GOWORA JA: On 27 November 2014, the High Court issued a
decree of divorce together with ancillary relief to the appellant and the respondent
respectively. On 17 December 2014,
the appellant, filed an appeal with the respondent filing a cross appeal on
19 December 2014. For ease of
reference I will refer to the parties as the appellant and the respondent.
The salient facts to this appeal are the following. On 7 May 1994, the parties entered into a
customary law union. On 15 August
1998 the parties had their marriage solemnized in terms of the Marriage Act [Chapter 5:11]. The union was blessed with three children, two
of whom, A and B are still minors.
On 17 April 2013, the respondent, citing irreconcilable
differences between the parties, filed summons in the High Court for divorce
and ancillary relief. The appellant
opposed the claim and filed a plea in support thereof.
However, at the pre-trial conference, the parties
agreed that the marriage had broken down irretrievably and that a decree of
divorce should be granted by consent. The
parties further agreed that an amount of $300.00 per month be paid as
maintenance for the two minor children and further that two immovable
properties, namely No. 397 Tariro Road, Chitungwiza and No. 29 Collenbrander
Road, Milton Park be shared equally between the parties. The issue of the custody of the minor
children and the distribution of the remainder of the matrimonial assets were
referred for trial.
The grounds of
appeal raised by the appellant were the following:
1)
The court a quo erred and misdirected itself in
ordering that the appellant should pay maintenance in respect of B
at the rate of
US300.00 per month considering that the minor child is in boarding school and
will only be with the respondent during holidays. (sic)
2)
The court a quo erred and misdirected itself in
awarding the respondent 50 per cent of the total herd of cattle at Plot 25
Highbury Estate, Mhangura and at the same time allowing the respondent to
retain whatever movable assets at her 89 Shamva Road Farm. (sic)
3)
The court a quo further erred and misdirected
itself in awarding the respondent 100 per cent of No. 1 Reigate Flat
whilst finding that respondent did not make any direct contribution towards the
acquisition of the same. The 100 per
cent award is unjustified in the circumstances.
4)
The court a quo further erred and misdirected
itself in awarding 50 per cent of No. 44 East Court Belvedere, Harare which was
not supported by facts in the circumstances to the respondent. (sic)
5)
The court a quo further erred and misdirected
itself in dealing with No. 2 Reigate Flat as if it is owned by appellant
entirely and also misdirected itself in dealing with No. 39A Dover Road as if
the same is owned by appellant entirely. The two properties are jointly owned and ought
not to have formed part of the matrimonial estate. In any event, no title was proven in respect
of the properties as being with the appellant. (sic)
6)
The court a quo also erred and misdirected itself
in awarding the appellant as his sole and exclusive property No. 13 Mardmaz
Flat when in fact it made a finding that the parties had both contributed to an
extent that each has to get 50%. (sic)
7)
The court a quo also erred by not ensuring that
the obligations and liabilities are shared equally between the appellant and
respondent in respect of;
i)
outstanding loans from
the purchase of the properties.
ii)
US109 000.00 school fees
per year for the minor children.
iii)
ZAR160 000.00 outstanding
mortgage bond for No. 10 Elizabeth Avenue, Rivonia, Sandton.
8)
At any rate the court a quo erred and misdirected itself in
not considering the respondent's assets for example Demusk Enterprises for
distribution under assets of the spouses. (sic)
9)
The court a quo also erred and misdirected itself
in including the Toyota Land Cruiser and Mazda Titan for distribution. The same
had long been sold by the appellant prior to the divorce proceedings and in any
event, the court a quo erred in
including the Land Rover Discovery which vehicle never existed and could
therefore not be allocated. (sic)
The respondent's
grounds in the cross appeal were as follows:
1
The court a quo grossly misdirected itself in
ruling that custody of the minor child A should be granted to the appellant
when it had made a finding that the same appellant was not suitable to be a
custodian parent. (sic)
2
The court a quo misdirected itself by only
ordering that the appellant pays as maintenance towards the minor child B US300.00
per month without directing the appellant to pay school fees and medical aid
for the minor child, when in fact the appellant had offered to pay the same.
3
The court a quo misdirected itself in awarding
appellant as his sole and exclusive property No. 13 Mardmaz Flat when in fact
it had made a finding that the parties had both contributed to an extent that
each has to get 50 per cent.
