After hearing argument in this matter I granted summary judgment and said the reasons for doing so would follow. These are the reasons:

The applicant and one Jacobus Andrew Summerfield are friends of long standing. This did not stop the applicant instituting summons action against the respondent, a company in which Jacobus Andrew Summerfield is Managing Director, for payment of a sum of US$88,000= together with interest at the prescribed rate and attorney and client costs.

In his declaration, the applicant averred that he sold and delivered to the respondent a UD Nissan 15 ton truck for a price of US$68,000= about 2006 or 2008 which amount the respondent failed to pay. He averred, further, that on 23 August 2010 the respondent acknowledged indebtedness in that sum but still did not pay. Instead, after negotiations, in February 2011, the respondent offered to pay that capital amount together with an additional US$20,000= as fixed interest in recognition of the lengthy delay in payment, hence the claim of US$88,000=.

The respondent entered appearance to defend the action prompting the applicant to file this application for summary judgement on the basis that the respondent has not a bona fide defence to the claim and has entered appearance for dilatory purposes.

The applicant maintains that no defence can exist in a matter such as the present where the respondent signed an acknowledgement of debt in the capital sum of $68,000= and went on to make an offer in writing to pay fixed interest of $20,000= which offer was also accepted in writing.

The acknowledgement of indebtedness, signed by the parties on 23 August 2010, with the respondent represented by the applicant's erstwhile friend, Jacobus Andrew Summerfield, has been submitted and it is on the respondent's very own letterhead. It reads, in part, thus:

“We hereby agree that J G Construction owes Mr Graeme Chadwick US$68,000=. Any other acknowledgement of debts between J G Construction, Mr Graeme Chadwick, and Mr Jacobus Andries Summerfield are now null and void except for this one.”

In addition to that, on 18 February 2011, Jacobus Andrew Summerfield sent a written offer to the applicant, again, on the respondent's letterhead, in the following:

“I can offer you 88K as soon as you would like it and in one payment.”

This was followed by another dated 25 February 2011 which states;

“I think that you have misunderstood, Graham, I can only offer you $88K in total but can arrange for that payment immediately.”

The offer was accepted by the applicant by letter dated 17 June 2011 which also explains the route the parties took to arrive at the figure. The applicant wrote:

“I accept the offer of $88,000= in your email of 18 February 2011 and 21 February 2011 as the full and final amount owed by J.G. Construction (Pvt) Ltd to me for the UD15 ton truck and trailer sold to J G Construction in about 2006 or 2008.

We agree that this amount includes the capital amount of $68,000= contained in the acknowledgement of debt dated 23 August 2010 and remaining $20,000= is the final amount agreed (offered and accepted) as interest on the capital even though you had originally indicated that you would pay me interest at 15% per annum, which is US$10,200= interest per year, or $30,600= interest from 2008 or $51,000= interest from 2006. In the end, you only offered me US$20,000=. I accept it as the total interest from 2006 or 2008 to date.”

At no time did the respondent refute the contents of the above quoted letter. One can only assume that its silence represented its acquiescence.

In opposing the application, the respondent introduced a new element not mentioned anywhere in the deliberations of the parties as appear on the documents I have referred to. While claiming the existence of a dispute as to the amount owing, the respondent stated that the parties were in partnership and that the Nissan UD truck was the applicant's contribution to the partnership. This, despite the fact that no attempt whatsoever was made to prove the existence of such partnership, either in the form of a partnership deed or otherwise or to set out the terms of the alleged partnership.

In fact, the respondent's opposing affidavit is couched in such scant and vague terms as to put its bona fides to serious doubt. No meaningful effort was made to explain the acknowledgement of debt and the written offer made by the respondent and those documents remain unchallenged.

Counsel for the respondent half-heartedly tried to argue that the interest claimed violates the Money Lending and Rates of Interest Act [Chapter 14:14]. He did not develop that argument at all and could not even cite the rate of interest that was applied.

I agree with counsel for the applicant that whatever interest was agreed by the parties was a compromise. A compromise is a settlement of disputed obligations. See R H CHRISTIE, Business Law In Zimbabwe, 2^nd ed…,. A party sued on a compromise is not entitled to raise defences to the original cause of action. Moyo & Anor v Intermarket Discount House Ltd 2008 (1) ZLR 268 (S).

