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HH728-17 - C R S (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY

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Tax Law-viz income tax appeal.
Tax Law-viz fiscal appeal.
Tax Law-viz taxable income re non-existent income iro section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz rules of construction re deeming provisions iro section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz rules of interpretation re deeming provisions iro section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz rules of construction re fiscal statutes.
Procedural Law-viz rules of interpretation re tax legislation.
Procedural Law-viz appeal re fiscal proceedings iro Rule 11 documents.
Procedural Law-viz appeal re taxation proceedings iro Rule 11 documents.
Procedural Law-viz condonation re fiscal proceedings iro interests of justice.
Procedural Law-viz condonation re tax proceedings iro the interests of justice.
Procedural Law-viz appeal re fiscal proceedings iro section 65 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Tax Law-viz appeal re section 65 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Tax Law-viz appeal re Rule 11 documents iro Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz tax appeal re  Rule 11 documents iro Part I of the Twelfth Schedule of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz rules of construction re mandatory provision iro use of the word "shall".
Procedural Law-viz rules of interpretation re peremptory provision iro use of the term "shall".
Procedural Law-viz cause of action re form of proceedings iro fiscal appeal proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz cause of action re nature of proceedings iro income tax appeal proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz court management re directions of the court.
Procedural Law-viz court management re judicial directives.
Company Law-viz legal personality re related party transactions.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re digital evidence iro email.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re digital evidence iro electronic mail.
Law of Contract-viz contract of hire re fiscal considerations.
Law of Contract-viz contract of letting re taxation considerations.
Tax Law-viz tax avoidance re under-invoicing.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re documentary evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re evidence on behalf of a company iro institutional memory.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re documentary evidence iro the best evidence rule.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re abandoned pleadings.
Company Law-viz change of name.
Procedural Law-viz signatures re the caveat subscriptor rule iro representative signations.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re candidness with the court iro suppression of evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re being candid with the court iro the obligation to disclose all information to the court.
Transport Law-viz road carriage re cross-border transport services.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re expert evidence iro commercial road carriage.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re prevaricative evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re inconsistent evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re approbating and reprobating a course in proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re signatures iro the caveat subscriptor rule.
Procedural Law-viz documentary evidence re signatures iro the caveat subscriptor rule.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re representative signations iro the caveat subscriptor rule.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re evidence on behalf of corporate entity iro institutional memory.
Procedural Law-viz rules of construction re deeming provisions.
Procedural Law-viz rules of interpretation re deeming provisions.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro assessment of evidence.
Law of Contract-viz intent re simulated agreement.
Law of Contract-viz animus contrahendi re disguised contracts.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re onus iro burden of proof.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re onus iro standard of proof.
Administrative Law-viz the exercise of administrative discretion.
Procedural Law-viz final orders re case law authorities iro foreign judgments.
Procedural Law-viz final orders re judicial precedents iro foreign case law authorities.
Procedural Law-viz final orders re case authorities iro the doctrine of stare decisis.
Procedural Law-viz final orders re judicial precedent iro the doctrine of stare decisis.
Procedural Law-viz case law authorities re persuasive authority iro foreign judgements.
Procedural Law-viz judicial precedents re persuasive authority iro foreign case law.
Tax Law-viz tax avoidance re section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Company Law-viz Group structures re related party transactions iro the arm's length principle.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re documentary evidence iro the best evidence rule.
Law of Contract-viz illegal contract re just cause conduct.
Law of Contract-viz illegal agreement re just cause conduct.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re corroborative evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re expert evidence iro haulage operations.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re being candid with the court iro suppression of evidence.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re candidness with the court iro suppression of evidence.
Law of Contract-viz consensus ad idem re sanctity of contract iro administrative variation of contracts.
Law of Contract-viz consensus ad idem re privity of contract iro administrative variation of contracts.
Law of Contract-viz variation of contracts re statutory induced variation of agreements.
Law of Contract-viz variation of agreements re statutory-induced variation of contracts.
Tax Law-viz taxable income re notional income.
Procedural Law-viz rules of construction re ambiguous provisions iro intent of the legislature.
Procedural Law-viz rules of interpretation re vague provisions iro legislative intent.
Administrative Law-viz the exercise of administrative prerogative.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re corroborative evidence iro witness statement.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re obligation to disclose all information to the court iro suppression of evidence.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re judicial deference iro remittal.
Tax Law-viz fiscal amnesty re the Finance Act, Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014.
Tax Law-viz tax amnesty re section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014.
Constitutional Law-viz constitutional rights re non-discrimination iro section 56 of the Constitution.
Tax Law-viz penalties re section 64 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Constitutional Law-viz constitutional rights re limitation of constitutional rights iro section 86 of the Constitution.
Constitutional Law-viz fundamental rights re attenuation of constitutional rights iro section 86 of the Constitution.
Procedural Law-viz final orders re relief conflicting with statutory provisions.
Constitutional Law-viz constitutionality of statutory provisions re fiscal legislation iro the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014.
Constitutional Law-viz constitutionality of statutory provisions re tax laws iro the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014.
Tax Law-viz penalties re the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act Chapter 23:06].
Tax Law-viz fiscal penalties re section 46 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz appeal re appeal in the wide sense iro fiscal appeal.
Procedural Law-viz appeal re appeal in the wide sense iro taxation proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re digital evidence iro e-mail.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re digital evidence iro email.
Procedural Law-viz costs re tax proceedings iro section 65 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz costs re fiscal proceedings iro section 65 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].
Procedural Law-viz costs re no order as to costs.
Procedural Law-viz costs re no costs order.

Approach re: Functions & Powers of Revenue Authority, Fiscal Appeals or Objections & the Pay Now Argue Later Principle


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the appellant moved, in accordance with the notice filed of record on 24 August 2015, and served on the respondent on the same date, for the non-suiting of the respondent for failure to file Rule 11 documents.

Counsel for the respondent conceded the failure and sought the Court's indulgence for the respondent to participate in the appeal without the Rule 11 documents. He contended, that, the failure was not prejudicial to the appellant, and, in the alternative, promised to file the documents by the end of business on Friday 18 September 2015 failing which the Court would disregard all the evidence, contentions, and submissions made by the respondent at the appeal hearing.

Rule 11 is found in Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the rules regulating Income Tax Appeals that are applied in the determination of an appeal under section 65 of the Income Tax Act or any proceedings incidental thereto or connected therewith. It stipulates that:

“The Commissioner shall transmit to the Special Court, together with the agreed case, or with the appellant's case and the Commissioner's case, a certified copy or extract of the assessment in so far as it relates to the assessment made upon the appellant, and also the notice of objection lodged and the notice of appeal, together with any material correspondence related thereto, unless the same have already been included in the statement of facts. A copy of the decision appealed from and of the reasons for the same shall accompany the documents above mentioned.”…,.

In the present case, the parties did not agree on a statement of facts. Rather, each party filed with the Registrar its respective case devoid of any attachments.

In this regard, it was mandatory for the respondent to file a certified copy or extract of each assessment raised against the appellant, the notice of objection, the decision appealed against and the reasons thereof, the notice of appeal, and any material correspondence relating to each assessment together with the Commissioner's case.

There was, and would be no need for the respondent to file the appellant's case with these documents as it was and would always be filed with the Registrar and served on the respondent prior to the filing of the Commissioner's case and its addendums.

In the same vein, it would serve no useful purpose for the respondent to file those Rule 11 documents which would have been attached to either the Appellant's case or the Commissioner's case together with the Commissioner's case.

The Rule 11 documents provide the contextual background to the objection and appeal and represent a “court record of sorts” from which the Appeal Court is able to derive important and material contentions of fact and law.

The failure to file the Rule 11 documents at the required time is not only contemptuous of the Rules of Court but is prejudicial to the appellant in that it deprives the Appeal Court of the material information on which the dispute between the parties is grounded.

In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant acceded to the submission made by counsel for the respondent in the alternative.

The appeal hearing proceeded in the normal way, and, true to his promise, counsel for the respondent filed the Rule 11 documents before the end of business on 18 September 2015.

The respondent is directed to abide by the mandatory requirements of Rule 11 in all future income tax appeals.

Appeal, Leave to Appeal re: Approach, Notice of Appeal, Grounds of Appeal & Right of Appeal iro Fiscal or Taxation Proceedings


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the appellant moved, in accordance with the notice filed of record on 24 August 2015, and served on the respondent on the same date, for the non-suiting of the respondent for failure to file Rule 11 documents.

Counsel for the respondent conceded the failure and sought the Court's indulgence for the respondent to participate in the appeal without the Rule 11 documents. He contended, that, the failure was not prejudicial to the appellant, and, in the alternative, promised to file the documents by the end of business on Friday 18 September 2015 failing which the Court would disregard all the evidence, contentions, and submissions made by the respondent at the appeal hearing.

Rule 11 is found in Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the rules regulating Income Tax Appeals that are applied in the determination of an appeal under section 65 of the Income Tax Act or any proceedings incidental thereto or connected therewith. It stipulates that:

“The Commissioner shall transmit to the Special Court, together with the agreed case, or with the appellant's case and the Commissioner's case, a certified copy or extract of the assessment in so far as it relates to the assessment made upon the appellant, and also the notice of objection lodged and the notice of appeal, together with any material correspondence related thereto, unless the same have already been included in the statement of facts. A copy of the decision appealed from and of the reasons for the same shall accompany the documents above mentioned.”…,.

In the present case, the parties did not agree on a statement of facts. Rather, each party filed with the Registrar its respective case devoid of any attachments.

In this regard, it was mandatory for the respondent to file a certified copy or extract of each assessment raised against the appellant, the notice of objection, the decision appealed against and the reasons thereof, the notice of appeal, and any material correspondence relating to each assessment together with the Commissioner's case.

There was, and would be no need for the respondent to file the appellant's case with these documents as it was and would always be filed with the Registrar and served on the respondent prior to the filing of the Commissioner's case and its addendums.

In the same vein, it would serve no useful purpose for the respondent to file those Rule 11 documents which would have been attached to either the Appellant's case or the Commissioner's case together with the Commissioner's case.

The Rule 11 documents provide the contextual background to the objection and appeal and represent a “court record of sorts” from which the Appeal Court is able to derive important and material contentions of fact and law.

The failure to file the Rule 11 documents at the required time is not only contemptuous of the Rules of Court but is prejudicial to the appellant in that it deprives the Appeal Court of the material information on which the dispute between the parties is grounded.

In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant acceded to the submission made by counsel for the respondent in the alternative.

The appeal hearing proceeded in the normal way, and, true to his promise, counsel for the respondent filed the Rule 11 documents before the end of business on 18 September 2015.

The respondent is directed to abide by the mandatory requirements of Rule 11 in all future income tax appeals.

Final Orders re: Procedural Irregularities & Discretion of Court to Condone, Interfere, Dismiss, Strike, Remit or Set Aside


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the appellant moved, in accordance with the notice filed of record on 24 August 2015, and served on the respondent on the same date, for the non-suiting of the respondent for failure to file Rule 11 documents.

Counsel for the respondent conceded the failure and sought the Court's indulgence for the respondent to participate in the appeal without the Rule 11 documents. He contended, that, the failure was not prejudicial to the appellant, and, in the alternative, promised to file the documents by the end of business on Friday 18 September 2015 failing which the Court would disregard all the evidence, contentions, and submissions made by the respondent at the appeal hearing.

Rule 11 is found in Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the rules regulating Income Tax Appeals that are applied in the determination of an appeal under section 65 of the Income Tax Act or any proceedings incidental thereto or connected therewith. It stipulates that:

“The Commissioner shall transmit to the Special Court, together with the agreed case, or with the appellant's case and the Commissioner's case, a certified copy or extract of the assessment in so far as it relates to the assessment made upon the appellant, and also the notice of objection lodged and the notice of appeal, together with any material correspondence related thereto, unless the same have already been included in the statement of facts. A copy of the decision appealed from and of the reasons for the same shall accompany the documents above mentioned.”…,.

In the present case, the parties did not agree on a statement of facts. Rather, each party filed with the Registrar its respective case devoid of any attachments.

In this regard, it was mandatory for the respondent to file a certified copy or extract of each assessment raised against the appellant, the notice of objection, the decision appealed against and the reasons thereof, the notice of appeal, and any material correspondence relating to each assessment together with the Commissioner's case.

There was, and would be no need for the respondent to file the appellant's case with these documents as it was and would always be filed with the Registrar and served on the respondent prior to the filing of the Commissioner's case and its addendums.

In the same vein, it would serve no useful purpose for the respondent to file those Rule 11 documents which would have been attached to either the Appellant's case or the Commissioner's case together with the Commissioner's case.

