose of execution, let alone completely re-write an order granted nearly seven years ago. Any such power would have to be the consequence of legislation - which currently does not exist in Zimbabwe.

Under the common law, and as a protection against loss of value of a judgment, where a litigant has suffered a loss that can properly be expressed in foreign currency the court can enter judgment in foreign currency, but payment must be made in local currency converted as at the date of payment. See Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC)…, where the court said that:

“Fluctuations in world currencies justify the acceptance of the rule not only that a court order may be expressed in units of foreign currency, but also that the amount of the foreign currency is to be converted into local currency at the date when leave is given to enforce the judgment. Justice requires that a plaintiff should not suffer by reason of devaluation in the value of the currency between the date on which the defendant should have met his obligation and the date of actual payment or the date of enforcement of the judgment. Since execution cannot be levied in foreign currency, there must be a conversion into local currency for this limited purpose and the rate to be applied is that obtaining at the date of enforcement.”

See also Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 1994 (4) SA 747 (A)…, where it was stated that;

“…, the damages to be awarded in this case should be expressed in US dollars. It is implicit in any order to this effect that the judgment debt may be satisfied in South Africa by payment in the foreign currency or by payment of its equivalent in Rand when paid.”

This court is persuaded by the contention, which is supported by various decisions by the Supreme Court and the High Court, that, had the judgment in this matter been sought and made after January 2009, even in respect of an accident that occurred before that date, judgment could be granted in foreign currency as being the effective currency to redress the loss.

As further authority for this proposition, see Kwindima v Mvundura 2009 (1) ZLR 168 (H).

However, in this case, judgment was sought prior to January 2009, specifically in Zimbabwe dollars, and quite clearly Zimbabwe dollars is the currency in which the losses were sustained.

Section 41 of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15] reads:

“41 Legal tender of banknotes

(1) A tender of a banknote which has been issued by the Bank and which has not been demonetised in terms of subsection (2) shall be legal tender in payment within Zimbabwe of the amount expressed in the note.

(2) The President may, by statutory instrument, call in and demonetize any banknotes issued by the Bank, and shall likewise determine the manner in which and the period within which payment for such banknotes shall be made to the holders thereof.”

It is common cause that the President has not demonetized the Zimbabwe currency in terms of the Presidential Powers (Temporary Measures) (Currency Revaluation and Issue of New Currency) Regulations 2009, as confirmed by the Finance Act 2009, and that, he had not done so at the time that this application was filed, on 8 May 2013.

Section 44 of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15] provides that:

“44A Legal tender of foreign currencies

The Minister may, in regulations made under section 64, prescribe that, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the regulations, a tender of payment in any currency other than Zimbabwean currency shall be legal tender in all transactions or in such transactions as may be specified in the regulations.”

It is submitted, on behalf of the respondent, quite correctly in my view, that this provision does not render the Zimbabwe currency to be moribund, but that it allows foreign currencies to be treated as legal tender in addition to the Zimbabwe currency. It was correctly submitted, in my view, that there is no statute or other legal instrument that has abolished or suspended the existence of the Zimbabwe currency. Accordingly, as a matter of law, if not practice, the Zimbabwe currency still exists. See Stuart v National Railways of Zimbabwe (unreported)…,.

If any conversion is to take place for the purposes of allowing the enforcement of a judgment granted before February 2009, in Zimbabwe currency, it must be done at the rate prevailing on the date of payment, not the date of judgment….,.

The Legislature, in its wisdom, only enacted section 44A of the Reserve Bank Act, and did not see fit to provide a further framework to guide us on how to dispose of these matters. If the applicant's judgment has been rendered incapable of being satisfied through lack of a legislative framework that regulates its execution, then the applicant's remedies must lie with the Legislature.

The applicant seeks to use the date of judgment as the date on which conversion into US dollars is to be made, and seeks to use the rate of exchange allegedly applicable on that date. However, it is pertinent to note that, at the date of the judgment, January 2008, the use of United States dollars in Zimbabwe was not permitted, and any judgment given in United States dollars as being the currency in which the loss was sustained could only be satisfied by the payment of Zimbabwe currency as at that date.

This court lacks that jurisdictional basis to make any conversion as at the date of judgment because such conversion would, at that time, have been contrary to exchange control legislation. Any attempt to do a conversion as at the date of the judgment would in effect be to render a completely new judgment, in breach of the once and for all rule.

