This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the High Court.
The question for determination is whether the law governing the property rights of married persons, or the law of testamentary disposition of estates, binds a testator to bequeath his or her right in an estate to the husband or wife.
The Court holds as follows;
The law governing the property rights of married persons in Zimbabwe is the Married Persons Property Act [Chapter 5:12] which provides that, since 1929, marriages in Zimbabwe are out of community of property. Parties to a marriage out of community of property are legally entitled to own and dispose of property in their individual capacities.
The law of testamentary disposition in Zimbabwe recognises the doctrine of freedom of testation and does not oblige a testator to bequeath his or her property to the surviving spouse.
The law of testamentary disposition, which is based on the universal principle of equality of men and women, gives a right to a person married out of community of property to dispose of his or her estate, by will, to whomsoever he or she chooses.
Decisions of the High Court, to the effect that a testator is, in the circumstances, bound to leave his or her property to the husband or wife and declaring testamentary disposition to the contrary to be void are inconsistent with the law. They should no longer be followed.
The reasons for the decision of the Court now follow.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts are common cause. The first respondent was married to the late Aaron Chigwada (“the deceased”) in 1971 in terms of customary law. In 1975, the parties had the union solemnised in terms of the Marriage Act [Chapter 5:11]. Before marrying the first respondent, the deceased had been married to the appellant's mother. They had divorced.
The deceased had six children with his first wife, the appellant being the fifth child and the youngest son.
During the subsistence of their marriage, the first respondent and the deceased acquired a house, Stand No.28181 Harare Township of Salisbury Township Lands, also known as No.85 Vito Street (“the immovable property”). The immovable property, which became the matrimonial house, was registered in the joint names of the husband and wife. Each spouse owned half of the beneficial interest in the house.
On 20 September 2007, the deceased made a will, in terms of which he bequeathed his half share of the beneficial interest in the immovable property to his son, the appellant. He appointed the second respondent as the executor to give effect to the testamentary disposition. The deceased died on 19 July 2011.
The will surfaced after the deceased's death.
The first respondent, who is the surviving spouse, approached the High Court (the court a quo) challenging the right of the appellant to succeed to the half share of the beneficial interest in the immovable property left to him by the deceased in terms of the will.
The first respondent believed, from teachings at her church, that the surviving spouse had a right to inherit the estate of the deceased husband or wife regardless of the existence of a will disposing of the property to a person other than the surviving spouse. Motivated by the belief she held, she thought that had it been the testator's intention to bequeath the property to his child, he ought to have bequeathed it to all the children that survived him.
During the proceedings in the court a quo, the only issue that remained for determination was whether the will was valid under the Wills Act [Chapter 6:06].
The other grounds for disputing the will were abandoned.
Initially, the first respondent sought an order declaring the will void on the allegation that the deceased lacked mental capacity to execute the will. She had also alleged fraud and undue influence. The first respondent eventually settled on the allegation that the will was invalid because the disposition did not leave the testator's estate to her as the surviving spouse.
The contention addressed the question of the essential validity of the will by making the allegation that the law of testamentary disposition binds a spouse to leave his or her entire estate to the husband or wife.
THE QUESTION FOR DETERMINATION IN THE COURT A QUO
The question for determination was whether there was a law which binds a spouse desirous of disposing of his or her estate, by will, to leave the property to the surviving spouse. If the correct finding by the court a quo was that there was such a law, the disposition by the deceased of his estate by will, to the appellant, would be void on account of failure to comply with an essential requirement of validity.
The question for determination by the court a quo was not one of construction of any of the provisions of the Wills Act. The learned Judge identified what she believed to be the law binding a spouse intending to make a disposition of his or her property by will to leave the estate to the surviving spouse as section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act [Chapter 6:02].
The law in question addressed matters of succession to an intestate estate and had nothing to do with the question of the right of a testator to dispose of his or her property to whomsoever he or she chooses.
The learned Judge, nonetheless, found that section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act [Chapter 6:02] was the law referred to in section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act as the “law governing the property rights of married persons”, to which the validity of the disposition of property by will is made to be subject.
In what can only be described as an unusual process of reasoning, the learned Judge concluded that section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act binds a married person to dispose of his or her estate, by a will, to his wife or her husband. She held that the deceased's will was void for contravening section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act because it gave effect to a disposition of his estate to a person other than the surviving spouse.
