Legitimate Expectation

HB04-09 : ECKEM WILIAM SITHOLE vs PG INDUSTRIES ZIMBABWE (LIMITED) T/A THE AFRICAN LUMBER COMPANY P/L
Ruled By: NDOU J

It is common cause that a company has the discretion to make promotion appointments depending on the employee's performance and the performance of the company. The company, further, has the discretion to extend the training period. The discretion enjoyed by the company entails either a favourable or an unfavourable outcome. It is trite that legitimate ...

SC24-14 : KUNDAI MAGODORA AND OTHERS vs CARE INTERNATIONAL ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, PATEL JA and GUVAVA JA

I now turn to the argument that the continual renewal of fixed term contracts over a period of time creates a legitimate expectation of re-employment or permanent employment. This position, in its essence, was rejected by this Court in UZ-UCSF Collaborative Research Programme in Women's Health v Shamuyarira 2010 (1) ZLR 127 (S), the material facts of which ...

SC81-14 : JORAM NYAHORA vs CFI HOLDINGS ( PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA and PATEL JA

The appellant's further claim that he had a legitimate expectation to purchase the vehicle is, in my view, also without merit. It seems to me that whatever expectation he had to purchase the vehicle is merely that - an expectation. It has no legal basis. It is not justiciable. It cannot be converted into ...

SC64-15 : TELONE (PVT) LTD vs BIGBOY SENGENDE
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and GOWORA JA

LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION The respondent was offered, and accepted, a renewal of the contract on the understanding that the renewal would not create an expectation of further renewals. See UZ-UCSF Collaborative Research Programme in Women's Health v Shamuyarira 2010 (1) ZLR 127 (S); Kundai Magodora Ors v Care International Zimbabwe SC24-14. Prior to the renewal ...

SC64-17 : THOKOZILE ZINONDO vs CAFCA LIMITED
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

In chambers in terms of section 92F(3) of the Labour Act. This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Labour Court. On 24 July 2017, I dismissed this application. The applicant wrote ...

In chambers in terms of section 92F(3) of the Labour Act.

This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of the Labour Court. On 24 July 2017, I dismissed this application. The applicant wrote to the Registrar requesting reasons for my order.

These are they.

The factual background of the matter is as follows:

The applicant was employed by the respondent as an Industrial Nurse from May 1980. When she started working, her salary was tagged at grade C1, and, thereafter, she rose through the ranks to grade C3. In July 2013, she retired, having attained the retirement age of 65. Thereafter, the respondent offered her a contract to work as an occupational Health Officer which she accepted.

Before her retirement, the applicant was being paid a monthly salary of $572=. However, during the period of employment as an Occupational Health Officer, she accidentally came across a March 2011 basic salaries schedule. The schedule showed that she was the least paid employee in the grade C3 and that she was paid even less than some employees in lower grades C2 and CI. Thinking it was an error, the applicant approached the Human Resources Executive with a view to having her salary reviewed upwards. On being advised that it was not an error she proceeded file a complaint with a labour officer. The dispute was subsequently brought before an arbitrator.

The arbitrator found that the applicant had been underpaid from July 2011 to September 2013 and that she was supposed to be paid $13,986=. The respondent appealed against the award to the Labour Court and the court upheld the appeal on the basis that, at law, an employer can pay different salaries to employees doing the same work based on the terms of their agreements. This is as long as the terms do not violate the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The court a quo thus concluded that the findings of the arbitrator were not supported by the law - albeit morally sound.

Aggrieved, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal to this court, before the Labour Court. The application was set down for hearing on 16 February 2016. Neither the applicant nor her legal representative attended the hearing, and, consequently, the application was dismissed in default. The applicant then filed an application for rescission of the default order dismissing her application for leave to appeal. In motivating her application, she argued that the default was not wilful and that the judgment ought to be rescinded.

On 19 August 2016, the court dismissed the application for rescission on the following grounds, that:

(i) The applicant was to blame for the actions of her erstwhile legal practitioners;

(ii) Her legal practitioners had not given an explanation for their inaction;

(iii) There were inconsistences in her submissions; and

(iv) She had no prospects of success on appeal.

The applicant then filed an application for leave to appeal against the order dismissing her application for rescission of the default order. On 22 March 2017, that application was dismissed, hence the present application for leave to appeal against the order that dismissed her application for rescission of the default order.

It is trite that an applicant seeking leave to appeal must establish that he has prospects of success on appeal. In the words of GARWE JA in Chikurunhe and Ors v Zimbabwe Financial Holdings SC10-08;

“The party seeking leave must show, inter alia, that he has prospects of success on appeal. In other words, leave is not granted simply because a party has sought such leave.”

In this case, the question of prospects of success hinged on whether or not the applicant satisfied the requirements for rescission.

In an application for rescission of a default judgment, the court must be satisfied that there is good and sufficient cause to rescind the order. In Makoni v CBZ Bank Limited HH357-16, CHITAKUNYE J quoted the case of Stockil v Griffiths 1992 (1) ZLR 172 (S)…, wherein GUBBAY CJ aptly noted that:-

“The factors which a court will take into account in determining whether an applicant for rescission has discharged the onus of proving “good and sufficient cause”, as required to be shown by Rule 63 of the High Court of Zimbabwe Rules 1971 are well established. They have been discussed and applied in many decided cases in this country. See for instance, Barclays Bank of Zimbabwe Ltd v CC International (Pvt) Ltd SC16-86 (not reported); Roland and Another v McDonnell 1986 (2) ZLR 216 (S) at 226E-H; Songore v Olivine Industries (Pvt) Ltd 1988 (2) ZLR 210 (S) at 211C-F. They are:

(i) The reasonableness of the applicant's explanation for the default ;

(ii) The bona fides of the application to rescind the judgement; and

(iii) The bona fides of the defence on the merits of the case which carries some prospect of success.

These factors must be considered not only individually but in conjunction with one another and with the application as a whole.”

From this authority, it is clear that the test of a good and sufficient cause involves the establishment of the following factors:

(a) Explanation for the default must be reasonable;

(b) The bona fides of the application to rescind the judgment;

(d) Prospects of success.

I now proceed to deal with these factors separately.