The 'once and for all rule' is a common law rule that stipulates that a plaintiff must claim, in a single action, compensation for the damage he has already suffered and the prospective loss which he reasonably expects to suffer in future. See Oslo Land Co Ltd v Union Government 1938 AD 584…,.; and Custom Credit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Shembe 1972 (3) SA 462 (A)…,.

In his book The Law of Delict, PROFESSOR BOBERG sums up the common law position as follows:

“A single wrongful act gives rise to a cause of action for all damage, past and future, that it causes. This means that a plaintiff cannot claim compensation piecemeal for his various losses as they occur: he must sue 'once and for all' for the whole of his damage, seeking redress not only for the harm he has already suffered (actual or accrued loss) but also for the harm he expects to suffer in the future (prospective loss). And if he succeeds he will generally be awarded damages in a lump sum, payable immediately, in respect of both past and future losses.”

See also Elvins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 (2) SA 814 (A)…, where the court said:

“The 'once and for all' rule applies especially to common law actions for damages in delict, though it has also been applied to claims for damages for breach of contract….,. Expressed in relation to delictual claims, the rule is to the effect that in general a plaintiff must claim, in one action, all damages…,. This rule appears to have been introduced into our practice from English Law. Its introduction and the manner of its application by our courts have been subject to criticism…, but it is a well entrenched rule. Its purpose is to prevent a multiplicity of actions based upon a single cause of action to ensure that there is an end to litigation.”

In Dube v Banana 1998 (2) ZLR 92 (HC)…, the law in Zimbabwe was stated in the following terms:

“Our law recognizes the 'once and for all rule' which states that a plaintiff, when suing for damages, must sue for all his damages in a single action, both for loss suffered and for prospective loss…,. In my opinion, the once and for all rule should be modified. I consider this can best be done by an Act of Parliament rather than by 'judge-made law', which is, by its very nature, haphazard and piecemeal. The Law Development Commission of Zimbabwe issued a report entitled Report No. 43: 'Once and for all rule in claims for damages', in which, as the title suggests, it examined the rule and in which it made recommendations for its reform.”

Parliament has not intervened to change the law.

This court accepts as a correct application of the law to the circumstances of this case that the applicant has had his once and for all right to claim damages for the injuries which he sustained in the accident. He elected to litigate for those damages in 2008. He claimed those damages partly in Zimbabwe currency and partly in Botswana Pula. He received the awards he sought. He had a further opportunity to recast his case before the Supreme Court, in October 2010, when the appeal was heard, which was after dollarization. He chose not to do so, or to seek the leave of the Supreme Court to have the Zimbabwe dollar component of the judgment 'converted' to a currency that he could use. The Supreme Court, on application for its leave, would have had an opportunity for 'judge made law' to decide whether to remit the matter back to this court for evidence to be adduced on the question of the 'conversion' of the Zimbabwe dollar component of the judgment to a currency of the applicant's choice.

The applicant cannot now come back to this court seeking to change the judgment given to him. The applicant has already had his day in court he cannot now come for a second judgment arising out of the same circumstances as the first.

Res judicata is a rule that matters which have already been adjudicated upon between the same parties cannot be adjudicated again. It is a consequence of the 'once and for all rule'.

In Union Wine Ltd v Snell and Co Ltd 1990 (2) SA 189 (C)…, the Judge said:

“Although it is not clear from the cases whether the 'once and for all' rule is just a manifestation of the exceptio rei judicatae or whether it has a wider range than the latter, it is settled practice in South Africa that where a cause of action gives rise to more than one remedy a plaintiff who pursues one of those remedies and has obtained a judgment thereupon can be met with a plea of res judicata if he should institute a second action to pursue one of the other remedies.”

It is common cause that the parties before this court are the same as those before the court in 2008. It is common cause that the cause of action is the same and that damages are being sought pursuant to that cause of action. In the January 2008 judgment this court decided that the applicant had suffered damages which required to be redressed by the payment of Zimbabwe currency. This court accepts that all those issues are now res judicata and cannot be re-opened.

In the result, this court finds that it has no jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the applicant, and that, no factual basis has been laid in the founding affidavit to justify granting the relief sought. The court is functus officio, the damages which the applicant seeks to be 'converted' to another currency now, were assessed and awarded in 2008. Any attempt to re-assess the award made in 2008 now, even if such assessment involves the calculation of the value of the damages in a different currency, would amount to changing the nature of the judgment given in 2008, a power which is only available to a superior court on appeal.