The court a quo set aside the deceased's will, leaving the estate to be disposable in terms of the law of intestate succession.
The appellant was aggrieved by the court a quo's decision, against which he appealed to the Court.
The interpretation and application of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act has given rise to conflicting judgments in the High Court. The conflicting decisions of the High Court, on the question whether a person married out of community of property in Zimbabwe enjoys freedom of testation or is bound to dispose of his or her estate, by will, to the surviving spouse have caused confusion and created uncertainty in the minds of members of the public as to the correct legal position.
A five-member Bench of the Court had to be constituted to answer the divisive question once and for all.
CONFLICTING DECISIONS OF THE HIGH COURT
It is prudent to set out the cases which support the two different schools of thought in order to appreciate the nature and source of the conflicting decisions rendered by different Judges of the High Court on the matter.
In Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H)…, (“the Wakapila decision”) KUDYA J had this to say:
“The argument advanced by Mr Matimba, that the surviving spouse is vested with rights in a deceased estate, in which a testamentary disposition has been made at the time of death, is fallacious for three reasons;
(i) The first is that the divested property, subject to acceptance by the beneficiary, no longer belongs to the testator.
(ii) The second being that giving such a meaning to the provision in issue would result in so radical an alteration of the common law power of a spouse to dispose of his or her property to whomsoever he or she wishes.
If the lawmaker intended such a radical departure from the common law it would have said so in clear language.
It would be absurd to allow the spouse to dispose of his or her property during his or her lifetime but take away that power from him or her to dispose of it by will.
(iii) The third, being that a wife married under customary law can only inherit from her husband's estate if he dies intestate. Where he has disposed of his estate by a will, she does not inherit and thus has no rights in any property belonging to his estate.”
In Roche v Middleton HH198-16 CHITAKUNYE J held that the Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) decision was based on the correct interpretation and application of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act. The court intimated that it would be absurd to hold that a person who could dispose of his or her property without the other spouse's consent would lose the right to dispose of it by will to whomsoever he or she chooses. The court further held that if the Legislature intended such a radical departure from the common law it would have enacted express provisions to that effect.
The reasoning championed by Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) was to be rejected in later decisions of the High Court where the position adopted was that a will which does not bequeath the matrimonial house to the surviving spouse is void.
The departure from Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) was registered in Chimbari NO v Madzima and Ors HH325-13, where the court held that section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act prohibits a testator from disinheriting a surviving spouse. The court, in that case, held that the provisions of section 5(3)(a) were put in place to safeguard the rights that accrue to a surviving spouse at the death of the testator.
In Chiminya v Estate Late Chiminya and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 450 (H) (“the Chiminya decision”) the court expressed the view that the purpose of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act was to cure the mischief by testators who wanted to disinherit their surviving spouses. The reasoning of the court was based on the assumption that the surviving spouse has a “right of inheritance” which is protected by section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act. The court relied on section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act which it said prescribed inheritance principles regarding surviving spouses.
The court adopted the reasoning, notwithstanding the fact that section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act applies where the deceased died intestate whilst section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act addresses requirements for the validity of disposition of estates of married persons by will.
The reason given by the court, for relying on section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act, was that the provision was in conformity with section 56 of the Constitution which prohibits discrimination based on marital status and promotes equality before the law.
The reasoning, with respect, is not logical, as there was an admission of the fact that section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act was irrelevant to the matter under discussion. The attempt to draw similarities between the purpose of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act and that of section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act was unnecessary.
The court had this to say at 453E-G:
“I am alive to the fact that the Deceased Estates Succession Act [Chapter 6:02] deals with intestate succession. Suffice to mention, at this stage, that I have alluded to it in so far as it is in conformity with the Constitution and insofar as it recognises the surviving spouse's right to inheritance. In the same manner, the Wills Act [Chapter 6:06] recognises the surviving spouse's rights by having provisions such as section 5(3)(a) which recognise rights of a surviving spouse and seek to protect inheritance right of a surviving spouse even where the other spouse dies testate.”
The approach adopted in Chiminya v Estate Late Chiminya and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 450 (H) was followed in Majuru v Majuru HH404-16 where the court held that a will that disinherited a surviving spouse was in contravention of section 26 of the Constitution which recognises equality of spouses during marriage and at dissolution either through death or divorce. The court held that disinheriting a spouse was contrary to public policy and prejudiced the surviving spouse's right to inherit the deceased's estate.