The part of the
judgment being appealed against raises two fundamental questions on appeal,
which are, firstly, whether or not the court a quo misdirected itself in the manner in which it distributed the
matrimonial assets of the marriage. The second question is related to the
custody of the minor children and the attendant issues of maintenance, the
payment of school fees, school uniforms and the general welfare of the minor
children.
The distribution of matrimonial property
pursuant to a decree of divorce is provided for in accordance with the
provisions of s 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Chapter 5:13], “the Act”. It is trite that the court
faced with such a dispute is required to exercise discretion,
which discretion it has been held in numerous authorities must be
exercised judicially.
The approach which
a court should adopt in apportioning the assets of parties following the
dissolution of a registered marriage was set out by MCNALLY
JA in Takafuma v Takafuma 1994(2) ZLR
103(S). In that case the learned Judge stated
at 106B-E:
“The
duty of a court in terms of s 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act involves the
exercise of a considerable discretion, but it is a discretion which must be
exercised judicially. The court does not simply lump all the property together
and then hand it out in as fair a way as possible. It must begin, I would
suggest, by sorting out the property into three lots, which I will term “his”,
“hers” and “theirs”. Then it will concentrate on the third lot marked “theirs”.
It will apportion this lot using the criteria set out in s 7(3) of the Act.
Then it will allocate to the husband the items marked “his”, plus the appropriate
share of the items marked “theirs”. And the same to the wife. This is the first
stage.
Next
it will look at the overall result, again applying the criteria set out in s
7(3) and consider whether the objective has been achieved, namely, “as far as is
reasonable and practicable and, having regard to their conduct, is just to do
so, to place the spouses …… in the position they would have been had a normal
relationship continued”……….
Only
at that stage, I would suggest, should the court consider taking away from one
or other of the spouses something which is actually “his” or “hers”.”
The appellant contends that the court a quo exercised its discretion
erroneously, acted on the wrong principle and failed to take into account some
relevant considerations in its apportionment of the assets of the spouses upon
the dissolution of the parties' union. It is also contended that the court
lumped all the property as “theirs” and proceeded to apportion the assets in
'as fair a way' as possible. It was submitted that to this extent, the court a quo departed from the correct approach
stipulated in the Takafuma case (supra).
It was further argued that this was a proper case for intervention by the
appellate court.
The appellant is correct in his assertion that in the
exercise of its discretion in terms of s 7(4) of the Act, a court is enjoined
to take into account all the factors set out in the provision, and that if the
court fails to take into account any relevant factor then it would have failed
to exercise its discretion judicially. Therefore, the starting point to the enquiry
is the creation by a court of three lots, 'theirs', 'his' and 'hers'. The court then follows up the process by
applying the criteria set forth in s 7(4).
The principle set out in Takafuma is that in the
distribution of property by a court pursuant to a decree of divorce it must be
clear as to which property is individual and which constitutes matrimonial
property. Only the latter category constitutes the assets subject to
apportionment by the court in the exercise of its discretion. A court must therefore endeavor to clarify
the category in which the assets forming the subject of the dispute fall. However, it must be made clear that the
authority does not prescribe a stringent form that parties must always adhere
to but the result from the exercise of discretion by the court must make it
clear which property is 'his', 'hers' or 'theirs'.
It is clear from a
reading of the judgment that the court a
quo was fully alive to the principle set out in s 7(4) and applied it
correctly. The court approached the
matter in the following manner:
“From
the totality of the evidence before this court, it is not in dispute that the
parties were married for about twenty years and that they acquired substantial
property jointly and individually. It is not in dispute that both plaintiff and
defendant are executives with professional qualifications worth noting and that
they were not living a substandard style of life. The case of Shenje v Shenje (supra) spelt out that
all contributions material or otherwise matter when it comes to the
consideration of all circumstances with a view to coming up with a fair
distribution, trying of course to place the parties in a position they would
have been had the marriage remained intact. It is apparent from the evidence on
record that all the property mentioned in the pleadings and during trial falls
under assets of the spouses which fall for distribution, division and
apportionment. One needs not go further
than the Matrimonial Causes Act. Also as
clearly spelt out in Gonye v Gonye
(supra) it would be erroneous to exclude property acquired by a spouse during
the period of separation as that would not only fetter the wide discretion of
the court on the rights of the parties but would also create an unjust
situation. It is my considered view in the circumstances of this case that all
the property acquired by either of the spouses with or without knowledge of the
other ought to fall for consideration.”
