I am inclined to agree with the remarks by the court a quo that:

“The provisions of s103(2) are peremptory and in the absence of a cogent argument as to why council should not comply with the said provision I am unable to find that s89 applies in the removal of a mayor from office.”

This is an appeal against a judgment of the Labour Court which dismissed an appeal by the appellant (“Murawo”) against the termination of his contract of employment by the respondent, the Grain Marketing Board (“the GMB”).

The background facts are as follows:

Murawo was employed by the GMB as a Safety, Health and Environment Officer. Between 4 March and 7 March 2004 the GMB held a strategic planning workshop (“the workshop”) at Troutbeck Inn, Nyanga. Those eligible to attend the workshop were divisional heads and departmental heads. Officers below departmental heads could also attend the workshop if invited.

Murawo was neither a divisional head nor a departmental head.

On 5 March 2004, Murawo attended the workshop and presented his paper. However, it later turned out that Murawo's attendance at the workshop had not been authorised by the GMB directorate. He was, therefore, asked to leave the workshop.

On 6 March 2004, Murawo left the workshop and checked out of the hotel, but remained within the hotel premises because he had a cheque to give to Mrs Zemura (“Zemura”), the GMB's Public Relations Manager, who was participating in the workshop.

However, Murawo's continued presence at the hotel offended the GMB directorate.

Consequently, the directorate called upon Mhonde, Murawo's head of department, to ensure that Murawo left the hotel premises. Subsequently, Murawo left Troutbeck Inn after giving Zemura the cheque that he was supposed to give her.

Thereafter, on 8 March 2004, Murawo was suspended without pay and benefits on the ground that he had committed two acts of misconduct in terms of the GMB Code of Conduct (“the Code”). In relevant part, the letter of suspension, written by Mhonde, reads as follows:

“On Wednesday the 3rd of March 2004, you communicated to me that the Marketing Director had invited you to the Strategic Planning Workshop. This, however, turned out to be untrue.

On Saturday morning, at about 08.30am, on the 6th March 2004, I told you to leave the Troutbeck Inn immediately as you were not invited to the meeting. However, up to lunchtime you were still at the premises and now purporting to have been tasked by the A/CEO to discuss issues related to workers with the Union representatives, Mr Munodawafa and Mr Mhunza, and present them in the seminar. This also turned out to be untrue.

Given the scenario explained above, Management has decided that you be suspended without pay and benefits with immediate effect, and you are being charged in line with the GMB Code of Conduct as follows:

1. Category I section 1: 'Insubordination – wilful and unreasonable disobedience of a lawful order from a superior'.

2. Category I section 5: '…, activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of his contract of employment.'…,.

In keeping with the provisions of our Code of Conduct you are required to reply in writing answering to the above charges…,. Your reply must, of necessity, cover the following aspects:

(a) Admit or deny the charges.

(b) Facts to be taken into account if you admit the charges.

(c) If you deny the charges, offer an explanation of the basis of your defence…,.”

On 9 March 2004, Murawo replied to the letter of suspension. His letter, in relevant part, reads as follows:

“I confirm that I did not receive a written invitation to present a paper at the Troutbeck Retreat. I, however, thought, in good faith, that, since this was an important strategic planning session of the organisation our department could take advantage of the gathering of eminent people in the organisation to market the Health and Safety portfolio which was launched some eight months ago.

I prepared a document for presentation. Initially, the presentation was short and just a small section of the presentation of the Engineering Department. I, however, developed a longer presentation which I thought could be incorporated in the Engineering Report. I thought I was contributing to the organisation's cause. I did not know that in doing so I was contravening any section of the GMB Code of Conduct.

Therefore, if at all I contravened category I section 1 and 5 of the Code, the contravention was not wilful.

When I was excused from the activities of the 6th of March 2004, I checked out of the hotel. I, however, realised that I had forgotten to give a cheque I had been asked to bring to Mrs Zemura. As the morning session had already started, I thought it was not wise to disturb the session. I waited for an opportune moment to give the cheque to Mrs Zemura. That moment presented itself at lunchtime and I duly handed over the cheque to Mrs Zemura. At the same time, some apples and potatoes I had ordered away from the hotel, after checking out, were only delivered to me around the same time. I then left for Harare…,.”

On 18 March 2004, Murawo appeared before a disciplinary hearing committee which found him guilty on both counts, and recommended his dismissal. He was subsequently dismissed with effect from the date of his suspension, i.e. 8 March 2004.

Thereafter, on 3 May 2004, Murawo appealed to the Acting Chief Executive Officer (“Muvuti”) against the dismissal. In that appeal he alleged that he had attended the workshop because Mhonde had indicated to him that he (Mhonde) would be comfortable if he (i.e. Murawo) attended the workshop and presented his own paper as an addendum to his (i.e. Mhonde's) report. He also denied being ordered by Mhonde to leave Troutbeck Inn.

Nevertheless, on 30 May 2004, Muvuti dismissed the appeal.

Aggrieved by that decision, Murawo appealed to the Labour Court. After hearing evidence and considering written submissions filed on behalf of the parties, the Labour Court allowed the appeal in respect of the first count, i.e. the count alleging “wilful and unreasonable disobedience of a lawful order from a superior”, but, dismissed the appeal in respect of the second count, i.e. the count alleging that Murawo committed “activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of his contract of employment.”

Dissatisfied with that result, Murawo appealed to this Court....,.

The main issue in this appeal is whether Murawo was properly found guilty of “activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of his contract of employment.”

However, before dealing with that issue, I would like to consider a submission by Murawo's counsel in his heads of argument.

The submission was that the Labour Court erred in its interpretation of the act of misconduct specified in section 5 of category I offences, and that, in terms of the eiusdem generis rule of statutory interpretation the conduct complained of by the GMB does not constitute the act of misconduct specified in section 5.

The act of misconduct specified in section 5 reads as follows:

“Incitement, intimidation, indulging in disorderly behaviour or activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of his contract of employment.”

As already indicated, Murawo was charged with “activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of his contract of employment.”

The submission by Murawo's counsel was that the activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of an employee's contract of employment, envisaged in section 5, must be activities in the same genus or class as incitement, intimidation and indulging in disorderly behaviour.

The learned author, GAIL-MARYSE COCKRAM, states the eiusdem generis rule as follows, at p153 of her work, The Interpretation of Statutes 3ed:

“Where a list of items which form a genus or class is followed by a general expression, the general expression is, in the absence of a contrary intention in the statute, construed eiusdem generis to include only other things of the same class as the particular words.”

I should now determine whether the eiusdem generis rule applies to the interpretation of Employment Codes of Conduct.

I do not think it does.

I say so because, in general, Employment Codes of Conduct are not drafted with the same expertise and precision required for the drafting of statutes. Almost invariably, Employment Codes of Conduct are drafted by laymen with little or no knowledge of law.

However, even if the eiusdem generis rule applied to Employment Codes of Conduct, I am of the view that the rule should have no application in the present case because it would lead to an absurdity. It would mean that “activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of his contract of employment” which are in the same genus or class as “incitement, intimidation (and) indulging in disorderly behaviour” would constitute acts of misconduct, whilst other “activities inconsistent with the express or implied condition of his contract of employment”, which are not in the same genus or class as “incitement, intimidation (and) indulging in disorderly behaviour”, which could be more serious activities, would not constitute acts of misconduct.

In any event, the eiusdem generis rule is not a rule of general application, and has to be applied with caution.

This point was made by SOLOMON CJ, in Rex v Nolte 1928 AD 377…, where the learned CHIEF JUSTICE said:

“Moreover, the rule itself is one that has to be applied with caution, and is not of general application. Thus, LORD ESHER, in Anderson v Anderson (1895 1 QB 752) in commenting upon the rule, said:

'I am not surprised to find that the modern tendency of the Courts has been to construe general words in their ordinary sense'…,.”

Similar views were expressed by BARON JA in S v Makandigona 1981 (4) SA 439 (Z AD)…, as follows:

“It must be remembered that the eiusdem generis rule is only one of many rules of construction; it is not to be invoked automatically whenever general words follow particular words. Thus, Craies on Statute Law 7ed says at 181:

'The eiusdem generis rule is one to be applied with caution and not pushed too far, as in the case of many decisions, which treat it as automatically applicable, and not as being what it is, a mere presumption, in the absence of other indications of the intention of the legislature.'”

In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the Labour Court did not err in its interpretation of the act of misconduct specified in section 5 of Category I offences. I am also satisfied that the conduct complained of by the GMB constitutes the act of misconduct specified in section 5.

This is a labour dispute between the parties. A brief history of the matter is as follows:

The appellant (the Corporation) employed the respondent (Mr Moyana) on 20 October 1980 as a Marketing Executive. The contract was a simple one, providing that his functions were to be assigned to him from time to time. His starting salary was specified and it was provided that "salary reviews are carried out in Nedlaw as and when an executive shows himself to have performed well and produced results."

(Nedlaw was the Corporation's holding company).

There was also provision for one month's notice of termination of the contract to be given by either side.

Mr Moyana became a Training Officer in the Training Department in 1981 and a Principal Training Officer on 9 January 1982.

On 27 May 1986, the Group Personnel and Training Director wrote complaining about certain alleged shortcomings in Mr Moyana's work, and Mr Moyana replied rejecting the complaints. He claimed that the problems arose out of shortage of staff, and pointed out that the Training Manager had been transferred and not replaced. He claimed that his request for a salary review had been ignored and asserted that he was entitled to an acting allowance during the absence of the Training Manager.

The Corporation's Chairman then wrote withdrawing the letter of 27 May 1986 and adding "Your reply dated 2 June 1986 therefore falls away."

Mr Moyana at once responded that he did not withdraw his claim to be paid as a Training Manager from the time the actual Training Manager had left. (He did not, at any stage, rely on an actual appointment as Training Manager).

After a certain amount of bickering, which need not be set out, the Corporation suspended Mr Moyana without pay with effect from 16 July 1986 and referred the dispute to a Labour Relations Officer in terms of the Labour Relations (General Conditions of Employment) (Termination of Employment) Regulations 1985 (S.I.371 of 1985).

Thereafter, events developed as follows:

1. On 1 October 1986, the Hearing Officer made a determination that Mr. Moyana be reinstated and paid $12,000 in "Back payment in salary."

2. The Corporation appealed to the Regional Hearing Officer, but, meanwhile, on 6 October 1986, reinstated Mr Moyana as directed.

3. On 22 December 1986, the Regional Hearing Officer upheld the Hearing Officer's decision and increased the "back payment" from $12,000 to $15,184.

4. On 25 March 1987, the High Court, in Judgment No. HH168-87, set aside both these determinations on the grounds of procedural irregularity. In doing so, it commented: "It may well be that, in practical terms, the applicant will be obliged to approach the Labour Relations Officer once again for authority to dismiss the second respondent, but, that is not the concern of this court."

5. Ignoring this advice, and after further criticism by the Corporation's senior officers of Mr Moyana's performance, the Chairman wrote to him, on 28 May 1987, formally terminating his contract of employment and giving him a month's pay in lieu of notice.

6. On 8 June 1987, Mr Moyana referred this dismissal and his claim for an acting allowance of $33,750 to a Labour Relations Officer.

7. The matter was referred to the Labour Relations Board in terms of section 109(2)(d) of the Labour Relations Act, 1985.

8. The Labour Relations Board made determination on 8 April 1988. In summary, it ordered:

(a) Payment of an acting allowance for the twenty-four months preceding the date of the order. Page 307 of 1989 (1) ZLR 304 (SC).

(b) Payment of emoluments from the date of illegal termination to date.

(c) Termination of the contract of employment forthwith (ie with effect from 8 April 1988) on the ground of incompatibility.

9. The Corporation appealed against this decision to the Labour Relations Tribunal which, in an undated judgment apparently handed down on 12 October 1988, ordered as follows:

"1. That the termination of Mr Moyana's contract of employment, as per the Corporation's letter of 28 May 1987, was of no force or effort.

2. That Mr Moyana be and is hereby reinstated as the Corporation's Principal Training Officer without loss of salary or other benefit accompanying his post.

3. That the Corporation pay Mr Moyana acting allowance for carrying out the functions of a Training Manager for a period of 24 months extending from 8 July 1987 and dating back to 7 July 1985 at the rate for the job less his salary as Principal Training Officer.

4. That there be no order as to costs."

Against this order, the Corporation appealed to the Supreme Court. It alleged a number of procedural irregularities and sought a reversal of each of the orders made by the Tribunal.

I will deal with them in turn.

(A) THE VALIDITY OF MR MOYANA'S DISMISSAL ON 28 MAY 1987

I noted earlier that the Corporation seemed to ignore the advice of the High Court that it should, again, seek authority to dismiss Mr Moyana.

The letter of 28 May 1987 is very curiously worded. It begins by saying:

"This letter is to inform you of the termination of your employment with the Art Printers Group in terms of sections 3(a), 3(b), 3(g) and 3(h) of Statutory Instrument 371 [of 1985]."

Yet, those subsections do not deal with termination of employment. They deal with summary suspension without pay.

The Corporation was well aware of this because earlier, on 16 July 1986, it had acted under this section and had summarily suspended Mr Moyana. It is difficult to understand how the Corporation thought it could dismiss Mr Moyana under this section.

Before us, counsel for the appellant did not seek either to defend or explain these contradictions. He asserted that the letter of 28 May 1987 was a dismissal on one month's notice and contended that dismissal on notice was lawful in terms of the Labour Relations Act. Insofar as section 2 of the Labour Relations (General Conditions of Employment) (Termination of Employment) Regulations 1985, S.I.371 of 1985 contradicted the assertion, it was, he claimed, ultra vires the Labour Relations Act 1985.

I will assume that the letter of 28 May 1987 can be regarded as a dismissal on notice because it reads in part:

"However, the Company intends nevertheless to pay you not only your salary in respect of May 1987 (which has already been paid) but also a month's pay in lieu of notice, that is to the 30th June 1987."

Despite this, I remain un-persuaded that the Labour Relations (General Conditions of Employment) (Termination of Employment) Regulations 1985, S.I.371 of 1985 are ultra vires.

Basically, I agree with the reasoning of the President of the Tribunal, who relied, in turn, upon a decision of the Judge President of the High Court in Jarvis v Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd HH312-88.

I will therefore set out my reasons only briefly.

Counsel for the appellant's central submission was that section 12(1)(a) of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985, enshrines the right of an employer to terminate a contract on notice. That being so, the Minister has no power, by Regulations, to qualify or, a fortiori, to eliminate that right.

I will accept, for purposes of argument, that the conclusion is correct. It is the premise, in my view, which is false.

Section 12(1)(a) of the Labour Relations Act reads as follows:

"Except where a longer period of notice has been provided for in any contract or in any relevant enactment, every contract of employment made without reference to time, not being a contract to perform some specific service, shall be deemed, in the case where -

(a) The contract is to pay wages at a monthly rate, to be a contract from month to month, terminable by either party at any time upon giving not less than one month's notice, terminating on the last day of a month…,."

This section does not enshrine the right of an employer to terminate a contract on notice. All it does is to introduce a statutory term into employment contracts which are " made without reference to time."

The section in fact says nothing about the contract with which we are concerned, because that contract did specify a month's notice. It was not "made without reference to time." I am entirely satisfied that the section is no more that a deeming section. It speaks only of the content of a contract of employment; it says nothing about the enforceability of the terms deemed to be part of the contract.

It is interesting, as confirmation of the above, that sections 13, 14 and 15 of the Labour Relations Act 1985, to which counsel for the appellant referred by way of analogy, all contain the words "shall be entitled".

No such words appear in section 12 of the Labour Relations Act 1985.

There is a further reason, if further reasons are necessary, why I am unable to accept the submission that section 12(1)(a) of the Labour Relations Act 1985 enshrines the right of an employer to terminate a contract of employment on notice.

Insofar as there is ambiguity in the provisions, although I do not believe there is any, one must look for an interpretation which is consistent with the context within which the words came into existence. In looking at the context, one has in mind the words of SCHREINER JA in Jaga v Donges NO & Anor: Bhana v Donges NO & Anor 1950 (4) SA 653 (A)…,.:

"'[T]he context' as here used is not limited to the language of the rest of the statute regarded as throwing light of a dictionary kind on the part to be interpreted.

Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its backgrounds."

The long title of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985 sets out its purpose to be:

"To declare and define the fundamental rights of employees; to define unfair labour practices; to regulate conditions of employment and other related matters…,."

The provisions of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985 itself confirm the clear impression that one of its fundamental objects is to improve the lot of the employee. Thus -

(a) There is no definition or declaration of the fundamental rights of employers, whereas Part II sets out the fundamental rights of employees;

(b) Part III sets out unfair labour practices which may be committed by employers, by trade unions, and by worker' committees. There is no specific references to unfair labour practices by individual employees, though section 20 allows the Minister to prescribe acts or omissions which constitute unfair labour practice by employees. Apart from failure to comply with the provisions of a Collective Bargaining Agreement (section 87(3) of the Labour Relations Act) no such practice has been defined: see the Third Schedule to S.I.368 of 1985;

(c) The general conditions of employment defined are all minimum requirements and may be improved, in favour of the employee, by contract or by Regulations, industrial agreement, or determination: see generally Part IV of the Labour Relations Act;

(d) Specifically, section17 of the Labour Relations Act gives the Minister regulatory powers for the "development, improvement, protection, regulation, and control of employment and conditions of employment."

These Regulations have overriding force: see section 17(2) of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985.

In the wider context, too, one construes the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985 according to its historical setting and in terms of the "mischief" rule.

LORD SIMON of GLAISDALE, in his speech in Cheng v Governor of Pentonville Prison [1973] 2 All ER 204 (HL)…, spoke of:

"…, ascertaining, first, the general situation in which Parliament was legislating, and, secondly, the particular situation for which Parliament was providing a remedy. These are really different aspects of the same canon of construction; though the former is sometimes called construction according to 'historical setting', the latter 'the mischief rule'. "

Thus, when the decision in S v Jovner 1982 (2) ZLR 252 (SC) showed that the Employment Act 1980, in its section 8, and the Employment (Conditions of Service) Regulation 1981, in section 4, did not serve to prevent termination on notice, the President clarified the State's intentions by means of the Emergency Powers (Termination of Employment) Regulations 1982, published in S.I.714B of 1982.

The existence of the statutory instrument was obviously known to the Legislature when the Labour Relations Act was enacted in 1985 and the overwhelming probability must be that the Legislature did not intend to go back to the status quo ante.

Indeed, one has only to look at the difference between section 17(2) of the 1985 statute and section 5(2)(a) of the 1980 statute to appreciate that the Legislature intended to confirm the reversal of S v Jovner 1982 (2) ZLR 252 (SC) achieved by section 4 and 5 of the Emergency Powers (Termination of Employment) Regulations 1982, published in S.I.714B of 1982 which were only finally repealed by S.I.77 of 1987.

I have taken this further argument more or less directly from the heads of page 311 of 1989 (1) ZLR 304 (SC) argument of Mr Gillespie in Jarvis v Commercial Careers College (1980) (Pvt) Ltd HH312-88 which was heard some days after the present appeal was argued.

I acknowledge the force of the submissions, and I adopt them, without deviating from my primary view that the words of the enactment are clear and do not require interpretation.

Once it is accepted that section 12 of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985 does not give or enshrine a right to give notice, then one may turn again to section 17 of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985, which begins:

" (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the Minister may make regulations providing for the development, improvement, protection, regulation, and control of employment and conditions of employment. "

Clearly, the Minister's power, under this sub-section, to "regulate" dismissal on notice, is not subject to the provisions of section 12.

Section 12 of the Labour Relations Act 1985, as we have seen, concerns only the content of contracts of employment, and section 17(2) of the Labour Relations Act 1985 makes it clear that Regulations override content, when it says -

"Regulations made by the Minister, in terms of subsection (1), shall, unless such regulations otherwise provide, prevail over the provisions of any other statutory instrument or of any agreement or arrangement whatsoever…,."

Finally, the Minister's power is defined in section 17(3)(r) of the Labour Relations Act 1985 which permits him to make regulations -

"…, specifying or otherwise restricting the circumstances in which contracts of employment may be terminated summarily or otherwise."

I am therefore satisfied that section 2 of the Labour Relations (General Conditions of Employment) (Termination of Employment) Regulations 1985, S.I. 371/1985 is not ultra vires the powers granted to the Minister in terms of section 17 of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985 and is not in conflict with the provisions of section 12 of the Labour Relations Act No.16 of 1985.

The first point must therefore be decided against the appellant.

The first applicant is a nominated Parliamentary candidate for the Movement For Democratic Change, the (“MDC”). He will stand for the Goromonzi West House of Assembly constituency seat in Mashonaland East Province. The second applicant is the Movement for Democratic Change, a political party which fielded candidates for the Presidential, Parliamentary, Senatorial and Local Council elections.

The first respondent is the Chairman of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which is responsible for the conducting of elections in Zimbabwe. The second respondent is the Registrar-General of Voters, responsible for the registration of voters, though he does so under the control and supervision of the first respondent.