This is also a judgment based on the wrong premise that section 5(1) of the Wills Act, which gives every person, possessed of the capacity to do so, a right to dispose of his or her estate by will to whomsoever he or she pleases, is not based on the principle of equality of men and women.
The reasoning in Chiminya v Estate Late Chiminya and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 450 (H) was also adopted in Nyamnshanya and Ors v Nyamnshanya and Ors HH693-17.
The court held that a will which disinherited a surviving spouse was void for the reason that it contravened section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act and section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act. The court further held that the surviving spouse's right to inherit the deceased spouse's estate was guaranteed by the statutory provisions and that the will ran foul of the law by bequeathing the matrimonial house to a person other than the surviving spouse.
Needless to say, the decision was also based on the erroneous proposition that there is a correlation between the provisions of section 5(3(a) of the Wills Act and those of section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act.
The departure from Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) to Chiminya v Estate Late Chiminya and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 450 (H) is predicated on the presumed applicability of section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act in the interpretation of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act.
Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) is to the effect that the rights of the surviving spouse, protected by section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act, are those that the surviving spouse holds at the time that the will is executed. In other words, the rights must flow from a law which governed the rights of the deceased spouse and the surviving spouse while they were both alive. On the other hand, Chiminya v Estate Late Chiminya and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 450 (H) holds that section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act protects the rights that a surviving spouse holds under section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act.
Chiminya v Estate Late Chiminya and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 450 (H) suggests that the rights which flow from section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act entitle a surviving spouse to inherit the matrimonial house. This is a departure from Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H).
REASONING OF THE COURT A QUO
The court a quo adopted the reasoning in Chiminya v Estate Late Chiminya and Ors 2015 (1) ZLR 450 (H). It held that the testator's will, which bequeathed his half share of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial house to the son, was invalid because it had prejudiced the surviving spouse's right to inherit the whole beneficial interest.
The court a quo stated that section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act is the law governing the property rights of married persons. It held that if the deceased had died intestate, the surviving spouse would have been entitled to inherit the matrimonial house in terms of section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act. The view of the court a quo was that she could not be prejudiced merely because the deceased had executed a will. The court a quo further held that the fact that section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act applied to spouses who died wholly or partly intestate was indicative of the intention of the Legislature to protect surviving spouses even in situations where there was a will. The effect of the judgment was that the overriding factor was that the person affected was a surviving spouse.
The learned judge had this to say at p3 of the cyclostyled judgment:
“The fact that section 3A above includes situations where part of the estate is covered by a will as evidenced by the use of the phrase 'dies wholly or partly intestate' is an indication that the intention of the Legislature was to protect such spouses even in situations where there is a will.
Section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act [Chapter 6:02] is part of the law referred to in section 5(3) of the Wills Act which would have made the plaintiff obtain 50% of the house from the testator's estate if the bequest to the first defendant had not been made by the testator in his will.
This means that the bequest of 50% of the matrimonial home to the first defendant in the will by the late Aaron Chigwada is the obstacle which is now prejudicing the plaintiff from the enjoyment of the only home she has ever known since she got married.
In my view, this is the mischief which the legislature intended to cure when it enacted section 5(3) of the Wills Act [Chapter 6:06]. The intention was to intervene in situations where surviving spouses would be rendered homeless by the wills of their deceased partners in situations where the will bequeathed the spouses' home, or part of it, to a third party as in the present situation.”…,.
The view of the court a quo cannot be the correct interpretation of the provisions of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act.
The effect of the approach adopted by the court a quo, in interpreting section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act, is one which abrogates the right of testation given under section 5(1(a) of the Wills Act. The words “wholly or partly intestate” do not refer to property disposed of by a will. They refer to property not covered by a testamentary disposition.
At law, property is disposed of by a will or it is not.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS GOVERNING THE DISPOSITION OF DECEASED ESTATES
It is necessary to set out the statutory provisions at the centre of the divergent opinions of the High Court.
Section 5 of the Wills Act
“5 Power to make dispositions by will
(1) Subject to this Act, and any other enactment, any person who has capacity in terms of section four to make a will may, in his will -
(2) Subject to this Act, and any other enactment, a will shall not be invalid solely because the testator has disinherited or omitted to mention any parent, child, descendant or other relative or because he has not assigned any reason for such dis-inheritance or omission.