The matter cannot properly be determined by the improper use of this court's inherent jurisdiction.

This court's inherent jurisdiction does not cloak it with power to re-determine issues between the same parties which have already been conclusively determined. It may only do so on limited grounds where it is directed to do so by a higher court, the Supreme Court, and on very specific directions. There being no such direction from the Supreme Court, to this court, it is trite that the issues between the parties are res judicata.

This court has no jurisdiction to exercise the same principles of social justice and equity as the Labour Court, and any attempt to rely on labour matters, as the basis for inviting this court to exercise powers that are specific to and pertinent to the Labour Court will find no truck with this court.

In the circumstances of this case, where 'accident damages' were assessed and awarded as special damages and general damages, under the law of delict, it is my view that, there is no factual or legal basis in the papers filed of record, on which this court can 'convert' a 2008 judgment made in Zimbabwe currency to United States dollars.

Despite this finding, this court respectfully declines to exercise its discretion and grant punitive costs against the applicant as advocated for by counsel for the respondent.

Accordingly, the application is dismissed with costs on an ordinary scale.

On 21 December 1999 at the 12km peg along the Rusape to Nyanga road a horrific collision involving the respondent and an employee of the appellant occurred. The former sustained frightful injuries. Sadly, the appellant's employee succumbed to injuries occasioned from the collision.

The following facts are common cause.

The respondent sued for and was awarded damages by the High Court on 23 January 2008. The damages so awarded were the following:

(i) BP (Botswana Pula) 63,750 for the cost of replacement of a vehicle;

(ii) BP83,717=90 in respect of medical expenses.

(iii) BP1,800,000 for loss of income.

(iv) Z$3,500 towing charges.

(v) BP12,000,000 car hire charges.

(vi) Z$2,000,000 shock, pain and suffering.

(vii) Z$850,000 disability damages.

(viii) Z$1,000,000 future medical expenses.

The appellant was dissatisfied with the judgment and appealed to this Court against the finding of vicarious liability as well as the amounts awarded in Botswana Pula (BP). There was no appeal against the amounts denominated in the Zimbabwe dollar. On 28 February 2012 this Court, in the case of The Cold Chain (Pvt) Ltd v Robson Makoni SC09-12, issued an order in the following terms:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The application to adduce further evidence is dismissed with costs.

2. The appeal against the finding of vicarious liability is dismissed.

3. The appeals in respect of the value of the replacement motor vehicle, vehicle hire charges, and lost income are allowed and the order of the court a quo is altered in the following respects:

(i) In paragraph (a), Botswana Pula 40,000 is substituted for BP63,000;

(ii) In paragraph (c), Botswana Pula 616,200 is substituted for BP1,800,000;

(iii) In paragraph (e), Botswana Pula 6,000 is substituted for BP12,000,000.

4. There will be no order as to costs of appeal.

It is common cause that the appellant paid the amounts denominated in Botswana Pula. In respect of the other sums it tendered payment in Zimbabwe dollar. The respondent rejected the tender. He contended that due to the erosion of the currency it had become moribund due to disuse, and, as such, he had no use for it. He could not tender the same for payment to anyone.

An impasse ensued which resulted in the respondent filing an application with the High Court for the conversion to United States Dollars of the sums awarded to him in the local currency.

The High Court found that it had no jurisdiction to convert the amounts thus awarded to United States dollars. It said:

“In conclusion, this Court's opinion on the issue of currency nominalism, in the circumstances of this case, is that, while on the whole this Court has inherent jurisdiction to ensure that the process of execution is neither abused nor unfair, it does not have jurisdiction to rewrite an order in the manner sought by the applicant. I hold the considered view that this Court cannot revalue an order for purpose of execution.”

In short, it declined jurisdiction.

The respondent was aggrieved and appealed to this Court and was successful. In Robson Makoni v The Cold Chain t/a Sea Harvest SC55-16, this Court said the following:

“The principles enunciated in the case of Dube (supra) demonstrate that the once and for all rule is not applicable to the facts of this case because the applicant is not seeking further damages for the injuries he sustained in the accident. He is seeking the conversion of the damages he was awarded by the High Court in 2008 in Zimbabwean dollars to United States dollars. The appellant's application is intended to facilitate the enforcement of the order of damages in Zimbabwean dollars. The once and for all rule prevents a plaintiff from seeking further damages from a cause of action previously sued on. It does not prevent him from seeking the currency adjustment of an order already granted by the court.