The Rule 11 documents provide the contextual background to the objection and appeal and represent a “court record of sorts” from which the Appeal Court is able to derive important and material contentions of fact and law.

The failure to file the Rule 11 documents at the required time is not only contemptuous of the Rules of Court but is prejudicial to the appellant in that it deprives the Appeal Court of the material information on which the dispute between the parties is grounded.

In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant acceded to the submission made by counsel for the respondent in the alternative.

The appeal hearing proceeded in the normal way, and, true to his promise, counsel for the respondent filed the Rule 11 documents before the end of business on 18 September 2015.

The respondent is directed to abide by the mandatory requirements of Rule 11 in all future income tax appeals.

Documentary Evidence, Certification, Commissioning, Authentication and the Best Evidence Rule re: Approach


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the appellant moved, in accordance with the notice filed of record on 24 August 2015, and served on the respondent on the same date, for the non-suiting of the respondent for failure to file Rule 11 documents.

Counsel for the respondent conceded the failure and sought the Court's indulgence for the respondent to participate in the appeal without the Rule 11 documents. He contended, that, the failure was not prejudicial to the appellant, and, in the alternative, promised to file the documents by the end of business on Friday 18 September 2015 failing which the Court would disregard all the evidence, contentions, and submissions made by the respondent at the appeal hearing.

Rule 11 is found in Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the rules regulating Income Tax Appeals that are applied in the determination of an appeal under section 65 of the Income Tax Act or any proceedings incidental thereto or connected therewith. It stipulates that:

“The Commissioner shall transmit to the Special Court, together with the agreed case, or with the appellant's case and the Commissioner's case, a certified copy or extract of the assessment in so far as it relates to the assessment made upon the appellant, and also the notice of objection lodged and the notice of appeal, together with any material correspondence related thereto, unless the same have already been included in the statement of facts. A copy of the decision appealed from and of the reasons for the same shall accompany the documents above mentioned.”…,.

In the present case, the parties did not agree on a statement of facts. Rather, each party filed with the Registrar its respective case devoid of any attachments.

In this regard, it was mandatory for the respondent to file a certified copy or extract of each assessment raised against the appellant, the notice of objection, the decision appealed against and the reasons thereof, the notice of appeal, and any material correspondence relating to each assessment together with the Commissioner's case.

There was, and would be no need for the respondent to file the appellant's case with these documents as it was and would always be filed with the Registrar and served on the respondent prior to the filing of the Commissioner's case and its addendums.

In the same vein, it would serve no useful purpose for the respondent to file those Rule 11 documents which would have been attached to either the Appellant's case or the Commissioner's case together with the Commissioner's case.

The Rule 11 documents provide the contextual background to the objection and appeal and represent a “court record of sorts” from which the Appeal Court is able to derive important and material contentions of fact and law.

The failure to file the Rule 11 documents at the required time is not only contemptuous of the Rules of Court but is prejudicial to the appellant in that it deprives the Appeal Court of the material information on which the dispute between the parties is grounded.

In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant acceded to the submission made by counsel for the respondent in the alternative.

The appeal hearing proceeded in the normal way, and, true to his promise, counsel for the respondent filed the Rule 11 documents before the end of business on 18 September 2015.

The respondent is directed to abide by the mandatory requirements of Rule 11 in all future income tax appeals.

Condonation or Judicial Indulgence re: Approach, Time-Barred Proceedings, Extension of Time and Interests of Justice


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

At the commencement of the hearing, counsel for the appellant moved, in accordance with the notice filed of record on 24 August 2015, and served on the respondent on the same date, for the non-suiting of the respondent for failure to file Rule 11 documents.

Counsel for the respondent conceded the failure and sought the Court's indulgence for the respondent to participate in the appeal without the Rule 11 documents. He contended, that, the failure was not prejudicial to the appellant, and, in the alternative, promised to file the documents by the end of business on Friday 18 September 2015 failing which the Court would disregard all the evidence, contentions, and submissions made by the respondent at the appeal hearing.

Rule 11 is found in Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the rules regulating Income Tax Appeals that are applied in the determination of an appeal under section 65 of the Income Tax Act or any proceedings incidental thereto or connected therewith. It stipulates that:

“The Commissioner shall transmit to the Special Court, together with the agreed case, or with the appellant's case and the Commissioner's case, a certified copy or extract of the assessment in so far as it relates to the assessment made upon the appellant, and also the notice of objection lodged and the notice of appeal, together with any material correspondence related thereto, unless the same have already been included in the statement of facts. A copy of the decision appealed from and of the reasons for the same shall accompany the documents above mentioned.”…,.

In the present case, the parties did not agree on a statement of facts. Rather, each party filed with the Registrar its respective case devoid of any attachments.

In this regard, it was mandatory for the respondent to file a certified copy or extract of each assessment raised against the appellant, the notice of objection, the decision appealed against and the reasons thereof, the notice of appeal, and any material correspondence relating to each assessment together with the Commissioner's case.

There was, and would be no need for the respondent to file the appellant's case with these documents as it was and would always be filed with the Registrar and served on the respondent prior to the filing of the Commissioner's case and its addendums.

In the same vein, it would serve no useful purpose for the respondent to file those Rule 11 documents which would have been attached to either the Appellant's case or the Commissioner's case together with the Commissioner's case.

The Rule 11 documents provide the contextual background to the objection and appeal and represent a “court record of sorts” from which the Appeal Court is able to derive important and material contentions of fact and law.

The failure to file the Rule 11 documents at the required time is not only contemptuous of the Rules of Court but is prejudicial to the appellant in that it deprives the Appeal Court of the material information on which the dispute between the parties is grounded.

In the present appeal, counsel for the appellant acceded to the submission made by counsel for the respondent in the alternative.

The appeal hearing proceeded in the normal way, and, true to his promise, counsel for the respondent filed the Rule 11 documents before the end of business on 18 September 2015.

The respondent is directed to abide by the mandatory requirements of Rule 11 in all future income tax appeals.

Prevaricative or Inconsistent Evidence and Approbating and Reprobating a Course in Proceedings


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400





Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

Documentary Evidence re: Caveat Subscriptor Rule iro Effect of Representative Signations


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400





Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

Evidence on Behalf of a Corporate Entity and Institutional Memory


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400





Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

Findings of Fact re: Assessment of Evidence and Inferences iro Evidentiary Concessions & Conduct Resulting in Estoppel


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400





Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

Intent or Animus Contrahendi re: Simulated or Disguised Agreements


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400





Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book....,.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions....,.

Section 98 of the Income Tax Act states:

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that
precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

Onus, Burden and Standard of Proof and Principle that He Who Alleges Must Prove re: Approach


It is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Approach re: Functions & Powers of Revenue Authority, Fiscal Appeals or Objections & the Pay Now Argue Later Principle


It is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Appeal, Leave to Appeal re: Approach, Notice of Appeal, Grounds of Appeal & Right of Appeal iro Fiscal or Taxation Proceedings


It is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Final Orders re: Composition of Bench iro Judicial Precedents, Effect of Ex Post Facto Statutes and Judicial Lag


It is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Approach re: Functions & Powers of Revenue Authority, Fiscal Appeals or Objections & the Pay Now Argue Later Principle


The Commissioner...,. raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act....,.

I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the..., opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

Appeal, Leave to Appeal re: Approach, Notice of Appeal, Grounds of Appeal & Right of Appeal iro Fiscal or Taxation Proceedings


The Commissioner...,. raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act....,.

I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the..., opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

Administrative Law re: Approach, Discretionary Powers, Judicial Interference and the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation


The Commissioner...,. raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act....,.

I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the..., opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion, Tax Defaulters and the Tax Amnesty


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400





Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book....,.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions....,.

Section 98 of the Income Tax Act states:

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that
precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax....,.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties....,.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

Unjust Enrichment re: Illegal Contracts, Ex Turpi Causa and In Pari Delicto Rules, Criminal Liability & Just Cause Conduct


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400





Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book....,.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions....,.

Section 98 of the Income Tax Act states:

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme....,.

Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme....,.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

In the hyper-inflationary era, the appellant averred, that, it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations.

It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower, mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers, would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts, and the experienced, skilled, and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the General Manager in charge of local operations.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; its fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly, it was able to retain the pool of experienced, internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre....,.

The appellant established, that, other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments. These purposes were achieved....,.

With the introduction of the multi currency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished.

The parties re-negotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Unjust Enrichment re: Illegal Contracts, Ex Turpi Causa and In Pari Delicto Rules, Criminal Liability & Just Cause Conduct


In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, TROLLIP JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

“When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important, I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other, and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself…,. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And, the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out, s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

See also the sentiments of HEFER JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)….,.

Consensus Ad Idem re: Approach iro Foundation, Sanctity, Privity, Retrospectivity & Judicial Variation of Contracts


The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax....,.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

Variation of Contracts re: Approach iro Statutory Induced Variations


The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax....,.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

Variation of Contracts re: Deed of Settlement, Compromise Agreement iro Waiver, the Presumption Against Waiver & Estoppel


In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Debt re: Statutory Obligations and Approach to Statutory Defaulters


In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Approach re: Functions & Powers of Revenue Authority, Fiscal Appeals or Objections & the Pay Now Argue Later Principle


In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Approach


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Approach


Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book.

Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilize section 98 of the Income Tax Act?

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions.

The Onus

Before dealing with the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Again, it seems to me, that, section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an over-arching shadow over the construction of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

The Commissioner employs section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute income to the taxpayer and raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act.

Accordingly, I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98, based on South African authority, is contrary to our law.

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Approach


Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

In the hyper-inflationary era, the appellant averred, that, it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations.

It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower, mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers, would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts, and the experienced, skilled, and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the General Manager in charge of local operations.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; its fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly, it was able to retain the pool of experienced, internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.

With the introduction of the multi currency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished.

The parties re-negotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Whether the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which would not be normally employed for such a transaction?

In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, TROLLIP JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

“When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important, I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other, and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself…,. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And, the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out, s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

See also the sentiments of HEFER JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,.; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)….,.

It is a notorious fact of commercial life, that, related parties enter into contractual arrangements.

I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories.

There was, however, an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

For starters, the appellant over-emphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

In the letter of 24 October 2013…, the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.”

The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013…, where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.”

The fixed rental fee, with all maintenance and running costs for the account of the tenant model, was unique to the related parties and therefore abnormal.

Other hauliers, including the related party, conducted the haulage business for their own account. The charge per trip, and not per kilometre, was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative purposes.

However, the charge per leg per trip was abnormal.

In charging per trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a variety of factors such as overheads, distance, and the nature of the load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model.

The ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and the related party were not disclosed. That, in my view, was abnormal.

In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges.

The 2009 agreement recorded that “the change in currency, from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar, which took effect in February 2009, did not have any effect on the agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.”…,.

These were in South African rands, which remained, and still remain, the currency of account of the agreement.

Such disclosure would have assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multi-currency era resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each of the four tax years under consideration.

I add, for good measure, that, the payment of the remuneration of the drivers used by the related party, without any form of compensation, was abnormal; as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in Zimbabwe for free.

In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant, and to this Court, by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.

In the light of the formulation of TROLLIP JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's length.

Whether the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction?

It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements.

The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental.

The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals, which negated the cost plus mark-up principle, was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.

Again, the use of the drivers by the related party, for no compensation, just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free, were rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's length.

I hold, that, the appellant did not act at arm's length with the related party and concluded, and executed, an agreement that was inimical to its bottom line.

Whether the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main purposes of the agreement?

The appellant established, that, other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments.

These purposes were achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year “audited” as “a going concern”.

It seems trite to me, that, the purpose of a private company is to make a profit.

The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made, and continues to make, losses without any prospects of ever making a profit.

It seems to me, that, the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments, and, at the same time, avoid or reduce its income tax liability.

That the spectre of income tax, and, indeed, other imposts were contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1, cited above, where the parties agreed to adjust and revise the fixed rental in tandem with “any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates.”

As it turned out, the rate was merely increased in tandem with inflation, and not taxes, because the appellant continued to make losses.

I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).

In Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100…, LORD CAIRNS stated that:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

And, in CIR v IHB King; CIR v AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A)…, WATERMEYER CJ made the poignant observation, that:

“If a transaction is covered by the terms of the section, its provisions come into operation; if it is not, then, its provisions cannot be applied.”

In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.

It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the findings in G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H) and H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

The conduct of the banks, unlike in the present case, passed the normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that the “apt reminder” is invoked against the Commissioner.