The explanation for default and bona fides of the application to rescind

In her application for rescission of the default order, in the court a quo, on one hand, the applicant submitted that her default was due to the inadvertence of her erstwhile legal practitioners who did not advise her that the matter had been set down nor attend the hearing of the matter. She expanded on this submission in her founding affidavit and stated that her legal practitioners had been served with a notice of set down but had not notified her of this fact.

On the other hand, in her oral submissions at the hearing, the applicant argued that her legal practitioners were not served with the notice of set down, thus they were unaware of the hearing date and so was she. These submissions were inconsistent with the evidence on record, in particular, the return of service which was placed before the court and which showed that the applicant's legal practitioners had been served with the notice of set down.

The court a quo found that other than the applicant's inconsistent explanations, her legal practitioners had not filed a supporting affidavit admitting to the blame and/or explaining why they failed to act on behalf of their client despite being served with the notice of set down.

It is trite that where the legal practitioner is the one who is at fault, he must file an affidavit admitting his errors. The principle was laid out in the case of Diocese of Harare v The Church of the Province for Central Africa SC09-10, where this Court held that:

“Although in argument Mr Zhou suggested that the failure to comply with the relevant Rules of Court was wholly attributable to the respondent's legal practitioners, there was no admission of negligence by the legal practitioner…,.

It would have been after the responsible legal practitioner had filed an affidavit admitting fault and explaining in some detail what happened, that the Judge would be in a position to decide whether the respondent should not be visited with the sins of its legal practitioners. Where no factual basis for making such a distinction of culpability has been provided, the Judge would have no right to draw it. It must follow that without an affidavit from the person responsible for the “oversight” admitting fault and explaining the circumstances under which he or she overlooked the Rules, one is at a loss for the reason why it was found necessary to state in the opposing affidavit that an 'oversight' on the part of the respondent was the cause of non-compliance. The procedure adopted by the respondent is another example of lack of care to ensure that Rules of Court were complied with.”

In light of the above authority, with regards the explanation for the delay and the applicant's bona fides, my view is that the court a quo was correct in concluding that the applicant's explanation for the default was not reasonable and that her application for rescission lacked bona fides as she was clearly trying to mislead the court.

Prospects of success

The applicant argued that despite receiving a salary that was in terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), such salary was less than that received by others in her grade and by some in lower grades. Accordingly, she was entitled to the difference as from July 2011.

It should be noted that Collective Bargaining Agreements stipulate minimum wages for any particular grade. An employer is only guilty of an unfair labour practice if he fails to pay the minimum salaries for a particular grade provided therein. It follows, therefore, that employees may receive different salaries despite being in the same grade. The actual amount of the salary depends on the employee's negotiations with the employer in forming the employment contract.

Moreover, it is trite that an employment contract is one that is between the employer and the employee. The principles of the law of contract, such as freedom of contract, therefore, apply. In Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC)…, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, explaining the freedom of contract principle, stated thus:

“Self-autonomy, or the ability to regulate one's own affairs, even to one's own detriment, is the very essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity. The extent to which the contract was freely and voluntarily concluded is clearly a vital factor as it will determine the weight that should be afforded to the values of freedom and dignity.”

Further, in Malunga & Ors v PTC SC117-97, this court dealt with a matter almost similar to the present one.

In that case, the appellants were receiving different salaries despite the fact that they were doing the same work. They argued that payment of different wages for the same type of work had no objective basis and was irrational.

The learned judge of appeal found that there was no legitimate expectation on the part of an employee to be paid more than what he is supposed to be paid simply because other employees may be receiving greater, seemingly unjustified, benefits.

It was on the basis of the foregoing, and authorities cited, that I found no fault in the decision of the court a quo to the effect that the applicant had no prospects of success on appeal in this matter, had tendered no satisfactory explanation for the default in question, and had also demonstrated a lack of bona fides in the defence that she proffered. In short, she had not proved a case for the relief sought.

Accordingly, I dismissed the application with costs.

SC70-17 : TEL ONE (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs MARUFU A. CHIGAAZIRA
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and UCHENA JA

This is the unanimous decision of this court. This is an appeal against the decision of the Labour court upholding the appellant's appeal against the arbitrator's finding that the respondent had legitimate expectation for the renewal of his fixed term contract….,. THE MERITS The appellant gave the respondent notice of both the expiry and the non-renewal of ...

This is the unanimous decision of this court.

This is an appeal against the decision of the Labour court upholding the appellant's appeal against the arbitrator's finding that the respondent had legitimate expectation for the renewal of his fixed term contract….,.

THE MERITS

The appellant gave the respondent notice of both the expiry and the non-renewal of his 5 year fixed term contract. The appellant went on to advertise for the post of Commercial Director, a title which was previously held by the respondent.

Despite this advertisement, it is not in dispute that no one was employed to take up this position.

Given these circumstances, the respondent was of the view that he was unfairly dismissed in view of the provisions of section 12B(3)(b) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. His main contention was that he had a legitimate expectation that his contract would be renewed.

The arbitrator and the Labour court agreed with his view.

However, section 12(b)(3)(b) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] requires that for an employee to be deemed to have been unfairly dismissed in terms of that provision, he must not only establish that he had a legitimate expectation of being re-engaged, but also that another person was engaged in his stead.

This court has held, in the case of Magodora & Others v Care International Zimbabwe SC24-14 that these two requirements are conjunctive and the mere existence of an expectation without the concomitant engagement of another employee does not suffice.

Applied to the circumstances of this case, it is evident that even if this court were to find that the respondent had a legitimate expectation of his contract being renewed, his claim would fall on the basis that the second requirement was not met.

In this respect, we find that counsel for the respondent's submission that this issue should be determined on the basis of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment is without merit.

Accordingly, the appeal has merit and ought to be upheld. In view of this finding, we find it unnecessary to consider the appellant's other grounds of appeal.

It is, in the result, ordered as follows:-

1. The appeal is allowed with costs.

2. The judgment of the court a quo be and is hereby set aside and substituted with the following:-

“1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The arbitral award rendered by P. Chawira, on 25 January 2012, be and is hereby set aside.”

HH159-15 : NGONIDZASHE TAMSANQA GOBA vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
Ruled By: HUNGWE J

If a denial of a legitimate expectation, in a given case, amounts to denial of a right guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on well known grounds of review. In R (Bhatt Murphy) v Secretary of State for the ...