The brief facts leading to this application are as follows:

The applicants, exercising their right under section 21(4) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13], which I will refer to as the Electoral Act in this judgment, requested the respondents to supply them with electronic copies of the voters roll. They supplied the respondents with compact disks onto which the voters roll was to be copied. The applicants have since been given fifty compact disks, with voters rolls copied onto them - but in a format not acceptable to the applicants. They were advised that other disks could not presently be copied because of the breakdown of the respondents' computers.

The applicants, being spurred by the approaching election day on 29 March 2008, urgently want the Voters Roll, hence the filing of an urgent application. They seek an order compelling the respondents to give them electronic copies of the voters roll in a format they have specified.

Counsel for the respondents raised a point in limine.

He submitted that this court, being a creature of statute, does not have jurisdiction to determine issues arising from the provisions of section 21 of the Electoral Act as that section does not confer jurisdiction on the Electoral Court.

He submitted that this court can only exercise jurisdiction in cases where the Electoral Act specifically confers jurisdiction on it.

He further submitted that the Electoral Act specifies instances when the court has jurisdiction, meaning, in instances where jurisdiction is not specifically conferred the legislature did not intend to confer jurisdiction. He relied on the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule of interpretation.

Counsel for the applicants, in response, submitted that this court was created to deal with electoral matters, and, therefore, has jurisdiction to hear and determine matters arising from failure to comply with any provisions of the Electoral Act.

He submitted that the use of the words “and other matters in terms of this Act”, means and other cases arising from this Act confers jurisdiction on this court in instances where the legislature did not specifically do so.

He summed up by saying the Electoral Court was created to hear and determine electoral cases.

He pointed out various provisions in which various officials are required to act in one way or the other and asked what would happen if they did not comply. He submitted that this court should intervene and order the officials to comply as should be done in this case.

Counsel for the respondents, in reply, submitted that the applicants are not left without remedy as they can apply to the High Court which has inherent jurisdiction and can hear and determine matters for which the Electoral Court has no jurisdiction.

Creature of Statute

This court was created in terms of section 161(1) of the Electoral Act. There is no doubt that it is a creature of statute.

As a creature of statute, it can only exercise the jurisdiction conferred on it by the statute which created it. Its powers are confined within the provisions of the creating Act.

In the case of Vengesai & Ors v Zimbabwe Glass Industries Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 593 (H)…, GILLESPIE J said:

“The concept of the rule of practice is peculiarly appropriate only to superior courts of inherent jurisdiction. Any other court, tribunal, or authority is a creature of statute and bound by the four corners of its enabling legislation.”

See also the cases of Chairman, Public Service Commission and Ors v Zimbabwe Teachers Association & Ors 1996 (1) ZLR 637 (S)…,; Harare City v TA Prop (Pvt) Ltd 1994 (2) ZLR 82 (S)…,; and Gwalazimba v PG Merchandising Ltd and Anor 1993 (2) ZLR 215 (S)…, where McNALLY JA said:

“This submission is undoubtedly correct. The Tribunal is a creature of statute and can only hear appeals as provided in the Labour Relations Act 16 of 1985.”

In the case of PTC v Mahachi 1997 (2) ZLR 71 (H)…, CHATIKOBO J, commenting on the powers of a court created by statute, said:

“The Tribunal was established by section 83(1) of the Labour Relations Act [Cap 28:01] (“the Act”). Being a creature of statute, the Tribunal has no powers other than those conferred upon it by the legislature either expressly or by necessary implication.”

The important observation made by CHATIKOBO J, which I respectfully agree with, is that the Act which confers jurisdiction on the creature of statute can do so expressly or by necessary implication. This means the enabling Act must be analysed to determine whether or not the implied jurisdiction, which, in this case, counsel for the applicants seems to rely on, was conferred. The implied jurisdiction must be discovered from the provisions of the Electoral Act.

The provision in dispute

Section 161(1) of the Electoral Act provides as follows:

“(1) There is hereby established a court to be known as the Electoral Court for the purpose of hearing and determining election petitions and other matters in terms of this Act.”

There is no dispute on the meaning of the part of section 161(1) which establishes the Electoral Court. It is common cause that this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine election petitions.

The dispute arises from the interpretation of the later part of section 161(1), namely, the words “and other matters in terms of this Act.”

Most of the words in that phrase present no difficulties as their meanings are obvious. They are not ambiguous as they admit of no other meanings besides their ordinary grammatical meanings. It is the word “terms” which the parties rely on in arriving at their respective constructions of the phrase in question.

Construction of the phrase

The meaning of the phrase “and other matters in terms of this Act” can be discovered by assigning an ordinary, literal, or grammatical meaning to every word in the phrase.

In Keyter v Minister of Agriculture 1908 NLR 522…, BALE CJ said:

“It is the duty of the court to give effect to every word which is used in a statute unless necessity or absolute intractability of the language employed compels the Court to treat the words as not written. (Salmon v Duncombe & Ors 7 NLR 182).

Another cardinal rule, in ascertaining the meaning of a statute, is that in construing the words used we are to ascertain the meaning from the words themselves, and not from what we imagine to have been the intention of the legislature.”

In the case of The Queen v Bishop of Oxford 4 QBD 261, it was said a statute “should be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.”

In the case of Chegutu Municipality v Manyora 1996 (1) ZLR 262 (SC)…, McNALLY JA said:

“There is no magic about interpretation. Words must be taken in their context. The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, as LORD WENSLEYDALE said in Grey v Pearson (1857) 10 ER 1216 at 1234, 'unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency - but no further.'”

In this case, the word “and” in the phrase is a conjunction joining the other matters which this court can hear and determine to petitions, which are agreed can be heard and be determined by this court.

The word “other” simply means other than the petitions already referred to.

The word “matters” means other cases which can be heard and determined along side the petitions which it is common cause can be heard by this court.

The word “in” directs the inquirer to the source from which he or she can look for the “other matters” which can be heard and determined by this court.

The word “terms” refers to what qualifies a matter to be heard and determined by this court. It is the word whose true meaning has to be construed to determine whether or not this court has jurisdiction to hear this case….,.

The remaining words “of this Act” directs the inquirer to look within the Electoral Act for the other cases or matters which can be heard and determined by the Electoral Court.

In this case, the key word is “terms”.

Its interpretation should be based on its ordinary, literal, grammatical meaning.

In the case of Expedite Haulage (Pvt) Ltd v Scotfin Ltd 2000 (2) ZLR 113 (HC)…, CHATIKOBO J said:

“On the face of it, the contention advanced by Mr de Bourbon seems to be closer to the wording of the statute than that advanced by Mr Colgrave, and, of course, the cardinal rule of construction is that the words of a statute must be given their ordinary, literal, grammatical meaning, unless to do so would lead to a glaring absurdity.”

The same principles were expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Endevour Foundation & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1995 (1) ZLR 339 (S)…, where GUBBAY CJ said:

“The general principle of interpretation is that the ordinary, plain, literal meaning of the word or expression, that is as popularly understood, is to be adopted, unless that meaning is at variance with the intention of the legislature as shown by the context, or such other indicia as the court is justified in taking into account, or creates an anomaly or otherwise produces an irrational result. See Stellenbosch Farmers' Winery Ltd v Distillers' Corp (SA) Ltd & Anor 1962 (1) SA 458 (A) at 476E-F.

The same notion was expressed in another way by MARGO J in Loryan (Pvt) Ltd v Solarsh Tea & Coffee (Pvt) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 834 (W) at 846G-H:

'Dictionary definitions of a particular word are very often of fundamental importance in the judicial interpretation of that word in a statute or in a contract or in a Will. Nevertheless, the task of interpretation is not always fulfilled by recourse to a dictionary definition, for what must be ascertained is the meaning of that word in its particular context, in the enactment, or contract, or other document.'”

The inquiry, according to these cases, must encompass the following rules of interpretation:

(a) The literal rule, to establish the ordinary, literal, grammatical or dictionary meaning of the word;

(b) Intention of the legislature to determine the contextual meaning of the word as guided by the clear intention of the legislature; and

(c) Other indicia or rules of interpretation to confirm the presence or absence of anomalies and absurdity in the resultant meaning established through the use of the above-mentioned.

The Literal Interpretation

It is trite that a court can rely on a dictionary meaning in the construction of statutes. See the cases of Endevour Foundation & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1995 (1) ZLR 339 (S) and Chegutu Municipality v Manyora 1996 (1) ZLR 262 (SC).

The ordinary grammatical meaning of the word “terms”, according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, means:

“(i)(a) limit in space, duration, etc, that which limits the extent of anything; a limit, extremity, boundary, bound; (b) Utmost or extreme limit, end; (c) That to which movement or action is directed or tends, as its object, end or goal.

(ii) A limit in time; a space of time.

(iii) Limiting conditions pl. Conditions or stipulations limiting, what is proposed to be granted or done.”

The dominant meaning of the word “term” clearly has something to do with limiting, conditioning, bounding, and directing, whatever is to be done.

In the context of this case, this means the jurisdiction of this court, is as is limited, conditioned, bound, and directed by the Electoral Act. In simple language, the jurisdiction of the Electoral Court is as is provided by the Electoral Act.

The word “term” has acquired a well known judicial meaning.

In the Law of Contract, when one refers to the terms of a contract, the clear meaning is the conditions on which the contract is premised.

In a Will, it means as is provided by the testator in the Will.

Similarly, in an enactment, it means as is provided by the provisions of the enactment.

In the result, the literal, ordinary, plain, and technical meaning of the word “terms”, as used in section 161 of the Electoral Act, and in the context of the Electoral Act, means as stipulated, limited, or provided by the Electoral Act.

The Intention of the Legislature

Counsel for the applicants took this court through the various sections of the Electoral Act for which no court is vested with jurisdiction to enforce compliance in the event the officer who is required to act does not do so.

He argued that in such situations the Electoral Court has jurisdiction.

He obviously had in mind the implied intention of the legislature referred to in PTC v Mahachi 1997 (2) ZLR 71 (H) or the assumed or imagined intention of the legislature, referred to in Keyter v Minister of Agriculture 1908 NLR 522.

Counsel for the respondents argued that, in such circumstances, the aggrieved party should apply to the High Court which has inherent jurisdiction. He referred to section 13 of the High Court Act [Chapter 7:06].

It is correct that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction and can hear such cases, but, the issue is: does the Electoral Court have jurisdiction to hear such cases as submitted by counsel for the applicants?

This can be determined by ascertaining the expressed or implied intention of the Legislature from the construction of the sections which confer jurisdiction on the Electoral Court and a careful study and construction of the scheme of the Electoral Act.

This calls for an analysis of the sections conferring jurisdiction on this court and other courts.

In Part V of the Electoral Act, aggrieved parties are, in terms of section 25(6), referred to a designated magistrate for the province in which the affected constituency is situated for redress in the case of a dispute over claims for transfer of registration.

In Part VI, sections 27(3)(a) and (b), 28(3)(b) and 29 of the Electoral Act confers jurisdiction on a designated magistrate to hear appeals against objections by the Constituency Registrar or a voter.

Section 30(1) to (4) provides for the submission of a stated case by the designated magistrate to a judge of the High court for his opinion.

In Part X, section 44(7) confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine petitions against the decision of the presiding officer over the election of the Council of Chiefs and of President and Deputy President of the Council of Chiefs and other Senator Chiefs.

In Part XI, section 46(19)(b) and (c) confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine appeals from the Nomination Court.

In Part XIII, section 66(2) provides for the presence of an Electoral Court Judge at the drawing of lots to determine the winning candidate. Section 66(4) confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine a petition against the decision of the Chief Elections Officer. Section 70(3)(b), (4), (5), and (8) confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to determine issues and make orders in relation to the destruction or preservation of electoral documents.

In Part XIV, section 81 confers jurisdiction on the High Court to, on convicting a person for inducing any person to obtain a ballot paper and influencing him or her to vote in favour of a particular candidate, to declare the convicted person disqualified from voting in any election for a period not exceeding five years.

In Part XVII, section 111 confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine petitions on an undue return or an undue election of a person to the office of President, while section 112A as read with the Fifth Schedule, confers jurisdiction on the Chief Justice to preside over the electoral college for the election of a President.

In Part XVIIIA, in sections 133E and 138, confers jurisdiction on the High Court to impose additional punishment, of a civil nature, to a person it will have convicted for intimidatory practices. The same jurisdiction is conferred on the High Court in terms of section 150. Identical jurisdiction is conferred on the Electoral Court by section 155, but after the hearing of a petition after the election. It is clear the legislature conferred jurisdiction on two different courts on this aspect. The High Court deals with intimidatory and illegal practices before the elections, while the Electoral Court deals with the same situations and can impose the same additional penalties after the elections.

In Part XXI, sections 155 to section 158 confer jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine petitions and applications and make appropriate orders specified in the various sections.

In Part XXII, section 161 establishes the Electoral Court, and, in subsection (1) and (2) specifies what it can or cannot do.

In Part XXIII, section 167 provides for the presentation of election petitions to the Electoral Court. Section 170(1) confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine objections on the sufficiency of the security provided by an applicant to an election petition. Section 171(1) confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine election petitions. Sections 177, 179, 180, and 181 provide for the other powers the Electoral Court may exercise in the hearing of petitions.

In Part XXIV, section 183 confers jurisdiction on the Electoral Court to hear and determine applications by persons convicted on perjured or false evidence, for the removal of the incapacity imposed at the time of conviction.

An examination of the sections conferring jurisdiction on the various courts clearly demonstrates the legislature's deliberate intention as to which court it intended to deal with which situation.

There is no doubt in my mind that where the legislature intended to confer jurisdiction on this court it did so by conferring it through a specific provision in the Electoral Act. There is clearly no room for the conferring of jurisdiction by implication.

The legislature's specific mention of the instances where this court has jurisdiction means where it did not confer jurisdiction it intended not to confer jurisdiction.

This would support counsel for the respondents submission that the application of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule to the specific conferring of jurisdiction in some instances means this court has no jurisdiction where it is not specifically conferred.

In the case of Nkomo & Anor v Attorney-General & Ors 1993 (2) ZLR 422 (SC)…, GUBBAY CJ said:

“To ascribe a sensible meaning to subs (5) and to avoid superfluity necessitates the legitimate recourse of construing the general words 'any sentence' in subs (6) as excluding the specific reference to 'a sentence of death' in subs (5). This is no more than an application of the rule embodied in the maxim 'expressio unius exclusio alterius.' It draws attention to the fairly obvious linguistic point that in many contexts the mention of some matters warrants an inference that other cognate matters were intentionally excluded. See MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed at p293.”

In the case of Eagle Insurance Co. Ltd v Grant 1989 (3) ZLR 278 (SC)…, KORSAH JA, commenting on the operation of the maxim, said:

“A rule which is variably resorted to in the interpretation of statutes, the expressio unius rule, is that the mention of one or more things of a particular class may be regarded as silently excluding all other members of the class.”

The use of the words “may be regarded as silently excluding”, leaves room for the inapplicability of the rule in some cases. This is confirmed in the case of Chivinge v Mushayakarara & Anor 1998 (2) ZLR 500 (SC); at p506E-F GUBBAY CJ said:

“The same result is arrived at, so it seems to me, by a cautious application of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterus: see Taylor v Prime Minister & Anor 1954 SR 94 at 165; 1954 (3) SA 956 (SR) at 965B-D; R v Ndhlovu (1) 1980 ZLR 96 (G) at 100A-D; Hewlett v Minister of Finance & Anor 1981 ZLR 571 (S) at 596C-E; National Automobile & Allied Workers Union v Borg-Warner 1994 (3) SA 15 (A) at 26H–I.

The specific mention of the instances of permissible discharge of termination on notice by a permanent employee, to my mind, leads to the unavoidable inference that it was not the intention of the parties to the contract to allow termination on notice of a permanent employee.”

The need to exercise caution before relying on the expressio unius rule is because a conclusion based on it is a product of a logical deduction inferred from the specific mention of the other thing being an implied exclusion of that which was not mentioned.

In the case of Commissioner of Taxes v F Kristiansten (Pvt) Ltd 1994 (1) ZLR 412 (SC)…, the Supreme Court, commenting on the nature of the rule, said:

“It may be that one cannot rely on that uncertain principle of interpretation known as the 'expressio unius exclusio alterius' in this situation.”

The uncertainty of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule was again commented on by the Supreme Court in the case of Davies and Ors v Minister of Lands, Agriculture & Water Development 1996 (1) ZLR 681 (SC)…, where GUBBAY CJ said:

“Mr Anderson's counter to this argument was that the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius was one of limited application to be applied with great caution. This is of course true, but, whereas here something which is not on the face of it acquisition is specifically stated so to be, there is a strong indication that acquisition is to otherwise be given its ordinary meaning.”

In the present case, a careful reading of the sections of the Electoral Act conferring jurisdiction on this court and other courts, together with section 161 of the Electoral Act, whose interpretation restricts the search for jurisdiction within the Electoral Act, the express mention of the instances where this court has jurisdiction is a clear indication that where no jurisdiction was specifically conferred the legislature did not intend to confer jurisdiction on this court. In the context of the whole Act, the words “and other matters in terms of this Act” means and other matters in which jurisdiction has been conferred by provisions of this Electoral Act.

Other indicia

Counsel for the applicants referred this court to section 157 of the Electoral Act and submitted that reference in it to “petitions and applications” when no specific jurisdiction in terms of the Act is conferred on this court to hear and determine petitions means applications such as the applicant's are the “other matters” which can be heard and be determined by this court.

This tends to suggest that the literal meaning, as established above, should include applications as provided in section 157.

The expressio unius est exclusio alterius rule would not be applicable as the mentioning of applications, without providing for them in any specific sections of the Electoral Act, would leave this court with jurisdiction in circumstances mentioned by counsel for the applicants. That would not be consistent with the plain meaning of the phrase “and other matters in terms of this Act.” It would entitle this court to depart from the plain, literal, and grammatical meaning to avoid the inconsistency or the absurdity: see the case of Chegutu Municipality v Manyora 1996 (1) ZLR 262 (SC).

Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the word “application” means petition. He therefore argued that its being mentioned in section 157 is of no significance. He relied on section 15(2) of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1: 01] which provides as follows:

“Any reference in an enactment to a petition to a court shall be construed as a reference to an application to the court or to a judge, magistrate, or other judicial officer of the court, made in accordance with rules of the court.”

Counsel for the first respondent's submission is persuasive but does not explain why the legislature would convey the same concept using two different words of the same meaning in succession. This would suggest that one of the words is superfluous. If the use of both words was out of caution then why would the legislature use the word “or” between them suggesting that it should be one or the other?

A careful reading of section 157 of the Electoral Act is called for. It provides:

“(1) When it appears to the Electoral Court, either on application or upon an election petition, that –

(a) Any act or omission of a candidate at an election or of his or her chief election agent or of another agent or person, which but for this section would be an illegal practice, has been done or made in good faith through inadvertence or accidental miscalculation or some other reasonable cause of a like nature; and

(b) By reason of the circumstances it would be just that the candidate or his or her chief election agent or other agent or person, or any of them, should not be subject to any of the consequences under this Act of the said act or omission;
the Electoral Court, may make an order allowing the act or omission to be an exception from the provisions of this Act which would otherwise make the act or omission an illegal practice, and thereupon the candidate, agent or person shall not be subject to any of the consequences under this Act of the said act or omission.

(2) Where application is made for relief in terms of subsection (1), the Electoral Court, before hearing the application, shall be satisfied that reasonable notice of the application has been given in the constituency or area in which the election was held.”

The clear meaning of section 157 of the Electoral Act is that the Electoral Court, may, during the hearing of a petition or when an application is made to it in terms of sub-section (2), make an order allowing an otherwise illegal practice an exception to the provisions of the Electoral Act.

The provisions of section 15 of the Interpretation Act are therefore not applicable in this case.

Subsection (2) specifically provides for the making of an application to the Electoral Court, and confers jurisdiction on it to hear and determine such applications.

I, with respect, do not agree with both counsel for the applicants and counsel for the respondents' respective interpretations of section 157 of the Electoral Act: therefore, the interpretation of the words “and other matters in terms of this Act,” as discussed above, remains unaffected by the provisions of section 157 of the Electoral Act.

Even if subsection (2) of section 157 had not clarified the issue, there are other sections of the Electoral Act which confer jurisdiction on this court to hear and determine applications.

Section 179(2) of the Electoral Act provides for an application for substitution of a petitioner. Section 183 provides for an application to the Electoral Court for the removal of any incapacity imposed upon conviction based on perjured or false evidence.

It is therefore beyond doubt that the instances in which this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine applications are specifically provided for in the Electoral Act.

As already indicated, that means all the instances in which the legislature intended to confer jurisdiction on this court are specified leaving no room for this court to assume jurisdiction in circumstances referred to by counsel for the applicants.

Counsel for the respondents sought costs on the legal practitioner and client scale against the applicants on the basis that his clients were unnecessarily dragged to a court which does not have jurisdiction to hear the application.