In cases where these twin principles do not apply, such as in R Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC); 45 SATC 148 (ZH)…, and Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (A)…., and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (AD)…, the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Approach


Whether the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, by reference to exhibit 4, that, the assessment was wrong and submitted that it should be set aside.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the determination contemplated by the concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act was based on estimated and not actual and correct rates.

The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act require the respondent to:

“Determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax.

He contended, that, the respondent was empowered to make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued income.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

It is also correct, that, our income tax legislation is designed to tax created income as opposed to notional income.

In this regard, BEADLE CJ stated, in Commissioner of Taxes v Feldman & Others 1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:

“The Act seeks to tax income, and, a taxpayer's income is arrived at after including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”

He continued at 95G thus:

“Whichever way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to make it attract tax, is not, I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”

The learned Chief Justice, however, did acknowledge, at p94G of the same judgment, that:

“It is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But, in such cases, the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, in unambiguous language, empower the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.

However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do so.

In the exercise of his wide discretion, the Commissioner elected to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income in respect of each of the four years of assessment.

It was common cause, that, in the determination of 14 November 2014, the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate and correct rate.

The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by the respondent.

His mere say so was inadequate to establish the veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's written statement some three (3) weeks before the appeal commenced.

The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by the respondent, using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant in each year, would not result in the negative variances computed by the appellant in exhibit 4 in all these years but would result in a negative variance of US$100,782=51 for 2009; and positive variances of US$187,174=47 in 2010; US$149,277=68 in 2011; and US$65,653=46 in 2012.

Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and Table 5 the tax due.

Table 4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by the appellant.

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012

Distance km

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

Acceptable rate

16.55

17.52

19.45

20.04

Expected revenue

ZAR

4 759 488.72

8 860 704.96

8 882 114.80

9 019 482.96

Expected revenue average USD rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Expected revenue in USD

688 583.44

1 227 244.45

1 258 089.92

1 130 261.02

Transport services income AFS

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Expenses declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates

2 989 241.00

345 976.97

3 372 076.00

467 046.54

3 741 501.00

529 957.65

4 320 056.00

541 360.40

Total AFS & expenses USD

789 365.95

1 049 069.98

1 108 812.24

1 064 607.56

variance

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant tax computations from the above would be as follows:

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012


Appellant computations

-41 675.00

-75 497.00

-93 013.00

-20 652.00


Add: Provisions

10 520.00

28 982.00

17 416.00

312.00


Bad debts

-

-

18 783.00

-


Donations

-

-

100.00

-


Apportionment of drivers salaries

90 908.17

158 374.08

170 616.13

190 669.93


Freight rates adjustment (variance)

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Bank deposits anomaly

100.25

0.31

0.00

85.47


Total

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Taxable income

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Tax at 25.75%

nil

74 683.72

67 768.80

60 787.73


It seems to me, that, the appellant undermined its objection and appeal by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on page 50.2 of exhibit 1 in respect of 2013.

There was neither reason nor logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the period 2009 to 2012.

I formed the distinct impression, from the appellant's conduct, that, it was reluctant to supply the requisite information, and, to that extent, was unco-operative with the respondent.

In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the appellant.

The seeds of the suggested method were sown in Annexure B to the letter of 13 June 2014…,.

If I had that information, I would have marked down the total costs of the related party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me, that, the mark-up of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of 19% from the gross rate of R22.47.

The appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration.

The examples set out in Annexure A of the objection letter…, concerning five (5) round trips in respect of each tax year, indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible information required to calculate the mark down rate.

The use of the formula Mark-up=(A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips in 2009 of 11%; 2010 of 5%; 2011 of 1.8%; and 2012 of 21%.

The range in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and 19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2012 it was between 3.5% and 32.3%.

Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant supplied and applied them as outlined in Table 4 and 5 above.

I will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Approach


The answer to the real question before me

The answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is answered in the affirmative.

The closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act direct the Commissioner to “determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction” once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect, and he, firstly, forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's length, and, secondly, the further opinion that it was created and implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing, or postponing the payment of tax.

I have found, that, the agreement had the stipulated effect and have upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned respects. The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act provide the Commissioner with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.

He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8 of the 2003 agreement. He would, of course, have required information on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the related party.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.

Disposition

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31 December 2009; 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010; 1/3435 for the tax year ended 31 December 2011; and 1/3436 for the tax year ended 31 December 2012, issued on 23 June 2014, be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment, and, in so doing, shall:

(i) Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in Table 4 in computing the variance between the expected income and received income.

(ii) Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in Table 4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009; R7.22 for 2010; R7.06 for 2011; and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.

3. The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of equipment to the related party, and unreconciled bank deposits.

4. The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in full.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Notional Income


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Notional Income


Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book.

Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilize section 98 of the Income Tax Act?

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions.

The Onus

Before dealing with the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Again, it seems to me, that, section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an over-arching shadow over the construction of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

The Commissioner employs section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute income to the taxpayer and raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act.

Accordingly, I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98, based on South African authority, is contrary to our law.

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Notional Income


Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

In the hyper-inflationary era, the appellant averred, that, it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations.

It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower, mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers, would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts, and the experienced, skilled, and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the General Manager in charge of local operations.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; its fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly, it was able to retain the pool of experienced, internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.

With the introduction of the multi currency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished.

The parties re-negotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Whether the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which would not be normally employed for such a transaction?

In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, TROLLIP JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

“When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important, I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other, and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself…,. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And, the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out, s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

See also the sentiments of HEFER JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,.; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)….,.

It is a notorious fact of commercial life, that, related parties enter into contractual arrangements.

I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories.

There was, however, an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

For starters, the appellant over-emphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

In the letter of 24 October 2013…, the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.”

The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013…, where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.”

The fixed rental fee, with all maintenance and running costs for the account of the tenant model, was unique to the related parties and therefore abnormal.

Other hauliers, including the related party, conducted the haulage business for their own account. The charge per trip, and not per kilometre, was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative purposes.

However, the charge per leg per trip was abnormal.

In charging per trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a variety of factors such as overheads, distance, and the nature of the load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model.

The ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and the related party were not disclosed. That, in my view, was abnormal.

In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges.

The 2009 agreement recorded that “the change in currency, from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar, which took effect in February 2009, did not have any effect on the agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.”…,.

These were in South African rands, which remained, and still remain, the currency of account of the agreement.

Such disclosure would have assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multi-currency era resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each of the four tax years under consideration.

I add, for good measure, that, the payment of the remuneration of the drivers used by the related party, without any form of compensation, was abnormal; as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in Zimbabwe for free.

In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant, and to this Court, by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.

In the light of the formulation of TROLLIP JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's length.

Whether the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction?

It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements.

The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental.

The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals, which negated the cost plus mark-up principle, was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.

Again, the use of the drivers by the related party, for no compensation, just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free, were rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's length.

I hold, that, the appellant did not act at arm's length with the related party and concluded, and executed, an agreement that was inimical to its bottom line.

Whether the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main purposes of the agreement?

The appellant established, that, other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments.

These purposes were achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year “audited” as “a going concern”.

It seems trite to me, that, the purpose of a private company is to make a profit.

The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made, and continues to make, losses without any prospects of ever making a profit.

It seems to me, that, the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments, and, at the same time, avoid or reduce its income tax liability.

That the spectre of income tax, and, indeed, other imposts were contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1, cited above, where the parties agreed to adjust and revise the fixed rental in tandem with “any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates.”

As it turned out, the rate was merely increased in tandem with inflation, and not taxes, because the appellant continued to make losses.

I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).

In Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100…, LORD CAIRNS stated that:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

And, in CIR v IHB King; CIR v AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A)…, WATERMEYER CJ made the poignant observation, that:

“If a transaction is covered by the terms of the section, its provisions come into operation; if it is not, then, its provisions cannot be applied.”

In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.

It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the findings in G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H) and H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

The conduct of the banks, unlike in the present case, passed the normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that the “apt reminder” is invoked against the Commissioner.

In cases where these twin principles do not apply, such as in R Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC); 45 SATC 148 (ZH)…, and Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (A)…., and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (AD)…, the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Notional Income


Whether the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, by reference to exhibit 4, that, the assessment was wrong and submitted that it should be set aside.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the determination contemplated by the concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act was based on estimated and not actual and correct rates.

The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act require the respondent to:

“Determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax.

He contended, that, the respondent was empowered to make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued income.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

It is also correct, that, our income tax legislation is designed to tax created income as opposed to notional income.

In this regard, BEADLE CJ stated, in Commissioner of Taxes v Feldman & Others 1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:

“The Act seeks to tax income, and, a taxpayer's income is arrived at after including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”

He continued at 95G thus:

“Whichever way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to make it attract tax, is not, I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”

The learned Chief Justice, however, did acknowledge, at p94G of the same judgment, that:

“It is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But, in such cases, the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, in unambiguous language, empower the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.

However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do so.

In the exercise of his wide discretion, the Commissioner elected to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income in respect of each of the four years of assessment.

It was common cause, that, in the determination of 14 November 2014, the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate and correct rate.

The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by the respondent.

His mere say so was inadequate to establish the veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's written statement some three (3) weeks before the appeal commenced.

The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by the respondent, using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant in each year, would not result in the negative variances computed by the appellant in exhibit 4 in all these years but would result in a negative variance of US$100,782=51 for 2009; and positive variances of US$187,174=47 in 2010; US$149,277=68 in 2011; and US$65,653=46 in 2012.

Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and Table 5 the tax due.

Table 4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by the appellant.

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012

Distance km

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

Acceptable rate

16.55

17.52

19.45

20.04

Expected revenue

ZAR

4 759 488.72

8 860 704.96

8 882 114.80

9 019 482.96

Expected revenue average USD rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Expected revenue in USD

688 583.44

1 227 244.45

1 258 089.92

1 130 261.02

Transport services income AFS

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Expenses declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates

2 989 241.00

345 976.97

3 372 076.00

467 046.54

3 741 501.00

529 957.65

4 320 056.00

541 360.40

Total AFS & expenses USD

789 365.95

1 049 069.98

1 108 812.24

1 064 607.56

variance

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant tax computations from the above would be as follows:

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012


Appellant computations

-41 675.00

-75 497.00

-93 013.00

-20 652.00


Add: Provisions

10 520.00

28 982.00

17 416.00

312.00


Bad debts

-

-

18 783.00

-


Donations

-

-

100.00

-


Apportionment of drivers salaries

90 908.17

158 374.08

170 616.13

190 669.93


Freight rates adjustment (variance)

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Bank deposits anomaly

100.25

0.31

0.00

85.47


Total

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Taxable income

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Tax at 25.75%

nil

74 683.72

67 768.80

60 787.73


It seems to me, that, the appellant undermined its objection and appeal by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on page 50.2 of exhibit 1 in respect of 2013.

There was neither reason nor logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the period 2009 to 2012.

I formed the distinct impression, from the appellant's conduct, that, it was reluctant to supply the requisite information, and, to that extent, was unco-operative with the respondent.

In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the appellant.

The seeds of the suggested method were sown in Annexure B to the letter of 13 June 2014…,.

If I had that information, I would have marked down the total costs of the related party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me, that, the mark-up of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of 19% from the gross rate of R22.47.

The appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration.

The examples set out in Annexure A of the objection letter…, concerning five (5) round trips in respect of each tax year, indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible information required to calculate the mark down rate.

The use of the formula Mark-up=(A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips in 2009 of 11%; 2010 of 5%; 2011 of 1.8%; and 2012 of 21%.

The range in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and 19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2012 it was between 3.5% and 32.3%.

Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant supplied and applied them as outlined in Table 4 and 5 above.

I will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.

Taxable Income and Tax Deductions re: Notional Income


The answer to the real question before me

The answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is answered in the affirmative.

The closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act direct the Commissioner to “determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction” once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect, and he, firstly, forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's length, and, secondly, the further opinion that it was created and implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing, or postponing the payment of tax.

I have found, that, the agreement had the stipulated effect and have upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned respects. The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act provide the Commissioner with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.

He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8 of the 2003 agreement. He would, of course, have required information on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the related party.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.

Disposition

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31 December 2009; 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010; 1/3435 for the tax year ended 31 December 2011; and 1/3436 for the tax year ended 31 December 2012, issued on 23 June 2014, be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment, and, in so doing, shall:

(i) Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in Table 4 in computing the variance between the expected income and received income.

(ii) Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in Table 4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009; R7.22 for 2010; R7.06 for 2011; and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.

