Income
Tax Appeal
1.
KUDYA
J:
This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the
respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the
four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and
2012.
2.
The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is
whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the
deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter
23:06].
3.
At the commencement of the hearing, Mr de
Bourbon,
for the appellant moved in accordance with the notice filed of record
on 24 August 2015 and served on the respondent on the same date for
the non-suiting of the respondent for failure to file r 11 documents.
4.
Mr Bhebhe,
for the respondent conceded the failure and sought
the Court's indulgence for the respondent to participate in the
appeal without the Rule 11 documents. He contended that the failure
was not prejudicial to the appellant and in the alternative promised
to file the documents by the end of business on Friday 18 September
2015 failing which the Court would disregard all the evidence,
contentions and submissions made by the respondent at the appeal
hearing.
5.
Rule 11 is found in Part I of the Twelfth Schedule to the Income Tax
Act [Chapter 23:06], the rules regulating Income Tax Appeals that are
applied in the determination of an appeal under section 65 or any
proceedings incidental thereto or connected therewith. It stipulates
that:
“The
Commissioner shall transmit to the Special Court, together with the
agreed case, or with the appellant's case and the Commissioner's
case, a
certified copy or extract of the assessment in so far as it relates
to the assessment made upon the appellant, and also the notice of
objection lodged and the notice of appeal, together with any material
correspondence related thereto, unless the same have already been
included in the statement of facts. A copy of the decision appealed
from and of the reasons for the same shall accompany the documents
above mentioned.”
(Underlining my own for emphasis)
6.
In the present case, the parties did not agree on a statement of
facts. Rather each party filed with the Registrar its respective case
devoid of any attachments.
7.
In this regard, it was mandatory for the respondent to file a
certified copy or extract of each assessment raised against the
appellant, the notice of objection, the decision appealed against and
the reasons thereof, the notice of appeal and any material
correspondence relating to each assessment together with the
Commissioner's case. There was and would be no need for the
respondent to file the appellant's case with these documents as it
was and would always be filed with the Registrar and served on the
respondent prior to the filing of the Commissioner's case and its
addendums.
8.
In the same vein, it would serve no useful purpose for the respondent
to file those Rule 11 documents which would have been attached to
either the Appellant's case or the Commissioner's case together
with the Commissioner's case.
9.
The Rule 11 documents provide the contextual background to the
objection and appeal and represent a “court
record of sorts”
from which the appeal court is able to derive important and material
contentions of fact and law. The failure to file the Rule 11
documents at the required time is not only contemptuous of the rules
of Court but is prejudicial to the appellant in that it deprives the
appeal court of the material information on which the dispute between
the parties is grounded. In the present appeal Mr de
Bourbon
acceded
to the submission made by Mr Bhebhe
in the alternative.
10.
The appeal hearing proceeded in the normal way and true to his
promise, Mr Bhebhe
filed the Rule 11 documents before the end of business on 18
September 2015. The respondent is directed to abide by the mandatory
requirements of Rule 11 in all future income tax appeals.
11.
On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a
separate logistical agreement with a South African company,
hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its
mechanical trucks, trailers and tankers for a fixed rental. The
agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease
agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006 and 6
July 2009.
12.
In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance
investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common
ancestry, logo, name and managing director between the two companies.
13.
The Commissioner identified 5 areas of dispute, which resulted in the
exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August
and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by
8 October 2013.
14.
The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and
wages of the local drivers used by the related party while the second
was in respect of under invoicing. The issue relating to the drivers
was resolved on 23 April 2014.
15.
The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the
respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.
16.
The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014.
The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The
appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014
and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18
December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on
30 March 2015.
17.
The appellant contended that the rentals in the agreements were fair
and reasonable while the respondent contended that they were
outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore
tax avoidance.
18.
The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on
3 local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exh 2 against the
Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party
on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exh 2.
19.
The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was
conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form on p66 of
the exh 1, which I reproduce below as Table 1.
Table
1
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
CD3-revenue
R
|
2
579 685.00
|
2
429 399.00
|
1
815 806.00
|
1
795 380.00
|
CD3
revenue USD
|
298
658.98
|
336
530.44
|
257
329.12
|
224
855.18
|
Other
local income USD
|
144
730.00
|
245
493.00
|
321
525.47
|
298
391.98
|
Total
US$ in FSs
|
443
388.98
|
582
023.44
|
578
854.59
|
523
247.16
|
Av
exchange rate
|
8.64
|
7.22
|
7.06
|
7.98
|
20.
Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party
the respondent maintained that the rentals were outrageously low and
unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross
border hauliers. It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47
on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income
set out on page 50.2 of exh 1, which formed part of the amended
assessments. It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the
market rates charged by third parties in 2013.
21.
At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of
its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old
founder and managing director, who has stood in the position of a
general manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive
committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR
and the 374 paged lever arch file exh 1 and one paged exh 4.
22.
The respondent called the evidence of two of its chief investigations
officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and
relied on the 32 paged exh 2 and 6 paged exh 3A, 3B and 3C in
addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.
23.
At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues
were referred on appeal for determination:
(i)
Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by
the respondent and if so what was the source of the income.
(ii)
Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related
party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received
additional income for tax purposes.
(iii)
Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the
appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section
98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] and if not whether the
respondent was entitled as a matter of law to utilise section 98 of
the Income Tax Act.
(iv)
In the event of any such additional income or deemed income having
been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was
obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have
been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions, in
particular the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in
conducting such transactions.
(v)
Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.
(vi)
The appropriate penalty.
24.
At the commencement of the appeal hearing on 14 September 2015, Mr de
Bourbon
abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five
issues.
25.
The evidence was mostly common cause. The appellant was incorporated
on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name
on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80
year old managing director and a registered trust. The managing
director also held the same position in the related party, a company
he promoted in 1978.
26.
It was common cause that even though the two entities did not have
common shareholders, they were related parties. (Para 8 appellant's
case and concession made in oral submissions by appellant's
counsel).
27.
The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry
with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers and 11
tankers. A common recurring statement in the director's report in
each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was
“engaged
in transport and operated principally in Africa.”
The
operations were manned by 7 head office staff, 10 workshop employees
and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer
internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving
experience. The transport business is dependent on the availability
of imported fuel, spare parts and tyres. In 1996 the appellant had
difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service
its cross-border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of
apartheid in South Africa in 1994, the South African economy became
more integrated with other regional economies.
28.
The appellant alleged that it staved off the spectre of liquidation
by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party
through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to
carry goods by road between South Africa and the designated countries
to the north.
29.
The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three
years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16
August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the
multicurrency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an
indefinite lifespan.
30.