(3) No provision, disposition, or direction made by a testator in his will shall operate so as to vary or prejudice the rights of —
(a) Any person to whom the deceased was married to a share in the deceased's estate or in the spouses' joint estate in terms of any law governing the property rights of married persons.”…,.
Section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act
“3A The surviving spouse of every person who, on or after the first of November 1997, dies wholly or partly intestate shall be entitled to receive from the free residue of the estate:
(a) The house or other domestic premises in which the spouses or surviving spouse, as the case may be, lived immediately before the person's death; and
(b) The household goods and effects which immediately before the person's death were used in relation to the house or domestic premises referred to in paragraph (a); where such house, premises, goods and effects form part of the deceased's estate.”
SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL
The appellant's submissions
The submissions by counsel for the appellant were largely based on Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) and the reasoning therein. He argued that the first respondent had not been prejudiced in relation to any of her rights in the property. His argument was that the deceased owned a half share of the beneficial interest in the house and the first respondent owned the other half. The deceased did not bequeath any part of the first respondent's half share. Realizing that he owned half of the beneficial interest in the immovable property, the deceased bequeathed the estate that belonged to him. As a result, the first respondent's property rights were not varied or prejudiced as she remained the sole owner of her half share of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial house.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that the property rights referred to in section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act are rights which exist at the time that the will is executed. The appellant's argument was that had the deceased bequeathed the first respondent's half share of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial house the bequest would have been void on account of the operation of section 5(3)(a) unless she would have consented to the variation of her rights.
He further submitted that to give to section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act the meaning given by the court a quo would result in a radical alteration of the common law. The argument was that if Parliament intended to make such a radical departure from the common law principle of freedom of testation it would have done so through express provisions.
The first respondent's submissions
Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the first respondent was entitled to receive the deceased's half share of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial house because she is the surviving spouse. She contended that the will that had been executed by the deceased prejudiced the surviving spouse's right to inherit his estate. She argued that the right to inherit the deceased's estate was based on section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act. Her argument was predicated on two legal assumptions;
(a) The first assumption was that a surviving spouse has a right to inherit the deceased's estate.
(b) The second assumption was that the law governing property rights of married persons, referred to in section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act, is section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act.
Counsel went further and submitted that the fact that most of the challengers of wills in cases of this nature are women betrays the reality of gender issues in Zimbabwe. She argued that a decision that allowed a testator to dis-inherit the surviving spouse of the matrimonial house, whilst gender neutral on the face of it, has adverse effects on women. She further contended that due to gender inequality men are the property holders. According to counsel, the decision in favour of the appellant would lead to the perception of discrimination against women on the ground of gender.
Counsel for the first respondent submitted that the Court should take cognisance of the fact that Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) was made in 2008 before the current Constitution came into effect.
The contention was that Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H) is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution which place emphasis on respect for gender equality, protection of vulnerable members of society, and promotion of family values.
Counsel further submitted that the rules of Constitutional interpretation include a presumption that Zimbabwe does not intend to abrogate its obligations under international law. The point made was that Zimbabwe is party to several international conventions that prohibit discrimination against women. To buttress the point, counsel made reference to the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979) (“CEDAW”) and General Recommendation 29, which speak of property rights of spouses. Reference was also made to Article 21 of the Protocol To The African Charter On Human and Peoples Rights On The Rights Of Women In Africa (“the Maputo Protocol”). She further submitted that, in terms of section 326 of the Constitution, the Court should adopt an interpretation that honours Zimbabwe's obligations under international law.
The first amicus curiae' s submissions
Ms Mahere argued that the court a quo erred in awarding the property in question to the first respondent contrary to the express intention of the testator. For this proposition she made reference to section 5(1)(a) of the Wills Act, which underscores the doctrine of freedom of testation. She said that the testator was at large to dispose of his property, by will, to whomsoever he chose. She quoted from De WAAL and MALAN "Law of Succession" (4ed, Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town 2008) in which the learned authors state…, that, although strict formalities attach to the execution of a will, its contents are left to the discretion of the testator.
Ms Mahere also made reference to an article by EDRICK ROUX titled ''Freedom of Testation - Can a person disinherit a spouse?" DR, November 2013:48 [2013] DEREBUS 225. The writer states that freedom of testation goes beyond the testator distributing his or her assets to his or her surviving family members. He emphasizes that the assets can be distributed to whomsoever the testator chooses.
