Final Orders re: Approach iro Functions, Powers, Obligations, Judicial Misdirections and Effect of Court Orders

Appealed
SC27-08 : JOSHUA KADENGU and LAMECK KADENGU and ROSA KADENGU vs OLGA KADENGU and RICHARD CHIMBARI and MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT
Ruled By: SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA and GARWE JA

The late Job Bruno Kadengu died testate on 25 March 1990. His Will contained the following clauses:

“2. The expression 'Executors' or 'Executor' wherever used in this Will mean either Executors or Administrators or Trustees or any two or all of these offices as may be appropriate in the circumstances and in the context thereof and the term 'Executors' includes the singular and the term 'Executor' includes the plural.

5. My Executor shall take possession of all my property, whether movable or immovable, of whatsoever nature and sort, and wheresoever situate, and whether the same be in possession, reversion, remainder or expectancy, and, after paying thereout all my just debts and taxes payable by reason of my death, and the expenses of the administration of my Estate, then he shall pay and apply the same as hereinafter directed.

6. I hereby direct that my Executor shall purchase a house in the northern suburbs of Harare and I desire that such house be large enough and commodious enough, in the discretion of my Executor, to comfortably accommodate my wife, OLGA, and any dependent children born of me and my said wife who may survive me. I hereby give and bequeath to my said wife the said house as a special legacy. I further give and bequeath to my said wife, as a special legacy (or special legacies), all the household furniture and effects of which I may die possessed and effects of which may, at the time of my death, be situate in the residential property where my said wife and I may be living as at the date of my death. The legacies referred to in this paragraph shall be conditional upon my said wife, OLGA, surviving me for a period in excess of thirty (30) days.

7. I record that I own a certain farming property situate near Rusape. Provided that my mother shall survive me for a period in excess of (30) thirty days and provided that I still own the said farming property as at the date of my death, I hereby give as special legacies to my mother all the farming implements, livestock and other movables which may belong to me at my death and which may be situate on the said farm as at the date of my death. I further hereby give and bequeath to my said mother a life usufruct in respect of the said immovable farming property but subject to the provisions contained in the immediately subsequent paragraph hereof pertaining to my sister, ROSA CHIMAMBO. I direct that the dominium in the said farming property shall be assumed and taken by my Trustee appointed hereunder who shall deal with the same as directed hereunder.

9. After discharging my debts and taxes, and paying the legacies and providing for the aforesaid usufruct, and, generally dealing with my directives detailed hereinabove, my Executor shall sell and liquidate and turn into cash the entire balance of my Estate and my Executor shall hold the resultant monies in his own name as Trustee of a Trust Fund and he shall apply the income and capital thereof as hereinafter directed. The successor in office as Trustee of my Trust Fund shall be the Senior Partner for the time being of the said Messrs Gollop & Blank.

10. My Executor, as Trustee, in such manner as he shall, in his absolute discretion, from time to time think fit, pay and apply the income of my Trust fund to or for or towards, the benefit, maintenance, education, and advancement of my said wife, OLGA, my said mother and any and every child born of my union with my previous wife and any and every child born of my union with my said wife, OLGA, and, without derogating from the generality of the aforegoing, the following persons; viz.”

The appellants were among the persons listed under paragraph 10.

It is common cause that Gregory Slater who was appointed executor of the Will failed to complete the administration thereof before he fled the country on allegations of misappropriation of funds and that Messrs Gollop and Blank renounced their appointment as executors and trustees of the estate on 5 September 1997.

The assets of the estate were given as 4,000 shares in Paradise Park Motel (Pvt) Ltd and a certain piece of land in the district of Makoni called Alloa Farm.

The Master, in an attempt to speed up the administration of the estate, on 2 July 1999, appointed the second respondent as executor dative of the estate.

It seems that the second respondent was unable to remedy the problems left unresolved by Gregory Slater, and, on 28 September 2000, the first and the second appellants wrote to the Master complaining of the second respondent's inaction and his failure to wind up the estate in accordance with the wishes of the testator.

The letter did not achieve the desired result, and, on 24 March 2003, the appellants made an application to the High Court seeking the following order:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1. The Trust which was to be set up in terms of Clause 9 of the Will be and is hereby abandoned.

2. The deceased's 4,000 shares in Paradise Park Motel (Pvt) Ltd shall be sold to the best advantage of the beneficiaries.

3. A large enough and commodious enough house shall be purchased for the first Respondent and her minor children from the proceeds of the sale of Paradise Park Motel (Pvt) Ltd. The Master of the High Court (the third respondent) shall determine whether the house which the estate shall be purchasing for the first respondent and her children is 'large enough and commodious enough'.

4. After purchasing the house described above for the first respondent and her children, the residue shall be equally distributed among the surviving beneficiaries. The shares of the beneficiaries who are outside the country or who are not part (sic) to these proceedings shall be…,. (illegible).

5. The immovable property, situate in Makoni District, namely, Alloa Farm, held under Deed of Transfer 7689/81 shall not be sold. It shall be retained as the family home to be registered in all beneficiaries names or to be registered in the name of the nominated beneficiary in trust for the rest of the beneficiaries.”

It was their contention that the intention of the testator, as expressed in clause 9 of the Will, could no longer be implemented because of the abdication of Gregory Slater and the renunciation by Gollop & Blank. They alleged that they could not agree on a suitable substitute, and, in any event, some of the beneficiaries could not be located while others were resident outside Zimbabwe.

On 23 July 2003 the appellants obtained a default judgment in the terms set out above. This order was, however, rescinded, by consent, and the matter was argued before the court a quo.

The second respondent, the executor dative, alleged that the estate was illiquid making it impossible for him to discharge his mandate. It was his view that the ownership of the 4,000 shares should be determined before the estate could be wound up.

The three issues argued by the parties before the court a quo were as follows:

1. Whether or not the estate can no longer be wound up in terms of the Will because some clauses have become irrelevant;

2. Whether or not the 4,000 shares in Paradise Park Motel (Pvt) Ltd form part of the deceased's estate; and

3. Whether or not Alloa Farm can still be dealt with in terms of the Will.

The application was dismissed by the court a quo primarily on the grounds that the appellants had no locus standi to bring such an application. In this regard, the learned Judge said:

“It seems to me, however, that a more fundamental point, which unfortunately was not addressed, arises. It is whether or not the applicants have locus standi, that is, a direct and substantial interest, in seeking variation or rectification of the Will.”

And later, at p6 of his judgment:

“It seems to me, therefore, that the applicants in casu are obliged to show the direct and substantial interest that they have in the subject matter before me of seeking the variation of certain clauses of the Will. In terms of the Will they are residuary heirs. They will only be able to benefit from the Will after Clause 9 thereof has been fulfilled.”

The court a quo, though alive to the fact that neither party had been given the opportunity to make submissions on this issue, yet proceeded to decide the matter on an issue not raised during the hearing and addressed by the parties.

In so doing, the learned Judge misdirected himself. It was imperative that the issue was fully canvassed and investigated.

As it was said in Middleton v Carr 1949 (2) SA 374 (AD)…,:

“…, as has often been pointed out, where there has been full investigation of a matter, that is, where there is no reasonable ground for thinking that further examination of the facts might lead to a different conclusion, the court is entitled to, and generally should, treat the issue as if it had been expressly and timeously raised. But, unless the Court is satisfied that the investigation has been full, in the above sense, injustice may easily be done if the issue is treated as being before the Court.”

The issue was not before the court a quo, and, in the absence of a full investigation thereof, the court erred in treating the issue as one which was before it.

Clearly, there was a real chance of an injustice being done to the appellants against whom the finding was made.

HH181-12 : JENNIFER NYAMAKURA vs AGRIPPA MUZENGI
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and MAWADZE J

This is an appeal against the judgment of the Harare Magistrates Court delivered on 17 February 2010 in which the court a quo granted the following order:-

“Custody of the two minor children is hereby awarded to the respondent with the appellant having reasonably access.”

The facts giving rise to this appeal can be summarised as follows:-

The appellant and the respondent entered into an unregistered customary law union sometime in 2001 and two children, namely, Blessed Muzengi (born on 14 September 2001) and Gracious Muzengi (born on 1 June 2006) were born out of the union. The appellant apparently fell ill sometime in 2009 and she had to go to her parents' home for treatment which culminated in the separation between the parties, and, consequently, the dissolution of the union. At that relevant time the two minor children remained in the respondent's custody on account of the appellant's ill-health.

It would appear from the facts, that, before the parties separated, the appellant had obtained a Maintenance Order in respect of the two minor children.

When the appellant had recovered she apparently failed to obtain custody of the two minor children and proceeded, on 28 January 2010, to file an application for custody of the two minor children with the Magistrates Court. In her affidavit in support of the application for custody the appellant stated that it is in the best interest of the children that she be awarded custody and briefly gave the following reasons;

(i) That the two minor children are of tender age (then 11 years and 4 years respectively), and, as such, need the care of their mother.

(ii) That the appellant had the means to contribute to the welfare of the two minor children as she is now engaged in horticulture business in Shamva and is able to provide, to a great extent, for the daily upkeep of the minor children.

(iii) That the respondent is not a suitable parent to have custody of the minor children as he has no time for the children and has neglected the children and had taken the eldest child to his parents in rural Chivhu.

(iv) That the two minor children have a right to a family and hence should not be separated from each other.

The record of proceedings reflects that the respondent did not file any opposing affidavit although during the brief hearing in the court a quo the respondent seemed to make reference to “his papers filed of record”. However, on the hearing date, on 11 February 2010, the respondent opposed the application by the appellant and gave the following reasons:-

(a) That the parties separated due to irreconcilable differences and the appellant left the children in his custody.

(b) That when the appellant recuperated she asked for the children on 14 December 2009 and that the children were to be returned to him after the new year since he had paid some cattle to the appellant's parents as “chiredzwa”.

(c) That he subsequently reached an agreement with the appellant that the appellant would have custody of the younger child, but, the appellant later reneged on this promise as she also wanted custody of the elder child which prompted the respondent to take the elder child to his parent's rural home in Chivhu.

(d) That the elder child has always been staying with the respondent's parents in rural Chivhu since the time he was weaned and that he is more close to the respondent's mother than the biological mother - the appellant.

(e) That the appellant is not a suitable parent to look after the children as she has in the past misused the money paid by the respondent as maintenance for the children; has failed to ensure that the children attend school at all material times; and, at one point, assaulted one of the minor children.

The appellant, in response, vehemently denied that she ever agreed to surrender custody of the minor children to the respondent and that the arrangements made were temporary as the appellant was unwell.

The appellant said the elder child was to attend school in Harare and not to be taken to rural Chivhu where the respondent's parents are supposed to take care of the child. The appellant denied assaulting any of the minor children, and, instead, said it is the respondent who assaulted the child and boasting that he could do as he pleases since the child was his.

It was after hearing the brief oral submissions outlined above, from the parties, that the court a quo, without giving reasons, granted the order referred to supra.

On 25 March 2010, the appellant asked for the reasons for the ruling made on 17 February 2010 to enable the appellant to pursue the matter on appeal. The trial magistrate responded on 29 March 2010 and gave the following reasons for the order granted on 17 February 2010:

“After having considered submissions made by both sides, the court is of the view that it will be in the best interests of the children for custody to be awarded to the respondent.”

Dissatisfied with the reasons given by the court a quo the appellant caused a notice of appeal to be filed with this court on 29 March 2010 on the following grounds of appeal:-

“GROUND OF APPEAL

1. The magistrate erred and misdirected herself by mero motu awarding the custody of the two minor children to the respondent when there was no application by the respondent placed before the court as for the Guardianship of Minors Act [Cap 5:08] section 5(3)(b) for custody of the two minor children.

2. The magistrate further erred and misdirected herself by denying the appellant, the natural mother of the minor children, custody when there were no special and/or extenuating circumstances placed before the court or proved by the respondent which warranted the appellant being denied her inherent right to custody of the two minor children moreso considering their tender age and need for motherly love, care, and attention.”

I now turn to the merits of this matter.

There are a number of irregularities in this matter.

The court a quo, despite the request by the appellant, did not give meaningful and well reasoned basis for granting custody of the two minor children to the respondent. The reasons for judgment are bereft of any reasoning process for arriving at the decision made....,.

In terms of section 5(3)(b) of the Guardianship of Minors Act [Chapter 5:08] the court may grant custody of minor children born out of wedlock to the father upon such an application.

In casu, the respondent did not make such an application for custody before the court a quo but merely alleged that he had de facto custody of one of the minor children. In fact, even in his submissions before this court, on appeal, the respondent was clear that he only had custody of one minor child, Blessed, and that the appellant had custody of the younger child, Gracious.

It therefore boggles the mind why the court a quo granted custody of the two minor children to the respondent in the absence of such an application by the respondent.

This constitutes a misdirection.

As already stated, the court a quo failed to state reasons as to why it would be in the best interests of the minor children to deprive the appellant of custody of the minor children born out wedlock and award such custody to the respondent....,.

The respondent did not make an application for custody of the minor children but was awarded custody. The reason or reasons for this are not given. Both parties submitted, before the court a quo, that they were suitable parents to be awarded custody of the minor children without giving any further details in that regard. No submissions were made by the parties on the suitability or otherwise of the appellant as a parent for her to be deprived of custody of the minor children. No submissions were made that the best interests of the minor children will be best served if the custody of the children was awarded to the respondent, albeit, without even making such an application.

The reasoning process to show how the trial magistrate arrived at the decision made is none existent and not supported by the submissions made by the parties. It is a decision arrived at out of the blues with no basis or rationality at all.

HH71-09 : AGRO CHEM DEALERS (PVT) LTD vs STANLEY GOMO and CITY OF HARARE and RONALD AJARA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: GOWORA J

A court cannot resolve a dispute that has not been brought before it for specific relief.

HH86-09 : CHAWASARIRA TRANSPORT (PVT) LTD vs THE RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: BHUNU J

The respondent, that is to say the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe is a body corporate established in terms of the Reserve Bank Act [Chapter 22:15]. Its function, among others, include acting as the Exchange Control Authority in terms of the Exchange Control Act [Chapter 22:05] as read with the Exchange Control Regulations Statutory Instrument 109/09, S.I.109 of 2009.

On the other hand, the applicant is a duly registered company which is in the business of exporting commodities.

In terms of section 7 of the Exchange Control Regulations (Currency Exchange) Order S.I.9 of 2004, the applicant is required to acquit its export documentation, that is to say, repay or settle its debts or obligations to the respondent arising from export receipts commonly known as CD3 forms. The section reads:

“7(1) With effect from the 1st January 2004, every business organisation engaging in the export of goods and services shall be required to acquit the export documentation in respect of those exports.”

Failure to acquit CD3 forms in terms of the Exchange Control Regulations (Currency Exchange) Order S.I.9 of 2004 amounts to a criminal offence punishable by the courts.

Sometime in 2000, the applicant fell into arrears with the acquittal of some of its CD3 forms.

As a result, it was prosecuted, convicted, and fined in the Magistrates Court. In sentencing the applicant, the trial magistrate found special circumstances for not ordering repatriation. As a result, he sentenced the applicant to a fine of $2,000,000 but declined to order repatriation as requested by the State.

Repatriation, in terms of the Exchange Control Regulations (Currency Exchange) Order S.I.9 of 2004 means to pay back.

Following the conviction and sentencing of the applicant, the respondent demanded the acquittal of the outstanding CD3 forms in terms of the Exchange Control Regulations (Currency Exchange) Order S.I.9 of 2004.

The applicant refused to repay or settle its debts to the respondent arising from the outstanding CD3 forms arguing that it had been absolved by the magistrate from paying its debts to the respondent whereupon the respondent allegedly invoked the sanction provided by section 7 of the Exchange Control Regulations S.I.9 of 2009.

The effect of which was to freeze the applicant's foreign currency account number 9440031502000.

The applicant then filed this application seeking a declarator to the effect that it has been absolved from regularizing or acquitting its CD3 forms by the Magistrates Court.

It also sought an order overriding the sanction imposed by the respondent.

The respondent has objected to the applicant's application on the basis that it has not exhausted its domestic remedies and that the magistrate's refusal to order acquittal of the CD3 forms did not amount to absolving the applicant from regularizing or acquitting its CD3 forms according to law.

The issues which arise from the undisputed facts is:

(i) Whether or not the magistrate, in sentencing the applicant, absolved it from regularizing or acquitting its CD3 forms according to law; and

(ii) Whether or not the applicant is properly before this Court.

While it is desirable that parties should be encouraged to exhaust their domestic remedies before approaching the courts, the mere existence of domestic remedies does not oust the unlimited jurisdiction of this Court.

The Court has therefore discretion whether or not to entertain the application.

Having regard to the fact that the regularization or acquittal of CD3 forms has a direct bearing on the fiscus, the country's economy, and the applicant's business operations, it is in the national interest that the matter be determined as soon as possible. That being the case, I have decided to determine the matter on the merits so as to avoid unnecessary delays which may have the effect of prejudicing both parties and the nation at large.