3. The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of equipment to the related party, and unreconciled bank deposits.

4. The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in full.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Rules of Construction or Interpretation re: Deeming Provisions


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Rules of Construction or Interpretation re: Deeming Provisions


Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book.

Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilize section 98 of the Income Tax Act?

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions.

The Onus

Before dealing with the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Again, it seems to me, that, section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an over-arching shadow over the construction of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

The Commissioner employs section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute income to the taxpayer and raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act.

Accordingly, I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98, based on South African authority, is contrary to our law.

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Rules of Construction or Interpretation re: Deeming Provisions


Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

In the hyper-inflationary era, the appellant averred, that, it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations.

It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower, mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers, would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts, and the experienced, skilled, and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the General Manager in charge of local operations.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; its fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly, it was able to retain the pool of experienced, internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.

With the introduction of the multi currency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished.

The parties re-negotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Whether the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which would not be normally employed for such a transaction?

In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, TROLLIP JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

“When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important, I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other, and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself…,. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And, the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out, s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

See also the sentiments of HEFER JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,.; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)….,.

It is a notorious fact of commercial life, that, related parties enter into contractual arrangements.

I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories.

There was, however, an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

For starters, the appellant over-emphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

In the letter of 24 October 2013…, the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.”

The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013…, where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.”

The fixed rental fee, with all maintenance and running costs for the account of the tenant model, was unique to the related parties and therefore abnormal.

Other hauliers, including the related party, conducted the haulage business for their own account. The charge per trip, and not per kilometre, was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative purposes.

However, the charge per leg per trip was abnormal.

In charging per trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a variety of factors such as overheads, distance, and the nature of the load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model.

The ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and the related party were not disclosed. That, in my view, was abnormal.

In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges.

The 2009 agreement recorded that “the change in currency, from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar, which took effect in February 2009, did not have any effect on the agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.”…,.

These were in South African rands, which remained, and still remain, the currency of account of the agreement.

Such disclosure would have assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multi-currency era resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each of the four tax years under consideration.

I add, for good measure, that, the payment of the remuneration of the drivers used by the related party, without any form of compensation, was abnormal; as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in Zimbabwe for free.

In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant, and to this Court, by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.

In the light of the formulation of TROLLIP JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's length.

Whether the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction?

It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements.

The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental.

The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals, which negated the cost plus mark-up principle, was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.

Again, the use of the drivers by the related party, for no compensation, just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free, were rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's length.

I hold, that, the appellant did not act at arm's length with the related party and concluded, and executed, an agreement that was inimical to its bottom line.

Whether the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main purposes of the agreement?

The appellant established, that, other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments.

These purposes were achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year “audited” as “a going concern”.

It seems trite to me, that, the purpose of a private company is to make a profit.

The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made, and continues to make, losses without any prospects of ever making a profit.

It seems to me, that, the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments, and, at the same time, avoid or reduce its income tax liability.

That the spectre of income tax, and, indeed, other imposts were contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1, cited above, where the parties agreed to adjust and revise the fixed rental in tandem with “any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates.”

As it turned out, the rate was merely increased in tandem with inflation, and not taxes, because the appellant continued to make losses.

I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).

In Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100…, LORD CAIRNS stated that:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

And, in CIR v IHB King; CIR v AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A)…, WATERMEYER CJ made the poignant observation, that:

“If a transaction is covered by the terms of the section, its provisions come into operation; if it is not, then, its provisions cannot be applied.”

In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.

It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the findings in G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H) and H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

The conduct of the banks, unlike in the present case, passed the normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that the “apt reminder” is invoked against the Commissioner.

In cases where these twin principles do not apply, such as in R Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC); 45 SATC 148 (ZH)…, and Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (A)…., and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (AD)…, the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.

Rules of Construction or Interpretation re: Deeming Provisions


Whether the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, by reference to exhibit 4, that, the assessment was wrong and submitted that it should be set aside.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the determination contemplated by the concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act was based on estimated and not actual and correct rates.

The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act require the respondent to:

“Determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax.

He contended, that, the respondent was empowered to make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued income.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

It is also correct, that, our income tax legislation is designed to tax created income as opposed to notional income.

In this regard, BEADLE CJ stated, in Commissioner of Taxes v Feldman & Others 1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:

“The Act seeks to tax income, and, a taxpayer's income is arrived at after including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”

He continued at 95G thus:

“Whichever way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to make it attract tax, is not, I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”

The learned Chief Justice, however, did acknowledge, at p94G of the same judgment, that:

“It is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But, in such cases, the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, in unambiguous language, empower the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.

However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do so.

In the exercise of his wide discretion, the Commissioner elected to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income in respect of each of the four years of assessment.

It was common cause, that, in the determination of 14 November 2014, the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate and correct rate.

The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by the respondent.

His mere say so was inadequate to establish the veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's written statement some three (3) weeks before the appeal commenced.

The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by the respondent, using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant in each year, would not result in the negative variances computed by the appellant in exhibit 4 in all these years but would result in a negative variance of US$100,782=51 for 2009; and positive variances of US$187,174=47 in 2010; US$149,277=68 in 2011; and US$65,653=46 in 2012.

Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and Table 5 the tax due.

Table 4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by the appellant.

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012

Distance km

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

Acceptable rate

16.55

17.52

19.45

20.04

Expected revenue

ZAR

4 759 488.72

8 860 704.96

8 882 114.80

9 019 482.96

Expected revenue average USD rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Expected revenue in USD

688 583.44

1 227 244.45

1 258 089.92

1 130 261.02

Transport services income AFS

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Expenses declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates

2 989 241.00

345 976.97

3 372 076.00

467 046.54

3 741 501.00

529 957.65

4 320 056.00

541 360.40

Total AFS & expenses USD

789 365.95

1 049 069.98

1 108 812.24

1 064 607.56

variance

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant tax computations from the above would be as follows:

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012


Appellant computations

-41 675.00

-75 497.00

-93 013.00

-20 652.00


Add: Provisions

10 520.00

28 982.00

17 416.00

312.00


Bad debts

-

-

18 783.00

-


Donations

-

-

100.00

-


Apportionment of drivers salaries

90 908.17

158 374.08

170 616.13

190 669.93


Freight rates adjustment (variance)

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Bank deposits anomaly

100.25

0.31

0.00

85.47


Total

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Taxable income

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Tax at 25.75%

nil

74 683.72

67 768.80

60 787.73


It seems to me, that, the appellant undermined its objection and appeal by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on page 50.2 of exhibit 1 in respect of 2013.

There was neither reason nor logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the period 2009 to 2012.

I formed the distinct impression, from the appellant's conduct, that, it was reluctant to supply the requisite information, and, to that extent, was unco-operative with the respondent.

In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the appellant.

The seeds of the suggested method were sown in Annexure B to the letter of 13 June 2014…,.

If I had that information, I would have marked down the total costs of the related party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me, that, the mark-up of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of 19% from the gross rate of R22.47.

The appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration.

The examples set out in Annexure A of the objection letter…, concerning five (5) round trips in respect of each tax year, indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible information required to calculate the mark down rate.

The use of the formula Mark-up=(A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips in 2009 of 11%; 2010 of 5%; 2011 of 1.8%; and 2012 of 21%.

The range in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and 19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2012 it was between 3.5% and 32.3%.

Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant supplied and applied them as outlined in Table 4 and 5 above.

I will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.

Rules of Construction or Interpretation re: Deeming Provisions


The answer to the real question before me

The answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is answered in the affirmative.

The closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act direct the Commissioner to “determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction” once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect, and he, firstly, forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's length, and, secondly, the further opinion that it was created and implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing, or postponing the payment of tax.

I have found, that, the agreement had the stipulated effect and have upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned respects. The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act provide the Commissioner with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.

He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8 of the 2003 agreement. He would, of course, have required information on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the related party.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.

Disposition

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31 December 2009; 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010; 1/3435 for the tax year ended 31 December 2011; and 1/3436 for the tax year ended 31 December 2012, issued on 23 June 2014, be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment, and, in so doing, shall:

(i) Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in Table 4 in computing the variance between the expected income and received income.

(ii) Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in Table 4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009; R7.22 for 2010; R7.06 for 2011; and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.

3. The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of equipment to the related party, and unreconciled bank deposits.

4. The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in full.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Legal Personality re: Group Structures, Related Parties and the Arm's Length Principle


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Legal Personality re: Group Structures, Related Parties and the Arm's Length Principle


Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book.

Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilize section 98 of the Income Tax Act?

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions.

The Onus

Before dealing with the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Again, it seems to me, that, section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an over-arching shadow over the construction of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

The Commissioner employs section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute income to the taxpayer and raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act.

Accordingly, I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98, based on South African authority, is contrary to our law.

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Legal Personality re: Group Structures, Related Parties and the Arm's Length Principle


Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

In the hyper-inflationary era, the appellant averred, that, it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations.

It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower, mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers, would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts, and the experienced, skilled, and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the General Manager in charge of local operations.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; its fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly, it was able to retain the pool of experienced, internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.

With the introduction of the multi currency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished.

The parties re-negotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Whether the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which would not be normally employed for such a transaction?

In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, TROLLIP JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

“When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important, I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other, and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself…,. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And, the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out, s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

See also the sentiments of HEFER JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,.; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)….,.

It is a notorious fact of commercial life, that, related parties enter into contractual arrangements.

I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories.

There was, however, an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

For starters, the appellant over-emphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

In the letter of 24 October 2013…, the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.”

The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013…, where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.”

The fixed rental fee, with all maintenance and running costs for the account of the tenant model, was unique to the related parties and therefore abnormal.

Other hauliers, including the related party, conducted the haulage business for their own account. The charge per trip, and not per kilometre, was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative purposes.

However, the charge per leg per trip was abnormal.

In charging per trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a variety of factors such as overheads, distance, and the nature of the load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model.

The ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and the related party were not disclosed. That, in my view, was abnormal.

In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges.

The 2009 agreement recorded that “the change in currency, from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar, which took effect in February 2009, did not have any effect on the agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.”…,.

These were in South African rands, which remained, and still remain, the currency of account of the agreement.

Such disclosure would have assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multi-currency era resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each of the four tax years under consideration.

I add, for good measure, that, the payment of the remuneration of the drivers used by the related party, without any form of compensation, was abnormal; as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in Zimbabwe for free.

In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant, and to this Court, by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.

In the light of the formulation of TROLLIP JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's length.

Whether the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction?

It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements.

The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental.

The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals, which negated the cost plus mark-up principle, was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.

Again, the use of the drivers by the related party, for no compensation, just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free, were rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's length.

I hold, that, the appellant did not act at arm's length with the related party and concluded, and executed, an agreement that was inimical to its bottom line.

Whether the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main purposes of the agreement?

The appellant established, that, other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments.

These purposes were achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year “audited” as “a going concern”.

It seems trite to me, that, the purpose of a private company is to make a profit.

The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made, and continues to make, losses without any prospects of ever making a profit.

It seems to me, that, the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments, and, at the same time, avoid or reduce its income tax liability.

That the spectre of income tax, and, indeed, other imposts were contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1, cited above, where the parties agreed to adjust and revise the fixed rental in tandem with “any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates.”

As it turned out, the rate was merely increased in tandem with inflation, and not taxes, because the appellant continued to make losses.

I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).

In Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100…, LORD CAIRNS stated that:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

And, in CIR v IHB King; CIR v AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A)…, WATERMEYER CJ made the poignant observation, that:

“If a transaction is covered by the terms of the section, its provisions come into operation; if it is not, then, its provisions cannot be applied.”

In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.

It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the findings in G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H) and H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

The conduct of the banks, unlike in the present case, passed the normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that the “apt reminder” is invoked against the Commissioner.

In cases where these twin principles do not apply, such as in R Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC); 45 SATC 148 (ZH)…, and Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (A)…., and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (AD)…, the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.

Legal Personality re: Group Structures, Related Parties and the Arm's Length Principle


Whether the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, by reference to exhibit 4, that, the assessment was wrong and submitted that it should be set aside.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the determination contemplated by the concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act was based on estimated and not actual and correct rates.

The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act require the respondent to:

“Determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax.

He contended, that, the respondent was empowered to make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued income.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

It is also correct, that, our income tax legislation is designed to tax created income as opposed to notional income.

