Approach re: Functions & Powers of Revenue Authority, Fiscal Appeals or Objections & the Pay Now Argue Later Principle

HH79-12 : MARIANE SABETA vs COMMISSIONER GENERAL ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

Counsel for both parties are agreed, that, the only issue to be determined is whether the respondent is empowered, by the legislation that he administers, to refuse to assess and receive capital gains tax on the basis that it has come to his attention that the previous owner of the ...

HH68-14 : FAIRDROP TRADING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs THE ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

This was an urgent chamber application. One had to wade through layers of emotional hyperbole to get to the nub of the matter and to identify the real issues for determination. Each side gave as much as it got. It was a mortal combat in the literal sense. The applicant is a company. It runs a ...

The applicant is a company. It runs a hospital. It said it was fighting for its life and that of its patients, especially its cancer patients and also its employees. It said unless the exorbitant tax assessments by the respondent for the period 2010 to 2013 were set aside in the long run, and unless the suffocating garnishees that the respondent had imposed on its revenue sources were uplifted in the interim, and as a matter of urgency, it surely was going to liquidate. It said the situation was that dire.

The respondent is a statutory corporation. It is established by section 3 of the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11]. It is the tax collector for Government. Despite the Biblical exhortation “render therefore to Caesar the things which are Caesars'” undoubtedly few obey willingly, Christians and non-Christians alike. It is not hard to imagine hard-pressed workers and other taxpayers with families and extended families to support wanting to exclude Government from the list of dependants. The temptation sometimes is for some to craft some tax evasion schemes. Viewed from that angle the respondent's task must be an unenviable one. But the Government is a step ahead. The respondent is clothed with enormous powers to levy and collect taxes.

It is public policy that revenue inflows to Government should not be interrupted. Government functions must not grind to a halt. Therefore, for example, through the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], in addition to the power to levy and collect taxes (section 6 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]) the Government, through Parliament, has granted the respondent the following sweeping powers:

1. Section 45 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the power to make tax assessments and even to make estimates of taxes due from the available information.

2. Section 46 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the power to levy penalties on taxes due but unpaid.

3. Part VI of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the power to appoint another person to be the agent of a taxpayer where there is some taxable income due by the agent to the taxpayer, and the power to penalise the agent for any breach of this obligation.

4. Part VII of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the power to insist on payment of any tax as levied pending the determination of any objection to, or an appeal against, a tax as charged, and the power to resort to self-help to recover such tax.

Appealed
HH328-14 : PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J

“Pay now, argue later” is a pithy phrase that is used as a different expression of the biblical injunction to “render unto Caesar what belongs to Caesar.” Put differently, it means that the obligation to pay tax is inviolable, one cannot escape from that obligation, and, one is required to discharge the obligation first, and then ...

CC09-16 : BENARD WEKARE and MUSANGANO LODGE (PVT) LTD t/a MUSANGANO LODGE vs THE STATE and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ZIMBABWE and ZIMBABWE BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GARWE JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

The reasons given by the applicants for not complying with the law relate to accrual of benefits. Their contention is that programmes broadcast by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation are not of the quality they expected to receive in return for the money they would have paid as licence fee for possessing a receiver. Accrual ...

HMA17-17 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS (Case 1) and SYLVIA CHORUWA (Case 2) vs COMMISSIONER – GENERAL, ZIMRA
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

Section 119 of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02] provides that one may appeal to this court against any determination of the Commissioner after payment of any duty or tax demanded by the Commissioner.

Appealed
SC76-17 : CARE INTERNATIONAL IN ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and DESMOND MAMINIMINI and SURVIVAL HARDWARE (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: GOWORA JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and BHUNU JA

The first respondent's powers and functions are set out in the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11], the pertinent provisions of which read: “PART II ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY 3 Establishment of Zimbabwe Revenue Authority There is hereby established an authority, to be known as the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, which shall be a body corporate capable of suing and being sued in its own name ...

CC07-14 : MAYOR LOGISTICS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ

This Urgent Chamber Application was placed before me because the Chief Justice was not available to hear it. The application raised two questions for determination:(i) The first question is whether an interim order suspending the operation of legislation compelling payment by a taxpayer of the amount of tax liable to ...

This Urgent Chamber Application was placed before me because the Chief Justice was not available to hear it. The application raised two questions for determination:

(i) The first question is whether an interim order suspending the operation of legislation compelling payment by a taxpayer of the amount of tax liable to be paid notwithstanding an appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court or pending a decision of a court should be granted pending the hearing and determination of the main application challenging the constitutional validity of the legislation by the full Bench of the Constitutional Court.

(ii) The second question is whether an order should be made directing that the main application be heard on an urgent basis.

The facts which gave rise to the questions for determination are these.

The applicant is a company incorporated under the laws of Zimbabwe carrying on the business of supplying transport services and selling of fuel. The respondent is an administrative authority established in terms of the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11]. It is entrusted with the responsibility of assessing taxpayers for tax liability and collecting revenue due to the fiscus in terms of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12](“the VAT Act”) and the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] (“the Income Tax Act”).

The applicant has been a registered operator in terms of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] since October 2010. As from 2010, the applicant has been supplying transport services to and purchasing fuel for sale at its service station from an entity called Sakunda Energy. It has always been aware of its obligation to charge value added tax on the invoices for the transport services supplied to Sakunda Energy. Instead of submitting returns of value added tax based on the invoices on the transport services supplied, the applicant set off the costs of fuel purchased from Sakunda Energy against the invoices for the transport services and submitted returns for value added tax in respect of the balance.

The respondent commenced investigations into the tax affairs of the applicant in October 2013. Upon examination of the applicant's books of account, the respondent concluded that the applicant had under-declared the value added tax charged on the invoices on transport services supplied to Sakunda Energy as a result of the setting off of the cost of fuel purchased against the value of the invoices for the transport services. The applicant was advised of the under declaration on 11 December 2013. The respondent was of the view that the value added tax on the invoices was liable to be paid to the fiscus regardless of the purpose for which transport services were supplied.

On 7 February 2014, the respondent issued the applicant with an assessment of value added tax liability in an amount of US$1,619,161=32 including penalties and interest. According to the respondent, it was what the applicant and Sakunda Energy were doing in their business transactions, as revealed by the examination of books of account, which produced evidence of tax evasion.

The applicant was dissatisfied with the tax liability assessment arguing that it did not owe the whole amount of the value added tax assessed to be due and payable. On 27 February 2014, the applicant lodged a formal objection with the Commissioner against the correctness of the assessment in terms of section 32 of the VAT Act. The allegation was that the respondent had adopted a wrong method of assessing the applicant's tax liability. The respondent was accused of having misunderstood the nature of the applicant's business operations. Correspondence was exchanged on the matter between the parties between 14 and 17 March 2014. The Commissioner disallowed the objection in respect of the assessment of value added tax liability on 13 May 2014.

The applicant noted an appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court against the correctness of the assessment on 23 May 2014.

On 27 May 2014, the Commissioner reminded the applicant of its continuing obligation to pay the amount of the tax assessed to be due and payable notwithstanding the noting of the appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court. On 30 May 2014, the applicant's tax consultant simply expressed a view to the respondent that it would be prudent to await the outcome of the appeal.

Concurrently with the review of the applicant's value added tax affairs, the respondent carried out an assessment of the applicant's income tax liability. The respondent assessed the applicant's income tax liability to be an amount of US$2,066,652=84 including penalties and interest. On 3 June 2014 it sent to the applicant a complete tax computation for both value added tax and income tax. The respondent threatened to put in place measures to recover the taxes in terms of section 48 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] should the applicant fail to pay the money voluntarily. It later appointed three of the applicant's bankers, and Sakunda Energy, as agents for the payment of the value added tax assessed to be due and payable.

On 5 June 2014, the applicant filed an application with the Constitutional Court, in terms of section 85(1) of the Constitution, challenging the validity of sections 36 of the VAT Act and 69(1) of the Income Tax Act. The allegation is that the legislative provisions violated the applicant's fundamental right of access to the courts enshrined in section 69(3) and the right to administrative justice guaranteed under section 68(1) of the Constitution. The applicant sought, as the relief, a final order declaring sections 36 of the VAT Act and 69(1) of the Income Tax Act to be ultra vires sections 68(1) and 69(3) of the Constitution and therefore void.

Simultaneously with the filing of the main application, the applicant filed the urgent chamber application seeking an order that the main application be heard on an urgent basis. It also sought interim relief in the following terms:

“INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

1. Pending the hearing and finalization of Applicant's appeal in the Fiscal Appeal Court, Applicant's obligation to pay value added tax and income tax be and is hereby suspended.

2. Respondent be and is hereby ordered to forthwith provide written reasons for its decision to compel payment of value added tax and income tax pending Applicant's appeal to the Fiscal Appeals Court.”

