Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion, Tax Defaulters and the Tax Amnesty

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HH207-15 : G BANK ZIMBABWE LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

This is an appeal filed on 3 September 2013 by a registered commercial bank in the High Court in terms of section 65 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]. It arises from taxation in the four areas of staff retrenchment costs, Nostro accounts, Nostro charges [non-resident tax on fees] and offshore loans.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant called the evidence of 6 witnesses and produced a compendium of documentary exhibits encompassing some 1,207 pages. These documents were contained in 2 large box files, 2 lever files and 1 flat file. In addition, 10 loose leaf documentary exhibits that served as a useful summary to the compendium were produced.

The respondent did not lead any evidence. It was content to rely on the averments made in the 15-paged Commissioner's case and the 76 paged Rule 11 of the Income Tax Rules documents.

On 16 November 2012, the respondent issued to the appellant three amended assessments in respect of income tax for the tax years ending December 2009, 2010 and 2011 [p 1-3 Rule 11 documents], respectively.

The respondent objected to the assessments on 12 December 2012. The objections in respect of the subject matter for which the present appeal is concerned with were disallowed on 15 August 2013 [p 4-7 of Rule 11 documents]. However, on 21 November 2013 the appellant proceeded to issue further amended assessments for the tax year ending 31 December 2010 and 31 December 2011, respectively, after allowing deductions for VAT expenses incurred in the two years in question.

The issues for determination were:

1. Whether the appellant correctly brought the provision for retrenchment costs to account in its income tax return in the 2009 tax year.

2. Whether the respondent was entitled to deem the appellant's offshore Nostro accounts as interest-bearing accounts and the appropriate rate of interest.

3. Whether the respondent was entitled to attribute interest earned by non-resident related parties on loans made to businesses in Zimbabwe to the appellant.

4. Whether bank charges raised by offshore Banks holding the appellant's Nostro accounts amounted to fees under paragraph 1 of the 17th Schedule of the Income Tax Act....,.

NOSTRO ACCOUNTS

The Background

The respondent assessed the appellant for income tax over the 2009, 2010 and 2011 tax years. He observed “huge” balances of non-interest bearing amounts in the Nostro accounts held by the appellant with related parties that were, in his view, in excess of the monthly transactional requirements of the appellant.

Purportedly acting in terms of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] he imputed notional interest income to these accounts at the average local rates prevailing in Zimbabwe at the time.

It was common cause that the rates in Zimbabwe were much higher than the prevailing rates in the jurisdictions in which the Nostro accounts were held. The local interest rates applied were 12.4% for 2009, 11.65% for 2010, and 8.04% for 2011.

Notwithstanding some averments in the respondent's correspondence and Commissioner's case to the contrary, it is clear that the appellant did not actually earn such interest. The respondent deemed the appellant to have earned the ascribed interest income. He wrote back into the gross income of the appellant a total of US$5,392,369=88 for the 2009 tax year, US$11,429,964=09 for the 2010 tax year and US$8,065,117=68 for the 2011 tax year.

The appellant objected. The objection was disallowed, hence the appeal.

The Facts

The appellant relied on the oral evidence of its Head of Corporate Reporting cum Deputy Chief Finance Officer who is also a member of the Bank's Asset and Liability Management Committee. In addition, it relied on the documents in its bundle running from p 536 to 579. The bundle consists of the list of all the Nostro accounts held by the appellant [p 536-538]. Pages 539-579 consists of the transaction report of the debits from and credits to the Rand Nostro account of the appellant for the period 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2012.

The witness is responsible for all the reporting processes in the appellant including tax payments and the filing of tax returns. In that capacity he superintends over tracking balances, quantification, and reconciliation of all the appellant's Nostro accounts. He defined a Nostro account as a current account (also known as a clearing account), which a Bank in one jurisdiction opens in another jurisdiction to facilitate customer transactions in the currency of that jurisdiction. It is thus a current account held by a Bank in the books of a correspondent Bank in another country.

Nostro accounts facilitate trade and transactions between countries of varied currencies. He produced the list of all the 22 Nostro accounts, exhibit 3 and pages 536-538 of the bundle, held by the appellant throughout the world. The appellant holds Nostro accounts with other Banks of the same name worldwide (related parties) and other Banks not related to it (unrelated parties). Ten (10) of the accounts were held with related parties. The Nostro accounts, whether with related or unrelated parties, are all held at arm's length.

The witness stated that the most active Nostro accounts for the appellant were the Rand account held in Johannesburg South Africa with an unrelated party and the United States dollar account held in New York with a related party. He stated that the deposits into the Nostro accounts are made by customers and not by the appellant. The money is deposited directly into the customer's account and reflected in the Nostro account simply because the appellant is the banker to the customer.

The witness testified that Nostro accounts do not earn interest; a fact confirmed by his Chief Finance Officer on p30 of the Rule 11 documents.

It was evident from the evidence of the Head of Corporate Reporting that the appellant did not earn any interest on the deposits in the Nostro accounts. He produced a letter, exhibit 5, from the Director Global Head of USD Clearing Product Management, Americas, dated 2 September 2014, in response to a query raised on interest rates on clearing accounts. The letter reads:

“We are writing to you in response to your recent enquiries with regard to the non-payment of interest on your clearing account held with us.

As you will be aware, the global economy entered a recession (the Great Recession) in 2009, which had significant implications on the banking sector. The Federal Reserve took extraordinary actions in response to the financial crisis to help stabilize the US economy and financial system.

The actions included reducing the level of short-term interest rates to near zero. The Federal Fund's average rate since 2009 has been about 13bps (0.13%) whereas the average yields for three month US Treasury Bills since 2009 has been 8bps (0.08%) (refer to appendix to this letter) [produced as exh 4].

As a result of such low yields, interest rates on deposits placed in banks in the United States were significantly impacted, with many banks paying very little or no interest on deposits. We are aware that in some cases some of our competitor banks would in fact charge to hold customer deposits - resulting in 'negative interest' to their customers. The low interest environment continues to persist to date.

[Related Bank] NY, in general, pays no interest on the majority of the clearing accounts held for our clients, regardless of whether they are from [related Bank group] or from external parties.

We therefore confirm that the non-payment of interest on your clearing accounts with us has been, and remains, in line with market practice.”

Exhibit 5 confirmed that the appellant did not earn interest income on deposits in its United States dollar Nostro account resident in New York in the United States of America. The witness also produced exhibit 4, the Bloomberg US Generic Government 3 months' bond yield for any placement funds for the period 2 January 2009 to 14 October 2011. The average interest earned during that period was 0.08%. He confirmed his Chief Finance Officer's observation that call accounts earn the highest rate in those foreign jurisdictions.

The witness indicated that the appellant could only earn interest on transfer of the deposits from the Nostro account to an investment account such as a call account. The Bank also earns interest from buying Treasury Bills or other interest-bearing instruments. Interest was paid on the placement funds and accounted for in the respective tax years.

In 2012, a directive from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe stopped the offshore investment of funds from Nostro accounts.

It was common cause that interest rates offered internationally on placement funds were low as exemplified by the declared income earned on those accounts.

He disputed the averment that the Bank did not earn interest on Nostro accounts in order to avoid paying tax and averred that the Bank was in the business to earn income. He denied that the Bank entered into transactional operation schemes with Nostro banks to deliberately forego interest in order to postpone and avoid paying interest. He stated that the appellant Bank operated Nostro accounts, not as a vehicle to avoid, postpone, or reduce its tax obligations but as an objective banking necessity; as would any other Bank worldwide.

His testimony on the prevailing local position, before RTGS was introduced, tallied with the response of the appellant's Chief Finance Officer to the respondent of 10 December 2012 [p 30-33 of Rule 11 documents].The Chief Finance Officer indicated that in 2009 and 2010, before RTGS was introduced, the only option for local Banks was to hold foreign balances either as cash or Nostro balances. All Banks, including the Central Bank, opened correspondent bank relationships and used Nostro accounts to hold such funds in foreign Banks. The entire Zimbabwe National Payment System in this period was conducted through Nostro accounts and the level of balances was high for all Banks reflecting the size of clients for each Bank. He set out four reasons for Nostro accounts. These were;

(i) To ensure Bank liquidity to curtail a run on the Bank;

(ii) To maintain minimum liquidity levels set at the time by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe at 25% of customers deposits;

(iii) To safeguard depositor funds by diligent, prudential lending and thorough risk assessments of prospective clients; and

(iv) To support prompt settlement of customers' transactions.

When he was cross examined, he failed to state the balances sitting in the NY Nostro account at the end of 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. He did not dispute the averment that the balance in the New York Nostro account at the end of 2009 was US$10.4 million. He, also, did not dispute that the average monthly amounts held over the three years in issue in that Nostro account was US$18 million of which US$2 million routinely catered for the transactional requirements of customers leaving US$16 million idle. He maintained that the primary purpose of maintaining a Nostro account was to conduct customer business transactions. The witness maintained that the Bank was not obliged to lend money to earn income.

He revealed that the decision to move money from Nostro to RTGS to cash depended on the risk appetite and assessed needs of the Bank. He maintained that at the commencement of the multi-currency regime the Bank adopted a low asset to deposit ratio as it needed to fully understand the risk factors bedevilling the local economy.

In my view, the witness acquitted himself very well in respect of the Nostro accounts. He could not term the balances in the Nostro accounts huge.

The respondent averred, in the letter of 15 August 2013, disallowing the objection, that the justifications for the balances of liquidity risk management, safeguarding customers deposits, and prompt customer transaction settlement support did not eclipse the high balances that remained after these reasons had been taken into account. The magnitude of the balances, as disclosed in the cross-examination of the Head of Corporate Reporting, of US$16 million, was not disputed.

Counsel for the respondent suggested to the witness that the average monthly transactions were in the sum of US$2 million and US$16 million remained idle in the Nostro accounts and that this pattern characterised the period from 2009 to April 2012.

While the witness disputed they were huge, his immediate supervisor, the Chief Finance Officer, conceded they were huge.

I am satisfied that, in the context of the operational requirements, the balances were indeed huge.

The letter disallowing the objection further discloses that the respondent accepted that Nostro accounts did not create an entitlement to interest regardless of whether they were held with related or unrelated parties. It invoked section 98 of the Income Tax Act because the balances went beyond meeting liquidity and transaction purposes.

It was unclear why local rates were preferred to call rates prevailing in the jurisdiction of the correspondent Nostro bank. It was also unclear whether the proposal for the appellant to suggest other interest rates was limited to local interest rates or not.

Paragraph 14 of the respondent's case seems to concede that the computation of applicable interest could be extended to the foreign jurisdiction in which the deposits were made. That attitude is confirmed by the acceptance of the interest income declared on call funds invested in those jurisdictions. The view of the appellant was simply that the respondent had no legal right to intrude into its operational space in the absence of a local law that required it to move funds from the Nostro accounts into Zimbabwe to lend at the prevailing local interest rates.

The Legal Arguments

The basis for determining this issue lies in the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]. It reads:

“98 Tax Avoidance Generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

and the Commissioner is of the opinion that the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction.”

Counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no legal obligation for the appellant to have brought those funds onshore, earn interest, and avoid the 2009 loss. He further submitted that the respondent had no legal duty to direct how the appellant should run its business affairs.

He relied on the sentiments of WATERMEYER CJ in dealing with a provision in the South African tax legislation equivalent to our section 98 in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v IHB and AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A) at 207-208; (1947) 14 SATC 184 (A) at 190-191.

The essence of the sentiments being that section 98 cannot be invoked against a taxpayer who abstains from earning income by closing his business or resigning from employment or taking a lower paying job. The learned CHIEF JUSTICE listed several circumstances in which the equivalent to our section 98 would be inapplicable. He stated…,:

“These two types of cases may be uncommon but there are many other ordinary and legitimate transactions and operations which, if a taxpayer carries them out, would have the effect of reducing the amount of his income to something less than it was in the past, or of freeing himself from taxation on some part of his future income.