It is true that, with careful reading of the Electoral Act, the applicants should have known that they were suing the respondent in a court which did not have jurisdiction. It is however apparent from counsel for the respondents own failure to appreciate that the Electoral Act confers jurisdiction on this court to hear applications that the Electoral Act, as recently amended, is still to be fully understood by legal practitioners - especially those who infrequently appear before this court.

There is need for guidance through the judgments of this court.

I can therefore not grant punitive costs in circumstances which clearly call for the guidance of this court.

In the result, the applicant's application is dismissed with costs.

Section 2(2) of the Defence (Regular Force) (Non-Commissioned Members) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 172 of 1989 states that any other term used in the Defence (Regular Force) (Non-Commissioned Members) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 172 of 1989 that is defined in the Defence Act [Chapter 11:02] shall be so defined in the Defence (Regular Force) (Non-Commissioned Members) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 172 of 1989.

What this means, is that the Defence (Regular Force) (Non-Commissioned Members) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 172 of 1989 import the definition section of the enabling Defence Act [Chapter 11:02] as applicable where the same terms are used. Where an undefined term is used in the Defence (Regular Force) (Non-Commissioned Members) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 172 of 1989 but is defined in the

Defence Act [Chapter 11:02], that definition applies to the Defence (Regular Force) (Non-Commissioned Members) Regulations, Statutory Instrument 172 of 1989.

On 12 December 2011, the applicant filed an application in this court under Case No. HC12336/11 seeking a prohibitory interdict against the respondents.

The remedy sought was to prevent the respondents from moving or accepting any motion from any member of the House of Assembly to dismiss the applicant without the matter of his dismissal first being brought before the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders (CSRO) or its sub-committee or other independent and impartial disciplinary authority.

On realising that, despite having filed the aforesaid application, the respondents were determined to proceed with the motion to have him dismissed, the applicant filed the instant urgent application whose amended interim relief is couched in the following terms:-

“1. Pending the determination of the Court Application under Case Number HC12336/11 the respondents are prohibited, restricted, and interdicted from continuing to debate and voting on any motion to dismiss the applicant.

2. Pending the determination of the Court Application under Case Number HC12336/11, any debate, voting, or decision on the motion to dismiss the applicant, with or without amendments, be and is hereby declared null and void ab initio and therefore of no force and effect.”...,.

ON MERITS

Having disposed of the preliminary points raised, I wish to focus on the substantive issues raised by the parties in this application.

The fundamental guiding principle in this case was eloquently summed up by Mr Shepherd Mushonga, the fourth respondent, when he put it in the following words:-

“The principle of separation of powers is he hallmark of a constitutional democracy which entails that the three (3) arms of State, namely, Parliament, the Executive, and the Judiciary are separate and independent of each other in so far as the exercise of their powers is concerned.

The Constitution vests Parliament with the powers to regulate its own affairs. Parliament exercise judicial powers in respect of certain matters that fall within its domain to the exclusion of the Courts.”…,.

I applaud the sentiments and indeed associate myself with same.

Be that as it may, one needs to appreciate the often overlapping function that characterize the legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary.

Whilst these three arms of Government must enjoy their independence, they do not exist outside each other. They play a complimentary role.

The sovereignty of Parliament, or, to put it simply, the power enjoyed by Parliament is not absolute, for if it were so the citizens would be extremely vulnerable. It would mean that Parliament would do virtually everything it desired, including violating its own Rules and Regulations, to the detriment of its citizen with impunity. Such a scenario, in my view, would not be tenable. There must be some control mechanism through which Parliament is to be held accountable by disgruntled citizens: see The British Constitution by J.S. DUGDALE, M.A, published by Bath James Brodie Ltd, London 1962…,.

From my reading of the applicant's urgent chamber application, and the notices of opposition filed by the respondents, I discern the following issues to be pertinent and decisive in this matter;

(a) Whether or not the House of Assembly violated Standing Order 62(d) of the House of Assembly Standing Orders by continuing to debate and voting on the motion to dismiss the applicant after the applicant had filed case no HC12336/11....,.

(a) Alleged violation of Standing Order 62(d)

It was contended, by the applicant, that, after he had filed his application in this court seeking, among other things, to interdict the respondents from continuing to debate on the issue of his dismissal, and to force compliance with proper disciplinary procedures, the House of Assembly was obliged to follow the dictates of Standing Order 62(d) of the House of Assembly Standing Orders.

In countering this argument, the respondents argued that the existence of a court application could not operate as a bar to the conduct of Parliamentary business and that only a court order had the capacity to stop further debate on the motion that was already before the House.

The argument, by the respondents, in this regard, is quite pronounced in paragraph 8 of the joint Notice of Opposition filed by the first, second, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents.

In supporting the same argument, the fourth respondent, on his behalf and also duly authorised by the third respondent, re-affirmed the position that Parliamentary debate on the issue could not be stopped by the Court application alluded to by the applicant.

It is evident from the Hansard of the day that the members of the House offered conflicting views on this issue.

It is necessary to refer to the specific section in issue. The section reads as follows:-

“62 No member shall, while speaking to a question…,.

(d) Use derogatory, disrespectful, offensive or unbecoming words against the Head of State, Parliament or its members, the Speaker, nor reflect upon a statute unless for the purposes of moving for its repeal; nor shall a member refer to any matter on which a judicial decision is pending;”…,.

It appears to me that if one were to concentrate on the ordinary grammatical meaning of the Standing Order in question one would find it extremely difficult not to understand what the House intended when it crafted these rules of debate.

It is trite that in interpreting statutes the very basic approach is first to ascribe to the words used their ordinary grammatical meaning.

It is clear to me that the Standing Order referred to simply meant that when a matter is pending before the Courts, or when a matter is sub judice, House members are obliged to respect the Court process until a determination on that matter is made.

In this regard, I feel more inclined to lean on the views of the learned judge VAN DEN HEEVER JA when he remarked on the use of the word 'shall' as follows:-

“If a statutory command is couched in such peremptory terms it is a strong indication, in the absence of considerations pointing to another conclusion, that the issuer of the command intended disobedience to be visited with nullity”: Messenger of the Magistrate's Court. Dupbata v Pillay 1952 (3) SA 678 (AD)…,.

It will be noted that during debate on the issue, those who spoke in favour of proceeding with the tabled motion suggested, strangely so in my view, that the members of the House could only be stopped from debating the issue if, at the time, there was a Court order barring them from so acting.

With respect, the Standing Order in question does not say what the respondents, and those who contributed in support of the motion, desire it to mean. If Parliament intended the Standing Order to mean what the respondents say, surely Parliament could have had no difficulty in crafting the Standing Order to that effect.

It is not in dispute that the respondents, despite having been duly served with case no. HC12336/11 continued to debate the motion in complete defiance or violation of the Standing Order in question.

This belligerent attitude displayed by the respondents can only lead to one inevitable conclusion. That disobedience by the House of its own Standing Orders must be visited with “nullity” over what it did because it was not competent for the House to stubbornly ignore the clear provisions of section 62(d) of the House of Assembly Standing Orders.

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ: This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court wherein PATEL J dismissed the appellants' application to have set aside the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as "the Speaker").

The appellants, as the applicants in the court a quo, sought the following relief set out in the draft order:

"WHEREUPON after perusing the documents filed of record and hearing counsel, it is hereby declared that:-

1. The election of (the) second respondent as the Speaker of the Parliament of Zimbabwe on 25 August 2008 is null and void and set aside.

2….,.

3. That the respondents jointly and severally pay the costs of suit."

(The applicants abandoned the relief set out in paragraph 2).

The appellants' main contention in the court a quo, and in this Court, is that the election of the Speaker was null and void because it was not conducted in terms of section 39 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), as read with Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders of Parliament of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Standing Orders").

PATEL J dismissed the application. The appellants now appeal against that judgment.

The grounds of appeal are set out in the Notice of Appeal, which, in relevant part, reads as follows:

"Grounds of Appeal

1. The learned Judge a quo erred in finding that a proper election of Speaker of Parliament was conducted in terms of the Constitution and the law.

2. The learned Judge erred in condoning the first respondent's failure to implement and enforce his own procedures for the election.

3. The learned Judge a quo erred in finding that the participants' exposure of their completed ballot papers was not a violation of the secret ballot.

4. The learned Judge a quo erred in finding that a secret ballot took place.

5. The learned Judge a quo erred in interpreting section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Ordinance 6 of the House of Assembly Standing Orders, as directory and not peremptory."

The grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal, as read with the record and submissions by counsel, raise essentially the following two issues for determination in this appeal –

(a) Whether the exposure of the secret ballot before the depositing of the ballot papers in the ballot box by some Members of Parliament amounts to a violation of the voting by secret ballot, and, if so, whether that rendered the election of the Speaker null and void; and

(b) Whether the failure by the Clerk of Parliament of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Clerk") to control the voting process and the consequent chaotic conditions constitute a failure by the Clerk to conduct an election in terms of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with the Standing Orders.

The background facts of this case are as follows:

The first respondent is the Clerk of the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Pursuant to Proclamation No.7 of 2008, the Clerk convened the first meeting of Parliament on 25 August 2008 for the purposes of swearing in the Members of Parliament and electing the presiding officers.

The Clerk's mandate to conduct these elections is derived from the Standing Orders – in the case of the House of Assembly, Standing Order No.6.

Two candidates were nominated for the office of Speaker, namely, Mr Paul Themba-Nyathi (hereinafter referred to as "Nyathi") and the second respondent (hereinafter referred to as "Moyo").

Standing Order No.6 provides that if more than one person is proposed as Speaker of Parliament, the Clerk shall conduct an election of the Speaker by ballot box.

The election took place and the Clerk announced that Nyathi had garnered ninety-eight votes and Moyo had garnered one hundred and ten votes. The Clerk accordingly declared Moyo the winner. Moyo assumed the office of Speaker.

The appellants want the election of Moyo as Speaker set aside.

I now wish to deal with the issue of whether the election was conducted by secret ballot as is required by section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order No.6 of the Standing Orders.

The appellants contend that some Members of Parliament from the MDC-T party, having marked their ballot papers in the secrecy of the polling booths, openly displayed their marked ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box. The appellants contend that the majority of the Members of Parliament from the MDC-T party did this, while the respondents' position is equivocal.

The court a quo, however, concluded that of the two hundred and eight Members of Parliament who voted, most probably only six Members of Parliament displayed their votes in the manner alleged by the appellants. The Members of Parliament who are named as having done this are the Honourable Biti, the Honourable Khupe, the Honourable Chambati, the Honourable Chibaya, the Honourable Denga and the Honourable Moyo, the second respondent. In this regard, the court a quo concluded as follows at p11 of the cyclostyled judgment (judgment no. HH28-10):

"It is fairly clear that Hon. Biti took the lead in brandishing his vote and that several of his colleagues were then emboldened into emulating his possibly impolitic example. However, they did so of their own free will and, more significantly, they did so after having cast their votes in secret."

The conclusion of the court a quo that at least the six Members of Parliament named displayed their ballot papers after marking them but before depositing the ballot papers in the ballot box cannot be faulted.

This conclusion is fortified by the following factors:

It is specifically alleged by the appellants that Moyo displayed his ballot paper before depositing it. Moyo filed an affidavit in this case in which he does not deny this allegation. Five other Members of Parliament are named as having displayed their ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box. None of these five Members of Parliament have deposed to affidavits denying the allegation.

In my view, it would have been easy for Moyo to secure such affidavits from the named Members of Parliament denying the conduct alleged. Moyo, instead, filed an affidavit from a Member of Parliament, the Honourable Mpariwa, in respect of whom no such allegation was made. The Honourable Mpariwa does not deny that the named Members of Parliament had conducted themselves in the manner alleged by the appellants. Indeed, if anything, she appears to concede that that in fact did occur.

In the result, I agree with the conclusion of the court a quo that at least six Members of Parliament displayed their ballot papers after marking them but before depositing them in the ballot box.

Having concluded that at least six Members of Parliament displayed their ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box, the issue that falls for determination is the legal consequences of such conduct.

Section 39 of the Constitution provides as follows:

"(2) The Speaker shall be elected in accordance with Standing Orders from among persons who are or have been members of the House of Assembly and who are not members of the Cabinet, Ministers, or Deputy Ministers:

Provided that a person who is not a member of the House of Assembly shall not be elected as the Speaker unless he is qualified in accordance with Schedule 3 for election to the House of Assembly."

Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders provides as follows:

"If more than one person is proposed as Speaker, the Clerk shall conduct the election of Speaker by a secret ballot."…,.

The Clerk issued specific instructions on how the secret ballot was to be conducted. According to the second appellant, Moses Mliza Ndlovu, the Clerk issued the following instructions:

"4. The first respondent announced the procedure to the effect that according to the Standing Rules, an election would be held by secret ballot. To this extent, he assured the Honourable Members present that all necessary provisions had been made to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot.

5. The first respondent then explained that in terms of the procedure, he would issue a ballot paper to each Member present. Thereafter, the Member would put a mark against the name of the candidate the Member would wish to be the Speaker of Parliament.

6. The ballot paper had two candidates for Speaker of Parliament, namely, the second respondent nominated by the Movement for Democratic Change (Tsvangirai) (MDC-T) and Mr Paul Themba-Nyathi nominated by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

7. The first respondent then explained that the ballot paper, having been duly marked in secret in a booth, would be folded by the voting Member and deposited in a ballot box.

8. The first respondent then explained that, having cast the vote, the Honourable Member would then leave the House."

The Clerk does not deny that the above accurately reflects the instructions he gave. From the above, three essential elements of the secret ballot emerge –

(a) Each Member of Parliament was to be issued with a ballot paper;

(b) Each Member of Parliament was to mark the ballot paper in the privacy or secrecy of the polling booth; and

(c) Having marked the ballot paper in secret, the Member of Parliament was to fold the ballot paper to maintain the secrecy of the vote and deposit it in the ballot box, thus completing the process of secret voting.

It admits of no debate that the Clerk would then be required to count the vote to complete the process.

In my view, the counting of the votes cast is an essential part of the process of the election by secret ballot….,.

The appellants' case is that Standing Order 6 is peremptory and enjoins the Clerk to conduct an election of the Speaker by secret ballot.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the display of the ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box, by some Members of Parliament, is an aberration from the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders. He argued that such aberration rendered the election of the Speaker null and void.

Ms Damiso and Mr Chaskalson, for the respondents, submitted that the appellants' complaint is based on a fundamental misconception relating to the nature of a secret ballot.

They submitted that when an election takes place, by secret ballot, each voter has the right to have his or her vote kept secret. This right to secrecy, like any other right, can freely be waived by a voter who chooses to make known how he or she voted. The fact that any voter chooses to disclose how he or she voted cannot in itself compromise the secrecy of the ballot. They submitted that it is only when a voter is factually prevented from maintaining the secrecy of his or her vote that there is a violation of the secrecy of the ballot. On this basis, they argued that the display by six Members of Parliament of their ballot papers before depositing the ballot papers in the ballot box is not a violation of the principle of a secret ballot.

This argument found favour with the learned Judge in the court a quo. In this regard, he had this to say at p11 of the cyclostyled judgment:

"Having regard to the dictionary definitions and the case authorities cited by counsel, the gravamen of a secret ballot, in my view, is that each voter is enabled to cast his vote privately and in secret, without fear of having his voting choice identified or ascertained by others. In this respect, it is incumbent upon the regulating authority to provide the requisite wherewithal for that purpose. The courts should not interfere unless it is shown that the objective conditions put in place for the election precluded the possibility of a secret vote. Beyond this, it is then a matter purely for the individual voter if he chooses to divulge, whether publicly or in private, the specific manner in which he has cast his vote. If he does so of his own volition, without any external coercion or intimidation, and howsoever his conduct might influence other voters, this cannot detract from the secrecy of his vote or vitiate the secrecy of the ballot as a whole."

It was further argued that all that was required of the Clerk was for him to provide the guarantee that Members of Parliament voted in secret if they so wished. Those who wished to penetrate the veil of secrecy, as did the six Members of Parliament, were entitled to do so without contaminating the process.

In support of the above contention, both counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the case of Steel and Engineering Industries Federation and Ors v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2) 1993 (4) SA 196 (T)…, and on the case of J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920)…,.

Mr Chaskalson, in particular, submitted that the right to secrecy of the ballot, like any other right, can freely be waived by any voter who chooses to make known how he or she voted. He further submitted that this point has been made clear by United States judgments dealing with unsuccessful challenges to electoral laws. For this submission, he relied on the following remarks of BROWN J in J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920)…,:

"…, this privilege, of voting a secret ballot, has been held to be entirely a personal one. The provision has been generally adopted in this country for the protection of the voter, and for the preservation of his independence, in the exercise of this most important franchise. But, he has the right to waive his privilege and testify to the contents of his ballot. The voter has the right, at the time of voting, voluntarily to make public his ballot, and its contents in such case may be proven by the testimony of those who are present. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy shall be impenetrable unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it."

Mr Chaskalson also relied on the following passage from State ex rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932)…,:

"…, it has been uniformly held that under such provisions as that contained in section 6 of Article VI of our Constitution the elector cannot be compelled to violate the right of secrecy of his ballot but the great weight of authority is to the effect that such constitutional provision guarantees a personal privilege which might be waived. In State vs Anderson 26 Fla 240, 8 So 1, this Court, speaking through MR CHIEF JUSTICE RAINEY, said:

'The Constitution provides, section 6, Article VI, that in all elections by the people the vote shall be by ballot, and in those by the Legislature it shall be viva voce. The material guarantee of this constitutional mandate of vote by ballot is inviolable secrecy as to the person for whom an elector shall vote. The distinguishing theory of the ballot system is that every voter shall be permitted to vote for whom he pleases, and that no one else shall be in position (sic) to know for whom he has voted, or shall know unless the voter shall of his own free will inform him.': COOLEY's Constitutional Limitations m.p. 604 et seq."…,.

Further reliance was placed on the following passage from COOLEY's work Constitutional Limitations 7ed 912:

"The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with what party he pleases and that no one is to have the right or be in position (sic) to question his independent action, either then or at any subsequent time. The courts have held that a voter, even in case (sic) of a contested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he voted; and for the same reason we think others who may accidentally, or by trick or artifice, have acquired knowledge on the subject should not be allowed to testify to such knowledge, or to give any information in the courts upon the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it; his ballot is absolutely privileged…,."

Mr Chaskalson further submitted that the fact that any voter chooses to disclose how he or she voted cannot compromise the secrecy of the ballot. He argued that if this were the case secret ballots would be open to abuse by voters who, fearing that their candidates were at risk of losing the election, could invalidate a vote by merely waving their ballots about. It is only when a voter is factually prevented from maintaining the secrecy of his vote or her vote that there is a violation of the secrecy of the ballot. He further argued that on the facts of this case there is no suggestion of any such violation of the secrecy of the ballot. Consequently, the primary complaint of the appellants must be rejected.

The two cases cited by Mr Chaskalson, namely, J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920) and State ex rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932), were concerned with the constitutionality of statutory provisions that permitted voting by absentee voters such as soldiers serving abroad. The basis of challenging the constitutionality of the statutes providing for the absentee voters was that they violated the secrecy of the ballot guaranteed by the State Constitution, Article VI section 6.

Section 6 of Article VI declared that all elections by the people shall be by ballot, and all elections by the General Assembly shall be viva voce….,.

The contention, which was dismissed in the above American cases in respect of which the above cited passages were made, was that statutes allowing absentee votes would of necessity lead to the identification of the voter, thereby violating the secrecy of the ballot guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of North Carolina. The ratio decidendi of the court, in dismissing the challenge, was that the impugned statutes, by allowing voters to vote by postal ballot, did not compel voters to disclose their votes leading to a breach of their right to voting in secrecy. The courts held that the impugned statutes simply provided the voter with a choice either to vote secretly by presenting himself or herself at the polling booth or vote by postal ballot if he so wished, thereby compromising the secrecy of his or her vote. The court held, in both cases, that a secret ballot is not compulsory so far as the voter is concerned, for the statute provides that the ballot may be deposited for the voter by the Registrar or by one of the judges of the election or by the voter himself if he so chooses.

I wish to make the following observations regarding the above cases.

The judgments cited above are judgments of foreign courts. They are not binding but they are persuasive. The higher the courts are in their jurisdictions the more persuasive are their judgments. The cited judgments are not from the highest courts in North Carolina.

The second observation I wish to make is that the courts in the cited cases were interpreting statutes in their jurisdictions. They were not making pronouncements on general jurisprudential principles.

When interpreting statutes, courts are guided primarily by the wording and the context of the statutes. A court should not simply translocate one court's interpretation of a statute in that court's jurisdiction to an interpretation of a statute differently worded in its own jurisdiction.

In the above judgments, the courts of North Carolina were interpreting Article VI section 6 of the Constitution of North Carolina, which provided that:

"In all elections by the people, the vote shall be by ballot, and, in those by the Legislature, it shall be viva voce."