Courts have authority to adjust their orders but under prescribed circumstances. Those circumstances depend mainly on whether or not the court will be functus officio.

The court a quo erred by relying on the once and for all rule to hold that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appellant's application. The application was for the conversion of already granted Zimbabwean dollar awards to United States dollars, which both parties agree have not yet been paid as there is a dispute as to how payment should be made. It was thus premised on a subsequent dispute over how damages awarded by the High Court in 2008 should be enforced.

The court's awards had been made uncertain by the dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy.

The appellant could not have reasonably foreseen that the Zimbabwe currency was going to be rendered moribund by the introduction of the United States dollar as usable currency in Zimbabwe.”

The court therefore allowed the appeal and issued an order in the following terms:

“Accordingly, it is ordered as follows;

1. The appeal is allowed with costs.

2. The decision of the court a quo is set aside.

3. The matter is remitted back to the court a quo for a hearing and determination on the merits.”

At the conclusion of submissions by counsel, the parties in this case agreed that this matter should have been determined by the Labour Court and not the High Court.

It was also common cause that a determination by the Labour Court was necessary before the Supreme Court could be seized with this matter. Consequently, it was agreed between the parties that the matter be referred to the Labour Court for determination, and that, in the event of either party not being satisfied with the determination of the Labour Court, the aggrieved party appeals to the Supreme Court.

The Court agreed with the common stance of the parties.

The Court directed the parties to submit a draft order by consent for approval by the Court. The parties were not able to agree on the details of the order by consent. They addressed the following letter to the Registrar of this Court:

“FLEXIMAIL (PVT) LTD v GIFT BOB SAMANYAU AND 38 OTHERS: CASE NO. SC-135/11

We respectfully request that you place this memorandum before His Lordship The Chief Justice.

We refer to the above Supreme Court appeal in respect of the above matter which was heard on the 11^th of September 2013. Pursuant to the Court's direction that the parties draft a consent order and revert to the Court by the 13^th of September, we advise that there are areas of agreement and areas of disagreement.

Areas of agreement

The parties agree that the matter be referred to the Labour Court for quantification.

Areas of disagreement

The parties disagree on the following three issues:

1. Whether or not the appeal was allowed.

2. Whether or not the cross-appeal was allowed.

3. Whether or not the Labour Court was directed to quantify the damages in United States dollars or whether this issue remains open.

It is the appellant's view that the appeal was allowed as the Court indicated that the judgment of the High Court was set aside. However, the question of whether the respondents are entitled to damages in United States dollars remained to be decided by the Labour Court during the quantification proceedings. Accordingly, the cross appeal cannot have been granted.

We respectfully request the Court's direction as to how to proceed.”

The Court has considered the submissions by counsel and the above letter addressed to the Registrar of this Court seeking directions. The Court has come to the following conclusion.

1. The judgment of the High Court in this matter is hereby set aside for lack of jurisdiction. To that extent the appeal succeeds. The matter should have been determined by the Labour Court.

2. There being no valid appeal to this Court from a court of competent jurisdiction, the cross appeal falls away. The matter is hereby remitted to the Labour Court for determination.

3. For the guidance of the Labour Court, the Labour Court is directed to determine the following issues –

(a) What is the effect of the change in currency effected in February 2009 on debts occurring before the effective date?

(b) Does the Labour Court have the power to order payment in the operational currency (the United States dollar) of debts incurred under the Zimbabwe dollar currency which, though not demonetised, is no longer in use?

(c) Has the principle of currency nominalism any application in the circumstances of this case?

(d) The method of calculating the quantum of the debt in current realisable currency if the conclusion of the above issues is in favour of payment in United States dollars.

This matter has trudged a long and tortuous journey.

The applicants are former employees of the respondent who were charged with misconduct and dismissed in 2005 following disciplinary processes. The applicants challenged their dismissal right up to the Labour Court in case number LC/H15/06. The Labour Court found for the applicants on 5 July 2007 and ordered their reinstatement, alternatively, payment of damages in lieu of reinstatement. The respondent opted to pay damages, caused their quantification on 10 December 2008 equivalent to 5 years salary using the cut off date of 5 July 2007 and tendered them to the applicants.