In Hales v Doverick Investments (Pvt) Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 235…, MALABA J…, set out what a respondent in an application for summary judgment must show in order to successfully contest the application as follows:

“…, while the defendant need not deal exhaustively with the facts and the evidence relied on to substantiate them, he must at least disclose his defence and material facts upon which it is based with sufficient clarity and completeness to enable the court to decide whether the affidavit discloses a bona fide defence (Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 426D…,; the statement of material facts (must) be sufficiently full to persuade the court that what the defendant has alleged, if it is proved at the trial, will constitute a defence to the plaintiff's claim…,; if the defence is averred in a manner which appears in all the circumstances needlessly bald, vague or sketchy that will constitute material for the court to consider in relation to the requirement of bona fides…,; he must take the court into his confidence and provide sufficient information to enable the court to assess his defence. He must not content himself with vague generalities not substantiated by solid facts.”

I have already stated that the respondent's opposing affidavit is couched in vague and sketchy terms. It is needlessly bald and does not proffer any defence against the acknowledgment of indebtedness relied upon by the applicant. In fact, the respondent contented itself with arguing extraneously about the existence of a partnership it did not substantiate while ignoring the documents relied upon by the applicant.

I therefore come to the inescapable conclusion that the applicant's claim is unassailable and that appearance has indeed been entered for purposes of delay. This is a case in which the respondent should have capitulated from the very beginning especially as it has no answer whatsoever to the documents it authored accepting indebtedness. Instead, it proceeded to contest the claim almost headlong, in complete defiance of logic. An award of costs on a punitive scale is therefore in order.

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The application for summary judgment is hereby granted.

2. The respondent shall pay to the applicant the sum of US$88,000= (eighty eight thousand United States Dollars).

3. The respondent shall also pay to the applicant interest on the aforesaid amount at the prescribed rate, being 5% per annum, from the 7^th of July 2011, being the date of summons, to date of full and final payment.

4. The respondent shall pay costs of suit including costs on a legal practitioner and client scale.

This is an application for summary judgment.

The basis of the application is that sometime in 2010 the respondent was supplied, upon request, on credit, cake flour by the applicant to its various branches throughout the country. The cake flour was valued at US$828,518=05. This amount was due and payable on 7 December 2010.

The respondent acknowledged its indebtedness by securing US$700,000= via a surety mortgage bond number 1020/2010 by a company called Medworth Properties (Pvt) Ltd. A further US$218,240= was acknowledged via an acknowledgement of debt signed by the respondent on 27 October 2010.

Given the foregoing, the appearance to defend entered by the respondent is merely a dilatory tactic since the respondent has no bona fide defence.

The salient aspects of the opposition are as follows:-

1. The applicant's answering affidavit was filed without leave of the court. In the event, it must be disregarded.

2. Paragraph 4 of the applicant's declaration claims an amount of US$828,851= as capital debt, but, in the prayer, the amount claimed as capital is US$828,518=05. It is therefore not clear what the correct amount is.

3. Still on the amounts thrown about in the applicant's papers there is attached an alleged acknowledgement of debt for flour worth US$218,240= signed on 27 October 2010 by one Langton Chivasa. There is also a surety mortgage bond for US$700,000= by Medworth Properties (Pvt) Ltd. The two amounts, if added, yield $928,240= and not either of the capital amounts claimed of $828,851= or $828,518=05. It is not stated whether the respondent made some payments to reduce the debt or the applicant abandoned part of the debt. There are no payment terms on the mortgage bond. It simply refers to a facility granted to the respondent – supposedly that is where the payment terms are captured. Without spelling out those terms of payment the court has not been shown that the terms had been breached to ground foreclosure.

4. The mortgagor bound itself as a surety and co-principal debtor yet that mortgagor was not cited as a party to the proceedings despite it being an interested party.

5. The mortgage bond attached to the application is defective in that it has no identification number or date; it is not signed by the conveyancer; there is no proof that the owner authorized the transaction; and does not show the office where the conveyancer appeared.

Now, the essence of summary judgment was aptly summed up by LORDS ESHER and LOPES in Roberts v Plant [1895] QB 597…, as follows:

“Where…, the Plaintiff can show, to the satisfaction of the judge, that he has a clear case against the defendant, which the defendant cannot possibly answer, the judge may give the plaintiff leave to enter judgment forthwith without the expense and delay which would be involved in letting the case go on trial in the ordinary way. This is a stringent power to give and therefore the courts have said that its exercise must be strictly watched in order to see that the plaintiff has brought himself within the scope of the provisions of the order.”