The courts, in both J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920) and State ex rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932) interpreted Article VI section 6 as conferring a right to vote in secret, which can be waived. They ascribed this meaning to Article VI section 6 despite the use of the peremptory word "shall" in the section. I have some doubts about the correctness of this interpretation.

Be that as it may, I accept the conclusion in those two cases that where a Constitutional provision confers on the voter the right to vote by secret ballot that right is intended to protect the voter and the voter has the right to waive that right without violating the secrecy of the ballot.

I also accept the proposition that public policy requires that the veil of secrecy shall be impenetrable unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it: see also Boyer v Teague 106 NC 625; McRary on Elections 3ed…,; and Crolly Con. Lim. 7Ed…,.

However, section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is not a constitutional or statutory provision conferring the right to vote on a voter in the form of the Member of Parliament.

Section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, prescribes how a particular officer in Parliament, namely, the Speaker, is to be elected. It expressly provides that if more than one person is proposed as Speaker the Clerk of Parliament shall conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot. In other words, the use of the words "by a secret ballot" in the statute is prescribing the method by which a Speaker is to be elected.

The language is peremptory language.

It would be a different story if the wording of Standing Order 6 were to the effect: "If more than one Member is proposed Members of Parliament may vote by secret ballot to elect the Speaker."

The golden rule of interpretation is that one has to give the words of a statute their primary meaning.

If that rule is applied to Order 6 of the Standing Orders, then, the inescapable inference is that the Order is addressing the Clerk and is dictating to him the manner by which a Speaker should be elected.

In view of the explicit language of the statute, it is not open to the Clerk, or any Member of Parliament, to substitute the method of electing a Speaker with another method of their own choice, such as by open ballot. Put differently, it was not open, for instance, to Members of Parliament to tell the Clerk that they were waiving their right to vote for the Speaker by secret ballot or that they wished to vote for the Speaker by open ballot either individually or as a group. That option was not open to the Members of Parliament as a whole or to individual Members of Parliament.

Voting by secret ballot, as I have already stated, involves the following three essential procedures:

(i) Firstly, that each Member of Parliament receives a ballot paper;

(ii) Secondly, that each Member of Parliament indicates on that ballot paper the candidate of his choice in private and to the exclusion of the public; and

(iii) Thirdly, that, having done so, the Member of Parliament deposits his or her ballot paper into the ballot box privately without disclosing his or her ballot paper to the world.

Once the ballot paper has been deposited into the ballot box the process of voting by secret ballot, so far as the voter is concerned, is completed.

It would not be a violation of voting by secret ballot if the person discloses whom he has voted for at that stage. The voting by secret ballot by the voter is complete: see Steel and Engineering Industries Federation and Ors v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2) 1993 (4) SA 196 (T).

The next stage to complete the process provided for in terms of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is for the Clerk to count the votes cast to determine the winner.

This stage, in my view, is an essential process in the election of the Speaker of Parliament by secret ballot:

Because of the peremptory language of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, the Clerk has no discretion over what procedure is to be followed when electing the Speaker. It has to be by secret ballot. The use of any other method to elect the Speaker would be a failure to comply with the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

In casu, the appellants alleged that some Members of Parliament received ballot papers, marked the ballot papers in the privacy of the polling booth, and then, instead of folding the ballot papers to maintain the secrecy of their vote and before depositing them in the ballot box, they displayed them to fellow Members of Parliament to show them how they voted. Thereafter, they deposited the ballot papers in the ballot box.

The court a quo concluded that six Members of Parliament conducted themselves in this manner. The conclusion that only six out of the two hundred and eight voters voted in this manner is supported by the evidence and it cannot be faulted.

The learned Judge in the court a quo also concluded that the six Members of Parliament who displayed their votes complied with the requirement of a secret ballot because they were entitled to pierce the veil of secrecy without falling foul of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

I respectfully disagree with the learned Judge in this regard.

The six Members of Parliament, by displaying their ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box, violated the secrecy of their ballots, thereby rendering their votes invalid for the purposes of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6. This rendered their votes ineligible for counting for the purpose of determining the election of the Speaker.

The Clerk proceeded to count these six votes as valid votes in determining the outcome of the election. This contaminated the process.

Put differently, he counted oranges and apples in a process where the law provides that only oranges be counted.

In short, the Clerk failed to act as directed by section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, namely, to conduct an election by secret ballot. He conducted a cross-breed election, in that it was partly secret and partly open. That is not what the law provides for.

In this regard, I am satisfied that the Clerk failed to comply with the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

Having concluded that the Clerk did not comply with the statutory requirements in his conduct of the election, the issue that falls for determination is, what are the legal consequences that flow from the failure to comply with the statutory provisions?

Section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, has directed that the Clerk shall conduct an election of a Speaker by secret ballot but has not provided what should be the consequence of the non-compliance with this peremptory direction by Parliament.

This Court recently had occasion to deal with the issue of interpreting a statute that does not prescribe the consequences of non-compliance with a statutory provision in the case of Doctor Daniel Shumba and Anor v The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Anor Judgment No. SC11-08.

In that case, I cited with approval a passage from BENNION Statutory Interpretation…, which sets out how courts should approach that issue.

The learned author states that a court charged with the enforcement of a statute that does not state the consequences of non-compliance needs to decide what consequence Parliament intended should follow from such failure to comply. In that case, I had this to say at pp21-23 of the cyclostyled judgment:

"It is the generally accepted rule of interpretation that the use of peremptory words such as 'shall' as opposed to 'may' is indicative of the legislature's intention to make the provision peremptory. The use of the word 'may' as opposed to 'shall' is construed as indicative of the legislature's intention to make a provision directory. In some instances the legislature explicitly provides that failure to comply with a statutory provision is fatal. In other instances, the legislature specifically provides that failure to comply is not fatal. In both of the above instances no difficulty arises.

The difficulty usually arises where the legislature has made no specific indication as to whether failure to comply is fatal or not.

In the present case, the consequences of failure to comply with the provisions of section 18 of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act are not explicitly spelt out.

In those statutory provisions where the legislature has not specifically provided for the consequences of failure to comply, it has to be assumed that the legislature has left it to the Courts to determine what the consequences of failure to comply should be.

The learned author FRANCIS BENNION in his work Statutory Interpretation suggests that the courts have to determine the intention of the legislature using certain principles of interpretation as guidelines. He had this to say at pp21-22:

'Where a duty arises under a statute, the court, charged with the task of enforcing the statute, needs to decide what consequence Parliament intended should follow from breach of the duty.

This is an area where legislative drafting has been markedly deficient. Draftsmen find it easy to use the language of command. They say that a thing 'shall' be done. Too often they fail to consider the consequence when it is not done. What is not thought of by the draftsman is not expressed in the statute.

Yet the courts are forced to reach a decision.

It would be draconian to hold that in every case failure to comply with the relevant duty invalidates the thing done. So, the courts' answer has been to devise a distinction between mandatory and directory duties.

Terms used instead of "mandatory" include 'absolute', 'obligatory', 'imperative' and 'strict'. In place of "directory", the term 'permissive' is sometimes used. Use of the term 'directory' in the sense of permissive has been justly criticised: see CRAIES Statute Law (7th edn, 1971) p61 n74. However, it is now firmly rooted.

Where the relevant duty is mandatory, failure to comply with it invalidates the thing done. Where it is merely directory the thing done will be unaffected (though there may be some sanction for disobedience imposed on the person bound). {As to sanctions for breach of statutory duty see section 13 of this Code (criminal sanctions) and section 14 (civil sanctions)}.'

Thereafter, the learned author sets out some guiding principles for the determination of whether failure to comply with a statutory provision is fatal or a mere irregularity.

One of these guiding principles is the possible consequences of a particular interpretation. If interpreting non-compliance with a statutory provision leads to consequences totally disproportionate to the mischief intended to be remedied, the presumption is that Parliament did not intend such a consequence and therefore the provision is directory."

MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed…, says much the same as the above cited excerpt from BENNION.

Thus, the issue before this Court is to determine what Parliament intended to be the consequence of the Clerk's breach of the statutory requirement to count only regular votes in determining the outcome of the election of the Speaker.

I have come to the conclusion that Parliament intended to render invalid an election wherein the Clerk fails to comply with the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6. I have come to this conclusion for two reasons -

(i) Firstly, because of the peremptory language of the provision in question; and

(ii) Secondly, because of the use of different language from the one used by Parliament when it legislated on the same subject matter in another statute, namely, section 177 of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13].

Dealing with the issue of the use of peremptory language in section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, there can be no doubt that the language of the relevant section is peremptory, having regard to the use of the word "shall".

I accept that there has been movement from the principle of strict exaction of compliance with the wording of the statute to avoid invalidity to a more flexible approach giving the courts some latitude in determining the consequences of non-compliance.

My understanding of the new approach is that, while the use of the word "shall" is no longer conclusive of the intention of Parliament to render invalid non-compliance, it certainly still remains cogent evidence of such intention. This Court has, in a number of recent cases, held that failure to comply with the peremptory direction of a statute leads to invalidity. In this regard, Rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules provides as follows:

"29 Entry of appeal

(1) Every civil appeal shall be instituted in the form of a notice of appeal signed by the appellant or his legal representative, which shall state –

(a) The date on which, and the court by which, the judgment appealed against was given;

(b) If leave to appeal was granted, the date of such grant;

(c) Whether the whole or part only of the judgment is appealed against;

(d) The grounds of appeal in accordance with the provisions of Rule 32;

(e) The exact nature of the relief which is sought;

(f) The address for service of the appellant or his legal practitioner."…,.

In Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 this Court held that by use of the word "shall" compliance with the requirement of Rule 29 was peremptory and that failure to comply with the Rule rendered the Notice of Appeal a nullity and that such a notice cannot be condoned or amended.

KORSAH JA, at 219D, had this to say about the Notice of Appeal that did not comply with Rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules:

"This Notice of Appeal was defective for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 29, subrules (c), (d) and (e) which require the applicant or his legal representative to state: (i) whether the whole or only part of the judgment is appealed against; (ii) the ground of appeal to be set forth concisely and in separately numbered paragraphs; and (iii) the exact nature of the relief which is sought."

The learned JUDGE OF APPEAL further stated, at pp219H-220D:

"The Notice of Appeal, being bad for non-compliance with the Rules, was not cured by the filing, on 3 January 1990, of grounds of appeal without a prayer. Indeed, even if the grounds of appeal filed on 3 January 1990 had contained a prayer for relief, it would not have been effectual in validating the defective Notice of Appeal.

The reason is that a Notice of Appeal which does not comply with the Rules is fatally defective and invalid. That is to say, it is a nullity. It is not only bad but incurably bad, and, unless the court is prepared to grant an application for condonation of the defect and to allow a proper Notice of Appeal to be filed, the appeal must be struck off the roll with costs: De Jager v Diner & Anor 1957 (3) SA 567 (A) at 574 C-D.

In Hattingh v Pienaar 1977 (2) SA 182 (O)…, at 183, KLOPPER JP held that a fatally defective compliance with the Rules, regarding the filing of appeals, cannot be condoned or amended. What should actually be applied for is an extension of time within which to comply with the relevant Rule.

With this view I most respectfully agree; for if the Notice of Appeal is incurably bad, then, to borrow the words of LORD DENNING in McFoy v United Africa Co. Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC) at 1172I, 'every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse'."

GUBBAY CJ and MANYARARA JA concurred.

In Matanhire v BP & Shell Marketing Services (Pvt) Ltd 2004 (2) ZLR 147 (S) MALABA JA…, expressed the same sentiments when he stated at 149E-G:

"A nullity cannot be amended. In Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 (S) KORSAH JA at 220B said that the reason why a fatally defective Notice of Appeal could not be amended was that:'…, it is not only bad but incurably bad.'

Citing Hattingh v Pienaar 1977 (2) SA 182 (O) at 183 for authority, the learned JUDGE OF APPEAL said that what should actually be applied for is an extension of time within which to comply with the relevant Rule and condonation of non-compliance.

In Business Equipment Corp v Baines Imaging Group 2002 (2) ZLR 354 (S), a Notice of Appeal which did not state the date on which the judgment appealed against was given, in contravention of section 29(1)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, was held to be fatally defective, and the procedure stated in Jensen's case supra was approved as the appropriate remedy in having a proper Notice of Appeal placed before the court. See also Talbert v Yeoman Products (Pvt) Ltd S-111-99, SC111-99."

The learned JUDGE OF APPEAL further stated at p150B-C:

"As no valid Notice of Appeal was delivered and filed within fifteen days of the date when the decision of the Labour Court was given, there was no appeal before the court and to merely insert the relevant date in the defective Notice of Appeal, as suggested by Mr Muskwe, without an application for an extension of time within which to institute the appeal and for condonation of non-compliance with the Rules of Court, would be grossly irregular. The matter had to be struck off the roll."

It is quite clear from the above authorities that failure to comply with peremptory language of a statute can lead to a nullity.

Equally, there are decisions of this Court wherein it has been held that non-compliance with peremptory statutory provisions does not necessarily lead to a nullity. See Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S) and the cases referred to therein.

The above authorities can be reconciled on the basis that the use of peremptory language is one of a number of indicators of the legislative intent where such intent is not explicitly stated. This obviously is a departure from the principle of strict exaction of compliance with the wording of the statute that I referred to earlier.

In my view, the use of peremptory language, such as the words "shall" or "must" in a statute is no longer conclusive evidence of the intention of Parliament, but remains cogent evidence of such intention.

As I have already stated, I concluded that Parliament intended to render null and void an election in which irregular or invalid votes were counted together with valid votes to determine the outcome of the election of the Speaker for two reasons; namely, the peremptory language of the section and the use of different language from the one used by the Legislature on the same subject matter in a different statute.

The proposition that generally speaking Parliament, just like an individual, uses the same words or language to evince the same intent and different words or language to evince a different intent is grounded in elementary common sense.

MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed devotes a whole chapter on the presumptions arising from the change of language in statutory interpretation…,. His opening paragraph of this subject matter reads:

"From the general presumption that the same expression is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout an Act or series of cognate Acts, there follows the further presumption that a change of wording denotes a change in meaning; Ricket v Metropolitan Railway Co. (1867) LR 2 HL 175, per LORD WESTBURY; ex p. Haines [1945] KB 183; Evans v Evans [1948] 1 KB 175.

'Where the Legislature,' said LORD TENTERDEN CJ, 'in the same sentence uses different words, we must presume that they were used in order to express different ideas'; R v Inhabitants of Great Bolton (1828) 8 B & C 71 at p74)."

For the presumption to arise, the change of words does not necessarily have to be in the same section or the same Act. It can be from one statute to another; see MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes…, where the learned author states that:

"There are many modern cases on change of wording, and they fall roughly into three groups, according to whether the language alters (i) within the same section, (ii) within the same Act, (iii) from one statute to another."

For authority for the third category, which bears resemblance to the facts in casu, the learned author cites the following authorities; Att-Gen. for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349; B v B and H (L intervening) [1962] 1 All ER 29; Re P. (infants) [1962] 1 WLR 1296; Irwin v White, Tomkins and Courage, Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 387; Att.-Gen. of the Duchy of Lancaster v Simcock [1966] Ch.1; Seabridge v H.Cox & Sons (Plant Hire) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 46; Wild v Wild [1968] 3 WLR 1148.

While the authorities cited by MAXWELL relate mainly to historically connected statutes, I see nothing in principle that should limit the presumption to preceding statutes to the exclusion of statutes on the same subject matter but not historically connected. After all, Parliament is presumed to be familiar with its own Acts. The corollary, that Parliament is ignorant of its own Acts, is simply untenable.

Thus, at the time of enacting Standing Order 6, in 2005, in terms of which the Clerk acted, Parliament was familiar with the provisions of section 177 of the Electoral Act, which was enacted earlier. This particular provision has been included in no less than nine electoral Acts in this country since 1928.

In my view, it is permissible for a court to look at the language of another statute on similar or the same subject matter in the exercise to ascertain the intention of Parliament.

Section 177 of the Electoral Act, as appears from its heading, deals with the subject of the consequences of non-compliance with the Electoral Act. It provides as follows:

"177 When non-compliance with this Act invalidates election

An election shall be set aside by the Electoral Court by reason of any mistake or non-compliance with the provisions of this Act if, and only if, it appears to the Electoral Court that –

(a) The election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this Act; and

(b) Such mistake or non-compliance did affect the result of the election."

Section 177 of the Electoral Act clearly provides that it is only when non-compliance with the Act affects the result of the election that the election should be set aside. In effect, this section incorporates into the Electoral Act the doctrine of substantial compliance.

Section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, provides for the election of the Speaker, but does not incorporate the principle of substantial compliance. In my view, if Parliament had intended that only non-compliance that affected the outcome of the election of the Speaker would render invalid such an election it would have used the same or similar language.

Also, in determining the intention of Parliament, I took into account the fact that no draconian consequences would flow from a declaration of invalidity of the election.

Parliament consists of a little over two hundred Members and ordering a re-election of the Speaker does not pose financial or logistical problems of any magnitude. If properly organised, as it should be, I do not see the election of the Speaker taking more than an hour and it should require only a minimum of resources.

I am also mindful of the fact that Parliament is one of the most revered institutions in our, or any, society. It consists of the highest concentration of political leadership of the country. Parliament makes the laws that we all obey. Parliament should, therefore, lead by example and should scrupulously obey its own laws.

The election of the Speaker should be an example of how an election should be conducted. This is particularly so in Zimbabwe which is plagued by contestation of election results. Parliament should use the election of the Speaker to set the best example to the rest of the country. It is unacceptable that Parliament should seek to salvage a shambolic and chaotic election of a Speaker through the doctrine of substantial compliance.

I do not wish to be understood as setting aside the election of the Speaker on the ground that it was chaotic. I am satisfied that the chaos and the conduct of Members of Parliament, generally, did not, on their own, affect the election to the extent that it can be concluded that the Clerk did not conduct an election. I am merely expressing concern that the Clerk failed to stamp his authority on the election and insist that Members of Parliament conduct themselves in accordance with his instructions. I, however, do not think that conduct, alone, is sufficient, on its own, to constitute a basis for setting aside the election of the Speaker.

Before concluding, I feel constrained to make the following observation in the interests of clarity.

I have read the judgment of SANDURA JA.

It is a mis-interpretation of this judgment to conclude that it seeks to reinstate the old principle of strict compliance with the letter of the statute to avoid invalidity. This judgment is based on what I considered to be the intention of Parliament as evinced by the language of the statute, and by contrasting the language of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, with the language of section 177 of the Electoral Act.

I also do not agree that the principle that a peremptory enactment must be obeyed was abandoned in the case of Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S).

My understanding of Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S) is that it modified the principle by endorsing the movement away from strict compliance to a more flexible application of the principle. This is the only basis on which one can reconcile GUBBAY CJ's concurrence with the judgment of KORSAH JA in Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 (S) and his judgment in Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S). MANYARARA JA concurred with both judgments. This Court re-affirmed the modification of the principle in Doctor Daniel Shumba and Anor v The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Anor Judgment No. SC11-08.

In the result, I have come to the conclusion that the six named Members of Parliament did not vote by secret ballot, and, therefore, their votes were irregular. The inclusion of the irregular votes in the determination of the final outcome of the election of the Speaker constitutes a failure to comply with section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, providing for the election of the Speaker of Parliament by secret ballot, thereby rendering it invalid.

For the foregoing reasons I would allow the appeal. In the result, I make the following order –

1. The appeal is allowed with costs to be paid by the respondents jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved.

2. The order made by the court a quo is set aside and the following substituted –

"The application succeeds and the election of the second respondent as Speaker is hereby set aside."

ZIYAMBI JA: I agree

GARWE JA: I agree

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ: This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court wherein PATEL J dismissed the appellants' application to have set aside the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as "the Speaker").

The appellants, as the applicants in the court a quo, sought the following relief set out in the draft order:

"WHEREUPON after perusing the documents filed of record and hearing counsel, it is hereby declared that:-

1. The election of (the) second respondent as the Speaker of the Parliament of Zimbabwe on 25 August 2008 is null and void and set aside.

2….,.

3. That the respondents jointly and severally pay the costs of suit."

(The applicants abandoned the relief set out in paragraph 2).

The appellants' main contention in the court a quo, and in this Court, is that the election of the Speaker was null and void because it was not conducted in terms of section 39 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), as read with Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders of Parliament of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Standing Orders").

PATEL J dismissed the application. The appellants now appeal against that judgment....,.

MALABA DCJ: I have read the opinion expressed by the learned CHIEF JUSTICE. I regret that I am unable to agree with the decision that section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order No.6 of the House of Assembly Standing Orders ("Standing Order 6"), by implication, compels the nullification of the election upon proof that the Clerk of Parliament ("the Clerk"), who was under the obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker of the House of Assembly ("the Speaker") by a secret ballot, unlawfully counted invalid votes as secret ballots.

This case came to the Supreme Court by way of an appeal against the judgment of the High Court. The court a quo dismissed with costs an application for an order declaring that the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of the House of Assembly ("the House") on 25 August 2008 is null and void and set aside.