For example, a man can sell investments which produce income subject to tax, and, in their place, make no investments at all, or he can spend the proceeds in buying a house to live in, or in buying shares which produce no income but may increase in value, or he may invest the proceeds outside of the Union, or make investments which produce income not subject to normal tax in his hands, e.g. Union Loan Certificates, deposits in the Post Office Savings Bank or shares in public companies. He can also sell shares in private companies, the holding of which may subject him to heavy taxation in his hands although he does not receive the income which is taxed, or he can sell shares in companies which pay high dividends and invest in securities which return him a lower but safer and more certain income. He might even have conceived such a dislike for the taxation under the Act that he sells all his investments and lives on his capital or gives it away to the poor in order not to have to pay such taxation.

If he is a professional man he may reduce his fees or work for nothing, if he is a trader he may reduce his rate of profit or sell his goods at a loss in order to earn a smaller income. He can also secure deductions from the amount of his gross income, for example by insuring his life. He can carry out such operations for the avowed purpose of reducing the amount of tax he has to pay; yet, it cannot be imagined that Parliament intended, by the provisions of sec. 90, to do such an absurd thing as to levy a tax upon persons who carry out such operations as if they had not carried them out.

Moreover, the problem of deciding what the income of such persons for the tax year would have been if they had not carried out such operations would appear to be insoluble in some cases, if the countless possibilities of what they might otherwise have done with their capital or their labour are borne in mind.”

At p 210 he distinguished two meanings to which the term could apply and settled for the latter. He held:

“In order to answer these questions it should be realised that there is a real distinction between:

(i) The case of a man who so orders his affairs that he has no income which would expose him to liability for income tax; and

(ii) The case of a man who so orders his affairs that he escapes from liability for taxation which he ought to pay upon the income which is in reality his.

Similarly, there is a distinction between:

(i) Reducing the amount of tax from what it would have been if he had not entered into the transaction; and

(ii) Reducing the amount of tax from what it ought to be in the tax year under consideration.”

He held, at 210-11, that:

“If the words 'avoiding liability' and 'reducing the amount' are given the former meanings [(i) above] in sec. 90, then absurd results such as those mentioned above will follow; but, if the words be given the latter meanings [(ii) above], though some difficulties will still occur, absurd results are on the whole eliminated. The provision contained in sec. 90, that the taxpayer shall be taxed as if the transaction had not taken place, which suggests that he has escaped from a liability to which he ought to have been subject, strongly supports the view that the expression 'avoiding liability' and 'reducing the amount' should be given the latter meanings, and those are the meanings which should be given to them.”

In the present matter, the appellant did not earn any income from the Nostro accounts. Exhibit 5 demonstrates beyond a shadow of doubt that it was not possible for the appellant to have earned income from those Nostro accounts. The reality was that it was not going to earn any income unless it moved the deposits to a call account.

Counsel for the appellant submitted that section 98 of the Income Tax Act did not apply to the facts of this matter.

In Zimbabwe, SMITH J set out the four requirements that must co-exist in order to entitle the Commissioner to invoke section 98 of the Income Tax Act in A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (HC)…,. The four requisites are:

(a) The presence of a transaction, operation or scheme;

(b) Intended to avoid or postpone or reduce liability for any tax;

(c) Through means or ways not normally employed or which create rights or obligations which would not be ordinarily be created by parties dealing at arm's length;

(d) The Commissioner forms the opinion that the avoidance or postponement or reduction of such liability was the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

I deal with each of these requisites in turn.

(a) The appellant lawfully opened the Nostro accounts in question. The amounts in the accounts were deposited by clients in the normal course of business and not by the appellant.

The respondent suggested that the holding of funds in excess of the transactional needs for the clients was to the extent of the excess a scheme because this went unabated for three consecutive tax years.

I recognise, as SMITH J, and before him, McDonald JP…, in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (AD)…, did; that the words transaction, operation or scheme are all embracing and would apply to any activity carried out by a taxpayer.

In the circumstances of this case, I would find that holding excess idle funds in the Nostro accounts for three consecutive tax years constituted a scheme.

(b) The second element for determination is whether the scheme had the effect of avoiding or postponing or reducing tax liability.

The appellant stated that it could only earn income by moving the funds from the Nostro accounts to call accounts. It established, beyond a shadow of doubt, and the point was accepted by the respondent in the letter disallowing the objection, that Nostro accounts, whether held with related parties or not, do not earn interest. It was also accepted by counsel for the respondent, in argument, that the rates of interest offered on offshore call accounts was negligible. The appellant did not move the funds from the Nostro accounts onshore for two reasons;

(i) The first, proffered by the Chief Finance Officer of the appellant and amplified by his deputy in evidence, was that in 2009 and 2010, before the introduction of the RTGS platform in Zimbabwe, all funds were transacted through Nostro accounts.

In my view, that constituted the normal and usual method of operation for local Banks - including the Central Bank.

(ii) The second was that the prudential risk management policies of the appellant dictated that the money be kept in the Nostro accounts rather than be invested onshore.

The Bank had a low risk appetite and preferred to safeguard depositors' funds rather than invest the funds in a fragile and uncertain market. It does not appear to me that the scheme was entered into to avoid earning income. It was carried out to preserve the funds.

(c) The third element was not fulfilled.

It was the normal method of operation for any Bank with a Nostro account. It was not suggested by the respondent that the Nostro accounts with unrelated parties were operated differently from the ones in issue. The treatment and balances were the same for both related and unrelated parties. The Deputy Chief Finance Officer established that this was a common worldwide practice amongst all banks holding Nostro accounts. No rights or obligations not normally associated with this type of account were created for the related parties.

(d) The opinion of the Commissioner that the scheme was designed solely or mainly to avoid tax liability was incorrect.

It was common cause that the deposit of the funds in the Nostro accounts did not create a tax liability for the appellant. The decision by the appellant to hold the funds in the Nostro accounts, rather than investing them, could not, and did not, create any tax liability for the appellant. In the absence of such a tax liability, the Commissioner could not properly come to the opinion that holding the funds in the Nostro accounts was designed either solely or mainly to avoid, postpone, or reduce a tax liability that did not exist.

In deeming notional interest on the basis that the holding of huge amounts of idle funds in Nostro accounts did not make commercial sense for a Bank that derived most of its income from interest earnings, the respondent lost sight of the fundamental principle behind our income tax legislation. It is designed to tax income that has been created. The income must have accrued to or been received by the taxpayer. It is not designed to tax income which is not in and has not come into existence.

That the respondent was aware of this fundamental principle is demonstrated by the contradictory averments that characterise paragraph 13 of its pleadings.

It first suggested that the appellant committed tax evasion before imputing interest income that in reality was not earned. The bottom line was that either way income had to exist before it became liable to taxation. The income must either have accrued to or been received or deemed to have accrued or been received by the taxpayer in order to trigger tax liability.

In any event, it seems to me that, stripped of all the technical points, Commissioner for Inland Revenue v IHB and AH King 1947 (2) SA 196 (A)…,.; (1947) 14 SATC 184 (A)…, amongst other things, established that there is no obligation on any taxpayer to earn income.

The examples suggested by counsel for the appellant and conceded by counsel for the respondent demonstrate the point.

A registered legal practitioner in private practice who chooses to do pro bono work cannot be taxed on the notional income he could have earned. Nor would he be taxed on the income differential if he elects to take a less paying job in the public service. Indeed, neither would a Bank be assessed to tax on the highest interest rate offered in its or any other jurisdiction against any lower rate it would have accepted.

It is clear to me that where the activities of a taxpayer do not or fail to create income; it is beyond the remit of the Commissioner to wear the mantle of an investment adviser to the taxpayer and suggest to the taxpayer avenues for more income creation. I would add, as an apt reminder to the respondent, the words of BEADLE CJ in Commissioner of Taxes v Rendle 1965 (1) SA 59 (RAD)…, that:

“It is not for the Commissioner to direct how a taxpayer should run its business.”

It further seems to me that the Commissioner has no mandate to usurp the role of the onshore regulatory authority in respect of Nostro accounts. It was up to the appellant to deal with the deposits as it pleased subject, of course, to the requirements of both onshore and offshore regulatory authorities.

SILKE, in Income Tax in South Africa…, is to the same effect. The learned authors suggest that:

“If, by this interpretation, Internal Revenue considers that it is entitled to impute rights or obligations to a transaction that do not exist in the actual bargain between the parties, for example, to assume a reasonable rate of interest when none was actually stipulated, it is considered that it misinterprets s 103(1). On the basis of this principle, it is considered that the Commissioner is not entitled to apply s 103(1) in order to subject to tax a lender of an interest-free loan on an amount that he could have earned by way of interest had he charged it; a professional man who renders services to another person free of charge; or a trader who sells trading stock at a price below its current market price. In all these circumstances there is no amount 'received or accrued' on which an assessment may be framed. The existence of such an amount, it is submitted, is an essential requisite for the application of s 103(1).”

I am satisfied that the respondent wrongly invoked section 98 to the Income Tax Act to bring to account notional interest to the gross income of the appellant in the three tax years in issue.

HH621-15 : DELTA CORPORATION LTD vs ZIMABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO J

At the hearing of this matter I dismissed the appeal with costs and indicated that the reasons would follow. These are they.The facts of this case are largely common cause.On 23 May 1996, a firm of accountants, Messrs Deloitte and Touche (hereinafter “Deloitte and Touche”) wrote the following letter to ...

At the hearing of this matter I dismissed the appeal with costs and indicated that the reasons would follow. These are they.

The facts of this case are largely common cause.

On 23 May 1996, a firm of accountants, Messrs Deloitte and Touche (hereinafter “Deloitte and Touche”) wrote the following letter to the then Commissioner of Taxes (COT):

“Dear Sir,

BONUS SHARES (NINTH AND FIFTEENTH SCHEDULES TO THE INCOME TAX ACT)

The above term is not defined in the statute.

We would be grateful if you would advise us whether it is accepted that where a company, in declaring a dividend, allows its shareholders a choice of accepting cash or shares, those who opt for the latter receive “bonus shares”.

Yours faithfully

D and T”

The Commissioner of Taxes (COT) responded, on 8 July 1996, as follows:

“Dear Sirs

BONUS SHARES (NINTH AND FIFTEENTH SCHEDULES TO THE INCOME TAX ACT [CHAPTER 181])

You letter dated 23rd May 1996, reference RHMM/LWH/spw/12080, refers.

Please be advised that where a company declares a dividend which is immediately satisfied by issue of shares of an identical amount, no dividend is paid by the company and such shares constitute bonus shares.

Since there is no distribution of profits by the company and no property passed from the company to shareholders, what company does is to capitalise a portion of its profits. This does not constitute the payment of a dividend for income tax purposes. The fact that the company allows its shareholders an option of accepting cash or shares is not material.

Shares received in lieu of dividend are “bonus shares”.

Yours faithfully

T.I NCUBE (MRS)
For: ACTING COMMISSIONER OF TAXES”

The appellant, apparently acting on the strength of the above letter, did not pay withholding tax on scrip dividends issued subsequent to that letter.

On 24 November 2006, the Commissioner-General (COG) of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority, who is the successor to the Commissioner of Taxes (COT), wrote to the appellant requesting it to deduct and account for withholding tax for three years prior to that date on scrip dividends issued.

The appellant wrote back, on 5 December 2006, objecting and averred that in 1996 the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) had given a ruling upon the strength of which the appellant had acted. Such ruling, the appellant alleges, is binding on the current respondent.

The respondent disallowed the objection on 30 January 2007 and maintained that the withholding tax was due and payable chiefly because a scrip dividend was a dividend and not bonus shares.