I now proceed to determine the application on the merits.

In sentencing the applicant, the trial magistrate declined to make a repatriation order on the basis that he had found special circumstances. In his reasons for sentence…, the magistrate remarked that:

“For all the forgoing reasons, it is this court's finding that special reasons or circumstances exist in relation to both the offence(s) and the offender. See S v Chisiwa 1981 ZLR 666 (H): S v Mbano 1990 (1) ZLR 270 (SC).

It will be considered favourable that the Accused Company is a first offender.

Of course, the message must be distinctly conveyed to the Accused Company, and would be offenders, that, CD3 forms must be acquitted within stipulated times as directed.

It will be noted also that quite substantial amounts of monies were not accounted for to the Reserve Bank and that this is to be discouraged by the meting out of a fairly stiff penalty for the conviction today, but not necessarily repatriation of the monies as urged by State Counsel.

The following is the Accused Company's sentence:-

Fined $2,000,000, (new currency) or, in default of payment, Warrant of execution against property.”

I have carefully gone through the trial magistrate's reasons for sentence and I have found nowhere he stated or suggested that the applicant was excused or absolved from acquitting its CD3 forms.

It is clear, from a proper reading of the trial magistrate's reasons for sentence, that, he was alive to the applicant's statutory obligation to acquit its CD3 forms hence his remarks to the effect that the message must be driven home to the applicant, and others, that, CD3 forms must be acquitted within the prescribed time limits.

Check the use of the compulsive word “must” and not “should”.

The acquittal of CD3 forms is a statutory obligation imposed by law. That being the case, it is not the function of the courts to excuse or absolve anyone from complying with the law.

The mere fact that in punishing the applicant during criminal proceedings the trial magistrate declined to order repatriation did not absolve or excuse the applicant from complying with the law.

HH42-08 : JAMESON MANDAVA vs TSITSI CHASWEKA
Ruled By: MAKARAU JP and HLATSHWAYO J

On 23 May 2005, the respondent issued summons out of Marondera Magistrates' Court. Her claim against the defendant, as it appears on the face of the summons, is recorded as “sharing property”. An affidavit was attached to the summons, curiously titled, in my view, as “Applicant's supporting affidavit (Property Sharing)”.

In the affidavit, the respondent alleged that she was in an unregistered customary union with the appellant, and that, during the subsistence of the union, the parties had acquired certain household goods and effects. She gave the estimate value of each item that she alleged the parties acquired. She further alleged that due to the violent conduct that the appellant exhibited towards her, the union between them had broken down irretrievably. She ended the affidavit by praying that the court confirms the distribution of the assets as suggested by her in the affidavit.

It is not clear on the record how the matter was set down for trial….,.

The record, however, indicates that on the day of the trial, the appellant was in attendance and verbally indicated that he was opposed to the proposals made by the respondent. Prior to the set down date, he had not filed any pleadings or other papers in the matter.

The matter proceeded to trial with the parties giving evidence. For the purposes of this appeal, it is in my view not necessary that I go into the details of the evidence that each party led.

After hearing the parties, the trial court made an award that dissatisfied the appellant, prompting him to note an appeal to this court. In his Notice of Appeal, the appellant challenged the distribution that was made in the lower court and prayed that it be set aside.

The parties were not legally represented at any stage of the legal battle between them. We thus could not engage them at all regarding the legal issues that arise in this appeal.

The legal points made in this judgment are therefore our opinions without the aid of argument by counsel.

The two issues that arise, are, in my view, so important that a copy of this judgment will be dispatched to the Chief Magistrate for his attention and for the benefit of other trial magistrates who may be falling into the same pitfalls that the trial magistrate in this matter fell.

I shall make the necessary order for this to be effected by the Registrar.

Firstly, all Magistrates' Courts in this country are formal courts whose proceedings are governed by a set of rules and established procedures. It is trite that the pre-setting of rules of procedure is, to date, the widely acceptable manner of avoiding arbitrariness and ensuring fairness in the airing of disputes by litigants. Rules of Court are framed for a purpose and any procedure done outside the Rules is susceptible of being set aside as being unprocedural.

In the lower court, the respondent commenced her suit by issuing summons against the appellant. She then filed an affidavit to support her claim.

This was a most unusual mixture of procedures and one that the Rules of the lower court do not provide for.

In accordance with the Rules, having issued summons in the matter, the respondent had to file her particulars of claim to be answered by the respondent by the filing of a plea or other answer.

Affidavits, on the other hand, such as the one filed by the respondent, together with her summons, are a part of the application procedure.

The two procedures, viz, one commenced by the issuance of summons and the other by the filing of an application, while overlapping and sometimes exchangeable in terms of utility, are quite distinct one from the other. They cannot be employed at the same time to resolve the same dispute.

I have indicated above that the parties were not legally represented before the lower court. I thus do not hold it against her that she filed incompetent papers before the lower court. In my view, the fault lies squarely with the Clerk of the lower court who accepted summons to which an affidavit was attached.

Even assuming that the incompetent procedure detailed above escaped the attention of the Clerk, the trial magistrate should not have proceeded to trial on a matter that had not reached litis contestatio.

After the issuance of summons, no further pleadings were filed in the matter. No pre-trial conference was held.

The matter was thus not at issue and should therefore not have been referred to trial.

In my view, the informality allowed in this matter by the trial court, of hearing the parties in the absence of pleadings filed of record, and before a pretrial conference was held in the matter, is unacceptable and cannot be allowed to stand. It destroys the integrity of Magistrates' Courts as courts of law. It reduces proceedings before the court to the same level as that before the traditional leaders and at village level.

Even if we assume that the procedure before the court was application procedure, the appellant, as respondent in the lower court, had to file his notice of opposition and opposing affidavit before the matter could be referred to a magistrate for hearing.

Application procedure is ordinarily determined on the basis of the papers filed, and, in the absence of papers from the respondent, a hearing of oral evidence was improper.

The magistrate should have returned the matter to the Clerk as not being ready for a hearing in the absence of such observance to the Rules as I have highlighted above. His lapse in this regard, in my view, cannot be condoned and is unacceptable.

It is hereby brought to the attention of the Chief Magistrate for corrective action to be immediately taken lest the procedures in the Magistrates' Court, and the integrity of such court, fall into disrepute.

Appealed
SC04-12 : SHAUN EVANS and PAUL FRIENDSHIP vs YAKUB SURTEE and COLLIN MACMILLAN and RODNEY FINNIGAN and ACROSS ENTERPRISES PL
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and CHEDA AJA

On 19 May 2009, the High Court (BHUNU J) granted an order in favour of the first respondent in the following terms:

“1. The defendants, jointly and severally, the one paying the others to be absolved, deliver to the plaintiff 47,500 litres of fuel within forty-eight (48) hours of service of this order, failing which the Deputy Sheriff be and is hereby authorised to recover the fuel and deliver it to the plaintiff.

2. Costs of suit.”

The defendants referred to in the Order were the two appellants and the second, third and fourth respondents (“Macmillan”, “Finnigan” and “Across Enterprises”). I shall refer to the two appellants and the second to the fifth respondents collectively as “the defendants” and, where the context requires, to the two appellants as “the appellants”. The first respondent will be referred to as “Surtee”.

When the defendants failed to make delivery in terms of the Order made by BHUNU J, the Deputy Sheriff was charged with the execution thereof. He served the Order at 72 Eastern Road, Greendale, Harare, on 22 July 2009 and made the following return:

“Attempt to recover the fuel. Mrs Evans said they are no longer dealing in fuel supplies and they do not have the fuel. Nulla bona. Return to Attorneys.”

This prompted Surtee to file an application in the High Court seeking an order that the defendants be held to be in contempt of court and committed to gaol for 90 days.

Macmillan, Finnigan and Across Enterprises did not file opposing papers and were therefore in default. All five defendants were found to be in contempt of court. Across Enterprises was sentenced to a fine of US$55,000 while the remaining four defendants were sentenced each to a term of 30 days imprisonment. The sentences imposed were suspended on condition that the defendants, jointly and severally, the one delivering the other to be absolved, deliver to Surtee 47,500 litres of fuel on or before 30 November 2010.

The appellants now appeal against the order of the court a quo on the grounds, inter alia, that, the learned Judge erred:-

(i) In finding that the appellants were in contempt of the order made by BHUNU J;

(ii) In finding, that, that order was one ad factum praestandum;

(iii) In finding that the appellants intentionally disobeyed that Order despite the Deputy Sheriff's nulla bona return, the import of which was that the appellants did not have the fuel.

The main issues to be determined are whether the order by BHUNU J was an order ad factum praestandum, and, if so, whether the court a quo correctly found the appellants to be in contempt of court by reason of their disobedience of that order.

Orders of court are, generally speaking, divided into two categories:

(i) Orders to pay a sum of money, namely, orders ad pecuniam solvendam; and

(ii) Orders to do, or abstain from doing, a particular act, or to deliver a thing, namely, orders ad factum praestandum.

See HERBSTEIN and VAN WINSEN, The Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa, 3ed…,.

The remedy of committal for contempt is available only in the latter category of cases.

These definitions notwithstanding, the distinction between the two types of orders is, in practice, not as clear cut as it may seem. Thus, certain orders for the payment of money, namely, maintenance orders (which one would have regarded as orders ad pecuniam solvendam) have been classified by the courts as orders ad factum praestandum.

The principle was expressed by SCHREINER AJ, in Carrick v Williams 1937 WLD 76…, as follows:

“The reason for holding maintenance orders…, to be orders ad factum praestandum is that they are not really money orders at all.

In their essential nature, they are orders that the defendant do something, namely, maintain the wife or the children.

This duty might be performed in various ways, including the provision of housing, clothing, and food in kind, or the transfer of property; but, in practice, the Court indicates how the defendant is to fulfil the duty by the payment of a periodical sum of money fixed in relation to the apparent capacity of the defendant and the needs of the party to be maintained at the time of the making of the order.

This direction by the Court does not convert the judgment from one ordering the doing of an act by the defendant into one awarding a sum of money to the Plaintiff.”

And, in East London Transitional Council v MEC for Health, Eastern Cape & Ors 2001 (3) SA 1133 (Ck), an order directing a public official to pay a certain sum of money to the judgment creditor was held to operate against that official ad factum praestandum.

The following extract from the judgment of EBRAHIM J, at page 1140F-I of the judgment, is instructive:

“In its strict sense, the order that this Court issued on 28 July 2000, for payment of the sum of R801,249, is an order ad pecuniam solvendam. But, the crucial issue that falls to be considered is, in what manner such an order operates against the first and second respondents and what the effect thereof is.

In my view, its operation is similar to that of an order which indicates the manner in which maintenance must be paid: see Carrick v Williams 1937 WLD 76 at 83.

In casu, even though the order directs that the debt be paid, it is issued, and operates, against the respondents in their nominal capacities. At the same time, and because of their official capacities, it imposes an obligation on them to take such steps as are necessary to enable the relevant departmental procedures to be implemented so that payment of the debt can be effected.

The obligation it imposes is not of a financial nature but one that requires them to carry out one or other function which forms an integral part of their official duties. In this respect, I consider that the Court's order of 28 July 2000 operates against the first and second respondents as an order ad factum praestandum.”...,.

Orders ad factum praestandum are usually granted only where there is no other remedy available to the applicant, the rationale being, that, the successful party has other options to enforce an order ad pecuniam solvendam....,.

On this basis, counsel for the appellants submitted, that, on the authorities, the key determinant is not the act directed but the nature of the obligation to be enforced.

He submitted, that, the true nature of the Order by BHUNU J was one for the payment of a debt – albeit in kind - and that the fact that the court ordered the delivery of fuel does not convert the order from an order for payment of a debt into an order ad factum praestandum in the same way that an order for the payment of money by way of maintenance is not converted from an order ad factum praestandum to an order ad pecuniam solvendam by the fact that it is expressed in monetary terms.

He further submitted, that, just as a Maintenance Order requires the performance of an act in a specific way (and is therefore an order ad factum praestandum), so, the order by BHUNU J, required the payment of a debt in a specific manner (and was therefore an order ad pecuniam solvendam).

Counsel for the first respondent, on the other hand, contended, that, the order was clearly one ad factum praestandum since it directed the appellants to do something, namely, to deliver 47,500 litres of fuel.

The learned Judge in the court a quo decided the first issue on the basis that:

“As correctly acknowledged by both parties, this court's order, of 19 May 2009, was the type of order normally referred to as 'ad factum praestandum' (i.e. an order for specific performance or the performance of an act – namely, the delivery of 47,500 litres of fuel).”

I can find no such acknowledgement by the appellants on the record.

On the contrary, it is quite clear from the record that it was not common cause between the parties that the order was one ad factum praestandum.

In the supplementary heads of argument filed on behalf of the appellants in the High Court the following appears:

“It is submitted that the order sought to be enforced is not ad factum. The present case is very different from the one in Trevor Batezat case SC49-09 in that the appellant in that case was ordered to return an identified triaxle trailer Registration Number 490-816V…,.

In the case before this Honourable Court, the order arises out of a contractual arrangement of which the applicant cannot say he has no other remedy…, to cover his losses.”

In taking the parties to have agreed as to the nature of the order made by BHUNU J, the learned Judge misdirected himself.

HH58-12 : ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS ZIMBABWE LIMITED t/a FREDA REBECCA MINE vs JOACHIM C NGUWO
Ruled By: MUTEMA J

On 29 March 2011 I dismissed, unconditionally, an application for summary judgment by the applicant.

On 4 May 2011, I dismissed a chamber application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the order dismissing the application for summary judgment. The application for the leave to appeal had been made pursuant to section 43(2)(d) of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06]. That provision states that:

“(2) No appeal shall lie –

(a)…,.

(b)…,.

(c)…,.

(d) From an interlocutory order or interlocutory judgment made or given by a judge of the High Court, without the leave of that judge, or, if that has been refused, without the leave of a judge of the Supreme Court…,.”

I dismissed the application for leave on the basis of the provision of section 43(2)(b) of the of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06] which provides:

“(2) No appeal shall lie –

(a)…,.

(b) From an order of a judge of the High Court in which he refuses an application for summary judgment and gives unconditional leave to defend an action;”

In view of the clear and unambiguous provisions of section 43(2)(b) of the High Court Act, and the fact that my order was one dismissing an application for summary judgment wherein I gave unconditional leave to the respondent to defend the action, that order is not subject to any appeal and section 43(2)(d) of the High Court Act does not apply.

Even the Supreme Court cannot grant leave to appeal against such an order.

The provisions in section 43(2)(b) of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06] have been literally interpreted in a number of precedents.

In Haulage (Pvt) Ltd v Mumurgwi Bus Service (Pvt) Ltd 1980 (1) SA 729 (ZRA), the court, in interpreting section 31(1)(b) of the predecessor High Court Act [Cap 14] (ZR) whose provisions fell on all fours with those in our current section 43(2)(b) of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06] held that, in providing in section 31(1)(b) of the High Court Act [Chapter 14] (ZR), that no appeal shall lie from an order of a judge of the General Division giving 'unconditional leave to defend an action', the Legislature intended to refer only to the granting of unconditional leave to defend in summary judgment proceedings in terms of what are now Rules 69 and 70 of the Rules of the High Court (Order 10 of the High Court (General Division) Rules in Rhodesia Government Notice 995 of 1971).

Implicity, from the provisions of section 31(1)(b) of [Cap 14], where conditional leave to defend is granted in summary judgment proceedings, the right of either party to appeal is restricted to a right of appeal (with leave of the court under section 31(1)(b)) only against the conditions imposed.

Pertinent to note here is that the provisions of section 31(1)(b) of the then [Cap 14] are similar to those of section 43(2)(b) of the present High Court Act and Rules 69 and 70 of Order 10 of the High Court Rules 1971 are also still the same: see also Howff (Pvt) Ltd v Tromp's Engineering (Pvt) Ltd 1977 (2) SA 267 (R); Rheeder v Spence 1971 (1) SA 1041 (R).

In spite of the plain language of the relevant legislation and case law cited above, to the effect that refusal of an application for summary judgement, coupled with unconditional leave to defend an action, is not appealable, the applicant's legal practitioner, following my refusal of leave to appeal, has since noted an appeal to the Supreme Court against my order refusing summary judgment.

Whence he got the leave to lodge such appeal is alien to the applicable law.

He has now requested for written reasons for my order of 29 March 2011 to enable him to prosecute his appeal.

It is not for me to withhold them in spite of the law saying no such appeal shall lie from such an order. Those reasons are herewith provided.

HH111-08 : RAILWAY ARTISANS UNION and RAILWAY ASSOCIATION OF YARD OPERATING STAFF and ANOR vs RAILMED and NATIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE and RAILWAYS EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL
Ruled By: GOWORA J

This matter was initially placed before me under a certificate of urgency. As the final and interim relief sought on the provisional order were the same, I wrote an endorsement on the face of the application querying the manner in which the relief had been framed.