Ms Mahere further argued that the doctrine of freedom of testation is entrenched by section 71(2) of the Constitution, which provides that:
“(2) Subject to section 72, every person has the right, in any part of Zimbabwe, to acquire, hold, occupy, use, transfer, hypothecate, lease or dispose of all forms of property, either individually or in association with others."…,.
She submitted that the right to private property, guaranteed under the Constitution, includes the right to decide how one's property is disposed of during one's lifetime and after death.
De WAAL and MALAN "Law of Succession" (4ed, Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town 2008), the learned authors, postulate that the Constitutional protection of the right to freely determine how one's estate is to be distributed after death protects the principle of freedom of testation that supports it. Ms Mahere argued that the right to property enshrined in section 71(2) of the Constitution, and, by extension, the right of testation, is a fundamental right.
She further quoted from De WAAL and MALAN "Law of Succession" (4ed, Juta & Co Ltd, Cape Town 2008) where…, the learned authors say:
“Nobody has a right to inherit. Leaving someone out of a will as a beneficiary therefore does not amount to an encroachment upon or taking away of an existing right. A potential beneficiary has, at most, a so-called spes or hope.”
The contention by Ms Mahere was that a court's prerogative is not to write a will for the deceased but to give effect to the testator's intention. She submitted that section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act places a limitation on the exercise of the right of testation. The limitation is that the testator must not vary or prejudice the property rights of the person to whom he or she is married. She submitted that the first respondent had to illustrate that a right that she held in the property had been prejudiced by the testator's disposition of his own half share of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial house.
Ms Mahere emphasised the point that the property rights that are protected from possible prejudice, flowing from a disposition by the deceased, are the rights which the surviving spouse holds at the time the will is executed and not future or contingent rights.
She argued that the marriage to the deceased did not endow the first respondent with any proprietary rights in the deceased's half share of the beneficial interest in the immovable property. The contention was that the proprietary rights the first respondent had in the immovable property accrued to her as a result of the registration of her own half share in the beneficial interest as a joint owner of the matrimonial house. The deceased continued to exercise dominion over his share of the matrimonial house. Consequently, the contention that the first respondent's rights were prejudiced by the disposition by the deceased of his own property rights, by will, was not supported by the facts.
Ms Mahere further argued that the court a quo was wrong to rely on section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act. It conflated instances where one died testate with instances where one died intestate.
The contention was that what determined the applicable law was the answer to the question whether the deceased died intestate or testate. The determinant factor was not the marital status of the deceased.
Her argument was that the court a quo failed to take into account the fact that marriages in Zimbabwe are out of community of property. As a result, there has to be a clear law prohibiting testamentary disposition of a matrimonial house before a court can hold that the surviving spouse's rights or interests have been prejudiced or interfered with by a disposition by the deceased of his or her estate in the matrimonial house, by will, to a person other than the surviving spouse.
On the argument by counsel for the first respondent that women ought to be protected as vulnerable members of society, Ms Mahere made the observation that the first respondent was a property holder who owned a half share in the property in question. She owned the property in her personal capacity in terms of the law governing the property rights of married persons. Consequently, the first respondent could not be deemed to be economically disadvantaged.
The second amicus curiae's submissions
The submissions made by Mr Uriri were in support of Estate Late Wakapila v Matongo & Ors 2008 (2) ZLR 43 (H). Mr Uriri submitted that section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act does not create proprietary rights. It relates to existing rights. These rights must be provided for in terms of a law governing the property rights of married persons. He submitted that the law governing the property rights of married persons in Zimbabwe is the Married Persons Property Act [Chapter 5:12], which provides that all marriages in Zimbabwe are out of community of property. The contention was that the import of the provision of the Married Persons Property Act is that spouses are equal partners, each with the capacity and freedom to hold and dispose of property independent of the other.
Mr Uriri argued that section 5(1)(a) of the Wills Act embodies the principle of freedom of testation. He argued that the wording of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act is clear and requires no interpretation. He said that, in its literal sense, section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act proscribes prejudice to the surviving spouse's rights held in terms of the law governing the property rights of married persons.
Mr Uriri contended that the purpose of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act is to safeguard the respective spouses' rights acquired under the Married Persons Property Act; the object of which was to abolish the matrimonial power of the husband under the community of property legal regime.