The appellant was aggrieved by the decision and filed the present appeal.

The appellant's case is that the letter by the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) amounts to an advance tax ruling which binds the respondent and suggests that the benefits which are derived from the 1996 letter to Deloitte and Touche accrue to it as well. The appellant also avers that a scrip dividend is equivalent to bonus shares which type of shares are not subject to income tax in terms of the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]. It is also the appellant's case that a scrip dividend is incorporeal property in lieu of cash. The appellant further contends that it would not be proper for the respondent to demand arrear taxes when it acted in line with an understanding with the Commissioner of Taxes (COT).

The respondent's main line of defence is that the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) letter to Deloitte and Touche, in 1996, did not amount to a tax ruling. Rather, the respondent argues, it was just a confirmation of a position as perceived by Deloitte and Touche. The respondent also avers that if any benefit is to be derived from the said letter, such benefit can only accrue to Deloitte and Touche and not to the present appellant because it was not privy to the communication or transaction between Deloitte and Touche and the Commissioner of Taxes (COT), the respondent's predecessor....,.

The respondent has taken the position that a scrip dividend is not the same as bonus shares, and, for that reason, is not exempt from tax in terms of the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

In terms of sections 26 and 28 of the Income Tax Act, shareholders are liable to pay tax on their dividends. The company distributing such dividends is, at law, required to withhold such tax when it distributes the dividends and remit the same to the respondent. See sections 2(1) of both the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income tax Act.

Dividends, for the purposes of shareholders' taxes, are defined in terms of the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act as follows:

“'dividend' means any amount which is distributed by a company to its shareholders…,.”

The most important principle, in relation to this, emanates from the reading of the section itself.

The wording of the letter from Messrs Deloitte and Touche, to the Commissioner of Taxes, becomes relevant. It speaks to the state of the transaction involved. It says in part “…, where a company, in declaring a dividend, allows…,.”

The very act of declaring a dividend is distribution of an amount to the shareholders.

At this stage, before any further considerations are made, the amount so declared is a dividend and subject to the withholding tax.

The fact that the shareholders are then allowed an election, after the declaration of the dividend, matters not. By then, taxes would already have accrued by operation of law.

The act of declaring a dividend is not linked to the choice the shareholders are given in whether to accept cash or take a scrip dividend. The former precedes the latter. At the point the former is declared, tax is chargeable. Therefore, as at the time a dividend is declared, the appellant is obliged to withhold tax for onward transmission to the respondent. What happens to the dividend after that stage matters not for purposes of taxation.

This position is buttressed by section 1(2) under both the 9th and 15th Schedules to the Income Tax Act. The sections are similar and they provide for the following:

“A dividend shall be deemed to be distributed when it is paid to the shareholder, credited to his account or so dealt with that he becomes entitled to it, whichever occurs first.”

The question whether the appellant capitalized its profits can only be determined by having due regard to the circumstances surrounding the transaction. This position was succinctly put forward by BENJAMIN J in Wilson v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1926 CPD 63 70 in the following words:

“From a consideration of the judgment in that case, it appears the test to be applied is what was the intention of the company dealing with the matter; did the company intend that the sum dealt with should become income or capital. Thus, INNES CJ, in discussing the case of Bouch v Sproule (12 AC 385) said (at p.357):-

'It was a dispute as to whether the tenant for life or the remainder man was entitled to a bonus dividend applied in part payment of certain bonus shares. That depended upon whether the bonus was income passing to the tenant for life under the will or was an accretion of capital enuring to the ultimate benefit of the remainder man. So that the point which lies at the root of the present appeal fell to be decided: The facts were that the directors distributed certain accumulated profits (which had been temporarily capitalized) as a bonus dividend and allocated the new shares (partly paid up) to each shareholder, applying the bonus dividend in part payment of the new shares. Under these circumstances, it was held…, that the company did not pay or intend to pay any sum as dividend, but intended to do, and did, appreciate the undivided profits as an increase of the capital stock; the bonus dividend was therefore capital of the estate and the life tenant was not entitled to it or the shares.'

Again, in discussing the case of the Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Blott (35 T.L.R 687, 36 T.L.R. 575, 125 L.T 4970 he said (at p.358):

'The principle of Bouch v Sproule was applied – namely, that where the company has the power of capitalizing or distributing profits and decided to capitalize them, then the nature issued in respect of such profits was determined by the company's intention; and it was held that the procedure followed did not alter the real nature of the transaction.'

Again, a little lower down in the judgment he said (at p.361):

'The company ought, in the words of LORD HALDANE, to be 'dominant on the question whether the money in question was to be income or capital for all purposes.'”

It immediately becomes clear that for the shares to be considered bonus shares, it must have been a capitalisation of the undistributed profits at the instance of the company.

Once a dividend is paid out and the shareholder is given the option to use such cash dividend to buy more shares, such shares so bought are not bonus shares. This is no more than the shareholder electing to use his dividend to purchase more equity in a company.

The letter by Deloitte and Touche is clear in its tenor.

The choice is given to the shareholder whether to take the dividend in cash or in shares. There is nothing which stops the company from distributing the dividends in cash. In the same vein, there is nothing which would stop a shareholder from accepting some of the dividend in cash and the other part in shares. The intention of the company is paramount here - it was to distribute dividends to its members. It then gave the members a choice of accepting either cash or shares. The scrip dividend in this case does not cease to be a dividend. It is a dividend dealt in a particular way by the shareholder and not the company and it does not lose its status as a dividend. The scrip dividend, in these circumstances, is a dividend and not 'bonus shares.'

The submission by the appellant that “the company's accumulated profits have, as a matter of accounting practice, therefore been capitalised and thus the shareholder has received nothing out of the assets of the company for his separate use and benefit” cannot be correct.

The election to receive shares in lieu of a cash dividend in itself is a purchase of shares.

The choice given to the shareholder is that which shows that the profits have been distributed and the shareholder has elected to use his dues to buy more equity. Since a shareholder who accepts the dividend in cash is liable to pay tax, the fact that another has elected to deal with their dividend in a different manner does not make the dividend so received and utilised any less a dividend. The election to receive shares is a purchase of shares and the shareholder would have received something out of the assets of the company for his separate use and benefit. By distributing the dividend in the first place, the amount representing that dividend would have ceased to be part of the company's assets. The mere declaration of a dividend payable in one manner or the other means that such dividend ceases to be part of the company's assets and can be used by the shareholder in any manner he or she pleases.

On this premise, the contents of the letter by the Commissioner of Taxes (COT) to Deloitte and Touche do not capture the correct position of the law.

Equally untenable is the argument that a scrip dividend is not a dividend in that it is not an “amount distributed by a company to its shareholder.”

The fact of the matter is that the election only arises after the dividend is declared, the default position is that the dividend will be paid out in cash, an amount. When the shareholder elects to have shares instead, the shareholder would have disposed of his cash dividend and bought shares with it. The cash dividend which finances the purchase of shares is an 'amount.' The scrip dividend in that regard is also an amount.

It is not in doubt that after the appellant declared dividends, it invited its shareholders to decide whether to accept cash for the dividends or accept shares in lieu of cash. The acceptance of shares in lieu of cash simply means that the shareholders would have used their dividends to buy more shares in the appellant. The acceptance of shares in lieu of cash is no more than an instruction by the shareholder that his dividend ought to be used to purchase shares. This is totally independent from the declaration of the dividend. The declaration of the dividend is the act of the company and the acceptance of a scrip dividend is the act of a shareholder after the dividend has been declared.

Now, 'bonus shares' are shares which are given out by the company to its shareholders on a pro-rated basis and they are paid for from the company's undistributed reserve profits.

The intentions of the appellant are clear from the letter.

There was no scheme of the capitalisation of capital going on. The shareholders were given an election which they duly exercised. This is distinctly different from capitalization of undistributed profits.

The moment a company declares a dividend, and issues it out, the profits are distributed in the form of cash. The question of bonus shares does not arise as the company, by declaring a cash dividend, would have distributed the profits to its member. The question of bonus shares, which come about where a company does not distribute profits in cash and gives the members more shares in line with their shareholding in the company, does not arise in this case because the profits were distributed to the shareholder in cash as dividends.

'Bonus shares' are fully paid up using the company's reserve un-distributed profits.

The declaration of a dividend is, in its own, a distribution of profit. As such, the question of bonus shares cannot arise where such shares are paid for by proceeds from a dividend. In other words, a scrip dividend is not the same as a bonus share.

The Commissioner of Taxes was clearly wrong in saying that, in a script dividend situation, there is no distribution of profits and no property is passed from the company to the shareholders.

In a scrip dividend scenario, it is the individual shareholder who invests his dividend by purchasing more shares. In a bonus share arrangement, it is the company which pays for shares from the undistributed reserve profits and distribute the same to the members on a pro-rated basis. Both of these schemes result in shares for the members of a company but a scrip dividend is shareholder-driven and a 'bonus share' scheme is company-driven. As such, the principle relating to the two ought not to be conflated.

Perhaps the most important point to note is that where a dividend is declared, the shareholder becomes entitled to it and it attracts tax as at that point and the choice to take a scrip dividend can only be made after such tax is due by operation of law.

Now, regarding the retrospective effect of the Commissioner-General's (COG) measures, the revenue authority is not entitled, at law, to give anyone unlawful tax breaks and prejudice the fiscus.

Where the revenue authority has made an error, it is allowed to rectify it - even retrospectively.

SC140-21 : MBCA BANK (PRIVATE) LIMITED (Now known as Nedbank Zimbabwe Limited) vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and MAKONI JA

This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals, dated 28 November 2019, upholding the respondent's amended assessment of tax against the appellant.FACTSThe facts of the case can be summarised as follows;The appellant is a registered Bank in Zimbabwe. It is also a ...

This is an appeal against the whole judgment of the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals, dated 28 November 2019, upholding the respondent's amended assessment of tax against the appellant.

FACTS

The facts of the case can be summarised as follows;

The appellant is a registered Bank in Zimbabwe. It is also a subsidiary of MBCA Holdings Limited a local holding company, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Nedbank Limited (Nedbank) a South African company.

The respondent is an authority established in terms of the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11]. It is responsible for assessing, collecting, and enforcing payment of taxes to the State.

On 5 June 2012, the appellant filed its income tax self-assessment with the respondent for the tax year ending 31 December 2011.

On 27 June 2012, the respondent's Commissioner of Investigations and International Affairs launched a tax review of the appellant's operations for the period spanning January 2009 to May 2012.

The exercise resulted in the respondent issuing amended manual notices of assessment for Income Tax numbers 203324818 and 20324821 for the tax years 2010 and 2011 respectively.

The amended notice of assessment in respect of the 2010 tax year was subsequently withdrawn, whilst the amended assessment in respect of the 2011 tax year resulted in additional tax and penalties amounting to US$944,614=80.

The appellant objected to the amendment for the tax year ending 31 December 2011.

The respondent dismissed the objection after which the appellant appealed to the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals (the court a quo).

The issue before the court a quo was the validity of the amended assessment of Income Tax number 20324821, for the 2011 tax year.

The respondent disallowed the appellant's deductions pertaining to “expenditure incurred on general administration and management” in terms of section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] and debts written off by the appellant in its income tax self assessment as “bad debts” in terms of section 15(2)(a) as read with section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act.

It was established before the court a quo, that, the appellant is a subsidiary of MBCA Holdings Limited a local holding company, which, in turn, is a subsidiary of Nedbank Limited (Nedbank) a South African company.

In terms of section 143(1)(b) of the then Companies Act [Chapter 24:03] the appellant was deemed to be a subsidiary of Nedbank (South Africa).

During the 2011 tax year, Nedbank (South Africa) met several expenses on behalf of the appellant including travelling costs, telecommunications costs, and postage and freight costs. It also rendered services such as Group technology infrastructure and operation support services, system support service for the Africa Banking and e-commerce, strategic planning assistance, and risk advisory service assistance.