Section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] provides:

“36. Payment of Tax pending appeal

The obligation to pay and the right to receive and recover any tax, additional tax, penalty or interest chargeable under this Act shall not, unless the Commissioner so directs, be suspended by any appeal or pending the decision of a court of law, but, if any assessment is altered on appeal or in conformity with any such decision or a decision by the Commissioner to concede the appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court or such court of law, a due adjustment shall be made, amounts paid in excess being refunded with interest at the prescribed rate (but subject to section forty-six) and calculated from the date proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to be the date on which such excess was received, and amounts short-paid recoverable with penalty and interest calculated as provided in subsection (1) of section thirty-nine.”

The obligation to pay the amount of tax assessed to be due and payable is imposed by section 38 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12].

Section 69 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] provides:

“69. Payment of tax pending decision on objection and appeal

(1) The obligation to pay and the right to receive any tax chargeable under this Act shall not, unless the Commissioner otherwise directs and subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose, be suspended pending a decision on any objection or appeal which may be lodged in terms of this Act.

(2) If any assessment or decision is altered on appeal, a due adjustment shall be made, for which purpose amounts paid in excess shall be refunded and amounts short paid shall be recoverable.”

The obligation to pay income tax assessed to be due and payable is imposed by section 71(1) of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]….,.

I now turn to decide the first question.

It is important to mention that the purpose of these proceedings is not to determine the correctness or otherwise of the tax assessments made by the respondent. That is the question to be determined by the Fiscal Appeal Court in the appeal lodged by the applicant. On the question before this Court, the decision is that a case has not been made for the granting of the relief sought. The reasons for the decision follow:

There is no doubt that a judge of the Constitutional Court may grant interlocutory relief by way of an interim order pending determination of a constitutional matter by the full Bench of the court. Section 166(3) of the Constitution provides for interlocutory matters to be heard by one or more judges of the court. See Williams & Anor v Msipha N.O. & Ors 2010 (1) ZLR 552 (S)…,.

The applicant seeks an order suspending the statutory obligation to pay the amount of the tax it was assessed to be liable to pay to the fiscus pending the hearing and finalization of the appeal in the Fiscal Appeal Court. It is in the heads of argument that the applicant reveals that the relief sought is an interim interdict. There is need to have regard to the substance and not the form of the relief sought. The fact that the applicant calls the order sought an interim interdict does not make it one.

The subject of the application is not the kind of subject matter an interdict, as a remedy, was designed to deal with. An interdict is ordinarily granted to prevent continuing or future conduct which is harmful to a prima facie right pending final determination of that right by a court of law. Its object is to avoid a situation in which, by the time the right is finally determined in favour of the applicant, it has been injured to the extent that the harm cannot be repaired by the grant of the right.

It is axiomatic that the interdict is for the protection of an existing right. There has to be proof of the existence of a prima facie right. It is also axiomatic that the prima facieright is protected from unlawful conduct which is about to infringe it. An interdict cannot be granted against past invasions of a right nor can there be an interdict against lawful conduct. Airfield investments (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of Lands & Ors 2004 (1) ZLR 511 (S); Stauffer Chemicals v Monsato Company 1988 (1) SA 895; Rudolph & Anor v Commissioner for Inland Revenue & Ors 1994 (3) SA 771.

The applicant accepted, in the founding affidavit, that the respondent acted lawfully in enforcing the obligation to pay the tax notwithstanding the noting by it of the appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court against the correctness of the assessment. It did not allege any unlawful conduct on the part of the respondent which would justify the granting of an interdict. It also accepted that at the time the respondent put in place measures to collect the tax, the provisions of sections 36 of the VAT Act and 69(1) of the Income Tax Act were binding on it.

That means that the applicant had no prima facie right in existence at the time not to pay the amount of tax it was liable to pay to the fiscus. Sections 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] and 69(1) of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] protect a duty, not a right.

The provisions are designed to remove any doubt in the mind of the taxpayer as to whether an appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court, or a decision of a court, would have the effect of suspending the obligation to pay the tax assessed to be due and payable….,.

Sections 36 of the VAT Act and 69(1) of the Income Tax Act provide that the Commissioner may, by a directive, in appropriate circumstances, give the appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court the effect they prohibit on the obligation to pay the assessed tax. The Commissioner may, in the exercise of discretion, and upon consideration of the facts presented to him by the taxpayer, direct that the obligation to pay the tax be suspended pending determination of the appeal by the Fiscal Appeal Court or pending a decision by a court of law.

Whilst sections 36 of the VAT Act and 69(1) of the Income Tax Act provide that the occurrence of any of the specified events shall not suspend the taxpayer's obligation to pay the tax assessed to be due and payable, they, at the same time, create a remedy for the amelioration of possible financial hardships faced by an individual taxpayer. They give the Commissioner the discretionary power to suspend the obligation pending the determination of the appeal by the Fiscal Appeals Court or pending the decision by a court.

Failure to fulfill an obligation may be due to a variety of circumstances. The legislature decided to place the responsibility of deciding whether or not the particular circumstances of a taxpayer, entitle him or her to a directive suspending the obligation to pay the assessed tax, on the Commissioner. A court of law would be acting unlawfully if it usurped the discretionary powers of the Commissioner and ordered a suspension of the obligation on a taxpayer to pay assessed tax pending determination of an appeal by the Fiscal Appeal Court….,.

Sections 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] and 69(1) of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] make provision for a remedy, compliance, with which is designed to give effect to the protection of the fundamental rights the applicant claims have been infringed. See Metcash Trading Ltd v The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service and Another 2001 (1) SA 110 (CC).

The fact that the statutory provisions give the Commissioner the discretionary power to direct that the continuing obligation to pay the tax be suspended pending an appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court means that a mechanism was put in place to ameliorate financial hardships experienced by individual taxpayers as a result of the enforcement of the “pay now, argue later rule.” Suspension of the operation of the 'pay now, argue later rule' can be decided and should be decided by the Commissioner. He cannot act mero motu. As the facts on which the Commissioner would exercise the discretionary power would be within the exclusive knowledge of the taxpayer he or she must place them before the Commissioner.

In this case, the Commissioner was not formally requested, by the applicant, to direct the suspension of the continuing obligation to pay the charged tax pending determination of the appeal by the Fiscal Appeal Court. No decision was made by the Commissioner on the matter. The respondent cannot be ordered to give reasons for a decision it did not make. The applicant merely expressed an opinion that it would be prudent for the respondent not to demand payment of the tax pending determination of the appeal. The respondent cannot be ordered to give reasons for reminding the applicant of its statutory obligation…,.

(1)…,

(2) The application for an interim order suspending the obligation imposed on the applicant to pay the tax assessed to be due and payable pending the hearing of the appeal by the Fiscal Appeal Court or the constitutional matter filed in Case No. CCZ41/14 be and is hereby dismissed.

(3) The applicant is to pay the costs of the urgent chamber application.

View Appeal
SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GOWORA JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

The Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] provides a detailed mechanism for vendors to keep certain records and to periodically calculate, account for and pay value added tax to the Commissioner. The Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12], as a whole, and, in particular, its provisions relating to assessments and ...

The Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] provides a detailed mechanism for vendors to keep certain records and to periodically calculate, account for and pay value added tax to the Commissioner.

The Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12], as a whole, and, in particular, its provisions relating to assessments and the payment recovery and refund of tax provisions found in Part VII of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] are indispensable tools for the prompt collection of tax due. From an economic point of view, the provisions of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] are meant to ensure a steady, accurate and predictable stream of revenue for the fiscus.

These provisions are an embodiment of the principle “Pay Now Argue Later”, suggesting that an appeal would not have the effect of suspending payment. The principle is aimed at discouraging frivolous or spurious objections and ensures that the whole system of tax collection in the country maintains its efficacy. This serves the fundamental public purpose of ensuring that the fiscus is not prejudiced by delay in obtaining finality in any dispute....,.

Section 6 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] provides:

“Subject to this Act, there shall be charged, levied and collected, for the benefit of the Consolidated Revenue Fund a tax at such rate as may be fixed by the Charging Act on the value of -

(a) The supply by any registered operator of goods or services supplied by him on or after the 1^st January, 2004, in the furtherance of any trade carried on by him.

(b) …,. not relevant.”

Payment of tax under the relevant Act is provided for in terms of section 28 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] which reads:

“28 Returns and payments of tax

(1) Every registered operator shall, within the period ending on the twenty-fifth day of the first month commencing after the end of a tax period relating to such registered operator or, where such tax period ends on or after the first day and before the last day of a month, within the period ending on such last day -

(a) Furnish the Commissioner with a return in the prescribed form reflecting such information as may be required for the purpose of the calculation of tax in terms of section 15; and

(b) Calculate the amounts of such tax in accordance with the said section and pay the tax payable to the Commissioner or calculate the amount of any refund due to the registered operator.