The letter of explanation was not placed before me and it was not until after some months that the matter was then brought to my attention. In the event, it was set down before me in chambers to be argued as an urgent application.

The respondents indicated a desire to file affidavits in opposition and it was agreed between the parties that the best way was for the matter to be dealt with as an opposed application. The parties thereafter filed their documents, including heads of argument, and the matter was then argued in court.

On the date of hearing, counsel for the applicants made reference to a number of authorities to which I had no access. He promised to avail them to me shortly thereafter, but, it was not until 31 May 2007 that this request was complied with. It was, as a consequence, virtually impossible to render a judgment soon after the hearing as I then was heavily committed in other duties.

I turn now to the application before me.

The applicants are unions representing members in the employ of the second respondent. The first respondent is a medical aid society set up for the benefit of the employees of the second respondent and would appear to have been set up by virtue of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the second respondent and its employees.

It is common cause that the first respondent was collecting subscriptions from the employees and the second respondent. Benefits which the employees received were not related to the level of payment by the beneficiary and it was, consequently, a fact that the second respondent was operating as a welfarist society with its members being afforded the same benefits.

In August 2006, the second respondent put into effect a three-tier system where benefits were structured according to the level of contributions paid by respective members.

Following representations made to the second respondent, the changes were not put into effect immediately as the parties attempted to find a common position. However, at the end of August 2006, the second respondent gave notice of its intention to put the changes into effect at the beginning of October 2006. The changes were put into effect and the system is now operational.

In view of the reasons I alluded to earlier, an attempt to have a temporary interdict stopping the implementation was still-born. It therefore only leaves the final relief for determination.

The terms of the final relief are in the following terms:

1. That the implementation and execution of the tiered system by the first respondent, effected on 1 October 2006, be and is hereby set aside.

2. That the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to cease/stop and be inducted from implementing the tiered system introduced on 1 October 2006.

3. That the first respondent pays the costs of suit.

Extensive heads of argument were filed on behalf of the parties. In addition, both counsel addressed the court orally.

Counsel for the applicants argued that there were three issues for determination:

(i) The first issue was whether or not the first respondent had powers, in terms of its Constitution, to alter the medical aid scheme in existence since its inception. Counsel invited me to look at the narrow positivist meaning of clause 11(2) as well as the context of the agreement.

(ii) The second issue was whether or not the Board of the third respondent had issued a directive to the first respondent following upon a meeting held on 20 October 2006; and

(iii) The last issue was whether or not the applicants had a legitimate interest to be heard before a decision was made to link benefits to subscriptions.

Counsel for the respondents argued almost on the same premise as counsel for the applicants viz whether the second respondent had the power to introduce the benefit structure that it did.

His argument was that the applicants had considered the structure of the third respondent in isolation of the statute. He submitted that the first respondent had the power to alter the benefits accorded to its members. In so far as the third respondent was concerned it was his contention that it had not issued a directive to the first respondent to stop implementing the alteration in the benefit structure. Lastly, it was argued, on behalf of the first respondent, that, the provision of medical services by the first respondent to members of the applicants was not a condition of service and that therefore there was no need for the applicants' members to be consulted prior to the implementation of the changes.

I think the logical place to start in this matter is the examination of the relationship between the applicants and the first respondent.

The first respondent was established by the National Industrial Council for the Railway Industry in 1970. One of its objects was to afford members the facility of obtaining medical and surgical treatment for themselves, and their dependants, including the provision of drugs and medicines.

According to the Constitution in terms of which the first respondent was set up, its members comprised of the following; employees of Railways, employees of National Railways of Zimbabwe, Railmed, National Railways of Zimbabwe Pension Fund, RAE, RAU, RAYOS, REC, RMS, and Z.A.R.W.U. who are entitled to membership in terms of their conditions of employment.

Also included in the list of people entitled to be members are pensioners of the various institutions described above and the widows or widowers of those persons who had been in employment in the same and were members of the first respondent.

The applicants, being unions, are representing the persons employed by the various bodies I have referred to. Except for those employed by the first respondent, none of the members of the applicants can say that they are employees of the same. The greater number of the applicants' members therefore are employed by the other bodies.

Going by the objects of the Constitution of the first respondent, the applicants' members have a relationship with the first respondent whereby the latter has undertaken to afford the members facility for the provision of medical and surgical treatment as well as drugs and medication. Nowhere in their papers have the applicants' alluded to any other contract with the first respondent except for the provision of the services I have described above.

Yet, in addressing the question of the first respondent's actions in altering the benefit structure being offered to their members, the applicants contend that the actions of the first respondent are in fact an alteration of their conditions of service.

In order to dispose of the issue of the relationship between the applicants and the first respondent, it then becomes necessary to arrive at a decision as to the meaning to be ascribed to the phrase “conditions of service.”

When one is in service, one is in employment, and, therefore, conditions of service are the same as conditions of employment. In the case of OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Madeley NO & Anor 1943 TPD392, conditions of employment were described as:

“Conditions of employment in the present context means simply the terms, either express or implied, contained in a contract of employment.”

The terms and conditions of the employment contracts of the applicants' members are not in the purview of the first respondent. In my view, conditions of service can only exist where services of a personal nature are rendered, the one being the employer the other the employee.

We do not have services of a personal nature being rendered by the applicants' members to and on behalf of the first respondent.

I presume that the contracts of employment provide for contributions by the employer for subscriptions to a medical aid society. Beyond that, I refuse to go as the contracts are not before me and any further comments on my part would be mere speculation.

HH142-09 : JOVITA SANYANGOWE vs ELVIS CHALIMBA
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

Counsel for the respondent submitted that..., the law recognizes two types of orders. There is what is termed a constitutive order which confers rights to one party and imposes obligations on the other party. The other order is declaratory as it does not confer rights but states what the position ...

HH61-10 : WILLIAM WACHENUKA vs JOHN STRONG (PRIVATE) LIMITED and TOBS STRONG (PRIVATE) LIMITED and MINISTRY OF LANDS AGRICULTURE AND RESETTLEMENT
Ruled By: BERE J

There are various options available which a party desiring judgment to be pronounced soon must initiate.

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI
Ruled By: UCHENA J

Both counsel agreed that the issue of the granting of an application for a warrant for seizure of the applicant's motor vehicle will be the subject of separate litigation. That, however, does not affect the determination of this case as the parties in this application only dealt with the seizure of the motor vehicle without ...

SC46-15 : NATIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE RAILWAYS ARTISANS UNION AND OTHERS
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA and GUVAVA JA

This appeal, from the judgment of the Labour Court, raises the issue whether an Arbitrator can, in a compulsory arbitration, dictate the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.Collective Bargaining Agreements are governed by Part X of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (“the Act”). They are to be ...

This appeal, from the judgment of the Labour Court, raises the issue whether an Arbitrator can, in a compulsory arbitration, dictate the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties.

Collective Bargaining Agreements are governed by Part X of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (“the Act”). They are to be negotiated by the parties mentioned therein as the following provisions demonstrate:

“PART X

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED BY TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS ORGANIZATIONS

74 Scope of Collective Bargaining Agreements

(1) This Part shall apply to collective bargaining agreements negotiated by registered trade unions, employers, and employers' organizations or federations thereof:

Provided that nothing in this Part contained shall prevent an unregistered trade union or employers' organization from negotiating a collective bargaining agreement.

(2) Subject to this Act and the competence and authority of the parties, trade unions and employers or employers organizations may negotiate collective bargaining agreements as to any conditions of employment which are of mutual interest to the parties thereto.

(1) Without derogation from the generality of subsection (2), a collective bargaining agreement may make provision for —

(a) Rates of remuneration and minimum wages for different grades and types of occupations;

(b) Benefits for employees;

(c) Deductions which an employer may make from employees' wages, including deductions for membership fees and union dues, and deductions which an employer may be required or permitted by law or by order of any competent court to make;

(d) Methods of calculating, or factors for adjusting rates of pay, and the dates, times and modes of payment;

(e) All issues pertaining to overtime, piece-work, periods of vacation and vacation pay and constraints thereon;

(f) The demarcation of the appropriate categories and classes of employment and their respective functions;

(g) The conditions of employment for apprentices;

(h) The number of hours of work and the times of work with respect to all or some of the employees;

(i) The requirements of occupational safety;

(j) The maintenance of, and access by the parties to, records of employment and pay;

(k) Procedures for dealing with disputes within an undertaking or industry;

(l) Housing and transport facilities, or, in their absence, an allowance for the same;

(m) Measures to combat workplace violence and handling its aftermath…,.”…,.

The list of subjects set out in subsection (3) are suggestions as to matters that may be included by the parties in a Collective Bargaining Agreement. Thus, the parties may elect to include all or any of the suggested topics in their agreement.

The point being made is that the statute does not confer a right on any of the parties, without agreement of the others, to have included in their Collective Bargaining Agreement, any of the subjects on the list.

This is understandable since a Collective Bargaining Agreement is a contract between the parties to it and only they can set the terms by which they will be bound. It follows that any benefits to be included in the Collective Bargaining Agreement must be agreed by the parties. They cannot be imposed by the Arbitrator, or indeed any court, in the same way that a court cannot write a contract for the parties.

What occurred in this case was totally improper. The Labour Officer, the Arbitrator, and the Labour Court all missed the point.

THE BACKGROUND

The proceedings on record commenced on the 27th June 2007, when the General Secretary of ZARWU (it is not clear whether these are the initials of the 4th respondent (Zimbabwe Amalgamated Railwaymen Union) or 1st respondent (Zimbabwe Railways Artisans Union)) wrote to the Designated Agent of the Railway Employment Council in the following terms:

“Dear Sir

RE: DISPUTE HOUSING ALLOWANCE AND EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE

On the full council meeting on 21 June 2007 there was disagreement between Labour and Management on the above issue.

Labour, through ZARWU, are referring the matter to your office for Concilliation (Labour Act Section 63).

We wait to hear from your office.”

Thereafter, all the parties were notified of a hearing to be held on 12 July 2007 and later postponed to 19 July 2007.

On 19 July 2007, the parties appeared before a conciliator. The latter required each of the parties to state his position on the matter and enquired as to whether any of the parties had varied its position on the dispute. The parties had not. He therefore issued a Certificate of No Settlement, and, by agreement with the parties, referred the matter to an arbitrator for compulsory arbitration. The terms of reference were agreed to be whether the respondents were entitled to:

(a) Housing allowance, and, if so, the quantum thereof (the claim was stated at $7,500,000 per month);

(b) Education allowance calculated at Government school rates, whether boarding or day school for up to a maximum of three children or registered dependents;

(c) The effective date of such award.

The Arbitrator appointed to deal with the matter was Mr Chinjeruke.

The point was taken before the Arbitrator, in limine, that the matter was not properly before him since no conciliation had taken place. That point was dismissed on the basis that the parties could, in terms of section 93(1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], agree, and did in fact agree, to refer the matter to arbitration.

As to the merits, it was contended, before the Arbitrator, that the appellant had not refused to negotiate on the allowances but proposed, rather, that the negotiations be centered on basic pay. Accordingly, the appellant's refusal to accede to a request to negotiate on the allowances did not indicate bad faith on its part. However, in the event that the arbitrator came to the conclusion that the appellant had refused to negotiate, the most he could do was to order the parties to negotiate. He could not impose 'un-agreed' terms and conditions on the parties.

In that submission, the appellant was correct. It was, however, ignored by the Arbitrator.

It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the dispute, having arisen from the respondents' assertion that they are entitled to the allowances in terms of section 74(3) of the Labour Act, was a dispute of interest as opposed to one of right since that section provides for discretionary collective bargaining negotiations.

The Arbitrator appeared to accept this reasoning. He said:

“…, the dispute, in its current form, is a 'dispute of interest'. Because of 'may'…, in section 74(3), the matters are negotiable.”

He then went on to find:

“However, allowances such as Housing and School Fees, have to exist in one form or the other”, and, awarded, without giving reasons for so doing, school fees and housing allowances totaling 55 per cent of the basic salary of the employees.

The appellant was aggrieved by the award and appealed to the Labour Court.

Before the Labour Court, one of the main grounds of appeal was that the allowances sought and obtained by the respondents were not a right or entitlement but were to be negotiated. In the appellant's words, the Arbitrator had elevated a 'negotiable to an imperative', and, thereby, committed an error of law. A further ground of appeal was that the Arbitrator's award was premised on 'serious misdirections of fact which amount to mis-directions in law'. In particular, it was alleged that the Arbitrator erred in his finding that allowances such, as Housing and School fees 'have to exist in one form or the other'.

The Labour Court dismissed the appeal. Its concern was:

“This award was handed down on the 9th November 2007. Three years down the line the respondents' grievances have not been resolved. On page 6-9 of the record it has been shown that referring the matter back for conciliation will not assist as each party maintained its original position. This will further delay the finalization of this case.”

ISSUES ON APPEAL

The grounds of appeal are far from clear and concise. However, the main issue which clearly arises for determination, and which is dispositive of the appeal, is whether the Arbitrator could properly impose, upon the parties, the terms of a Collective Bargaining Agreement and whether the court a quo was correct in upholding the decision of the Arbitrator to do so.

As already stated above, the matters listed in section 74(3) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] are matters which the parties may, at their discretion, decide to include in their Collective Bargaining Agreement. The appellant's position, at all times, was that it preferred to negotiate on basic salaries and not allowances. In my view, both the Labour Court and the Arbitrator ought to have found that the allowances, not having been negotiated by the parties, and, therefore, not forming part of their Collective Bargaining Agreement, were not a right or entitlement available for appropriation by the respondents. This is a matter for the parties to bargain and reach agreement on. It is not a matter where a court can intervene.

A court can only intervene to enforce any agreement the parties will have concluded.

The Arbitrator could not, therefore, impose terms and conditions in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. His finding, that housing and school fees allowances 'have to exist in one form or the other', was misguided, devoid of any legal basis and irresponsible.

So, too, was the subsequent award of the said allowances in percentages (the percentages amounted to 55 per cent of the employees' salaries) lacking evidential foundation, and, as submitted by the appellant, “plucked out of the air”.

Clearly, the Arbitrator acted outside his powers when he purported to set the terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the parties and the Labour Court erred in law when it upheld the arbitrator's award....,.

The appellant's position was 'I will pay you the best salary that I can pay in the circumstances but I would rather not commit to pay allowances'.

There is nothing wrong with that approach.

Each undertaking is beset with its own peculiar circumstances. The fact that one employer considers it appropriate to pay allowances puts no obligation on another employer to do the same. Apart from dismissing the claim as being devoid of merit, the arbitrator had no meaningful role to play in this matter save to urge the parties to negotiate further on the issues in dispute. He could not, as he purported to do, create a contract for the parties.

It follows from the above that the Labour Court committed an error of law when it dismissed the appeal against the Arbitrator's award.

It is, therefore, ordered as follows:

1. The appeal is allowed with costs.

2. The order of the Labour Court is set aside and substituted with the following:

'The appeal is allowed with costs.

The Arbitrator's decision is set aside.'

SC31-13 : LAWSIGN NYARUMBU vs SANDVIK MINING AND CONSTRUCTION ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and PATEL AJA

After hearing argument from counsel, we allowed the appeal in this matter and made the following order:

1. The appeal is allowed with costs.

2. The judgment of the Labour Court is hereby set aside and substituted as follows:

(i) The appeal is dismissed with costs.

(ii) The appellant shall reinstate the respondent to his former position without loss of salary and benefits or pay damages to the respondent in lieu of reinstatement.

We further indicated that the reasons for our decision would follow in due course. These are the reasons.

BACKGROUND

The appellant was employed by the respondent as a Stores Clerk. On 12 February 2009, he issued a hydraulic pump to another employee without recording the issuance in the Stores Book. After the disappearance of the pump, the co-employee was convicted of theft. The appellant himself was also charged but later acquitted.

Following internal disciplinary proceedings, the appellant was dismissed.

The matter was referred to the relevant National Employment Council and then to an arbitrator. The latter referred the case back to the respondent's Disciplinary Committee to rehear the matter. The Disciplinary Committee found the appellant guilty of theft and that decision was confirmed by the respondent's Appeals Committee.

On appeal to the National Employment Council, it was ordered that the appellant be reinstated.

The respondent then appealed to the Labour Court on the ground that the appellant should have been found guilty of theft.

The Labour Court found the appellant not guilty of theft on the basis of what it regarded as purely circumstantial evidence. Instead, it found him guilty of negligence because of his apparent admission to that effect in the proceedings before the Disciplinary Committee. The court took the view that negligence was a competent verdict on a charge of theft. It also found that the appellant's negligence had resulted in prejudice to the respondent, and, therefore, constituted a grave offence warranting dismissal for a first offence. The court set aside the conviction of theft and substituted a conviction of negligent performance of duty resulting in loss to the employer. It then confirmed the penalty of dismissal.