The appellant subsequently paid Nedbank (South Africa) for the incurred expenses and accounted for all the payments made thereto, including reimbursement, payment for services rendered, and general and specific administration costs through a single ledger account headed “Operating Costs”.

The respondent's amended assessment was based on its treatment of all the payments made to Nedbank (South Africa) by the appellant as general administration and management costs.

The respondent disallowed all amounts in excess of limits set in terms of section 16(1)(r)(ii) of the Income Tax Act.

In respect of bad debts, the respondent's position was that bad debts could only be claimed in terms of section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act and that the debts written off as “bad debts” by the appellant, for the 2011 income tax year, failed to meet the criteria established in terms section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT A QUO

In proceedings before the court a quo, the appellant submitted, that, general costs and not specific costs fell under the purview of section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act, while the respondent adopted the contrary view, that, section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act did not differentiate between general and specific costs, but, rather, gave effect to all costs incurred by a subsidiary company to its holding company as general administration and management expenses which were deductible in terms of the formula provided by section 16(1)(r)(i)and (ii) of the Income Tax Act.

In determining the appeal, the court a quo held, that, section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act constituted an anti-tax avoidance measure against a local taxpayer by limiting its allowable deductions in respect of general administration and management expenses incurred by a foreign holding company.

It held, that, the provisions were enacted by the legislature to prevent local subsidiary companies and their foreign holding companies from colluding to overload expenses on the local entity whilst simultaneously reducing its Zimbabwean tax liability and increasing the foreign entity's profits.

In respect of all the payments made by the appellant to Nedbank (South Africa), the court a quo held that section 16(1)(r) as read with section 26(2) of the Income Tax Act was applicable.

The appellant was therefore confined to the prescribed deductible income limits provided for in section 16(1)(r)(ii) of the Income Tax Act.

In view of the foregoing, the court a quo determined, that, the expenses deducted by the appellant in favour of Nedbank (South Africa) fell into the category of “expenditure on general administration and management” in terms of section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act.

The court a quo took into consideration the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary definition of the term 'administration' and 'management' respectively, and determined that the former related to “the act of administering, management” and the latter to “the act or manner of managing, administrative skill.”

The court a quo was, however, of the view, that, the definitions were not the determinant factors of the issue, as “all of the appellant's contracted functions (were) headlined as management of sorts” in the appellant's accounting books.

It held, that, the pertinent issue for consideration was the proper definition of the word 'general' which definition was held to pertain to “all or most of the parts of the whole, completely or approximately universal within implied limits.”

After determining the issue of deductible income in terms of section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act, the court a quo considered whether or not the bad debts claimed by the appellant were allowable deductions in terms of section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act.

The bad debts claimed by the appellant, in its 2011 tax assessment, pertained to the sum of US$2,250,365=17 being unsatisfied loans due to the appellant from its four Bulawayo-based corporate clients.

The respondent was not satisfied, that, the debts written-off by the appellant constituted bad debts in terms of section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant contended, that, loss sustained and written off by a banking institution or money-lending business (such as itself) from loans, constituted a deductible loss as contemplated in section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant argued, that, bad debts in the case of banking institutions and money-lending institutions come into existence by operation of law as contained in paragraphs 20, 22, 24 and 25 of the Banking Regulations 2000, SI205 of 2000 (the Regulations).

The appellant wrote off the four unsatisfied loans in terms of paragraph 22(e) of the Banking Regulations 2000, S.I.205 of 2000, at the lapse of 360 days, which, it argued, placed them in the ambit of section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act.

The court a quo held, that, a past due date loan could not be categorised as a loss when the loan was well secured and/or where legal action to satisfy the loan has commenced. It held that a loan could be classified as a loss when it is established that it can no longer be recovered.

It was established, that, the appellant had not commenced legal proceedings against its first borrower when the debt was written off.

It was therefore held, that, the appellant had failed to discharge the onus upon it to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the loan was not recoverable at the time that the loss was declared.

In respect of the appellant's remaining three borrowers, it was established, that, their matters were under legal proceedings, wherein the respondent had secured judgments against the borrowers but had only partially recovered the total amount due to it. Sureties for the three borrowers had not yet been sued.

The court a quo held, that, the appellant had failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the debts written off were unrecoverable and constituted a loss.

It held, that, the appellant had failed to establish loss as provided for in terms of paragraph 22(e) of the Banking Regulations 2000, S.I.205 of 2000 or debt in terms of section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act, thus precluding the appellant from claiming income tax deductions thereon.

The court a quo therefore dismissed the appellant's appeal.

Aggrieved by the decision of the court a quo, the appellant noted an appeal to this Court on the following grounds:

GROUNDS OF APPEAL

“1. The court a quo erred in finding that there is no distinction between the expenditure incurred on general administration and management as contemplated by section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] and remuneration for reimbursement of specific services or expenses paid by a subsidiary to a holding company.

2. The court a quo erred in finding that the disputed expenses constituted expenditure on general administration and management as contemplated by section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act and were properly disallowed.

3. The court a quo erred in finding that bad debts written off by a commercial bank (specifically in terms of the Banking Regulations SI205/2000) cannot constitute expenses incurred for the purpose of trade or in the production of income as contemplated by section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act.

4. The court a quo erred in finding that the disputed debts could not be categorized as losses in terms of paragraph 22(e) of the Banking Regulations.

5. Alternatively, the court a quo erred in finding, that, the disputed debts were not bad debts and therefore deductible from the appellant's income in terms of section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act.”

The appeal raises two issues for determination:

1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in determining that there was no distinction between general costs, as provided for in section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act, and specific costs incurred by a subsidiary in favour of its foreign holding company.

2. Whether or not the court a quo erred in finding that the disputed debts were improperly written off as bad debts and therefore not deductible from the appellant's income in terms of section 15(2)(a) or section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act.

SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE PARTIES

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the court a quo did not make a finding on the nature of the services, but, rather, the recipient of the services. He further submitted, that, the nature of the expenses was not distinguished as that is not in the judgment of the court a quo.

On the deductibility of bad debts, he argued, that, as per Salisbury Board of Executors Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes 1941 SR 147, such deductions depended on whether the losses are in the course of the business of banking or money lending.

He contended, that, debts written off constitute losses of a revenue nature.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, section 15(2)(a) and (g) of the Income Tax Act are distinct and it was difficult to see which one the court a quo was using between the two.

He asserted, that, section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act applied primarily to and regulates a situation where there is a secondary consideration. He contended, that, in terms of section 15(2)(a), all that needs to be proved is that bad debts were written off. Counsel for the appellant argued, that, the criterion in the banking regulation was met bringing the claim in the purview of section 15(2)(a) and not (g) of the Income Tax Act.

Counsel for the respondent submitted, that, the judgment of the court a quo is correct.

He argued, that, when interpreting any statute, the context is a major consideration as indicated in Zambezi Gas (Pvt) Limited v N R Barber (Pvt) Limited & Anor SC03-20.

Counsel for the respondent submitted, that, the appellant and Nedbank (South Africa) are related parties.

He further argued, that, the agreement between the parties stated that the services were general.

He contended, that, the heading thereon is management support agreement between the appellant and Nedbank (South Africa) and that the nature of the services is clear from the agreement itself.

Counsel for the respondent argued, that, the purpose of section 16(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act is not to distinguish between general and specific costs.

He submitted, that, a specific service may be paid for in an exercise of rendering general and administrative services. He further submitted, that, in any event, the appellant's witness stated, that, all expenses can be labelled under specific expenses.

Concerning the issue of bad debts, counsel for the respondent submitted, that, Salisbury Board of Executors Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes 1941 SR 147 is not relevant in this case as section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act was not in existence in its current form at the time of the (1941) judgment.

He argued, that, the thrust of the respondent's submission is that there were no actual losses incurred.

He further argued, that, in 2011, the appellant held security which was sufficient to cover the debts and that it was its duty, in terms of section 15(2)(g) of the Income Tax Act, to be satisfied that the debts were bad.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the discretion of the Commissioner was properly exercised.

In response, counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the respondent was attempting to use the agreement to blanket all expenses as general when there is a clear distinction in the provision of services.

Concerning the issue of bad debts, he argued, that, the main consideration was that it was a loss incurred in the course of trade.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS

1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in determining that there was no distinction between general costs, as provided for in section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act, and specific costs incurred by a subsidiary in favour of its foreign holding company

The first and second grounds of appeal raised by the appellant challenge the application of section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act to the expenses it incurred in favour of its holding company, Nedbank (South Africa).

The appellant contends, that, it made payments for specific services to Nedbank (South Africa), which payments were distinct from general administration and management expenses as contemplated in section 16(1)(r) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant is of the view, that, had the legislature intended that there should be no distinction between general and specific expenses, the inclusion of the qualifying term “expenditure incurred on general administration and management” would not have been included.

The appellant further submitted, that, the interpretation adopted by the court a quo would be applicable had the relevant provision read “expenditure incurred in favour of a holding company” without the aforementioned qualification.

In the case of Parkington v Attorney General 1869 LR 4 H.L. 100, 122 LORD CAIRNS, commenting on interpretation of fiscal statutes, said:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation it is this: If a person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

I respectfully agree with the position of the law as stated by his Lordship.

To this I would add, that, if an amount to be taxed, or the percentage at which a subject has to be taxed, or the formula for taxation is established, the subject will be taxed at the established amount, percentage rate, or in terms of the amount established by the formula.

The law applicable to the determination of this issue is provided for by section 16(1)(r)(i) and (ii) as read with section 26(2) of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

Section 16(1)(r)(i) and (ii) of the Income Tax Act provides as follows:

“(1) Save as is otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no deduction shall be made in respect of any of the following matters...,.;

(r) In the case of expenditure incurred on general administration and management in favour of a company of which the taxpayer is the subsidiary or holding company or (where the company is a foreign company) the local branch

(i) Incurred prior to the commencement of trade or the production of income or during any period of non-production, any amount in excess of zero comma seventy-five per centum of the amount obtained by applying the following formula —

A – (B + C)

Where —

A represents the total expenditure qualifying for deduction in terms of section fifteen;

B represents the expenditure on general administration and management paid outside Zimbabwe by such local branch or subsidiary, whether or not such expenditure was incurred by the head office of that foreign company;

C represents expenditure qualifying for deduction in terms of section (2) of paragraph (f) of subparagraph (i) of section fifteen;

(ii) Incurred after the commencement of trade or the production of income, any amount in excess of one per centum of the amount obtained by applying the above formula.”…,.

Section 26(2) of the Income Tax Act provides as follows:

“(2) For the purposes of this section, any amount paid outside Zimbabwe by a local branch or subsidiary of a foreign company in excess of the amount allowable as a deduction in terms of paragraph (q) or (r) of subsection (1) of section sixteen shall be deemed to be the payment of a dividend upon which non-resident shareholders tax shall be charged, and the term 'dividend' shall be so construed for the purposes of the Ninth Schedule.”…,.

It is trite, that, the objective of interpretation of statutes is to discover the intention of the legislature, which, once established, must be applied as the law governing the interpreted provisions of the statute.

It is also trite, that, provisions of a statute must be interpreted within the context of the statute in which they are found.

The Constitutional Court, in the case of Chihava & 2 Ors v Provincial Magistrate Francis Mapfumo N.O. & Anor CC06-15…, said:

“The starting point in relation to the interpretation of statutes, generally, would be what is termed 'the golden rule' of statutory interpretation. This rule is authoritatively stated thus in the case of Coopers and Lybrand & Others v Bryant 1995 (3) SA 761 (A) at 767;

'According to the 'golden rule' of interpretation, the language in the document is to be given its grammatical and ordinary meaning, unless this would result in some absurdity, or some repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument.'…,

In his book 'Principles of Legal Interpretation - Statutes, Contracts and Wills' 1st Ed. at p57, EA KELLAWAY echoes this statement….,. The learned author, at p62, states:

'Even if a (South African) court comes to the conclusion that the language is clear and unambiguous, it is entitled to reject the purely literal meaning if it is apparent from the anomalies which flow therefrom that the literal meaning could not have been intended by the legislature.'”…,.