The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of
the related party and the appellant respectively. The 2006 and 2009
agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party
with the nephew. The notable terms and conditions of the agreements
were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based
on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance
covered.
31.
With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per
journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered
trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a
horse and a horse and trailer were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of
exh 1.
32.
These rentals were all increased annually by 10%. In addition, the
related party was responsible at its own cost for running maintenance
and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance,
tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as
road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the
equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the
appellant's drivers or third parties. The appellant employed and
remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did
not receive any compensation from the related party. However, the
appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs
carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.
33.
It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew that a portion of
the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another
used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet
while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local
expenses and staff salaries and wages. This situation continued until
hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the
domestic transport services in 2008.
34.
The appellant however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003
agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that
were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical
and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation
clause set out on page 12.29 of exh 1.
35.
However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on
page 15 and 16 of the exh 1 for each of the 4 tax years and for each
of the routes covered. The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in
Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued
different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north
bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:
Table
2
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
LSK-HRE
HRE-LSK
|
1420
2
310
|
1
562
2
541
|
1
800
3
000
|
2
050
3
420
|
2
260
3
760
|
CPBLT-HRE
HRE-CPBLT
|
1
970
3
930
|
2
167
4
323
|
2
500
5
000
|
2
850
5
700
|
3
140
6
270
|
BLA-KWE
KWE-BLA
|
NIL
3
110
|
NIL
3
421
|
NIL
4
000
|
NIL
4
560
|
NIL
5
020
|
BLA-HRE
HRE-BLA
|
1620
2
910
|
1
782
3
201
|
2
050
3
680
|
2
330
4
200
|
2
570
4
620
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
LLE-HRE
HRE-LLE
|
2
080
3
370
|
2
288
3
707
|
2
630
4
300
|
3
000
4
900
|
3
300
5
400
|
Transit
rates
LSK-HRE
–JBG
JBH-HRE-LSK
|
1
320
2
950
|
1
452
3
245
|
1670
3
730
|
1
900
4
200
|
2
100
4
620
|
CBLT-HRE-JBG
JBG-HRE-CBLT
|
1
570
3
650
|
1
727
4
015
|
2
000
4
620
|
2280
5
200
|
2
500
5
720
|
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
2013
|
BLA-HRE-JBG
JBG-HRE-BLA
|
1
560
3
470
|
1
716
3
817
|
2
025
4
390
|
2
300
5
000
|
2
530
5
500
|
LLE-HRE-JHB
JHG-HRE-LLE
|
1
740
3
930
|
1
914
4
323
|
2
200
4
970
|
2
500
5
600
|
2
750
6
160
|
36.
The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to
Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and
Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each
route in each of the 4 years, respectively.
37.
In 2009 it was R5,050, in 2010 it was R5,555, in 2011 it was R6,400
and in 2012 it was R7,300. The north bound routes from Zimbabwe were
the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre,
Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.
38.
The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The
cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in
2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to
Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in
2012.
39.
The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and
Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the
related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the
Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related
party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.
40.
The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for
Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The
related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in
2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600
in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe. The rental for the trailer only
was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.
41.
The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound
ones. The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the
same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in
2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012. The south bound transit
rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between
R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to
Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and
R2,280 in 2012.
42.
And lastly the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via
Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the
Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in
2009 and R2,500 in 2012. The related party paid R1,270 for the
trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012 the north
bound trailer rental was R1,450.
43.
The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two
trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations
outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of 4 trips.
44.
The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party in
respect of 21 mechanical horses between 1 January 2009 and 31
December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance
[listed on p23 to 23.53 of exh 1], US$436,983 for labour on repairs
and maintenance.
45.
In the same period tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the
related party and R536,021.51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The
related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460
on insurance and US$40,992 on lubricants.
46.
The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km [p22 of exh 1] during the
four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified
mechanical horse and the cost of maintenance and running expenses,
tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exh 1.
47.
The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on
the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on
pp24 and 42.5 of exh 1.
48.
I reproduce the essential costs in table 3 below.
Table
3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
Total
|
Km
travelled
|
359
478
|
505
748
|
456
664
|
450
074
|
1
771 964
|
Spares
in R
|
684
101
|
282
918
|
413
281
|
474
541
|
1
854 841
|
Labour
in R
|
161
168
|
66
653
|
97
365
|
111
797
|
436
983
|
Tyres
in R
|
233
661
|
328
736
|
296
832
|
292
548
|
1
151 777
|
Fuel
in R
|
1
406 193
|
2
198 516
|
2
484 789
|
3
039 323
|
9
128 822
|
Insurance
in R
|
489
000
|
489
000
|
440
100
|
391
360
|
1
809 460
|
Lubricants
in R
|
15
119
|
6
252
|
9
134
|
10
487
|
40
992
|
Total
cost in R
|
2
989 241
|
3
372 076
|
3
741 501
|
4
320 058
|
14
422 875
|
Average
cost per km in R
|
8.32
|
6.67
|
8.19
|
9.60
|
8.14
|
49.
The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions
from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three
local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC. It wrote exhibits 3A,
3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross
rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged
in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes
traversed by the related party.
50.
The responses, on pp13 to 15 of exh 2, were received between 5 August
and 19 September 2013. These parties did not offer a separate truck
and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the
operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental
management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance
covered, the nature of the cargo and competition.
51.
The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km
for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of
the 2012 tax year. In respect of the 2013 tax year the average rate
was US$2.50 per km. One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed
information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model
where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between
US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300
and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip
like the related party, it translated these charges to between
US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.
52.
The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from
the rental agreement.
53.
The appellant was inter
alia
assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign
currency supply accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3
forms to meet local expenses from a single client, it's fleet was
maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from
disuse, it was able to offer limited local transport services, it did
not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, it had a guaranteed free source of fuel
at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use and lastly it was able to
retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers
starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.
54.
On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of
authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican
public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling
to secure work permits in South Africa.
55.
It was common cause that the respondent treated the appellant as a
cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the
related party of R22.47 per km retrospectively to each of the tax
years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km
incurred in raising this amount.
56.
It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by
multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each
year and converted the total to United States dollars using the
uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.
57.
The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and
repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United
States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and
added the figure to the transport services income in the annual
financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.
58.
It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned
from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and
running maintenance and repair costs. The variance whether positive
or negative was added to income in the computation of taxable income.
59.
The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects. The first was
on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or
whether it also operated across our borders. The second was on
whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local
transport services.
60.
The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant
operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only. In each of the tax
years in issue the same witness signed the director's report in
which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in
Africa.
61.
In regards to the second aspect, he averred in para 39 of his
statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that the
appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate. At
p50.1 para 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based
external accountants wrote that “the
appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and
in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”
62.