The tender, dated 11 February 2009 from the respondent's legal practitioners addressed to the applicants' erstwhile legal practitioners, Mwonzora & Associates, reads:

“RE: L MAWERE AND OTHERS v FLEXMAIL: QUANTIFICATION OF DAMAGES

In line with the judgment of the Labour Court handed down on 10 December 2008, please find herewith our client's cheque in the sum of $12,594=77 (revalued) in full settlement of the amounts due to your clients. A copy of the schedule as to how the various figures were arrived at is attached hereto.

You will note from the computation that the amounts have been revalued and inflation adjusted to February 2009.

The matter is accordingly closed…,.”

The applicants, through their then legal practitioners mentioned above rejected the tender and returned the cheque in question. The attempt at payment was tendered after breakdown of quantification negotiations. The primary reason for rejecting the tender was that the respondent attempted to pay the damages in Zimbabwe dollars in February 2009 when the currency had become moribund.

In their amended draft order the applicants are seeking a declaratory order in the following terms:

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement to the applicants in United States Dollars using the initial United States Dollar salary scales which were used by the respondent when it started paying its employees in foreign currency.

2. That the respondent pay the costs of suit.”

The main thrust of the applicants' argument, as gleaned from the founding affidavit and heads of argument, is as follows:

The applicants have approached this court, since it is the only court with inherent jurisdiction, seeking a declaratur that the principle of currency nominalism has no place in Labour Law (a common law principle) as it would be at variance with the Labour Act's aim of achieving social justice. Further, they seek a declaration to the effect that damages in lieu of reinstatement have to be paid in an effective manner, that is in an amount, currency, and quantity that achieves fairness as required by the Labour Act. The applicants further seek an order compelling the respondent to pay damages in United States dollars using the initial United States dollar salary scales which were used by the respondent when it started paying its employees in foreign currency i.e. in February 2009. A successful appellant, so the argument went, should have a discretion to choose payment of damages in the currency that will redress the injury suffered and adequately compensate him/her/ it for the loss as well as fulfil the objectives of the Labour Act.

Interpreting the order of the Labour Court to mean payment in Zimbabwe dollars would amount to making the order a brutum fulmen because the Zimbabwe dollar, by the time of the tender, had became de facto valueless and useless, this would amount to non-payment thereby reducing court orders into empty judgments which is both unfair and against public policy.

The respondent's opposition was premised on the following main planks:

1. The matter is res judicata in that the Labour Court handed down judgment in case number LC/H/15/06 ordering the respondent to either reinstate the applicants or pay damages in lieu thereof. Following quantification of such damages, the amount due and payable was duly remitted to the applicants. In the event, this application disguised as an “application for a declaratory order” is merely meant to deal with the same issues which were concluded by the Labour Court.

2. The issue brought before this court is an employment/labour issue and by virtue of section 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], the jurisdiction of this court is ousted.

3. What the applicants are asking this court to do is to:

3.1 Ignore the salaries payable to the applicants as at 5 July 2007 when an order of reinstatement was made by the Labour Court.

3.2 Depart from the current position of law and order payment of damages based on a date after the order of reinstatement was made.

3.3 Ignore the lawful currency that governed the contractual relationship between the parties as at 5 July 2007 (which required payment of salaries in Zimbabwe dollars) and set aside that trite position to enable the applicants to be paid afresh damages in lieu of reinstatement in US dollars. This is despite the fact that, as at 5 July 2007, the applicants' employment contracts entitled them to remuneration in Zimbabwe dollars and not in US dollars sought by the applicants.

4. The issues raised by the applicants have been dealt with by the courts on many occasions and are not unique to the applicants.

I am mindful of the fact that what the applicants are inviting this court to do, as submitted by counsel for the respondent, boils down to two pertinent issues, viz:

1. To do that which Parliament should, i.e. to make law by repealing the common law principle of currency nominalism; and

2. To “overrule” those decisions of the Supreme Court which have already made the point that in quantification of damages in respect of labour disputes, the rates that are applicable are those that applied at the time of dismissal or suspension. See Redstar Wholesalers v E Mabika SC52-05 and First Mutual Life Limited v Jackson Muzivi 2000 (1) ZLR 325 (S).

Points 3 and 4 of the respondent's opposition cited above are interwoven with point 2 cited immediately above so I shall deal with them pari passu…,. First, let me deal with points one and two of that opposition quoted above. They allude to the issue of res judicata and ousting of this court's jurisdiction by virtue of section 89(6) of the Labour Act.

As regards the issue of res judicata, I have not been persuaded that it is applicable in the instant case.