In its determination on the question of distribution
of the matrimonial assets of the parties, the court a quo found that theirs was a marriage of equals. The two are well
educated, with both of them holding degrees in their respective professions. Both
were employed throughout the greater part of the marriage. Whilst the respondent brought everything into
the joint estate, the appellant would purchase assets without the knowledge of
the respondent. On his own evidence he
also disposed of vehicles behind her back and never accounted for the
proceeds. The court took into account
that the respondent and the children were living in the matrimonial home,
whilst the appellant had created a home for himself in South Africa. Fully alive to the provisions of s 7 the
court a quo considered that it would
be impractical for the parties to share the matrimonial home as joint
owners. An order where they were made to
share would also not achieve a clean break in the relationship.
The court a quo
is heavily criticized for not following the approach set out by MCNALLY
JA in Takafuma (supra). It was
suggested in argument that to the extent that the court a quo did not create
three such lots of property at the start of the apportionment process, then its
decision would be founded on a wrong principle.
It appears to me that the court in Takafuma's case was
setting out an approach on the correct way of achieving an equitable
distribution. The factors that a court had to take into account in the
distribution are set out in the Act. The principle itself is found in the Act.
The appellant fails to appreciate that what Takafuma prescribes is a formula
and it is not one that is applicable in every situation. It is erroneous in my
view to suggest that the court a quo
should have strictly followed the formula as set out by MCNALLY
JA. In this case, the court found that all the property, with the exception of
the stand in Chitungwiza, was acquired during the union. In such a case one cannot speak of
piles. They do not exist as all the
property is matrimonial property and falls for distribution.
The court a quo
did not create three lots of the matrimonial estate. That is not to say that
its approach was incorrect. Having found that theirs was a marriage of equals,
there were no baskets in which to place the properties. It became unnecessary
to do so.
The court a quo
ordered that the respondent be awarded the following immovable property:-
i)
a 100 per cent share in 3
Wye Turn Crescent.
ii)
a 100 per cent share in 1
Reigate Flats
iii)
a 50 per cent share in
Collen Brander Milton Park.
iv) a 50
per cent share in 397 Tariro Road, Unit F Seke, Chitungwiza.
v) a 50 per cent share in Eastcourt
Belvedere
vi)
a 50 per cent share in
39A Dover Rd
The appellant was awarded the following property:-
i)
a 100 per cent share in
10 Elizabeth Avenue Rivonia, Sandton, Johannesburg, South Africa.
ii) a 100
per cent share in 13 Mardmaz Flats, 109 Baines Avenue.
iii) a 50
per cent share in Eastcourt Belvedere
iv) a 100 per cent share in 2 Reigate Flats
v) a 50
per cent share in 39A Dover Rd
The appellant
challenged the order by the court awarding the respondent ownership of the
matrimonial home in Vainona despite the fact that the property was jointly
owned by the two. The appellant and the respondent
both contributed towards the acquisition of this property and were joint
owners. In deciding to award the entire
property to the respondent the court a
quo reasoned as follows:-
“It is
clear in respect of the matrimonial home 3 Wye Turn Close, Vainona, Harare that
the plaintiff and the children stay there while the defendant stays at his
workplace. The parties contributed in such a manner that on the face of it 50%
sharing would be justifiable. However, regard being had to the full
circumstances of the case and the estate as a whole measured against the need
to attain a fair and just distribution it is my considered view that the
plaintiff be awarded a 100 per cent stake in the home. Sharing the house which
is the home of the plaintiff and the children in the circumstances of this case
where there is other property which can be allocated to the defendant who does
not stay at the home is viewed as inappropriate.”
It was further
contended that where a property is jointly held in equal shares, the court
ought to be alive to the general principle that a joint owner is entitled to
their individual half share of the property. It was further argued that a court
will not award the co-owner more merely because it would be fair and equitable
to do so. Reliance for this proposition was sought from the dicta by MCNALLY
JA in Lafontant v Kennedy 2000(2) ZLR
280, (S), at 283H-284D where this court said:-
“Where
two persons own immovable property in undivided shares(as is the case
here)there must, I think, be a rebuttable presumption that they own it in equal
shares. That presumption will be strengthened when (as here) the parties are
married to each other at the time ownership was acquired. Thus, Jones Conveyancing in South Africa 4 ed p118
states:
“Where
transferees acquire in equal shares it need not be stated in the deed that they
acquire 'in equal shares', as this fact is presumed in the absence of any
statement to the contrary”.