In fact, under cross examination the witness maintained that the
local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of
running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages and not on the
distance or the nature of the load. He maintained that the dominant
intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain
viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant that
even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during
and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.
He sought to demonstrate by reference to a random selection of
charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exh 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42%
of the related party's group profit.(See letter of objection para
4.11 and 4.12 on p 31.1 of exh 1)
63.
It was common cause that the fees charged on north bound routes were
higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried
finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was
common cause that the exchange rate used in the computation of the
disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each
of the tax years under consideration.
64.
The sole witness applied the “correct
rates”
used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula
invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange
rate and produced different results in exh 4. The correct gross
revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009, ZAR17.52 in 2010,
ZAR19.45 in 2011 and ZAR20.04 in 2012.
65.
The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a
profit of US$65,433.97 in 2009, a loss of US$33,160 instead of a
profit of US$217,185.16 in 2010, a loss of US$64,793 instead of a
profit of US$73,119.91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a
profit of US$56,063.46 in 2012. The formula and workings of the
respondent were shown on page 38.6 of exh 1.
66.
The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013
figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external
accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her
determination of 14 November 2014 at p27.2 of exh 1. She wrote that:
“The
basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income
on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in
the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies
that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were
determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for
estimating income. Please note that if you have information
pertaining to the actual
and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention,
you are free to submit it for consideration.”
67.
I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.
Determination
of the issues
Did
the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the
respondent and if so what was the source of the income?
68.
It was common cause that the appellant did not receive the additional
income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent
imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions
of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.
I
hold as a matter of hard fact that the appellant did not receive the
assessed income.
Whether
or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party
resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional
income for tax purposes?
69.
It seems to me that the second issue requires some recasting to
reflect the real dispute between the parties.
70.
The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the
respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of
the transactions between the two related parties.
71.
The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings
constituted simulated transactions.
72.
Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland
Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL) at
19-20 and 25 and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v
Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC) at 22 and Barnett v
Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC) at 717 and the South
African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953
(2) SA 584 (A) at 592 and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182
(SCA) at 196 para [26] have no application in the present matter.
73.
While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the
agreements it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the
charges imposed by the related party to its own clients and the
charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined
that the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of
income tax from the leased equipment.
The
respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 to bring
the appellant to book.
Whether
or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant
with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the
Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] and if not whether the respondent was
entitled as a matter of law to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax
Act?
74.
Mr de
Bourbon
submitted that the provisions of section 98 were not applicable to
the transactions between the appellant and the related party both
from a factual and legal perspective while Mr Bhebhe
made contrary submissions.
The
Onus
75.
Before dealing with the provisions of section 98, it is necessary
that I resolve the issue of onus. I discussed the issue in H
Bank Zim Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
15-HH-575. I concluded my analysis at 1022C thus:
“The
onus, therefore rests on the taxpayer to establish on a balance of
probabilities that the opinion formed by the Commissioner was wrong.
I therefore agree with Mr Magwaliba that the Commissioner bears no
onus to establish on a balance of probabilities that his opinion was
correct.”
76.
Mr de
Bourbon
relied on two South African Supreme Court of Appeal cases for the
submission that the onus lies on the Commissioner to show that the
effect of the transaction was to avoid, postpone or reduce the tax
liability.
77.
In Commissioner
for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd)
1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA) at 1159-1160 paras [11] and [12]; 61 SATC 391
(SCA) at 397 Hefer JA stated that:
“The
onus is on the Commissioner to prove that its effect was to avoid or
postpone the liability for tax or reduce the amount thereof. Upon
proof that this was the case it is presumed in terms of ss(4) that
the effect of the transaction was also its sole and main purpose.”
78.
Again, Heher JA in Commissioner,
South African Revenue Services v LG Electronics SA (Pty) Ltd
2012 (5) SA 439 (SCA) para [25] said:
“Affording
due weight to those of the grounds relied on by the appellant which
were either common cause or not seriously denied by the respondent,
the conclusion of the learned judge that the Commissioner
had proved no stratagem on the part of the respondent
in regard to the importation of the screens appear to have been
justified. There was no evidence to suggest that the respondent
manipulated the design or manufacturing or the importation process to
avoid payment of duties. This seems clearly to fall within that
category of cases where a man may legitimately order his affairs so
that the tax is less than it otherwise would be.” (Underlining mine
for emphasis)
79.
The views of the South African Court of Appeal in these two cases,
are at variance with the sentiments of MacDonald JP in Commissioner
v F 1976
(1) RLR 106 (A) at 115F-116A that:
“The
next point is that the Commissioner is obliged to exercise his powers
under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme has the
stipulated 'effect' if he is of the 'opinion' that the
requisite abnormality is present and if he is further of the
'opinion' that the taxpayer's purpose was as stated in the
section. Here again there is a clear indication that it is the
intention of the Legislature to cast the net in such a way as to
block every possible avenue of escape. This intention is also
manifest by the further provision that when the stipulated effect is
present and the requisite opinions are held the onus rests on the
taxpayer (under the Eleventh Schedule to the Act) to establish on a
balance of probabilities that he did not have the purpose set out in
the section. Moreover the section strikes not only at avoidance but
also at mere postponement and reduction. This is a further indication
of the Legislature's intention to make the section all-embracing.
In short, the Legislature, by every conceivable means, has
endeavoured to make it extremely difficult for a taxpayer to avoid
the payment of tax which, in the normal course of his business and
but for his desire to avoid, postpone, or reduce such payment, would
fall due.”
80.
The sentiments expressed by MacDonald JP are binding on me and
override the expressions of the South African Supreme Court of Appeal
which merely constitute persuasive authority.
81.
Again, it seems to me that section 63 of our Income Tax Act casts an
overarching shadow over the construction of section 98. The
Commissioner employs section 98 to impute income to the taxpayer and
raises assessments against which a dissatisfied taxpayer objects and
appeals.
82.
Such an objection and appeal challenges the assessment raised by the
Commissioner and thus falls squarely into the provisions of section
63.
Accordingly,
I maintain that the onus remains on the taxpayer to establish that
the first and second opinions of the Commissioner were wrong.
83.
The attempt to render the section 63 onus subservient to section 98
based on South African authority is contrary to our law.
“98
Tax avoidance generally
Where
any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction,
operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been
entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or
postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such
liability, and which in the opinion of the Commissioner, having
regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or
scheme was entered into or carried out —
(a)
was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would
not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a
transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction,
operation or scheme in question; or
(b)
has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created
between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction,
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or
scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion that the
avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the
amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main
purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner
shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as
if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or
carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he
considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such
avoidance, postponement or reduction.”