SC11-19 : MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERS (MSF) BELGIUM vs VENGAI NHOPI and OTHERS
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, PATEL JA and MAVANGIRA JA

In Magodora v Care International 2014 (1) ZLR 397 (S)…, PATEL JA pronounced an interpretation on section 12B(3)(b) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. He stated that the plain meaning of section 12B(3)(b) of the Labour Act is that an employee on a contract of fixed duration must have had a legitimate expectation of being re-engaged upon its termination and was supplanted by another person who was engaged in his stead. He further stated, at 403A-C, that these requirements are patently conjunctive and the mere existence of an expectation without the concomitant engagement of another employee does not suffice.

In UZ-UCSF Collaborative Research Programme in Women's Health v Shamuyarira 2010 (1) ZLR 127 (S) ZIYAMBI JA made the point that the onus is on the employee to prove the two requirements stipulated in section 12B(3)(b) of the Labour Act. The same reasoning is also found in the South African case of Ferrant v Key Delta (1993) 14 ILJ 464 (IC), where the court held that the onus of proving reasonable expectation rests on the employee. In another South African case, Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt (2001) 22 ILJ 2407 (SCA), the court found that to discharge that onus, the employee must prove that he or she actually expected the contract to be renewed and that only then would the question whether the expectation was reasonable arise.

PROFESSOR MADHUKU L, Labour Law in Zimbabwe, Weaver Press, 2015…, states:

“The test for legitimate expectation is objective: would a reasonable person expect re-engagement? This requires an assessment of all the circumstances of the case. To be 'legitimate', the expectation must arise from impressions created by the employer.”

In other words, in order for an employee to show that he or she reasonably expected that his or her fixed term employment contract would be renewed, he or she must convince the court that there was an objective basis for the creation of the “reasonable expectation”….,.

According to the Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, “reasonable” means based on or using good judgment, and, therefore, fair and practical. The Collins English Dictionary defines “reasonable” as using or showing reason, or sound judgment; sensible….,.

In the South African case of Magubane & Ors v Amalgamated Beverages (1997) 18 ILJ 1112 (CCMA), the court held that whether there was a reasonable expectation of renewal must be determined from the perspective of both the employer and the employee.

HH173-17 : F. MUTATA and OTHERS vs THE MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and NDEWERE J

It is pertinent to appreciate the doctrine of legitimate expectation.In Metsola v Chairman, Public Service Commission Another 1989 (3) ZLR 147 (SC) …, GUBBAY JA…, had this to say on legitimate expectation:“Mr. Gillespie laid much emphasis on the legitimate expectation test introduced by LORD DENNING MR in Schmidt ...

SC200-97 : MUWENGA vs PTC
Ruled By: GUBBAY CJ, KORSAH JA and MUCECHETERE JA

This is an appeal against the decision of the Labour Relations Tribunal, brought under section 92(2) of the Labour Relations Act [Chapter 28:01] ("the Act"), in which it was held, that, the omission of the respondent ("the PTC") to promote the appellant to the post of superintendent did not amount to an unfair labour practice.

The factual background giving rise to the dispute, and upon which the question of law has been debated before this court, was succinctly outlined by the learned Chairman in his judgment. It may be restated as follows:

On 10 October 1984, the PTC invited applications for the post of Telephone Superintendent at its Gateway exchange in Gweru. Four such posts were to be filled by the lateral transfer of serving superintendents, or, if not available, by promotion from the grade of supervisor. The respondent was a Supervisor.

He applied.

After undergoing a two week training course, in April 1985, the appellant, and one Mahachi, a fellow Supervisor, were transferred, permanently, to Gateway Exchange with effect from 28 June 1985.

In April 1986, the appellant, and Mahachi, having by then acted for nine months, wrote to the Regional Telecommunications Manager requesting that they be appointed superintendents, as the two substantive posts at Gateway Exchange had not been filled. The immediate response to their veiled complaint was to offer them the choice of remaining in an acting capacity or being relieved of their positions.

Both resolved to continue as Acting Superintendents.

During February 1987, the appellant, and Mahachi, raised with the Senior Superintendent, Gweru, their concern at still awaiting substantive appointments; but to no avail. New posts, vacancies, and re-gradings were under freeze pending a review of the PTC's establishment.

Later that year, when the freeze was lifted, an exercise was undertaken by the PTC to fill the vacant substantive posts of superintendent at Gateway Exchange. Candidates were required to have attained five "O" level passes, including english language and mathematics, in the General Certificate of Education examination. There were no applicants with the stated qualification.

Neither the appellant, nor Mahachi, had obtained an "O" level pass in mathematics.

In January 1988, the Promotions Board of the PTC requested, and was granted, a waiver of the mathematics requirement for the post of Superintendent. The appellant, and Mahachi, thus qualified for promotion.

In the event, it was Mahachi, alone, who was appointed. The appellant was not, because, at that point in time, he was under investigation on charges of misconduct.

In September 1990, the PTC decided to advertise several posts, one of which was for a Superintendent at Gateway Exchange. The notice issued by it stated, explicitly, that, "O" level passes in english language and mathematics were required of the applicants.

The appellant applied, notwithstanding that he still lacked the mathematics qualification.

A supervisor from Harare Main Exchange also applied. He happened to satisfy the educational requirements: and so, it was he who secured the appointment.

Shortly, thereafter, on 5 February 1991, the appellant was informed, that, as a superintendent had now been appointed to Gateway Exchange, he was no longer needed to act in that capacity and was to be transferred back to Harare Main Exchange as a supervisor.

This was indeed a bitter pill for the appellant to swallow.

He had acted as superintendent at Gateway Exchange for a period of five years and seven months and was not prepared to comply meekly with the instruction that he revert to the grade of Supervisor. He immediately referred what he believed to be an unfair labour practice to a Labour Relations officer in terms of section 93(1) of the Labour Relations Act [Chapter 28:01]. A hearing was convened on 8 February 1991. The Labour Relations officer came to the conclusion that:

"The person who was appointed to fill the vacant post at Gateway Exchange was eligible for the post in terms of the Postmaster General's Circular No.8 of 1986, and in terms of the vacancy notice No.45 of 1990; the PTC acted within the parameters of its laid down policy, and, it was thus not guilty of an unfair labour practice in this regard."

Thereafter followed appeals to the Regional Hearing Officer and from him to the Labour Relations Board.

Section 8 of the Labour Relations Act specifies those acts or omissions which constitute an unfair labour practice by an employer.