In order to successfully ground such a defence, the litigant raising it must show that the dispute has been conclusively settled on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction and that the two actions are between the same parties, concerning the same subject matter founded on the same cause of complaint. See Gwaze v National Railways of Zimbabwe 2002 (1) ZLR 679.

The original dispute before the Labour Court was concerned with the lawfulness or otherwise of the applicants' dismissal and the quantum of damages payable in lieu of reinstatement. That court did not deal with the issue of the form of currency of payment - which is the gravamen of the present application.

That issue only arose following the introduction of the multi-currency regime in January/February 2009 – well after the Labour Court had already handed down its judgment which was silent on the currency to be used thereby providing the basis of discretion being asserted by the applicants. The present application seeks not to reverse, amend or modify the order that the applicants be paid five years salary as damages for the unlawful dismissal, but simply seeks a declaratory order that in view of the introduction of the multicurrency and the judicial and State recognition of the de facto redundancy of the Zimbabwe dollar, a successful litigant may choose to be paid in any applicable foreign currency in the country and that payment in a moribund currency is not an effective fulfilment of the court's order.

The Labour Court, not being endowed with inherent jurisdiction to make such a declaration, it cannot be said that the dispute was dealt with on the merits let alone conclusively settled.

Regarding the issue that this court's jurisdiction is ousted by section 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], I am unable to subscribe to this view. The subsection cited provides that:

“(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal or matter referred to in subs (1)”.

Subsection (1) has six paragraphs listing the functions to be exercised by that court to the exclusion of all other courts. Those functions do not include issuing declaratory orders. This meant that the Labour Court has no inherent jurisdiction to issue declaratory orders, and, in the event, the jurisdiction of the High Court remains intact.

In Sibanda & Anor v Chinemute NO & Anor HH131-04, MAKARAU JP…, put it aptly thus:

“Thus, the power to issue a declaratory order is not available in all courts that apply common law. It is specific to this court…,.

It is common cause that the Labour Court has not been specifically empowered to issue declaratory orders as this court has been. It cannot create such a relief or the procedure for granting such relief as it is not a court of inherent jurisdiction.”

I am in respectful agreement with this view.

I now turn to the other points raised in opposition cited supra.

Regarding the point raised, that the applicants are inviting this court to do what Parliament should, viz to make law by repealing the common law principle of currency nominalism, it is settled that it is not impermissible of the judiciary to make law by way of decided cases if an opportunity presents itself to plug a legislative gap especially where not to do so will leave many an unlawfully dismissed employee languishing in the asylum of financial misery.

The applicants are not asking this court to declare that the principle of currency nominalism no longer has any space in our common law generally. They are simply asking the court to pronounce that following the introduction of the multi currency regime, in January/February 2009, and the concomitant disuse of the Zimbabwe dollar which had become moribund as a result of economic and many other circumstances which had conspired to facilitate this major unprecedented conflagration, and Parliament has remained in a near catatonic state in addressing this occurrence, this court should declare that in the realm of employment relations, the principle of nominalism has, for now, no place until economic normalcy has been restored.

This court is enjoined to take judicial notice of the reality that immediately before and after the country adopted the multi-currency regime, in about February 2009, the Zimbabwe dollar was so valueless that it had ceased to be the medium of exchange in all financial transactions. To therefore have an employer tender damages in lieu of reinstatement in the form of Zimbabwe dollars in February 2009, as what the respondent did to the applicants in casu, is tantamount to giving someone an ordinary stone and expect him/her to transact using that stone as a medium of exchange. It does not make any sense in any sane society.

Should Zimbabwe continue being immutable to change on this score?

On principles of equity, this court should tread a path that will avoid iniquity and injustice where legislative intervention is not forthcoming.

The words of GUBBAY ACJ…, in the case of Zimnat Insurance Company Limited v Chawanda 1990 (2) ZLR 143 (S)…, regarding judicial law-making, bear useful repetition for clarity:

“Even if confirmation of the appellant's liability to the respondent should meet with disapproval as being an encroachment upon the discretion reposed in the law-giver to change the law, we would strongly defend the Judiciary's right to do so. Law in a developing country cannot afford to remain static. It must undoubtedly be stable, for otherwise reliance upon it would be rendered impossible. But, at the same time, if the law is to be a living force it must be dynamic and accommodating to change. It must adapt itself to fluid economic and social norms and values and to altering views of justice. If it fails to respond to these needs, and is not based on human necessities and experience of the actual affairs of men rather than on philosophical notions, it will one day be cast off by the people because it will cease to serve any useful purpose. Therefore, the law must be constantly on the move, vigilant and flexible to current economic and social conditions.”