84.
The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the
Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary
for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert
1971 (3) SA 567 (A) at 571E-H thus:
(a)
A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;
(b)
Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on
income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;
(c)
In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances
under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or
carried out was entered into or carried out;
(i)
Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would
not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a
transaction operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction,
operation or scheme in question;
(ii)
Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created
between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction,
operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or
scheme in question; and that
(d)
The avoidance, postponement or reduction of the amount of such
liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of
the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.
85.
See
ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z) at 69; Commissioner of Taxes v F supra
at 115E-116A; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H) at
232F-233B; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1)
ZLR 348 (H) at 364C-D; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue
Authority
15-HH-575.
Whether
or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?
It
was common ground that the agreements between the related parties
fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.
Whether
the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing or reducing the
income tax liability of the appellant?
86.
Mr de
Bourbon
contended that the transactions were conceived in circumstances that
precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing or reducing
the appellant's taxable income.
87.
Mr Bhebhe
argued that they had such an effect.
88.
In Commissioner
of Taxes v F supra
at 115F MacDonald JP described it as the “stipulated
effect”
and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers
under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the
stipulated effect.
89.
The practical results of the agreements were captured in the
unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each
tax year. It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010;
US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that
the appellant made assessed losses before, during and after the
period covered by the assessments. The appellant never declared
dividends despite the bullish going concern annual reports.
90.
In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of
US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively. That Zimbabwe
taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed
the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exh 1
which reads:
“the
rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for
any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local
authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or
indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be
effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month
in which the related party has received written notice thereof from
the appellant.”
Accordingly,
I agree with Mr Bhebhe
that the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing
the appellant's liability for income tax.
The
circumstances prevailing at the time the agreement was entered into
or carried out?
91.
In the hyperinflationary era, the appellant averred that it could not
secure local contracts that would enable it to fully utilize all its
assets. The local currency lost value at an alarming rate. The
pricing of transport services became a nightmare. The income derived
from transport services could not sustain the local operations. It
was faced with the spectre of liquidation and staff retrenchments.
92.
The effect of which was that its loyal and skilled manpower mainly
consisting of approximately 110 drivers would lose their only source
of livelihood for themselves and their families while the company
mechanical horses and trailers would deteriorate through disuse.
93.
The appellant could not access the foreign currency required to
purchase spare parts and fuel necessary to keep the local operations
running. Hyperinflation had a negative effect on its ability to meet
local overheads such as salaries and wages and repairs and
maintenance of the vehicles.
94.
It was saved from this predicament by the related party, an
international haulier operating from South Africa to an array of
destinations in sub Saharan Africa. It required the excess capacity
held by the appellant to meet its own contracts and the experienced,
skilled and responsible pool of drivers in the employ of the
appellant who could not secure work permits in South Africa. The
appellant held road permits for the use of these assets on the routes
desired by the related party.
95.
The comparative advantages for the appellant were listed by the
general manager in charge of local operations.
96.
The appellant was inter
alia
assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign
currency supply accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3
forms to meet local expenses from a single client, it's fleet was
maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from
disuse, it was able to offer limited local transport services, it did
not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa,
Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi, it had a guaranteed free source of fuel
at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use and lastly it was able to
retain the pool of experienced internationally certified drivers
starving it off from liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs. The
parties agreed on charges per route rather than per kilometre.
97.
With the introduction of the multicurrency economic regime in
Zimbabwe in 2009, hyperinflation vanished. The parties renegotiated
the original agreement and introduced a 10% annual escalation clause
of the charge per route.
Whether
the transaction was entered into or carried out in a manner which
would not be normally employed for such a transaction?
98.
In Hicklin
v Secretary for Inland Revenue
1980 (1) SA 481 (A) at 494H-495D, 41 SATC 179 at 195 Trollip JA set
out the practical way of applying the normality and arm's tests. He
stated that:
“When
the 'transaction, operation or scheme' is an agreement, as in the
present case, it is important I think, to determine first whether it
was concluded at arms' length. That is the criterion postulated in
para (ii).
For
'dealing at arms length' is a useful and often easily
determinable premise from which to start the enquiry.
It
connotes that each party is independent of the other and, in so
dealing, will strive to get the outmost possible advantage out of the
transaction for himself….. Hence, in an at arms' length agreement
the rights and obligations it creates are more likely to be regarded
as normal than abnormal in the sense envisaged by para (ii).
And
the means or manner employed in entering into it or carrying it out
are also more likely to be normal than abnormal in the sense
envisaged by para (i).
The
next observation is that, when considering the normality of the right
or obligations so created or of the means or manner so employed, due
regard has to be paid to the surrounding circumstances.
As
already pointed out s103(1) itself postulates that.
Thus
what may be normal because of the presence of circumstances
surrounding the entering into or carrying out of an agreement in one
case, may be abnormal in an agreement of the same nature in another
case because of the absence of such circumstances.
The
last observation is that the problem of normality or abnormality of
such matters is mainly a factual one. The Court hearing the case may
resolve it by taking judicial notice of the relevant norms or
standards or by means of the expert or other evidence adduced there
anent by either party.”
99.
See also the sentiments of Hefer JA in Commissioner
for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd)
supra
at 1159 para [11].
100.
It is a notorious fact of commercial life that related parties enter
into contractual arrangements. I did not discern any abnormalities in
the nature of the agreements nor in the identities of the
signatories. There was however an admixture of the normal and
abnormal in the manner in which the agreements were carried out.
101.
For starters, the appellant overemphasized the indisputable
uniqueness of the manner in which the agreements were carried out. In
the letter of 24 October 2013 at p50.1 para 11 the external
accountants for the appellant wrote that “the
appellant's position is unique in the transport regime of Zimbabwe
and there is no other haulier which provides a similar service.”
The
same point was repeated in the letter of 6 December 2013 at p45.1 in
para 1.2 where the same accountants indicated that they “were
unaware of any Zimbabwean company which operates in the same unique
situation as the appellant.”
The
fixed rental fee with all maintenance and running costs for the
account of the tenant model was unique to the related parties and
therefore abnormal.
102.
Other hauliers including the related party conducted the haulage
business for their own account. The charge per trip and not per
kilometre was normal as demonstrated by two of the three local
cross-border hauliers engaged by the respondent for comparative
purposes.
103.
However the charge per leg per trip was abnormal. In charging per
trip, the comparative cross-border hauliers took into account a
variety of factors such as overheads, distance and the nature of the
load. What emerged from the comparative correspondence was that the
normal charging method was the cost plus mark-up model. The
ingredients that went into the charging model of the appellant and
the related party were not disclosed. That in my view was abnormal.