The title deeds of
the property were not produced in evidence. We do not know whether the deed
shows that the property was transferred specifically in equal shares or not.
But either way, the fact remains that they are prima facie owners in equal
shares. This is the basis of such
decisions in this court as Takafuma v
Takafuma (supra). As KORSAH JA
said in Ncube v Ncube
S-6-93(unreported):
“As
a registered joint owner she is in law entitled to a half share of the value of
the property.”
That therefore is the
starting point.
“The
court cannot move from that position on mere grounds of equity. It cannot give
away A's property to B on the mere grounds that it would be fair and reasonable
or just and equitable, to do so. There must be a more solid foundation in law
than that.”
The remarks by MCNALLY
JA in Lafontant (supra) must be
understood within the circumstances of the case before the court. The cause of
action in the dispute was not premised on s 7. It was accepted by the court
that s 7 did not apply and that therefore the cause of action was not the
distribution of matrimonial assets pursuant to a divorce. The parties were no
longer married having been divorced by a court in Haiti before approaching the
High Court for a determination of their rights in an immovable property and a
motor vehicle.
Nevertheless, the principle
as set out in Lafontant that a court cannot give away A's property to B on the
mere grounds that it would be fair and reasonable, or just and equitable to do
so cannot be disputed. A court should only do so where there is a solid
foundation in law to so.
Unlike the dispute
in Lafontant, the parties herein are engaged in a tussle over the matrimonial
estate pursuant to a decree of divorce. The court therefore has to have
recourse to the Act. Section 7(1) provides as follows:
7 Division of assets and maintenance orders
(1)
Subject to this section, in granting a
decree of divorce, judicial separation or nullity of marriage, or at any time
thereafter, an appropriate court may make an order with regard to —
(a)
the division, apportionment or
distribution of the assets of the spouses, including
an order that any asset be transferred from one spouse to the other; (my
emphasis)
To suggest as the
appellant does, that the court erred in the manner in which it dealt with the
matrimonial home, is to deliberately ignore the provisions of s 7 which section
empowers a court to do just that. In granting an order for the transfer of the
property of the appellant to the respondent the court a quo had to have a solid foundation at law. The ambit of s 7 empowers
the court to transfer the property of one of the spouses to the marriage in
order to achieve a justiciable and fair distribution of the matrimonial estate
the effect of which is to achieve a result that would leave the parties in a
position that they would have been if the union had continued. The rationale
behind the principle is that following a divorce neither spouse should be in a
worse off position than they would have been had the marriage continued.
It has not been
suggested by the appellant that such an order is not supported by law. In
making an order in terms of s 7 the court is guided by factors set out in
subsection (4) which are the following:
(4) In
making an order in terms of subsection (1) an appropriate court shall have
regard to all the circumstances of the case, including the following—
(a) the income-earning capacity, assets and other
financial resources which each spouse and child has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable future;
(b)
the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each spouse and
child has or is likely to have in the
foreseeable future;
(c)
the standard of living of the family, including the manner in which any child
was being educated or trained or expected to be educated or trained;
(d)
the age and physical and mental condition of each spouse and child;
(e)
the direct or indirect contribution made by each spouse to the family,
including contributions made by looking after the home and caring for the family
and any other domestic duties;
(f)
the value to either of the spouses or to any child of any benefit, including a
pension or gratuity, which such spouse or child will lose as a result of the
dissolution of the marriage;
(g)
the duration of the marriage; and in so doing the court shall endeavour as far
as is reasonable and practicable and, having regard to their conduct, is just
to do so, to place the spouses and children in the position they would have
been in had a normal marriage relationship continued between the spouses.
In making the
disposition it did, the court a quo
had regard to the authority of Gonye v
Gonye 2009 (1) ZLR 232 (S). What was at issue in that matter was the extent
of the discretion of the court under s 7 with regard to the disposal of the
matrimonial assets of parties pursuant to a decree of divorce. Also at issue
was what assets a court had to take into account in the division, apportionment
or distribution under the ambit of s 7 of the Act. At pp236H-237F MALABA JA (as
he then was) said:
“It
is important to note that a court has an extremely wide discretion to exercise
regarding the granting of an order for the division, apportionment or
distribution of the assets of the spouses in divorce proceedings. Section 7(1)
of the Act provides that the court may make an order with regard to the
division, apportionment or distribution of “the assets of the spouses including
an order that any asset be transferred from one spouse to the other”. The
rights claimed by the spouses under s 7(1) of the Act are dependent upon the
exercise by the court of the broad discretion.
