Urgency re: Approach, the Principle of Equality of Treatment & Discretion of the Court to Hear Oral Arguments on Urgency

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

Professional Ethics, Legal Duty to the Court and Clients, Dominus Litis and Correspondence with the Court

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Interim Interdict Pending Nothing

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

Review re: Record of Proceedings iro Systemic Delays

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

Urgency re: Approach, the Principle of Equality of Treatment & Discretion of the Court to Hear Oral Arguments on Urgency

In Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, the learned judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

Urgency re: Approach iro Time, Consequent and Remedial Alternative Considerations of Urgency

In Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, the learned judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

Urgency re: Certificate of Urgency

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

Jurisdiction re: Judicial Deference iro Assessment of Prospects on Appeal, Review or Main Proceedings

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Approach

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Review re: Unterminated or Incomplete Proceedings, Stay of Proceedings Pendente Lite and the Doctrine of Ripeness

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Court Management re: Approach, Case Management, Postponement of Proceedings and Judicial Directives of the Court

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Constitutional Rights re: Legal Representation

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Constitutional Rights re: Arrest, Detention, Prosecution, Fair Trial Rights, Liberty Rights & Habeas Corpus Proceedings

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Practicing Certificates and Right of Audience before Courts re: Switching of Legal Representation in the Course of Proceedings

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Recusal re: Approach, Presumption of Judicial Impartiality, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and the Doctrine of Necessity

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Urgency re: Constitutional Rights and Constitutional Proceedings

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Urgency re: Approach iro Time, Consequent and Remedial Alternative Considerations of Urgency

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate.

The second respondent opposed the application, arguing that the matter was no longer urgent given the background of the application.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

On the aspect of urgency, the applicant avers, that, the matter is set to proceed on 10 March 2020 as is ordered by the first respondent. If not postponed, it will render the pending application for review purely academic.

To him, the first respondent will not preside fairly over his case and that is tantamount to a betrayal of his interests and justice. It is his constitutional right to be tried by an independent and impartial court.

The certificate of urgency, signed by Mr Peter Makombe, on 16 February 2020, contains a repetition of what the applicant contends in his founding affidavit, word by word, and need no repletion.

On the date when the court granted audience to the applicant to address it on the aspect of urgency, Ms Chimwawadzimba, counsel for the applicant, submitted, that, the matter was urgent and cited the matter of Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H) per MATHONSI J…, where the learned Judge held that:

“Urgent applications are those where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so, to the prejudice of the applicant. Too often, the issue of whether urgency is self-created is blown out of proportion. A delay of 22 days cannot be said to be inordinate as to constitute self created urgency.”…,.

The above words were originally echoed by MAKARAU JP in the case of Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 dealing with an obiter in Kuvarega v Registrar General & Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188 (H) per CHATIKOBO J.

In that case, the case had been delayed for 25 days. Nevertheless, Justice MAKARAU, in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06 ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the application.

The applicant's counsel also referred the court to the matter of Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13, an urgent chamber application where the applicant had applied for stay of proceedings pending review where the applicant's application for a discharge at the end of the State case had been dismissed by the trial court.

The facts in Lee Waverley John v S HH242-13 are different from those before me.

There was no evidence adduced by the State to implicate Lee Waverly John, and, MAFUSIRE J granted the application.

The applicant's counsel went on to refer the court to the matter of Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 per MAKARAU J…, to advance an argument, that, a High Court has powers to intervene in incomplete proceedings where injustice and unfairness are apparent.

The court is not dealing with a review, it is looking at the aspects of urgency before delving into the merits of the matter.

It is important to note, that, in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04 the learned Judge ruled, that, the matter was not urgent and dismissed the urgent chamber application.

Counsel for the second respondent contended, that, the cause of action which triggered the application occurred in mid-March 2019 and the applicant has failed to lay good and sufficient grounds for an urgent chamber application; she added, that, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that he will suffer prejudice or irreparable harm if the relief sought is not urgent.

As crisply pointed out by MAKARAU JP in Document Support Centre (Pvt) Ltd v T.M. Mapuvire HH117-06:

“In my view, urgent applications are those, where, if the courts fail to act, the applicants may well be within their rights to dismissively suggest to the court that it should not bother to act subsequently as the position would have become irreversible and irreversibly so to the prejudice of the applicant.”