At pp7 to 8 the court said:

“The principles set out in the dicta cited above can aptly and instructively be summarized as follows:

(i) The Legislature is presumed not to intend an absurdity, ambiguity, or repugnancy to arise out of the grammatical and ordinary meaning of the words that it uses in an enactment.

(ii) Therefore, in order to ascertain the true purpose and intent of the Legislature, regard is to be had, not only to the literal meaning of the words, but also to their practical effect.

(iii) In this respect -

(a) The words in question must be capable of an interpretation that is 'consistent' with the rest of the instrument in which the words appear;

(b) The state of the law in place before the enactment in question is a useful aid in ascertaining the legislative purpose and intention, and

(c) Where an earlier and later enactment (or provision) deals with the same subject matter, then, in the case of uncertainty, the two should be interpreted in such a way that there is mutual consistency.”…,.

Section 16(r)(i) and (ii) as read with section 26 of the Income Tax Act establish that the intention of the legislature was to prevent related parties from colluding to overload expenses on the local entity whilst reducing Zimbabwean tax liability and increasing the foreign entity's profits.

It is clear, that, the limitation of deductible expenses provided for by section 16(r)(ii) in respect of expenses incurred after the commencement of trade or the production of income, arrived at after calculations in terms of the fomula in section 16(r)(ii) cannot be exceeded.

The use of the words “any amount paid outside Zimbabwe by a local branch or subsidiary of a foreign company in excess of the amount allowable as a deduction in terms of paragraph (q) or (r) of subsection (1) of section sixteen shall be deemed to be the payment of a dividend upon which non-resident shareholders tax shall be charged” limits the amount allowable to the amount imposed by the formula.

It is apparent from these provisions, that, a limit of allowable deductions has been set and has to be complied with by a tax payer and enforced by the respondent.

I am satisfied, that, the interpretation adopted by the court a quo is consistent with the intention of the legislature and cannot therefore be said to constitute a misdirection.

The intention of the legislature, in section 16(r)(i) and (ii) as made clear by section 26 of the Income Tax Act must be given effect.

Whether or not the court a quo erroneously made findings concerning the literal and ordinary grammatical meaning of the term “general administration and management” as averred by the appellant, is of no consequence as the overriding consideration in the circumstances, in my view, is that the intention of the legislature supersedes a literal interpretation of a provision of a statute.

To uphold the assertion, that, a subsidiary “will be unduly taxed for expenses legitimately accrued to its holding company” would be incorrect, because, that provision specifically relates to foreign-incurred expenditure and the need to avoid abuse of the local tax system to the benefit of foreign entities.

I am of the view, that, the interpretation proffered by the appellant would have the effect of creating room for every local entity in a similar position to claim expenditure for specific costs to the detriment of the objectives of the law.

I respectfully associate myself with the reasoning and interpretation of the court a quo. Its decision should therefore be upheld....,.

The court a quo correctly interpreted section 16(1)(r) as read with section 26 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] as having been enacted to prevent Zimbabwean companies, which are subsidiaries of foreign holding companies, from colluding to overload expenses on the local entity whilst reducing Zimbabwean tax liability and increasing the foreign entity's profits.

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

This is an appeal against four amended income tax assessments number 20211442 for the year ending 31 December 2009; 20211443 for the year ending 31 December 2010; 202211446 for the year ending 31 December 2011; and 20211448 for the year ending 31 December 2012 that were issued against the appellant by the respondent on 27 June 2014….,.

On 25 July 2014, the appellant objected to the amended assessments in terms of section 62 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]. On 22 October 2014, all the objections were disallowed save for a few relating to penalties.

The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 30 October 2014 and duly filed the present appeal on 18 December 2014.

The appellant called the evidence of two witnesses, an independent tax consultant, LM, who worked for the respondent for the 16 years to 2006 and its Managing Director. In addition, it produced four voluminous documentary exhibits in excess of 500 pages, exhibits 1 to 4.

The respondent called its Chief Investigations Officer, OM, who has held that office since 2011 but with a total of 14 years experience, produced a 9 paged documentary exhibit, exhibit 5, and relied on the mandatory R11 documents.

Background

The appellant was incorporated on 29 September 1995 and underwent two name changes, on 24 April 1996 and 9 October 2014….,.

The second name change was precipitated by the acquisition of the South African registered sister company by the appellant's holding company on 1 June 2005.

Sometime in 2010…, the respondent commenced the tax compliance investigation on the appellant that resulted in the amended tax assessments that gave rise to this appeal. The appellant's main business activities in the four years in question were in the importation, distribution, and marketing of motor vehicles and spare parts of a specified brand….,.

The 1996 Distributor-Assembler Agreement

Initially, on 24 June 1997, the appellant entered into a detailed 53 article distributor-assembler three year agreement, the original agreement, with NML, a Japanese conglomerate engaged in the development, manufacture, and assembly and worldwide distribution and sale of an international brand of various models of motor vehicles and spare parts, retroactively from 1 April 1996….,.

The appellant had access to the conglomerate's trademarks, trade names, and engineering technology and was authorised to purchase, manufacture, assemble, market, distribute, and sell certain models of the brand, knocked down components, and spare parts through a network of dealers appointed by the appellant and approved by the conglomerate in Zimbabwe.

The ordering, production, shipment prices, and payment of the vehicles and components, in an amount sufficient to cover the price, was regulated by Articles 5 to 7 of exhibit 3….,.

The appellant met the full cost and expenses of the shipment and demurrage, and storage costs of the vehicles and spare parts. The risk for loss or damage passed to the appellant once the goods crossed the ship's rail at the port of shipment - but ownership and title of the goods was retained by the conglomerate until the payment obligation had been discharged.

It was discharged by payment into an L/C bank account opened in the name of the conglomerate by a bank acceptable to the conglomerate by irrevocable letters of credit at sight in favour of the conglomerate at which point the appellant simultaneously received the shipping documents for the relevant goods through that opening bank.

Because the timelines for ordering and the confirmation of the orders and payment preceded the production of the vehicles, ownership passed to the appellant on delivery of the vehicle FOB past the ship's rail at the port of shipment.

The appellant was solely responsible for securing Government licences and permits required to complete payments for and importation of the ordered goods….,.

The terms and conditions contemplated a cash before delivery sale.

The conglomerate could export and deliver to, and sell in Zimbabwe, brand vehicles in its own name through the agency of the appellant and pay the appellant for the services rendered.

The conglomerate played an active advisory role in the establishment of the appellant's business and was entitled to receive prescribed mandatory reports at specified periods and to inspect the appellant's operations.

The appellant undertook to maintain sufficient working capital and investment capital to enhance its business activities.

Each party was, in terms of Article 39-2, responsible for any and all expenditure incurred and assumed in the performance of its duties, obligations, and responsibilities.

Article 44 provided that:

“This agreement does not constitute either party as the agent or legal representative of the other party for any purpose whatsoever. Neither party is granted any expressed or implied right or authority to assume or to create any obligation or responsibility on behalf or in the name of the other party or to bind the same in any manner whatsoever.”

The appellant was also required to purchase a specified minimum number of vehicles, gain market share, and, in the event of a decline due to circumstances beyond its control, implement agreed counter measures to arrest the decline or risk termination of the agreement.

It appears to me, that, these were standard terms and conditions found in international contracts for the facilitation of international trade as demonstrated by their striking similarity with the conditions found in Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola & Ors 1976 (4) SA 464 (A) especially in regards to the payment arrangements and the passing of both risk and ownership.

The 1 August 2007 Memorandum of Understanding

The appellant and the related party…, whom I shall refer in this judgment as the intermediary, signed a memorial of the procedures for importation of vehicles into Zimbabwe in the Memorandum of Understanding dated 1 August 2007.

The intermediary was required to place monthly production orders with the brand suppliers. The importation value of the consignment was reflected in a manual invoice issued by the intermediary to the appellant. The vehicles were imported into Zimbabwe and held in the appellant's bonded warehouse as consignment stock with the intermediary retaining ownership of the vehicles until payment was made. Once payment was made, the invoice was stamped by customs officials and duty and other imposts paid for the consignment by a clearing agent before ownership was transferred to the appellant. The appellant, in turn, invoiced and transferred the vehicles to an authorised dealer for sale.

The Distribution Agreement of 25 April 2011

On 25 April 2011, the appellant and the conglomerate entered into a “Distribution Agreement”…, consisting of 39 Articles with retroactive effect…, from 1 February 2007.

It appeared to be a reproduction of an incomplete Distribution Agreement dated 31 January 2007 that was only signed and initialled by the appellant's Managing Director….,.

It substituted the original agreement.

The preamble, structure, and, in most respects, the contents, mirrored word for word the original agreement. The noticeable change was the wholesale removal of the right to purchase knocked-down kits for assembling from and the transfer of technological assistance and assembly by the conglomerate to the appellant.

Articles 21, 22 and 23 mirrored word for word Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the original agreement in respect of the ordering, production, and shipment of the vehicles and spare parts.

Article 24, like Article 10 in the original agreement, dealt with the supply of spare parts whose purchase prices were computed on a cost, insurance and freight (CIF) or free on board (FOB) basis derived from a price list provided by the conglomerate.

The grounds for termination were generally similar to those in the original agreement.

The Memorandum on Sales and Purchase of the Conglomerate Vehicles of 25 April 2011

The appellant and the conglomerate entered into a memorandum on Sales and Purchases of brand vehicles with the intermediary, retroactive from 1 February 2007, soon after signing the Distribution Agreement.

The appellant appointed and the conglomerate approved the appointment of the intermediary as the intermediary for the sale and purchase of the vehicles from the conglomerate under the Distribution Agreement.

The three parties agreed that the intermediary would purchase the vehicles from the conglomerate and sell them to the appellant.

The parties all incorporated the ordering, pricing, and payment and supply of spare parts provisions in Articles 21, 23 and 24 of the Distribution Agreement. They further agreed that any violation or default of those provisions, by the intermediary, would be ascribed to the appellant.

The Management Services Agreement between the Appellant and the Intermediary of 2 March 2009

On 2 March 2009, the appellant and the intermediary entered into a Management Services/Technical Services Agreement which was governed by the laws of Zimbabwe and took effect on 1 March 2009.

They were motivated by the introduction of the multi-currency financial regime in Zimbabwe. It was to run for an indefinite period. The intermediary undertook to:

“Provide administrative services, financial services and support and logistical services and support to help appellant achieve its goals in terms of gaining market share, growth and profitability…, ensure that new developments and systems will be properly communicated together with appropriate facilitation of technical support, system materials and training…, (and) be available to provide help and guidance on any aspect of the business mentioned, at the request of appellant.”

In regards to the computation of the fees, the parties agreed that:

“The intermediary will calculate the fees based on both the turnover reported by appellant and also the level of input that has been provided in terms of this agreement. The fees to be provided for shall be 2% of turnover; however, this will not necessarily be the amount finally invoiced. The amount finally invoiced shall not exceed 4% of turnover.”

And, in respect of payment, they agreed that:

“Payment of the management fees shall ordinarily be made in the year following that on which the fees have been based on receipt of an invoice from the intermediary. For cash flow purposes, it will be permissible to make part payments, but, at least two half-yearly payments will be required.”

The implementation and operation of the agreements

The evidence of the appellant's Managing Director was that the intermediary, a Mauritian registered short-term credit financier interposed between the conglomerate and the appellant in the purchase of the vehicles and spare parts destined to Zimbabwe.