The applicants, who are members of the House who had taken part in the election of the Speaker, disavowed the application as an application for review. The substance of the relief sought and the reliance on the provisions of section 4(1) of the Administration of Justice Act [Chapter 10:28], however, show that it was an application for review.

The applicants alleged, in effect, that the Clerk who, as the administrative authority, was given the power to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, in accordance with the machinery prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, failed to act in accordance with the requirements of the rule against counting invalid votes as secret ballots, and, as a result, affected their rights or legitimate expectation in the election.

A perusal of the papers filed in support of the application shows that the relief was sought on two grounds:

(i) The first ground was that there was "noise, utter chaos, and disorder" in the Chamber of the House at the time appointed by the Clerk for the holding of the election of the Speaker such that the environment never became conducive for conducting the election by a secret ballot.

(ii) The second ground was that, in violation of the secrecy of the ballot, and in defiance of the procedure laid down by the Clerk, some members of the MDC-T party came out of the polling booth with ballot papers, on which they had marked their votes, unfolded. The allegation was that they displayed the ballot papers to others to disclose for whom they had voted before folding the ballot papers and depositing them in the ballot boxes.

As part of the second ground, it was alleged that the Clerk was under a duty to stop or prevent the members of the MDC-T party from doing what they did, but, in disobedience of his duty, failed to do so.

It was not the applicants' case that the election of the second respondent, as the Speaker of the House, should be declared null and void because the Clerk counted invalid votes as secret ballots, thereby distorting the result of the election. The reason is that to do so would have involved an admission by the applicants of the fact that there was counting of secret ballots produced by the electoral process the applicants alleged had not taken place.

As the learned CHIEF JUSTICE arrived at the conclusion, with which I disagree, on the ground that the Clerk counted invalid votes as secret ballots, I will deal with the question whether in the machinery for the election of the Speaker, prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, the unlawful conduct of the Clerk, in counting invalid votes as secret ballots, automatically nullifies the election.

My view of the case is that the application ought to have been dismissed or granted on the grounds on which the applicants made it.

Before determining the question whether the applicants established the grounds on which they sought the relief from the court a quo, I set out and construe the law in terms of which the election of the Speaker, by a secret ballot, was required to be conducted.

It is for the Legislature to make provision, by legislation, for matters relating to elections to office in institutions of a democratic Government. All matters relating to the organisation and procedure for election to the office of the Speaker of the House must be determined on the construction of the broad terms of the legislation enacted for the purpose by Parliament.

Section 39(1) of the Constitution imposes on the House an obligation to elect a presiding officer, to be known as the Speaker, at its first meeting after dissolution of Parliament and before proceeding to transact any other business. The election must therefore be held at the time prescribed under section 39(1) of the Constitution.

It is required to be an election by a secret ballot - only a secret ballot under the statute can give rise to a "result of the election."

The right to vote in the election of the Speaker, where more than one person is proposed for the post, is given to members of the House who would have subscribed the oath of loyalty and are present in the Chamber of the House at the time the election is called by the Clerk.

By section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, the Clerk is appointed as the official to conduct the election required by section 39(1) where more than one person is proposed as Speaker. By the same provisions, the Clerk is enjoined to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

When the members elect a Speaker from candidates nominated they do so in their individual capacity. They are not acting as representatives of the people who elected them to the House.

Where the words "conduct the election" are used as they are used in section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, in respect of a situation where more than one person is proposed for election for a post, it is clear that the word "election" is used with the intention that it should be understood to mean the whole combined and continuous process for bringing about the result of the election. It is a process consisting of a number of material steps prescribed by law, beginning with the call for the election and ending in the declaration of the result of the election.

For the purposes of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, all these steps were driven by the free exercise of the right to vote by the electors directed by the Clerk entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the election by a secret ballot.

The words "conduct the election" compendiously describe the number of duties the Clerk would be expected to carry out to ensure that members who were desirous to elect the Speaker by means of a secret ballot did so freely. So, to "conduct the election" in the context of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, denotes the concept of legality, in the sense that it contemplates the making of decisions or the taking of actions in the performance of duties, the effect of which is to direct or manage the activities of the voters according to the prescribed requirements of the law to achieve the object or purpose of ensuring the election of the Speaker based on universal, equal, direct, and personal vote freely expressed by a secret ballot.

In construing section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, it is important to bear in mind that the right to vote vested in the members present and voting at the first meeting of the House is not affected by the requirement that the election should be conducted by a secret ballot. The statute relates to procedure alone and directs the mode in which the right to vote is to be exercised by the electors.

The Legislature chose the secret ballot for its optimum benefits and prescribed it as the only method by which the elector would validly exercise his or her right to vote for the Speaker. At the same time, it imposed on the Clerk the general obligation to provide the mechanisms and procedures for the recording, processing, and protection of the secret ballot to bring about the election of the Speaker.

Every voter was entitled to express his or her will on the candidates by voting "for" or "against" through the legally permitted form of voting.

As section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, prescribes a secret ballot and its attendant requirements as a condition the elector has to perform if he or she is desirous to give a valid vote for a candidate in the election of the Speaker, it is addressed to both the voter and the Clerk who has to conduct the election by a secret ballot. The validity of a vote and of any act performed by the Clerk must be measured in terms of its conformity with the requirements of a secret ballot prescribed as the essence of the election of the Speaker.

In my view, it is wrong to place on section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, a narrow construction which views it as directed at the Clerk only. The Clerk does not vote. He does not produce the result of the election. His functions are managerial. The elector is the driver of the election by a secret ballot. The Clerk and the voter must be viewed in the context of the legal relationship of the rights and duties they have to exercise or discharge to achieve the statutory objective or purpose.

The prescription of a secret ballot, as the method for the election of the Speaker, is based on the acceptance of the principle that it promotes and protects freedom of expression of choice of a preferred candidate without undue influence, intimidation, and fear of disapproval by others. The elector is given the right to mark the choice of one candidate from another, or others, in secret. The words "secret ballot" are used in the wide and narrow sense to mean the process by which the ballot is recorded, processed, and protected, as well as the ballot in which there is complete and inviolable secrecy designed to drive away the fear of disclosure and secure to the voter freedom from undue influence, intimidation, and fear of disapproval by others.

A "secret ballot" is therefore a ballot cast freely by a voter, in secret, when no other person is present and aware of what is happening.

The ballot is secret to the voter, in the sense that he or she is the only person who knows for whom he or she is voting.

Whilst the caster of the vote remains unknown, the secrecy of the ballot is maintained and the vote has been effectively cast in the election of the Speaker. It is the valid vote to be counted to ascertain the result of the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

To maintain the secrecy, made to be extremely material as the foundation to the validity of the vote itself, the voter must meet certain conditions.

He or she is required not to put on the ballot paper, on which the vote is given, any writing or mark by which his or her identity as the voter can be known by any other person looking at the ballot paper. The voter is also required not to display or expose the ballot paper after he or she has given the vote so as to disclose to any other person for whom he or she voted before depositing the ballot paper in the ballot box.

So essential is the secrecy of the ballot to its validity that any departure by the voter from these conditions, designed for the purpose of ensuring the maintenance thereof, must render the vote void.

The mandatory obligation imposed on the Clerk was to perform the duties put on him to provide the mechanisms and procedures that enabled the voter who was desirous to exercise the right to vote by a secret ballot to do so. The duties he had to perform were to ensure that the vote, given in secret, was recorded, processed, protected, and counted, to bring about the election of the Speaker.

The primary object of any act performed by the Clerk in the discharge of the obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot would have been the maintenance of the secrecy of the ballot given by the voter, unless the voter himself or herself failed to observe, strictly, the conditions essential to the validity of the vote as a secret ballot. The Clerk, as the official appointed by the Legislature, and given the responsibility of conducting the election of the Speaker by means of a secret ballot, was under an absolute duty not to do anything in the execution of his duties that would have the effect of compelling the voter to violate the secrecy of the ballot.

Although it does not say in express terms that the Clerk cannot record the vote in some other way, it is clear that section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, makes the prescribed manner of recording the ballot by means of a ballot paper, properly drawn up and with the names of the candidates and the appropriate spaces where the mark by which the vote would be given, the only manner in which a secret ballot was to be given.

The Clerk has no discretion as to how the election should be conducted. He must conduct it by a secret ballot.

The valid vote in an election had to be one given for a candidate by means of a secret ballot. It was, therefore, the duty of the Clerk to provide the official ballot papers. It was his duty to put in place the polling booth in which the voters would mark the ballot papers, screened from observation by other potential voters. It was his duty to provide sealed and translucent ballot boxes in which the voters would deposit the marked ballot papers for safekeeping before counting.

The Clerk discharged these duties in accordance with the requirements of the law. He put in the Chamber of the House the polling booth and two ballot boxes and provided the ballot papers.

It was also the Clerk's duty to provide the procedure by which the secret ballot was to be recorded, processed, protected, counted, and results of the election based on it declared.

He, again, complied with this requirement.

The Clerk explained to the members that the voter would only mark his or her vote on a ballot paper delivered by him just before proceeding to the polling booth and that the ballot paper had to have an official stamp marked on the back. Upon receipt of the ballot paper, the member was to go immediately into the polling booth and there mark his or her ballot paper to express his or her choice. The voter was then required to fold the ballot paper up whilst in the polling booth, so as to conceal the vote, and then go and deposit the ballot paper, so folded up, into the ballot box. The voter was required to exhibit to the Clerk the official stamp on the back of the folded ballot paper before dropping it into the ballot box.

The procedure met the purpose of the legislation of ensuring equality of conditions for election to the office of Speaker for the candidates and the occurrence of an election based on universal, equal, direct, and personal suffrage freely expressed by a secret ballot.

It was the duty of the Clerk to monitor the proceedings and keep a continuous oversight of the actions of the voter as he or she moved from the polling booth to drop the ballot paper into the ballot box. In that way he would be able to detect conduct inconsistent with the exercise by the voter of the right to elect the Speaker in accordance with the procedure prescribed to ensure the maintenance of the secrecy of the ballot.

Once he detected such conduct, it was the Clerk's duty to act judicially and determine that the conduct of the voter had stripped the ballot of secrecy and declare the vote invalid and not to be counted.

At the end of the poll, the Clerk was required to open the ballot box in the presence of the agents of the candidates. It was his duty to empty the ballot box and open each and every folded ballot paper and inspect it to ensure that only those ballot papers which were not contrary to the provisions and spirit of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, as to secrecy, were counted in the election of the Speaker.

Before counting the valid ballot papers, the Clerk was required to group and arrange them under the names of the respective candidates by placing, in separate parcels, those which were secret ballots opposite the name of the same candidate and rejecting all invalid ballot papers.

The results of the election to be declared by the Clerk in an election of the Speaker conducted in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, would not be the number of votes cast. The reason is that some of the votes would have lost their secrecy as they moved through the process, from the time they were given on the ballot paper in the polling booth to the time they were canvassed after the opening of the ballot box. The result of the election, under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is the outcome of secret ballots counted as such.

The result of an election cannot include invalid votes because it is unlawful to count invalid votes as secret ballots. Courts do not ordinarily nullify that which has been done lawfully. Nullification is a remedy intended to be used to redress a wrong.

There is yet another important aspect of the right to secrecy of the ballot which needs to be considered before the determination of the question whether the applicants established the grounds on which they sought relief in the court a quo.

It is that the right to secrecy of the ballot, protected under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is subject to the principle that everyone has a right to waive an advantage of a law made solely for his or her benefit and protection in his or her private capacity. He or she may dispense with the benefit or advantage, provided he or she does so without infringing any public right or public policy. See MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed…,.

There is no legal obligation that a voter must vote by secret ballot.

The requirement of a vote by a secret ballot is justified on the principle which, without unacceptably encroaching on the rights of the persons concerned to stay out of the prescribed system of election, fosters the values of honesty, freedom, and reliability that should characterise electoral choice. As the voter must exercise the right to vote for the Speaker by a secret ballot given on the ballot paper freely, he or she can waive the right to the secrecy of the ballot at the time the vote is cast or at any time before he or she deposits the ballot paper in the ballot box.

The right to vote by a secret ballot includes the right of the voter to disclose to any other person for whom he or she voted. He or she can, in the exercise of that freedom, decide to put a writing or mark on the ballot paper at the time he or she casts the vote by which he or she can be identified as the voter and for whom he or she voted. He or she may decide to display to others the ballot paper so as to share the knowledge for whom he or she voted. So, a voter can, of his or her own free will, inform whomsoever he or she chooses for whom he or she voted. A secret ballot is not compulsory insofar as the voter who is not desirous of taking part in the election by a secret ballot is concerned.

The rule that there should be no writing or mark put by the voter on the ballot paper by which his or her identity as the voter can be revealed, and that the ballot paper should not be displayed to any other person so as to disclose for whom the vote was given, prescribes a condition of the validity of the vote.

The question whether there is a secret ballot for the purposes of the validity of the vote will depend for its answer on the actions of the individual voter.

In Jenkins v Board of Elections 180 NC 169 (1920), cited by Mr Chaskalson, it is correctly stated by BROWN J that:

"…, voting by ballot, as distinguished from viva voce voting, means a secret ballot, and…, the elector, in casting his ballot, has the right to put it in the box and to refuse to disclose for whom he voted and that he cannot be compelled to do so. But, this privilege of voting a secret ballot has been held to be entirely a personal one. The provision has been generally adopted…, for the protection of the voter and for the preservation of his independence in the exercise of this most important franchise. But, he has the right to waive his privilege and testify to the contents of his ballot."

In State Ex Rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932), also cited by Mr Chaskalson in argument, BUFORD CJ quoted from COOLEY Constitutional Limitations 7ed…, where the learned author states:

"The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with what party he pleases and that no one is to have the right or be in a position to question his independent action either then or at any subsequent time. The courts have held that a voter, even in case of a contested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he voted; and, for the same reason, we think others who may accidentally or by trick or artifice have acquired knowledge on the subject should not be allowed to testify to such knowledge or to give any information in the courts upon the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it, his ballot is absolutely privileged."

I turn now to determine the question whether the applicants established the grounds on which they based the application for the relief sought.

On the first ground, the first applicant, in the founding affidavit, said that there was "too much noise in the House" at the beginning of the process for the election of the Speaker.

The intention was to show that the Clerk was unable to manage the activities of the members according to the prescribed procedure for the achievement of the purpose of the electoral law.

He said the noise was caused by members belonging to MDC-T party who were pacing up and down the Chamber conferring noisily with each other in support of the second respondent. He said that was done "in a manner that created utter disorder and raised very serious tensions in the House."

After describing how the Honourable Biti displayed the ballot paper, after he had cast his vote in the polling booth, so as to disclose to others for whom he had voted, before folding the ballot paper up and depositing it into the ballot box, the first applicant said, in paragraph 32 of the founding affidavit:

"Honourable Biti's shocking and unprecedented conduct caused more than a fracas in the House as Honourable Members started shouting objections and counter objections, including trading insults, at the top of their voices, while the voting process degenerated into total disorder…,."

In paragraphs 3.9, 3.10, 3.15, 5, 6, and 11 of the opposing affidavit the Clerk said:

"3.9 The mood and atmosphere in the House of Assembly, on the occasion, was neither unique nor unprecedented. Members of the House of Assembly were meeting together for the first time after a fiercely contested general election. As can be expected, under the circumstances, the conversation was lively and the exchanges exuberant. There was a fair amount of good-humoured raillery, including political taunting, verbal sparring and bantering, all done by Members from all the political parties represented in what appeared to be a good spirit of joviality. This kind of conduct is not unusual in our Parliament or any other Parliament for that matter, and, accordingly, I did not consider it a cause for concern on this occasion.

3.10 It is my submission that what has been described by (the) applicant as 'gross disorder, chaos or fracas' in the House was actually nothing more sinister than increased hustle and bustle in the House, in turn the result of the increase in number of Members of the House (an increase in the membership from 150 to 210 as a result of Constitutional Amendment No.18)…,.

3.15 Notwithstanding the environment in the House that I have described in paragraphs 3.9 and 3.10 of this affidavit I was able to manage the entire proceedings of the day according to my present programme without a hitch of any kind. It is, therefore, my submission that quite contrary to (the) applicants' allegations of 'utter disorder and fracas' the proceedings progressed exceptionally smoothly…,.

5. I deny that at the time immediately before the elections took place there was too much noise and there existed a state of utter disorder in the House. I also totally deny witnessing any manifestation of serious tensions. What I did witness in the House was the atmosphere that I have described in paragraphs 3.9 and 3.10 of this affidavit.

6. Save to confirm that I did call the House to order whenever I deemed it necessary, and, by so doing, achieved a continuing level of order which enabled me to discharge my obligation and safeguard the progress and integrity of the voting process as well as all other proceedings of that day the contents of this paragraph (25 of the founding affidavit) warrant no comment….,.

11. I totally deny that there was total disorder in the House which I failed to control. If such a state of disorder had existed, the process of voting would have been impossible - which it was not. Generally, Members remained in their places, heard their names being called, followed the order on the list, approached, took possession of the ballot papers, and proceeded to vote privately. After voting they resumed their places without impediment in an exceptionally orderly manner given their numbers and the congestion in the Chamber."

The court a quo found, on the facts, that there was not so much noise as to cause chaos or utter disorder, as described by the first applicant.

The finding was justified by the evidence.

The relevance of raising the issue of noise was to show that the Clerk was disabled from performing his duties to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot. The applicants did not refer to specific duties the Clerk failed to perform because of the noise. To the contrary, the facts showed that all the Members who were present and desirous to vote did so.

Each of the two hundred and eight members received a ballot paper from the Clerk and went into the polling booth where he or she marked his or her vote on the ballot paper in secret. Some of the members came out of the polling booth with their ballot papers folded to conceal the vote and dropped the ballot papers into the ballot boxes after exhibiting the official stamp on the back to the Clerk. Other members came out of the polling booth with their ballot papers unfolded and displayed them to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted before folding them and dropping the ballot papers into the ballot box.

All the members responded to the alphabetical order in which their surnames were called.

They could not have done that in the context of the environment of chaos or utter disorder described by the applicants.

The first applicant conceded, in paragraph 25 of the founding affidavit, that the Clerk occasionally intervened to restore order when it was necessary to do so.

It was indeed the duty of the Clerk to maintain order during the electoral process.

By that admission, the first applicant corroborated the Clerk, who said that he was able to act and control the situation when he considered that the noise would interfere with his ability to conduct the election by a secret ballot as required by the law.

The Clerk was not a mere moderator. He was the governor of the electoral process for the purposes of securing the proper conduct of the election. As such, his evidence had to be accorded appropriate weight, where it was supported by that given by the applicants.

It is of interest to note that the Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, the Honourable Kasukuwere, and the Honourable Member, Mr Zhuwawo, admit, in the affidavits filed in support of the applicants, that when they called out to draw the attention of the Clerk to the objections they were raising to what they considered was a violation of the requirements of a secret ballot by members of the MDC-T party, who displayed their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted, the Clerk told them not to make noise.

According to the two members, what was shouted were objections to the conduct of displaying ballot papers. The objections were not intended to obstruct the Clerk in the conduct of the election. They were not the confused and undesirable sounds characteristic of noise. The environment cannot be accurately described as characterized by complete absence of order.

In view of the fact that all the two hundred and eight members went through the process by which they gave their votes on the ballot papers and dropped them into the ballot boxes, with some displaying their ballots to others so as to show for whom they had voted, the allegation that there was so much noise that the atmosphere was not conducive for conducting the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot was not substantiated. The atmosphere was characterised by the factors described by the Clerk, which enabled him to conduct the election of the Speaker fairly and efficiently.

The first ground on which the application for relief was based was not proved.

The second ground was based on the allegation that it was unlawful for the members of the MDC-T party who displayed their ballot papers to do so and for the Clerk not to stop or prevent them from doing what they did.

The intention was to show that the actions of the voters concerned, and the failure to act by the Clerk, undermined the process by which the object of the electoral law was to be achieved, thereby violating the rights of the applicants to elect the Speaker, or be elected as the Speaker, by a secret ballot. In that regard, the first applicant said, in the answering affidavit:

"100: It is particularly notable that (the) second respondent himself was one of the Honourable Members from the MDC-T party that unlawfully opened and displayed their marked ballot papers and this fact alone, which is captured in the DVD evidence, is enough to show that his claim to be Speaker is legally vacuous….,.

103. The fact that some Honourable Members, actually most of them belonging to (the) second respondent's MDC-T party including (the) second respondent, defiantly opened and displayed their marked ballot papers simply means that there was no lawful election and (the) second respondent is wishfully wrong to claim that he was lawfully elected from an election that was in fact unlawful."…,.

The applicants invariably described the conduct of the members of the MDC-T party, in displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted, in terms which show that they considered the conduct unlawful.

They said it was "shocking behaviour"; "a brazen violation of the secret ballot"; a "deliberate and defiant violation of the election procedure"; "open and defiant violation of the secret ballot"; "blatant misconduct"; "the failure to observe and respect a fundamental Parliamentary Rule in the election of (the) Speaker"; "the rampant and systematic violation of the secret ballot"; "the failure to conduct the votes in secret as required"; and "an irregularity which is a grave breach of the Rules of Parliament."