The appellant now seeks an order for his reinstatement or damages in lieu thereof. His grounds of appeal are threefold:

(i) That the applicable Code of Conduct only permits dismissal for negligence following two prior warnings;

(ii) That the court's finding of negligence was not the subject of appeal; and

(iii) That negligence is not a competent verdict on a charge of theft.

I shall deal, firstly, with the last ground of appeal.

NEGLIGENCE AS COMPETENT VERDICT ON CHARGE OF THEFT

As a general rule, the standard of proof required in disciplinary matters is that on a balance of probabilities. This is obviously not as stringent as the standard required in criminal cases.

By the same token, a disciplinary tribunal is endowed with a greater measure of flexibility than that expected before a court of criminal law. Nevertheless, there are certain basic principles that neither a court nor tribunal can depart from.

One of those principles is that the offence that the accused is found guilty of must be commensurable with the offence that he has been charged with. In other words, both offences must bear some legally cognisable affinity with one another.

In our criminal law, as is probably the case in any other legal system, the essential elements of theft and offences based on negligence do not share any meaningful convergence. They are sui generis and fundamentally distinct offences. In my view, the same must apply to the treatment of these offences qua acts of misconduct in disciplinary matters.

This is clearly recognised in the Employment Code of Conduct applicable in the present matter – as prescribed in the Collective Bargaining Agreement: Engineering and Iron and Steel Industry (S.I.301 of 1996), amending the principal agreement contained in Statutory Instrument 282 of 1990, S.I.282 of 1990.

The Schedule to the Code of Conduct sets out four broad categories of misconduct and defines the diverse offences constituting misconduct. Negligence is identified as an act of misconduct under item B(4)(b), while the specific offence of theft is captured under item D(c).

They are clearly separate and distinct acts of misconduct.

The appellant in casu was charged with theft as defined in item D(c). The Labour Court found him guilty of negligence. That finding of negligence was clearly not a competent verdict on the particular charge of theft preferred against the appellant. In this regard, the court patently ignored the specific provisions of the Code of Conduct that should have guided its decision in the matter.

In short, as was conceded by counsel for the respondent, in his curious but not inappropriate reference to a malapropism having been committed, the court's finding was grossly erroneous....,.

POWER TO SUBSTITUTE DECISION OR ORDER

Section 89 of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] regulates the functions, powers, and jurisdiction of the Labour Court. Section 89(2), in its relevant portion, provides that:

“In the exercise of its functions, the Labour Court may –

(a) In the case of an appeal –

(i) Conduct a hearing into the matter or decide it on the record; or

(ii) Confirm, vary, reverse or set aside the decision, order or action that is appealed against, or substitute its own decision or order.”

It is axiomatic, in criminal as well as disciplinary proceedings, that a person cannot be found guilty of an offence that has not been preferred against him, unless that offence is a competent verdict on the offence originally charged.

The reason for this is obvious, viz: The person accused must be made aware of the case against him in order to enable him to effectively prepare his defence.

In this context, notwithstanding the provisions of section 89(2)(a)(ii) of the Labour Act, the Labour Court cannot, mero motu, substitute its own charge or make a finding of guilt on an entirely different offence.

Any such action would constitute a blatant miscarriage of justice: see Zimasco (Pvt) Ltd v Chizema 2007 (2) ZLR (S)…,.

Furthermore, sitting as a Court of Appeal, it can only deal with the matter on the basis of the grounds of appeal that have been raised by the appellant: see Chikanda v United Touring Company Limited SC07-99…,.

In the instant matter, it is not in dispute that the appellant was never at any stage charged with negligence. Moreover, the grounds of appeal before the Labour Court were confined to theft, without any reference to negligence, and negligence was not canvassed by the parties in the proceedings before it.

What the court did, by finding the appellant guilty of negligence, was to usurp the functions of the respondent's Disciplinary and Appeals Committees.

It follows that the court fundamentally erred in its finding of negligence, as that was an issue which was clearly not the subject of the appeal before it.

SC35-15 : ELIAS CHIDEMBO vs BINDURA NICKEL CORPORATION LIMITED
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and MAVANGIRA AJA

This is an appeal against the decision of the Labour Court which upheld the dismissal of the appellant from his employment with the respondent.The factual circumstances of this matter are common cause.The appellant was in the employ of Bindura Nickel Corporation Limited and served as a workers' committee chairman. He ...

Appealed
SC36-12 : RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE vs CAFCA LTD
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JA and OMERJEE AJA

This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court granting with costs a claim by the respondent for:

(i) Payment of the sum of US$750,000.

(ii) Interest tempore morae at the London Interbank rate for United States dollars, at 3.5% per annum, from 1 September 2005 to the date of payment.

(iii) Costs of suit.

The factual background to this dispute, which is largely common cause, may be summarised as follows:

The appellant is a financial institution. The respondent is a manufacturer and supplier of an exclusive range of cables for the transmission of communication and distribution of energy used by such entities like the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority, the Rural Electrification Agency, and Tel One.

The respondent's business caters for both domestic and export markets. As at end of 2003, 50% of its sales volumes were largely in exports.

In 2004, the respondent's business experienced slow growth due to inflation and the scarcity of foreign currency. During that year, the respondent's representatives met with the appellant's Governor, Dr. Gideon Gono, with a view of securing foreign currency to purchase imported inputs in order to sustain its business.

Dr Gono gave an oral undertaking to avail US$150.000 per week, to the respondent, from the foreign currency auction system.

In January 2005, the respondent began to receive the said sums of foreign currency against payment of a Zimbabwean dollar equivalent to the appellant via a commercial bank.

The special arrangement was extended to thirty-five (35) other companies selected as the recipients of foreign currency.

This allocation of US$150,000 was, with effect from 16 June 2005, increased to US$250,000.

Weekly allocations, at that new level, were made to the respondent until the end of July 2005.

In August 2005, the respondent made three transfers of money, in Zimbabwe dollars, to the appellant, for the equivalent of the amount of US$750,000. The payments were accompanied by details of external creditors to be paid by the defendant.

The appellant did not pay the foreign currency.

Its position, at the trial, was that foreign currency could not be paid because it was not available.

The respondent's witness, Mr. Turina, confirmed, in evidence, that, the appellant indicated that it did not have foreign currency for disbursement.

On 2, 11 and 19 August, respectively, the respondent made payments, in Zimbabwe dollars, equivalent to US$750,000.

In respect of these three payments, the respondent would receive a phone call from the appellant before making payment.

On 1 August, it received a call from the appellant before depositing a sum of Z$4,438,294,052=45 with the appellant the following day.

With regard to the second transaction, the respondent received a phone call on 5 August. In response thereto, it deposited the sum of Z$4,511,254,261=47 with the appellant on 11 August.

On the third occasion, the telephone call was made on 17 August. The respondent deposited an amount of Z$4,587,562,920=90 with the appellant on 19 August.

Bigboy Masoso, who was the Division Chief Treasury Officer testified on behalf of the appellant to the effect, that, the disbursement of foreign currency could only be made if the front office of the appellant made the funds available. He also stated that the telephone calls made to the respondent, and other companies, were meant to provide quotations to secure constance of the exchange rate.

In the affidavit filed of record, Dr Gono stated as follows at paragraph four thereof as follows:

“I advised them that the Bank would endeavour to source foreign currency for the plaintiff to the tune of USD$150,000 per week in recognition of the plaintiff company's strategic role in the national economy. No formal binding agreement was concluded in this regard and it was never the common understanding of the parties that we were concluding a formal agreement.”

At paragraph six of the affidavit, he stated as follows:

“As a result of further representations made by the plaintiff, the defendant increased the weekly allocation of foreign currency to the plaintiff to USD250,000 from or about the 8th June 2005. Again, it was never the common understanding and contemplation of the parties that they were entering into a formal binding transaction, hence no formal contractual documentation was executed.”

Again, at paragraph seven of his affidavit, he stated as follows:

“I am advised, that, during the month of August 2005, plaintiff made payments totalling Z$13,535,110 being the quoted equivalent at the auction rate of USD750,000 which the defendant had hoped to pay to the plaintiff. Due to many other competing and pressing national requirements, the defendant was unable to avail the foreign currency, not only to plaintiff but to many other companies in a similar situation who then accepted an offer for immediate refund. Plaintiff declined the refund.”

Following a trial, the learned Judge found as follows at p8 of the judgment:

“However, the main issue, in my view, is whether, by allocating to the plaintiff US$150,000 and later US$250,000 from the auction system, the defendant then became obligated to release the money to the plaintiff upon payment by the plaintiff, within twenty-four hours, of the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent at the defendant's instruction.”

At p9 of the judgement, the court a quo stated as follows:

“It becomes crucial for the defendant to explain the reasons for Patience Aisam to set in motion the process, if foreign currency was unavailable. My view is simply that the allocation was only made against funds that were already available from the auction.

It is important to note that Patience Aisam spoke of 'an approved allocation and not successful bid.'

This was so because the plaintiff was on a special list that was not required to bid.

There could, in my view, be no approval or allocation of what was not already available.

Given the condition that the completion of each transaction was totally dependant upon the availability of foreign currency, the possibility of Aisam confirming allocation and asking for payment of the Zimbabwe dollar equivalent, within 24 hours, when there was no foreign currency already earmarked for the plaintiff is, in my view, very remote.”

The learned Judge, at p9, made the following finding:

“I am therefore unable to accept that the above scenario did not create binding obligations on the part of the defendant.

To that end, I am of the view, that, upon compliance by the plaintiff, a binding contract was concluded and what remained was the release of the foreign currency purchased by the plaintiff.

The case of F.C. Hume (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of Natural Resources & Tourism 1989 (3) ZLR 55 indeed supports this view.

With the plaintiff having complied with all the requirements, the contract was already in place and the defendant was obliged to meet its obligation.”

The gist of the court a quo's reasoning was that, at the time the phone calls were made to the respondent, the foreign currency to which the call related was available and the call was an offer which the respondent accepted by depositing the money, in Zimbabwean dollars, with the appellant thereby giving rise to a binding contract.

The court a quo gave judgment in favour of the respondent as sought in the summons. It is against this judgment that the appellant now appealed to this Court.

In the grounds of appeal, the appellant contends that:

1. The court a quo erred in law and fact in not making a finding that the payment by the respondent of the Zimbabwe dollars, as directed by the appellant, did not create a binding contract which was an end itself but that performance was always subject to foreign currency being available.

2. The court a quo erred in law and fact in making a finding that the communications made by Patience Aisam, on behalf of the appellant, calling upon the defendant to pay the Zimbabwe dollars, meant or was evidence that the foreign currency being allocated was available for disbursement to the respondent.

3. The court a quo erred in fact and law in not making a finding that non-availability of foreign currency made performance impossible and that the appellant was entitled to refund the respondent the money it had paid as the suspensive condition, viz, the availability of foreign currency had failed to be met.

4. The court erred in law in allowing the claim for interest and in ordering the interest to run from 1 September 2005.

The primary question to be decided by this Court is: whether or not there existed a binding contract for the disbursement of a sum of foreign currency to the respondent's creditors upon payment by the respondent of an equivalent sum in Zimbabwean currency.

The following are undisputed facts:

As a result of an approach to the appellant's Governor, Dr Gono, on 27 October 2004, for assistance in obtaining foreign currency, the respondent was granted the status of a successful bidder at the weekly foreign currency auction.

Several other companies were on this special list.

The respondent was not required to place bids at the auction but was merely telephonically advised of the agreed weekly allocations.

The practice had been successfully operational from January 2005 to July 2005.

Payment requirements were availed to the respondent who complied by effecting payment of the equivalent amount of the foreign currency in Zimbabwe dollars.

There was no formal contract between the appellant and the respondent.

The respondent was amongst a list of thirty five (35) companies on this special list who had been identified as preferential recipients of foreign currency under the arrangement.

The court a quo correctly found, that, the arrangement between the parties was premised on the availability of foreign currency. As such, no allocation could be made without the availability of foreign currency.

Indeed, both parties were aware that the arrangement for the disbursement of foreign currency was subject always to a condition that foreign currency had to be available in the first instance.

Mr Turina stated, that, due to the scarcity of foreign currency, the respondent had reached an agreement with the appellant whereby bids from the respondent would be given preferential treatment.

He confirmed that the information on the allocations was done telephonically and that once an allocation (i.e. the initial US$150,000 rising to US$250,000) was made, the respondent was required to pay the equivalent in Zimbabwean dollars.

The arrangement had worked well from January 2005 until July 2005.

In August 2005, the appellant failed to disburse US$750,000 to the respondent's customers and suppliers after the respondent had deposited with the appellant an equivalent sum, in Zimbabwe dollars, in three separate tranches.

In this regard, the import of the affidavit of Patience Aisam was that a telephone call would be made to advise of an approved application and not allocation. In effect, the approval and the actual allocation of foreign currency were distinct processes - premised on the availability of foreign currency.

It was the evidence of Patience Aisam's superior, Bigboy Masoso that payments in foreign currency would only occur if the front office availed such funds.

This testimony accords with logic and probability.

Patience Aisam was not employed in the Front Office which was responsible for the allocation of foreign currency.

The court a quo found that there existed a binding contract between the parties.

When regard is had to Dr Gono's affidavit, it is clear that he advised the respondent that the appellant would “endeavour” to source foreign currency for the respondent.

Such assertion does not suggest that the appellant was binding itself to provide the respondent with foreign currency on an ongoing or permanent basis.

It is not in dispute that no allocation of foreign currency was made in August 2005. According to Bigboy Masoso, the system was discontinued because there was no foreign currency.

The 24 hours notice of payment of Zimbabwe dollars was not in fact adhered to by the respondent in August 2005.

The finding by the court a quo, that, upon payment by the respondent, a binding contract was concluded, is not borne out by the evidence with regard to the payments made following telephone calls of 5 and 17 August 2005.

It is to be noted, that, there was no formal contract between the parties.

Dr Gono offered to prioritise the respondent, and other companies, in the allocation and disbursement of foreign currency.

The Court finds that when Dr Gono put in place the special arrangement, there was no intention to create a binding contract to avail foreign currency to the respondent and the other companies on the special list.

The facility was put in place, at the time, because of the acute shortage of foreign currency.

It is highly unlikely, that, given that state of affairs, Dr Gono would seek to bind the appellant to avail foreign currency to the respondent, upon payment of the local currency, when the volume of inflows of foreign currency were unpredictable.

In the circumstances, it would not be logical for Dr Gono to enter into a binding contract to supply foreign currency to the respondent on the terms suggested.

It is not without significance that 35 other companies on the special list subsequently accepted refunds of Zimbabwe dollars deposited with the appellant in August 2005.

This fact is consistent with the position that the allocation of foreign currency was conditional upon its availability at any given time.

The effect of the evidence is that the agreement for the disbursement of foreign currency was predicated upon availability of foreign currency.

It was the respondent's testimony, that, the condition that foreign currency would be availed to the respondent, subject to availability, was expressed orally by the appellant's Governor when he entertained the respondent's request to be allocated foreign currency.

The agreement to accord the respondent preferential treatment, in the disbursement of foreign currency, together with 35 other companies, did not create a binding and enforceable contract between the parties.

The performance of the appellant's obligation, to provide foreign currency, was always qualified or conditional upon its availability.

Reliance by the respondent on previous dealings did not, in the circumstances, give rise to binding contractual obligations between the parties.

The parties understood, that, in the absence of foreign currency, there was no contract between them.

The Court is satisfied, that, the evidence does not establish that a binding contract existed between the parties regarding the disbursement of foreign currency, either formally or on past practice, upon payment by the respondent of the local currency equivalent.

It was found, by the court a quo, that, the Deputy Governor, Mr Ncube, gave an undertaking to make available the US$750,000 to the respondent as and when foreign currency became available.

The Deputy Governor's position was not part of the respondent's case on the pleadings in the court a quo.

The finding by the trial court that Mr Ncube's testimony, that he had promised the respondent that it would be paid the sum of US$750,000, was binding upon the appellant, is a misdirection.

HH243-10 : COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION OF ZIMBABWE vs TASARA ZVANDASARA and GILBERT KARIKUIMBA
Ruled By: UCHENA J

Judicial officers must check and ascertain the legality of orders before granting them.

HB122-11 : ESSIE NCUBE vs BRIAN NGWENYA and RHODAH NGWENYA
Ruled By: NDOU J and MATHONSI J

The late Ntongayabo Abel Ngwenya was a polygamist who was married to both the appellant and the second respondent in terms of the Customary Marriages Act [Chapter 5:07], he having married the second respondent in 1952 and the appellant, customarily, in 1970, before registering that marriage in 1997. He died in Bulawayo in 2008 at the age of 78 whereupon his estate was registered with the Additional Master and the first respondent, his son, with the second respondent, was appointed executor by Letters of Administration issued on 16 September 2008.