See also Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited v Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe & Others 2015 (1) ZLR 651 (H).

I am satisfied, that, the applicant can safely have alternative remedy in appealing against any outcome of the matter before the first respondent; his rights cannot be said to be irretrievably lost.

Given the history of this application, and the date when the applicant detected causes that would require an application for an urgent chamber application, the certificate of urgency also failed to meet the expected analysis and judgment reposed on a legal practitioner before such a certificate is prepared.

See General Transport & Engineering (Pvt) Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) per GILLESPIE J.

The preferential treatment, of allowing a matter to be dealt with urgently, is only extended if good cause is shown for treating the litigant in question differently from most litigants.

The applicant seems to rely on the excuse that the record was availed in December 2019 and then corrected in January 2020 – but, from March 2019 he had been inactive and all the push for acting urgently had completely fizzled out.

An application for review, in my view, is not what triggered the urgent application. It is the alleged manner of the magistrate which unnerved the applicant, and, the computations of delay, in this case, should start from March 2019 to date, which, in my view, is inordinate.

As per MAKARAU J in Robert Dombodzvuku and Another v Sithole N.O. and Another HH174-04:

“It has been stressed in this court, that, a matter does not become urgent as the date of reckoning looms. Rather, a matter is urgent when the facts giving rise to the cause of action arise and the matter cannot wait then. Pleas by legal practitioners, that, if the matter is not treated urgently because the date of reckoning is fast approaching are misplaced and un-impressive.”

In any case, Ms Chinwawadzimba openly admitted during the submission, that, the applicant has two available remedies open to him, but still contended, that, this court can still order the stay of proceedings.

I see no logic in that argument, and I dismiss it.

The matter is not urgent and struck off the roll of urgent matters.

Costs re: Claim for Costs from Presiding Judicial Officers Acting in the Course and Scope of Duty

This urgent chamber application was brought before me on 19 February 2020 in chambers. I adjudged that the application was not urgent.

On 11 February 2020, the applicant's counsel wrote to the Registrar seeking audience with the court and address it on the aspect of urgency.

The matter was set down for hearing on 17 February 2020.

On the date of hearing, the first respondent indicated, that, it was more concerned about the order of costs being prayed against the cited magistrate....,.

The applicant is seeking the following relief:

“TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That you show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:

1. That the criminal matter under case number MTC129/18 be and is hereby stayed pending outcome of the review application under case number HC30/20.

2. That the respondents shall pay costs of this application jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved in the event of anyone of them opposing the application.

INTERIM RELIEF GRANTED

Pending finalisation of this matter, an interim order is hereby granted on the following terms:

3. Pending the finalisation of the matter, the respondents be and are hereby interdicted from continuing with the trial under case number MTC129/18 scheduled for the 10th of March 2020.”

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

The background of the matter, preceding the commencement of the urgent chamber application, is contained in the founding affidavit of the aggrieved applicant from paragraph 5.2 following:

“5.2 The trial proceedings started on the 15th of December 2018 and the State led one witness. Unfortunately, the second State witness was not available and the matter was postponed to the 18th December to allow the State to bring its witness.

5.3 On the 18th December 2018, the second witness was in default and the matter was postponed to the 22nd of January 2019, nonetheless, the second State witness was in default again.

5.4 My legal representative made an application for my removal from remand, which was declined, and the matter was postponed to the 12th of February 2019. First respondent ruled that she was affording the State a final opportunity to call its witness. This was the third postponement occasioned by the State. These postponements were made in order to ensure that the State would bring its second witness.

5.5 On the 12th February 2019, unfortunately, my legal representative, Mr Zviuya, was unable to attend court due to a personal emergency which resulted in him travelling to South Africa on that morning. On the day of the hearing, Mr Zviuya sent a junior lawyer, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza, to seek a postponement. Notwithstanding that it was the first time I sought a postponement, it was declined. The matter was stood down to 2:15 for continuation. At 2:15pm, first respondent allowed the second State witness to testify. After the State finished leading evidence, Ms Gutuza again applied for a postponement to enable Mr Zviuya, my legal practitioner of choice, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. I did not understand why the first request for a postponement was refused given that my legal representative was absent due to reasons beyond my control.