104.
In addition, the appellant was not candid with both the Commissioner
and the Court in regards to the pre-2009 charges. The 2009 agreement
recorded that “the
change in currency from the Zimbabwean Dollar to United States Dollar
which took effect in February 2009 did not have any effect on the
agreed rates as set out in the [8 October 2003] October Agreement.”
(Clause 2.2 to 6 July 2009 amendment).
105.
These were in South African rands, which remained and still remain
the currency of account of the agreement. Such disclosure would have
assisted in ascertaining whether the advent of the multicurrency era
resulted in an increase or a decrease of the rental charged in each
of the four tax years under consideration.
106.
I add for good measure that the payment of the remuneration of the
drivers used by the related party without any form of compensation
was abnormal as was the drawing of the related party's fuel in
Zimbabwe for free.
In
assessing the information availed to the Commissioner by the
appellant and to this Court by both the appellant and the
Commissioner, I am satisfied the agreements were carried out in a
manner which would not normally be employed in such transactions.
In
the light of the formulation of Trollip JA in Hicklin
v Secretary for Inland Revenue supra,
it appears to me that the two parties were not acting at arm's
length.
Whether
the agreement created rights or obligations which would not normally
be created between persons dealing at arm's length under such a
transaction?
107.
It was clear that each party derived tangible benefits from the
agreements.
108.
The related party had the right to lease the equipment and the
obligation to pay rentals and maintain the equipment. The appellant
received a fixed rental. The obligation to meet the maintenance and
running expenses was unique and abnormal. The fixed rentals which
negated the cost plus mark-up principle was abnormal and would not
have been concluded by parties dealing at arm's length.
109.
Again the use of the drivers by the related party for no compensation
just like the drawing of its fuel by the appellant for free were
rights that would not have been created by parties acting at arm's
length.
I
hold that the appellant did not act at arm's length with the
related party and concluded and executed an agreement that was
inimical to its bottom line.
Whether
the avoidance or reduction of tax was the sole or one of the main
purposes of the agreement?
110.
The appellant established that other economic considerations informed
its decision to enter into this agreement. It sought to avoid
liquidation and attendant costly retrenchments. These purposes were
achieved. The financial statements showed that it was in each year
“audited”
as “a going concern”.
111.
It seems trite to me that the purpose of a private company is to make
a profit.
112.
The appellant is not a non-profit making organisation. The appellant
was content with the untenable situation in which it made and
continues to make losses without any prospects of ever making a
profit.
113.
It seems to me that the fixed rental was deliberately designed to
ensure that the appellant would remain viable enough to survive
liquidation and costly retrenchments and at the same avoid or reduce
its income tax liability.
114.
That the spectre of income tax and indeed other imposts were
contemplated by the parties was apparent from the note on p12.29 of
exhibit 1 cited above where the parties agreed to adjust and revise
the fixed rental in tandem with “any
taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local
authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or
indirectly effect the said rates”.
115.
As it turned out the rate was merely increased in tandem with
inflation and not taxes because the appellant continued to make
losses.
I
am satisfied that the avoidance or reduction of income tax liability
was one of the main purposes of the agreement(s).
116.
In Partington
v Attorney-General
(1869) LR 4 HL 100 at 122 Lord Cairns stated that:
“As
I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if
the person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he
must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial
mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the
tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the
subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the
case might otherwise appear to be.”
117.
And in CIR
v IHB King; CIR v AH King
1947 (2) SA 196 (A) at 209 Watermeyer CJ made the poignant
observation that:
“If
a transaction is covered by the terms of the section its provisions
come into operation, if it is not then its provisions cannot be
applied.”
118.
In my view, the transactions undertaken by the appellant fell into
the all-embracing provisions of section 98. The respondent correctly
invoked this provision in assessing the appellant to income tax in
each of the four tax years in question.
119.
It is well to distinguish the finding in the present case with the
findings in G
Bank and H Bank supra.
The conduct of the banks unlike in the present case passed the
normality and arm's length tests. It is in such circumstances that
the “apt
reminder”
is invoked against the Commissioner.
120.
In cases where these twin principles do not apply such as in R
Ltd & Anor v Commissioner of Taxes
1983 (1) ZLR 157 (HC), 45 SATC 148 (ZH) at 176A-B and 178E and Michau
v Maize Board
2003 (6) SA 459 (A) para [40] and Commissioner
for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler
1953 (2) SA 584 (AD) at 591F the taxpayer is at liberty to reduce his
tax liability by taking advantage of positive incentives prescribed
in the Taxes Acts without attracting the stigma of tax avoidance.
Whether
the respondent correctly assessed the appellant?
121.
Mr de
Bourbon
contended by reference to exh 4 that the assessment was wrong and
submitted that it should be set aside.
122.
Mr Bhebhe
contended that the determination contemplated by the concluding words
of section 98 was based on estimated and not actual and correct
rates. The concluding words of section 98 require the respondent to:
“determine
the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the
transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried
out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it
considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such
avoidance, postponement or reduction.”
123.
The appellant strongly argued against the alteration of the contract
of lease concluded between the related parties by the respondent.
124.
While Mr
Bhebhe
conceded that the respondent did not have the legal authority to
alter the contract of the related parties he forcefully argued that
it had the power either to disregard the existence of the contract or
to neutralise its perverse income tax consequences and assess a fair
and reasonable tax. He contended that the respondent was empowered to
make assessments based on notional rather than on received or accrued
income.
125.
It is correct that the respondent did not have the legal power to
vary the contracts concluded by the related parties. However, while
the sanctity of contracts is a fundamental and foundational principle
of our law, it may be abridged by legislation.
126.
This point was made by Innes CJ in Law
Union and Rock Insurance Company Ltd v Carmichael's Executors
1917 AD 593 at 598 when he stated that:
“…
public
policy demands in general full freedom of contract; the right of men
freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject
matters. The general interest of the community may and does in
certain cases require the abridgement of this right. But language
enforcing such abridgement should be narrowly regarded and strictly
construed. For it cannot be thought that the legislature would in the
interests of the public infringe upon so fundamental a principle of
public policy to a greater extent than would be required to obviate
the mischief aimed at.”
It
is also correct that our income tax legislation is designed to tax
created income as opposed to notional income.
127.
In this regard Beadle CJ stated in Commissioner
of Taxes v Feldman & Others
1968 (1) RLR 85 (AD) at 95A that:
“The
Act seeks to tax income and a taxpayer's income is arrived at after
including in his gross income what had been 'received by or accrued
to' him during the year of assessment (see s8(1)).”
128.