In this regard, BEADLE CJ stated, in Commissioner of Taxes v Feldman & Others 1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:

“The Act seeks to tax income, and, a taxpayer's income is arrived at after including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”

He continued at 95G thus:

“Whichever way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to make it attract tax, is not, I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”

The learned Chief Justice, however, did acknowledge, at p94G of the same judgment, that:

“It is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But, in such cases, the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, in unambiguous language, empower the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.

However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do so.

In the exercise of his wide discretion, the Commissioner elected to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income in respect of each of the four years of assessment.

It was common cause, that, in the determination of 14 November 2014, the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate and correct rate.

The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by the respondent.

His mere say so was inadequate to establish the veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's written statement some three (3) weeks before the appeal commenced.

The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by the respondent, using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant in each year, would not result in the negative variances computed by the appellant in exhibit 4 in all these years but would result in a negative variance of US$100,782=51 for 2009; and positive variances of US$187,174=47 in 2010; US$149,277=68 in 2011; and US$65,653=46 in 2012.

Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and Table 5 the tax due.

Table 4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by the appellant.

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012

Distance km

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

Acceptable rate

16.55

17.52

19.45

20.04

Expected revenue

ZAR

4 759 488.72

8 860 704.96

8 882 114.80

9 019 482.96

Expected revenue average USD rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Expected revenue in USD

688 583.44

1 227 244.45

1 258 089.92

1 130 261.02

Transport services income AFS

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Expenses declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates

2 989 241.00

345 976.97

3 372 076.00

467 046.54

3 741 501.00

529 957.65

4 320 056.00

541 360.40

Total AFS & expenses USD

789 365.95

1 049 069.98

1 108 812.24

1 064 607.56

variance

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant tax computations from the above would be as follows:

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012


Appellant computations

-41 675.00

-75 497.00

-93 013.00

-20 652.00


Add: Provisions

10 520.00

28 982.00

17 416.00

312.00


Bad debts

-

-

18 783.00

-


Donations

-

-

100.00

-


Apportionment of drivers salaries

90 908.17

158 374.08

170 616.13

190 669.93


Freight rates adjustment (variance)

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Bank deposits anomaly

100.25

0.31

0.00

85.47


Total

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Taxable income

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Tax at 25.75%

nil

74 683.72

67 768.80

60 787.73


It seems to me, that, the appellant undermined its objection and appeal by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on page 50.2 of exhibit 1 in respect of 2013.

There was neither reason nor logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the period 2009 to 2012.

I formed the distinct impression, from the appellant's conduct, that, it was reluctant to supply the requisite information, and, to that extent, was unco-operative with the respondent.

In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the appellant.

The seeds of the suggested method were sown in Annexure B to the letter of 13 June 2014…,.

If I had that information, I would have marked down the total costs of the related party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me, that, the mark-up of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of 19% from the gross rate of R22.47.

The appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration.

The examples set out in Annexure A of the objection letter…, concerning five (5) round trips in respect of each tax year, indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible information required to calculate the mark down rate.

The use of the formula Mark-up=(A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips in 2009 of 11%; 2010 of 5%; 2011 of 1.8%; and 2012 of 21%.

The range in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and 19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2012 it was between 3.5% and 32.3%.

Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant supplied and applied them as outlined in Table 4 and 5 above.

I will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.

Legal Personality re: Group Structures, Related Parties and the Arm's Length Principle


The answer to the real question before me

The answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is answered in the affirmative.

The closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act direct the Commissioner to “determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction” once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect, and he, firstly, forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's length, and, secondly, the further opinion that it was created and implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing, or postponing the payment of tax.

I have found, that, the agreement had the stipulated effect and have upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned respects. The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act provide the Commissioner with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.

He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8 of the 2003 agreement. He would, of course, have required information on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the related party.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.

Disposition

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31 December 2009; 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010; 1/3435 for the tax year ended 31 December 2011; and 1/3436 for the tax year ended 31 December 2012, issued on 23 June 2014, be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment, and, in so doing, shall:

(i) Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in Table 4 in computing the variance between the expected income and received income.

(ii) Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in Table 4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009; R7.22 for 2010; R7.06 for 2011; and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.

3. The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of equipment to the related party, and unreconciled bank deposits.

4. The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in full.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Approach re: Contract of Hire, Letting, Supply of Goods and Services, Service Agreements and Fiscal Considerations


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Approach re: Contract of Hire, Letting, Supply of Goods and Services, Service Agreements and Fiscal Considerations


Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book.

Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilize section 98 of the Income Tax Act?

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions.

The Onus

Before dealing with the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Again, it seems to me, that, section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an over-arching shadow over the construction of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

The Commissioner employs section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute income to the taxpayer and raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act.

Accordingly, I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98, based on South African authority, is contrary to our law.

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Approach re: Contract of Hire, Letting, Supply of Goods and Services, Service Agreements and Fiscal Considerations


Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

In the hyper-inflationary era, the appellant averred, that, it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations.

It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower, mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers, would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts, and the experienced, skilled, and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the General Manager in charge of local operations.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; its fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly, it was able to retain the pool of experienced, internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.

With the introduction of the multi currency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished.

The parties re-negotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Whether the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which would not be normally employed for such a transaction?

In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, TROLLIP JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

“When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important, I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other, and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself…,. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And, the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out, s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

See also the sentiments of HEFER JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,.; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)….,.

It is a notorious fact of commercial life, that, related parties enter into contractual arrangements.

I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories.

There was, however, an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

For starters, the appellant over-emphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

In the letter of 24 October 2013…, the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.”

The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013…, where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.”

The fixed rental fee, with all maintenance and running costs for the account of the tenant model, was unique to the related parties and therefore abnormal.

Other hauliers, including the related party, conducted the haulage business for their own account. The charge per trip, and not per kilometre, was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative purposes.

However, the charge per leg per trip was abnormal.

In charging per trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a variety of factors such as overheads, distance, and the nature of the load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model.

The ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and the related party were not disclosed. That, in my view, was abnormal.

In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges.

The 2009 agreement recorded that “the change in currency, from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar, which took effect in February 2009, did not have any effect on the agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.”…,.

These were in South African rands, which remained, and still remain, the currency of account of the agreement.

Such disclosure would have assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multi-currency era resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each of the four tax years under consideration.

I add, for good measure, that, the payment of the remuneration of the drivers used by the related party, without any form of compensation, was abnormal; as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in Zimbabwe for free.

In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant, and to this Court, by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.

In the light of the formulation of TROLLIP JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's length.

Whether the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction?

It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements.

The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental.

The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals, which negated the cost plus mark-up principle, was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.

Again, the use of the drivers by the related party, for no compensation, just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free, were rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's length.

I hold, that, the appellant did not act at arm's length with the related party and concluded, and executed, an agreement that was inimical to its bottom line.

Whether the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main purposes of the agreement?

The appellant established, that, other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments.

These purposes were achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year “audited” as “a going concern”.

It seems trite to me, that, the purpose of a private company is to make a profit.

The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made, and continues to make, losses without any prospects of ever making a profit.

It seems to me, that, the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments, and, at the same time, avoid or reduce its income tax liability.

That the spectre of income tax, and, indeed, other imposts were contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1, cited above, where the parties agreed to adjust and revise the fixed rental in tandem with “any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates.”

As it turned out, the rate was merely increased in tandem with inflation, and not taxes, because the appellant continued to make losses.

I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).

In Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100…, LORD CAIRNS stated that:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

And, in CIR v IHB King; CIR v AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A)…, WATERMEYER CJ made the poignant observation, that:

“If a transaction is covered by the terms of the section, its provisions come into operation; if it is not, then, its provisions cannot be applied.”

In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.

It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the findings in G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H) and H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

The conduct of the banks, unlike in the present case, passed the normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that the “apt reminder” is invoked against the Commissioner.

In cases where these twin principles do not apply, such as in R Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC); 45 SATC 148 (ZH)…, and Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (A)…., and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (AD)…, the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.

Approach re: Contract of Hire, Letting, Supply of Goods and Services, Service Agreements and Fiscal Considerations


Whether the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, by reference to exhibit 4, that, the assessment was wrong and submitted that it should be set aside.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the determination contemplated by the concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act was based on estimated and not actual and correct rates.

The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act require the respondent to:

“Determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax.

He contended, that, the respondent was empowered to make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued income.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

It is also correct, that, our income tax legislation is designed to tax created income as opposed to notional income.

In this regard, BEADLE CJ stated, in Commissioner of Taxes v Feldman & Others 1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:

“The Act seeks to tax income, and, a taxpayer's income is arrived at after including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”

He continued at 95G thus:

“Whichever way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to make it attract tax, is not, I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”

The learned Chief Justice, however, did acknowledge, at p94G of the same judgment, that:

“It is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But, in such cases, the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, in unambiguous language, empower the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.

However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do so.

In the exercise of his wide discretion, the Commissioner elected to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income in respect of each of the four years of assessment.

It was common cause, that, in the determination of 14 November 2014, the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate and correct rate.

The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by the respondent.

His mere say so was inadequate to establish the veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's written statement some three (3) weeks before the appeal commenced.

The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by the respondent, using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant in each year, would not result in the negative variances computed by the appellant in exhibit 4 in all these years but would result in a negative variance of US$100,782=51 for 2009; and positive variances of US$187,174=47 in 2010; US$149,277=68 in 2011; and US$65,653=46 in 2012.

Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and Table 5 the tax due.

Table 4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by the appellant.

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012

Distance km

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

Acceptable rate

16.55

17.52

19.45

20.04

Expected revenue

ZAR

4 759 488.72

8 860 704.96

8 882 114.80

9 019 482.96

Expected revenue average USD rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Expected revenue in USD

688 583.44

1 227 244.45

1 258 089.92

1 130 261.02

Transport services income AFS

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Expenses declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates

2 989 241.00

345 976.97

3 372 076.00

467 046.54

3 741 501.00

529 957.65

4 320 056.00

541 360.40

Total AFS & expenses USD

789 365.95

1 049 069.98

1 108 812.24

1 064 607.56

variance

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant tax computations from the above would be as follows:

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012


Appellant computations

-41 675.00

-75 497.00

-93 013.00

-20 652.00


Add: Provisions

10 520.00

28 982.00

17 416.00

312.00


Bad debts

-

-

18 783.00

-


Donations

-

-

100.00

-


Apportionment of drivers salaries

90 908.17

158 374.08

170 616.13

190 669.93


Freight rates adjustment (variance)

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Bank deposits anomaly

100.25

0.31

0.00

85.47


Total

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Taxable income

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Tax at 25.75%

nil

74 683.72

67 768.80

60 787.73


It seems to me, that, the appellant undermined its objection and appeal by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on page 50.2 of exhibit 1 in respect of 2013.

There was neither reason nor logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the period 2009 to 2012.

I formed the distinct impression, from the appellant's conduct, that, it was reluctant to supply the requisite information, and, to that extent, was unco-operative with the respondent.

In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the appellant.

The seeds of the suggested method were sown in Annexure B to the letter of 13 June 2014…,.

If I had that information, I would have marked down the total costs of the related party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me, that, the mark-up of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of 19% from the gross rate of R22.47.

The appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration.

The examples set out in Annexure A of the objection letter…, concerning five (5) round trips in respect of each tax year, indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible information required to calculate the mark down rate.

The use of the formula Mark-up=(A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips in 2009 of 11%; 2010 of 5%; 2011 of 1.8%; and 2012 of 21%.

The range in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and 19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2012 it was between 3.5% and 32.3%.

Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant supplied and applied them as outlined in Table 4 and 5 above.

I will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.

Approach re: Contract of Hire, Letting, Supply of Goods and Services, Service Agreements and Fiscal Considerations


The answer to the real question before me

The answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is answered in the affirmative.

The closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act direct the Commissioner to “determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction” once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect, and he, firstly, forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's length, and, secondly, the further opinion that it was created and implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing, or postponing the payment of tax.

I have found, that, the agreement had the stipulated effect and have upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned respects. The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act provide the Commissioner with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.

He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8 of the 2003 agreement. He would, of course, have required information on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the related party.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.

Disposition

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31 December 2009; 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010; 1/3435 for the tax year ended 31 December 2011; and 1/3436 for the tax year ended 31 December 2012, issued on 23 June 2014, be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment, and, in so doing, shall:

(i) Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in Table 4 in computing the variance between the expected income and received income.

(ii) Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in Table 4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009; R7.22 for 2010; R7.06 for 2011; and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.

3. The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of equipment to the related party, and unreconciled bank deposits.

4. The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in full.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Air, Land, Sea Carriage and Commercial Storage


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Air, Land, Sea Carriage and Commercial Storage


Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book.

Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilize section 98 of the Income Tax Act?

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions.

The Onus

Before dealing with the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, it is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus.

I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15. I concluded my analysis, at 1022C, thus:

“The onus, therefore, rests on the taxpayer to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba, that, the Commissioner bears no onus to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that his opinion was correct.”

Counsel for the appellant relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission, that, the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone, or reduce the tax liability.

In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…., HEFER JA stated that:

“The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case, it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

Again, HEHER JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA)…, said:

“Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge, that, the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens, appear to have been justified.

There was no evidence to suggest, that, the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.”…,.

The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MACDONALD JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, that:

“The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation, or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section.

Here, again, there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape.

This intention is also manifest by the further provision, that, when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held, the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, he did not have the purpose set out in the section.

Moreover, the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.

In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax, which, in the normal course of his business, and, but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

The sentiments expressed by MACDONALD JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

Again, it seems to me, that, section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an over-arching shadow over the construction of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

The Commissioner employs section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute income to the taxpayer and raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63 of the Income Tax Act.

Accordingly, I maintain, that, the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98, based on South African authority, is contrary to our law.

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Air, Land, Sea Carriage and Commercial Storage


Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

In the hyper-inflationary era, the appellant averred, that, it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations.

It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower, mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers, would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub-Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts, and the experienced, skilled, and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the General Manager in charge of local operations.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; its fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly, it was able to retain the pool of experienced, internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.

With the introduction of the multi currency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished.

The parties re-negotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Whether the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which would not be normally employed for such a transaction?

In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, TROLLIP JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

“When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important, I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other, and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself…,. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement, the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And, the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out, s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus, what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

See also the sentiments of HEFER JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,.; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)….,.

It is a notorious fact of commercial life, that, related parties enter into contractual arrangements.

I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories.

There was, however, an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

For starters, the appellant over-emphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

In the letter of 24 October 2013…, the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.”

The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013…, where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.”

The fixed rental fee, with all maintenance and running costs for the account of the tenant model, was unique to the related parties and therefore abnormal.

Other hauliers, including the related party, conducted the haulage business for their own account. The charge per trip, and not per kilometre, was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative purposes.

However, the charge per leg per trip was abnormal.

In charging per trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a variety of factors such as overheads, distance, and the nature of the load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model.

The ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and the related party were not disclosed. That, in my view, was abnormal.

In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges.

The 2009 agreement recorded that “the change in currency, from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar, which took effect in February 2009, did not have any effect on the agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.”…,.

These were in South African rands, which remained, and still remain, the currency of account of the agreement.

Such disclosure would have assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multi-currency era resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each of the four tax years under consideration.

I add, for good measure, that, the payment of the remuneration of the drivers used by the related party, without any form of compensation, was abnormal; as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in Zimbabwe for free.

In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant, and to this Court, by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.

In the light of the formulation of TROLLIP JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A)…; 41 SATC 179…, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's length.

Whether the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction?

It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements.

The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental.

The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals, which negated the cost plus mark-up principle, was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.

Again, the use of the drivers by the related party, for no compensation, just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free, were rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's length.

I hold, that, the appellant did not act at arm's length with the related party and concluded, and executed, an agreement that was inimical to its bottom line.

Whether the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main purposes of the agreement?

The appellant established, that, other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments.

These purposes were achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year “audited” as “a going concern”.

It seems trite to me, that, the purpose of a private company is to make a profit.

The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made, and continues to make, losses without any prospects of ever making a profit.

It seems to me, that, the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments, and, at the same time, avoid or reduce its income tax liability.

That the spectre of income tax, and, indeed, other imposts were contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1, cited above, where the parties agreed to adjust and revise the fixed rental in tandem with “any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates.”

As it turned out, the rate was merely increased in tandem with inflation, and not taxes, because the appellant continued to make losses.

I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).

In Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100…, LORD CAIRNS stated that:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law, he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

And, in CIR v IHB King; CIR v AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A)…, WATERMEYER CJ made the poignant observation, that:

“If a transaction is covered by the terms of the section, its provisions come into operation; if it is not, then, its provisions cannot be applied.”

In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.

It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the findings in G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H) and H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

The conduct of the banks, unlike in the present case, passed the normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that the “apt reminder” is invoked against the Commissioner.

In cases where these twin principles do not apply, such as in R Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC); 45 SATC 148 (ZH)…, and Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (A)…., and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (AD)…, the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.

Air, Land, Sea Carriage and Commercial Storage


Whether the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, by reference to exhibit 4, that, the assessment was wrong and submitted that it should be set aside.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the determination contemplated by the concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act was based on estimated and not actual and correct rates.

The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act require the respondent to:

“Determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

While counsel for the respondent conceded, that, the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties, he forcefully argued, that, it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax.

He contended, that, the respondent was empowered to make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued income.

It is correct, that, the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

This point was made by INNES CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593…, when he stated that:

“…, public policy demands, in general, full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may, and does, in certain cases, require the abridgement of this right. But, language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For, it cannot be thought that the legislature would, in the interests of the public, infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

It is also correct, that, our income tax legislation is designed to tax created income as opposed to notional income.

In this regard, BEADLE CJ stated, in Commissioner of Taxes v Feldman & Others 1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:

“The Act seeks to tax income, and, a taxpayer's income is arrived at after including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”

He continued at 95G thus:

“Whichever way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to make it attract tax, is not, I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”

The learned Chief Justice, however, did acknowledge, at p94G of the same judgment, that:

“It is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But, in such cases, the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act, in unambiguous language, empower the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.

However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do so.

In the exercise of his wide discretion, the Commissioner elected to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income in respect of each of the four years of assessment.

It was common cause, that, in the determination of 14 November 2014, the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate and correct rate.

The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by the respondent.

His mere say so was inadequate to establish the veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's written statement some three (3) weeks before the appeal commenced.

The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by the respondent, using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant in each year, would not result in the negative variances computed by the appellant in exhibit 4 in all these years but would result in a negative variance of US$100,782=51 for 2009; and positive variances of US$187,174=47 in 2010; US$149,277=68 in 2011; and US$65,653=46 in 2012.

Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and Table 5 the tax due.

Table 4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by the appellant.

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012

Distance km

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

Acceptable rate

16.55

17.52

19.45

20.04

Expected revenue

ZAR

4 759 488.72

8 860 704.96

8 882 114.80

9 019 482.96

Expected revenue average USD rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Expected revenue in USD

688 583.44

1 227 244.45

1 258 089.92

1 130 261.02

Transport services income AFS

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Expenses declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates

2 989 241.00

345 976.97

3 372 076.00

467 046.54

3 741 501.00

529 957.65

4 320 056.00

541 360.40

Total AFS & expenses USD

789 365.95

1 049 069.98

1 108 812.24

1 064 607.56

variance

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant tax computations from the above would be as follows:

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012


Appellant computations

-41 675.00

-75 497.00

-93 013.00

-20 652.00


Add: Provisions

10 520.00

28 982.00

17 416.00

312.00


Bad debts

-

-

18 783.00

-


Donations

-

-

100.00

-


Apportionment of drivers salaries

90 908.17

158 374.08

170 616.13

190 669.93


Freight rates adjustment (variance)

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Bank deposits anomaly

100.25

0.31

0.00

85.47


Total

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Taxable income

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Tax at 25.75%

nil

74 683.72

67 768.80

60 787.73


It seems to me, that, the appellant undermined its objection and appeal by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on page 50.2 of exhibit 1 in respect of 2013.

There was neither reason nor logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the period 2009 to 2012.

I formed the distinct impression, from the appellant's conduct, that, it was reluctant to supply the requisite information, and, to that extent, was unco-operative with the respondent.

In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the appellant.

The seeds of the suggested method were sown in Annexure B to the letter of 13 June 2014…,.

If I had that information, I would have marked down the total costs of the related party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me, that, the mark-up of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of 19% from the gross rate of R22.47.

The appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration.

The examples set out in Annexure A of the objection letter…, concerning five (5) round trips in respect of each tax year, indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible information required to calculate the mark down rate.

The use of the formula Mark-up=(A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips in 2009 of 11%; 2010 of 5%; 2011 of 1.8%; and 2012 of 21%.

The range in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and 19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2012 it was between 3.5% and 32.3%.

Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant supplied and applied them as outlined in Table 4 and 5 above.

I will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.

Air, Land, Sea Carriage and Commercial Storage


The answer to the real question before me

The answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by section 98 of the Income Tax Act to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is answered in the affirmative.

The closing words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act direct the Commissioner to “determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction” once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect, and he, firstly, forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's length, and, secondly, the further opinion that it was created and implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing, or postponing the payment of tax.

I have found, that, the agreement had the stipulated effect and have upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned respects. The concluding words of section 98 of the Income Tax Act provide the Commissioner with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.

He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8 of the 2003 agreement. He would, of course, have required information on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the related party.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.

Disposition

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31 December 2009; 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010; 1/3435 for the tax year ended 31 December 2011; and 1/3436 for the tax year ended 31 December 2012, issued on 23 June 2014, be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment, and, in so doing, shall:

(i) Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in Table 4 in computing the variance between the expected income and received income.

(ii) Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in Table 4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009; R7.22 for 2010; R7.06 for 2011; and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.

3. The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of equipment to the related party, and unreconciled bank deposits.

4. The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in full.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion, Tax Defaulters and the Tax Amnesty


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal....,.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Debt re: Statutory Obligations and Approach to Statutory Defaulters


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal....,.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Constitutional Rights re: Equal Protection of the Law, Non-Discrimination, Positive Discrimination and Classification


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal....,.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Constitutionality of Statutory Provisions re: Taxation Laws


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal....,.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Constitutionality of Statutory Provisions re: Delegated or Subsidiary Legislation and Statutory Instruments


This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.


Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98


Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:


Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400



Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160


The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.


Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14


The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal....,.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

Penalties and Interest


Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Administrative Law re: Approach, Discretionary Powers, Judicial Interference and the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation


Penalties

In paragraph 51 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant conceded, that, the Commissioner was authorised, by section 64(2) as read with paragraph (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection.

In the present matter, the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act, the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the taxpayer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty, and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner, in the first instance, nor this court, as a court of revision, can, on an appeal in the wider sense, remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%: see the remarks of SQUIRES J in ITC No.1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z)…, and of SMITH J in ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.

Counsel for the appellant urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH466-15.

In imposing the penalty, the Commissioner and the Appeal Court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence, and the interests of society.

Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed, I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

It co-operated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen, which, until the investigation under consideration took place, had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant, and its tax advisers, deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty.

Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

In each of the four financial statements in question, the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff, and, in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security.

Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made, but, was not reversed in the following tax year.

The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment.

The sole witness for the appellant averred, that, this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009; US$28,982 in 2010; US$17,416 in 2011; and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income, by consent, during the investigations and included in the amended assessments….,.

The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me, that, the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 Bad Debt Claim

This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration, issued on 22 May 2012, was in respect of arrear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction, and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief…,.

However, an e-mail from the appellant, of 10 October 2013, indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH617-14…, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove, on a balance of probabilities, in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad.

It is clear to me, that, by that date, the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

For undisclosed reasons, the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and counsel for the appellant correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly, the imposition of a penalty of any nature, let alone of 100%, was not justified.

In the exercise of my discretion, I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed….,. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year…, were US$90,908=17 for 2009; US$158,374=08 for 2010; US$170,616=13 for 2011; and US$190,669=93 for 2012.

It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers.

In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment, and not the drivers, to the related party. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

The appellant's case, throughout these proceedings, has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

The pleadings and evidence showed that its income, in respect of this equipment, was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisors deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed, of 100%, was most appropriate.

The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

The appellant conceded, that, some level of additional tax, less than the 100% penalty imposed, was appropriate.

The appellant was uncooperative.

I have already found, that, the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

During the investigation, the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100=25 for 2009; US$0=31 for 2010; and US$87=47 for 2012.

These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back, by consent, in the amended assessments.

The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs re: Fiscal or Taxation Proceedings


Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs....,.

1...,.

2....,.

3....,.

4....,.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Costs re: No Order as to Costs or No Costs Order iro Approach


Costs

In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs....,.

1...,.

2....,.

3....,.

4....,.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.

Income Tax Appeal

1. KUDYA J: This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

2. The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

3. At the commencement of the hearing, Mr de Bourbon, for the appellant moved in accordance with the notice filed of record on 24 August 2015 and served on the respondent on the same date for the non-suiting of the respondent for failure to file r 11 documents.