And, in the locus classicus of Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (AD)…, CORBET JA held as follows:-

“Accordingly, one of the ways in which a defendant may successfully oppose a claim for summary judgment is by satisfying the court…, that he has a bona fide defence to the claim. Where the defence is based upon facts, in the sense that material alleged by the plaintiff in his summons or combined summons, are disputed or new facts are alleged constituting a defence, the court does not attempt to decide these issues or to determine whether or not there is a balance of probabilities in favour of one party or the other. All that the court enquires into is:

(a) Whether the defendant has 'fully' disclosed the nature and grounds of his defence and the material facts upon which it is founded; and

(b) Whether on the facts so disclosed the defendant appears to have, as to either the whole or part of the claim, a defence which is bona fide and good in law.”

In Jena v Nechipote 1986 (1) ZLR 29 (S) it was held that all the defendant has to establish in order to succeed in having an application for summary judgment dismissed is that there is a mere possibility of his success; he has a plausible defence; there is a triable issue; or there is a reasonable possibility that an injustice may be done if summary judgment is granted.

Now, applying the law to the facts in casu in the chronological sequence of the defendant's defence enumerated supra Order 10 Rule 67 of the High Court Rules, 1971 provides;

“No evidence may be adduced by the plaintiff otherwise than by the affidavit of which a copy was delivered with the notice…,; provided that the court may do one or more of the following:-

(a)…,.

(b)…,.

(c) Permit the plaintiff to supplement his affidavit with a further affidavit dealing with either or both of the following:-

(i) Any matter raised by the defendant which the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to have dealt with in his first affidavit; or

(ii) The question whether, at the time the application was instituted, the plaintiff was or should have been aware of the defence.”

In light of the foregoing provision it is clear that in an application for summary judgment the plaintiff is limited only to the founding affidavit. Any further affidavit can only be filed with leave of the court and is restricted to the aspects provided for in proviso (c)(i) or (ii) cited above.

Accordingly, it follows that the defendant's contention that the applicant's answering affidavit, which was filed without the leave of the court, must be disregarded is quite correct. In the event, it is expunged from the record.

Regarding paragraph 4 of the applicant's declaration claiming $828,851= as the capital debt while the prayer has the amount as $828,518=05, the applicant was supposed to have applied to amend its declaration so that the correct amount it is claiming is reflected. The summons claims $828,518=05. The applicant's counsel, in his oral submissions, averred that it is trite law that in such a scenario the court is inclined to consider the figure highlighted in the summons. He, at the same time confessed that he had no authority for that proposition of law. Neither does the court. It is therefore not clear what the correct capital amount the applicant is claiming.

This, in conjunction with other issues to follow below, amounts to a triable issue and there exists a reasonable possibility that an injustice may be done if summary judgment is granted.

As regards aspect number 3 of the respondent's defence supra the amounts of $218,240= reflected in the acknowledgment of debt and the $700,000= appearing in the mortgage bond do not assist the applicant in establishing the exact capital amount claimed whether it be $828,851= or $828,518=05. There are no payment terms on the mortgage bond. It simply refers to a facility granted to the respondent.

The question that arises is what was that facility? Was it in respect of cake flour or money lent and advanced?

Without spelling out the nature of the facility and the terms of payment it is not possible to establish a nexus between the alleged facility and the cake flour claimed to found the cause of action, and whether the payment terms were breached in order to ground foreclosure of the bond. All these constitute a plausible defence as well as a mere possibility of the defendant's success.

Regarding aspect number 4 supra the mortgage bond clearly states that the mortgagor is a surety and co-principal debtor.

In Muchabaiwa v Grab Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd 1996 (2) ZLR 691 (SC) it was pointed out that a person who subscribes to an act of suretyship in solidum and as co-principal debtor is, as far as the creditor is concerned, a surety who has undertaken the obligations of a co-debtor. His obligations are co-equal in extent with those of the principal debtor. See also Neon and Cold Cathode Illumination v Ephron 1978 SA 463…, where TROLLIP JA stated that:

“It appears that generally the only consequence (albeit an important one) that flows from a surety also undertaking liability as a co-principal debtor is that vis-a-vis the creditor he thereby tacitly renounces the ordinary benefits available to a surety, such as those of excussion and division, and he becomes liable jointly and severally with principal debtor.”