He continued at 95G thus:
“Whichever
way the distribution is looked at, therefore, no 'amount' has
been received by or has accrued either to the partnership or to the
individual partners as a result of the dissolution. To attempt to fix
a notional value on an 'amount' not received or accrued, so as to
make it attract tax, is not I hope, the general purpose of the Act.”
129.
The learned Chief Justice however did acknowledge at p94G of the same
judgment that:
“It
is true that Income Tax Acts sometimes do strange things, and that
taxing a notional profit is by no means unknown. But in such cases
the language of the Act clearly indicates that this is the case.”
130.
I agree with Mr Bhebhe
that the closing words of section 98 in unambiguous language empower
the Commissioner to impute and tax notional income.
131.
However, the section does not provide the mechanism for determining
such income but accords a wide discretion on the Commissioner to do
so. In the exercise of his wide discretion the Commissioner elected
to apply the rate per km model using the 2013 rate per kilometre
supplied by the appellant in the computation of the notional income
in respect of each of the four years of assessment.
132.
It was common cause that in the determination of 14 November 2014,
the Commissioner recognised that the 2013 rate was not an accurate
and correct rate.
133.
The sole witness called by the appellant proffered some figures that
he alleged were the gross rates used by the related party in each of
the respective years, which were lower than the 2013 rates applied by
the respondent. His mere say so was inadequate to establish the
veracity of those figures. They were not subjected to an accuracy
test by the respondent as they were provided in the witness's
written statement some 3 weeks before the appeal commenced.
134.
The correct application of these rates to the formula propounded by
the respondent using the rates of exchange provided by the appellant
in each year would not result in the negative variances computed by
the appellant in exh 4 in all these years but would result in a
negative variance of US$100,782.51 for 2009, and positive variances
of US$187,174.47 in 2010, US$149,277.68 in 2011 and US$65,653.46 in
2012.
135.
Table 4 demonstrates how these variances arise and table 5 the tax
due.
Table
4: computation of variances using the rates supplied in evidence by
the appellant.
Year/item
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
Distance
km
|
359
478
|
505
748
|
456
664
|
450
074
|
Acceptable
rate
|
16.55
|
17.52
|
19.45
|
20.04
|
Expected
revenue
ZAR
|
4
759 488.72
|
8
860 704.96
|
8
882 114.80
|
9
019 482.96
|
Expected
revenue average USD rate
|
8.64
|
7.22
|
7.06
|
7.98
|
Expected
revenue in USD
|
688
583.44
|
1
227 244.45
|
1
258 089.92
|
1
130 261.02
|
Transport
services income AFS
|
443
388.98
|
582
023.44
|
578
854.59
|
523
247.16
|
Expenses
declared in Rands & USD at average yearly rates
|
2
989 241.00
345
976.97
|
3
372 076.00
467
046.54
|
3
741 501.00
529
957.65
|
4
320 056.00
541
360.40
|
Total
AFS & expenses USD
|
789
365.95
|
1
049 069.98
|
1
108 812.24
|
1
064 607.56
|
variance
|
-100
782.51
|
178
174.47
|
149
277.68
|
65
653.46
|
136.
Table 5: the computation of tax due from the appellant. The resultant
tax computations from the above would be as follows:
Year/item
|
2009
|
2010
|
2011
|
2012
|
|
Appellant
computations
|
-41
675.00
|
-75
497.00
|
-93
013.00
|
-20
652.00
|
|
Add:
Provisions
|
10
520.00
|
28
982.00
|
17
416.00
|
312.00
|
|
Bad
debts
|
-
|
-
|
18
783.00
|
-
|
|
Donations
|
-
|
-
|
100.00
|
-
|
|
Apportionment
of drivers salaries
|
90
908.17
|
158
374.08
|
170
616.13
|
190
669.93
|
|
Freight
rates adjustment (variance)
|
-100
782.51
|
178
174.47
|
149
277.68
|
65
653.46
|
|
Bank
deposits anomaly
|
100.25
|
0.31
|
0.00
|
85.47
|
|
Total
|
-40
929.09
|
290
033.86
|
263
179.81
|
236
068.86
|
|
Taxable
income
|
-40
929.09
|
290
033.86
|
263
179.81
|
236
068.86
|
|
Tax
at 25.75%
|
nil
|
74
683.72
|
67
768.80
|
60
787.73
|
|
137.
It seems to me that the appellant undermined its objection and appeal
by failing to provide the respondent with information on the gross
rate and the total operating costs of the related party as it did on
page 50.2 of exh 1 in respect of 2013.There was neither reason nor
logic in supplying 2013 figures when the investigation related to the
period 2009 to 2012.
138.
I formed the distinct impression from the appellant's conduct that
it was reluctant to supply the requisite information and to that
extent was uncooperative with the respondent.
139.
In that regard, the appellant deprived itself of the opportunity to
explore the eminently reasonable method of computing the acceptable
rate that would constitute the imputed gross rate applicable to the
appellant. The seeds of the suggested method were sown in annexure B
to the letter of 13 June 2014 on page 43.3 of exh 1. If I had that
information I would have marked down the total costs of the related
party by at least its proven mark-up to calculate a more realistic
gross rate for the appellant. It is apparent to me that the mark-up
of the appellant would have been lower than that of the related
party. The “acceptable rate” of R18.18 suggested a mark down of
19% from the gross rate of R22.47.
140.
The appellant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that
the same mark down rate pertained to the period under consideration.
The examples set out in annexure A of the objection letter at p31.3
to 31.5 of exh concerning 5 round trips in respect of each tax year
indicated the gross earning and total expenses and profit earned per
trip for the selected equipment and routes. These samples were too
limited in scope and depth and were thus unable to provide credible
information required to calculate the mark down rate.
141.
The use of the formula Mark-up= (A-(B+C)/B+C) x 100/1 where
A represented the gross revenue, B the costs less CD3 expenses and C
the CD3 expenses produced the average profit margin for the 5 trips
in 2009 of 11%, 2010 of 5%, 2011 of 1.8% and 2012 of 21%. The range
in 2009 was between -2.3% and 55.8%; in 2010 it was between -3.2% and
19.4%, in 2011 it was between -27% and 35% while in 2010 it was
between 3.5% and 32.3%.
142.
Faced with this difficulty, I adopted the gross rates the appellant
supplied and applied them as outlined in table 4 and 5 above.
I
will set aside the amended assessments issued on 23 June 2014 and
direct the Commissioner to issue further amended assessments that
adopt the computations in Table 4 and 5 of this judgment.
The
answer to the real question before me
The
answer to the question whether the Commissioner is empowered by
section 98 to impute notional income and proceed to tax it is
answered in the affirmative.
143.