Under section 10 of the Labour Relations Act, the Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare is empowered to prescribe, by statutory instrument, acts and omissions which constitute unfair labour practices and may vary, amend of repeal any such notice. Initially, such provision was made by the Minister in the Third Schedule to the Labour Relations (General) Regulations 1985 (S.I.368 of 1985); and, more recently, in the Second Schedule to the Labour Relations (Settlement of Disputes) Regulations 1993 (S.I.30 of 1993).

Those, then, are the particular acts or omissions deemed to be unfair labour practices which a Labour Relations Officer is mandated, by section 93 of the Labour Relations Act, to deal with.

It was not in contention, and rightly so, that the omission by the PTC to promote the appellant to the post of Superintendent, despite his long and good service when acting in that capacity, was one of the unfair labour practices specified in the legislation.

Nonetheless, the argument advanced was that the PTC had created a situation which caused the appellant to legitimately expect that he would be promoted to the post in which he was acting. The landmark judgment of CORBETT CJ in Administrator, Transvaal & Ors v Traub & Ors 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) was prayed in aid.

In the above cited decision…, the learned Chief Justice elaborated upon the doctrine of legitimate expectation in these words:

"There are many cases where one can visualise in this sphere: where an adherence to the formula of 'liberty, property, and existing rights' would fail to provide a legal remedy when the facts cry out for one, and would result in a decision which appeared to have been arrived at by a procedure which was clearly unfair being immune from review. The law should, in such cases, be made to reach out and come to the aid of persons prejudicially affected.

At the same time, whereas the concepts of liberty, property, and existing rights are reasonably well defined, that of legitimate expectation is not.

Like public policy, unless carefully handled, it could become an unruly horse: and, in working out, incrementally, on the facts of each case, where the doctrine of legitimate expectation applies and where it does not, the courts will, no doubt, bear in mind the need, from time to time, to apply the curb. A reasonable balance must be maintained between the need to protect the individual from decisions unfairly arrived at by public authority (and by certain domestic tribunals) and the contrary desirability of avoiding undue judicial interference in their administration."

The extension of the principle of natural justice, as enunciated in Administrator, Transvaal & Ors v Traub & Ors 1989 (4) SA 731 (A) has been accepted by this court: see Health Professions Council v McGown 1994 (2) ZLR 329 (S)…,.; Taylor v Minister of Higher Education & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 776 (S).

Even if it be assumed (without in any way deciding the point), that, it was permissible for the Labour Relations Officer to accept the appellant's reference, albeit falling outside those definitive acts or omissions specified as constituting unfair labour practices, the particular facts seem to me to exclude a finding that the appellant had a tangible natural law right to be promoted to the post of Superintendent.

Most importantly, at the date the appellant was appointed an Acting Superintendent it must have been known to him that he lacked the necessary academic level in mathematics to secure the substantive post. It was only because there was no qualified applicants that the requirement for an "O" level pass in mathematics was waived in 1988. Hence Mahachi was promoted.

But, for the pending investigation, the probability is that the appellant would have been appointed as well, since there remained a vacancy at Gateway Exchange.

Colloquially speaking, that was a "one off" situation.

The waiver of mathematics was dictated by the prevailing circumstances. It was not to be a permanent relaxation: and, when, in September 1990, the PTC advertised the vacancy at Gateway Exchange, an "O" level pass in mathematics was once more a pre-requisite. The appellant had the experience but not the academic qualification.

How could he, therefore, legitimately or reasonably expect to obtain the appointment?

The decision not to promote him, in my opinion, was not one unfairly arrived at.

If the PTC had again waived the requirement of mathematics, the appellant's position might have been different. However, it is unnecessary to decide the outcome.

I would merely emphasise, as cautioned by CORBETT CJ, that, the need to avoid undue judicial interference in the administration of public authorities must always be placed in the balance.

Indeed, it could be submitted, with some persuasion, that, the promotion of an employee is a privilege left to the discretion of the employer, to be conferred when deemed fit. It is not a right that an employee is entitled to claim unless, of course, his contract of employment so provides.

For the aforegoing reasons, I would dismiss the appeal with costs.

SC30-08 : DANAI GURUVA vs TRAFFIC SAFETY COUNCIL OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: SANDURA JA, CHEDA JA and GWAUNZA JA

The appellant is employed by the Traffic Safety Council of Zimbabwe as a Regional Manager. He was based at their Gweru office from where he was transferred to the Masvingo office.

The dispute which led to this case arose from his lateral transfer from Gweru to Masvingo.

On 14 November 2003, the respondent's Deputy Director, Finance and Administration, wrote a memorandum to the appellant advising him that he is transferred to Masvingo on a lateral transfer with effect from 1 January 2004 as result of a meeting which had been held by the Directorate of the respondent on 10 November 2003.

Reasons for the transfer were given, in the memorandum, as follows:

1. Training of managers through job rotation and enrichment.

2. That the Masvingo office was performing better than the Gweru office, though the Masvingo office was apparently smaller.

3. That the transfer had been necessitated by a thorough consideration of the likely impact on production and consequent benefits thereto.

The appellant wrote back to the Director of Finance making his submissions against the transfer.

The reasons that he gave were personal. He requested that the transfer to Masvingo be put on hold - but did not say for how long.

It is common cause, that, after the appellant had made his submissions, a meeting of the Directorate was held on Wednesday 19 November 2003 to deliberate on the representations made by the appellant.

On 20 November 2003, the Deputy Director wrote to the appellant advising, among other things, as follows:

“The directorate held a meeting at 11:00hrs to deliberate on the issues on Wednesday 19 November 2003. We sympathise with the personal circumstances in which you are. Also, we note, that, you are doing some publications concerning Traffic Safety work which could be made easier in Gweru. Nevertheless, the directorate realizes that each of us, forty seven (47) employees in all, have different personal circumstances, some of them could be much more taxing than yours. The directorate considers each case on its own merits but guided by the fact that the individual needs and goals are subordinate to those of Traffic Safety Council.”

The letter ended with the following statement:

“Having made a thorough consideration of your submissions, the directorate resolves that the earlier decision to transfer you to Masvingo, with effect from 1 January 2004, still stands.”

On 27 November 2003, the appellant wrote a long letter to the respondent appealing against the decision to transfer him to Masvingo and asking that it be reversed.

He did not succeed.