4. Mr Bhebhe, for the respondent conceded the failure and sought the Court's indulgence for the respondent to participate in the appeal without the Rule 11 documents. He contended that the failure was not prejudicial to the appellant and in the alternative promised to file the documents by the end of business on Friday 18 September 2015 failing which the Court would disregard all the evidence, contentions and submissions made by the respondent at the appeal hearing.

5. Rule 11 is found in Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the rules regulating Income Tax Appeals that are applied in the determination of an appeal under section 65 or any proceedings incidental thereto or connected therewith. It stipulates that:

The Commissioner shall transmit to the Special Court, together with the agreed case, or with the appellant's case and the Commissioner's case, a certified copy or extract of the assessment in so far as it relates to the assessment made upon the appellant, and also the notice of objection lodged and the notice of appeal, together with any material correspondence related thereto, unless the same have already been included in the statement of facts. A copy of the decision appealed from and of the reasons for the same shall accompany the documents above mentioned.” (Underlining my own for emphasis)

6. In the present case, the parties did not agree on a statement of facts. Rather each party filed with the Registrar its respective case devoid of any attachments.

7. In this regard, it was mandatory for the respondent to file a certified copy or extract of each assessment raised against the appellant, the notice of objection, the decision appealed against and the reasons thereof, the notice of appeal and any material correspondence relating to each assessment together with the Commissioner's case. There was and would be no need for the respondent to file the appellant's case with these documents as it was and would always be filed with the Registrar and served on the respondent prior to the filing of the Commissioner's case and its addendums.

8. In the same vein, it would serve no useful purpose for the respondent to file those Rule 11 documents which would have been attached to either the Appellant's case or the Commissioner's case together with the Commissioner's case.

9. The Rule 11 documents provide the contextual background to the objection and appeal and represent a “court record of sorts” from which the appeal court is able to derive important and material contentions of fact and law. The failure to file the Rule 11 documents at the required time is not only contemptuous of the rules of Court but is prejudicial to the appellant in that it deprives the appeal court of the material information on which the dispute between the parties is grounded. In the present appeal Mr de Bourbon acceded to the submission made by Mr Bhebhe in the alternative.

10. The appeal hearing proceeded in the normal way and true to his promise, Mr Bhebhe filed the Rule 11 documents before the end of business on 18 September 2015. The respondent is directed to abide by the mandatory requirements of Rule 11 in all future income tax appeals.

11. On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006 and 6 July 2009.

12. In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name and managing director between the two companies.

13. The Commissioner identified 5 areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013.

14. The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party while the second was in respect of under invoicing. The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

15. The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

16. The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

17. The appellant contended that the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended that they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

18. The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on 3 local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exh 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exh 2.

19. The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form on p66 of the exh 1, which I reproduce below as Table 1.



Table 1


2009

2010

2011

2012

CD3-revenue R

2 579 685.00

2 429 399.00

1 815 806.00

1 795 380.00

CD3 revenue USD

298 658.98

336 530.44

257 329.12

224 855.18

Other local income USD

144 730.00

245 493.00

321 525.47

298 391.98

Total US$ in FSs

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Av exchange rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

20. Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party the respondent maintained that the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers. It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exh 1, which formed part of the amended assessments. It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

21. At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and managing director, who has stood in the position of a general manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file exh 1 and one paged exh 4.

22. The respondent called the evidence of two of its chief investigations officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exh 2 and 6 paged exh 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

23. At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent and if so what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] and if not whether the respondent was entitled as a matter of law to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income or deemed income having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions, in particular the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

24. At the commencement of the appeal hearing on 14 September 2015, Mr de Bourbon abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

25. The evidence was mostly common cause. The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old managing director and a registered trust. The managing director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

26. It was common cause that even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties. (Para 8 appellant's case and concession made in oral submissions by appellant's counsel).

27. The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.” The operations were manned by 7 head office staff, 10 workshop employees and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience. The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts and tyres. In 1996 the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross-border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

28. The appellant alleged that it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods by road between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

29. The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multicurrency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

30. The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew. The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

31. With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse and a horse and trailer were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exh 1.

32. These rentals were all increased annually by 10%. In addition, the related party was responsible at its own cost for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties. The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party. However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

33. It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew that a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages. This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

34. The appellant however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exh 1.

35. However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exh 1 for each of the 4 tax years and for each of the routes covered. The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:



Table 2


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620







LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400

Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720


2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160

36. The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the 4 years, respectively.

37. In 2009 it was R5,050, in 2010 it was R5,555, in 2011 it was R6,400 and in 2012 it was R7,300. The north bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

38. The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

39. The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

40. The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe. The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

41. The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones. The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012. The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012.

42. And lastly the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012. The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012 the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

43. The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of 4 trips.

44. The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party in respect of 21 mechanical horses between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance [listed on p23 to 23.53 of exh 1], US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

45. In the same period tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021.51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance and US$40,992 on lubricants.

46. The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km [p22 of exh 1] during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exh 1.

47. The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exh 1.

48. I reproduce the essential costs in table 3 below.

Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment


2009

2010

2011

2012

Total

Km travelled

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

1 771 964

Spares in R

684 101

282 918

413 281

474 541

1 854 841

Labour in R

161 168

66 653

97 365

111 797

436 983

Tyres in R

233 661

328 736

296 832

292 548

1 151 777

Fuel in R

1 406 193

2 198 516

2 484 789

3 039 323

9 128 822

Insurance in R

489 000

489 000

440 100

391 360

1 809 460

Lubricants in R

15 119

6 252

9 134

10 487

40 992

Total cost in R

2 989 241

3 372 076

3 741 501

4 320 058

14 422 875

Average cost per km in R

8.32

6.67

8.19

9.60

8.14

49. The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC. It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

50. The responses, on pp13 to 15 of exh 2, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013. These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo and competition.

51. The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year. In respect of the 2013 tax year the average rate was US$2.50 per km. One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

52. The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

53. The appellant was inter alia assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms to meet local expenses from a single client, it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse, it was able to offer limited local transport services, it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use and lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

54. On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

55. It was common cause that the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party of R22.47 per km retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

56. It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

57. The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

58. It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance whether positive or negative was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

59. The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects. The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders. The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

60. The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only. In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

61. In regards to the second aspect, he averred in para 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate. At p50.1 para 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

62. In fact, under cross examination the witness maintained that the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages and not on the distance or the nature of the load. He maintained that the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant that even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based. He sought to demonstrate by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exh 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's group profit.(See letter of objection para 4.11 and 4.12 on p 31.1 of exh 1)

63. It was common cause that the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause that the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

64. The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exh 4. The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009, ZAR17.52 in 2010, ZAR19.45 in 2011 and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

65. The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433.97 in 2009, a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185.16 in 2010, a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119.91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063.46 in 2012. The formula and workings of the respondent were shown on page 38.6 of exh 1.

66. The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014 at p27.2 of exh 1. She wrote that:

The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

67. I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent and if so what was the source of the income?

68. It was common cause that the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold as a matter of hard fact that the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

69. It seems to me that the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

70. The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

71. The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

72. Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL) at 19-20 and 25 and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC) at 22 and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC) at 717 and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A) at 592 and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA) at 196 para [26] have no application in the present matter.

73. While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined that the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 to bring the appellant to book.

Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] and if not whether the respondent was entitled as a matter of law to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act?

74. Mr de Bourbon submitted that the provisions of section 98 were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party both from a factual and legal perspective while Mr Bhebhe made contrary submissions.

The Onus

75. Before dealing with the provisions of section 98, it is necessary that I resolve the issue of onus. I discussed the issue in H Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 15-HH-575. I concluded my analysis at 1022C thus:

The onus, therefore rests on the taxpayer to establish on a balance of probabilities that the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong. I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba that the Commissioner bears no onus to establish on a balance of probabilities that his opinion was correct.”

76. Mr de Bourbon relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the submission that the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone or reduce the tax liability.

77. In Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA) at 1159-1160 paras [11] and [12]; 61 SATC 391 (SCA) at 397 Hefer JA stated that:

The onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon proof that this was the case it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”

78. Again, Heher JA in Commissioner, South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd 2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA) para [25] said:

Affording due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent, the conclusion of the learned judge that the Commissioner had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent in regard to the importation of the screens appear to have been justified. There was no evidence to suggest that the respondent manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.” (Underlining mine for emphasis)

79. The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases, are at variance with the sentiments of MacDonald JP in Commissioner v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A) at 115F-116A that:

The next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the 'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the section. Here again there is a clear indication that it is the intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to block every possible avenue of escape. This intention is also manifest by the further provision that when the stipulated effect is present and the requisite opinions are held the onus rests on the taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish on a balance of probabilities that he did not have the purpose set out in the section. Moreover the section strikes not only at avoidance but also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing. In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid the payment of tax which, in the normal course of his business and but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would fall due.”

80. The sentiments expressed by MacDonald JP are binding on me and override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal which merely constitute persuasive authority.

81. Again, it seems to me that section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an overarching shadow over the construction of section 98. The Commissioner employs section 98 to impute income to the taxpayer and raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and appeals.

82. Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section 63.

Accordingly, I maintain that the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.

83. The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98 based on South African authority is contrary to our law.

98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion that the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction.”

84. The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A) at 571E-H thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

85. See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z) at 69; Commissioner of Taxes v F supra at 115E-116A; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H) at 232F-233B; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H) at 364C-D; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 15-HH-575.

Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

86. Mr de Bourbon contended that the transactions were conceived in circumstances that precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

87. Mr Bhebhe argued that they had such an effect.

88. In Commissioner of Taxes v F supra at 115F MacDonald JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

89. The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year. It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during and after the period covered by the assessments. The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern annual reports.

90. In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively. That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exh 1 which reads:

the rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with Mr Bhebhe that the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax.

The circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into or carried out?

91. In the hyperinflationary era, the appellant averred that it could not secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived from transport services could not sustain the local operations. It was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.

92. The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower mainly consisting of approximately 110 drivers would lose their only source of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.

93. The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and maintenance of the vehicles.

94. It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of destinations in sub Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity held by the appellant to meet its own contracts and the experienced, skilled and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes desired by the related party.

95. The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the general manager in charge of local operations.

96. The appellant was inter alia assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms to meet local expenses from a single client, it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse, it was able to offer limited local transport services, it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use and lastly it was able to retain the pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs. The parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.

97. With the introduction of the multicurrency economic regime in Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished. The parties renegotiated the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause of the charge per route.

Whether the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which would not be normally employed for such a transaction?

98. In Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue 1980 (1) SA 481 (A) at 494H-495D, 41 SATC 179 at 195 Trollip JA set out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He stated that:

When the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the present case, it is important I think, to determine first whether it was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in para (ii).

For 'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.

It connotes that each party is independent of the other and, in so dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the transaction for himself….. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).

And the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (i).

The next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.

As already pointed out s103(1) itself postulates that.

Thus what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another case because of the absence of such circumstances.

The last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there anent by either party.”

99. See also the sentiments of Hefer JA in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd) supra at 1159 para [11].

100. It is a notorious fact of commercial life that related parties enter into contractual arrangements. I did not discern any abnormalities in the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the signatories. There was however an admixture of the normal and abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.

101. For starters, the appellant overemphasized the indisputable uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out. In the letter of 24 October 2013 at p50.1 para 11 the external accountants for the appellant wrote that “the appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.” The same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013 at p45.1 in para 1.2 where the same accountants indicated that they “were unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique situation as the appellant.” The fixed rental fee with all maintenance and running costs for the account of the tenant model was unique to the related parties and therefore abnormal.

102. Other hauliers including the related party conducted the haulage business for their own account. The charge per trip and not per kilometre was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative purposes.

103. However the charge per leg per trip was abnormal. In charging per trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a variety of factors such as overheads, distance and the nature of the load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model. The ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and the related party were not disclosed. That in my view was abnormal.

104. In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges. The 2009 agreement recorded that “the change in currency from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar which took effect in February 2009 did not have any effect on the agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.” (Clause 2.2 to 6 July 2009 amendment).

105. These were in South African rands, which remained and still remain the currency of account of the agreement. Such disclosure would have assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multicurrency era resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each of the four tax years under consideration.

106. I add for good measure that the payment of the remuneration of the drivers used by the related party without any form of compensation was abnormal as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in Zimbabwe for free.

In assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the appellant and to this Court by both the appellant and the Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.

In the light of the formulation of Trollip JA in Hicklin v Secretary for Inland Revenue supra, it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's length.