[Subsection substituted by Act 5 of 2009 and amended by Act 10 of 2009, by Act 3 of 2010, by Act 5 of 2010 and by Act 9 of 2011] (1a)…,. [Subsection repealed by Act 5 of 2009]

(2) Every registered operator who is registered in terms of Part IV shall within the period allowed by subsection (1) of this section furnish the return referred to in that subsection in respect of each tax period relating to such registered operator, whether or not tax is payable or a refund is due in respect of such period.

(3) The Commissioner may, having regard to the circumstances of any case but subject to section thirty-eight, extend the period within which such return is to be furnished or such tax is to be paid.”

Section 27 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] sets out four categories of operators and tax periods for the submission of returns and payment of assessed VAT by the operator are then regulated according to the category of the respective operators. Tax periods for the four categories range from one calendar month to two, or such other period as may be approved by the Commissioner in relation to category D.

The anchor to the provisions on recovery of tax is section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] which excludes the suspension of payment of tax upon the noting of the appeal. Section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] provides, in relevant part:

“36 Payment of tax pending appeal

The obligation to pay and the right to receive and recover any tax, additional tax, penalty or interest chargeable under this Act shall not, unless the Commissioner so directs, be suspended by any appeal or pending the decision of a court of law, but if any assessment is altered on appeal or in conformity with any such decision or a decision by the Commissioner to concede the appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court or such court of law, a due adjustment shall be made, amounts paid in excess being refunded with interest at the prescribed rate (but subject to section forty-six) and calculated from the date proved to the satisfaction of the Commissioner to be the date on which such excess was received, and amounts short-paid being recoverable with penalty and interest calculated as provided in subsection (1) of section thirty-nine.”

The learned judge construed the provision in question thus:

“My reading of section 36 is that the liability to pay remains extant until the appeal is finalised or in the alternative, unless the Commissioner directs that the obligation to pay falls away until the pending appeal is finalised. Applicant in this matter has not argued that the effect of the noting of the appeal is to extinguish its obligation to pay.Section 33 of the VAT Act provides for the circumstances in which an aggrieved person can appeal to the Fiscal Appeals Court against the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner. The right to appeal against the exercise of discretion by the respondent's officers to the Commissioner is provided for in terms of section 32 of the VAT Act.”…,.

In my view, section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] creates a remedy for the amelioration of possible financial hardship faced by an individual taxpayer and allows the Commissioner to suspend payment pending an appeal. However, the Commissioner cannot exercise the discretion mero motu. He can only do so upon consideration of facts presented to him by a taxpayer who wishes to benefit from the exercise of discretion by the Commissioner. As a consequence, the taxpayer bears the onus to place the necessary facts before the Commissioner regarding the hardships facing him should the obligation to pay not be suspended. For, as stated by the learned DEPUTY CHIEF JUSTICE in the case of Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd v ZIMRA CC07-14:

“As the facts on which the Commissioner would exercise the discretion would be within the exclusive knowledge of the taxpayer he or she must place them before the Commissioner.”...,.

It follows, therefore that, whilst section 48 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] is concerned with the Commissioner's power to appoint an agent for purposes of collection or recovery of tax, section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] enshrines the taxpayer's duty to pay tax. The two are inextricably linked in that the decision to use one method of recovery is determined by whether or not any facts have been placed before the Commissioner on whether or not there exist hardships which would justify a suspension of the obligation to pay assessed tax by a taxpayer.

What was before the court a quo was a plea for mercy as opposed to the enforcement of an existing right.

Once the discretion in section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] is exercised in favour of the suspension of the obligation to pay tax, then by parity of reasoning, it follows that the discretion to appoint an agent in terms of section 48 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] falls away.

The obligation to pay the amount of tax assessed as being due and payable is imposed by section 38 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12].

In considering the VAT collection system in general the following observations emerge. Section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] does not serve to protect any right of the taxpayer but to preserve the right of the Commissioner to be paid and to collect the revenue. It also secures the obligation of the operator to pay unless such obligation is suspended by the Commissioner upon request. As a consequence, the discretion to suspend payment in terms of the said section is that of the Commissioner.

In Mayor Logistics (Pvt) Ltd v ZIMRA CC07-14 his Lordship, MALABA DCJ, had this to say:

“Failure to fulfil an obligation [to pay tax] may be due to a variety of circumstances. The legislature decided to place responsibility for deciding whether or not the particular circumstances of a taxpayer entitle him or her to a directive suspending the obligation to pay the assessed tax on the Commissioner. A court of law would be acting unlawfully if it usurped the powers of the Commissioner and ordered a suspension of the obligation on a taxpayer to pay assessed tax pending the determination of an appeal by the Fiscal Appeals Court.”

HMA01-18 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS and SYLVIA CHORUWA and PATRICK MUGUTI vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and MINISTER OF FINANCE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and ATTORNEY GENERAL
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

The Zimbabwe Revenue Authority's (ZIMRA) first technical objection was that the applicants had…, violated the fiscal principle that says pay-now-and-argue-later, which is enshrined in section 119 of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02]. This section reads: “119 Appeals against valuation of goods [1] Any person who is aggrieved by any determination of the Commissioner in terms of this Part may, ...

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SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GOWORA JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

In determining the urgent application, the High Court found that the liability on the part of a registered operator under section 36 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] remains extant and is not extinguished by the noting of an appeal unless the Commissioner directs that the obligation falls ...

SC13-19 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and ZIYAMBI AJA

In a letter dated 17 December 2012, the respondent, through its legal practitioners, objected, in terms of section 62 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], to the amendments and the penalties imposed on it by the appellant. The proviso to section 62 of the Income Tax Act reads: “Provided that, if the Commissioner has not ...

Appealed
SC17-19 : ECONET WIRELESS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER GENERAL
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, GOWORA JA and MAVANGIRA JA

It is the appellant's argument, before this court, that the court a quo determined an issue which was not properly before it by finding that the appellant's declarations had contravened the law. In determining this issue the starting point is the letter of 3 December 2013. This is the letter which triggered the litigation that ...

It is the appellant's argument, before this court, that the court a quo determined an issue which was not properly before it by finding that the appellant's declarations had contravened the law.

In determining this issue the starting point is the letter of 3 December 2013. This is the letter which triggered the litigation that has culminated in this appeal. This letter, from the respondents to the appellant, alleged that there were anomalies in the clearances of 'base station' importations and that “(T)he anomalies arose as a result of the fact that Econet Wireless was misclassifying single components/units or parts of Base Stations as complete base stations.”...,. The respondents further arrogated an error on the appellant of failing to move all the base station importations in bond.

In the founding affidavit of its application in the court a quo the appellant contended that the duty to classify did not lie with it. This was in response to the case which the respondents laid at its door in the said letter. Put differently, the decision which was being reviewed by the court a quo was the decision embodied in that letter. It was never the respondents' case, in that letter, that the appellant had falsely declared its importations.

In opposing the application in the court a quo, the respondents sought to argue that its post clearance audits had shown that the declarations by the appellant and its agents had been irregular. This was not the case that the respondents had laid against the appellant when it wrote the letter of 3 December 2013 and subsequently garnished the appellant's bank accounts. The issue that culminated in the litigation in this matter was that of alleged mis-classification and not one of false declarations.

If the respondents had changed their case to one of false declarations, it ought to have informed the appellants accordingly and set aside its initial position. The fact stands that these proceedings were set in motion by the letter alleging mis-classification. Proceedings ought to be disposed of on the basis on which they are brought. It is unclear how the proceedings mutated from being based on classification to being based on false declarations. The court a quo ought to have decided the matter without losing sight of the root or trigger of the litigation - which was the letter of 3 December 2013.

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HH964-15 : ECONET WIRELESS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER GENERAL and STEWARD BANK LTD and CBZ BANK LTD and NMB BANK LTD and STANBIC BANK LTD
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

Effect of Noting Appeal Counsel for the applicant submitted that section 201A of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02] relates to appointment of agents by the Commissioner-General. Since an appeal was noted against the decision of the Commissioner General, the decision made in the letter of 3 December 2013 was suspended. He based this submission on the ...

Effect of Noting Appeal

Counsel for the applicant submitted that section 201A of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02] relates to appointment of agents by the Commissioner-General. Since an appeal was noted against the decision of the Commissioner General, the decision made in the letter of 3 December 2013 was suspended.

He based this submission on the common law.

However, counsel for the applicant further submitted that there is conflict regarding the effect of noting an appeal against the decision of an administrative authority. Nonetheless, counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the case of Econet v Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd 1998 (1) ZLR149 (HC). He also referred to section 14 of the Fiscal Appeals Court Act.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that the dispute must be analysed in the context of the provisions of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02]. Thus, the statute in question bestows certain powers on the respondents which cannot be overridden by common law principles. For example, there is provision for payment of duty pending the resolution of a dispute….,.