The terms used are the “assets of the
spouses” and not “matrimonial property”. It is important to bear in mind the
concept used, because the adoption of the concept “matrimonial property” often
leads to the erroneous view that assets acquired by one spouse before marriage
or when the parties are separated should be excluded from the division,
apportionment or distribution exercise. The concept “the assets of the spouses”
is clearly intended to have assets owned by the spouses individually (his or
hers) or jointly (theirs) at the time of the dissolution of the marriage by the
court considered when an order is made with regard to the division,
apportionment or distribution of such assets.
To hold, as the court a quo did, that as a matter of principle assets acquired by a
spouse during the period of separation are to be excluded from the division,
apportionment or distribution a court is required to make under s 7(1) of the
Act is to introduce an unnecessary fetter to a very broad discretion, on the
proper exercise of which rights the parties depend.
It must always be borne in mind that s
7(4) of the Act requires the court, in making an order regarding the division,
apportionment or distribution of the assets of the spouses, and therefore
granting rights to one spouse over the assets of the other, to have regard to
all the circumstances of the case. The object of the exercise would be to place
the spouses in the position they would have been in had a normal marriage
relationship continued between them. As was pointed out by LORD DENNING MR in Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] 1 All ER 829
(CA) at p 842:
'In
all these cases it is necessary at the end to view the situation broadly and
see if the proposals meet the justice of the case'.”
It must be
accepted that the court a quo paid
due regard to the factors set out above. It considered that the appellant had a
home in Kenya where he was in employment, and that in addition there was the
Rivonia house in South Africa where he had also set up home. The evidence
showed that the respondent was not welcome there and had been refused access
thereto.
In contrast the
respondent had been living with the children at the matrimonial home. The
evidence also showed that the respondent had always lived at the matrimonial
home since its acquisition by the parties. That property was the only one where
the spouses and the children had shared as a family. The other properties were
to all intents and purposes investments from which the spouses were drawing an
income. In my view, the decision to transfer the appellant's half share in the
same cannot in the circumstances be impugned. Such order as the court a quo
gave was completely within its discretion in accordance with the provisions of
s 7(4) of the Act.
In addition to the
above, the court a quo found as a
fact that the appellant had lied to it with regards to his interest in some of
the immovable properties. The evidence
revealed that the appellant had purchased 2 Reigate, 29A Dover Rd 44 East Court
Belvedere and the Rivonia property behind the respondent's back. The court clearly had in mind when
distributing the assets, the fact that the appellant had not only tried to hide
his assets he had also misled the court in the manner in which he had
pleaded. He had stated that the Rivonia
property was rented. In relation to 29A
Dover Rd, the appellant initially denied its existence only to later claim that
it was jointly owned with a friend residing in the United Kingdom. In Beckford
v Beckford 2009 (1) ZLR 271(S), this court stated:
“Having
rejected Mr Beckford's evidence in respect of the proprietary rights of the
parties, the learned trial judge said the following at pp 81-82 of the
cyclostyled judgment:
'I
however, find that the plaintiff did not disclose all his assets especially
after he instituted these proceedings. The consequences of his attitude are
summed up in the English Court of Appeal by BUTLER-SLOSS LJ, in Baker v Baker ([1995]2 FLR 829(CA)) at
page 835, in these words:
'Mr
Posnansky pointed to an utterly false case and asked us to consider why the
husband was lying and what did he have to hide. If the cupboard was bare, it
was in his interests to open it and display its meager contents. But on the
contrary, the husband, despite his protestations to the contrary, continued to
live the life of an affluent man. I agree with the submissions from Mr
Posnansky that if a court finds that the husband has lied about his means, and
failed to give full and frank disclosure, it is open to the court to find that
beneath the false presentation, and the reasons for it, are undisclosed
assets.'
I
will use this fact against him in distributing the assets that he disclosed. It
is fair, just and equitable that I award to the defendant all the money that is
held in the joint account of their respective English solicitors. I have
agonized over the appropriate order to make concerning the distribution of the
immovable properties that the plaintiff disclosed which are registered in
England.