Customers in Zimbabwe would place an order on the brand model of their choice, either to the appellant or an approved dealer appointed by the appellant. The appellant would group the orders and submit a bulky order of the required stock of vehicles, four (4) months in advance, to the intermediary, which, in turn, placed orders with the conglomerate.

The conglomerate would build the ordered vehicles for the intermediary.

The intermediary would purchase the vehicles, in its own name, from the conglomerate, and consign them directly to the appellant's bonded warehouse in Zimbabwe.

The intermediary retained ownership of the consignment in bond until it was paid.

Ownership vested in the appellant upon payment of the purchase price equivalent to the value for duty purposes.

Thereafter, the appellant would, where applicable, pay customs duty, surtaxes, and VAT based on the agreed value, through a clearing agent, before the consignment was released from the bonded warehouse and delivered to the approved dealer and end user.

The appellant used to import stock from a South African related party and the conglomerate under value rulings 18 and 29 of 2001 before the advent of the French holding company. These were replaced by value ruling 15 of 2007, on 5 November 2007, following upon protracted negotiations between the appellant and the respondent that commenced on 26 March 2006….,.

A sample of the documents used in the consignment of the vehicles from the intermediary to the appellant were captured on pp14 to 38 of exhibit 2 and pp1 to 9 of exhibit 5.

These were commercial invoices, telegraphic transfers, and Zimra certificates of origin, bills of entry, and customs clearance certificates.

These commercial invoices…, denoted the intermediary as the supplier and the appellant as the purchaser and consignee.

The vehicles were fully described by model, chassis and engine number, colour, and year of manufacture.

The order number, dates of issue and delivery, method of shipment, origin and destination together with the terms of payment, the free on board purchase price, the cost of freight, insurance and total CIF price, denominated in United States dollars, were also indicated.

The certificates of origin…, certified that each vehicle was manufactured by the supplier in South Africa and bore the same information contained in the commercial invoice in regards to the supplier, consignee, and description of the vehicle.

The bills of entry…, were completed by the clearing agent and identified the intermediary as the exporter or consignor.

They identified the country of supply and destination, the description, and total invoice value of each vehicle separately from the freight and insurance charges.

The customs clearance certificates…, for each vehicle were issued by Zimra.

They contained the full description of the vehicle shown in the commercial invoice. The cost, freight, and insurance price for each vehicle sold was captured in a combined invoice…, issued by the intermediary to the appellant, which the appellant submitted to its bankers with instructions to pay the intermediary by telegraphic transfer….,.

The sequence of dates on these documents showed that an advance payment by telegraphic transfer was made on 12 February 2007, the certificate of origin was presented on 15 April 2007 while the commercial invoice was issued on 24 April 2007 and the vehicle was cleared by a bill of entry at the port of entry on 9 May 2007. Thereafter, a customs clearance certificate was issued on 19 June 2007.

It was common ground, that, the intermediary's consignment was delivered to Zimbabwe and warehoused by the appellant in bond.

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not suffer any exposure to foreign currency risk or credit risk since the end users were required to make payment before the relevant vehicles were dispatched from South Africa…, in 2009 and 2010.

However, in 2011 and 2012, the appellant was exposed to foreign currency risk through the importation of inventory, the liability of which was settled in South Africa in a carrying amount of US$264,729 and US$294,956 respectively….,.

It was common ground that the appellant received vehicle prepayments in the sum of US$2,064,187…, in 2010 that was subsequently revised to US$4,693,512…, in the 2011 financial statements, US$3,086,165 in 2011…, and US$755,673…, in 2012.

Summary of the Tripartite Arrangement

The nature and scope of the tripartite arrangement between the parties was concisely set out by counsel for the respondent in paragraph 5 of his written heads of argument.

A customer placed an order to the appellant through an approved dealer appointed by the appellant. The appellant placed orders with the intermediary, which, in turn, procured the motor vehicles from the conglomerate.

The appellant received the motor vehicles in Zimbabwe and kept them in a bonded warehouse.

Ownership of the motor vehicles remained with the intermediary until duty had been paid by the appellant.

The purchase of a motor vehicle by a customer resulted in the payment of duty to the respondent by the appellant before the vehicle was released to the customer.

The intermediary was paid the transaction value of the motor vehicle, which, according to the letter of the appellant to the respondent, of 8 August 2007, included a 5% administration charge and interest of the selling price on the price list…, in which was incorporated its mark-up of between 7.5% and 10%.

The appellant was responsible for rentals, marketing expenses, and payment of duty.

It sold the vehicles to the dealers at a mark-up of 7.5% and the dealers sold the vehicle to the end customer.

Concessions made at the commencement of the appeal hearing

At the commencement of hearing, the appellant confirmed the concession first made in the letter of 19 June 2014, that, it was remiss in failing to charge the intermediary a mark-up of 7% for transit services rendered in the sum of US$2,240 for 2009, US$2,505=87 for 2010 US$2,198=13 for 2011 and US$3,273=40 for 2012 in respect of vehicles exported by the intermediary to Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania.

Again, the appellant conceded, that, it paid management fees to the intermediary when such fees were not due in the sum of US$130,000 in 2009, US$140,000 in 2010, US$256,629 in 2011 and US$140,000 in 2012.

In the same vein, the respondent conceded, that, it wrongly raised notional interest at the rate of 24% in the sum of US$97,279=92 in respect of the 2012 loan to GS and in the sum of US$106,953=12 for 2010, US$266,879=52 for 2011 and US$124,666=80 for 2012 in respect of the loans availed to ADI.

Assessment of witnesses

The appellant acted in a devious manner in regards to management fees. Its conduct amounted to a deliberate act of transfer pricing which was done with intent to avoid tax.

The production of backdated agreements gave the impression that these were created as a response to the tax investigation.

This was apparent from the purported agreement of 31 January 2007 which had the appellant's signatures only that was rejected by the respondent and resulted in the production of duly signed agreement of 25 April 2011 backdated to 1 February 2007.

The Managing Director misled the court that the appellant provided functional analysis input under duress, contrary to his letter of 12 July 2013 in which he requested two weeks within which to provide the requested information, thus affording the appellant in excess of a month from the date of the initial request.

He disputed making prepayments to the intermediary yet the financial statements, in note 17 on p71 of exhibit 1, show that US$4,693,512 was paid in 2010 and US$3,086,165 in 2011 before the vehicles were exported in bond.

He falsely averred, and thus copied the evidence adduced by the Tax Consultant in his presence, that, the audits for his company commenced in November of each year in contradistinction to the timelines indicated in the audit engagement letter.

The tax consultant prevaricated on what the respondent's generally prevailing practice in regards to provisions was.

The chief investigations officer failed to demonstrate how he arrived at the apportionment ratio he used in his functional analysis. He testified that the appellant misled the respondent by claiming ownership of the consignment stock at the time he applied for the value ruling, contrary to the contents in the letters written by the appellant at that time.

The issues referred for determination

At the pre-trial hearing of 2 June 2015, the following issues were referred for determination. In view of the concessions made by the respondent at the commencement of trial, it is no longer necessary to outline in respect of the loans advanced by the appellant to GS and ADI.

Sharing of profits/transfer pricing

1. Whether or not the respondent is precluded from adopting its current stance on this issue on account of either:

1.1 The value ruling issued by it; or

1.2 The fact that duties and taxes were assessed and paid to it on a different basis.

2. Whether the respondent is entitled to invoke section 24 of the Act to deem income to have accrued to the appellant which was not actually received by it.

Expenses relating to Leave Pay and Audit Fees

1. Whether it was proper of the appellant and open to the appellant to make provision for the costs in question.

2. Whether the respondent was precluded from issuing amended assessments by virtue of the provisions of section 47 of the Act.

Penalties

1. What, if any, penalties are payable to the respondent.

I proceed to deal with each issue in turn.

Sharing of profits/Transfer Pricing

The respondent's current stance

The position adopted by the respondent during the investigation, objection, determination, and espoused in correspondence with the appellant, and in evidence and argument at the appeal hearing was to disregard the values of the motor vehicles received into the country by the appellant that were accepted by the Commissioner-General in the Value Ruling No.15 of 2007 of 5 November 2007 issued under sections 106 and 113 of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02] in preference to the values derived from the functional analysis purportedly computed in terms of section 24 the Income Tax Act.

The Value Ruling

The Value Ruling No.15 of 2007 was issued on 5 November 2007. It replaced two other value rulings, Numbers 18 and 29 of 2001.

The transaction value accepted by the respondent, in the first value ruling, was based on the “invoiced prices plus dutiable adjustments” and in the second value ruling it was based on the invoice price plus Yen12,500 on each complete CKD kit and automobile CBU plus dutiable adjustments value and an uplift on the spare parts of 5% of the invoice price plus dutiable adjustments.

The transaction value of the consignment stock provided in section 113(2) of the Customs and Excise Act also included all costs, charges, and expenses incidental to the sale and handling and transport costs from the port of exportation to the port of importation in Zimbabwe.

The application preceding Value Ruling 15 of 2007 was necessitated by the change of ownership in the appellant through the purchase of 75% of the appellant's capital by a French company which also wholly owned the share capital in the intermediary. The holding company instigated the substitution of the conglomerate and the South African company in the supply matrix by the intermediary with the result that the appellant was designated as the importer and the intermediary as the supplier in the Value Ruling Number 15 of 2007.

The Ruling stated that:

“MOTOR VEHICLES

Invoiced prices plus dutiable adjustments are acceptable.

SPARE PARTS

Invoiced prices plus dutiable adjustments are acceptable.

Transaction Value, TV, Method applicable.

Subject also to the inclusion of all costs, charges, and expenses not mentioned above which are incidental to the sale and to placing the goods on board the means of transport they are removed from country of exportation. Any subsequent costs, charges, and expenses incurred in delivering the goods to the place of importation in Zimbabwe should also be included in terms of the Customs and Excise Act.”

The covering letter of the same date explained that:

“Based upon the information you have provided regarding your importations from the intermediary - RSA, the following value ruling number 15/2007 has been issued by the Commissioner General of the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority in terms of section 106 and 113 of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02] as amended.

The value for duty purposes will consist of the total price paid or payable (directly or indirectly) for the goods, plus any necessary dutiable adjustments referred to in section 113 of the Customs and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02].

Your necessary dutiable charges/adjustments include the cost (not already included in the invoice) of any packages, packing, loading, handling, transport, and insurance associated with the transportation of the goods to the place of importation in Zimbabwe.

Provided that the relative amounts can be distinguished from the price of the goods and the necessary documentary evidence is furnished with the customs entry, the cost of transport and insurance beyond the place of importation may not be included in the value for duty purposes.

The Commissioner General has made the ruling in accordance with the principles of the WTO valuation code based upon the present terms and conditions of trading between yourselves and the supplier concerned, as made known to the Department.

Any changes of these terms and conditions of trading must be notified to this office immediately.”

In a further covering letter of the same day, the respondent confirmed that the appellant was the importer.

However, this view was contrary to the insurance attestation on pp73 and 74 of exhibit 2, covering the 2007 calendar year, in which the French based insurance brokers certified that the intermediary's vehicles sold to the appellant were validly insured against damage and that the insurance policy was subject to automatic renewal from year to year. The risks covered were identified in bold print as:

“all risks from the warehouse of the seller to the warehouse of the consignee in Zimbabwe, on CIF value.”…,.

Sections 104 to 119 in Part X of the Custom and Excise Act [Chapter 23:02] deal in detail with the computation of the value for duty purposes.