Regarding the effect of noting of the appeal, section 14 of the Fiscal Appeal Court Act [Chapter 23:05] provides that -

“The obligation to pay and the right to receive and recover any tax, additional tax, penalty or interest chargeable under this Act shall not, unless the Commissioner so directs, be suspended by any appeal in accordance with section 11 or 13 or pending the decision of the court, but, if any assessment is altered on appeal or in conformity with any such decision or a decision by the Commissioner to concede the appeal to the court, a due adjustment shall be made, amounts paid in excess being refunded with interest at the prescribed rate and calculated from the date proved, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, to be the date on which such excess was received, and amounts short-paid being recoverable with penalty and interest.”

In Econet v Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd 1998 (1) ZLR 149 (HC), SMITH J held that, in civil cases, the noting of an appeal automatically suspends the execution of any judgment or order granted by the court of first instance. Having noted that there are statutes that provide against the suspension of a judgment or order upon the noting of an appeal the learned judge went further to recommend that the law be amended in as far as it provides for the automatic suspension of the execution of a judgment or order upon the noting of an appeal.

In Longman Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v Midzi & Others 2008 (1) ZLR 198 (S), the Supreme Court noted that the common law rule on the effect of noting an appeal has not been applied uniformly, resulting in a divergence of opinion. However, at pp 205-206 GARWE JA had this to say:

“There is a presumption in our law that Parliament does not intend to alter the common law unless it does so expressly or by necessary implication. Silence by the Legislature should not be taken to mean that the Legislature intends to alter the common law position. If the enabling legislation is silent, then the common law position must apply: PTC v Mahachi 1997 (2) ZLR 71 (H).

The position may now be accepted as settled in this jurisdiction that, unless empowered by law to do so, an inferior court, tribunal or other authority has no power to order the suspension of its own orders or judgments, and, further, that the noting of an appeal against the judgment or order of such a court, tribunal or other authority, in the absence of a statutory provision to that effect, does not have the effect of suspending the operation of the judgment or order that is sought to be appealed against.”

In light of section 14 of the Fiscal Appeal Court Act [Chapter 23:05], the noting of an appeal with the Fiscal Appeal Court did not suspend the decision of the Commissioner-General. I did not hear any contention that the Commissioner General directed the suspension of the order against the applicant pending the appeal noted….,.

1….,.

2….,.

3….,.

4. The noting of appeal to the Fiscal Appeal Court did not suspend the decision of the second respondent.

HH621-15 : DELTA CORPORATION LTD vs ZIMABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO J

At the hearing of this matter I dismissed the appeal with costs and indicated that the reasons would follow. These are they.The facts of this case are largely common cause.On 23 May 1996, a firm of accountants, Messrs Deloitte and Touche (hereinafter “Deloitte and Touche”) wrote the following letter to ...

At the hearing of this matter I dismissed the appeal with costs and indicated that the reasons would follow. These are they.

The facts of this case are largely common cause.

On 23 May 1996, a firm of accountants, Messrs Deloitte and Touche (hereinafter “Deloitte and Touche”) wrote the following letter to the then Commissioner of Taxes (COT):

“Dear Sir,

BONUS SHARES (NINTH AND FIFTEENTH SCHEDULES TO THE INCOME TAX ACT)

The above term is not defined in the statute.

We would be grateful if you would advise us whether it is accepted that where a company, in declaring a dividend, allows its shareholders a choice of accepting cash or shares, those who opt for the latter receive “bonus shares”.

Yours faithfully

D and T”

The Commissioner of Taxes (COT) responded, on 8 July 1996, as follows:

“Dear Sirs

BONUS SHARES (NINTH AND FIFTEENTH SCHEDULES TO THE INCOME TAX ACT [CHAPTER 181])

You letter dated 23rd May 1996, reference RHMM/LWH/spw/12080, refers.

Please be advised that where a company declares a dividend which is immediately satisfied by issue of shares of an identical amount, no dividend is paid by the company and such shares constitute bonus shares.

Since there is no distribution of profits by the company and no property passed from the company to shareholders, what company does is to capitalise a portion of its profits. This does not constitute the payment of a dividend for income tax purposes. The fact that the company allows its shareholders an option of accepting cash or shares is not material.

Shares received in lieu of dividend are “bonus shares”.

Yours faithfully

T.I NCUBE (MRS)
For: ACTING COMMISSIONER OF TAXES”

The appellant, apparently acting on the strength of the above letter, did not pay withholding tax on scrip dividends issued subsequent to that letter.

On 24 November 2006, the Commissioner-General (COG) of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, who is the successor to the Commissioner of Taxes (COT), wrote to the appellant requesting it to deduct and account for withholding tax for three years prior to that date on scrip dividends issued.

The appellant wrote back, on 5 December 2006, objecting and averred that in 1996 the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) had given a ruling upon the strength of which the appellant had acted. Such ruling, the appellant alleges, is binding on the current respondent.

The respondent disallowed the objection on 30 January 2007 and maintained that the withholding tax was due and payable chiefly because a scrip dividend was a dividend and not bonus shares.

The appellant was aggrieved by the decision and filed the present appeal.

The appellant's case is that the letter by the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) amounts to an advance tax ruling which binds the respondent and suggests that the benefits which are derived from the 1996 letter to Deloitte and Touche accrue to it as well. The appellant also avers that a scrip dividend is equivalent to bonus shares which type of shares are not subject to income tax in terms of the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]. It is also the appellant's case that a scrip dividend is incorporeal property in lieu of cash. The appellant further contends that it would not be proper for the respondent to demand arrear taxes when it acted in line with an understanding with the Commissioner of Taxes (COT).

The respondent's main line of defence is that the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) letter to Deloitte and Touche, in 1996, did not amount to a tax ruling. Rather, the respondent argues, it was just a confirmation of a position as perceived by Deloitte and Touche. The respondent also avers that if any benefit is to be derived from the said letter, such benefit can only accrue to Deloitte and Touche and not to the present appellant because it was not privy to the communication or transaction between Deloitte and Touche and the Commissioner of Taxes (COT), the respondent's predecessor....,.

The respondent has taken the position that a scrip dividend is not the same as bonus shares, and, for that reason, is not exempt from tax in terms of the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

In terms of sections 26 and 28 of the Income Tax Act, shareholders are liable to pay tax on their dividends. The company distributing such dividends is, at law, required to withhold such tax when it distributes the dividends and remit the same to the respondent. See sections 2(1) of both the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income tax Act.

Dividends, for the purposes of shareholders' taxes, are defined in terms of the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act as follows:

“'dividend' means any amount which is distributed by a company to its shareholders…,.”

The most important principle, in relation to this, emanates from the reading of the section itself.

The wording of the letter from Messrs Deloitte and Touche, to the Commissioner of Taxes, becomes relevant. It speaks to the state of the transaction involved. It says in part “…, where a company, in declaring a dividend, allows…,.”

The very act of declaring a dividend is distribution of an amount to the shareholders.

At this stage, before any further considerations are made, the amount so declared is a dividend and subject to the withholding tax.

The fact that the shareholders are then allowed an election, after the declaration of the dividend, matters not. By then, taxes would already have accrued by operation of law.

The act of declaring a dividend is not linked to the choice the shareholders are given in whether to accept cash or take a scrip dividend. The former precedes the latter. At the point the former is declared, tax is chargeable. Therefore, as at the time a dividend is declared, the appellant is obliged to withhold tax for onward transmission to the respondent. What happens to the dividend after that stage matters not for purposes of taxation.

This position is buttressed by section 1(2) under both the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act. The sections are similar and they provide for the following:

“A dividend shall be deemed to be distributed when it is paid to the shareholder, credited to his account or so dealt with that he becomes entitled to it, whichever occurs first.”

The question whether the appellant capitalized its profits can only be determined by having due regard to the circumstances surrounding the transaction. This position was succinctly put forward by BENJAMIN J in Wilson v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 CPD 63 70 in the following words:

“From a consideration of the judgment in that case, it appears the test to be applied is what was the intention of the company dealing with the matter; did the company intend that the sum dealt with should become income or capital. Thus, INNES CJ, in discussing the case of Bouch v Sproule (12 AC 385) said (at p.357):-

'It was a dispute as to whether the tenant for life or the remainder man was entitled to a bonus dividend applied in part payment of certain bonus shares. That depended upon whether the bonus was income passing to the tenant for life under the will or was an accretion of capital enuring to the ultimate benefit of the remainder man. So that the point which lies at the root of the present appeal fell to be decided: The facts were that the directors distributed certain accumulated profits (which had been temporarily capitalized) as a bonus dividend and allocated the new shares (partly paid up) to each shareholder, applying the bonus dividend in part payment of the new shares. Under these circumstances, it was held…, that the company did not pay or intend to pay any sum as dividend, but intended to do, and did, appreciate the undivided profits as an increase of the capital stock; the bonus dividend was therefore capital of the estate and the life tenant was not entitled to it or the shares.'

Again, in discussing the case of the Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Blott (35 T.L.R 687, 36 T.L.R. 575, 125 L.T 4970 he said (at p.358):

'The principle of Bouch v Sproule was applied – namely, that where the company has the power of capitalizing or distributing profits and decided to capitalize them, then the nature issued in respect of such profits was determined by the company's intention; and it was held that the procedure followed did not alter the real nature of the transaction.'