The first respondent was dishonest in the administration of the estate in that he and the second respondent did not disclose the existence of the appellant as the second wife and sought to appropriate the entire estate to themselves.

When she discovered this, the appellant brought an application in the court a quo seeking an order reversing the fraudulent process of winding up the estate. The trial magistrate, having heard the application, referred the matter to this court for the proceedings to be quashed and the matter was placed before me. On 5 November 2010 I issued a review minute which reads:

“In light of the findings of the magistrate, I direct as follows;

(1) The entire proceedings and the winding up of the estate late Ntongayabo Abel Ngwenya under DRBY322/08 and everything done in terms of authority granted thereunder including the transfer of House No.14/412 Mpopoma, Bulawayo to the name of Rhoda Ngwenya be and is hereby set aside.

(2) The estate of the late Ntongayabo Abel Ngwenya should be reopened and its administration be commenced afresh to take into account the interests of all concerned.”

Having quashed the proceedings, the court a quo was required to commence the proceedings afresh.

It is not clear what happened thereafter but the record does not contain any fresh hearing at all. No evidence was led by the parties concerned but out of nowhere the trial magistrate delivered a ruling on 2 December 2010 in the following;

“After hearing both parties, including family members from both litigants, it has been agreed that the applicant be allowed the use of the matrimonial house for a period of one year while she builds herself a homestead in the rural home or acquires alternate accommodation as the urban matrimonial home should now be shared between the applicant and respondent. The sharing ratio would be two fifths and three fifths. The applicant (Essie Ncube) gets two fifths whereas the respondent (Rhoda Ngwenya) gets three fifths. This is an ex tempore ruling.”

Unfortunately, there is no record that the learned trial magistrate heard the parties as alleged in his ruling nor that the parties consented to the order that he made. The situation is made worse by the fact that the learned magistrate did not give reasons for arriving at a share of 40% to the appellant and 60% to the second respondent.

The failure to give reasons for the decision raises the possibility that the magistrate did not apply his mind to the case. There is always a need for judgments to be reasoned and for the reasons to be stated. Failure to give reasons is, in my view, a gross irregularity. This is particularly so in a case such as the present where the magistrate alleges that part of the order made was by consent and yet that consent is not on record. The judgment of the court a quo therefore cannot stand.

In the result, it is ordered that:

(1) The appeal succeeds to the extent that the judgment of the court a quo is set aside.

(2) The matter is hereby remitted to the Magistratse Court for a trial de novo before a different magistrate.

(3) Each party shall bear its own costs.

HB119-10 : NYARADZAI KAZUVA vs GILBERT DUBE
Ruled By: CHEDA J and MATHONSI J

As stated in Mandava v Chasweka HH42-08 (as yet unreported)…,;“All Magistrates' Courts in this country are formal courts whose proceedings are governed by a set of rules and established procedures. It is trite that the pre-setting of rules of procedure is, to date, the widely accepted manner of avoiding ...

HHB21-11 : STATE vs NOMPUMELELO MPOFU
Ruled By: MATHONSI J and NDOU J

In considering sentence, the magistrate converted the United States Dollars to South African rands and came up with a total of ZAR12,000= as the value of the prejudice. It is not clear why he saw it fit to make the conversion, which must have been at a rate of 1 US$ to 10 ...

When counsel for the accused person (she had been unrepresented at the trial) perused the court record for purposes of preparing submissions for review, there were no reasons for sentence, a point that he took up in his submissions. The matter was referred back to the magistrate for his response to those submissions. His response reads in part as follows:

''Reasons for sentence were given ex tempo (sic) in court in the presence of accused person during the sentence. It could be the legal practitioner has (sic) sight of the record before the trial magistrate had placed the same in the record.''

Counsel for the accused has commented as follows:

''When counsel went to look for the record a considerable time, about two weeks, had elapsed after the passing of sentence. At that time, a review cover had been completed and the record, according to the Clerk of Court, was ready for dispatch to the Criminal Registrar for his Lordship's attention. It was dispatched on 27 January 2010, sentence having been passed on the 13^th January. One has difficulty in understanding how a judicial officer could remember, some two weeks later, what he had said orally without writing in open court. One should be forgiven for taking the view that the learned trial magistrate adopted the reasoning process of Shakespear's characters - starting with the conclusion and later going back to justify it…,. Had his worship not adopted the wrong reasoning process, he would probably not have misdirected himself on sentence, for misdirect himself he did, by exaggerating the gravity of the offence.''

It is a cardinal principle of our criminal justice system that before assessing an appropriate sentence a judicial officer must seriously engage in a pre-sentencing inquiry in order to gather as much information as possible to enable him or her to humanely and meaningfully assess sentence. Sentencing cannot be left to the caprices and instincts of the judicial officer. A thorough investigation should be carried out by the judicial officer before arriving at an appropriate sentence.

Where the judicial officer gives an ex tempore judgment with reasons for sentence contained in his head, only to be inserted in the court record much later, he runs the risk of someone concluding that he did not apply his mind to the case at hand. Indeed, it is a misdirection for the judicial officer not to record the reasons for sentence, a misdirection which entitles the reviewing judge to tamper with the sentence.

I agree with counsel for the accused that the magistrate may have come up with reasons which were added on long after the sentence simply to justify the sentence he had already imposed. I can assign no other reason for the fact that at some stage after sentence the reasons for sentence were missing and he ''placed'' them in the record later.

View Appeal
HH178-14 : WILLOUGHBY'S INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs PERUKE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE (Ret) A. R. GUBBAY SC
Ruled By: ZHOU J

The first respondent, on the other hand, objected in limine to the application on the basis that it was filed out of time. The first respondent contended that the arbitral award was ready for collection by the parties on 25 February 2011 when a letter was addressed to the applicant's legal practitioners by the Secretary ...

The first respondent, on the other hand, objected in limine to the application on the basis that it was filed out of time. The first respondent contended that the arbitral award was ready for collection by the parties on 25 February 2011 when a letter was addressed to the applicant's legal practitioners by the Secretary to the Commercial Arbitration Centre advising them that the award was ready for collection upon payment of the fee stated in the letter. The applicant did not attend to collect the award as advised. The award was subsequently delivered to the applicant's legal practitioners on 14 March 2011 under cover of a letter dated on the same date.

Article 34(3) of the Arbitration Act [Chapter 7:15] provides as follows:

“An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making the application had received the award or, if a request had been made under Article 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal.”

The above provision shows that the period of three months is reckoned from the date that a party wishing to apply for the setting aside of an arbitral award received the award.

Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the date on which the award was made available to the parties must be taken as the date on which the parties received the award. In this instance, that date would be the 25^th of February 2011 when the applicant was notified that the award had been completed and was available for collection.

According to the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 'receive' means “to get (something given or sent to one).” The Oxford Advanced Learners' Dictionary explains the meaning of the word 'receive' as follows: “to get or accept sth that is sent or given to you.” The word 'received' to me means that the award must have been sent or delivered to the recipient. In this case, there was an invitation to collect the award. Until the award was delivered to or collected by the applicant one cannot say that the applicant had received it. The letter of the 25^th February 2011 does not amount to traditio longa manu as submitted by counsel for the first respondent. That letter does not amount to a pointing out (with the long hand) of the item to be delivered. Further, the nature of the thing, the award, is such that the court would be most reluctant to extend that form of delivery to it as it could be easily handled and physically given to the applicant, as what eventually happened on 14 March 2011. See Groenewald v Van der Merwe 1917 AD 233…,.; Mankowitz v Loewenthal 1982 (3) SA 758 (A)…,. The award was, therefore, received by the applicant on 14 March 2011 and not on 25 February 2011. The application was, therefore, filed timeously. Compare Mtetwa & Anor v Mupamhadzi 2007 (1) ZLR 253 (S).

On that account, the objection in limine fails.

View Appeal
SC43-14 : STREAMSLEIGH INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs AUTOBAND INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, GARWE JA and GOWORA JA

It was argued that the manner in which the eviction order was framed did not put the appellant at risk of being evicted at the instance of the respondent, a factor which appears to have escaped the notice of the learned judge. An order for the eviction of African Medical Investments Plc would not ...

SC01-15 : FIRSTEL CELLULAR (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs NETONE CELLULAR (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA & PATEL JA

This is an appeal against the decision of the High Court granting summary judgment against the appellant in the sum of US$8,330,470=52 together with interest at 2.5% per annum above the prime overdraft Bank rate and costs of suit.

The claim against the appellant arose from a Service Provider Agreement concluded between the parties on 10 March 2006 (the Agreement). The Agreement required the appellant to pay the sums due thereunder within thirty days of receiving the respondent's invoices.

It is common cause that the appellant owed the respondent the outstanding amount claimed as at 30 September 2010.

The respondent issued summons on 16 November 2010, and, following the appellant's appearance to defend, applied for summary judgement on 14 February 2011.

The court a quo held that the respondent's claim was unimpeachable and that the appellant had no plausible defences to the claim. In particular, the court found that there was no supervening impossibility due to the currency regime changeover between January and March 2009, entailing any objective impossibility of recovering debts from the appellant's customers. Additionally, there was no condition precedent in the Agreement that those customers should first pay the appellant before it became obliged to pay the respondent. Lastly, there was no principal and agent relationship between the parties to preclude the recovery of payments from the appellant upon presentation of the respondent's invoices.

The grounds of appeal herein arise from the defences raised in the High Court, viz: supervening impossibility of performance, recovery from customers as a condition precedent for payment, and the existence of a principal and agent relationship between the parties.

In essence, the question to be determined is whether the learned judge was correct in holding that the respondent's claim was unassailable and that the appellant had no bona fide defences to that claim.

In addition, the appellant's heads of argument raise a further ground of appeal not pleaded in its Notice of Appeal. It is argued that the order granted by the court a quo is vague as it does not specify the applicable rate of interest and the dates when the amounts due accrued interest....,.

VAGUENESS OF COURT ORDER

The court a quo granted summary judgment as prayed for in terms of the draft order. The latter is regrettably terse and simply orders that summary judgement be entered in terms of the summons.

In the summons, the respondent's claim is for payment of the sum of US$8,330,470=52 with:

”Interest thereon at a rate of 2.5% per annum above the prime overdraft rate of the Standard Chartered Bank of Zimbabwe, from the date each payment was due to the date of payment.”

Counsel for the appellant contends that this part of the court order is vague and unclear as regards the rates of interest applicable and their respective dates of application.

As I have already indicated, this is not a ground of appeal that was raised in the notice of appeal. Nevertheless, it is a point of law that can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, provided that the other party is not thereby prejudiced.

Counsel for the respondent accepts that it would not be improper or prejudicial to the respondent for the point to be addressed and determined at this stage.

In my view, there is nothing vague or unclear in the court order as read with the summons.

The applicable rates of interest are undoubtedly available from the Bank cited and the dates from which those rates apply will be apparent from the relevant tax invoices presented by the respondent to the appellant.

In any event, this is an issue that should most appropriately be agreed between the parties themselves, or, failing such agreement, be referred to the court a quo for determination and quantification.

View Appeal
SC12-16 : AFARAS MTAUSI GWARADZIMBA vs C. J. PETRON & COMPANY (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

In a judgment handed down on 16 April 2014, the High Court made an order setting aside the decision of the appellant refusing the request made by the respondent for leave to institute civil proceedings against SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd. The court further granted leave to the respondent to institute the proceedings and ordered ...

The court further granted leave to the respondent to institute the proceedings and ordered the appellant to pay the costs of the application.

This appeal is against that judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd (“SMM”) is a company under a reconstruction order issued by the Minister of Justice, Legal & Parliamentary Affairs in terms of the Reconstruction of State-Indebted Insolvent Companies Act [Chapter 24:27] (“the Reconstruction Act”). The appellant was appointed Administrator of SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd in September 2004. Upon such appointment, the appellant was conferred, by law, with the power, inter alia, to raise money, in order to turn around the fortunes of the company.

In 2008 and 2009, the appellant sought loans on behalf of SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd in order to purchase spares and other consumables from various South African suppliers. The spares and consumables were meant to capacitate Shabani Mine so that its mining operations could continue. As at 31 December 2010, the total amount outstanding on the two loans was US$3,635,158=31 which amount the appellant acknowledged was due and owing.

Efforts by the respondent to recover the debt were in vain.

Accordingly, in June 2012, the respondent made a written request to the appellant to grant it leave to institute proceedings against SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd in terms of section 6 of the Reconstruction of State-Indebted Insolvent Companies Act [Chapter 24:27].

On 28 August 2012, the appellant, through his legal practitioners, declined to give such leave.

Consequently, the respondent filed a court application, in November 2012, seeking an order setting aside the decision of the appellant refusing it leave to institute civil proceedings and for the court itself to grant such leave.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE HIGH COURT

The application before the High Court was made in terms of section 4 of the Administrative Justice Act [Chapter 10:28].

The basis of the application was that the decision of the appellant, refusing leave to institute proceedings, was contrary to the intention of the legislature, grossly unreasonable, made in bad faith and constituted an abuse of authority; that it was an unlawful deprivation of the right of the respondent to obtain judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction; that it was not a fair decision, regard being had to the fact that the debt in question was incurred during the administration period; that there was no rational basis for the decision, and, lastly, that the appellant had failed to comply with his duty and obligations as an administrative authority as provided for in section 3 of the Administrative Justice Act [Chapter 10:28].

In his opposing papers, the appellant justified the refusal of the grant of leave on the basis that there was need, in the short term period, to preserve the assets of the company pending its full recapitalisation and subsequent reopening of operations. He further averred that, were the respondent to obtain judgment against SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd and thereafter proceed to execute on that judgment, SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd would, in the result, have to be liquidated, thus negating the whole purpose of reconstruction.

In heads of argument filed by both parties, various issues were identified as requiring determination.

The appellant, inter alia, submitted that the application filed by the respondent was a review application. He further submitted that, on the papers, the application did not comply with the requirements for review. Indeed, the presiding judge, in his judgment, accepted that the issue that fell for determination, amongst others, was whether the application was properly before the court….,.

The court reached the conclusion that the decision to refuse leave was wrong, unfair and in breach of section 3 of the Administrative Justice Act [Chapter 10:28]. The court consequently set aside the decision. The court considered it unnecessary to decide whether or not the decision refusing leave was grossly unreasonable “in the Wednesbury sense.” The court was also of the view that this was a proper case for it to grant the leave which the appellant had refused. Consequently, the court granted such leave in paragraph [2] of the operative part of its judgment.

APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL

In submissions before this Court, the appellant has argued that the court a quo erred in failing to determine the question whether the application filed by the respondent was properly before it, and, in particular, whether the application complied with the requirements of Order 33 of the Rules of the High Court. He further submitted that the fact that the court a quo proceeded to deal with the merits of the application suggests a tacit acceptance by the court that the matter was properly before it. The absence of reasons for such tacit acceptance and the failure by the court to expressly deal with the issue constitute a serious misdirection. He has further submitted that, on the authority of Minister of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development & Anor v Silas Machetu & 3 Ors SC34-12, there is little doubt this was an application for review. The present application, having been filed some three months after the making of the decision, was therefore not properly before the court.

The appellant also submitted that the refusal to grant leave was not unreasonable, unfair or wrong. Lastly, he submitted that, in terms of the Administrative Justice Act, it is not permissible for the court itself to substitute its own decision in place of that of the Administrator.

RESPONDENT'S SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL

In submissions before us, the respondent has argued that the Administrative Justice Act, in effect, created a new jurisdiction not only in respect of the obligations of an administrative authority but also in respect of the manner in which challenges to such administrative authority could be made. In the absence of a provision in the Act requiring applicants to comply with Order 33 of the High Court Rules, no obligation arises to comply with the various provisions under Order 33. To the contrary, it is the provisions of Order 32, and in particular Rule 226 of the High Court Rules, 1971, which are applicable. Consequently, in the absence of any period stipulated by the Minister in terms of section 10(2)(b) of the Administrative Justice Act [Chapter 10:28], no time limits apply to applications in terms of section 4 of the Administrative Justice Act [Chapter 10:28]…,.

The respondent has further submitted that the central issue that fell for determination before the court a quo was whether the appellant, as an administrative authority, acted lawfully, reasonably and in a fair manner in declining to give the necessary leave for the institution of proceedings against SMM Holdings (Pvt) Ltd.

On the facts, it is quite clear that the decision of the appellant was irrational and unreasonable.

The respondent has further argued that section 6(b) of the Reconstruction of State Indebted Insolvent Companies Act [Chapter 24:27] is not valid in terms of the current Constitution, regard being had to the provisions of section 69 of the Constitution, which provide for the right of access to the court for the resolution of any dispute.

Lastly, the respondent has submitted that section 4 of the Reconstruction of State Indebted Insolvent Companies Act [Chapter 24:27] cannot be interpreted as preventing the High Court, in an appropriate case, from substituting its own decision for that of the administrative authority.