Furthermore, CANEY, The Law of Suretyship, 4^th ed…, in regard to the significance of the surety also binding himself as co-principal debtor states “he is liable with him jointly and severally.”

On the strength of the above authorities, the mortgagor should have been joined in this suit it being a co-principal debtor who, in the process of being such, had renounced the ordinary benefits normally available to a surety such as those of excussion and division. The respondent's contention on this score has merit constituting a bona fide defence.

The last point relates to the deficiencies of the mortgage bond itself. The applicant argued;

“That the bond is regular and that its ineligibility (sic) is owed to the poor photocopying.”

Most probably counsel wanted to say its illegibility is due to poor photocopying. I find that the contentions raised by the respondent, in regard to the deficiencies in the bond, cannot be dismissed out of hand as mere sophistry. They require closer examination going beyond “poor photocopying.” That bond is annexure “C” to the applicant's founding affidavit…,.

That bond has no identification number 1020/2010 that appears in paragraph 5.4 of its founding affidavit. It also has no date or stamp showing when it was registered and which Registrar of Deeds' office it was registered. The conveyancer's signature is not appended to it.

A bond's identification number is governed by practice and common law.

Section 44(b) of the Deeds Registries Act [Chapter 20:05] provides that a mortgage bond shall be executed in the presence of the Registrar by a notary public duly authorized by such owner by power of attorney.

In casu, the bond is not signed by the conveyancer and there is not proof that the owner of the property duly authorized its execution by way of power of attorney. No such power of attorney is attached. Since the bond does not show which office of the Registrar it was registered, coupled with the foregoing defects, it cannot be said that there is a valid mortgage bond that can be used as proof of indebtedness.

In the result, I find that the respondent has managed to fully disclose the nature and grounds of its defence and the material facts upon which it is founded thereby establishing a defence which is bona fide and good in law. In the event, the application is dismissed with costs and the respondent is given unconditional leave to defend the action.

This is an application for summary judgment.

On 6 October 2009, the plaintiff issued summons against the defendants claiming the sum of US$4,568=85 in respect of certain goods allegedly sold and delivered at the first defendant's special instance.

In its declaration, the plaintiff alleged that during the period 22 April to 20 May 2009, the plaintiff supplied stationery to the first defendant valued at $9,932=85. On 20 May 2009, the second defendant bound himself as co-principal debtor and surety for the debt due by the first defendant, which, at the date of the suretyship, stood at $8,700=. It was further alleged that the first defendant made several payments to the plaintiff leaving the balance claimed in the summons.

On 13 October 2009, the defendants filed an entry of appearance to defend, prompting the plaintiff to file this application for summary judgment.

The application was opposed.

In opposing the application, the second respondent, who deposed to the affidavit on behalf of both respondents, denied that the first respondent had purchased the stationery from the plaintiff. He averred that the first respondent received an order from its client for the stationery, and it, in turn, sourced the stationery from the plaintiff. When its client failed to pay for the stationery, mainly chalk it would appear, the first respondent advised the plaintiff of the fact. The plaintiff however refused to accept the chalk back. It is further averred that an agreement was reached between the parties in terms of which the first respondent would sell the chalk, presumably to other of its customers and remit periodic payments to the applicant. This the first respondent had been doing prior to the issuing of summons.

At the hearing of the application, the applicant applied for leave to file an answering affidavit. In terms of the rules, the proper term for this affidavit should be “supplementary affidavit” and not answering affidavit. The name of the affidavit is to be derived from the wording of Rule 67 of the High Court Rules 1971, which I refer to below, which grants discretion to the court to allow a plaintiff to supplement his founding affidavit. No answer is permissible in summary judgment proceedings.

In the affidavit, the plaintiff denied that it sold the stationery to the first defendant on consignment. It maintained that it had sold the stationery to the first respondent outrightly and further denied the alleged arrangement between the parties to the effect that the purchase price would be remitted to the applicant as and when the first respondent was able to sell the stationery to its customers.

The filing of a supplementary affidavit is restricted, in the discretion of the court, to instances where a defence that was not anticipated by the applicant is raised in the opposing affidavit. See Beresford Land Plan (Pvt) Ltd v Urquhart 1975 (1) RLR 260 (G) and Omashah v Karasa 1996 (1) ZLR 584 (H).