He took the matter to the Labour Relations Office alleging victimization and unfair transfer.

The Labour Officer referred the matter to Arbitration.

The arbitrator held, that, the respondent had not observed the dictates of the audi alteram partem rule and declared that the transfer was unlawful and should be reversed.

The Traffic Safety Council of Zimbabwe appealed against that decision at the Labour Court. The Labour Court upheld the appeal and confirmed the decision to transfer the appellant.

The appellant now appeals against the decision of the Labour Court.

The appellant's grounds of appeal are as follows:

1. The Labour Court made a total error of law in its interpretation of clause 8.5 of the Traffic Safety Council of Zimbabwe's conditions of service as regards the transfer of employees.

2. The Labour Court incorrectly interpreted the audi alteram partem principle, and, therefore, wrongly applied the doctrine on finding that it was observed by the respondent.

3. The Labour Court erred in law on finding that my legitimate expectation to be heard was fulfilled by the respondent.

The appellant does not dispute the contents of the letter addressed to him on 20 November 2003. His contention is that the original decision, of 10 November 2003, should never have been made without him being granted a hearing. He referred this Court to the respondent's conditions of service, and to the case of Taylor v Minister of Higher Education & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 772 (S).

It is conceded, and rightly so, by the respondent, that, the appellant should have been granted a hearing before the decision to transfer him was made.

Indeed, that is the principle laid down in Taylor v Minister of Higher Education & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 772 (S).

The appellant's attitude, in his submissions, is that once that decision was unlawful it should be set aside.

If the matter had ended there, with that decision made in that manner, I would have no hesitation in holding that it was improper to handle the transfer in that manner although declaring it unlawful would remain an arguable issue depending on the circumstances of the case.

However, that is not the position in this case.

To begin with, the appellant made submissions, detailed submissions, in writing, against the transfer. As a result, the respondent's Directorate held a meeting to deliberate on his submissions.

It is not as if the respondent refused to hear him.

Can it be said, that, once the appellant made representations, the employer should necessarily have made a different decision?

I do not believe that to be the position, and the appellant cannot say that is the position either.

Secondly, it has not been shown, that, the respondent made its original decision on the basis of grounds which have since been proved to be incorrect.

It was still open to the respondent to arrive at the same decision - even after hearing the appellant.

It must be accepted, that, the right to transfer an employee from one place to another is the prerogative of the employer. It is the employer who knows better where the services of an employee are required. The employer's discretion, in determining which employee should be transferred and to which point of the employer's operations, is not to be readily interfered with except for good cause shown.

Good cause, in the circumstances, while not easy to define, would include such matters as unfounded allegations, victimization of the employee, and any action taken to disadvantage the employee.

The reasons for transferring the appellant were given in its very first correspondence. It is not as if the reasons were made to counter the appellant's objections. Even if the reasons had not been given in the first correspondence to him, the reasons would still be valid as long as they are genuine.

The employee who undertakes to work for an employer, whose business is carried out at different places, takes the risk of being sent to perform services for the employer where ever such services are required unless the employment contract stipulates that he is to be employed and remain at a specific place only: see Ngema Chule v Minister of Justice: Kwazulu & Anor 1992 (4) SA 349.

While the respondent may have erred in not giving the appellant a hearing in the very first place, I am satisfied, that, since the respondent did not compel the appellant to go on transfer before he was heard, but, deliberated on the issue before re-affirming its previous decision, the requirement of the audi alteram partem rule was complied with.

There is nothing in the Labour Court's judgment which points at a wrong interpretation of clause 8:5 to 8:5.3. of the appellant's conditions of service.

That clause deals with transfer costs, and it is not the appellant's case that he was denied such costs.

That ground of appeal is baseless.

Taylor v Minister of Higher Education & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 772 (S), which the appellant relied on in most of his submissions, while emphasizing the need for an officer to be heard before transfer, cannot be said to set the precedent that a decision made after the officer has complained must necessarily be different.

Further to that, in Taylor v Minister of Higher Education & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 772 (S), there was an allegation of victimization, and there was no indication, that, after he had complained, there was any further consideration of the matter. He had also asked for reasons for the transfer and they were never supplied.

The court a quo, in Taylor v Minister of Higher Education & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 772 (S), had interpreted the phrase “without his consent” in the Regulations as meaning that the employee had no right to be heard.

In the case before this Court, it is my view, that, although the employee has a right to be heard, and to make representation against the transfer, the final decision still lies with the employer.

Once it is shown that the employer gave consideration to the need to transfer an employee, and gave that employee a hearing, the employer's decision cannot be held to be improper.

In Taylor v Minister of Higher Education & Anor 1996 (2) ZLR 772 (S), the Appeal Court went further and pointed out, that, in some cases, an employer can still transfer an employee without giving him or her a hearing, depending on the special circumstances of the case, and that it would be unworkable if every employee were to be consulted before a transfer or decision is made.

In conclusion, I am satisfied, that, even if the appellant in this case had not been given a hearing when the decision to transfer him was first made, once he complained, and the Directorate met and deliberated on the matter, his legitimate expectation to be heard was met, the audi alteram partem rule was complied with, and the decision to transfer him cannot be set aside.

In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

HH176-22 : NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY (PVT) LTD vs WALTER NHAU
Ruled By: MUCHAWA J

This is an application for rei vindicatio made in terms of common law. The following draft order is sought:

“1. The application for rei vindicatio be and is hereby granted.

2. The respondent be and is hereby ordered to surrender the Mazda BT50 motor vehicle registration number AFF 1103 to the applicant's offices within forty-eight (48) hours of this order.

3. In the event that respondent fails to comply with the order in (2) above, the Deputy Sheriff be and is hereby empowered to seize, from the respondent, and deliver to the applicant the Mazda BT50 motor vehicle registration number AFF 1103 without notice.

4. Should the application be opposed, respondent shall pay costs of suit on an attorney and client scale.”

It is common cause that the respondent was employed by the applicant in terms of a fixed term contract which was to lapse on 31 December 2024, in the capacity of Human Resources Manager.

On the 14th of July 2020, the respondent was served with a notice of termination of employment contract in terms of section 12(4a)(c) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], as read with his employment contract.

On the 27th of October 2020, the respondent referred to conciliation, before a labour officer, his complaint of unfair dismissal.

That matter is still pending.