5.6 Due to the fact that Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza is not a criminal lawyer and does not have experience to cross-examine, she sought a postponement to allow Mr Zviuya to attend to the cross examination. The application was again declined and the 1st respondent indicated that the trial was to continue the following day with or without my legal representative notwithstanding that when the matter was postponed on the 18th December 2018 it was never agreed that the matter would roll over onto the 13th February 2019.

5.7 On the 13th of February 2019, Ms Cresentia Tatenda Gutuza could not attend due to other commitments. I was assisted by Mr Jakazi from Maunga Maanda and Associates to seek a postponement. I also furnished the 1st respondent with a letter attached herein marked 'A'. Again, the application for a postponement was declined and the matter was stood down to 11:15am.

5.8 In the meantime, Mr Zviuya dictated a letter from South Africa to the Provincial Magistrate in a bid to stop the injustice which was taking place in my case. I annexed hereto the letter marked 'B'.

5.9 I returned to court at 11:15am; however, the court only resumed at 12:45 and the matter, surprisingly, without any application for a postponement, was postponed to the 22nd February 2019.”

The applicant then instructed his lawyers to refer the matter to the Constitutional Court based on the violation and impartial court.

The applicant indicates, in his founding affidavit, that, he instructed his lawyers to apply for the recusal of the magistrate due to the manner she had conducted the applicant's trial.

On 12 March 2019, an application for the recusal of the magistrate was dismissed.

The applicant also requested for transcription of the record.

The first respondent informed the applicant that the matter was going to be proceeded with on 27 March 2019 whether the applicant had a lawyer or not.

In March 2019, the applicant filed an urgent chamber application for stay of proceedings pending an application for review of the proceedings within a period of 30 days.

The matter was continuously postponed, the last date of postponement was 5 February 2020.

The transcribed record was availed to the applicant on an unspecified date in December 2019 and the applicant filed an application for review.

Meanwhile, the initial urgent chamber application, under HC77/19, was withdrawn after it had been initially removed from the roll of urgent matters.

The reference for the application for review is HC30/20.

The criminal trial has now been set for 10-11 March 2020.

According to the applicant, the given dates are still not ideal for him for Mr Zviuya will be engaged in the High Court on that date.

In his view, the first respondent is no longer fit to deal with the trial; to him, the first respondent has ceased to be neutral and objective in her conduct of the trial proceedings.

Law Portal
Zimbabwe

HMT24-20 - MATCHES CHADENGA vs MAGISTRATE MANHIBI N.O. and THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL

Urgency re: Approach, the Principle of Equality of Treatment & Discretion of the Court to Hear Oral Arguments on Urgency

Professional Ethics, Legal Duty to the Court and Clients, Dominus Litis and Correspondence with the Court

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Interim Interdict Pending Nothing

Review re: Record of Proceedings iro Systemic Delays

Urgency re: Approach, the Principle of Equality of Treatment & Discretion of the Court to Hear Oral Arguments on Urgency

Urgency re: Approach iro Time, Consequent and Remedial Alternative Considerations of Urgency

Urgency re: Certificate of Urgency

Jurisdiction re: Judicial Deference iro Assessment of Prospects on Appeal, Review or Main Proceedings

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Approach

Review re: Unterminated or Incomplete Proceedings, Stay of Proceedings Pendente Lite and the Doctrine of Ripeness

Court Management re: Approach, Case Management, Postponement of Proceedings and Judicial Directives of the Court

Constitutional Rights re: Legal Representation

Constitutional Rights re: Arrest, Detention, Prosecution, Fair Trial Rights, Liberty Rights & Habeas Corpus Proceedings

Practicing Certificates and Right of Audience before Courts re: Switching of Legal Representation in the Course of Proceedings

Recusal re: Approach, Presumption of Judicial Impartiality, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and the Doctrine of Necessity

Urgency re: Constitutional Rights and Constitutional Proceedings

Urgency re: Approach iro Time, Consequent and Remedial Alternative Considerations of Urgency

Costs re: Claim for Costs from Presiding Judicial Officers Acting in the Course and Scope of Duty

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HMT24-20 - MATCHES CHADENGA vs MAGISTRATE MANHIBI N.O. and THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL

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