As stated above, paragraph (c) to the proviso to Rule 67 of the High Court Rules, 1971 grants power to the court to permit the plaintiff to supplement his founding affidavit with a further affidavit dealing with either matters raised by the defendant which the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to have dealt with in his first affidavit or the question whether, at the time the application was instituted, the plaintiff was or should have been aware of the defence.

Rule 67 provides as follows:

“No evidence may be adduced by the plaintiff otherwise than by the affidavit of which a copy was delivered with the notice, nor may either party cross-examine any person who gives evidence viva voce or by affidavit:

Provided that the court may do one or more of the following —

(a) Permit evidence to be led in respect of any reduction of the plaintiff's claim;

(b) Put to any person who gives oral evidence questions —

(i) To elucidate what the defence is; or

(ii) To determine whether, at the time the application was instituted, the plaintiff was or should have been aware of the defence;

(c) Permit the plaintiff to supplement his affidavit with a further affidavit dealing with either or both of the following —

(i) Any matter raised by the defendant which the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to have dealt with in his first affidavit; or

(ii) The question whether, at the time the application was instituted, the plaintiff was or should have been aware of the defence.”

In casu, I allowed the filing of the answering affidavit on the turn and indicated that my reasons would follow. It is convenient that I now set them out.

The plaintiff's claim against the defendant is for the sum of $4,568=85 in respect of goods sold and delivered. Correspondence between the parties, prior to the issuance of summons, which are attached to the founding affidavit, indicated that the defendants had failed to collect the purchase price from their customer and were in the process of collecting the chalks back. The sale agreement between the parties was not denied in any of this correspondence. Liability was also not specifically or impliedly denied at this stage. The logistical arrangement relating to the return of the chalk was informed of the plaintiff - not as a defence to the claim. It was simply by way of information with a request that the defendants be granted two weeks to finalise (this arrangement).

In my view, it was therefore not reasonably expected of the plaintiff to deal with the issue of the return of the chalk in its founding affidavit as such return was a mere logistical arrangement that the defendants felt they had to attend to. It was not suggested as a defence to the claim for the payment of the balance of the purchase price.

In opposing the application for summary judgment, the defendant used the return of the chalk as a defence and the plaintiff needed to deal with this unexpected alleged defence.

It is on the basis of the above that I allowed the supplementary affidavit, wrongly headed “Answering Affidavit”, to be filed.

The test to be applied in summary judgment applications is clear and settled on the authorities.

The defendant must allege facts which, if he can succeed in establishing them at the trial, would entitle him to succeed in his defence. Obviously implied in this test, but oft overlooked by legal practitioners, is that the defendant must raise a defence. His facts must lead to and establish a defence that meets the claim squarely. If the facts that he alleges, fascinating as they may be and which he may very well be able to prove at the trial of the matter do not amount to a defence at law, the defendant would not have discharged the onus on him and summary judgement must be granted.

In casu, the defendants allege that after they had obtained the chalk from the plaintiff, and having, in turn, delivered the chalk to their own customer, they failed to get the customer to pay for the chalk. This may very well be true and I have no doubt that the defendant may be able to prove that this is what happened.

The issue to be determined is whether this amounts or constitutes a defence to the claim raised by the applicant for the balance of the purchase price of the chalk.

The general rule is that once the parties are in agreement over the merx and the payment of the purchase price payable for the merx, a valid contract of sale comes into being between the parties. The contract them casts upon the seller the obligation to deliver the merx sold and upon the purchaser, the obligation to pay the purchase price. To defend a claim under an agreement of sale, then, the purchaser must attack either the existence of the agreement itself or the fact that the goods sold were not delivered to him.

The defendants before me have denied that they purchased the chalk from the plaintiff. Such denial is not only bare but is contradicted by their further averments that they indeed received the chalk from the plaintiff and that they have paid part of the purchase price to the plaintiff. In the face of such an admission, the defence that there was no agreement of sale between the parties in untenable and the plaintiff must succeed.

The plaintiff has generously interpreted the facts alleged by the defendant in the opposing affidavit as raising a contract of consignment. I say generously because the defendants have not so alleged in their papers.