Notwithstanding the fact that the propriety of the application had been put in issue, the court a quo, in its judgment, did not deal with the submission but took the view that the substantive issue falling for determination was the extent to which the respondent could exercise the discretion bestowed on him…,.

On the question whether the court a quo failed to resolve the issue raised by the appellant, namely, that the proceedings, being of the nature of a review, were subject to the provisions of Order 33 of the High Court Rules, the respondent has submitted that it is quite permissible for a court not to deal with each and every submission raised by the parties and instead confine itself only to those issues which are critical to its decision….,.

It is essential to deal, first, with the submission whether the court a quo erred in not dealing with the preliminary point taken by the appellant in the court a quo that the application before it, having been one of review, was not properly before it. That this submission was made by the appellant in argument before the court a quo is not in dispute. Indeed, in its judgment, the court a quo confirms that the appellant had argued that “the application failed to satisfy the requirements for review.”

Although it was alive to the fact that the appellant had raised this preliminary point, the court a quo said nothing further on the matter, and, instead, concluded that “aside from the constitutional point…, the substantive issue before [the court] was the extent to which the respondent could exercise the discretion bestowed on him by s 6(b) of the Reconstruction Act.”

I am inclined to agree with the respondent that, in proceeding to determine the substantive issue that fell for determination before it, the court must have tacitly accepted that the application was property before it. Had the court concluded otherwise, it would not have proceeded to deal with the merits of the application.

In general, I agree with the respondent's submission that, in a case where a number of issues are raised, it is not always incumbent upon the court to deal with each and every issue raised in argument by the parties. It is also correct that a court may well take the view that, in view of its finding on a particular issue, it may not be necessary to deal with the remaining issues raised. However, this is subject to the rider that the issue that is determined in these circumstances must be one capable of finally disposing of the matter.

In the present case, the substantive issue that was determined by the court a quo did not dispose of the matter. The question still remained whether the application was, in the first instance, properly before the court. This was not an issue that the court a quo could ignore or wish away. The court was obliged to consider it and decide whether the matter was properly before it. It was, in short, improper for the court to proceed to determine the substantive factual and legal issues without first determining the propriety or otherwise of the application itself.

If the court, as it appears to have done, tacitly accepted that the matter was properly before it, then reasons for such tacit acceptance should have been given.

The position is well settled that a court must not make a determination on only one of the issues raised by the parties and say nothing about other equally important issues raised “unless the issue so determined can put the whole matter to rest” - Longman Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Midzi & Ors 2008 (1) ZLR 198, 203 D (S).

The position is also settled that where there is a dispute on some question of law or fact, there must be a judicial decision or determination on the issue in dispute. Indeed, the failure to resolve the dispute or give reasons for a determination is a misdirecton, one that vitiates the order given at the end of the trial - Charles Kazingizi v Revesai Dzinoruma HH106-06; Muchapondwa v Madake & Ors 2006 (1) ZLR 196 D-G, 201 A (H); GMB v Muchero 2008 (1) ZLR 216, 221 C-D (S).

Although it is apparent in this case that the judge in the court a quo may have considered the question whether the matter was properly before him when he considered the merits, a large portion of those considerations remained stored in his mind instead of being committed to paper. In the circumstances, this amounts to an omission to consider and give reasons, which is a gross irregularity - S v Makawa & Anor 1991 (1) ZLR 142.

Consequently, the failure by the court a quo to specifically determine the question whether or not the application was properly before it, its tacit acceptance that this was the position, and the consequent failure on its part to give reasons why it had proceeded to deal with the substantive issues in the light of the preliminary point taken, vitiated the proceedings.

In the light of the above conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to deal with the rest of the issues raised by the parties to this appeal.

DISPOSITION

In the circumstances, it seems to me that the most appropriate course would be for this matter to be remitted to the court a quo for a determination whether, in the first instance, the application was properly before it, and, if so, whether the decision of the appellant denying leave is, on the facts and the law, sustainable.

In the result, this court makes the following order:

1. The appeal is allowed with the costs of the appeal being in the cause with those in case no. HC13496/12.

2. The judgment of the court a quo is set aside.

3. The matter is remitted to the court a quo for a determination of the preliminary point taken by the appellant, and, thereafter, if need be, the substantive issues raised by the parties.

SSC33-16 : ELPHAS NCUBE vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA and MUTEMA AJA

I turn next to the question of sentence. In passing sentence, the learned judge before whom the appellant, for purposes of having sentence passed, did not give reasons for the sentence meted out to the appellant. A failure to give reasons for sentence or an order is a gross irregularity and thus amounts ...

SC53-16 : PG INDUSTRIES (ZIMBABWE) LIMITED vs MARK BVEKERWA and 34 OTHERS
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, GOWORA JA and PATEL JA

Counsel for the appellant contended before us that the absence of reasons for the judgment constitute an irregularity such as to justify interference with the judgment of the court a quo by this court. I agree. In Muchapondwa v Madake Ors 2006 (1) ZLR 196 (H)…, KARWI J said: “The ...

I agree.

In Muchapondwa v Madake & Ors 2006 (1) ZLR 196 (H)…, KARWI J said:

“The issue to be decided is whether or not an appeal is invalid if it is noted without the appellant having requested, in writing, and being furnished with the reasons for a judgment or order. I do not agree with the submission by Mr Magwaliba that such an appeal is a nullity. I equally do not agree with Mr Magwaliba's assertion that a judicial officer is not under obligation to provide reasons for his judgment or order. It is settled that:

'When a matter is opposed and the issues have been argued, it is unacceptable for a court to make an order without giving any reasons for it, since the litigants are entitled to be informed of the reasons for the decision.'”

See HERBSTEIN and VAN WINSEN, Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa, Vol 1 4ed…,.

The rationale for the above was set out in Botes & Another v Nedbank Ltd 1983 (30) SA 27 (A)…,.:

“The first is that the judge who heard the exception and application to strike out made orders dismissing the exception and allowing, in part, the motion to strike out without giving any reasons. In my view, this represents an unacceptable procedure. In a case such as this, where the matter is opposed and the issues have been argued, the litigants are entitled to be informed of the reasons for the judge's decision. Moreover, a reasoned judgment may well discourage an appeal by the loser. The failure to state reasons may have the opposite effect. In addition, should the matter be taken on appeal, as has happened in this case, the court of appeal has a similar interest in knowing why the judge who heard the matter made the order which he did.”

A court is obliged to give reasons for its judgment to inform the parties on its reasons for the decision. A failure to give reasons is an irregularity which has the effect of vitiating the proceedings. The Labour Court considered an application for leave to appeal against that judgment to this court. Notwithstanding its knowledge of the intent of the appellant to note the said appeal, the Labour Court has, to date, not provided reasons for its order.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that in light of the irregularity, this court should exercise its powers of review in terms of section 25 of the Supreme Court Act [Chapter 7:13]. Section 25 of the Supreme Court Act [Chapter 7:13] reads:

“25 Review powers

(1) Subject to this section, the Supreme Court and every judge of the Supreme Court shall have the same power, jurisdiction and authority as are vested in the High Court and judges of the High Court, respectively, to review the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts of justice, tribunals and administrative authorities.

(2) The power, jurisdiction and authority conferred by subsection (1) may be exercised whenever it comes to the notice of the Supreme Court, or a judge of the Supreme Court, that an irregularity has occurred in any proceedings or in the making of any decision notwithstanding that such proceedings are, or such decision is, not the subject of an appeal or application to the Supreme Court.

(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed as conferring upon any person any right to institute any review in the first instance before the Supreme Court or a judge of the Supreme Court, and provision may be made in Rules of Court, and a judge of the Supreme Court may give directions, specifying that any class of review or any particular review shall be instituted before or shall be referred or remitted to the High Court for determination.”

Due to the irregularity, the appeal cannot be decided on its merits.

The absence of reasons makes the task of the court even more difficult as the reasons for the decision remained locked in the mind of the judicial officer.

See S v Makawa 1991 (1) ZLR 142 (S)…,.

In the exercise of its review powers, this court finds that it is in the interests of justice that the judgment be set aside….,.

I turn now to the substance of the appeal itself.

THE ISSUES RAISED AND THE DISPOSITION THEREOF

The sole ground of appeal complains that the granting of the amendment reflecting the appellant as the respondent to the dispute had the effect of turning the appellant, instead of PG Timbers, into the respondent's employer. In view of the finding of irregularity in the proceedings it is not intended to go into the merits of that submission.

What is, however, of import is how the application came about.

In its judgment of 2 August 2013, the court a quo ordered that an application be made to rectify what the court termed was an irregularity in the manner in which the two entities had been cited. The said irregularity being referred to by the court arose as a result of a point in limine raised by the appellant on its improper citation on one of the documents constituting the notice of appeal. The learned judge did not determine the point in limine, choosing instead to order the respondents to amend their notice of appeal.

Two issues arise immediately.

(i) The first is that the court failed to deal with and determine an issue that had been raised before it.

The point in limine was to the effect that due to the irregularity in the citation of the respondent to the appeal, there was, in fact, no respondent before the court. The preliminary point raised was such that the court could not dispose of any issue in relation to the matter without making a finding on the point. The court could not simply wish it away as a non-issue. It had to make a determination.

In my view, the failure to deal with an issue raised is an irregularity that can serve to vitiate the proceedings.

The position is settled that where there is a dispute on a question, be it on a question of fact or point of law, there must be a judicial decision on the issue in dispute.

The failure to resolve the dispute vitiates the order given at the end of the proceedings.

Although the learned judge may have considered the question as to whether or not there was an irregularity in the citation of the employer, there was no determination on that issue. In the circumstances, this amounts to an omission to consider and give reasons, which is a gross irregularity.

(ii) The second issue is that the court fashioned a remedy on behalf of one of the parties and ordered that party to take a procedural step which had neither been sought nor prayed for.

Nor had the court been addressed by any of the parties on the order it ultimately issued.

SC31-10 : COMMERCIAL FARMERS UNION and OTHERS vs THE MINISTER OF LANDS AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT and OTHERS
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and CHEDA AJA

It was submitted that some of the individual applicants and other former owners or occupiers of acquired land have court orders issued by the Magistrates Courts and the High Court authorising their occupation of acquired land after the prescribed period. If such orders were issued, they would have the effect of authorising the ...

SC15-17 : LIFORT TORO vs VODGE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and MANYAME RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL and MINISTER OF LANDS AND RURAL RESETLEMENT
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

Whether or not the court a quo erred by not determining whether or not there were disputes of fact which could not be resolved through the application procedure? The purpose of litigation is for the court to determine disputes placed before it by the parties. The court must therefore give reasons stating how it resolved ...

Whether or not the court a quo erred by not determining whether or not there were disputes of fact which could not be resolved through the application procedure?

The purpose of litigation is for the court to determine disputes placed before it by the parties. The court must therefore give reasons stating how it resolved all the disputes placed before it, unless the determination of one or some of the issues clearly renders the determination of one or other issues unnecessary.

The issue of whether or not there were disputes of fact was critical as to whether or not the respondent had used the correct procedure. It could have established that the application procedure was inappropriate. That, in turn, would have left the court a quo with the option of either dismissing the application or referring it to trial. There would, in either of the two options, have been no need to determine the other issues. Therefore, the issue of whether or not there were material disputes of fact should have been determined before the court could determine other issues. The court a quo therefore erred when it failed to determine this critical issue. In the case of Gwaradzimba v C. J. Petron and Company (Pvt) Ltd SC12-16 GARWE JA said:

“The position is well settled that a court must not make a determination on only one of the issues raised by the parties and say nothing about other equally important issues raised, 'unless the issue so determined can put the whole matter to rest' - Longman Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v Midzi & Ors 2008 (1) 198, 203 D (S).

The position is also settled that where there is a dispute on some question of law or fact, there must be a judicial decision or determination on the issue in dispute. Indeed, the failure to resolve the dispute or give reasons for a determination is a misdirection; one that vitiates the order given at the end of the trial. Charles Kazingizi v Revesai Dzinoruma HH106-06; Muchapondwa v Madake & Ors 2006 (1) ZLR 196…,. D - G 201A (H); GMB v Muchero 2008 (1) ZLR 216 at 221 C-D (S).”

I therefore agree that the court a quo misdirected itself when it failed to determine the issue of whether or not there were material disputes of fact.

It was in view of these findings that we upheld the appeal and granted the order set out on page 1 of this judgment.

SC47-17 : BAREND VAN WYK vs TARCON (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: GARWE JA, MAVANGIRA JA and BHUNU JA

Lastly, comment is called for on the remark by the court a quo that the claim was founded on an employment dispute. The appellant, as plaintiff, had predicated his cause of action on a stated or agreed amount. Once he failed to prove that the amounts were agreed, then that was the end of ...

HB04-16 : PATIENCE MAFU vs FREEMAN BIBA NCUBE and THE BULAWAYO CITY COUNCIL
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

Courts of law are there to adjudicate disputes on the merits. While matters may be disposed of procedurally; in my view, a definitive determination of the merits should be the first prize.

HB112-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs SIKHANYISIWE MPOFU and CHRISTIAN NDLOVU and T. TASHAYA N.O.
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

ULRIC HUBER, Jurisprudence of My Time…, put it very well when he said: “The duty of the judge is, in general, to give his decision according to the dictate of the law and custom…,. Everything, therefore, which is done by a judge contrary to the precepts of the law or the established essentials of a transaction is ipso facto and ...

HHH75-15 : THE STATE vs TATENDA TAKAWIRA and TITOS MUKANGA
Ruled By: MATHONSI J and MAWADZE J

Nothing underscores the importance of giving reasons for sentence more than the above-cited passage of the record. It is imperative that reasons for any decision, including sentence, be given to show that the judicial officer has heard the evidence and arguments for each side and has not taken into account extraneous considerations: S v Mkali ...

SC57-18 : DRUM CITY (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs BRENDA GARUDZO
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MAKARAU JA and MAKONI JA

This is an appeal against the decision of the Labour Court confirming the draft ruling of the respondent, a labour officer. The ruling was in favour of the appellant's former employee, Ms Umarah Khan whose contract of employment was summarily terminated as from 15 April 2015 on allegations of certain ...

FACTUAL CONSPECTUS

The decision to dismiss Ms Khan from employment was reached after it was found that she had two earlier written warnings in relation to similar offences. An amount of US$3,986=61 was paid as terminal benefits through her bank account after Ms Khan refused to sign the letter of termination.

Aggrieved by the decision to terminate her employment, Ms Khan filed a complaint of unfair labour practice against the appellant in terms of section 93 of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] (“the Act”). The dispute was placed before the respondent for a hearing.

It was her case, that, no proper investigations were conducted into the allegations levelled against her, and, further, that she was not granted the right to be heard before she was summarily dismissed.

She thus claimed damages for unlawful dismissal totalling US$23,253=34.

Before the labour officer, the parties did not agree on Ms Khan's monthly salary, as the appellant alleged that it was US$750 while Ms Khan argued that it was US$1,500. The respondent ruled in favour of Ms Khan on this point, and, having found that her dismissal from employment was unfair, ordered the appellant to reinstate her without loss of pay and benefits. Alternatively, the appellant was to pay Ms Khan damages in lieu of reinstatement amounting to a total of US$9,000.

Subsequently, the labour officer applied to the Labour Court in terms of section 93(5a) of the Labour Act for confirmation of her draft ruling. In the application, she cited the appellant only as the respondent while Ms Khan, in whose favour the draft ruling was made, was neither cited, nor joined, as a party to the proceedings.

The appellant opposed the application, but, the court a quo, after hearing oral argument from the appellant, granted an order confirming the ruling.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT

The appellant was aggrieved by the decision of the court a quo and has appealed against it to this Court.

It argues in the main, that, the court a quo erred in simply confirming the respondent's award to Ms Khan of US$9,000 as damages without fully addressing the principles of law to be applied thereto. It further argued, that, the respondent made a ruling in favour of Ms Khan despite the fact that she was charged with disobedience of lawful orders, negligence or misuse of company property, and, in addition, had failed to avail herself for the hearing which led to her dismissal.

The respondent, that is the labour officer, did not file any heads of argument nor did she appear before this Court on the date of hearing.

The court observed, that, the respondent, who was in effect a nominal respondent, had no personal interest in the dispute nor any outcome thereof.

Ms Khan, was not cited in the appeal before this Court.

Accordingly, a default judgment in this case, whose effect would be to set aside an award made in her favour would be manifestly unjust, given that she would not have been notified of the hearing, nor accorded the right to be heard before such an adverse order is made against her.

SECTION 93(5a) OF THE LABOUR ACT – NEED FOR EMPLOYEE TO BE JOINED IN CONFIRMATION PROCEEDINGS

Counsel for the appellant rightly conceded, that, the Labour Court could have properly ordered the joinder of Ms Khan to the confirmation proceedings before it. This would have given her the right to defend the application for confirmation of the award made in her favour, both in the court a quo and in this Court.

Accordingly, he further conceded that the matter be remitted to the Labour Court for Ms Khan to be joined as a party.