The effect of the contention advanced by counsel for the appellants, on appeal, was that the members of the MDC-T party, who displayed the ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted, had no right to do so.

In paragraph 6 of the answering affidavit, the first applicant emphasised the fact that he considered the failure by the Clerk to stop or prevent the members of the MDC-T party who displayed their ballots from doing so as unlawful. He said:

"6. His failure principally arose from his inability or unwillingness, for whatever reasons, to ensure that no Member left the polling booth, after voting, with an unfolded ballot paper, and that no Member openly displayed his or her marked ballot paper to any other Member for whatever reason."

In paragraph 178 of the answering affidavit, the first applicant summarized the issue for determination by the Court as follows:

"At issue is only the unchallenged fact in the papers, namely, that unfolded and marked ballot papers were displayed by many Honourable Members of the MDC-T party, including (the) second respondent, outside the polling booth during the election and that this was in violation of the procedure that marked ballot papers should be folded in the polling booth and (the) first respondent did nothing to stop this violation."

Counsel for the appellants argued, on appeal, that the failure by the Clerk to prevent or stop the members of the MDC-T party from displaying their ballot papers was evidence of breach by him of the duty to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The court a quo found, on the facts, that only six members of the MDC-T party were shown to have come out of the polling booth with unfolded ballot papers and to have displayed the ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted.

The finding was, again, justified.

Although the first and second applicants had alleged, in their affidavits, that "many" members of the MDC-T party had displayed their ballots, no evidence was produced to support the allegation.

The use of the word "many", in a case in which they were not able to state the number of the members of the MDC-T party who acted in the manner alleged, suggests that there was an element of exaggeration.

This is particularly so when regard is had to the fact that the applicants also said "some" members of the MDC-T party displayed their ballot papers so as to disclose to others for whom they had voted.

Given the fact that the applicants were seeking an order of nullification of the election, it was necessary that their case be based on clear evidence of the number of voters who displayed their ballot papers. The legal consequence would have been that the voters concerned had disenfranchised themselves by their own conduct.

Proceeding as the parties did on appeal, on the basis that six members displayed their ballots so as to disclose for whom they had voted, did the applicants show that those voters acted unlawfully? Did they ipso facto show that the Clerk acted unlawfully in failing to stop or prevent those voters from behaving in the manner they did?

I must add that the only reasonable inference from the circumstances of the case is that the six members displayed their ballot papers to other members of the MDC-T party to disclose to them that they had voted for the second respondent.

All members, including the six who displayed their ballot papers, had the right to waive the right to the secrecy of their votes.

In displaying the ballot papers to others, the six members exercised their right to share with any other person the knowledge for whom they voted.

As long as they were not coerced or compelled to expose their ballot papers to others, the voters acted lawfully. The power conferred on the Clerk, to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, is limited by the right of the voter not to maintain the secrecy of his or her ballot.

The Clerk was not under any duty to stop or prevent the voters from voluntarily displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted.

Whilst the duty on the Clerk, to maintain the secrecy of the ballot given by the voter, requires that he should refrain from doing anything that would compel the voter to disclose to any other person how he or she voted, it cannot be relied upon to justify conduct by which the voter would be prevented from freely exercising the right to disclose to whomsoever he or she chooses for whom he or she voted because the secrecy of the ballot is protected under the law for the benefit of the voter.

The Clerk owed the duty not to do anything to compel the voter to disclose for whom he or she voted to the voter. He cannot discharge the duty to the detriment of the interests of the voter by preventing or stopping him or her from exercising the right of disclosure of information as to how he or she voted.

It is clear that the duty on the Clerk was not to interfere with the recording, processing, and protection of a secret ballot as long as the voter maintained the secrecy of the ballot.

The applicants did not show that the Clerk acted unlawfully by not stopping or preventing the six members from displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose that they had voted for the second respondent. His duty was to manage and direct the activities of the electors in accordance with the rules designed to ensure a free and fair election by a secret ballot.

The applicants failed to establish the two grounds on which they sought the relief from the High Court by way of an order declaring the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of the House null and void and set aside.

The application ought to have been dismissed at that stage of the proceedings.

As I disagree with the learned Judge, on the comments he made on the legal consequences of the conduct of the six members in displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they voted, and also disagree with the learned CHIEF JUSTICE on the conclusion he reached that the counting by the Clerk of invalid votes cast by the six members as secret ballots nullified the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of the House, and not just the affected votes, I proceed to express my opinion on these matters.

The words "shall conduct the election of Speaker by a secret ballot" are placed in a statute by the provisions of which the Legislature recognised the possession by the members of the House present at its first meeting of the right to vote for the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The rule of law is that a right to vote must be exercised strictly according to the terms of the statute which confers it.

What this means, on the facts of this case, is that when the six members displayed their ballot papers to others, so as to disclose for whom they had voted, they voluntarily took their votes out of the system of the election by a secret ballot prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6. By the same conduct by which they waived the right to the secrecy of their ballots, the voters lifted the veil of secrecy from the ballots rendering them void and of no value in the election of the Speaker.

I do not accept, as a correct statement of the law, the contention advanced by Mr Chaskalson and Ms Damiso, on behalf of the respondents, and accepted by the learned Judge in the court a quo, that the six ballots remained valid votes, notwithstanding the fact that they had been displayed by the voters concerned to others so as to disclose for whom they had been given.

The learned Judge, at p11 of the cyclostyled judgment, said:

"The courts should not interfere unless it is shown that the objective conditions put in place for the election precluded the possibility of a secret vote. Beyond this, it is then a matter purely for the individual voter if he chooses to divulge, whether publicly or in private, the specific manner in which he has cast his vote. If he does so of his own volition, without any external coercion or intimidation and howsoever his conduct might influence other voters, this cannot detract from the secrecy of his vote or vitiate the secrecy of the ballot as a whole."…,.

The statement that, a voluntary display by a voter of the ballot paper so as to disclose to other people for whom he or she voted does not "detract from the secrecy" of the vote, cannot be a correct statement of the legal effect of such conduct on the secrecy of the ballot affected.

The object of the ballot prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is to secure complete secrecy as a condition of its validity, to be maintained not only by the voter desirous to elect the Speaker but by the official entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the election by a secret ballot during the electoral process, including the time when the counting of the votes takes place.

How can the official be able to maintain complete secrecy of a ballot in the face of conduct by the voter which removes the secrecy from the ballot? How the ballot can retain its secrecy thereafter I cannot imagine.

The secrecy is conferred on the ballot at the time the vote is given on the ballot paper in the polling booth. It must, however, be maintained thereafter to ensure the validity of the vote in the election of the Speaker.

It is clear, from the object of the statute and the procedure for voting, that a ballot paper which has a writing or mark made on it by which the identity of the voter can be known or one that is displayed to other people so as to disclose for whom the vote was cast, gets stripped of the secrecy of the ballot. The secret as a secret ceases to exist.

The ballot becomes void and cannot be counted in the election by a secret ballot.

The view expressed by the learned Judge did not take into account the effect of the requirement of the procedure provided by the Clerk for voting by a secret ballot.

The duty put on the voter desirous of maintaining the validity of his or her ballot in the election of the Speaker was that, after marking the ballot paper in the privacy of the polling booth, he or she would fold the ballot paper so as to conceal the ballot and keep it so folded until he or she deposited the ballot paper in the ballot box for safekeeping. The rule was to ensure the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot for the purpose of its validity in the election.

The direct effect of the voter displaying the ballot paper to other people, so as to disclose to them for whom he or she voted, is the invalidation of the ballot as a secret ballot.

Without pretending that there was no criterion by which a secret ballot had to be identified, I think the conclusion that the ballots displayed by the six voters to others, so as to disclose to them for whom they had voted, did not lose their secrecy, does not accord with what seems to have been the intention of the Legislature.

The proposition that the invalidity of the votes does not occur at the time the ballot papers are displayed so as to disclose for whom the vote was given would create a situation which would be quite unclear, and, to a certain extent, even illogical. Every exercise of a right has a direct consequence. The exercise of the right to vote which removes the secrecy of the ballot cannot have the same consequence as the exercise of the right which maintains the secrecy of the vote.

Failure by the Clerk to respond to the actions of the six voters and formally declare the ballots void did not change the fact that the ballots had been rendered invalid by the very actions of the voters.

The votes remained invalid at the time the Clerk counted them as secret ballots. He was not under any duty to count invalid votes as secret ballots. The statute is, in effect, clear that in no case will votes be allowed which are in any form other than the form of a secret ballot.

The result of the election of the Speaker, by a secret ballot, was not the number of votes cast, as some of them would have lost the essential element of secrecy as they travelled in their journey from the time they were cast to the time of counting. The result of the election was who was elected by a secret ballot.

The counting of invalid votes that had lost their secrecy affected two classes of voters:

(a) The first class is of voters who deliberately exercised their right to waive the benefits of the secrecy of the ballot by displaying the ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted.

(b) The second class is that of voters who kept the knowledge for whom they voted to themselves.

The first class of voters had no right or legitimate expectation that their votes would be counted as valid votes. In this case, they did not, as a matter of fact, seek to enforce any such right or legitimate expectation. They appreciated the fact that they did not have such a protection. If anything, the legitimate expectation would have been that the votes they had voluntarily stripped of secrecy be not counted as secret ballots.

The second class of voters had the right or legitimate expectation that their votes and the election based on them be declared lawful. The applicants belonged to this class of voters. It appears that they are acting against their own interests and those of other voters in this class.

What right did they seek to protect or enforce by an order of nullification of the election?

If it is the right to a fair and free election by a secret ballot, they had to first show that it was violated by the respondents. They failed to show that violation.

Where there is proof of violation of electoral rights, such as the right to vote or to stand for election, the need to enforce the rights under judicial protection may require that the election be set aside if it was shown that the violation had undue influence on the result of the election.

There cannot be a remedy without proof of violation of a right.

The learned CHIEF JUSTICE reached the conclusion that nullification of the election was the only remedy for the unlawful conduct by the Clerk, of counting invalid votes as secret ballots. The reason was that, whilst imposing on the Clerk the mandatory obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, did not provide a remedy for the disobedience of the command.

The conclusion that nullification of the election was the only remedy for what, in reality, was a nullity in respect of the six votes, could only have been reached by implication of what is the intention of Parliament. It would be based on a construction of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, which presumes that it is the intention of the Legislature that voters who had complied strictly with the law and voted by a secret ballot for the Speaker should lose their valid votes on account of a failure by an official to discharge his duty not to count invalid votes as secret ballots.

The principle of law to be applied is that where an enactment imposes an obligation but is silent as to the remedy to be awarded for disobedience, a court must ascertain, from the language by which the obligation is imposed, whether it is the intention of the Legislature that nullification of the offending conduct should be the remedy to be awarded without any limit as to the scope of its operation or application.

MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed…, summarises the principles to be applied as follows:

"…, when a statute requires that something shall be done or done in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance: is the requirement to be regarded as imperative (or mandatory) or merely as directory (or permissive)?

In some cases, the conditions or forms prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the regard to them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any, were imposed for breach of the enactment.

'An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.' Woodward v Sarsons (1875) LR 10 CP 733.

It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory.

'No universal rule', said LORD CAMPBELL LC, 'can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.' Liverpool Borough Bank v Turner (1860) 2 De. G F & J 502 at pp507, 508.

And LORD PENZANCE said:

'I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and, upon a review of the case in that aspect, decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory.' Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203 at p211."

See also Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S).

There is no question that section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is a mandatory enactment, the subject-matter of which is the election of the Speaker of the House. The object of the statute is to secure an election of the Speaker by members of the House qualified to vote by a secret ballot. The object is also to ensure, by the imposition of the obligation on the Clerk to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, that there is provided mechanisms and procedures for the recording, processing, protecting, and counting of the secret ballot.

In other words, it is to ensure the establishment of an effective system for the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot conducted fairly, efficiently, and impartially.

The Clerk did put in place the mechanisms and procedures for the recording, processing, protection and counting of secret ballots.

Of the two hundred and eight members who voted, two hundred and two complied strictly with the requirements of the law for the exercise of their right to vote for the Speaker by a secret ballot - that is the main object for the achievement of which the provisions of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, were enacted.

He had assembled together all the necessary mechanisms which were required by the law governing the election to be put in place at the time prescribed to ensure delivery of the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The six members who displayed their ballot papers to others, so as to disclose for whom they had voted, did so in the context of the mechanisms and procedures.

The failure committed by the Clerk was not to declare the invalid ballots void. It was the unlawful conduct of counting invalid ballots as secret ballots that has been used as a justification for the proposed award of the order of nullification of the election of the Speaker.

The disobedience did not relate to a secret ballot.

In other words, it is not a case of the Clerk failing to record, process, or count a secret ballot or declaring a secret ballot to be an invalid vote.

Had that been the case, the result of the election of the Speaker would have been affected by the disobedience of the Clerk to the duty to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

He had no power to decide what should be counted to ascertain the result of the election. He was told by the law what to count and for what purpose.

In this case, the Clerk counted what was at law a nullity as a secret ballot. His conduct did not give value to the invalid votes and did not in any way affect the result of the election of the Speaker.

The discounting of the invalid votes as well as the declaration of the conduct of the Clerk to be unlawful would not give rise to any difficulty in the determination of who the winner of the election of the Speaker was. The result of the election would not change.

The nullification of the election, based on a secret ballot, would subvert the purpose of the statute.

The general rule is that a declaration of nullity must be confined to the conduct in respect of a particular vote or class of votes, the invalidity of which has been established, unless the non-observance of the requirements of the law governing the specific duty is of a character which is contrary to the principle of an election by a secret ballot and is so great that it might have permeated the process and affected the result of the election: Phillips v Goff (1886) 17 QB 805.

There are numerous cases in which courts have struck off the invalid votes and declared conduct in respect of them void without affecting the election. The principle applied has been that to nullify the results of the election based on votes given by a secret ballot in strict compliance with the requirements of the law governing the election would imply that the provisions of the law complied with are misleading.

Had the Clerk declared the invalidity of the six votes at the appropriate stage in the election process, the declaration would have affected those votes only and not the other votes validly cast.

Why should the court, upon review of his conduct, in failing to do the right thing at the right time, go farther than the remedy the law had placed at his disposal had he acted lawfully?

The purpose of voting is not only the differentiation of the electorate and the expression of the will of the individual voters but also the ability to accept such decisions based on the will of the majority.

In my view, the principle of majority rule, on the basis of which results of democratic elections are determined, requires that courts should refrain from interfering with the will of the majority of voters expressed in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the ground that the official entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the election by a secret ballot unlawfully counted non-secret ballots as secret ballots - especially where there would be no confusion at all as to who is the winner following the discounting of the invalid votes.

An election may be set aside if it is not clear, upon determination of the conduct forming the ground on which the validity of the election is impugned, who was the winner.

In this case, there is clear evidence of the election of the Speaker of the House in accordance with the mode of voting prescribed by the law governing the election concerned.

The general principles of the law on which I have based my decision in this case and believe are applicable in the resolution of the questions raised were stated by LORD COLERIDGE CJ in Woodward v Sarsons (1875) LR 10 CP, referred to with approval in Chanter v Blackwood (1904) 1 CLR 39…,. He said:

"As the first point, we are of opinion that the true statement is that an election is to be declared void by the common law applicable to Parliamentary elections, if it was so conducted that the tribunal which is asked to avoid it is satisfied, as matter of fact, either that there was no real electing at all, or that the election was not really conducted under the subsisting election laws.

As to the first, the tribunal should be so satisfied, i.e., that there was no real electing by the constituency at all, if it were proved, to its satisfaction, that the constituency had not in fact had a fair and free opportunity of electing the candidate which the majority might prefer.

This would certainly be so, if a majority of the electors were proved to have been prevented from recording their votes effectively according to their own preference, by general corruption or general intimidation or to be prevented from voting by want of the machinery necessary for so voting, as by polling stations being demolished, or not open or by other of the means of voting according to law not being supplied, or supplied with such errors as to render the voting by means of them void, or by fraudulent counting of votes or false declaration of numbers by a Returning Officer, or by other such acts or mishaps.

And we think the same result should follow if, by reason of any such or similar mishaps, the tribunal, without being able to say that a majority had been prevented, should be satisfied that there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority of the electors may have been prevented from electing the candidate they preferred.

But, if the tribunal should only be satisfied that certain of such mishaps had occurred, but should not be satisfied either that a majority had been, or that there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority might have been, prevented from electing the candidate they preferred, then we think that the existence of such mishaps would not entitle the tribunal to declare the election void….,."

I am of the view that the construction of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, for the purpose of establishing the intention of the Legislature regarding the nullification of the election for the unlawful conduct of the Clerk, in counting invalid votes as secret ballots, does not justify the conclusion that it is the intention of the Legislature that breach of any of the numerous duties imposed on the Clerk, under the general obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, should attract an order of nullification of the election regardless of the nature of the neglect of duty and its effect on the "result of the election".

There can be no doubt that the majority of the voters freely expressed their preference of the candidate they wished to be the Speaker in the secrecy of the polling booth and exercised their right to maintain the secrecy of the ballot in accordance with the requirements of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

The majority of the voters were enabled by the process conducted by the Clerk to freely elect, by a secret ballot, the Speaker from the two candidates.

To declare such an election void would be to declare void what is lawful.

The remedy awarded would be wholly disproportionate to the wrong committed. There was, in fact, no failure by the Clerk to conduct the election by a secret ballot within the meaning of the statute. The ballots which were effectively cast decided who was elected as the Speaker of the House.

The fact that the Clerk counted invalid votes as secret ballots because he had not seen the conduct by which they were rendered void did not change their invalid status.

The question is whether the purpose for which the powers to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot were conferred on the Clerk was fulfilled.

A close interpretation of the facts leads to the conclusion that the purpose of the statute was accomplished.

An appropriate remedy is one which accords with the intention of the Legislature.

In this case, it is the one that upholds the result of the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The valid result is that the second respondent was elected the Speaker of the House by a majority of voters who cast secret ballots.

It would, in my view, be contrary to fairness and justice to say, as a matter of principle, that the Legislature intended that the election of the Speaker conducted by a secret ballot in terms of the law be nullified on account of, say, a single invalid vote counted by the official conducting the election as a secret ballot. The intention of the Legislature must be that only irregularities which undermined the achievement of the object or purpose of the legislation, of ensuring an election of the Speaker based on universal, equal, direct, and personal vote freely expressed by a secret ballot, should vitiate the election.

In the exercise of review powers, the court a quo came to the conclusion that the improper counting of invalid votes as secret ballots was not an irregularity of the class the Legislature intended would vitiate the election.

The conclusion is, in my view, not evidence of a misdirection on the part of the court a quo.

It is when the irregularity affected the actual discharge of the positive duty to conduct the election by a secret ballot, and not by any other type of vote, that it may be used as a ground for challenging the validity of the election by a secret ballot.

The Legislature prescribed the standard which had to be used by everyone, including the court, as an accurate and reliable criterion for determining the ballot papers which had to be counted to ascertain the result of the election.

Applying the test, the Clerk came to a wrong conclusion in respect of the six ballots cast for the second respondent. They were not secret ballots qualified to be counted.

The court a quo was, on the facts, in a position to apply the criterion to the ballot papers and arrive at the conclusion the Clerk ought to have reached in respect of the invalidity of the six ballots had he properly applied the prescribed test.

If it had to set aside anything, the court a quo should have set aside the counting of the ballot papers made by the Clerk and not the election itself.

The legality of the election was dependent upon the will of the electorate having been freely expressed by a secret ballot reflected by accurate and reliable results. The unlawful act of counting six invalid votes as secret ballots because of the wrong application of the prescribed standards of differentiating secret ballots from non-secret ballots did not disable the court, which had jurisdiction to do so, from objectively scrutinising the facts and obtaining a reliable result of the election. The court would be acting within the bounds and limits of the requirement that there should have been brought about an election of the Speaker by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and personal right to vote freely expressed according to the principle of majority rule.

I would therefore dismiss the appeal....,.

The appeal is dismissed with no order for costs.

Section 122 of the Administration of Estates Act [Chapter 6:01] provides as follows:

"In cases where minor heirs are interested in property inherited from the estate of any deceased person, the Master may apply through the chamber book to a judge in Chambers for authority for the lease, mortgage, sale or other disposition of such property, and the judge make such order as in the circumstances he considers advisable."…,.

An interpretation of the provision, in my view, seems to indicate that the Master of the High Court is called upon to exercise his discretion as to the referral of the case to a judge in chambers. Thus, the word "may" is used instead of the mandatory "shall"….,.

Clearly, the intention of the legislature was to protect the inheritance of minors from unscrupulous executors.