The value, for duty purposes, is derived from the transaction value of the goods or services imported or due to be imported into Zimbabwe. The formula is provided in section 105(1) and in the opening words of section 106(1) of the Custom and Excise Act in these terms:

“105 Value for duty purposes

(1) For the purpose of assessing the amount of any duty payable on any imported goods and for the purpose of any declaration or oath which may be required by this Act or any other enactment in relation to any question of value or duty in connection with the importation of goods, or goods which are likely to be imported, the value of such goods shall, subject to this Act, be the transaction value thereof as established or determined in terms of sections one hundred and six to one hundred and twelve.

106 Transaction value: primary method of valuation

(1) Subject to this Act, the value for duty purposes of any imported goods shall be the transaction value of the goods, that is to say, the price actually paid or payable for the goods when sold for export to Zimbabwe, adjusted in terms of section one hundred and thirteen, if —“…,.

The price actually paid or payable on imported goods is defined in section 104 of the Customs and Excise Act as the aggregate of all payments made or to be made on these goods by the importer to the seller that is to the satisfaction of the Commissioner and the value determined by the Commissioner of any consideration or services rendered or to be rendered by the importer for the benefit of the seller.

The concept of related parties is captured in section 104(3) of the Customs and Excise Act to include individuals who, inter alia, are officers or commissioners in each other's businesses or corporate bodies in which any other person, directly or indirectly, owns, controls or holds at least 5% of the issued shares of both or both are so controlled by a third person or control a third person or are members of the same family.

In terms of section 104(4) of the Customs and Excise Act, any sole agent or distributor or concessionaire of the other who falls into any of the categories listed in subsection (3) is deemed to be a related party under Part X of the Customs and Excise Act.

There are five other elaborate methods of computing the transaction value of goods for duty purposes set out from section 107 to section 112 of the Customs and Excise Act.

These comprise of the first alternative method and second alternative method which are based on the values of identical and similar goods, respectively, exported to Zimbabwe at about the same commercial level and the same quantity at about the same time.

The third alternative deductive method is based on comparative sales between unrelated parties of similar or identical goods less any commissions, mark-up, cost of sales, transport, loading and unloading, handling and insurance costs within Zimbabwe from the place of importation and any duty or tax payable locally on importation or sale of the goods.

The fourth alternative method relies on the manufacturer's production costs plus mark-up.

The final alternative method is a fall back method, which incorporates the preceding four methods with necessary modifications.

The respondent is precluded from resorting to fictitious or higher alternative values from the country of origin or to any prescribed minimum custom values.

The adjustments prescribed by section 113 of the Customs and Excise Act are additional to the price actually paid or payable by the importer to the seller to the extent that they were incurred by the buyer and were excluded in the price actually paid or payable. These includes: packing, loading and unloading, handling, transport and insurance, royalties and licence fees for the use of intellectual property rights, transport and insurance from the place of manufacture to the place of export to place of importation into Zimbabwe but the costs incurred within Zimbabwe, from the place of importation, are excluded from the transaction value.

It is clear from the provisions of section 114 of the Customs and Excise Act, that, the value of any imported goods in the Bill of Entry does not constitute the value determined and accepted by the Commissioner for duty purposes.

In correspondence, and the determination to the objection, as well as in pleadings, evidence, and argument, the respondent advanced two reasons for abandoning the Value Ruling in the present matter and electing to assess the appellant for income tax purposes on a different basis:

(i) The first was that the Value Ruling applied to the determination of the duty value of the imported motor vehicles, which constitute the subject matter of the income tax appeals.

(ii) The second and alternative contention was that the respondent was not bound by the Value Ruling as from 1 March 2009 and throughout the tax years in which the appeals relate because the appellant reneged on one of the terms and conditions going to the root of the Value Ruling in that it failed to inform the Commissioner General of the Management Fees/Technical Fees Agreement entered into with the intermediary on 2 March 2009.

Whether the Customs and Excise Value Ruling binds the Commissioner in an Income Tax matter

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the Commissioner was bound by the Value Ruling in question in the present income tax appeals even though it was made to resolve a Customs and Excise question.

Counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions on the point.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, as a single entity, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority was obliged by the fundamental provisions section 68 of the Constitution and section 3(1)(a) of the Administrative Justice Act [Chapter 10:28] to act in a lawful, reasonable, and fair manner in utilising its opinion formed under the Customs and Excise Act on the transaction value of the imported motor vehicles to the computation of the purchase price under the Income Tax Act.

He contended, that, the Commissioner could not possibly justify the change of opinion, reflective as it was of his state of mind, in the finding that the relationship between the appellant and intermediary did not influence the transaction value.

He further contended, that, the importer had proved, to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, that, the transaction value closely approximated the values referred to in section 106(2) of the Customs and Excise Act.

Counsel were however agreed, that, there was no specific section in the Scheduled Acts which require the Commissioner to act in the manner advocated by counsel for the appellant.

The foundational provisions of the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11]

It is indisputable, that, the respondent is created by section 3 of the Revenue Authority Act [Chapter 23:11] as a single entity with the seamless functions outlined in section 4, amongst which is the assessment, collection, and enforcement of the payment of all revenues under the administrative purview of a single Commissioner-General appointed in terms of section 19.

However, in terms of section 20 and 21, the Board also appoints Commissioners in charge of such departments or divisions that the Board may establish but who serve under the control of the Commissioner General and who administer the Scheduled Acts listed in the First Schedule amongst which are the Customs and Excise Act and the Income Tax Act.

The Commissioner-General is empowered to exercise the functions conferred on each of these Commissioners and may delegate such authority to any member of staff.

The delegated authority, unless set aside by him, is deemed to be his authority.

In terms of section 34D, the Commissioner General may personally, or by proxy, make an advance tax ruling on any provision of any of the Acts in the First Schedule of his own accord or on application by an interested person to a taxable transaction.

Tax is defined in the Fourth Schedule as “any tax, duty, fee, levy, charge, penalty, fine or any money levied, imposed, collected or received in terms of any of the Acts specified in the First Schedule” while “relevant Act in relation to an advance tax ruling means any one the Acts specified in the First Schedule in respect of which the ruling is made or sought.”

The context and the 13 minimum contents of an Advance Tax Ruling are provided in paragraph 2(2) of the Fourth Schedule to the Revenue Authority Act.

Sub-paragraphs (2)(c) to (f) require a complete description of the proposed transaction for which the ruling is sought and its impact on the tax liability of the applicant and a citation of the relevant statutory provisions or issues and reasons why the proposed ruling should be made.

It is apparent to me, contrary to the contention propounded by counsel for the appellant, in paragraph 12(b) of his written heads of argument, that, the application for the Value Ruling, set out in exhibit 2, does not meet these minimum requirements in respect of the Income Tax Act.

In this regard, the submission made by counsel for the appellant, in paragraph 10 of his written heads of argument, to the effect that one ruling in respect of one Schedule Act fits all the other Scheduled Acts in regards to the same imported item, is devoid of any merit.

The differentiation applied by the respondent was lawfully grounded in the minimum requirements for an Advance Tax Ruling provided in paragraph 2(2) to the Fourth Schedule of the Revenue Authority Act.

Again, the Value Ruling falls woefully short of the requirements of paragraph 6 of the same Schedule failing as it does to apply to the relevant Income Tax Act.

While the facts and circumstances may be the same as in the value ruling, the four requirements in paragraph 6 are conjunctive; so, the failure to fulfil any one is fatal to the appellant's contention seeing it falls outside the time frame of the advance ruling and the requirement to update the Commissioner with any new information affecting the value ruling.

The attempt to export the favourable interpretation in paragraph 4(1) of the Fourth Schedule to the Revenue Authority Act, from the Customs and Excise Act to the Income Tax Act, flounders on the phrase “apply the relevant Act” defined with reference to the specified Act in respect of which the ruling was made or sought.

The value ruling was not sought and obtained in terms of the Income Tax Act but in terms of the Customs and Excise Act.

In the alternative, counsel for the appellant submitted, that, like should be treated alike otherwise it would be unconscionable for the respondent to alter its opinion merely for the sake of extracting as much income tax from the appellant as it did with respect to customs duty on the same facts and circumstances.

He submitted, that, by making the Value Ruling, the respondent, in essence, determined, as contemplated by section 106(2) of the Customs and Excise Act, that the two related parties acted at arm's length, a consideration in convergence with the requirements of section 24 of the Income Tax Act.

He argued, that, the juxtaposition of a different and contradictory opinion on the purchase price, under the Income Tax Act, to the transaction value under the Customs and Excise Act of the self-same imported vehicles, was both illogical and unlawful.

The judicial definition of an opinion

The word opinion is not defined in any of the Taxes Acts. It has been judicially defined in a number of cases:

In Judes v District Registrar of Mining Rights, Krugersdorp 1907 TS 1046…, INNES CJ equated a decision, in the absence of a qualification, with a final determination.

Both Herbert Porter & Co Ltd and Another v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1974 (4) SA 781 (W)…, and Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 (A)…, defined decision as “the final and definite result of examining a question” and “adjudication in the juristic sense, i.e. a final and definite result in consequence of examining a question”, respectively.

These definitions were adopted in Media Workers Association of South Africa & Ors v Press Corporation of South Africa Ltd (Preskor) 1992 (4) SA 791 (A)…,. This was a labour matter in which the relevant statutory provision stipulated that “an assessor shall be a person, who, in the opinion of the Chairman of the Court, has experience in the administration of justice or skill in any matter which may be considered by the Court.”

By reference to The Shorter Oxford Dictionary, it was held, at 796E, that, an opinion was a matter of speculation which could not be proved by any available evidence to be right or wrong.

In the local case of R v Foster 1962 (1) SA 280 (SR)…, BEADLE CJ held that:

“Opinion means something different from 'intention'…,. If the long and complex definition of 'opinion' in the Shorter Oxford Dictionary is examined, it will be seen that the meaning of 'opinion' includes only such things as 'a judgment' or 'a belief of something'. It does not include merely an intention.”

However, in R v Sibanda & Ors 1965 RLR 363…, an opinion of a court was equated with a judgment derived from objective facts and not a belief.

In my view, the publication and contents of the Value Ruling No.15 of 2007, and the accompanying correspondence, demonstrated that the Commissioner-General was alive to the powers vested in him generally by Part X, and, in particular, by section 106 and 113 of the Customs and Excise Act.

It seems to me, that, the provisions in Part X delineate almost all the possible ingredients that constitute a transaction value for the purposes of computing the duty value of an imported item under the Customs and Excise Act.

In summary, the ruling was that the sum payable to the intermediary was the value for duty purposes and that amount was religiously treated by the appellant as the purchase price of the motor vehicles in all its tax returns from the time it took effect.

And rightly so, for those ingredients, in my view, are similar to the considerations which must necessarily constitute the purchase price of such an imported item for Income Tax purposes.

In ruling on the transaction value for duty purposes, the Commissioner General made a final and definitive determination amounting to an “adjudication in the juristic sense, i.e. a final and definite result in consequence of examining a question” or a 'judgment' as indicated in Knop v Johannesburg City Council 1995 (2) SA 1 (A) and R v Foster 1962 (1) SA 280 (SR), respectively.

That final and definite determination was that the relationship between the appellant and the intermediary did not influence the price actually paid for the goods concerned.

The opinion of the Commissioner was that the parties acted at arm's length in setting the transaction value.

The finding was based on the objective assessment of the information provided to the Commissioner, which information would, more or less, be used to determine the purchase price of the imported vehicles.

The introduction of a different statute would not change the value of the motor vehicles nor the finding that the parties had an arm's length relationship, especially in view of the respondent's refusal to refund the duty, surtax, and VAT paid on the higher transactional value.

Clearly, the appellant cannot approbate and reprobate in respect of the same motor vehicles simply because the imposts are levied under two different statutes.

Contrary to the submission by counsel for the respondent, in paragraph 11.2 of his written heads of argument, I am satisfied, that, the assessment and payment of import duties and taxes based on the transaction value of these vehicles, which was objectively ascertained by the respondent, is binding on the respondent.