Having chosen to be married under a specific matrimonial regime, neither party requires protection from the known legal consequences of their own choice. The known consequence of marriage out of community of property is the existence of separate and divisible estates between the spouses. The contention was that property acquired by a spouse in his or her own right belongs to that spouse. The parties jointly own property by agreement.
ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
The first respondent based her case on the premise that the disposition by the deceased of his half share of the beneficial interest in the matrimonial house ran foul of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act, in that it allegedly contravened section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act which entitles the surviving spouse to inherit the matrimonial house and goods in it.
A reading of section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act reveals that it is not any spouse who is entitled to inherit the matrimonial house and the chattels in it. It is the spouse of a person who died wholly or partly intestate.
The first respondent is a surviving spouse of a person who died testate. She is not eligible to the benefits of entitlements that flow from section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act because there was a valid will executed by the deceased.
It should follow that where there is a valid will, section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act cannot be said to have been contravened by the disposal of a matrimonial house and the chattels therein.
The purpose of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act is to provide protection for the property or estate belonging to the other spouse from being disposed of by the testator, by will, as if it is part of his or her own estate. The effect of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act is that, if the property belongs to the other spouse, in terms of the law governing the property rights of married persons, the execution of the will disposing of that property is a nullity.
For the first respondent to benefit from the provisions of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act, she had to allege, and prove, that the deceased made a will by which he sought to dispose of her property.
She, however, accepted that the half share of the beneficial interest in the immovable property the deceased disposed of, by the will, belonged to him.
She claimed a right to the immovable property on the sole ground that she was the surviving spouse.
Section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act could not be invoked to assist her cause. Subject to the condition that a disposition of an estate by will must not have the effect of varying or prejudicing the property rights of a spouse under a law governing property rights of married persons, section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act does not subtract from the right of testation provided for in section 5(1).
Section 5(2) is important in that it provides that a will shall not be invalid solely because the testator has disinherited or omitted to mention any relative or because he or she has not assigned any reason for such disinheritance or omission.
The subject matter of section 5 of the Wills Act, as a whole, is the provision, disposition, or direction made by a testator in his or her will. The testamentary power given to a testator under section 5(1) of the Wills Act relates to these subject matters.
The effect of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act is that the testator must not include in the disposition by will property belonging to the other spouse except with his or her consent. He or she must include in the disposition by will assets consisting of his or her own estate. Including in the disposition of the estate by will assets belonging to the other person to whom the testator is married, without his or her consent, would render the will void. Such a disposition by will would inevitably have the effect of varying or prejudicing the property rights of the other spouse, contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act.
Section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act cannot be understood to mean that a testator has no right to dispose of his or her estate to whomsoever he or she chooses. Such a view of section 5(3)(a) the Wills Act would ignore the provisions of subsection (1) of section 5, which is the root to the provisions of the other subsections. The only qualification to the right of testation, provided for in sub-section (1) by section 5(3)(a), is that the testator must ensure that the assets he or she intends to have disposed of by will to whomsoever he or she chooses belong to him or her. Section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act is not concerned with the status of the person to whom the testator intends to have his or her estate disposed upon his or her death.
The issue is not that the person to whom the testator was married is dis-inherited. A surviving spouse can be a subject of disinheritance by a will complying with the formalities of a valid will as well as with the requirements for essential validity such as are prescribed under section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act.
Once a will complies with all the requirements of validity, its terms and conditions determine the question of succession to the deceased's estate. Section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act should not be read to mean that a husband or wife cannot disinherit the surviving spouse by a will. The requirements for the essential validity of the will are not to the effect that the testator must leave his or her estate to the surviving spouse.
The reference to section 3A of the Deceased Estates Succession Act in the interpretation of section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act was an attempt at finding justification for a decision to set aside an otherwise valid will. The purpose was to imbue a surviving spouse in a testate succession with the same benefits that accrue to a surviving spouse under intestate succession.
There is no legal basis for the adoption of such an approach....,.
A will, as a legal document, derives its validity from compliance with the provisions of the statute prescribing the requirements of a valid will. A will which complies with all the requirements of validity cannot be set aside on the basis of extraneous matters, such as that its execution has the effect of disinheriting the surviving spouse. The law of wills imposes an obligation on all who deal with the deceased's property, including the surviving spouse, to give effect to the intention of the deceased regarding the disposition of his or her property as expressed in a valid will.
A court is bound to act in terms of the law.
It cannot set aside a valid will because it thinks that the testator ought to have bequeathed his or her property to the surviving spouse.