Section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe came into operation on the 14th of September 2005. Subsections (2) and (3) of section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe..., provide as follows:

“(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter –

(a) All agricultural land –

(i) that was identified on or before the 8th of July 2005 in the Gazette, or Gazette Extraordinary, under section 5(1) of the Land Acquisition Act [Chapter 20:10], and which is itemised in Schedule 7, being agricultural land required for resettlement purposes; or

(ii) that is identified after the 8th of July 2005, but before the appointed day...,.; or

(iii) that is identified in terms of this section by the acquiring authority, after the appointed day...,.; is acquired by and vested in the State with full title therein with effect from the appointed day, or, in the case of land referred to in subparagraph (iii) with effect from the date it is identified in the manner specified in that paragraph; and

(b) No compensation shall be payable for land referred to in paragraph (a) except for any improvements effected on such land before it was acquired.

(3) The provisions of any law referred to in section 16(1) regulating the compulsory acquisition of land that is in force on the appointed day, and the provisions of section 18(1) and (9) shall not apply in relation to land referred to in subsection (2)(a) except for the purpose of determining any question related to the payment of compensation referred to in subsection (2)(b), that is to say, a person having any right or interest in the land –

(a) shall not apply to a court to challenge the acquisition of the land by the State, and no court shall entertain any such challenge;

(b) may, in accordance with the provisions of any law referred to in section 16(1), regulating the compulsory acquisition of land that is in force on the appointed day, challenge the amount of compensation payable for any improvements effected on the land before it was acquired.”

Subsections (5) and (6) of section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe..., provide as follows:

“(5) Any inconsistency between anything contained in –

(a) a notice itemised in Schedule 7; or

(b) a notice relating to land referred to in subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (iii); and the title to which it refers, or is intended to refer, and any error whatsoever contained in such notice, shall not affect the operation of subsection (2)(a) or invalidate the vesting of title in the State in terms of that provision.

(6) An Act of Parliament may make it a criminal offence for any person, without lawful authority, to possess or occupy land referred to in this section or other State land.”...,.

Section 16(9b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe..., was introduced by Act 14 of 1996.

Section 16(9b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides that –

“Nothing in this section shall affect or derogate from –

(a) Any obligation assumed by the State; or

(b) Any right or interest conferred upon any person; in relation to the protection of property and the payment of compensation in respect of the acquisition of property in terms of any convention, treaty, or agreement acceded to, concluded, or executed, by, or under, the authority of the President with one or more foreign states, or governments, or international organizations.”...,.

The meaning and effect of section 16(9b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe are clear and unambiguous – nothing contained in section 16 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe shall affect or derogate from the protection of property rights and the compensation payable therefor as guaranteed in terms of any treaty concluded by the Executive.

There is no mention of anything contained in any other provision of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

In contrast, the expropriation of agricultural land without compensation for the land itself is stipulated by section 16B(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe so as to apply, notwithstanding anything contained in Chapter III, viz. the Declaration of Rights, which includes section 16(9b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

Applying the maxim lex posterior priori derogant, or, as it is otherwise stated, leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, the later section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe must be construed to take precedence and prevail over the earlier section 16(9b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, to the extent that the latter is inconsistent with the former.

On the other hand, section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is couched in general and all-embracing terms, whereas section 16(9b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is specific in its scope of application to property rights protected by international treaties that are binding upon Zimbabwe. Having regard to the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant, it is perfectly permissible to construe the later general provisions of section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe as not derogating from the special provisions of section 16(9b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

There are several other general rules of statutory interpretation that come into play in the present context.

The first and foremost is the presumption against the retrospective operation of statutes impinging on vested rights. One aspect of this rule is that where one enactment repeals another, the repeal does not “affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under the enactment so repealed.” See section 17(1)(c) of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:01]. Taking the presumption further, a later statute will only be construed as affecting, or taking away, a right accrued under a previous statute if the later enactment expressly intends to take away the prior existing right. See Browne v Incorporated Law Society of Natal 1968 (3) SA 535(N).

In the Constitutional context, there is a general presumption against the extinction, or diminution, of pre-existing fundamental or substantive rights.

In Nkomo & Anor v Attorney General & Ors 1993 (2) ZLR 422 (S), the State sought to argue that the effect of the amendments to section 15 of the Constitution was to deprive the applicants of the remedy they sought. On behalf of the applicants, it was argued that the passing of the Amendment Bill was contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and that, in any event, the amendment did not affect existing rights vested in the applicants.

GUBBAY CJ..., observed as follows –

“..., I would stress that where fundamental human rights or freedoms are conferred on individuals under a Constitution, derogations therefrom, as far as their language permits, should be narrowly or strictly construed. See Minister of Home Affairs & Ors v Dabengwa & Anor 1982 (1) ZLR 236 (S) at 244B-C, 1982 (4) SA 301 (ZS) at 306H; S v Ncube & Ors 1987 (2) ZLR 246 (S) at 264F, 1988 (2) SA 702 (ZS) at 715C; African National Congress (Border Branch) & Anor v Chairman, Council of State of the Republic of Ciskei & Anor 1992 (4) SA 434 (CKGD) at 447G-I...,.

The case of In re Munhumeso & Ors 1994 (1) ZLR 49 (S) is also instructive as to the interpretative approach to be applied in the examination of provisions which derogate from fundamental rights.

GUBBAY CJ..., stated as follows –

The repealed provisions of section 115 of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02], which were in force between 6 September 2007 and 30 January 2009, are, therefore, applicable.

Section 17(1)(b)(c), and (e) and (3) of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:01], ..., provides as follows:

“17 Effect of Repeal of Enactment  

(1) Where an enactment repeals another enactment, the repeal shall not –

(a) ...,.

(b) Affect the previous operation of any enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered under the enactment so repealed; or

(c) Affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability, acquired, accrued, or incurred under the enactment so repealed; or

(d) ...,.

(e) Affect any investigation, legal proceedings, or remedy, in respect of any such rights, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, as aforementioned, and any such investigation, legal proceeding, or remedy, shall be exercisable, continued, or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture, or punishment, may be imposed, as if the enactment had not been so repealed.

(3) When an enactment repeals and re-enacts, with or without modification, any provision of any other enactment, all proceedings commenced under any provision so repealed shall be continued, and in conformity with the provisions so repealed.”

In interpreting a statutory provision, the court must endeavour to arrive at the intention of the legislature from an examination of the provision being construed. Therefore, it is a principle of statutory interpretation that the ordinary and literal meaning of a statutory provision be given effect unless to do so would lead to an absurdity. See S v Nottingham Estates (Pvt) Ltd 1995 (1) ZLR 253 (S). GUBBAY CJ made the following remarks at p256 D-F –

“The primary rule of interpretation is, of course, to endeavour to ascertain the intention of the lawmaker from an examination of the provisions under consideration placed in proper context. A court will commence its enquiry by giving the word its grammatical significance, unless it is clear that the literal sense, when so applied, defeats the legislative intendment. In such event, a deviation from the ordinary meaning is justified, provided always that the word is sufficiently flexible to admit of another meaning by which such intention can be better effected. See Ebrahim v Min. of the Interior 1977 (1) SA 665 (A) at 678A-C; Birch v Klein Karro Agricultural Co-operative Ltd 1993 (3) SA 403 (A) at 411 E-G.”  

The same principle for statutory interpretation was stated by McNALLY JA in S v Kachipare 1998 (2) ZLR 271 (S) thus –

“I take the view that one is entitled to look closely at the wording of the section in order to find an interpretation which achieves sense rather than nonsense, justice rather than injustice, in the application of the section in a situation almost certainly not contemplated by the legislature. This must be especially so in a statute which deals with procedure rather than substantive law.”

The remarks by McNALLY JA are particularly significant in casu when regard is had to the provisions under scrutiny.

What is at issue herein is the procedures that attach to the election of a Mayor by councillors of an urban municipal council.

The provisions are not concerned with substantive law but procedure.

It is pretty obvious that the language in the provisions relating to the election of a Mayor, his deputy, a Chairperson, and his deputy, are clear and unambiguous. According to section 103 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15], where an election has taken place, after a meeting of the council, a Mayor, his deputy, a Chairperson, or his deputy, shall hold office until the appointment of a successor. A successor is only appointed if an election is held following a vacancy in the office of the Mayor, his deputy, a Chairperson, or his deputy, such vacancy having arisen either through resignation or by virtue of the operation of section 78 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15].  

In terms of section 78 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15], the office becomes vacant if a councillor resigns, ceases to be qualified for election as a councillor, is absent without leave of council from ordinary meetings of council during a consecutive period of two months, or is absent from ordinary council meetings for a period of six calendar months, whether or not leave has been obtained, ceases to be a councillor in terms of section 22 of the Provincial Administration Act [Chapter 29:11], or has been suspended, in terms of section 114 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15], for a period in excess of thirty days, in which case his seat becomes vacant by operation of law.

The Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] does not provide for the vacation of the seat of a Mayor, his deputy, a Chairperson, or his deputy, except for the instances referred to above. An election to fill the seat is only held if a vacancy arises from the situations outlined above. Thus, the position of Mayor, being a creation of statute, and provided for in terms of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15], the election can only be changed in terms of the statute, and the removal from office of a person from the position can only be effected under the provisions of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] that created the position. Once a Mayor ceases to hold office, the respective council can then exercise its powers under the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] and elect a successor, as provided for in section 103(1) and (2) of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15].

In casu, the council did not follow the provisions of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] in removing the Mayor because there is no provision in the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] for such removal. Therefore no successor was elected.

Thus, the procedure followed in removing the Mayor was un-procedural and illegal.

Section 25 of the Civil Matters (Mutual Assistance) Act [Chapter 8:02] expressly acknowledges that the Act does not derogate from other laws and provides that:

“This Act shall be regarded as additional to, and not as limiting the provisions of any other law relating to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, the service of process, or the taking of evidence, whether on commission or otherwise.”

It follows that the Civil Matters (Mutual Assistance) Act does not purport to override or exclude the operation of any other law, including the common law, pertaining to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

In effect, section 25 of the Civil Matters (Mutual Assistance) Act accords with the general rule of statutory interpretation that the common law cannot be ousted except by clear language or in express terms.

Is the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls Road a “City to City” Trunk Road Network?

The Roads Toll (Regional Trunk Road Network) [Amendment] Regulations, 2009, (S.I.39 of 2009) defines a city to city trunk road network as -  

“..., roads of the Regional Network that links cities in Zimbabwe.”

On the one hand, taken in isolation, this definition would exclude the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls Road on account of the fact that Victoria Falls is not a city, as defined under section 14(3) of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15].

On the other hand, section 3(2), as read with the Second Schedule of the Roads Toll (Regional Trunk Road Network) [Amendment] Regulations, 2009, (S.I.39 of 2009), the Bulawayo-Victoria Falls Road is a city to city trunk road network.

In casu, I hold that the latter construction applies.

Section 3(2) of the Roads Toll (Regional Trunk Road Network) [Amendment] Regulations, 2009, (S.I.39 of 2009) specifically provides -

“Every route along the City to City Trunk Road Network specified in the first column of the Second Schedule shall be a toll road for the purposes of the Act.” (emphasis added).

In this context, “city” cannot be interpreted as reference to “city” as defined in section 14(3) of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15].

The extent to which Schedules can, and will, be regarded as intra-textual, structural, parts of any enactment, will have to be determined with reference to their nature, and intended function, relative to the context of the legislation, or enactment, as a whole. Schedules are treated, at least, as intra-textual sources of clarification and elucidation which are not necessarily only consulted in instances uncertainty and ambiguity, but also as complements to, or further explanations of the apparently clear and unambiguous sections contained in the body of the enactment.

The Second Schedule further explains the trunk roads to which section 3 of the Roads Toll (Regional Trunk Road Network) [Amendment] Regulations, 2009, (S.I.39 of 2009) is applicable – Strydom v Strydom 2003 (1) ZLR 379 (H)...,.; Liquidator Wapejo Shipping Co. v Lurie Brothers 1924 AD 69...,.; S v Bechoo 1979 (3) SA 946 (A); and Utopia Vakansie-oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A)...,.

The court has got inherent jurisdiction to declare as null and void subsidiary legislation on the ground that it is ultra vires if it cannot be construed so as to accord with the primary legislation.

This is an urgent chamber application for stay of execution pending review. The relevant background to this matter is as follows:

On 14 December 2009, the Regional Court sitting at Harare convicted the applicant Bank of contravening section 136 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] and sentenced the applicant to pay a fine of $500 and also ordered the applicant to compensate the first respondent the sum of $250,000.

The learned Magistrate suspended the payment of the fine to the next day, 15 December 2009. Immediately after the sentence, the applicant noted an appeal against both conviction and sentence.

That appeal is still pending before this court.

Mr Clemence Zingoni, who deposed to an affidavit on behalf of the applicant says that he was shocked to hear, on 17 December 2009, that, on the same day, the second respondent, armed with a writ of execution together with a Bond of Indemnity, had been at the applicant's Head Office with the intent to attaching property in order to satisfy the Order of Restitution.

Mr Zingoni averred, that, the issuing of the writ was improper and unlawful, as, the effect of noting of an appeal against the magistrate's decision was to suspend its execution. The writ was therefore defective as it could not be issued in those circumstances.

It was Mr Zingoni's further contention that the value of the writ exceeded the jurisdiction of the Regional Magistrate as prescribed by Statutory Instrument 21 of 2009.

It was also contented, that, in terms of section 372 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] any Court purporting to enforce a Restitution Order made in criminal proceedings can only do so if it has monetary jurisdiction in the first instance.

Following the service of the writ of execution on the applicant, its legal practitioners immediately filed an ex parte application, on 18 December 2009, in the Magistrate's Court, for stay of execution.

The application was dismissed by a magistrate on the same day.

Immediately thereafter, the applicant filed an application for review of the learned magistrate's judgment. That application for review was filed simultaneously with this application for stay of execution.

It is worthy noting, that, in its application for the review of the conduct of the learned magistrate who dismissed the ex parte application, the Messenger and the Clerk of Court, the applicant concedes, that, the noting of an appeal does not suspend the execution of any sentence of imprisonment, fine or community service as is provided in section 63 of the Magistrate's Court Act [Chapter 7:10].

However, the applicant's argument is that the Order which is subject of these proceedings is neither a term of imprisonment, a fine nor an Order for community service. It is an order for restitution. It is further argued that restitution is not specifically mentioned by the said Magistrates Court Act, and, therefore, in accordance with rules of interpretation, the express mention of the other forms of punishment excludes what is not stated in section 63 of the Magistrate Court Act....,.

It was further argued, that, the order of compensation, which prompted the writ of execution, had been suspended by the appeal which the applicant had filed.

Section 63 of the Magistrate Court Act provides as follows:

“The execution of any sentence of imprisonment, fine, or community service shall not be suspended by -

(a)…,.

(b) The noting of an appeal referred to in section sixty unless -

(1) In the case of imprisonment or fine, bail is granted by a judge or magistrate in terms of section 163 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07]; or

(2) In the case of community service, an application is granted by the magistrate to suspend the operation of the sentence pending determination of the appeal.”

What this means is that the payment of the fine is not suspended by the appeal.

The Magistrate Court Act does not, however, mention whether or not an order of compensation is suspended by an appeal.

In terms of section 370 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act “a court which makes an award or order in terms of this Part may require the injured party to give security for repayment of the compensation or the return of the property, in case the award is reversed on appeal or review.”

This clearly suggests that payment of compensation is immediate and is not suspended by an appeal or review.

If an order of restitution was suspendable by an appeal or review, the legislature would not have provided for security to be given by the injured party. The need to provide security by the injured party pre-supposes that compensation would have been paid soon after the sentence is passed....,.

It was Mr Zingoni's further contention that the value of the writ exceeded the jurisdiction of the Regional Magistrate as prescribed by Statutory Instrument 21 of 2009.

It was also contented, that, in terms of section 372 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07] any Court purporting to enforce a Restitution Order made in criminal proceedings can only do so if it has monetary jurisdiction in the first instance....,.

It is also my considered view, that, the Regional Court had the jurisdiction to order compensation as it did for section 367 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act provides that:-

“Notwithstanding any enactment limiting the civil jurisdiction of the court concerned, any court, including the court of a Regional magistrate, may:

(a) Award compensation in terms of section three hundred and sixty two, three hundred and sixty three, or three hundred and sixty four in any amount; or

(b) Make an order in terms of section three hundred and sixty five for restitution of property, whatever the value of the property concerned.”

Although section 16B of the Constitution does not explicitly override pre-existing court decisions, the specific and clear intention of the legislature was to validate the acquisition of all the properties listed in Schedule 7 to the Constitution of Zimbabwe and to effectuate the vesting in the State.

The applicants in this matter are all duly elected Members of Parliament. The first respondent is the Clerk of Parliament, cited herein in his official capacity.

The second respondent was elected to the position of Speaker of the House of Assembly on the 25th of August 2008.

The applicants challenge the validity of the second respondent's election as Speaker on several grounds.

They originally sought an order setting aside the second respondent's election, and, consequentially, an order nullifying all acts performed by him qua Speaker. However, at the hearing of this case, counsel for the applicants conceded the excessiveness and enormity of the consequential relief sought and opted not to pursue that aspect.

Background

By virtue of section 39(2) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Speaker must be elected in accordance with the Standing Orders of the House of Assembly.

On the 25th of August 2008, following the swearing-in of Members of Parliament (Members), the first respondent announced the procedure for the election of the Speaker. As there was more than one person proposed as Speaker, the election was to be conducted by secret ballot as enjoined by Standing Order Nos. 4 and 6 of the House of Assembly.

According to the applicants, what ensued in Parliament thereafter was chaotic and disorderly and quite contrary to the requirements of a secret ballot.

The first respondent concedes that there was an unprecedented number of Members in the Chamber on that day but denies that the voting process was disorderly or improper. The second respondent supports this position and also raises several preliminary objections to the application, pertaining to locus standi, non-joinder, and the exhaustion of domestic remedies.

The Issues

In the event, the preliminary and substantive issues for determination in this matter, as I perceive them, are as follows:

(i)...,.

(ii)...,.

(iii) Whether the applicants should have exhausted domestic remedies available in Parliament before approaching this Court....,.

Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies

The second respondent avers that the applicants did not lodge any formal objection or complaint with the first respondent before the election result was announced. It was incumbent upon the applicants to have exhausted relevant Parliamentary processes before approaching this Court. In this regard, counsel for the second respondent relies upon the decision in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC)…,

He submits, quite correctly, that the nature of the relief sought by the applicants carries far-reaching implications for the separation of powers doctrine because it asks the judiciary to interfere with the internal proceedings of Parliament. Consequently, the Court should not recognise the applicants' locus standi to claim such relief unless they have made proper and diligent attempts in Parliament to redress the conduct complained of or provide a satisfactory explanation for their failure to do so.

As is clearly recognised in section 5 of the Privileges, Immunities and Powers of Parliament Act [Chapter 2:08], Members enjoy full freedom of speech and debate in Parliament and the proceedings of Parliament are generally immune from being questioned or impeached in any court of law. In other words, as a general rule, Parliament is at large to regulate its own proceedings without external interference.

However, it is well-established that in a constitutional democracy, such as ours, this general immunity is necessarily and invariably subject to the provisions of the Constitution. This subordination to the primacy of the Constitution is entrenched and clearly recognised in sections 3 and 49 of the Constitution. See Smith v Mutasa N.O. & Another 1989 (3) ZLR 183 (SC)…,; Chairman, Public Service Commission & Others v Zimbabwe Teachers Association & Others 1996 (1) ZLR 637 (S)…,.

The election of the Speaker is a process that is not exclusive to Parliamentary privileges and powers. It is explicitly regulated by section 39 of the Constitution and there can be no doubt that it is a matter that is justiciable by the courts to ensure due compliance with the Constitution and the Standing Orders.

Nevertheless, I fully endorse the approach enunciated by the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) and concur that this Court should be loathe to interfere with the internal proceedings of Parliament unless it is shown that the applicants have attempted to exhaust relevant Parliamentary processes in the first instance.

In the instant case, it appears from the first applicant's affidavit that several queries were raised by certain Members during the election process but the first respondent refused to take any questions throughout the election.

What is not clear from the papers is whether the queries that were raised were by way of formal objection or mere interjection.

In this respect, counsel for the first respondent submits that the first respondent was entitled to ignore informal protests or interjections and that any MP wishing to be heard had to make a formal objection by standing up and raising a “point of order” as envisaged in Standing Order Nos. 49 and 61.

As against this, counsel for the applicants argues that, although the conduct of normal Parliamentary business does admit the possibility of formal objections, there is no equivalent procedure prescribed in the Constitution or in the Standing Orders with respect to the election of the Speaker that enables the Clerk of Parliament to deal with formal objections.

Having regard to the Standing Orders, taken as a whole, I am inclined to agree with counsel for the applicants. Standing Order Nos. 49 and 61, relating to formal speeches and objections, are contained in the Section titled PUBLIC BUSINESS, and, more specifically, in the sub-section titled Order in House and Rules of Debate.