In
making the order that I have come to, I have been influenced in great measure
by the plaintiff's failure to make full and frank disclosure, the size of the
business transactions that were carried out by Coralsands and the concomitant
income that must have accrued to him, the benefit that accrued to him from the
disposal of 7A Granville Road to Nicky Morris on 10 November 2005, the
concerted program that he undertook in asset stripping the matrimonial estate
to his benefit and to the impoverishment of the defendant of which the
registration of a charge in favour of his parents for £67 000 against 390
Sutton Common Road was part of, his financial acumen and resourcefulness and
his apparent disdain for the integrity of the legal process. I will order that
the two disclosed properties be transferred into the defendant's name while the
plaintiff shall remain responsible for the discharge of all the encumbrances,
such as the mortgages and restrictions registered against them.
The
issue which now arises is whether there is any basis for interfering with the
proprietary awards made by the learned trial judge in favour of Mrs Beckford in
terms of paras 16 to 19 of the order. I do not think there is.
In
Baker v Baker supra OTTON LJ, who concurred with BUTLER-SLOSS LJ who prepared
the main judgment, said the following at 837:
'accordingly,
the husband cannot complain if the judge following authority explored what was
before him and drew inferences which may turn out to be less fortunate than
they might have been had he been more frank and disclosed his affairs more
fully. Such inferences must be properly drawn and reasonable. On appeal it may
be possible for either party to show that the inferences or the award were
unreasonable in the sense that no judge faced with the information before him
could have drawn the inferences or awarded the figures that he did. I am
satisfied that the appellant has not succeeded in demonstrating that the
figures WARD J awarded were in any regard unreasonable or unjustified.'
In
the present case, I am not prepared to say that no Judge could have drawn the
inferences or made the awards made by the learned trial judge. There is,
therefore, no basis for interfering with the awards made.”
The appellant has
also criticized the trial court for awarding the respondent 50 per cent of the
herd of cattle currently at his plot in Mhangura, whilst at the same time
allowing the respondent to retain whatever movable assets were at her farm in
Shamva.
In respect of this
ground, I find that the appellant has not shown that the court a quo grossly misdirected itself in the
manner in which it disposed of the cattle. The court found that the appellant
had sold some of the cattle after divorce proceedings had commenced. By law
that sale should have been taken into account which should have resulted in the
respondent being awarded a greater number than the 50 per cent. In fact the
court awarded the appellant all the farm equipment, yet he does not claim that
this has resulted in an inequitable distribution.
The mere fact that
the court did not make an order in respect to property at the respondent's farm
would not on its own justify interference by this court of the award of half of
the herd of cattle to the respondent. Further to this the appellant had lied to
the court regarding the existence of the very cattle whose disposition he now
seeks to challenge.
The appellant has
contended that the court a quo misdirected itself in including the Toyota Land
Cruiser and the Mazda Titan in the movable assets for distribution. He
suggested that as he had sold them prior to the divorce they should not form
part of the matrimonial estate.
The court a quo awarded the two vehicles to the respondent.
The appellant suggested that the vehicles had been sold to his friend. He did
not provide proof of such sale in an effort to counter the evidence of the
respondent that the vehicles were still in existence. If indeed he had sold
them he was under an obligation to account to the respondent for the proceeds
of the sale. He did not do so. The court a quo was well within its rights to
consider them as matrimonial assets subject to distribution. Similarly, I find
no merit on the attack against the inclusion of the Land Rover Discovery in the
matrimonial assets. The court disbelieved the appellant and found the
respondent a more credible witness. This finding has not been challenged on
appeal.
It appears to me
that the appellant has not shown that in making the award in respect of the
matrimonial estate the court a quo
took leave of its senses, applied a wrong principle or overlooked critical
evidence.