After quoting the celebrated American jurist, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES opening page of his famous work, The Common Law which reads:

“The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a Book of Mathematics.”

The learned ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE, at page 154 paragraphs A-E of Zimnat Insurance Company Limited v Chawanda 1990 (2) ZLR 143 (S), went on to say:

“Today, the expectations amongst people all over the world, and particularly in developing countries, are rising, and the judicial process has a vital role to play in moulding and developing the process of social change. The judiciary can, and must, operate the law so as to fulfil the necessary role of effecting such development. It sometimes happens that the goal of social and economic change is reached more quickly through legal development by the Judiciary than by the Legislature. This is because judges have a certain amount of freedom or latitude in the process of interpretation and application of the law. It is now acknowledged that judges do not merely discover the law - but they also make law. They take part in the process of creation. Law-making is an inherent and inevitable part of the judicial process. The opportunity to play a meaningful and constructive role in developing and moulding the law to make it accord with the interests of the country may present itself where a judge is concerned with the application of the common law, even though there is a spate of judicial precedents which obstructs the taking of such a course. If judges hold to their precedents too closely they may well sacrifice the fundamental principles of justice and fairness for which they stand.”

The learned ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE then quoted a famous passage by LORD ATKIN, referring to judicial precedents:

“When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains the proper course is for the judge to pass through them undeterred.”

The quotations cited above are not only attractive and persuasive but fit the instant scenario of the application before me like a fiddle.

The principle of currency nominalism works fairly in an economy which can be described as normal or stable, or, at the very worst, in which inflation is not hyper, not like in an environment with a runaway inflation as was the case in this country in the period immediately preceding the introduction of the multi-currency regime.

After introduction of multiple currency, in February 2009, it is beyond cavil that the Zimbabwe dollar died a natural death by disuse. To then give someone such currency, which no one nationwide was prepared to accept in any transaction, let alone beyond our borders, as damages in lieu of reinstatement, and after having laboured for the employer for periods ranging between 25 and 46 years like what the respondents did in casu is not only immoral but an infringement of a human right.

If judges continue to cling to their precedents in such a scenario of social and economic change, like the grasp of an epileptic during a fit, they will certainly be sacrificing the fundamental principles of justice and fairness for which they stand.

I am prepared in the instant case not to let the ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their medieval chains but to pass through them undeterred in the interests of justice and fairness.

In any event, the assertion that by granting the order sought would be usurping the role of the Legislature has no legal leg to stand on for the issuing of orders in foreign currency has been decisively dealt with before locally, regionally, and internationally.

In Makwindi Oil Procurement (Pvt) Ltd v National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 1988 (2) ZLR 482 (SC) GUBBAY JA…, was of the view that in the absence of any legislative enactments which require our courts to order payment in local currency only, the innovative approaches taken in England and South Africa, making orders in foreign currency, had to be adopted in order to bring Zimbabwe into line with other foreign legal systems. In that case, the court relied on the House of Lords decision in Owners of the MV Eleftherotria v Owners of the MV Despina R (1971) 1 ALL ER 421 (HL).

In South Africa, a similar approach was followed in the case of Elgin Brown & Hammer v Dampskibsselskabet Torm Limited 1988 (4) SA 671 (NPD).

After reviewing the three authorities cited immediately above, MAKARAU JP…, awarded delictual damages in foreign currency to a party who had purchased a house in local currency against a seller who had failed to effect transfer as a result of a prior sale to another party in Kwindima Fabiola v Mvudura Louis HH25-09. At page 5 of the cyclostyled judgment the learned judge reasoned as follows:

“It appears to me that the issue I have to determine is whether to extend the approach that has been taken in the Makwindi case and be innovative enough to suggest that where a loss has been suffered and can be calculated in both the local and in a foreign currency, the court has a discretion to award judgment in that currency that will redress the injury suffered and adequately compensate the plaintiff for the loss. It would then follow that where that currency is the foreign currency as opposed to the local currency, then judgement should be in the foreign currency, for to award damages in the local currency, where the local currency has been rendered valueless by inflation might be to deny a plaintiff the redress that he or she seeks.”