It appears from supplementary affidavits filed in this matter, that, a meeting was held on 26 May 2021, between the applicant and the respondent which explored the possibility of reinstatement and withdrawal of all pending cases.

Nothing came out of it as the respondent's post was then advertised on 7 November 2021 and respondent applied to resume duty.

It is the applicant's case, that, it is the owner of the vehicle in issue which was only availed for use by the respondent in furtherance of the employer's interests during his employment. It was submitted that since the respondent's contract of employment had been terminated, his entitlement to possess and use the vehicle had ceased and he was bound to surrender it. It was argued that, as the owner, the applicant had a vindicatory right against the whole world - the respondent included.

In opposition, the respondent took a point in limine that the High Court has no jurisdiction, in the first instance, to deal with this matter, which jurisdiction lies with the Labour Court in terms of section 89(6) of the Labour Act.

I heard the parties on this point, and on the merits, and reserved my judgment....,.

Whether the respondent has a right to retain the motor vehicle

Counsel for the applicant submitted that the applicant relies on the actio rei vindicatio and it is trite that an owner has a right to vindicate his property against a possessor who holds it without his consent.

The requirements to be proved are that the applicant is the owner of the property which the respondent is holding against his or her will. Once this is shown, it was averred that the onus shifts to the respondent to prove a right of retention.

It was submitted, and is not disputed, that, the vehicle in issue is owned by the applicant.

In his defence, the respondent submitted that his dismissal was improper and has been challenged before the labour officer.

He also sought to rely on the promise of reinstatement which was intimated in the meeting of 26 May 2021, which meeting, it was argued, was at the instance of the applicant.

He therefore further argued that he had a legitimate expectation of reinstatement as his post had not yet been filled at the time of the hearing of this matter.

The claim of a legitimate expectation is just that. An expectation. It does not give rise to any contract of employment entitling the respondent to retain the vehicle: see Nyahora v CFI (Pvt) Ltd SC81-14 where a claim for legitimate expectation to purchase the company vehicle was dismissed in the following manner;

“The appellant's further claim, that he had a legitimate expectation to purchase the vehicle, is, in my view, also without merit.

It seems to me that whatever expectation he had to purchase the vehicle is merely that - an expectation. It has no legal basis. It is not justiciable. It cannot be converted into a claim of right.”

HH238-15 : WATER AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION OF ZIMBABWE vs CITY OF HARARE
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

This is an opposed application wherein the applicant prays for the following relief:“IT IS ORDERED THAT:1. The purported retirement by the Respondent of its employees as contained in its letters dated 13th March 2014 be and is hereby declared unlawful and set aside with the employees being reinstated to their ...

This is an opposed application wherein the applicant prays for the following relief:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The purported retirement by the Respondent of its employees as contained in its letters dated 13th March 2014 be and is hereby declared unlawful and set aside with the employees being reinstated to their respective positions without loss of salary and benefits.

2. The Respondent pays the costs of this application.”

The applicant is a trade union duly registered in terms of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]. It, the applicant, represents some employees of the respondent, who constitute the majority of its membership.

In March 2014, the respondent took a decision to retire about 94 of its employees who are members of the applicant. The employees were being retired for having reached the normal or official retirement age of 60 years. The respondent could, however, if it so wished, retire the employees at 65 years (late retirement).

In the main, letters sent to the affected employees generally read as follows:

“RE: YOUR NORMAL RETIREMENT FROM COUNCIL SERVICE

Our records show that you attained the age of 60 years in 2013 and in terms of HR and GPC recommendations items 30 and 2 of 28 January and 4 February 2014 respectively and adopted by Council on the 6th of March 2014 as read with Clause 7(4)(a) and Clause 10(1)(b) of Statutory Instrument 135 of 2012 Collective Bargaining Agreement your service with Council is hereby terminated with immediate effect.

You will receive your terminal benefits, including 3 months notice period payment, from the Remuneration and Welfare Division of the Human Capital Department, Pay Office at Rowan Martin Building. It is also important for you to note that Council engaged Local Authorities Pension Fund (LAPF) and agreed that the processing of your pension will be expedited. You are required to return any Council property in your possession to your Head of Section before you retire.

I now wish to extend my profound gratitude for the loyal and valuable service you have rendered to the Department and Council as a whole for the period of service and wish you a happy time after retirement.”

Employees affected by the above communication fall under the Local Authorities Pension Fund Rules, which rules allow the respondent to fix the retiring ages of its employees i.e. the applicant's members.

That point is common cause.

Section 11 of the Pension Fund Rules provides as follows:

“Retirement of contributors

11(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), for the purposes of this Scheme, a contributor -

(a) May retire or be retired on attaining or at any time after he has attained the age fifty-five years;

(b) Shall retire or be retired on attaining -

(i) Such age between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-five years, both included, as his employer may fix as the retiring age for contributors.

(ii) Where his employer has not fixed a retiring age for the purposes of subparagraph (i) applicable to him, the age of sixty years.

(2) Where an employer considers it desirable to retain a contributor beyond the retiring age applicable to him in terms of paragraph (b) of subsection (i), the contributor may, with his consent, be retained in the service of his employer beyond such retiring age but shall retire or be retired not later than the last day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty-five years.”

Furthermore, section 10(1)(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Harare Municipal Undertaking (General Conditions of Service) S.I.135 of 2012 (the CBA) provides as follows:

“Subject to the Local Authority Pension Regulations, the following shall be considered pensionable ages –

(a) 55 years of age - Early Retirement;

(b) 60 years of age - Normal Retirement;

(c) 65 years of age - Late Retirement;

Provided such employee shall qualify for a pension upon having served the employer for a continuous period of ten (10) years on pensionable conditions upon reaching the aforementioned ages.”

It is also common cause that when the respondent took the decision being challenged, some of the employees were already above the age of 60 years and were therefore awaiting late retirement at 65 years.

The applicant takes no issue with the provisions of the law quoted above but argues that the respondent cannot proceed to exercise its right to retire the affected employees at the normal retirement age of 60 years without their consent.

The applicant also argues that the respondent is aware that the pension fund has no money and that the respondent has not been paying its dues. Added to that, the applicant notes that the Medical Aid Scheme under which its members fall (i.e. the Harare Municipal Medical Aid Society) is also owed money by the respondent.

The applicant then contends that the respondent should honour its obligation under the pension fund and the medical aid scheme before forcing its members to retire at the age of 60 years.