At this stage, I believe that it is pertinent that I set out, in full, the contents of what I regard as the operative part of the defendants' opposing affidavit. In response to the averments verifying the plaintiff's cause of action and the fact that the defendants had entered appearance to defend solely for the purposes of delay, the defendants had this to say in paragraph 4 of their joint affidavit:

“This is disputed. The applicant did not supply any stationery to the first respondent. The brief facts are that:-

4.1 The first respondent obtained an order for chalks from its customer Kingstones which it, in turn, sourced from the applicant.

4.2 After receiving the chalks, Kingstones failed to pay for them and returned the chalks; the applicant was advised and the Applicant refused to accept the chalks back.

4.3 An agreement was reached with the applicant in terms of which the respondent would sell the chalk and remit payments to the applicant as and when any quantity was sold.

4.4 The 1^st respondent has been selling the chalks and remitting the proceeds of the sold quantities to the applicant.

4.5 Indeed, the Applicant's Annexure “A” confirms this arrangement.”

As was remarked by McNALLY JA in Mbayiwa v Eastern Highlands Motel (Pvt) Ltd SC139-86…,:

“…, while the defendant need not deal exhaustively with the facts and the evidence relied on to substantiate them, he must at least disclose his defence and material facts upon which it is based with sufficient clarity and completeness to enable the court to decide whether the affidavit discloses a bona fide defence.”

I find the contents of the defendants opposing affidavit contradictory, confusing, and lacking the sufficient clarity and completeness that McNALLY J A referred to.

Whilst the defendants deny that the applicant delivered to them any chalk, they proceed to concede that they sourced for chalk from the applicant which somehow ended up with their customer. In this regard, for instance, it is not clear whether the defendants are setting up the defence of agency, in which case they would not be liable for the purchase price of the chalk. The defendants do not clearly raise agency as a defence and it would appear from their subsequent averments that the relationship was not between the plaintiff and Kingstones directly but that Kingstones was a customer of the defendants only.

Similarly, it is equally not clear whether the facts alleged by the defendants, as detailed above, raise a contract of consignment.

I do not think so.

I do not read any allegation of a contract whereby the plaintiff, as one trader, entrusted the chalk to the first defendant for the chalk to be sold by the first defendant on behalf of the plaintiff.

The opposing affidavit spells out, clearly in my view, that the defendants obtained an order from their own customer for the chalk. They then approached the plaintiff for the chalk. The plaintiff did not seek the defendants out for them to sell its chalk on consignment in which event the plaintiff would be obliged to accept back whatever portion of the consignment remains unsold. Rather, the defendants appear to me quite clear that it was only after their customer had failed to pay for the chalk that they approached the plaintiff with the news and sought to return the chalk to the plaintiff.

In my view, the facts alleged by the defendant do not in themselves constitute a defence. If it was the intention of the defendant to deny liability for the purchase price of the chalk, and, instead to allege that the customer who failed to pay for the chalk was actually liable for the payment of the chalk directly to the plaintiff, on the basis of either agency or consignment, such must have been alleged clearly.

In my view, it is not the function of the court to put words into the defendant's mouth and thereby establish a possible defence on his behalf when the defendant fails to do so in his opposing affidavit.

I have also considered whether the alleged subsequent agreement between the parties, that the defendants would proceed to sell the chalk and remit periodic payments to the plaintiff, would constitute a defence to a claim for the purchase price of the chalk. In this regard, I have considered whether this subsequent arrangement, if proved, would constitute a variation of the terms of the original agreement between the parties.

It would have assisted me greatly had this been pleaded or argued before me.

Instead, even the original agreement of sale is denied in the defendants' papers. How then can I, mero motu, hold that the defendants are raising a possible defence to the plaintiff's claim to the effect that the terms of the original agreement were varied by a subsequent agreement in the circumstances?

The onus resting on a defendant resisting summary judgment has been described as amongst the lightest that the rules of procedure cast on litigants. The defendant does not have to prove his defence. He must merely set up facts, which, if he can prove at the trial, will entitle him to succeed in his defence. The defence so set up must however be plausible and bona fide.

In casu, I find the possible defences set up by the defendants not only to be contradictory but also not plausible. They are inherently and seriously unconvincing, giving rise to the inference that they were raised solely for the purposes of delay. See Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Pyanayiotts 2009 (3) SA 363 (W).

On the basis of the foregoing, I find that the plaintiff's claim is clearly unanswerable.

In the result, I make the following order:

1. Judgment is hereby entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $4,568=85.

2. The defendants shall bear the costs of suit.