The closing words of section 98 direct the Commissioner to “determine
the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the
transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried
out or in such a manner as in the circumstances of the case it
considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such
avoidance, postponement or reduction”
once the transaction, operation or scheme has the stipulated effect
and he firstly forms the opinion that it was entered into or executed
in an abnormal manner or was not entered into or executed at arm's
length and secondly, the further opinion that it was created and
implement for the purpose of avoiding, reducing or postponing the
payment of tax.
144.
I have found that the agreement had the stipulated effect and have
upheld the Commissioner's opinion in both the aforementioned
respects. The concluding words of section 98 provide the Commissioner
with a very wide discretion in computing the imputed notional tax.
145.
He would have been within his rights to treat the agreement as a
partnership despite the disavowal of the related parties in clause 8
of the 2003 agreement. He would off course have required information
on which to apportion the partnership shares based amongst other
factors on the ratio of the appellant's equipment to that of the
related party.
Whether
or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?
146.
It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations SI
163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance
Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The
period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to the 31
March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.
147.
The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure
was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax,
were under investigation or audit or were challenging their
assessments were not eligible.
148.
The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers. The
eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax,
penalties and interest once the application was granted.
149.
Mr de
Bourbon
contended that the appellant as a law abiding citizen was being
discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and
interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which
required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have
equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits
to the appellant. He submitted in the alternative that in exercising
its discretion this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any
additional tax and interest.
150.
Section 56(1) and (6) stipulate that:
“(1)
All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.
(6)
The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to
promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people
or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination, and —
(a)
such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;
(b)
no such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of
subsection (3).”
151.
Section 56 falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and
freedoms.
152.
In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution they apply to both
natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of
section 46 of the Constitution which amongst others requirements
prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in
section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society
based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a
Court of law.
153.
The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are
however not absolute rights.
154.
They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the
Constitution which states that:
“(2)
The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be
limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the
extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and
justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant
factors, including —
(a)
the nature of the right or freedom concerned;
(b)
the purpose of the limitation, in particular whether it is necessary
in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public
morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general
public interest;(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;
(d)
the need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any
person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;
(e)
the relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in
particular whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or
freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and
(f)
whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose
of the limitation.”
155.
The inarticulate major premise embodied in Mr de
Bourbon's
submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were to the extent
that they discriminated against the appellant unconstitutional. He
did not disclose how the Finance Act No.2 of 2014, on which these
amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality
stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.
156.
I await proper and well-reasoned rather than bald and unsubstantiated
legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the
taxpayer and the Commissioner. The arguments advanced are inadequate
to convince me on a balance of probabilities that the appellant
should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this
Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty
provisions.
The
main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are
accordingly dismissed.
I
therefore hold that the statutory instrument in question has no
application in the present matter
Penalties
157.
In para 51 of his written submissions, Mr de
Bourbon
conceded that the Commissioner was authorised by section 64(2) as
read with para (m) to the Eleventh Schedule of the Income Tax Act to
increase the level of penalties imposed during an assessment in his
determination of an objection. In the present matter the penalties
were increased from 90% to 100%.
158.
In terms of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act the Commissioner has
discretion to remit or waive additional penalty where the tax payer
did not intend to evade the payment of the tax due.
159.
Where the intention to evade, in any one of the three alternatives
propounded in ITC
1577,
56 SATC 236 of direct intent, awareness of certainty and awareness of
possibility is evinced, neither the Commissioner in the first
instance nor this court as a court of revision can on an appeal in
the wider sense remit or waive the additional tax to anything other
than 100%. See the remarks of Squires J in ITC
No 1334
(1981) 43 SATC 98 (Z) at 106 and of Smith J in ITC
1631 supra,
at p70.
160.
Mr de
Bourbon
urged me to apply the principles that I set out in PL
Mines v Zimbabwe Revenue
Authority
15-HH-466.
In imposing the penalty the Commissioner and the appeal court are
obliged to consider the triad of the offender, the offence and the
interests of society.
161.
Before dealing with each specific transaction for which penalty was
imposed I do take cognisant of the specific factors pertaining to the
appellant.
162.
It cooperated with the respondent in some and all instances. It was a
good corporate citizen which until the investigation under
consideration took place had complied with its tax obligations. It
was an employer which held the interests of its workforce at heart.
It served the country by bringing some modicum of foreign currency
into the country when the local economic environment was bleak.
163.
The offence of tax avoidance was described by MacDonald JP in
Commissioner
of Taxes v F supra
in rather strong language as an evil. Of course taxpayers are allowed
to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do
not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the
burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the
offender. Courts emphasise both personal and general deterrence in
imposing suitable penalties.
164.
As will appear in my assessment of each offending transaction, the
appellant and its tax advisers deliberately implemented an opaque
system of tax avoidance and reduction with the intention of evading
the payment of the correct tax due. This course of action obviously
raises the moral turpitude of the appellant and results in the
imposition of the maximum penalty permitted by law. The interests of
society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair
share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the
pinch.
165.
I have these factors in mind as I consider each offending transaction
and assess the suitable penalty. Penalties were imposed in respect of
the following transactions:
Provision
for leave pay and for security
166.
In each of the four financial statements in question the appellant
made provision for accrued leave pay due to its staff and in 2010 and
2011 a provision for security. Each provision was claimed as an
expense incurred under the general deduction formula, section
15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act in the year in which it was made but
was not reversed in the following tax year. The appellant conceded
the failure to reverse these provisions in each of the four years of
assessment. The sole witness for the appellant averred that this was
due to a bookkeeping oversight for which it did not evince any
intention to mislead the respondent or seek to obtain a tax
advantage.
167.
The appellant ended up erroneously claiming excess deductions under
this head of US$10,520 in 2009, US$28,982 in 2010, US$17,416 in 2011
and US$312 in 2012, which were added back to income by consent during
the investigations and included in the amended assessments.(P44.2 and
44.3 of exh 1 and p13.2 of exh 2).
168.
The respondent treated the non-reversal as a deliberate attempt to
evade the payment of the correct tax and imposed the penalty of 100%.
The appellant failed to show how such an error could have taken place
consecutively in each year.
It
seems to me that the respondent was justified in treating these
failures as deliberate attempts motivated by the desire to reduce the
appellant's tax liability. The imposition of a penalty of 100% in
these circumstances was justified.
The
2010 bad debt claim
169.
This was in respect of rentals in the sum of US$18,783 owed by a
tenant for the appellant's property in Mutare for the 2011 calendar
year. The claim in the summons and declaration issued on 22 May 2012
was in respect of arear rentals in the sum of US$2,000 per month for
the period 1 June 2010 to 31 December 2011, eviction and holding over
damages from 1 January 2012 and other consequential relief [p52 to
52.7].