It is trite that an appellate court is loath
to interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless it has been shown that
the trial court exercised its discretion improperly. It was stated in Barros v Chimphonda 1999(1) ZLR 58(S)at 62F-63A as follows:
“The
attack upon the determination of the learned judge that there were no special
circumstances for preferring the second purchaser above the first one-which
clearly involved the exercise of judicial discretion- may only be interfered
with on limited grounds. See Farmers'
Co-operative Society v Berry 1912 AD 343 at 350. These grounds are firmly
entrenched. It is not enough that the appellate court considers that if it had
been in the position of the primary court it would have taken a different
course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the
discretion. If the primary court acts upon the wrong principle, if it allows
extraneous or irrelevant factors to guide or affect it, if it mistakes the
facts, if it does not take into account some relevant consideration, then its
determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own
discretion in substitution, provided always it has materials for doing so. In
short, this court is not imbued with the same broad discretion as enjoyed by
the trial court.”
Given that the
distribution of assets in a matrimonial dispute has as its premise the exercise
of discretion on the part of the trial court, it was incumbent upon the
appellant to show that in this case the court did not exercise its discretion
properly. The appellant, in my view, had
to establish that in its distribution of the assets of the parties, the court a quo failed to uphold the principles
set out in s 7. The distribution of matrimonial property is done in the
exercise of a discretion which an appellate court should be slow to interfere
with.
It has not been shown that the court acted upon a
wrong principle. Nor does it appear that the court a quo made an error in the exercise of its discretion under s 7. The formula suggested by the appellant in
deciding which property belongs to whom would result in this court ignoring
property that falls for distribution as matrimonial assets. This court would in fact fall into an error.
The court a quo was correct in its
manner of distribution. I find no misdirection.
Turning to the cross appeal it was contended that the
court a quo erred and misdirected
itself in awarding custody of the minor child A Junior Denhere, a male child
born 13 November 1999, to the appellant.
At the time of the
divorce the child was just shy of fifteen years of age. The relationship between the mother and the
child was to say the least, strained. The
mother readily conceded the poor relations between her and the child but was of
the view that if she got custody she would be able to retrieve and mend the
relationship. The court a quo was not convinced that it would be
in the interests of the child for him to be reunited with his mother. The court said:
“It is
also not in dispute that since July 2013 the relations between A and his mother
have been painted bad. This bad relationship was confirmed by the plaintiff in
court and as a concerned mother she was tearful and shuddered to recall what
her son had said to her showing the bad relations. The defendant confirmed the
relation was not good. In as much as the court apportions the sour relations to
the influence by the defendant given that he took the child under the pretext
of holiday but never returned the child, it is a fact that A Junior and the
mother no longer enjoy cordial mother son relations. Harm has been done in so
far as the relations have been tainted. It
is however, my considered view that given what the mother and father said A
would require time to heal and mend the relations. It would not be necessary at this stage to
disrupt the child's school which was disrupted by the defendant when he
transferred the child to learn in Kenya. To cause A Junior to transfer again and come
to Zimbabwe would not be in the best interests of the welfare of the child. He
is approaching majority and I am sure with proper guidance he will learn to
appreciate what a mother and father mean to him. The child's educational, social and moral
fabric would be negatively affected by changing his environment at this stage.”
In determining the issue of the custody involving a
minor child, a court is enjoined to consider the best interests of the child. It seems to me that the court a quo took into account the relationship
that a mother has with a child and how precious such a relationship is. The court also took into account the sour
relations that have developed between the mother and A and how it came
about. The court also considered the
importance of allowing the relationship between the mother and the son to mend.
Also of consideration by the court was
the desirability of keeping siblings together unless the circumstances demand
otherwise.
However, it is settled law that the best interests of
a minor child are the paramount consideration in issues surrounding the
welfare of minor children. What
constitutes the best interests of a minor child is dependent on the facts and
the surrounding circumstances thereto. In this instance, the child is at school
in Kenya. He has been there for some
time and has now established roots in that country. He is learning in accordance with the Kenyan
educational system. He has friends and a social network in that country. Even if this court were to accept the need for
the relationship of the mother and the child to be mended, it would not be in
his interests to be uprooted and brought to Zimbabwe. It would disrupt his
entire life, education and social life. I
do not believe that such a course of action would be of benefit to the family
as a whole, or most importantly, the child himself.
In my view, the court a quo was correct in the manner it exercised its discretion both as
regards the distribution of the matrimonial assets and the question of custody
of the minor child.
In the result both the appeal and the cross appeal are
dismissed for want of merit. Each party
is ordered to pay his or her own costs.
GUVAVA JA I agree
MAVANGIRA JA I
agree
Venturas & Samukange,
appellant's legal practitioners
Mutetwa & Nyambirai, respondent's legal
practitioners