The court saw merit in his request for written reasons for the judgment, in order to clarify both the procedure and the law to be applied, in the face of confusion as to the handling of this and other cases brought to the Labour Court in terms of section 93(5a) of the Labour Act.

The need was recognized for that court to follow a procedure that would ensure that all parties who have a substantial interest in the dispute at hand are accorded the right to argue their respective cases before the determination is made as to whether to confirm or not, a labour officer's draft ruling in terms of section 93(5b) of the Labour Act.

HH113-15 : GWYNNE ANN STEVENSON vs MAXWELL MATSVIMBO SIBANDA
Ruled By: HUNGWE J

Rule 165(1) of Order 24…, requires the respondent to comply with the order dated 25 November 2013. As for the substantial compliance ground, I hold the view that there is nothing of such a nature where a court issues a clear and unambiguous order as here….,.

View Appeal
SC18-18 : SHORAI NZARA and AAROLA IDEHEN and AMOSOGE IDEHEN and OSARETIN IDEHEN vs CECILIA KASHUMBA N.O. and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS and MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT and TAFIRENYIKA KAMBARAMI
Ruled By: GARWE JA, GUVAVA JA and UCHENA JA

Whether or not a court can grant an order not sought by the parties? Counsel for the appellants, citing authorities which will be analysed below, submitted that the court a quo erred and misdirected itself when it granted relief which had not been sought by either party. Counsel for the first respondent and counsel for the fourth respondent supported the ...

Whether or not a court can grant an order not sought by the parties?

Counsel for the appellants, citing authorities which will be analysed below, submitted that the court a quo erred and misdirected itself when it granted relief which had not been sought by either party.

Counsel for the first respondent and counsel for the fourth respondent supported the court a quo's decision without legally establishing the court a quo's authority to grant orders not sought by the parties.

The fact that the court a quo granted orders not sought by the parties can be demonstrated by comparing the orders sought by the parties and the orders granted by the court a quo.

In terms of their application and the subsequent notice of amendment the appellants, who were the applicants in the court a quo, sought the following relief:

1. “Deed of Transfer No.3030/06, held in the name of Dzingai Kashumba, be and is hereby cancelled and title in respect of the remainder of Subdivision 'A' of Subdivision 'F' of Quinington of Borrowdale Estate should revert back to the second, third, and fourth Applicants.

2. Deed of Transfer No.773/2011, in the name of Tafirenyika Kambarami, be and is hereby cancelled and title in respect of Stand 553 Quinington Township of Subdivision A of Subdivision F of Quinington of Borrowdale Estate reverts back to second, third, and fourth Applicants.”

Through her opposing affidavit, Cecilia Kashumba merely sought the dismissal of the applicants' application.

The fourth respondent, in his opposing affidavit, also merely sought that the applicants' application be dismissed with costs.

In the determination of the application before it the court a quo made the following orders:

“1. It is hereby declared as follows:

1.1 That the Deed of Sale between the first applicant and the Late Dzingai Kashumba (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased” on 11 and 12 May 1999 in respect of the property described as Stands 552 and 553 Quinington Township of Subdivision A of Subdivision F of Borrowdale Estate, measuring 3,999 square metres and 4,002 square metres respectively (hereinafter referred to as “the original property”, was never cancelled.

1.2. That the balance of the purchase price due and owing by the deceased to the first applicant, as at 9 May 2001, in respect of the Deed of Sale aforesaid, was never paid.

1.3. That the transfer of 3 May 2006, in favour of the deceased, of the two properties known as certain pieces of land situate in the District of Salisbury, respectively called Stands 552 and 553, Quinington Township of Subdivision A of Subdivision F of Quinington of Borrowdale Estate, respectively on Deeds of Transfer Nos.3030/2006 and 3031/2006 (hereinafter referred to as “Stands 552 and 553 Quinington Township”) was unlawful and therefore invalid.

1.4 That the subsequent transfer of Stand 553 Quinington Township on Deed of Transfer No.773/2011 on 17 February 2011 in favour of Tafirenyika Kambarami, was unlawful and therefore invalid.

1.5 That the balance of the purchase price outstanding, due and owing by the deceased to the first applicant as at 9 May 2001 in respect of the sale and purchase of the original property was in the sum of ZW$503,573=02, being the total of ZW$337,178=77, reflected on the deceased's cheque subsequently rejected by the first applicant, and ZW$166,394=25 subsequently found by the arbitrator to have been the shortfall on the cheque amount aforesaid.

2. Notwithstanding the declaration of invalidity of the transfers referred to in paragraph 1 above, but subject to paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 below, if the 1^st respondent pays, or causes to be paid, to the applicants, or one or other of them, the one receiving payment, the others to be bound, the equivalent of the balance of the purchase price referred to in paragraph 1.5 above in the functional currency current at the time of payment, together with interest thereon as envisaged herein, then the title deeds in respect to which the transfers aforesaid have been declared unlawful and invalid shall not be set aside, and the declarations of invalidity herein shall automatically lapse.

3. Unless the equivalent amount of the balance of the purchase price referred to in paragraph 1.5 above is otherwise agreed to in writing within thirty (30) calendar days of the date of this order, or such other extended period not exceeding a further thirty (30) calendar days as they may agree to in writing, the parties shall engage the Commercial Arbitration Centre in Harare solely to determine the equivalent amount of that balance, in any of the functional currencies, and the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding.

4. The first respondent shall pay the equivalent amount of the balance of the purchase price referred to above within thirty (30) days of the date the amount is ascertained either by agreement between the parties, or through determination by arbitration as contemplated by paragraph 3 above, together with interest thereon at the prescribed rate from the date of such agreement or determination, whatever the case might be, to the date of payment.

5. In the event that the first respondent fails or neglects to pay as envisaged in this order, then the applicants, or one or other of them, shall ipso facto, forthwith have the right to declare, in writing, the immediate and automatic cancellation of the Deed of Sale aforesaid and, without prejudice to any other rights they might have at law, shall be entitled to keep as rouwkoop all such monies as they might have received as purchase price for the original property.

6. Subject to any rights to compensation for improvements that they have in the event that the title deeds mentioned herein have been cancelled as aforesaid, the first and fourth respondents, and all those claiming occupation through them, shall, within thirty (30) calendar days of the date of such cancellation, vacate, the respective properties occupied by them, failing which the Sheriff of Zimbabwe, or his lawful deputy or assistant deputies, or such of his agents as might be duly authorized by him, shall be empowered, authorized and directed to evict the aforesaid respondents and all those claiming occupation through them.

7. Save and except for the fourth respondent, whose costs of suit shall be borne by the first and second respondents, jointly and severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, each party shall bear its own costs”….,.

It is clear from the court a quo's orders that some of the orders it granted had not been sought by either party. It is also clear that the parties had not made submissions for or against those orders. They were granted mero motu by the court a quo. It did so without seeking the parties' views on those orders. There is no doubt that the court a quo exceeded its mandate which was to determine the issues placed before it by the parties through pleadings and proved by the evidence led.

The function of a court is to determine disputes placed before it by the parties. It cannot go on a frolic of its own. Where a point of law or a factual issue exercises the court's mind but has not been raised by the parties or addressed by them either in their pleadings, in evidence, or in submissions from the bar, the court is at liberty to put the question to the parties and ask them to make submissions on the matter.

In Welkom Municipality v Masureik and Herman T/A Lotus Corp 1997 (3) SA 363…, MARAIS JA commenting on what the court should base its decision on said:

“I should add that whether or not South Africa did or did not fail to do so is a question of fact upon which there was no evidence before the court a quo, and for reasons too obvious to require enumeration, the learned Judge was not entitled to enquire into this issue of fact after reserving judgment and without any reference to the parties, and then to decide it. Compare Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1996 (4) SA 965 (NmS) at 973H–974C.”…,.

In the Namibian case of Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1996 (4) 965 (NmS) DUMBUTSHENA AJA…, said:

“The above matters are not crucial to the determination of this appeal. They are, however, important because a frequent departure from counsel's, more correctly, the litigant's case, may be wrongly interpreted by those who seek justice in our courts of law. It is the litigants who must be heard and not a judicial officer.

It would be wrong for judicial officers to rely for their decisions on matters not put before them by litigants either in evidence or in oral or written submissions. Now and again a Judge comes across a point not argued before him by counsel but which he thinks material to the resolution of the case. It is his duty in such a circumstance to inform counsel on both sides and invite them to submit arguments either for or against the Judge's point. It is undesirable for a court to deliver a judgment with a substantial portion containing issues never canvassed or relied on by counsel.

To produce a wide–ranging judgment dealing with matters not only extraneous and unnecessary to the decision but which have not been argued is an exercise full of potential pitfalls and the judgment of the court a quo has placed this court in a difficult position.

Are we to consider every opinion expressed in the judgment, however unnecessary it was to the decision and say whether it accords with our own? Or can we leave such matters well alone until such time as they become necessary to decide and are fully argued?

In our view, the latter course is the proper one to take and in doing so we emphasize that it must not be thought that this Court in any way approves or endorses the many obiter opinions expressed in the judgment of the court a quo.”

Before leaving this aspect of the appeal I consider it appropriate to refer to what was said by BHAGWATI J…, in M.M. Pathak v Union (1978) 3 SCR 334 in relation to the practice of the Supreme Court of India:

“It is the settled practice of this Court to decide no more than what is absolutely necessary for the decision of a case.”…,.

In Groenewald NO and Anor v Swanepoel 2002 (6) SA 724…, PICKERING J, commenting on what a judicial officer should do if he wants to take into consideration issues not covered in pleadings, evidence and submissions of the parties said:

“It was therefore the duty of the learned Judge to have informed plaintiff's counsel of the relevant point, more especially where that point was, in her view, conclusive of the matter, and to have invited him to submit argument to her. Had she done so counsel would no doubt have been in a position to address her concerns and the necessity for this appeal may well have been obviated.

Secondly, the remark made by the learned Judge concerning the alleged arrest of the defendants was not based on any averment made in either the pleadings or the evidence adduced before her at the hearing or in the course of argument by Mr Pretorius. It would appear that she must have gleaned this information from some outside source. It hardly needs stating that a judge may only have regard to the evidence placed before him or her during the course of the hearing and that a reliance on facts not averred in the pleadings or raised in court constitutes a serious misdirection.”…,.

I respectfully agree with the views expressed in the authorities referred to above.

The function of a court is to determine the dispute placed before it by the parties through their pleadings, evidence, and submissions. The pleadings include the prayers of the parties through which they seek specified orders from the court.

This position has become settled in our law.

Each party places before the court a prayer he or she wants the court to grant in its favour. The Rules of Court require that such an order be specified in the prayer and the draft order. These requirements of procedural law seek to ensure that the court is merely determining issues placed before it by the parties and not going on a frolic of its own. The court must always be seen to be impartial and applying the law to facts presented to it by the parties in determining the parties' issues. It is only when the issues or the facts are not clear that the court can seek their clarification to enable it to correctly apply the law to those facts in determining the issues placed before it by the parties.

The judgment of the court a quo unfortunately fell short of these guiding principles. In seeking to find middle ground, the court a quo granted orders which had not been sought by either party. It granted the first and fourth respondents a further grace period and a referral to arbitration. The first and fourth respondents had not sought such orders.

Such orders cannot be sustained at law.

They seem to have been motivated by equity and sentiments of justice rather than the law and the facts, as demonstrated by the court a quo's narration of the exploits of the legendry “judge jackal” in setting free a man who was about to be eaten by a leopard he had rescued from a trap.

Where a court is of the view that an order not sought by the parties may meet the justice of the case, it must put that possible relief to the parties and allow them an opportunity to address it on such an order.

In Proton Bakery (Pvt) Ltd v Takaendesa 2005 (1) ZLR 60 (S)…, GWAUNZA JA said:

“The appellant argues, in the light of all this, that the action of the court a quo, in reaching a material decision on its own, amounted to gross irregularity justifying interference by this court on the principles that have now become trite.

I am, for the reasons outlined below, persuaded by this argument…,.

The misdirection on the part of the court a quo is left in no doubt. It is my view, so serious as to leave this Court with no option but to interfere with the determination of the lower court.”

The determination by the court a quo, of matters not placed before it, goes against a litigant's right to be heard and this view is supported in the fourth edition of Judicial Review of Administrative Action by J. M. EVANS…, where it was highlighted that the principle that “no man is to be judged unheard” is an age-old view adopted from the ancient Greeks. This principle has been adopted in our system under the audi alteram partem rule.

Therefore, the fact that the respondents are not taking issue with the court's mero motu decision is neither here nor there. This irregularity militates against the validity of parts of the judgment of the court a quo.

The “grace period” of thirty days granted to the first respondent by the court a quo has no founding at law and cannot be legally justified. The initial thirty days awarded by BARTLETT J were in terms of the Contractual Penalties Act. The purchaser, having already been granted this thirty-day period in terms of the law, cannot be granted a further thirty-day period not provided for in terms of the law to the prejudice of the seller on no legal basis.

Judicial discretion should at all times remain guided by the dictates of the law.

A court is not entitled to determine a dispute placed before it, wholly based on its own discretion, which is not supported by the issues and facts of the case. It is required to apply the law to the facts and issues placed before it by the parties.

HB235-16 : ESTATE LATE MOSES KANHUKAMWE (represented by Winnie Mudzinganyama curator bonis) vs CBZ BANK LTD and I.Q. MARKETING (PVT) LTD and THE ADDITIONAL SHERIFF – BULAWAYO
Ruled By: TAKUVA J

Rule 240 of the High Court Rules 1971…, states; “240 Granting of Order At the conclusion of the hearing or thereafter the court may refuse the application or may grant the order applied for, including a provisional order, or any variation of such order or provisional order, whether or not general or other relief has been asked for and may ...

HB237-16 : PETROS MOYO vs ROBERT NCUBE
Ruled By: BERE J and MATHONSI J

In Mathuthu v Chegutu Municipality Others HH502-14 I said that: “The authority, dignity and respect of courts of law should never be demeaned, prejudiced or undermined. It behoves the subject to bow to the decision of the court, and, where there exists a remedy, to then pursue that remedy elsewhere. This is extremely important for the proper ...

HH278-17 : DAVID LUWO and ROSE LUWO vs DOWOOD SERVICES (PVT) LTD and RAILING ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD
Ruled By: MOYO J

At the hearing of this matter I dismissed it by consent with costs at the legal practitioner and client scale. I was then served with a letter requesting for reasons. Here are the reasons.

HH217-17 : NAISON SEKERAMAYI and OTHERS vs MASTER OF HIGH COURT and PROVINCIAL MAGISTRATE, HARARE and EASTER DZWOWA and YARADZO MUNANGATI MANONGWA (Executrix Dative in Estate Lovemore Sekeramayi)
Ruled By: ZHOU J

Significantly, however, there is nothing to show what evidence was placed before the first respondent to enable him to come to the conclusion that the third respondent was the deceased's wife…,. The conclusion by the first respondent that the deceased had two wives is therefore not based upon any evidence which was placed before him. That is ...

HH477-13 : BARCLAYS BANK OF ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE and UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: ZHOU J

After hearing argument from counsel I granted the relief sought with some amendments to the draft order and gave brief reasons. I indicated to the parties that my full written reasons would be given upon the request of either party. The first respondent has written a letter requesting to be furnished with the written reasons for the ...

View Appeal
HH336-14 : IGNATIUS CHOMBO vs MARIAN CHOMBO (NEE MHLOYI)
Ruled By: MANGOTA J

The defendant cited the Constitution of the country and the ruling party's manifesto, the contents of which documents she said supported the proposition that women should be treated on an equal footing with men when it comes to the distribution of the country's natural resources - including land. She also made reference to statistics which emanated from ...

HH720-14 : PANDHARI LODGE (PVT) LTD and SUNDAY CHIFAMBA and SWISIDAYI NYAMUFUKUDZA vs CENTRAL AFRICA BUILDING SOCIETY and DEPUTY SHERIFF
Ruled By: MANGOTA J

The courts, as an institution, should dispense justice instead of injustice.

HH161-15 : MCR VENGESAYI and AGNES VENGESAYI T/A VENGESAYI ARHITECTS vs BELVEDERE NURSING HOME (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: DUBE J

Where a court has made a ruling or order on any matter whatsoever, that ruling stands until rescinded by a competent order of court or is upset by a court of appeal. It is unprofessional and discourteous for a legal practitioner to ignore such a ruling and precede and pretend as if that ruling does ...

HHH778-15 : WILSON MUKARONDA ZUNIDZA vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHIWESHE JP and HUNGWE J

A court must always pay due regard to the language it uses in giving reasons for any decision. To use what might be termed “extravagant language” may lead to a conclusion that the court was swayed by considerations extra-judicial. I make mention of this because, in the present case, the learned trial magistrate remarked that this crime ...