Again, a little lower down in the judgment he said (at p.361):

'The company ought, in the words of LORD HALDANE, to be 'dominant on the question whether the money in question was to be income or capital for all purposes.'”

It immediately becomes clear that for the shares to be considered bonus shares, it must have been a capitalisation of the undistributed profits at the instance of the company.

Once a dividend is paid out and the shareholder is given the option to use such cash dividend to buy more shares, such shares so bought are not bonus shares. This is no more than the shareholder electing to use his dividend to purchase more equity in a company.

The letter by Deloitte and Touche is clear in its tenor.

The choice is given to the shareholder whether to take the dividend in cash or in shares. There is nothing which stops the company from distributing the dividends in cash. In the same vein, there is nothing which would stop a shareholder from accepting some of the dividend in cash and the other part in shares. The intention of the company is paramount here - it was to distribute dividends to its members. It then gave the members a choice of accepting either cash or shares. The scrip dividend in this case does not cease to be a dividend. It is a dividend dealt in a particular way by the shareholder and not the company and it does not lose its status as a dividend. The scrip dividend, in these circumstances, is a dividend and not 'bonus shares.'

The submission by the appellant that “the company's accumulated profits have, as a matter of accounting practice, therefore been capitalised and thus the shareholder has received nothing out of the assets of the company for his separate use and benefit” cannot be correct.

The election to receive shares in lieu of a cash dividend in itself is a purchase of shares.

The choice given to the shareholder is that which shows that the profits have been distributed and the shareholder has elected to use his dues to buy more equity. Since a shareholder who accepts the dividend in cash is liable to pay tax, the fact that another has elected to deal with their dividend in a different manner does not make the dividend so received and utilised any less a dividend. The election to receive shares is a purchase of shares and the shareholder would have received something out of the assets of the company for his separate use and benefit. By distributing the dividend in the first place, the amount representing that dividend would have ceased to be part of the company's assets. The mere declaration of a dividend payable in one manner or the other means that such dividend ceases to be part of the company's assets and can be used by the shareholder in any manner he or she pleases.

On this premise, the contents of the letter by the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) to Deloitte and Touche do not capture the correct position of the law.

Equally untenable is the argument that a scrip dividend is not a dividend in that it is not an “amount distributed by a company to its shareholder.”

The fact of the matter is that the election only arises after the dividend is declared, the default position is that the dividend will be paid out in cash, an amount. When the shareholder elects to have shares instead, the shareholder would have disposed of his cash dividend and bought shares with it. The cash dividend which finances the purchase of shares is an 'amount.' The scrip dividend in that regard is also an amount.

It is not in doubt that after the appellant declared dividends, it invited its shareholders to decide whether to accept cash for the dividends or accept shares in lieu of cash. The acceptance of shares in lieu of cash simply means that the shareholders would have used their dividends to buy more shares in the appellant. The acceptance of shares in lieu of cash is no more than an instruction by the shareholder that his dividend ought to be used to purchase shares. This is totally independent from the declaration of the dividend. The declaration of the dividend is the act of the company and the acceptance of a scrip dividend is the act of a shareholder after the dividend has been declared.

Now, 'bonus shares' are shares which are given out by the company to its shareholders on a pro-rated basis and they are paid for from the company's undistributed reserve profits.

The intentions of the appellant are clear from the letter.

There was no scheme of the capitalisation of capital going on. The shareholders were given an election which they duly exercised. This is distinctly different from capitalization of undistributed profits.

The moment a company declares a dividend, and issues it out, the profits are distributed in the form of cash. The question of bonus shares does not arise as the company, by declaring a cash dividend, would have distributed the profits to its member. The question of bonus shares, which come about where a company does not distribute profits in cash and gives the members more shares in line with their shareholding in the company, does not arise in this case because the profits were distributed to the shareholder in cash as dividends.

'Bonus shares' are fully paid up using the company's reserve un-distributed profits.

The declaration of a dividend is, in its own, a distribution of profit. As such, the question of bonus shares cannot arise where such shares are paid for by proceeds from a dividend. In other words, a scrip dividend is not the same as a bonus share.

The Commissioner of Taxes was clearly wrong in saying that, in a script dividend situation, there is no distribution of profits and no property is passed from the company to the shareholders.

In a scrip dividend scenario, it is the individual shareholder who invests his dividend by purchasing more shares. In a bonus share arrangement, it is the company which pays for shares from the undistributed reserve profits and distribute the same to the members on a pro-rated basis. Both of these schemes result in shares for the members of a company but a scrip dividend is shareholder-driven and a 'bonus share' scheme is company-driven. As such, the principle relating to the two ought not to be conflated.

Perhaps the most important point to note is that where a dividend is declared, the shareholder becomes entitled to it and it attracts tax as at that point and the choice to take a scrip dividend can only be made after such tax is due by operation of law.

Now, regarding the retrospective effect of the Commissioner-General's (COG) measures, the revenue authority is not entitled, at law, to give anyone unlawful tax breaks and prejudice the fiscus.

Where the revenue authority has made an error, it is allowed to rectify it - even retrospectively.

The appellant relies on Commissioner of Taxes v Astra Holdings (Pvt) Ltd 2003 (1) ZLR 417 (S) for the proposition that the taxing authority is required, at law, to act fairly towards both the taxpayer and the fiscus.

In this light, the allegation is that the appellant has acted on the strength of the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) ruling and requiring it to pay withholding tax going three years back would be unfair.

However, as a matter of law, the respondent is not precluded from assessing a tax legally due only because the taxpayer has relied upon the respondent's predecessor's prior mistaken view of the law. In Dixon v United States 381 US 68 (1965), it was said, in part:

“Commissioner is empowered, retroactively, to correct the mistakes of law in the application of the tax laws to particular transactions. He may do so even where a taxpayer may have relied, to his detriment, on the Commissioner's mistake…,. This principle is no more than a reflection of the fact that Congress, not the Commissioner, prescribes tax law.”

The argument by the appellant, that the decision to have it pay withholding tax for the three prior years is unlawful, is untenable.

The point here is that the appellant cannot require the respondent to continue acting unlawfully in order that its actions be fair.

The main duty on the respondent is to act lawfully, and, in demanding the withholding tax, it acted lawfully. There is no question of the respondent acting unfairly when it acts in accordance with the law; in other words, lawfully. Implicit in lawfulness is fairness.

A similar principle can be derived from Tregers Industries (Private) Limited v Commissioner General of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2006 (2) ZLR 62 (H) wherein GARWE JP…, said:

“The applicant argued that the respondent is 'estopped' by the actions of his subordinates from denying that the applicant's interpretation of section of the Act is correct.

I do not accept this submission.

What the applicant is saying is that irrespective of the correct interpretation, the fact that the respondent's employees accepted that the goods in question were zero rated estops the respondent from arguing to the contrary.

As a matter of law, that cannot be correct.

If an interpretation of the law is not correct, then that interpretation is not correct. The fact that respondent's employees may not have looked into the matter more carefully cannot estop the respondent from arguing that such interpretation is not correct.”

The respondent cannot be estopped from acting lawfully.

What is apparent is that the appellant cannot seek to enforce an unlawful position on the basis that it would be unfair on it should the respondent revert to acting lawfully.

Sight should not be lost of the fact that tax law is strict liability law.

The fact that the respondent's predecessor made a mistake upon which it relied does not save the appellant. It would be still required to remit all taxes as is required at law.

It is for these reasons that I dismissed the appeal with costs.

Appealed
SC82-21 : TRIANGLE LIMITED and HIPPO VALLEY ESTATES LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and OTHERS
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MATHONSI JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court sitting at Masvingo, delivered on 24 June 2020, which dismissed with costs the application made by the two appellants for a declaratory order and an interdict.FACTUAL BACKGROUNDThe two appellants are sugar-producing giants in the Lowveld while the first respondent ...

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The two appellants are sugar-producing giants in the Lowveld while the first respondent (Zimbabwe Revenue Authority) is the statutory body charged with revenue collection in Zimbabwe. The remainder of the respondents are either sugar cane farmers or associations representing such farmers (Zimbabwe Sugarcane Development Association, Zimbabwe Cane Farmers Association, Mkwasine Sugarcane Farmers Trust, Commercial Sugarcane Farmers Association of Zimbabwe, Hippo Valley Productive Farmers Association, Zimbabwe Sugarcane Development Association Royal Trust, Chipiwa Mpapa Mill Group, Chiredzi Productive Cane Growers, Farai Dumo Augustine Musikavanhu and Roy Bhila).

The respondents will be referred to in this judgment, for convenience, as Zimbabwe Revenue Authority and the farmers respectively.