Whether the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a transaction?

107. It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the agreements.

108. The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant received a fixed rental. The obligation to meet the maintenance and running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals which negated the cost plus mark-up principle was abnormal and would not have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.

109. Again the use of the drivers by the related party for no compensation just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free were rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's length.

I hold that the appellant did not act at arm's length with the related party and concluded and executed an agreement that was inimical to its bottom line.

Whether the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main purposes of the agreement?

110. The appellant established that other economic considerations informed its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments. These purposes were achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year “audited” as “a going concern”.

111. It seems trite to me that the purpose of a private company is to make a profit.

112. The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant was content with the untenable situation in which it made and continues to make losses without any prospects of ever making a profit.

113. It seems to me that the fixed rental was deliberately designed to ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive liquidation and costly retrenchments and at the same avoid or reduce its income tax liability.

114. That the spectre of income tax and indeed other imposts were contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 cited above where the parties agreed to adjust and revise the fixed rental in tandem with “any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates”.

115. As it turned out the rate was merely increased in tandem with inflation and not taxes because the appellant continued to make losses.

I am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).

116. In Partington v Attorney-General (1869) LR 4 HL 100 at 122 Lord Cairns stated that:

As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

117. And in CIR v IHB King; CIR v AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A) at 209 Watermeyer CJ made the poignant observation that:

If a transaction is covered by the terms of the section its provisions come into operation, if it is not then its provisions cannot be applied.”

118. In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into the all-embracing provisions of section 98. The respondent correctly invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in each of the four tax years in question.

119. It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the findings in G Bank and H Bank supra. The conduct of the banks unlike in the present case passed the normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that the “apt reminder” is invoked against the Commissioner.

120. In cases where these twin principles do not apply such as in R Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes 1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC), 45 SATC 148 (ZH) at 176A-B and 178E and Michau v Maize Board 2003 (6) SA 459 (A) para [40] and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (AD) at 591F the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.

Whether the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?

121. Mr de Bourbon contended by reference to exh 4 that the assessment was wrong and submitted that it should be set aside.

122. Mr Bhebhe contended that the determination contemplated by the concluding words of section 98 was based on estimated and not actual and correct rates. The concluding words of section 98 require the respondent to:

determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction.”

123. The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.

124. While Mr Bhebhe conceded that the respondent did not have the legal authority to alter the contract of the related parties he forcefully argued that it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair and reasonable tax. He contended that the respondent was empowered to make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued income.

125. It is correct that the respondent did not have the legal power to vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.

126. This point was made by Innes CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors 1917 AD 593 at 598 when he stated that:

“… public policy demands in general full freedom of contract; the right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters. The general interest of the community may and does in certain cases require the abridgement of this right. But language enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly construed. For it cannot be thought that the legislature would in the interests of the public infringe upon so fundamental a principle of public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate the mischief aimed at.”

It is also correct that our income tax legislation is designed to tax created income as opposed to notional income.

127. In this regard Beadle CJ stated in Commissioner of Taxes v Feldman & Others 1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:

The Act seeks to tax income and a taxpayer's income is arrived at after including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”

128. He continued at 95G thus:

Whichever way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to make it attract tax, is not I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”

129. The learned Chief Justice however did acknowledge at p94G of the same judgment that:

It is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But in such cases the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”

130. I agree with Mr Bhebhe that the closing words of section 98 in unambiguous language empower the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.

131. However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do so. In the exercise of his wide discretion the Commissioner elected to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income in respect of each of the four years of assessment.

132. It was common cause that in the determination of 14 November 2014, the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate and correct rate.

133. The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by the respondent. His mere say so was inadequate to establish the veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's written statement some 3 weeks before the appeal commenced.

134. The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by the respondent using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant in each year would not result in the negative variances computed by the appellant in exh 4 in all these years but would result in a negative variance of US$100,782.51 for 2009, and positive variances of US$187,174.47 in 2010, US$149,277.68 in 2011 and US$65,653.46 in 2012.

135. Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and table 5 the tax due.

Table 4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by the appellant.

Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012

Distance km

359 478

505 748

456 664

450 074

Acceptable rate

16.55

17.52

19.45

20.04

Expected revenue

ZAR

4 759 488.72

8 860 704.96

8 882 114.80

9 019 482.96

Expected revenue average USD rate

8.64

7.22

7.06

7.98

Expected revenue in USD

688 583.44

1 227 244.45

1 258 089.92

1 130 261.02

Transport services income AFS

443 388.98

582 023.44

578 854.59

523 247.16

Expenses declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates

2 989 241.00

345 976.97

3 372 076.00

467 046.54

3 741 501.00

529 957.65

4 320 056.00

541 360.40

Total AFS & expenses USD

789 365.95

1 049 069.98

1 108 812.24

1 064 607.56

variance

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46

136. Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant tax computations from the above would be as follows:



Year/item

2009

2010

2011

2012


Appellant computations

-41 675.00

-75 497.00

-93 013.00

-20 652.00


Add: Provisions

10 520.00

28 982.00

17 416.00

312.00


Bad debts

-

-

18 783.00

-


Donations

-

-

100.00

-


Apportionment of drivers salaries

90 908.17

158 374.08

170 616.13

190 669.93


Freight rates adjustment (variance)

-100 782.51

178 174.47

149 277.68

65 653.46


Bank deposits anomaly

100.25

0.31

0.00

85.47


Total

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Taxable income

-40 929.09

290 033.86

263 179.81

236 068.86


Tax at 25.75%

nil

74 683.72

67 768.80

60 787.73


137. It seems to me that the appellant undermined its objection and appeal by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on page 50.2 of exh 1 in respect of 2013.There was neither reason nor logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the period 2009 to 2012.

138. I formed the distinct impression from the appellant's conduct that it was reluctant to supply the requisite information and to that extent was uncooperative with the respondent.

139. In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the appellant. The seeds of the suggested method were sown in annexure B to the letter of 13 June 2014 on page 43.3 of exh 1. If I had that information I would have marked down the total costs of the related party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me that the mark-up of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of 19% from the gross rate of R22.47.

140. The appellant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration. The examples set out in annexure A of the objection letter at p31.3 to 31.5 of exh concerning 5 round trips in respect of each tax year indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible information required to calculate the mark down rate.

141. The use of the formula Mark-up= (A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips in 2009 of 11%, 2010 of 5%, 2011 of 1.8% and 2012 of 21%. The range in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and 19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2010 it was between 3.5% and 32.3%.

142. Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant supplied and applied them as outlined in table 4 and 5 above.

I will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.

The answer to the real question before me

The answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by section 98 to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is answered in the affirmative.

143. The closing words of section 98 direct the Commissioner to “determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction” once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect and he firstly forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's length and secondly, the further opinion that it was created and implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing or postponing the payment of tax.

144. I have found that the agreement had the stipulated effect and have upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned respects. The concluding words of section 98 provide the Commissioner with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.

145. He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8 of the 2003 agreement. He would off course have required information on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the related party.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

146. It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations SI 163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to the 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

147. The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

148. The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers. The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties and interest once the application was granted.

149. Mr de Bourbon contended that the appellant as a law abiding citizen was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant. He submitted in the alternative that in exercising its discretion this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

150. Section 56(1) and (6) stipulate that:

(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) no such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

151. Section 56 falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

152. In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution which amongst others requirements prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a Court of law.

153. The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are however not absolute rights.

154. They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) the nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) the purpose of the limitation, in particular whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

155. The inarticulate major premise embodied in Mr de Bourbon's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant unconstitutional. He did not disclose how the Finance Act No.2 of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

156. I await proper and well-reasoned rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner. The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me on a balance of probabilities that the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold that the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter

Penalties

157. In para 51 of his written submissions, Mr de Bourbon conceded that the Commissioner was authorised by section 64(2) as read with para (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his determination of an objection. In the present matter the penalties were increased from 90% to 100%.

158. In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act the Commissioner has discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the tax payer did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.

159. Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives propounded in ITC 1577, 56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty and awareness of possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner in the first instance nor this court as a court of revision can on an appeal in the wider sense remit or waive the additional tax to anything other than 100%. See the remarks of Squires J in ITC No 1334 (1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z) at 106 and of Smith J in ITC 1631 supra, at p70.

160. Mr de Bourbon urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 15-HH-466. In imposing the penalty the Commissioner and the appeal court are obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence and the interests of society.

161. Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was imposed I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the appellant.

162. It cooperated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a good corporate citizen which until the investigation under consideration took place had complied with its tax obligations. It was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart. It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.

163. The offence of tax avoidance was described by MacDonald JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F supra in rather strong language as an evil. Of course taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender. Courts emphasise both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties.

164. As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the appellant and its tax advisers deliberately implemented an opaque system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law. The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

165. I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction and assess the suitable penalty. Penalties were imposed in respect of the following transactions:

Provision for leave pay and for security

166. In each of the four financial statements in question the appellant made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff and in 2010 and 2011 a provision for security. Each provision was claimed as an expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made but was not reversed in the following tax year. The appellant conceded the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of assessment. The sole witness for the appellant averred that this was due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax advantage.

167. The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under this head of US$10,520 in 2009, US$28,982 in 2010, US$17,416 in 2011 and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income by consent during the investigations and included in the amended assessments.(P44.2 and 44.3 of exh 1 and p13.2 of exh 2).

168. The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%. The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place consecutively in each year.

It seems to me that the respondent was justified in treating these failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the appellant's tax liability. The imposition of a penalty of 100% in these circumstances was justified.

The 2010 bad debt claim

169. This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar year. The claim in the summons and declaration issued on 22 May 2012 was in respect of arear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction and holding over damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief [p52 to 52.7].

170. However an e-mail from the appellant of 10 October 2013 indicated that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.

171. The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of summons.

172. In BT (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 14-HH-617, 12-FAC-012, I set out the three requirements that a taxpayer is required to prove on a balance of probabilities in respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.

173. The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the date on which the debt was declared to be bad. It is clear to me that by that date the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.

In my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's income.

174. For undisclosed reasons the appellant conceded that it wrongly deducted the amount and Mr de Bourbon correctly found himself bound by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.

Clearly the imposition of a penalty of any nature let alone of 100% was not justified. In the exercise of my discretion I will direct that the penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.

The failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial year

175. This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the 2011 tax computation as an expense.

176. Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an error” could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its disposal.

The respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.

The failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles

177. The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any form of reimbursement from the related party.

178. The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years. This was only discovered during the investigation.

179. On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed. This figure was arrived at using the information on p42 to 42.6 exh 1. The agreed amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year are set out on pages 42.4, 42.6 and 38.2 of exh 1. They were US$90,908.17 for 2009, US$158,374.08 for 2010, US$170,616.13 for 2011 and US$190,669.93 for 2012.

180. It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in relation to these drivers. In terms of the agreements, the appellant leased only its equipment and not the drivers to the appellant. All the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the appellant but were doing so to the related party.

181. In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.

182. The appellant's case throughout these proceedings has always been that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved in the cross border haulage business of the related party were actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the production of its income.

183. The pleadings and evidence showed that its income in respect of this equipment was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.

184. I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and tax advisers deliberately intended to evade the payment of the appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.

The penalty imposed of 100% was most appropriate.

185. The assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the related party

186. The appellant conceded that some level of additional tax less than the 100% penalty imposed was appropriate. The appellant was uncooperative.

187. I have already found that the transactions infringed the provisions of section 98. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the payment of tax due to the respondent.

A penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.

The unreconciled bank deposits

188. During the investigation the appellant failed to reconcile bank deposits of US$100.25 for 2009, US$0.31 for 2010 and US$87.47 for 2012. These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the appellant and were added back by consent in the amended assessments. The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.

189. The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.

190. The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax due.

The imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was and remains most appropriate.

Costs

191. In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.

192. I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.

Disposition

Accordingly, it is ordered that:

1. The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31 December 2009, 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010, 1/3435 for the tax year ended 31 December 2011 and 1/3436 for the tax year ended 31 December 2012 issued on 23 June 2014 be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in compliance with this judgment and in so doing shall:

(i) Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in table 4 in computing the variance between the expected income and received income.

(ii) Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in table 4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009, R7.22 for 2010, R7.06 for 2011 and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.

3. The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of equipment to the related party and unreconciled bank deposits.

4. The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in full.

5. Each party shall bear its own costs.



Gill, Godlonton & Gerrans, appellant's legal practitioners

Kantor & Immerman, the respondent's legal practitioners

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