Adopting the approach taken in Kwindima Fabiola v Mvudura Louis HH25-09, I am persuaded that in the instant case, in order to adequately compensate the applicants, the currency which the respondent must pay them as damages for unlawful dismissal in lieu of reinstatement should be in foreign currency. I say so because in a multi-currency regime where the local currency has become moribund, to award damages to an unlawfully dismissed employee who has toiled for the employer for between 25 and 46 years in such local currency is not only clinging to a positivist jurisprudential approach but iniquitous and offends against all known tenets of justice in a civilised and democratic society.

Such an award should not be a brutum fulmen but must be meaningful and beneficial to the beneficiary.

Even on an international plane, in terms of Article 10 of the I.L.O. Convention 158 Termination of Employment Convention 1982, adequate compensation should be paid for unjustified loss of employment.

Certainly payment in Zimbabwe dollars in this era will not amount to adequate compensation.

The last point to deal with relates to points 3 and 4 of the respondent's opposition as encapsulated in the contention that the applicants are inviting this court to “overrule” those decisions of the Supreme Court which have already made the point that in quantification of damages in respect of labour disputes, the rates that are applicable are those that applied at the time of reinstatement as held inter alia, in the case of Redstar Wholesalers v Mabika SC52-05 and First Mutual Life Limited v Jackson Muzivi SC09-07.

In the instant case, the applicants, in applying for payment of their damages to be made in US dollars want the rate applicable to be “the initial United States dollar salary scales which were used by the respondent when it started paying its employees in foreign currency.” In support of their contention in this regard, the applicants argued, in their heads of argument, in this vein:

“As to a potential objection of what would be the appropriate salary in foreign currency to use, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. Reference may be had to the salary scales of the first month that the respondent first started fully and wholly paying its employees remuneration in foreign currency. Alternatively, is to look at the first National Employment Council (NEC) salaries in foreign currency and applying those. After all, these are exactly the salaries that the applicants would have been earning if they had been reinstated rather (than) being paid damages in lieu of reinstatement. What is called for here is not mathematical precision computation but substantive justice and fairness that, in the words of OMERJEE J in Stanmarker Mining (Pvt) Ltd v Metallon Gold Corporation, places the successful party 'as nearly as possible in the same position as he would have occupied if the contract had been performed…,.'”

Prima facie, the argument is titillating.

The citation of Stanmarker Mining (Pvt) Ltd v Metallon Gold Corporation is HC3074/04. Therein, OMERJEE J made the pronouncement when holding that regarding judgments sounding in foreign currency “it is the plaintiff's prerogative to claim in a currency that will most truly express his loss and accordingly most fully and exactly compensate him for that loss. However, in order to succeed, a claimant is required to lay a foundation that supports him claim.”

In that case, the court found that the plaintiff had laid an adequate foundation establishing its entitlement to damages in United States dollars because the defendant was selling the disputed shares (which it claimed were valued in Zimbabwe dollars) in United States dollars including their final disposal.

I am constrained to shy away from the applicants' contention in this connection for two reasons;

(i) Firstly, the pronouncements by OMERJEE J, in Stanmarker Mining (Pvt) Ltd v Metallon Gold Corporation HC3074/04, were confined to the choice of currency by the claimant which I have already disposed of supra in the applicants' favour and not to the rate of salary to invoke when calculating damages in lieu of reinstatement.

(ii) Secondly, and more importantly, based on the doctrine of stare decisis, this court is bound by the plethora of Supreme Court decisions to the effect that in calculating damages for unlawful dismissal in lieu of reinstatement, the rate of salary to be used is the one pertaining at the date of the reinstatement order - certainly not the one obtaining at a later date.

Since I have already held that the applicants must be paid their damages not in Zimbabwe dollars but in foreign currency of their choice (and they chose the United States dollars), the rate of salary to be used in the calculation of the damages should be the one obtaining as at 5 July 2007 (the date of the reinstatement order) but being the official rate of exchange of the Zimbabwe dollar – United States dollar equivalent.

I also find that the respondent, in the face of the stark economic reality obtaining at the time of its tender of the damages, was quite unreasonable in refusing to yield to reason. It should accordingly pay the applicants costs of suit. In any event, costs always follow the result.

In the event, there is need to amend the applicants' amended draft order to read as follows:

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement to the applicants in United States dollars using the official rate of exchange of the Zimbabwe dollar-United States dollar equivalent obtaining on 5 July 2007.

2. That the respondent pay the costs of suit.”