As appears from Standing Order Nos. 7 and 17, the Speaker holds the Chair for the conduct of public business generally. In the absence of the Speaker, the Deputy Speaker assumes the Chair, and, in the absence of both, the Chair is assigned to the Deputy Chairperson of Committees or a member of the Chairperson's panel.

At no stage does the Clerk of Parliament exercise the powers of the Chair in the conduct of ordinary public business to which the procedures outlined in Standing Order Nos. 49 and 61 apply.

The only occasion on which the Clerk holds the Chair is for the purpose of conducting the election of the Speaker in terms of Order Standing Order Nos. 3 to 7.

These Standing Orders are contained in the section titled PROCEEDINGS ON MEETING OF NEW PARLIAMENT.

As I have already noted, Standing Order Nos. 49 and 61, which provide for formal objections, are to be found in an entirely different section, and, therefore, they do not apply to Standing Order Nos. 3 to 7 governing the election of the Speaker.

Arguably, the power of the Chair to take and deal with formal objections could and should be implied, mutatis mutandis, in the latter context as well. However, a strict interpretation of the Standing Orders precludes any such importation in the absence of clear language to that effect.

It follows from all of this that the Standing Orders do not prescribe any procedure for the raising of formal objections during the election of the Speaker and before the election result is announced. It also follows that, in the absence of any such procedure, there was no internal Parliamentary process that the applicants could be required to exhaust before approaching this Court for the relief that they seek.

That being so, the second respondent's preliminary objection in this regard cannot succeed and must be dismissed.

I am satisfied that section 12B of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] does not abolish the employer's common law right to terminate employment on notice in terms of an employment contract for a number of reasons.

The time-honoured and golden rule of statutory interpretation is that you give the words of a statute their primary meaning. See National Railways of Zimbabwe Contributory Pension Fund v Edy SC141-88; Madoda v Tanganda Tea Company Ltd 1999 (1) ZLR 374 (S); S v Masivira 1990 (1) ZLR 373 (HC); MAXWELL on the Interpretation of Statutes 12ed...,.; Nyemba and Watunga v R 1961 R & N 688 (SR)...,.;  

Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of Lands and Anor 2008 (1) ZLR 17 (S)...,.; and Mawarire v Mugabe N.O. and Ors CC01-13.

Applying this golden rule of statutory interpretation, I see no words in section 12B of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] that either expressly, or by necessary implication, abolish the employer's common law right to terminate an employment relationship by way of notice.

The law is not static but dynamic, going with economic, social, and cultural values. If the law is construed in a narrow sense, negating the social values on which the Constitution, which is the supreme law, is anchored on, then the law will not resonate with what is reasonable. It will cease to serve the purpose for which it is enacted, and society will not have respect for the law, thus leading to lawlessness and anarchy. I subscribe to the sentiments echoed in Zimnat Insurance Company (Pvt) Ltd v Chawanda 1990 (2) ZLR 145 (S) wherein it was held -

If, however, I am wrong in this finding, alternatively, I find that this contract of carriage (by land) is a consumer contract as defined in section 2 of the Consumer Contract Act [Chapter 8:03].

Furthermore, the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:01] defines statutory instrument as follows:-

“statutory instrument” means any proclamation, rule, regulation, by-law, order, notice or other instrument having the force of law, made by the President or any other person or body under an enactment.”

Counsel for the respondents submits that section 31K(1) of the Constitution was brought in precisely because the Legislature wished to ensure that certain executive powers were not justiciable, moreso in light of the decision in the Patriotic Front - Zimbabwe African Peoples Union v Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs 1985 (1) ZLR 305 SC case.

That seems to be the position, moreso in light of the fact that the applicants did not challenge that submission.

Section 31K(1)(d) of the Constitution is particularly relevant in that what the applicants wish this court to do is to review the manner in which the first respondent has exercised its discretion in fixing the 16^th March 2013 as the date of the referendum. 

The provisions of that paragraph preclude the court from doing so.

Counsel for the applicants, no doubt realising that the wording of that paragraph cannot be interpreted in any other way, sought to persuade this court that that paragraph should not be interpreted in isolation, but that it should instead be read together or in conjunction with the preceding paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).

I agree with counsel for the respondents that it would be improper to do so. 

Traditionally, our courts have been guided by the decision in Sutter v Scheepers 1932 AD 165, wherein the following rules of interpretation were suggested:-

“(1) The word “shall” when used in a statute is rather to be considered as peremptory unless there are other circumstances which negative this construction.

(2) If a provision is couched in a negative form, it is to be regarded as a peremptory rather than a directory mandate.

(3) If a provision is couched in positive language and there is no sanction added in case the requisites are not carried out, then the presumption is in favour of an intention to make the provision only directory.

(4) If when we consider the scope and objects of a provision, we find that its terms would, if strictly carried out, lead to injustice and even fraud, and there is no explicit statement that the act is to be void if the conditions are not complied with, or if no sanction is added, then the presumption is rather in favour of the provision being directory.

(5) The history of the legislation also will afford a clue in some cases.”….,.

The following submission, also made in the applicant's heads of argument, is instructive.

The preamble to the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act 1984 contains the provisions of sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the Constitution as at 18 April 1980. These sections have since been repealed and substituted in the Constitution itself. The preamble to the 1984 Act is therefore out of date and I would venture to suggest may require updating especially in view of the provisions of section 6 of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:01] which provides:

The point in limine raised is whether this matter was prematurely set down i.e. before the lapse of the one month stated in the Rules.

In terms of section 33(6)(c) of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:10] a month is as it stands in the calendar e.g. 1 December to 31 December 2008.

It is trite that language of a predominantly imperative nature is generally taken to be indicative of peremptoriness. The verb “shall” is one such word – Messenger of Magistrates Court, Durban v Pillay 1952 (3) SA 678 (A); R v Busa 1959 (3) SA 385 (A); Maharaj and Ors v Ramperstad 1964 (4) SA 638 (A)…,. But, a court called upon to determine whether a particular provision is peremptory or directory must construe the language of the concerned provision in the context, scope and object of the Act of which it forms part – Charlestown Town Board v Vilakazi 1951 (3) SA 361 (A). In Maharaj and Ors v Ramperstad 1964 (4) SA 638 (A)…, the court had this to say:

“Appellants' counsel pointed out that the regulation used the word “shall”…, in relation to the requirement of attaching to the application a plan or map tracing, and on the authority of such decisions as Messenger of the Court, Durban v Pillay 1952 (3) SA 678 A…, he contended that this was a “strong indication” that the requirement was peremptory. In the former of the two cases referred to immediately above, VAN DEN HEEVER JA described the word “moet” (“shall”) in Katian terms as embodying the “categorical imperative”. It would be a work of supererogation to refer to the long list of examples in our reported case law where that word, in the light of considerations pointing to another conclusion, has had to surrender this resounding accolade and been reduced to the status of a mere directory verb.”

Further, in Nkisimane and Ors v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1978 (2) SA 430 (A), TROLLIP JA had this to say:

“Preliminarily, I should say that statutory requirements are often categorized as “peremptory” or “directory”. They are well known concise and convenient labels to use for the purpose of differentiating between the two categories. But the earlier, clear cut, distinction between them (the former requiring exact compliance and the latter merely substantial compliance) now seems to have become somewhat blurred. Care must therefore be exercised not to infer merely from the use of such labels what degree of compliance is necessary and what the consequences are of non - or - defective compliance. These must ultimately depend upon the proper construction of the statutory provision in question, or in other words, upon the intention of the law giver as ascertained from the language, scope and purpose of the enactment as a whole and the statutory requirement in particular (see the remarks of VAN DEN HEEVER J in Lion Match Co Ltd v Wessels 1946 OPD 376 at 380). Thus, on the one hand, a statutory requirement construed as peremptory usually still needs exact compliance for it to have the stipulated legal consequence, and any purported compliance falling short of that is a nullity. (See authorities quoted in Shalala v Klerksdorp Town Council & Anor 1969 (1) SA 582 (T) at 587A-C). On the other hand, compliance with a directory statutory requirement, although desirable, may sometimes not be necessary at all, and non – or - defective compliance therewith may not have any legal consequence (see, for example, Sutter v Scheepers 1932 AD 165). In between those two kinds of statutory requirements it seems that there may now be another kind which, while it is regarded as peremptory, nevertheless only requires substantial compliance in order to be legally effective (see JEM Motors Ltd v Boutle and Anor 1961 (2) SA 320 (N) at 327 in fin – 328B and Shalala's case supra at 587F - 588H, and of Maharaj and Others v Rampersad 1964 (4) SA 638 (A) at 646C-E). It is unnecessary to say anything about the correctness or otherwise of this trend in such decisions. Then, of course, there is also the common kind of directory requirement which need only be substantially complied with to have full legal effect (see for example Rondalia Versekerings - Korporasie Bpk v Lemmer 1966 (2) SA 245 (A) at 257H-258H).”

It is thus clear that the mere use of labels such as the word “shall” does not necessarily mean that the provision is peremptory. Such language, in many cases, represented little more than the first stage of the enquiry.

“It is the duty of the courts of justice to try to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute concerned to be construed.” Crawford and Ors v Borough of Eshowe & Anor 1956 (1) SA 147 (NPD) and Vita Food Products, Incorporated v Unus Shipping Co Ltd 1939 AC…,.

The court must carefully examine the object at the Act and the public importance of compliance with it. Such case has to be considered on its merits - Liverpool Borough Bank v Turner 2d G.F. and J. 502, 507.

It is not the first time that I have to decide whether section 39(2) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] is peremptory or directory. In Sibanda v The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe HB46-08, the same issue arose. In that case, considered on its merits, I held that the language of section 39(2) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] is peremptory.

However, there are exceptions to this general rule - JEM Motors Ltd v Boutle and Anor 1961 (2) SA 320 (N) and the New Zealand case of Simpson v Attorney General [1955] NZLR 271 (discussed in DE SMITH's Judicial Review of Administrative Action (4^th Ed) by J M Evans…,.).

In the Simpson v Attorney General [1955] NZLR 271 case it was held that procedural requirements should not be construed as mandatory (peremptory) if serious public inconvenience would result.  Further, in his book, Interpretation of Statutes (Juta & Co) G.E. DEVENISH…, states that courts do frequently condone non-compliance with ostensibly mandatory provisions by weighing up all the relevant considerations such as, inter alia, public convenience, justice and the object of the Act. The court has to consider whether interpreting the Act in a peremptory sense would cause hardships and inconveniences to ratepayers. According to MAXWELL, 10^th Ed…, provisions of a statute which relate to the performance of a public duty seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, that is to say as directory only, where the invalidation of actions done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty and where invalidation would not promote the essential aims of the legislature.

The view attributed to the learned author MAXWELL…, makes a lot of sense and should, in my humble view, be adopted in the construction of section 39(2) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13]. Such an interpretation would be reasonable given that if the court were to make an order that by-elections be held when the relevant funds for holding such elections are not there the order would be brutum fulmen and this would clearly be an undesirable situation. If the Government were to commit the little available funds and resources to the holding of by-elections this would result in serious general inconvenience to the general public. In the circumstances of this case, it should be accepted that the provisions of section 39(2) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] should be understood as nothing more than mere instructions for guidance to the President when he carries out his public duty to gazette election dates. Clearly, ordering the President to gazette by-elections in the absence of the required financial resources would not only disrupt the smooth running of the country but would cause serious inconvenience to the public.

Counsel for the third respondent's reliance on section 161(2) of the Electoral Act is supported by the golden rule of interpretation. Words in a statute must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning. This was stressed by SANDURA JA in the case of Madoda v Tanganda Tea Company Ltd 1999 (1) ZLR 374 (SC)…, where he said;

“By adopting that approach to the interpretation of s7 of the Code, the learned judge in the court a quo departed from the ordinary grammatical meaning of the section, and, therefore, erred. As JOUBERT JA said in Coopers & Lybrand & Ors v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767D-F:

'The matter is essentially one of interpretation. I proceed to ascertain the common intention of the parties from the language used in the instrument. Various canons of Constitution are available to ascertain their common intention at the time of concluding the cession. According to the 'golden rule' of interpretation, the language in the document is to be given its grammatical and ordinary meaning, unless this would result in some absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument.'"

The same view was subsequently expressed by my brother McNALLY in Chegutu Municipality v Manyora 1996 (1) ZLR 262 (S)…, where he said:

"There is no magic about interpretation. Words must be taken in their context. The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, as Lord WENSLEYDALE said in Grey v Pearson (1857) 10 ER 1216 at 1234; 'unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further'."

Section 161(2) of the Electoral Act, according to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the words used, specifically gives the Electoral Court exclusive jurisdiction;

“(a) To hear appeals, applications and petitions in terms of this Act; and

(b) To review any decision of the Commission or any other person made or purporting

to have been made under this Act;”

In the case of Hove v Gumbo (Mberengwa West Election Petition Appeal) 2005 (2) ZLR 85 (S)..., MALABA JA quoted with approval the case of Nath v Singh and Others (1954) SCR 892…, where MAHAJAN CJ said:-

“The general rule is well settled that the statutory requirement of law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possesses no common law power. It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law.”

The learned Judge also alluded to the case of Sahu v Singh and Another (1985) LRC 31, where CHANDRACHUD CJ had this to say…,:-

“The rights arising out of elections, including the right to contest or challenge an election, are not common law rights. They are creatures of the statues which create, confer, or limit those rights. Therefore, for deciding the assertion whether an election can be set aside on any alleged ground, the courts have to consult the provisions of law governing the particular election; they have to function within the framework of that law and cannot travel beyond it.”

There are two approaches open to a Court faced with apparent absurdities in the construction of statutes - the narrow and the wider approach.

The narrow approach was articulated in The Queen v Judge of the City of London Court [1892] QBD 273 by LORD ESHER as follows:

“If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to a manifest absurdity. The Court has nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has committed an absurdity. In my opinion the rule has always been this – if the words of an Act admit of two interpretations, then they are not clear; and if one interpretation leads to an absurdity, and the other does not, the Court will conclude the legislature did not intend to lead to an absurdity, and will adopt the other interpretation.”

Under the narrow approach, the Court chooses, between the two possible interpretations, the one which does not lead to an absurdity.

In this case, it would be the first interpretation or Reading “A” of section 58(1) of the Constitution.

In Venter v Rex 1906 TS 910…, INNES CJ expressed the wider approach thus:

“That being so, it appears to me that the principle we should adopt may be expressed somewhat in this way – that when to give the plain words of the statute their ordinary meaning would lead to absurdity so glaring that it could never have been contemplated by the legislature, or where it would lead to a result contrary to the intention of the legislature, as shown by the context or by such other considerations as the Court is justified in taking into account, the Court may depart from the ordinary effect of the words to the extent necessary to remove the absurdity and to give effect to the true intention of the legislature.”

According to the “wider approach” the Court has a broad discretion in removing an absurdity being guided ultimately by the intention of the Legislature, or, in constitutional terms, by the intention of the framers of the supreme law. Once an ambiguity or absurdity has been established, it would appear that the proper approach to adopt would be the wider one, where the Court calls into aid historical, schematic, teleological and purposive approaches to interpretation.

In the case of Buchanan & Co v Babco Ltd (C.A.) [1977] QBD 208…, LORD DENNING followed precisely this method of interpretation, long adopted by the European Court of Justice at Luxembourg, thus:

“They adopt a method which they call in English by strange words – at any rate they were strange to me – the 'schematic and teleological' method of interpretation. It is not really so alarming as it sounds. All it means is that the judges do not go by the literal meaning of the words or by the grammatical structure of the sentence. They go by the design or purpose which lies behind it.

When they come upon a situation which is to their minds within the spirit – but not the letter - of the legislation, they solve the problem by looking at the design and purpose of the legislation – at the effect which it was sought to achieve.

Furthermore, insofar as concerns statutory interpretation generally, the courts are enjoined by section 326(2) of the Constitution to interpret legislation in a manner that is consistent with international customary law. 

In similar vein, it was recognised in State v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC)…, that a Constitution requires:

“a generous interpretation…, suitable to give to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.”

In awarding the respondent arrear maintenance, the court a quo relied on section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:09] which provides that;

“11 Claim for arrear maintenance for children

1. Where a spouse has provided for the maintenance of any children of the marriage or of a former marriage of one or other of the spouses, that spouse shall be entitled to recover, in arrear, from the other spouse such maintenance or such portion of such maintenance as an appropriate court may consider just or equitable in the circumstances.

2. An appropriated court may make an order for the payment by a spouse of his or her share of such arrear maintenance in an application by the other spouse for maintenance pendent lite, pending an action for divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, or may include such an order in the final order of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, as the case may be.”

Subsection (1) makes it clear that a spouse who has provided for any child of a former marriage of the spouses is entitled to recover arrear maintenance determined as just or equitable by the appropriate court.

The respondent is a former spouse of the appellant who has since established in court his obligation to pay maintenance for their child. The appellant has however sought to bar the respondent from recovering arrear maintenance for the child by employing the expressio unius est alterius maxim. That maxim, loosely translated, means that the express mention of one thing excludes that which is not mentioned. By extension, counsel for the appellant argued that the express mention of spouse in sectionn 11(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:09] excludes former spouses who are not mentioned therein.

As I have already indicated, whenever a court interprets legislation to do with the welfare of children it is enjoined to employ the purposive interpretation in the best interest of the child. Thus, where the court is confronted with more than one interpretation of a given statute or common law principle, it will invariably give effect to the construction best suited to give effect to the best interest of the child.

A child is an offspring of both parents who have joint legal obligation to contribute towards its maintenance according to their means. It is therefore clear that the purpose of section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:09] is to enable a spouse, or former spouse, who has, in good faith, discharged the other party's maintenance obligation in the best interest of the child to recover arrear maintenance pertaining to their child from the former spouse. Excluding reference to subsisting marriages the section reads:

“(3) Where a spouse has provided for the maintenance of children…, of a former marriage of one other of the spouses, that spouse shall be entitled to recover, in arrear, from the other spouse such maintenance or such portion of such maintenance as an appropriate court may consider just or equitable in the circumstances.”

Thus, on proper reading of section 11 of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:09], given its natural and grammatical meaning, it expressly confers the right to recover arrear maintenance on a former spouse.  The appellant's reliance on the expressio unius maxim was therefore misplaced and ill-advised as there was no omission to talk about.

Section 69

Section 69 of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [Chapter 10:27] provides as follows:

“69. Refusal of registration of mass media service

(1) The Commission may not refuse to register a mass media service unless -

(a) It fails to comply with the provisions of this Act; or

(b) The information indicated in an application for registration is false, misleading or contains any misrepresentation; or

(c) That mass media service seeks to be registered in the name of an existing registered mass media service;

and the Commission shall forward a written notification of the refusal of registration, stating the grounds upon which such refusal is based.

(2) An application for the registration of a mass media service shall not be considered –

(a) If it contravenes any provision of this Act;

(b) If the application has been filed by a person who has no authority to do so;

(c) If the application fee has not been paid.

(3) An application for registration may be re-submitted for consideration after the removal of any contraventions or when there is a change of circumstances.”…,.

Subsections (2) and (3) have since been repealed.

Section 69 of the Act sets out the powers of the Commission in regard to an application for registration of a mass media service provider.

The first point I wish to make in regard to this section relates to the use of the word 'may' in subsection (1). It is quite clear from the context in which that word is used that it should be taken to mean 'shall.' The word 'may' generally confers discretion, but when followed by the negative word 'not', i.e. 'may not', as is the case here, it means absence of discretion as in 'shall.' When this Court dealt with the word 'may' in section 79 of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [Chapter 10:27] in Association of Independent Journalists & Others v The Minister of State for Information and Publicity in the President's Office & Others SC136-02, the Court made the following observation:

“It is quite clear from the context that the word 'may' means 'shall' in this subsection.

In ordinary usage, 'may' is permissive and 'must' is imperative, and, in accordance with the usage, the word 'may' in a statute will not generally be held to be mandatory. In some cases, however, it has been held that expressions such as 'may' or 'shall have power' or 'shall be lawful' have – to say the least – a compulsory force and so their meaning has been modified by judicial exposition.

See MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12 ed by P St. J. LAGAN at pp 234-235 and the cases there mentioned.”

I am satisfied that the word 'may' in subsection (1) of section 69 of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [Chapter 10:27] means 'shall.'

The golden rule of interpretation is that words are to be given their ordinary and grammatical meaning, unless doing so results in an absurdity, in which case a court can depart from such ordinary meaning, but only to the extent necessary to cure such absurdity.

The remarks of GUBBAY JA…, in Mxumalo & Ors v Guni 1987 (2) ZLR 1 (S) are apposite. He said:-

“The language used is plain and unambiguous and the intention of the Law Society is to be gathered therefrom. It is not for a court to surmise that the Law Society may have had an intention other than that which clearly emerges from the language used. This principle has been stated frequently and I need only refer to Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re R v Jacobson & Levy 1931 AD 466 at 480, where STRATFORD J said that:

The Supreme Court said, in S v Nottingham Estates (Pvt) Ltd 1995 (1) ZLR 253 (S) 256 E:

The use of the word “must”…., underscores the fact that the obligation imposed…, is a mandatory obligation.