The appellants and the farmers entered into two types of agreements, either a “Cane Milling Agreement” or a “Cane Purchase Agreement” in terms of which the appellants would either provide milling services to the farmers and market their sugar and molasses or outrightly purchase the sugar cane.

The dispute which arose between the parties did not involve the outright purchase and sale of sugar cane. As such this judgment does not deal with that scenario at all. The judgment concerns itself with the cane milling agreements entered into between the parties.

In terms of the cane milling agreements, the charge for milling and marketing services, payable by the farmers to the appellants, was calculated in terms of a pre-determined ratio referred to as the “Division of Proceeds” (DoP) ratio. It was fixed at 23 percent of the proceeds the farmers would get; meaning that, the appellants would retain 23 percent of the proceeds while remitting the balance of 77 percent to the farmers.

Regrettably, in fixing the milling and marketing charge, the appellants did not include Value Added Tax (VAT) as required by law. It follows, that, no Value Added Tax was paid by the appellants to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority in that regard.

It was in the process of auditing the appellants Value Added Tax (VAT) assessments for the period 2009 to 2017 that the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority decided that the milling and marketing charges of 23 percent of the proceeds levied by the appellants against the farmers attracted VAT.

The Zimbabwe Revenue Authority proceeded to issue assessments of value added tax (VAT) for those years and demanded payment of same from the appellants. These assessments related to the past supplies where the appellants ought to have, but failed, to collect and remit VAT to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority.

The appellants objected to the assessments which objections were all disallowed by the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority. The appellants appealed to the Fiscal Appeals Court but paid the assessed value added tax (VAT) to the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority notwithstanding.

An appeal does not exonerate a taxpayer from paying the assessed tax.

View Appeal
HMA28-20 : TRIANGLE LIMITED and HIPPO VALLEY ESTATES vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZISENGWE J

The Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) is a statutory body whose chief mandate is to assess, collect, and enforce the payment of all revenues on behalf of the State. It is established in terms of the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11].

SC98-21 : M COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, GUVAVA JA and GOWORA JA

This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Fiscal Appeal Court handed down on 1 November 2016 under judgment number HH661-16 of case number FA08/14, in terms of which the court handed down judgment in favour of the respondent.The appellant seeks relief in the following terms:“WHEREFORE Appellant prays ...

This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Fiscal Appeal Court handed down on 1 November 2016 under judgment number HH661-16 of case number FA08/14, in terms of which the court handed down judgment in favour of the respondent.

The appellant seeks relief in the following terms:

“WHEREFORE Appellant prays that the appeal be allowed with costs and that the order of the court a quo be set aside and substituted with the following:

The appeal be and is hereby allowed as prayed.”

The material facts of this matter are as follows:

The appellant is a locally registered company that operates as an exporter and seller of processed tobacco from Zimbabwe. On 1 April 2004 and 1 April 2011, respectively, the appellant entered into two successive "Sales and Marketing Commission Agreements" with two foreign companies domiciled in Bermuda and Switzerland respectively. The appellant was identified in both documents as the "Principal" whilst the foreign companies were specifically termed "agents" in the sale of the appellant's export tobacco to foreign markets.

The initial sales commission agreed upon by the appellant and the agents was 8.5 per cent of the aggregate net export sales and Foreign Currency Account (FCA) Zimbabwe sales value of each export. The sales commission was subsequently reduced to 7.5 per cent in compliance with the Zimbabwe Exchange Control Regulations.

In 2007, the respondent undertook an audit of the affairs of the appellant. It was subsequently determined, that, the commission paid in respect of the Sales and Marketing Commission Agreements for the year 2005 qualified as fees for services of a technical and administrative nature, performed by an overseas agent, on behalf of the appellant.

In light thereof, the respondent determined, that, the appellant was liable for withholding non-resident tax as provided for in the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] (the Act).

On 5 April 2007, the respondent issued an assessment of withholding tax to the appellant, which assessment the appellant objected to.

On 10 August 2007, the respondent disallowed the objections lodged by the appellant leading to an appeal being filed on 24 August 2007. The appeal subsequently lapsed, having been filed outside of the prescribed time limits, and the appellant continued to remit non-resident tax fees to the respondent.

On 24 October 2013, the appellant indicated to the respondent that it would cease any further remittals of non-resident tax fees pending a resolution of its 2007 appeal.

The parties conducted a meeting on 5 December 2013, in terms of which the respondent produced a schedule of payable withholding tax fees from the period of January 2009 to October 2013. In terms of the schedule, the principle amount of the non-resident's withholding tax fees that was due was US$4,252,647=57. An equivalent amount was imposed as a penalty and a further US$795,988=62 was imposed as interest. The penalty fee was later reduced, leaving the appellant with a revised total liability of US$5,974,959=97.

The appellant objected to the revised schedule of non-resident's withholding tax by means of an objection letter dated 16 December 2013. The appellant disputed liability on the basis that commissions constituted fees as contemplated in section 30 as read with the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act.

Eventually, the appellant undertook to pay the outstanding principal amount by way of four separate instalments spanning between 13 December 2013 and 20 January 2014.

As a result of the undertaking, the respondent elected to further waive the reduced penalty and interest through an e-mail sent on 19 December 2013.

The appellant, however, managed to settle the entire principal amount by 20 December 2013.

On 13 December, a meeting was held between the appellant's tax advisors and the respondent. It appeared, that, in the course of the meeting, the parties agreed that the objections noted by the appellant had been improperly made.

In any event, however, the appellant proceeded to file its Notice of Appeal in the court a quo on 25 March 2014 and served the respondent with the same on the following day. The appeal was premised on the failure of the respondent to make a response to the appellant's objection letter within the prescribed three month time frame.

At the hearing, the respondent raised a preliminary objection to the appeal on the basis, that, it did not issue any written decision of the Commissioner to the appellant on 5 December 2013 or any other date. Consequently, the objection of 10 December 2013, and subsequent notice of appeal issued on 25 March, was invalid and of no force or effect.

The appellant contended, inter alia, that the appeal was validated in terms of paragraph (y) of the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act which prescribes the decisions of the Commissioner that may be subjected to objection and appeal.

It was established as common cause, that, the appellant abandoned its 2007 appeal with the effect that the appellant accepted liability for the non-resident tax on fees which it had failed to withhold and remit to the respondent.

Moreover, both parties accepted that the subsequent commissions paid by the appellant, during the period prior to August 2007, constituted fees for services of a technical, administrative, managerial, or consultative nature.

Having established the fact, it was determined, that, the appellant was not precluded from objecting, as it did, to the respondent's assessment of liability for its failure to remit non-residents tax fees for the period January 2009 to October 2013.

In view thereof, the court a quo determined that the appeal was properly before it.

SC140-21 : MBCA BANK (PRIVATE) LIMITED (Now known as Nedbank Zimbabwe Limited) vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and MAKONI JA

This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals, dated 28 November 2019, upholding the respondent's amended assessment of tax against the appellant....,.The respondent is an authority established in terms of the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11]. It is responsible for assessing, collecting, ...

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

This is an appeal against four amended income tax assessments number 20211442 for the year ending 31 December 2009; 20211443 for the year ending 31 December 2010; 202211446 for the year ending 31 December 2011; and 20211448 for the year ending 31 December 2012 that were issued against the appellant ...

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

Although distinguishable on the facts and contentions of law, to the extent that Commissioner of Taxes v Astra Holdings (Pvt) Ltd t/a Puzey and Payne 2003 (1) ZLR 417 (SC) was decided on the principle of “the operation of law” the respondent was correct to rely on that case for ...

HH823-15 : AT INTERNATIONAL LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

The answer sought in this appeal is whether, the appellant, a foreign registered company is liable to pay value added tax in Zimbabwe.The appellant disputed liability for value added tax (VAT) arising from the purported importation of goods into and the carrying on of trade in Zimbabwe and appealed against ...

The answer sought in this appeal is whether, the appellant, a foreign registered company is liable to pay value added tax in Zimbabwe.

The appellant disputed liability for value added tax (VAT) arising from the purported importation of goods into and the carrying on of trade in Zimbabwe and appealed against a contrary determination of the respondent.

Introduction

The appellant is an International Business Company incorporated on 19 May 2005 in the British Virgin Islands in Guernsey in the Channel Islands but is not permitted to trade in that jurisdiction. The respondent is a body corporate responsible for the collection, amongst other imposts, of value added tax in Zimbabwe.

The Facts

The original intention of the appellant in Zimbabwe, prior to 1992, was to invest in property and participate in the construction of the Chitungwiza road…,.

Instead, the appellant became a supplier of basic commodities to local companies that included the WG (hereinafter referred to as the holding company).

It concluded an agency agreement with D & T, a subsidiary of the holding company, in 1992.

By 1999, it was supplying basic commodities under a US$10 million line of credit registered with the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to the holding company and other local customers…,.

On 1 October 2007, the Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe unveiled the Basic Commodities Supply Side Intervention, BACOSSI, facility designed to end the chronic shortages of basic commodities in Zimbabwe…,.