On its part, the respondent, in the main, opposes the relief sought on the grounds that:

(a)...,.

(b) It retired employees who had reached normal retirement age and was not obliged to seek their consent.

(d) Its financial problems do not take away its right to retire employees who have attained the normal retirement age and the financial issue is before an arbitrator....,.

On the merits of the matter, I find myself being unable to agree that the applicant is entitled to the relief it seeks.

It is clear to me that in terms of section 10(1)(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Harare Municipal Undertaking (General Conditions of Service) SI 135 of 2012 the normal retirement age was fixed at 60 years. That, in my view, is in line with section 11 of the Pension Fund Rules which grant the respondent the power to fix the retirement age.

The respondent fixed the normal retirement age at 60 years and set 65 years as the late retirement age.

The applicant agrees with that, but, contends that there was still a need on the part of the respondent to obtain consent from each of its members.

I disagree.

As indicated in the Pension Fund Rules as read with section 10(1)(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Harare Municipal Undertaking (General Conditions of Service) S.I.135/2012 (CBA), the employee's consent only becomes an issue if the respondent desires the services of the employee beyond the normal retirement age.

There is no dispute regarding the meaning of normal retirement age. The normal retirement age was fixed at 60 years. I will therefore not delve into that.

I agree that some members of the applicant were allowed to continue serving beyond the age of 60 years. That would certainly have caused them to believe they would now fall under the late retirement age of 65 years (i.e. legitimate expectation).

I, however, venture to say, upon reaching the normal retirement age, members of the applicant served at the pleasure of the respondent. That explains why we are not told about the process of obtaining their consent to serve beyond the normal retirement age. The members raised no issue with that, yet the issue of late retirement should not have been taken for granted.

The respondent, in deciding to retire the applicants' members before the age of 65 years was magnanimous enough to give them three months notice upon having consulted with the Central Works Council. It was not denied that some members of the applicant, namely, Messrs Kisi and Kuzora. attended the consultation meeting(s) with the respondent. I want to believe that those members of the applicant who attended the meetings had the requisite mandate.

I do not believe that once an employee reaches the normal retirement age he or she has an obligation to engage the employer unless he or she wants to apply to be considered for late retirement. The same applies to the employer in the sense that engagement with the employee is only necessary if the employer wants to retain the employee beyond the age of 60 years.

That is the interpretation I give to the relevant provisions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, Harare Municipal Undertaking (General Conditions of Service) SI135/12 (CBA) and the Pension Fund Rules.

Furthermore, I do not think that where there are clear retirement provisions in a contract of employment, the law will dictate that the employer abandons same in favour of retrenchment.

The employer can only be challenged if the retirement rules have been violated.

I do not find that to be the case in casu. The applicant's members were lawfully retired and the issue of retrenchment never arose.

The above finding means that other financial issues raised by the applicant do not in any way impact on the legality of the respondent's decision. The applicant's members are at liberty to lay their claims before the pension fund.

In any case, the financial matters that the applicant raised are the subject of an ongoing arbitration process. That position was not disputed by the applicant.

In view of the foregoing, the application cannot succeed.

The application is dismissed with costs.

SC04-18 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs CHESTER MUDZIMUWAONA
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA and MUTEMA AJA

This was an appeal against the whole judgment of the Labour Court delivered on 17 May 2012. After perusing the record and hearing the submissions of the parties, this Court allowed the appeal and indicated that the reasons would be availed in due course.

The following are the reasons for the order.

The facts arising in this matter are that, in 2002, the respondent was employed by the appellant as a Revenue Trainee on a fixed term contract of three years. It specifically stated the following:

“Upon successful completion of the probation period, the employment contract shall run for a further period of 24 (twenty-four) months after which the authority may, at its sole discretion, offer you permanent employment on such terms and conditions as determined by it at the time.”

The literal meaning of that clause is that the respondent's contract was subject, first, to the successful completion of the probation period and then would terminate at the end of the 36 month.

In 2005, the respondent was based at the Beitbridge Border post and was charged with failing to uphold ethical and professional standards of behaviour within the workplace as well as carrying out an act inconsistent with the express or implied conditions of the contract of employment.

He was arraigned before a Disciplinary Committee and was found guilty of both charges. He was, as a consequence, dismissed from employment.

He appealed to the Appeals Committee without success.

The respondent appealed against that decision to the Labour Court which upheld the appeal and held that the he had been unlawfully dismissed. The court a quo ordered the appellant to reinstate the respondent without loss of salary or benefits, and, in the event that reinstatement was no longer tenable, to pay damages in lieu of reinstatement.

This decision was not appealed against.

Instead, the parties decided to negotiate the quantum of damages but failed to agree resulting in the respondent applying to the Labour Court for quantification.

He claimed, that, when he was dismissed he had not completed his training period but it was common cause that he was going to continue with his job after training and thus he was entitled to compensation as if he was a permanent employee.

The appellant opposed the quantification on the basis that the respondent was employed on a fixed-term contract and he had failed his examinations and thus the contractual relationship would have ended at the expiry of the 36 months provided in the contract.

The Labour Court ruled in favour of the respondent and ordered the appellant to pay:

(a) US$19,740=16 as back-pay and benefits.

(b) Twelve (12) months' salary that the respondent would have earned in August 2011 minus US$150 earned by the respondent per month for a period of twelve months.

The appellant was aggrieved by the decision, and, with the leave of this court has appealed the order of the court a quo.

It is criticized for the following reasons:

(i) Failing to put due weight to the fact that the respondent was employed as a Revenue Trainee on a fixed term contract of 36 (thirty six) months.

(ii) Failing to give proper weight to the fact, that, when the respondent was dismissed he was left with a period of 6 (six) months before expiration of the contract.

(iii) Failing to give proper weight to Clause 1.3 of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority offer of employment which provides that permanent employment could only be offered at the sole discretion of the appellant....,.

On the merits, the issues which are pertinent in the determination of the appeal are the following:

(a)...,.

(b) Whether or not the respondent had a legitimate expectation of being offered employment on a permanent basis;...,.

In terms of clause 3.1 of the contract, the appellant had the sole discretion in deciding whether or not to offer the respondent a permanent position.

When the respondent was dismissed, the appellant had not exercised that discretion.

As a consequence, the court a quo ought to have given effect to that clause....,.