HHH170-15 : THE STATE vs GIBSON MURINDA
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J and DUBE J

This record was referred to me from the Acting Regional Magistrate for Harare who scrutinised the record. He has raised the following concerns; “The trial court, as part of its sentence, prohibited the accused from driving for two years on the basis that accused had driven a public service vehicle. This is in spite of the fact ...

This record was referred to me from the Acting Regional Magistrate for Harare who scrutinised the record. He has raised the following concerns;

“The trial court, as part of its sentence, prohibited the accused from driving for two years on the basis that accused had driven a public service vehicle. This is in spite of the fact that the charge does not allege that the vehicle accused drove was a public service vehicle. The court appears to have inferred that it was a public service vehicle from the averment in the charge that the vehicle was a Toyota Hiace, an inference I am unable to support since not all Toyota Hiaces are public service vehicles.”…,.

The brief facts surrounding the commission of this offence may be summarised as follows. The accused appeared before a Harare magistrate facing charges of contravening section 52(2) of the Road Traffic Act [Chapter 13:11], thus Negligent Driving. He pleaded guilty to the offence and was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment of which 3 months were suspended for 5 years on condition that the accused performs community service. In addition, he was prohibited from driving classes of motor vehicle to which commuter omnibus or heavy motor vehicles belong for 2 years. His licence was cancelled.

The allegations in the State Outline are as follows;

On the 27^th of May 2012, the accused was driving a Toyota Hiace along Robert Mugabe Rd. At the intersection of Robert Mugabe Rd and Wheeler Ave, Harare, the accused, who was driving and following behind the complainant's vehicle, failed to observe that the complainant was indicating to turn, resulting in him colliding with the rear of the complainant's vehicle.

The charge of negligent driving reads as follows;

“In that on the 27^th of May 2012 and at the intersection of Robert Mugabe and Wheeler Rd, Eastlea, Harare, Gibson Murinda drove a motor vehicle, namely, a Toyota Hiace registration number ABQ negligently.”

There is no allegation in the State papers that the accused drove a commuter omnibus or a public service vehicle but simply a Toyota Hiace vehicle. The trial court fell into the error of supposing that the vehicle in issue was a commuter omnibus and a public service vehicle….,.

When the court was explaining what special circumstances are to the accused, it remarked as follows;

“Accused person you have been convicted of negligent driving of a public service vehicle, namely, a commuter omnibus.''…,.

The definition section of the Road Traffic Act [Chapter 13:11] defines a public service vehicle as follows;

“Public service vehicle” means a motor vehicle in respect of whose operation an operator's licence is required in terms of the Road Motor Transportation Act [Chapter 13:15];”

A Toyota Hiace is not, as a matter of course, a commuter omnibus nor a public service vehicle. A vehicle which is a commuter omnibus only becomes a public service vehicle when it is used for the purposes of ferrying passengers for profit in terms of the legal definition of a public service vehicle. The vehicle may be an omnibus, but, it can only become a commuter omnibus when it is used for the purpose of ferrying passengers. It is not the class of vehicle, type or description of a vehicle that determines whether it is a public service vehicle, but, rather, the use to which the vehicle is being put….,.

The suggestion that the accused had been involved in an accident whilst driving a public service vehicle was both misleading and erroneous as the State was not alleging that the accused drove a public service vehicle or an omnibus.

View Appeal
HH385-13 : WEBSTER RUSHESHA (as legal guardian of Panashe Rushesha and Tivonge Rushesha) and RASAR INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD vs ALEXIOUS DERA and ZIMCOR TRUSTEES LTD and FRANK BUYANGA and BOKA INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD and MATTHEW BOKA and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: ZHOU J

Court proceedings are not a game of chess. They are a serious inquiry into and determination of the rights of the participants in the proceedings.

View Appeal
SC26-18 : T. M. SUPERMARKETS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ITAYI NKOMO and THEMBINKOSI NYATHI and NICHOLAS KHUMBULA TSHILI
Ruled By: GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and BERE AJA

The failure by a court to appreciate the issues before it is a just cause for setting aside its order.

View Appeal
CC22-17 : MOVEN KUFA and VOICE FOR DEMOCRACY TRUST vs THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and OTHERS
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and OMERJEE AJA

Although the Attorney General abandoned the preliminary points, the issues nevertheless remained live, and, in my view, should nevertheless have been dealt with by the court a quo. The court should have asked itself how it was possible, considering the relief the appellants were seeking, for the appellants to approach the court in terms of section ...

View Appeal
CC09-19 : SIMON SHONHAYI DENHERE vs MUTSA DENHERE (nee MARANGE) and ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA CJ and GWAUNZA DJC and BERE JCC

Section 2 of the Constitution makes the Constitution the supreme law of the land. In this regard, section 3 of the Constitution provides for the values and principles which should guide all institutions and persons in Zimbabwe. Section 85(1) ought, therefore, to be understood in the context of section 3 of the Constitution. The most ...

These principles are central to the approach that courts ought to take when adjudicating all matters. The Constitution itself protects fundamental rights and freedoms and further provides that all institutions, including the judiciary, are bound to comply with its provisions. In this regard, the rule of law demands that there be accountability before the law by all persons and institutions exercising public authority. The requirement for accountability speaks to the need to respect fundamental human rights and freedoms through procedural fairness and regularity in the administration of justice - the Supreme Court is included. ...,.

The former Constitution provided for the right to protection of the law in section 18(1). In Williams & Another v Msipha NO & Others 2010 (2) ZLR 552 (S)…., the Supreme Court, sitting as a Constitutional Court, considered the scope of the right in relation to judgments of the courts and said the following:

“The Constitution guarantees to any person the fundamental right to the protection under a legal system that is fair but not infallible. Judicial officers, like all human beings, can commit errors of judgment. It is not against the wrongfulness of a judicial decision that the Constitution guarantees protection. A wrong judicial decision does not violate the fundamental right to the protection of the law guaranteed to a litigant because an appeal procedure is usually available as a remedy for the correction of the decision. Where there is no appeal procedure there cannot be said to be a wrong judicial decision because only an Appeal Court has the right to say that a judicial decision is wrong. See Maharaj v AG of Trinidad & Tobago (No.2) (PC) [1979] AC 385 at 399 D–H; Boordman v Attorney General [1996] 2 LRC 196 at 205i–206b.

It is the failure by the judicial officer to comply with the requirements of the protection provided by the law of the fundamental human right or freedom which results in the violation or likelihood of violation of the right or freedom against which the Constitution guarantees to the litigant the right to the protection of the law. It is, therefore, important in every case of an alleged violation by a judicial officer of a fundamental human right or freedom to understand what it is that the judicial officer was required by the law to do and what he did in order to decide whether there was failure of judicial protection which caused a violation of the fundamental human right or freedom concerned.”…,.

See also Rushesha & Others v Dera & Others CC24-17….,.

The South African courts have also stated that the Constitution does not ensure protection of litigants against wrong decisions. In the case of Lane and Fey NNO v Dabelstein and Others 2001 (2) SA 1187 (CC) [4] the court held:

“Even if the [Supreme Court of Appeal] erred in its assessment of the facts, that would not constitute the denial of the ['right to a fair trial and to fair justice']. The Constitution does not, and could hardly, ensure that litigants are protected against wrong decisions. On the assumption that section 34 of the Constitution does indeed embrace that right, it would be the fairness and not the correctness of the court proceedings to which litigants would be entitled.”

When the Supreme Court, like any other court, sits to decide an appeal, all it is required to do is to dispose of the matter in a manner which is consistent with the law. A judicial decision is the end result of a process that is regulated by law. In other words, a person has a right to a fair judicial process.

HH281-16 : JOHANNES TOMANA vs JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS
Ruled By: MAKONI J

It does not assist the applicant that he is a legal practitioner of some standing. He was, at one point, the adviser to the Government before the National Prosecuting Authority was made into an independent entity, which he now heads. He is expected to understand; (i) That cases are decided in accordance with the law and ...

CC14-19 : GARIKAI KAMANGA vs PRINCE EDWARD SCHOOL – SDA
Ruled By: MALABA CJ and GARWE JCC and MAKARAU JCC

In the applicant's founding affidavit filed of record, he made allegations to the effect that the decision of the court a quo was incorrect. He indicated that the court a quo: “…, should have interpreted the word 'judgment' in section 19(3)(b) of the Prescription Act in a way that would least intrude on the applicant's right to ...

prev 1 2 3 4 5 next

Back Main menu

Law Portal Zimbabwe

Final Orders re: Approach iro Functions, Powers, Obligations, Judicial Misdirections and Effect of Court Orders

Appealed SC27-08 : JOSHUA KADENGU and LAMECK KADENGU and ROSA KADENGU vs OLGA KADENGU and RICHARD CHIMBARI and MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT Ruled By: SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA and GARWE JA

HH181-12 : JENNIFER NYAMAKURA vs AGRIPPA MUZENGI Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J and MAWADZE J

HH71-09 : AGRO CHEM DEALERS (PVT) LTD vs STANLEY GOMO and CITY OF HARARE and RONALD AJARA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: GOWORA J

HH86-09 : CHAWASARIRA TRANSPORT (PVT) LTD vs THE RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE Ruled By: BHUNU J

HH42-08 : JAMESON MANDAVA vs TSITSI CHASWEKA Ruled By: MAKARAU JP and HLATSHWAYO J

Appealed SC04-12 : SHAUN EVANS and PAUL FRIENDSHIP vs YAKUB SURTEE and COLLIN MACMILLAN and RODNEY FINNIGAN and ACROSS ENTERPRISES PL Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and CHEDA AJA

HH58-12 : ASHANTI GOLDFIELDS ZIMBABWE LIMITED t/a FREDA REBECCA MINE vs JOACHIM C NGUWO Ruled By: MUTEMA J

HH111-08 : RAILWAY ARTISANS UNION and RAILWAY ASSOCIATION OF YARD OPERATING STAFF and ANOR vs RAILMED and NATIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE and RAILWAYS EMPLOYMENT COUNCIL Ruled By: GOWORA J

HH142-09 : JOVITA SANYANGOWE vs ELVIS CHALIMBA Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

HH61-10 : WILLIAM WACHENUKA vs JOHN STRONG (PRIVATE) LIMITED and TOBS STRONG (PRIVATE) LIMITED and MINISTRY OF LANDS AGRICULTURE AND RESETTLEMENT Ruled By: BERE J

HH76-10 : ROSEMARY CHINJAYANI vs MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS and COMMISSIONER OF POLICE and DETECTIVE INSPECTOR MUKOSI Ruled By: UCHENA J

SC46-15 : NATIONAL RAILWAYS OF ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE RAILWAYS ARTISANS UNION AND OTHERS Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA and GUVAVA JA

SC31-13 : LAWSIGN NYARUMBU vs SANDVIK MINING AND CONSTRUCTION ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and PATEL AJA

SC35-15 : ELIAS CHIDEMBO vs BINDURA NICKEL CORPORATION LIMITED Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and MAVANGIRA AJA

Appealed SC36-12 : RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE vs CAFCA LTD Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JA and OMERJEE AJA

HH243-10 : COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION OF ZIMBABWE vs TASARA ZVANDASARA and GILBERT KARIKUIMBA Ruled By: UCHENA J

HB122-11 : ESSIE NCUBE vs BRIAN NGWENYA and RHODAH NGWENYA Ruled By: NDOU J and MATHONSI J

HB119-10 : NYARADZAI KAZUVA vs GILBERT DUBE Ruled By: CHEDA J and MATHONSI J

HHB21-11 : STATE vs NOMPUMELELO MPOFU Ruled By: MATHONSI J and NDOU J

View Appeal HH178-14 : WILLOUGHBY'S INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs PERUKE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE (Ret) A. R. GUBBAY SC Ruled By: ZHOU J

View Appeal SC43-14 : STREAMSLEIGH INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs AUTOBAND INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, GARWE JA and GOWORA JA

SC01-15 : FIRSTEL CELLULAR (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs NETONE CELLULAR (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA & PATEL JA

View Appeal SC12-16 : AFARAS MTAUSI GWARADZIMBA vs C. J. PETRON & COMPANY (PROPRIETARY) LIMITED Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

SSC33-16 : ELPHAS NCUBE vs THE STATE Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, GOWORA JA and MUTEMA AJA

SC53-16 : PG INDUSTRIES (ZIMBABWE) LIMITED vs MARK BVEKERWA and 34 OTHERS Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, GOWORA JA and PATEL JA

SC31-10 : COMMERCIAL FARMERS UNION and OTHERS vs THE MINISTER OF LANDS AND RURAL RESETTLEMENT and OTHERS Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA and CHEDA AJA

SC15-17 : LIFORT TORO vs VODGE INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and MANYAME RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL and MINISTER OF LANDS AND RURAL RESETLEMENT Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

SC47-17 : BAREND VAN WYK vs TARCON (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: GARWE JA, MAVANGIRA JA and BHUNU JA

HB04-16 : PATIENCE MAFU vs FREEMAN BIBA NCUBE and THE BULAWAYO CITY COUNCIL Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HB112-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs SIKHANYISIWE MPOFU and CHRISTIAN NDLOVU and T. TASHAYA N.O. Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HHH75-15 : THE STATE vs TATENDA TAKAWIRA and TITOS MUKANGA Ruled By: MATHONSI J and MAWADZE J

SC57-18 : DRUM CITY (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs BRENDA GARUDZO Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MAKARAU JA and MAKONI JA

HH113-15 : GWYNNE ANN STEVENSON vs MAXWELL MATSVIMBO SIBANDA Ruled By: HUNGWE J

View Appeal SC18-18 : SHORAI NZARA and AAROLA IDEHEN and AMOSOGE IDEHEN and OSARETIN IDEHEN vs CECILIA KASHUMBA N.O. and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS and MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT and TAFIRENYIKA KAMBARAMI Ruled By: GARWE JA, GUVAVA JA and UCHENA JA

HB235-16 : ESTATE LATE MOSES KANHUKAMWE (represented by Winnie Mudzinganyama curator bonis) vs CBZ BANK LTD and I.Q. MARKETING (PVT) LTD and THE ADDITIONAL SHERIFF – BULAWAYO Ruled By: TAKUVA J

HB237-16 : PETROS MOYO vs ROBERT NCUBE Ruled By: BERE J and MATHONSI J

HH278-17 : DAVID LUWO and ROSE LUWO vs DOWOOD SERVICES (PVT) LTD and RAILING ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD Ruled By: MOYO J

HH217-17 : NAISON SEKERAMAYI and OTHERS vs MASTER OF HIGH COURT and PROVINCIAL MAGISTRATE, HARARE and EASTER DZWOWA and YARADZO MUNANGATI MANONGWA (Executrix Dative in Estate Lovemore Sekeramayi) Ruled By: ZHOU J

HH477-13 : BARCLAYS BANK OF ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE and UNIVERSITY OF ZIMBABWE Ruled By: ZHOU J

View Appeal HH336-14 : IGNATIUS CHOMBO vs MARIAN CHOMBO (NEE MHLOYI) Ruled By: MANGOTA J

HH720-14 : PANDHARI LODGE (PVT) LTD and SUNDAY CHIFAMBA and SWISIDAYI NYAMUFUKUDZA vs CENTRAL AFRICA BUILDING SOCIETY and DEPUTY SHERIFF Ruled By: MANGOTA J

HH161-15 : MCR VENGESAYI and AGNES VENGESAYI T/A VENGESAYI ARHITECTS vs BELVEDERE NURSING HOME (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: DUBE J

HHH778-15 : WILSON MUKARONDA ZUNIDZA vs THE STATE Ruled By: CHIWESHE JP and HUNGWE J

HHH170-15 : THE STATE vs GIBSON MURINDA Ruled By: MUSAKWA J and DUBE J

View Appeal HH385-13 : WEBSTER RUSHESHA (as legal guardian of Panashe Rushesha and Tivonge Rushesha) and RASAR INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD vs ALEXIOUS DERA and ZIMCOR TRUSTEES LTD and FRANK BUYANGA and BOKA INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD and MATTHEW BOKA and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: ZHOU J

View Appeal SC26-18 : T. M. SUPERMARKETS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ITAYI NKOMO and THEMBINKOSI NYATHI and NICHOLAS KHUMBULA TSHILI Ruled By: GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and BERE AJA

View Appeal CC22-17 : MOVEN KUFA and VOICE FOR DEMOCRACY TRUST vs THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and OTHERS Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and OMERJEE AJA

View Appeal CC09-19 : SIMON SHONHAYI DENHERE vs MUTSA DENHERE (nee MARANGE) and ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF ZIMBABWE Ruled By: MALABA CJ and GWAUNZA DJC and BERE JCC

HH281-16 : JOHANNES TOMANA vs JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION and THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS Ruled By: MAKONI J

CC14-19 : GARIKAI KAMANGA vs PRINCE EDWARD SCHOOL – SDA Ruled By: MALABA CJ and GARWE JCC and MAKARAU JCC

Categories

Your Donation.

Law Portal
Zimbabwe