The facility commenced in May 2008 and continued until the introduction of the multi-currency regime on 29 January 2009.

In May 2008, officials of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) amongst whom was the Governor and the Senior Division Chief Strategic Planning and Special Projects (SDC) visited the warehouse of D & T in Chitungwiza. The RBZ was referred to the appellant by D & T.

The appellant and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) commenced negotiations which culminated in the purchase of the non-Bacossi basic commodities that were in the D & T warehouse valued at US$7,987,207=54. The two parties also concluded an agreement in which the appellant supplied basic commodities to the RBZ, in Zimbabwe, the bacossi goods, valued at US$11,698,174 between July and September 2008.

The Baccossi Agreement was reduced to writing…, but was not signed by the parties apparently because the appellant was unhappy with the preamble to the agreement.

A verbal agreement, purportedly concluded between the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), represented by the Governor, and the appellant, represented by a named Ukrainian lady, governed the supply relationship between them.

The respondent conducted a tax investigation of the purchases, in foreign currency, of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe from the appellant for the period between May 2006 and September 2008. The investigations revealed non-payment of value added tax (VAT) on the supplies made in that period…,.

They also revealed that D & T was paid commission, in terms of an agreement between them, on the invoiced supplies from 1 January 2006 to 31 January 2009.

On 9 February 2009…, the respondent made written demand on the Finance Director of the holding company, who was also the public officer of D & T, for the payment of value added tax (VAT) on the invoiced income paid to the appellant during that period.

On 13 February, a meeting was held at the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) between the Senior Division Chief Strategic Planning and Special Projects, the investigators of the respondent, and the liaison officer of the appellant, who was also the Sales and Marketing Director of the holding company of D & T, the appellant's agent.

On 12 March, the respondent appointed the CEO of the holding company of D & T as the public officer for the appellant in terms of section 61 of the Taxes Act on the ground that his company was closely linked and connected to the appellant's local trading activities.

The CEO objected to the appointment on 17 and 20 March 2009 on the ground, that, he was not an agent, employee, director, or signatory to the bank account of the appellant; but, the respondent did not relent in its demand.

On 20 March 2009, at the respondent's offices, a meeting was held between three representatives of the respondent and two tax advisors from a local firm of accountants.

In reply to counsel for the respondent's oral submissions, counsel for the appellant disputed that the appellant was represented at the meeting and suggested that the tax accountants represented D & T.

The purpose of the meeting was to get the respondent's version on the value added tax (VAT) issues pertaining to both the appellant and D & T.

The VAT head from the tax advisors provided the respondent with two letters of his firm's mandate to represent the client.

It is inconceivable that he would not have received full instructions from his client, as he indicated, were that client D & T.

I am satisfied, from the heading of the minutes minuted by the tax advisors, that, they represented the appellant and not D & T.

In any event, the briefing given him by the respondent related to the alleged activities of the appellant, including the payment of 0.1% commission on the gross sales of the appellant in Zimbabwe to D & T.

On 30 March, the public officer of D & T disputed the legality of the appointment of his CEO as a public officer for the appellant. He, nonetheless, compiled and delivered the monthly breakdowns of the income received by D & T during the period from January 2006 to 31 January 2009 requested in the letter of 9 February.

On 25 March 2015…, the appellant wrote to the respondent objecting to the appointment of the public officer outside its registered place of business in Guernsey and to the tax liability claim.

The basis of the objection was that it did not maintain offices nor employ staff nor was it a value added tax (VAT) registered operator obligated to charge VAT on goods purchased from its foreign based operations and supplied to clients in Zimbabwe.

The relevant part of the letter reads:

“We object to your claim that we have a tax liability in Zimbabwe as we do not have a self-established presence in the country. Our involvement with Zimbabwe clients, and the West Group, is limited to the supply of our stock to agents who operate on a commission basis to store and handle our stock that we hold in Zimbabwe, for which we have always operated with Reserve Bank Approval.”

The objection by the appellant, of 25 March, and the further objection of its compulsorily appointed public officer, were dismissed by the respondent on 31 March 2009.

On 1 April, the respondent proceeded to appoint the holding company, and its subsidiaries, as an agent for the collection of value added tax (VAT) due from the appellant, purportedly in terms of section 48 of the Value Added Tax Act…,.

On 3 April 2009, the appellant, through its authorised signatories, wrote to the CEO of the holding company appointed as its public officer and copied the letter to the head of investigations of the respondent, and the Senior Division Chief Strategic Planning and Special Projects on the tax enquiry conducted by the respondent disputing tax liability on two grounds:

(i) The first was that it was not the importer; and

(ii) The second was that the sale to the importer, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), took place outside Zimbabwe.

I believe exhibit 2 may have been written by the compulsorily appointed public officer for the appellant between May 2009 and 17 June 2009, and not on 15 April 2008, as it is highly unlikely that the author possessed prescient powers to predict the events that were to take place between January and May 2009.

It was addressed to the prospective external legal practitioner of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ).

The writer summarised the history of the relationship between the appellant and the holding company and one of its subsidiaries, D & T, before and during the bacossi period. He also dealt with the relationship between these parties and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and exonerated the appellant from value added tax (VAT) liability.

In response, on 17 June 2009, the external legal practitioner of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) wrote a six page legal opinion to the Senior Division Chief on the US$4m tax dispute….,.

The legal practitioner in question had apparently held a meeting, on 21 April, with the Senior Division Chief of the central bank and two representatives of the holding company. He believed, that, his mandate to protect the interests of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) coincided with the interests of the appellant. He had engaged the lawyers of record of the appellant.

He identified the common problem to be the demand for value added tax (VAT) on the appellant in respect of the supply of Bacossi goods and its agent on commission received from the appellant.

Apparently, the appellant declined to supply him with information on its business profile, shareholders and directors, summary of significant business activities in the 12 months to the date of the letter and on the nature and extent of its business activities in Zimbabwe, its certificate of registration, any Board resolutions on Bacossi transactions, and its local call account.

In the absence of this information, he could not state, with certainty, that the appellant was not conducting local trading activities nor exclude it from value added tax (VAT) liability other than on the mere say so of its agent, D & T.

He advised that the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) was liable for the payment of value added tax (VAT), in local currency, on the basis of the bills of entry that identified it as the importer.

He urged the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), for strategic reasons that he set out in the opinion, to tender the duty in local currency hoping, that, if the respondent accepted the payment, the appellant would automatically be exempted from liability.

On 1 July 2009, the Senior Division Chief wrote to the appellant's legal practitioner of record. She confirmed the importation of Bacossi goods and the acceptance of liability for value added tax (VAT) by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ)….,.

On 20 August 2009, three members of the respondent investigations team held a meeting with four RBZ employees at the RBZ amongst whom was the Senior Division Chief (SDC).

In that meeting, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) repudiated the concession made by the Senior Division Chief (SDC) and laid liability at the doorstep of the appellant.

However, in view of the national importance of the project and the profile of the major beneficiaries, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) resolved to seek exemption for payment of value added tax (VAT) on these goods from the Ministry of Finance by 25 August 2009.

A further meeting was held on 7 October 2009, in the Governor's boardroom at the Central Bank, between the Reserve Bank and the holding company, to discuss the appellant/RBZ value added tax (VAT) liability of US$3.2m….,.

In attendance were the Governor, his advisor, bank secretary, and a strategic planning executive for the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the Sales and Marketing Director, indicated in exhibit 2 as the liaison officer of the appellant, and another officer of the holding company.

Notwithstanding that the respondent was not claiming value added tax (VAT) from the central bank, the Governor prevaricated on whether the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) accepted liability or not. In one vein he accused the Senior Division Chief (SDC) of erroneously accepting liability for the central bank without his express authority, and, in the other, he was prepared to pay the VAT as long as it was charged in Zimbabwe dollars.

The Sales and Marketing Director for the holding company declined to answer for the appellant insisting that D & T acted as liaison for the appellant as the foreign supplier and local buyers.

The underlying suggestion from her contribution was that the appellant was not liable for value added tax (VAT).

In addition, the concluding remarks of the meeting suggested the existence of minutes of meetings between the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) and the appellant.

The investigation prompted the respondent to raise against the appellant schedules for outstanding value added tax (VAT) on both the non-Bacossi and Bacossi transactions, initially on 17 March and later on 15 July 2009, in the sum of US$6,302,712=13 inclusive of interest and penalties, which it corrected by the exclusion of zero rated products on 13 October 2009 by reducing the amount to the sum of US$6,249,496=70.

The computations of the principal value added tax (VAT) due in each month for the non Bacossi commodities were in the sum of US$1,198,081=13. The respondent added an equal amount in penalties and a further amount of US$206,799=52 in interest and requested payment of US$2,602,961=79 for the non-Bacossi commodities.