The respondent had not completed his training period at the time that he was dismissed and he had failed two core courses which he resat for examinations in 2005 - and failed. He would only be competent to be employed on a permanent basis after successfully completing the training.

Paragraph 9 of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority Staff Training and Development Policy provides:

“A Revenue Trainee who fails to successfully complete level 2, and has a negative mentor's report, will have his/her contract of employment terminated at the end of the prescribed traineeship period. However, in exceptional cases, or on recommendation by a mentor/supervisor, he/she may be given one chance to re-sit the failed subject.”

He did not deny that he had re-written the required examinations and that he had failed a second time.

His explanation, upon being shown the examination scripts, was that he had forgotten having written the said examinations.

Against these clear admissions, it was therefore a serious misdirection on the part of the court to accept a contention from the respondent that he had only seen the 2005 examination scripts for the first time in court when the appellant produced them.

From what is stipulated in the policy, it is clear that the respondent's employment would have been terminated at the end of the 36 months because he had failed the examinations.

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Legitimate Expectation

HB04-09 : ECKEM WILIAM SITHOLE vs PG INDUSTRIES ZIMBABWE (LIMITED) T/A THE AFRICAN LUMBER COMPANY P/L
Ruled By: NDOU J

SC24-14 : KUNDAI MAGODORA AND OTHERS vs CARE INTERNATIONAL ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, PATEL JA and GUVAVA JA

SC81-14 : JORAM NYAHORA vs CFI HOLDINGS ( PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA and PATEL JA

SC64-15 : TELONE (PVT) LTD vs BIGBOY SENGENDE
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and GOWORA JA

SC64-17 : THOKOZILE ZINONDO vs CAFCA LIMITED
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

SC70-17 : TEL ONE (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs MARUFU A. CHIGAAZIRA
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and UCHENA JA

HH159-15 : NGONIDZASHE TAMSANQA GOBA vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
Ruled By: HUNGWE J

SC11-19 : MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERS (MSF) BELGIUM vs VENGAI NHOPI and OTHERS
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, PATEL JA and MAVANGIRA JA

HH173-17 : F. MUTATA and OTHERS vs THE MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and NDEWERE J

SC200-97 : MUWENGA vs PTC
Ruled By: GUBBAY CJ, KORSAH JA and MUCECHETERE JA

SC30-08 : DANAI GURUVA vs TRAFFIC SAFETY COUNCIL OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: SANDURA JA, CHEDA JA and GWAUNZA JA

HH176-22 : NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY (PVT) LTD vs WALTER NHAU
Ruled By: MUCHAWA J

HH238-15 : WATER AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION OF ZIMBABWE vs CITY OF HARARE
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

SC04-18 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs CHESTER MUDZIMUWAONA
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA and MUTEMA AJA

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Legitimate Expectation

HB04-09 : ECKEM WILIAM SITHOLE vs PG INDUSTRIES ZIMBABWE (LIMITED) T/A THE AFRICAN LUMBER COMPANY P/L Ruled By: NDOU J

SC24-14 : KUNDAI MAGODORA AND OTHERS vs CARE INTERNATIONAL ZIMBABWE Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, PATEL JA and GUVAVA JA

SC81-14 : JORAM NYAHORA vs CFI HOLDINGS ( PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA and PATEL JA

SC64-15 : TELONE (PVT) LTD vs BIGBOY SENGENDE Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and GOWORA JA

SC64-17 : THOKOZILE ZINONDO vs CAFCA LIMITED Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

SC70-17 : TEL ONE (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs MARUFU A. CHIGAAZIRA Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and UCHENA JA

HH159-15 : NGONIDZASHE TAMSANQA GOBA vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE Ruled By: HUNGWE J

SC11-19 : MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERS (MSF) BELGIUM vs VENGAI NHOPI and OTHERS Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, PATEL JA and MAVANGIRA JA

HH173-17 : F. MUTATA and OTHERS vs THE MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and NDEWERE J

SC200-97 : MUWENGA vs PTC Ruled By: GUBBAY CJ, KORSAH JA and MUCECHETERE JA

SC30-08 : DANAI GURUVA vs TRAFFIC SAFETY COUNCIL OF ZIMBABWE Ruled By: SANDURA JA, CHEDA JA and GWAUNZA JA

HH176-22 : NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY (PVT) LTD vs WALTER NHAU Ruled By: MUCHAWA J

HH238-15 : WATER AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION OF ZIMBABWE vs CITY OF HARARE Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

SC04-18 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs CHESTER MUDZIMUWAONA Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA and MUTEMA AJA

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Law Portal
Zimbabwe

HB04-09 : ECKEM WILIAM SITHOLE vs PG INDUSTRIES ZIMBABWE (LIMITED) T/A THE AFRICAN LUMBER COMPANY P/L
Ruled By: NDOU J

SC24-14 : KUNDAI MAGODORA AND OTHERS vs CARE INTERNATIONAL ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, PATEL JA and GUVAVA JA

SC81-14 : JORAM NYAHORA vs CFI HOLDINGS ( PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA and PATEL JA

SC64-15 : TELONE (PVT) LTD vs BIGBOY SENGENDE
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and GOWORA JA

SC64-17 : THOKOZILE ZINONDO vs CAFCA LIMITED
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA

SC70-17 : TEL ONE (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs MARUFU A. CHIGAAZIRA
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and UCHENA JA

HH159-15 : NGONIDZASHE TAMSANQA GOBA vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND EXCISE
Ruled By: HUNGWE J

SC11-19 : MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERS (MSF) BELGIUM vs VENGAI NHOPI and OTHERS
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, PATEL JA and MAVANGIRA JA

HH173-17 : F. MUTATA and OTHERS vs THE MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC WORKS AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and NDEWERE J

SC200-97 : MUWENGA vs PTC
Ruled By: GUBBAY CJ, KORSAH JA and MUCECHETERE JA

SC30-08 : DANAI GURUVA vs TRAFFIC SAFETY COUNCIL OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: SANDURA JA, CHEDA JA and GWAUNZA JA

HH176-22 : NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY (PVT) LTD vs WALTER NHAU
Ruled By: MUCHAWA J

HH238-15 : WATER AND ALLIED WORKERS' UNION OF ZIMBABWE vs CITY OF HARARE
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

SC04-18 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs CHESTER MUDZIMUWAONA
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA and MUTEMA AJA