170.
However an e-mail from the appellant of 10 October 2013 indicated
that the tenant paid all the rentals at the rate of US$2,300 per
month during 2010 but defaulted in 2011.
171.
The appellant included the unpaid rentals in its 2011 income but
reversed it all at the end of that calendar year. The tenant
commenced payment of reduced rentals of US$1,500 after the issue of
summons.
172.
In BT
(Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
14-HH-617, 12-FAC-012, I set out the three requirements that a
taxpayer is required to prove on a balance of probabilities in
respect of a bad debt. An application of these requisite elements
show that the amount claimed by the appellant was due and payable.
173.
The financial statements for 2011 were prepared on 14 March 2012, the
date on which the debt was declared to be bad. It is clear to me that
by that date the amount was unlikely to have been recovered at the
end of the 2011 financial year. The Commissioner must also have been
satisfied that it was a bad debt. The amount had been included in the
taxable income of the taxpayer in that year of assessment.
In
my view, the amount should have been deducted from the appellant's
income.
174.
For undisclosed reasons the appellant conceded that it wrongly
deducted the amount and Mr de Bourbon correctly found himself bound
by that concession that the appellant knowingly and voluntarily made.
Clearly
the imposition of a penalty of any nature let alone of 100% was not
justified. In the exercise of my discretion I will direct that the
penalty imposed in respect of the bad debt be discharged in full.
The
failure to reverse the donation of US$100 made in the 2011 financial
year
175.
This was attributed to a bookkeeping error. It was deducted in the
2011 tax computation as an expense.
176.
Again, like in the issue in respect of leave pay and security
provisions, the appellant failed to indicate how such “an
error”
could occur in the face of the accounting skills that were at its
disposal.
The
respondent was justified in treating the purported error as evincing
a deliberate intention to reduce the appellant's taxable income for
which he had no choice but to impose a 100% penalty.
The
failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed by the
appellant who drove the related party's vehicles
177.
The appellant paid all the statutory salaries and wages and
allowances of some of its drivers who drove the related party's
vehicles that did not form party of the leased equipment without any
form of reimbursement from the related party.
178.
The appellant always claimed these drivers wages as expenses against
income. The appellant admitted that it had been doing this for years.
This was only discovered during the investigation.
179.
On the advice of its South African based accountants, the appellant
agreed that 50.28% of the total wage bill be disallowed. This figure
was arrived at using the information on p42 to 42.6 exh 1. The agreed
amounts that were added back to income in respect of each tax year
are set out on pages 42.4, 42.6 and 38.2 of exh 1. They were
US$90,908.17 for 2009, US$158,374.08 for 2010, US$170,616.13 for 2011
and US$190,669.93 for 2012.
180.
It was apparent that the appellant did not incur the expense in
relation to these drivers. In terms of the agreements, the appellant
leased only its equipment and not the drivers to the appellant. All
the 110 drivers were not rendering any service to or on behalf of the
appellant but were doing so to the related party.
181.
In my view, there was no legal justification for the appellant to
deduct the wage bill of all the drivers who were driving both the
appellant's rented equipment and the related party's equipment.
182.
The appellant's case throughout these proceedings has always been
that it was not in the business of cross-border transportation. It
ill behoves the appellant to now claim that all the drivers involved
in the cross border haulage business of the related party were
actually engaged for the purpose of its own trade or in the
production of its income.
183.
The pleadings and evidence showed that its income in respect of this
equipment was derived from the rental agreements. The salaries of
these drivers were the responsibility of the related party.
184.
I fail to discern how any self-respecting internal and external
accountants of the appellant would allow such a practice to prevail
for as long as it did without batting an eyelid. The only reason it
prevailed was because the appellant and its erstwhile accountants and
tax advisers deliberately intended to evade the payment of the
appropriate tax due to the Zimbabwean fiscus.
The
penalty imposed of 100% was most appropriate.
185.
The
assessment of additional income from the hire of equipment to the
related party
186.
The appellant conceded that some level of additional tax less than
the 100% penalty imposed was appropriate. The appellant was
uncooperative.
187.
I have already found that the transactions infringed the provisions
of section 98. The appellant deliberately intended to evade the
payment of tax due to the respondent.
A
penalty of 100% was and remains most appropriate.
The
unreconciled bank deposits
188.
During the investigation the appellant failed to reconcile bank
deposits of US$100.25 for 2009, US$0.31 for 2010 and US$87.47 for
2012. These amounts were omitted from the taxable income of the
appellant and were added back by consent in the amended assessments.
The appellant failed to account for the anomaly.
189.
The issue is not how insignificant they are, but the principle
involved. This is because the logical conclusion such a contention
would be that payment of a 100% penalty on these insignificant
amounts would not place any undue burden on the appellant.
190.
The failure to explain the discrepancy does demonstrate a pattern of
tax avoidance or reduction on the part of the appellant that was
motivated by the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount
of tax due.
The
imposition of a penalty of 100% on these insignificant amounts was
and remains most appropriate.
Costs
191.
In terms of section 65(12) of the Income Tax Act, an order for costs
is only made against the Commissioner if the claim of the
Commissioner is held to be unreasonable and against the appellant if
the grounds of appeal are found to be frivolous.
192.
I do not find the positions taken by the Commissioner to have been
unreasonable neither do I find the grounds of appeal to have been
frivolous. Accordingly, each party will bear its own costs.
Disposition
Accordingly,
it is ordered that:
1.
The amended assessments number 1/3433 for the tax year ended 31
December 2009, 1/3434 for the tax year ended 31 December 2010, 1/3435
for the tax year ended 31 December 2011 and 1/3436 for the tax year
ended 31 December 2012 issued on 23 June 2014 be and are hereby set
aside.
2.
The Commissioner is directed to issue further amended assessments
against the appellant in respect of each year of assessment in
compliance with this judgment and in so doing shall:
(i)
Apply the gross rates per kilometre set out in table 4 in computing
the variance between the expected income and received income.
(ii)
Apply the average exchange rates between the United States dollar and
South African rand in each year of assessment of as set out in table
4 of this judgment of R8.64 for 2009, R7.22 for 2010, R7.06 for 2011
and R7.98 for 2012 to 1U$.
3.
The appellant is to pay additional tax of 100% in respect of
provision for leave pay and for security, failure to reverse the
donation, the failure to apportion the wages of the drivers employed
by the appellant who drove the related party's vehicles, hire of
equipment to the related party and unreconciled bank deposits.
4.
The additional penalty imposed in respect of bad debts is waived in
full.
5.
Each party shall bear its own costs.
Gill,
Godlonton & Gerrans,
appellant's
legal practitioners
Kantor
& Immerman, the respondent's legal practitioners