In regards to the Bacossi commodities, it claimed a principal sum of US$1,754,726=10 and a penalty in an equal amount and interest from 21 July 2008 to 23 October 2009 in the sum of US$137,082=72 totalling US$3,646,534=92….,.

The appellant lodged an objection to the assessment in terms of section 32 of the Value Added Tax Act [Chapter 23:12] through its legal practitioners of record on 25 September 2009.

It also applied for condonation from the Commissioner for filing the objection outside the normal time limits. It set out four grounds for condonation and eight grounds of objection.

The respondent dismissed the condonation and disallowed the objection.

The appellant appealed both decisions to this Court on 12 October 2009. The respondent filed its reply on 12 November 2009....,.

Rule 5(c) Documents

The respondent did not file Rule 5(c) documents within 14 days of entering his reply as required by Rule 5.

The material correspondence contemplated by Rule 5(c) would consist of the notice claiming the outstanding value added tax (VAT), the letter of objection, and the Commissioner's response to the objection.

Rather, at the hearing, and soon after the appellant had closed its case, counsel for the respondent produced the purported documents from the bar.

The documents consisted of a letter of objection dated 21 October 2014, a set of original value added tax (VAT) assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on that date for the period May 2006 to August 2008, the letter of objection of 25 September 2009, and the unsigned agreement on the supply of basic commodities between the appellant and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.

It did not file the ruling dismissing the condonation sought and disallowing the objection.

In the letter of objection, the appellant refers to “assessments, the last of which are dated 15 July 2009.”

The earlier assessments of 17 March and 22 May and the letters of 24 June and 10 September 2009, referred to in the notice of appeal, were not produced in evidence nor did they form part of the Rule 5(c) documents or the pleadings.

The respondent must simply comply with the law to obviate unnecessary delays associated with his failure to abide by the law in this regard.

The documents constitute a type of record of proceedings, which helps this Court understand the real dispute between the parties and the basis on which the determination appealed against was made.

That the objection was dismissed on the ground that it was filed out of time was only disclosed in the respondent's reply to the notice and grounds of appeal.

Rule 5(c) documents are simple documents that the respondent always has in its possession - even before filing his reply. This kind of dilatoriness on its part is totally inexcusable.

The respondent is directed to comply with Rule 5(c) in all future cases.

Condonation

At the pre-trial hearing of 17 September 2014, by consent of the parties, the delay in the filing of the notice of objection by the appellant and the failure to file Rule 5(c) documents timeously by the respondent were condoned.

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Law Portal
Zimbabwe

Approach re: Functions & Powers of Revenue Authority, Fiscal Appeals or Objections & the Pay Now Argue Later Principle

HH79-12 : MARIANE SABETA vs COMMISSIONER GENERAL ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH68-14 : FAIRDROP TRADING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs THE ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

Appealed
HH328-14 : PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J

CC09-16 : BENARD WEKARE and MUSANGANO LODGE (PVT) LTD t/a MUSANGANO LODGE vs THE STATE and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ZIMBABWE and ZIMBABWE BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GARWE JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

HMA17-17 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS (Case 1) and SYLVIA CHORUWA (Case 2) vs COMMISSIONER – GENERAL, ZIMRA
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

Appealed
SC76-17 : CARE INTERNATIONAL IN ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and DESMOND MAMINIMINI and SURVIVAL HARDWARE (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: GOWORA JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and BHUNU JA

CC07-14 : MAYOR LOGISTICS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ

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SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GOWORA JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

HMA01-18 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS and SYLVIA CHORUWA and PATRICK MUGUTI vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and MINISTER OF FINANCE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and ATTORNEY GENERAL
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

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SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED
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SC13-19 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and ZIYAMBI AJA

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HH964-15 : ECONET WIRELESS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER GENERAL and STEWARD BANK LTD and CBZ BANK LTD and NMB BANK LTD and STANBIC BANK LTD
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HH621-15 : DELTA CORPORATION LTD vs ZIMABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
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Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MATHONSI JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

View Appeal
HMA28-20 : TRIANGLE LIMITED and HIPPO VALLEY ESTATES vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZISENGWE J

SC98-21 : M COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, GUVAVA JA and GOWORA JA

SC140-21 : MBCA BANK (PRIVATE) LIMITED (Now known as Nedbank Zimbabwe Limited) vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and MAKONI JA

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH823-15 : AT INTERNATIONAL LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

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Law Portal Zimbabwe

Approach re: Functions & Powers of Revenue Authority, Fiscal Appeals or Objections & the Pay Now Argue Later Principle

HH79-12 : MARIANE SABETA vs COMMISSIONER GENERAL ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH68-14 : FAIRDROP TRADING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs THE ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

Appealed HH328-14 : PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J

CC09-16 : BENARD WEKARE and MUSANGANO LODGE (PVT) LTD t/a MUSANGANO LODGE vs THE STATE and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ZIMBABWE and ZIMBABWE BROADCASTING CORPORATION Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GARWE JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

HMA17-17 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS (Case 1) and SYLVIA CHORUWA (Case 2) vs COMMISSIONER – GENERAL, ZIMRA Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

Appealed SC76-17 : CARE INTERNATIONAL IN ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and DESMOND MAMINIMINI and SURVIVAL HARDWARE (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: GOWORA JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and BHUNU JA

CC07-14 : MAYOR LOGISTICS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: MALABA DCJ

View Appeal SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GOWORA JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

HMA01-18 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS and SYLVIA CHORUWA and PATRICK MUGUTI vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and MINISTER OF FINANCE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and ATTORNEY GENERAL Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

View Appeal SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GOWORA JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

SC13-19 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and ZIYAMBI AJA

Appealed SC17-19 : ECONET WIRELESS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER GENERAL Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, GOWORA JA and MAVANGIRA JA

View Appeal HH964-15 : ECONET WIRELESS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER GENERAL and STEWARD BANK LTD and CBZ BANK LTD and NMB BANK LTD and STANBIC BANK LTD Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

HH621-15 : DELTA CORPORATION LTD vs ZIMABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO J

Appealed SC82-21 : TRIANGLE LIMITED and HIPPO VALLEY ESTATES LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and OTHERS Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MATHONSI JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

View Appeal HMA28-20 : TRIANGLE LIMITED and HIPPO VALLEY ESTATES vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and OTHERS Ruled By: ZISENGWE J

SC98-21 : M COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, GUVAVA JA and GOWORA JA

SC140-21 : MBCA BANK (PRIVATE) LIMITED (Now known as Nedbank Zimbabwe Limited) vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and MAKONI JA

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH823-15 : AT INTERNATIONAL LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: KUDYA J

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Law Portal
Zimbabwe

HH79-12 : MARIANE SABETA vs COMMISSIONER GENERAL ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH68-14 : FAIRDROP TRADING (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs THE ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

Appealed
HH328-14 : PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: CHIGUMBA J

CC09-16 : BENARD WEKARE and MUSANGANO LODGE (PVT) LTD t/a MUSANGANO LODGE vs THE STATE and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ZIMBABWE and ZIMBABWE BROADCASTING CORPORATION
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GARWE JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

HMA17-17 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS (Case 1) and SYLVIA CHORUWA (Case 2) vs COMMISSIONER – GENERAL, ZIMRA
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

Appealed
SC76-17 : CARE INTERNATIONAL IN ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and DESMOND MAMINIMINI and SURVIVAL HARDWARE (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: GOWORA JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and BHUNU JA

CC07-14 : MAYOR LOGISTICS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ

View Appeal
SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GOWORA JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

HMA01-18 : MAIN ROAD MOTORS and SYLVIA CHORUWA and PATRICK MUGUTI vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and MINISTER OF FINANCE & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT and ATTORNEY GENERAL
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

View Appeal
SC28-16 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs PACKERS INTERNATIONAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GOWORA JA and HLATSHWAYO JA

SC13-19 : ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY vs STANBIC BANK ZIMBABWE LIMITED
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, MAVANGIRA JA and ZIYAMBI AJA

Appealed
SC17-19 : ECONET WIRELESS (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER GENERAL
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, GOWORA JA and MAVANGIRA JA

View Appeal
HH964-15 : ECONET WIRELESS (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and COMMISSIONER GENERAL and STEWARD BANK LTD and CBZ BANK LTD and NMB BANK LTD and STANBIC BANK LTD
Ruled By: MUSAKWA J

HH621-15 : DELTA CORPORATION LTD vs ZIMABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO J

Appealed
SC82-21 : TRIANGLE LIMITED and HIPPO VALLEY ESTATES LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and OTHERS
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, MATHONSI JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

View Appeal
HMA28-20 : TRIANGLE LIMITED and HIPPO VALLEY ESTATES vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY and OTHERS
Ruled By: ZISENGWE J

SC98-21 : M COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO JA, GUVAVA JA and GOWORA JA

SC140-21 : MBCA BANK (PRIVATE) LIMITED (Now known as Nedbank Zimbabwe Limited) vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and MAKONI JA

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH823-15 : AT INTERNATIONAL LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J