The appellant has shown that it knows of no other means and the respondent has not discharged the evidentiary onus that shifted to it of showing how the purchase price required for the computation of taxable income on these vehicles could have been arrived at other than in the same way that was used to ascertain the transaction value.

Was the respondent entitled to invoke section 24 of the Income Tax Act to compute notional income?

The respondent conducted a tax compliance investigation of the appellant in respect of the four years in question. It was dissatisfied with the transactions between the appellant and the intermediary, who were related parties.

The basis of the disquiet was that import documents showed the appellant as the owner of the vehicles in the bonded warehouse when in fact ownership vested in the intermediary who insured them whilst in bond.

The prepaid forex amount on the price list was the Carriage Insurance Paid (CIP) price equivalent to 40% of the total cost of the vehicle.

In addition, the appellant was responsible for the payment of rentals for the bonded warehouse, advertising and promotion expenses, clearing charges, and management fees, which expenses it claimed from its income.

At the same time, the owner of the motor vehicles incurred comparatively less costs and enjoyed more of the profits in a foreign tax jurisdiction beyond the reach of the respondent.

The respondent formed the opinion, that, the arrangement was intended to reduce the appellant's profits in Zimbabwe and transfer them to this other tax jurisdiction to the obvious detriment of the Zimbabwe fiscus.

In the result, the appellant invoked the provisions of section 24 of the Income Tax Act, and, in collaboration with the appellant, conducted a functional analysis of the transactions in the supply chain, from the purchase of the vehicles from the conglomerate by the intermediary to their disposal to the dealers by the appellant, and concluded that the transactions between the two were not conducted at arm's length.

On the basis of functional analysis, it apportioned and adjusted the income, expenses, and profits earned from this supply chain in the ratio of 61% to the appellant and 39% to the intermediary.

Even though these expenses were paid by the appellant, the respondent disallowed the portion attributed to the intermediary.

Functional Analysis

The Chief Investigations Officer testified, that, this was an international best practice adopted by revenue authorities to assess the true income earned by related parties from transactions carried out for mutual benefit that fail the arm's length test.

In its simplest form, a functional analysis determines what part of a transaction was undertaken by the various parties involved in that transaction.

In the present case, the parties were the manufacturer (conglomerate), the intermediary, the appellant, and the parent company.

The respondent categorised the functions under, functions performed; the attendant risks; and the assets used and apportioned percentages to the work performed by each player.

The respondent raised the functional analysis method around April-May 2013 on realising that the appellant was paying both management fees and a mark-up of between 7.5% and 10% on the conglomerate bought-out price to the intermediary.

On 24 June 2013, it supplied the appellant with the “Appellant's Functional Analysis” document…,.

The document was divided into six columns headed functions, and each of the names of the four parties involved in the taxable transaction was indicated. The last column was reserved for comments.

The functions covered, firstly, management and administrative services and the associated tasks of communication with customers, the handling of payment from buyer and to suppliers, provision of accounting and management services and maintaining customer negotiations, accounting and financial records and inventories.

The second function was in respect of marketing and customer liaison and the associated tasks for the development, preparation, approval, implementation and funding of marketing strategies and programs which incorporated negotiations with buyers, liaison with suppliers and dealers, and the preparation of pre-shipping exit customs documents and the payment of clearing, shipping, freight and importation expenses.

The risks were in respect of credit, exchange and business risk and covered the insurance of vehicles and the loss of inventory and warehousing.

The assets used covered warranties, skilled and technical employees, intellectual property rights, and vehicles and office accommodation.

At the request of the respondent, on 12 July 2013, the appellant allocated 100% to those tasks that were wholly undertaken by each party and inserted comments in the column provided for that purpose.

Again, on 14 August 2013, the appellant provided a more detailed percentage allocation against the other tasks.

In respect of the management and administrative function, the task of communicating the intention to buy was allocated 100% to the appellant.

The other tasks were allocated as follows:

(i) Payments from the buyer - appellant 95% and the intermediary 5%;

(ii) Payments to the conglomerate - the intermediary 100%;

(iii) Maintenance of accounting records, negotiation records with buyers and preparing financial reports - the appellant 100%;

(iv) Inventory control system - the appellant 50% and the intermediary 50%;

(v) Management support - the French holding company 100%; and

(vi) The financial support for funding and liaison with suppliers - the intermediary 100%.

Under the marketing and customer liaison function, the tasks were allocated as follows:

(i) Developing marketing strategies - the appellant 100%;

(ii) Funding - 96.5% to the appellant and the conglomerate 3.5%;

(iii) Implementation of marketing programmes, negotiation with buyers and liaison with the dealers - appellant 100%;

(iv) Payment of clearing charges and transport fees - appellant 85% and the intermediary 15%;

(v) Price negotiations with the supplier/conglomerate - appellant 60%, the intermediary 10%, and the French holding company 30%; and

(vi) Pre-shipping, customs exit documents, and freight to the place of importation in Zimbabwe - the intermediary 100%.

In regards to the risks function, the tasks were allocated as follows:

(i) Insurance risk from embarkation in the country of manufacture to sale in a bonded warehouse in Zimbabwe - intermediary 100%;

(ii) Credit and exchange rate risks - intermediary 100%; and

(iii) Business risk - appellant 50% and intermediary 50%.

And, in regards to the use of assets function, the tasks were allocated thus:

(i) Warranties - appellant 10% and the conglomerate 90%;

(ii) The use of intellectual property rights - the conglomerate 100%;

(iii) The use of technical skills - the appellant 25%, the intermediary 25%, the conglomerate 25%, and the French holding company 25%; and

(iv) The use of operational vehicles and rentals - appellant 100%.

On 21 November 2013, the respondent concluded the functional analysis by averaging the percentages inserted by the appellant with its own and allocated 61% to the appellant and 39% to the intermediary.

The vehicles sales gross profit of US$1,252,021 for 2009; US$3,110,196 for 2010; US$6,338,185=46 for 2011; and US$4,918,389=78 for 2012 were based on total gross sales figure that did not include the intermediary's invoices.

These gross profit figures were derived from the difference between the appellant's local sales and the landed costs comprised of the conglomerate's FOB costs and shipping costs, finance charges, and handling and clearing charges.

The Commissioner disregarded the gross profit recorded in the appellant's statement of comprehensive income of US$837,160 for 2009; US$2,327,853 for 2010; US$3,953,949 for 2011; and US$3,615,881 for 2012.

Counsel for the appellant correctly criticised the functional analysis methodology as an arbitrary, unscientific, and an opinion based on value judgment and not on a formula.

He accurately observed, that, the imputed gross profit was out of step with the comparable prices of similar vehicles offered in Zimbabwe by other brand competitors.

He correctly contented, that, the Chief Investigations Officer did not explain how his tabulated figures, and, especially, the vehicle sales gross profit figures, were computed and more importantly how he arrived at the 61:39 split.

In my view, even the more detailed functional analysis percentage apportionments provided by the appellant, on 14 August 2013, in annexure H of the Commissioner's case, failed to disclose how the 61:39 split was achieved.

Apparently, it was invoked on the weak basis of a purported concession to profit-sharing made by the appellant in a letter of 9 September 2011, which letter did not form part of the pleadings or evidence in this case.

The evidence at hand established, that, the appellant, at all times, disputed ever sharing any profits with the intermediary.

The real reason for ascribing profit sharing between them, as eventually disclosed by the Chief Investigations Officer, was that they each added a mark-up of 7.5% to their respective purchase prices.

The respondent thus formed the opinion, that, the parties shared profits equally and not the costs - which burden was borne by the appellant. The respondent found the position contrary to the arm's length principle.

Is it part of our law

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, functional analysis was not part of our law notwithstanding that the respondent foistered it upon the appellant.

He further submitted, that, it was illogical and irrational and did not form part of the South African or OECD transfer pricing system.

In regards to transfer pricing, he argued, that, until the introduction of section 98A to the Income Tax Act by the Finance Act No.1 of 2014, on 1 January 2014, there were no statutory provisions dealing with this subject in our law.

The concept of transfer pricing, as explained by KEITH HUXMAN and PHILIP HAUPT, in Notes on South African Income Tax 24ed (2005) involves the manipulation of prices, income, and expenses by associated companies operating in different tax jurisdictions in order to reduce profits in a higher tax jurisdiction.

It is invariably measured by the arm's length principle.

It seems to me, that, transfer pricing could be dealt with under the general deduction formula in section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act as was the case in South Africa when ITC 569 (1944) 13 SATC 447 was decided before the introduction of section 31 in Act 58 of 1962 and the subsequent publication of Note 7, which delineated transfer pricing transactions in that country.

While our law did not have a specific transfer pricing provision until 1 January 2014, it seems to me that the issue could be dealt with under the general deduction formula, or either section 24 or section 98 of the Income Tax Act if the requirements in those sections were met.

It is clear that the functional analysis methodology is not specifically provided for in our law.

Nor was transfer pricing specifically provided for in our law prior to 1 January 2014.

The respondent relied on the provisions of section 24 of the Income Tax Act to invoke the functional analysis methodology.

The correspondence between the parties, both before and after the objection, and, especially in the summary of evidence filed by the appellant in preparation of the appeal hearing, recognised the existence of the functional analysis concept.

In the objection letter, the appellant recognised functional analysis as an international practice.

And, in its summary of evidence, the appellant was ready to call evidence to show how functional analysis was prepared and the context in which it applied.

Indeed, in argument, counsel for the appellant referred to the pillars on which it stands as comprising the functions of the targeted parties in the chain of supply, the nature and type of assets or resources deployed used, and the risks assumed by each party in the supply chain.

These were applied by the respondent in the functional analysis it conducted in collaboration with the appellant.

To the extent that it is a recognised method of assessing taxable income earned, or deemed to have been earned by a taxpayer, I would, on the sparse evidence before me, hold that there is nothing in our law that would preclude the Commissioner from applying it in suitable cases.

Whether or not this was a suitable case to employ functional analysis, in determining the appellant's taxable income, depends on whether or not the provisions of section 24 of the Income Tax Act applied to the circumstances pertaining to the appellant.

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the genesis of the provisions section 24 of the Income Tax Act can be traced back to English Company Law.

Incorporated companies, whether related or independent had always been regarded as separate and distinct entities. In time, in order to answer the pressing questions raised by the conduct of related parties, and, especially holding companies and their subsidiaries, the English courts imported the concepts of assignment and agency into the relationship and this was quickly adopted by both the South African and Zimbabwean courts.

Expressions such as:

'an assignee of the holding companies': see Harold Holdsworth & Co (Wakefield) Ltd v Caddies (1955) 1 All ER 725 (HL)…, and DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets (1976) 3 All ER 462 (CA);

'an agent of the holding company…, conducting its business for it': see In Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd v Anor 1988 (3) SA 290 (A)…,.; and

'one economic entities': see Moodie v Industrial & Pipe Employees Trust (Pvt) Ltd and Industrial and Pipe Ltd SC165-97…, and CC Sales Ltd v David Dyer & Dajen (Pvt) Ltd HH230-98 were used to remove the separate and distinct nature of these corporate entities.

While the facts of each case in which these expressions were used were different from the present case, the principles derived from these cases resulted in the legislative intervention crystallised in section 24 of the Income Tax Act that sought to treat the activities of subsidiaries that shared management, control, and capital, and that breached the arm's length principle, as “one economic entities.”

I do not think, that, the respondent's legal right to invoke the provisions of section 24 of the Income Tax Act, in making the adjustments to the appellant's tax liability arising from either the failure to declare all the income earned or claiming unjustified deductions, can be gainsaid.

The section stipulates that:

“24. Special provisions relating to determination of taxable income in accordance with double taxation agreements

The Commissioner may —

(a) If any person —

(i) Carrying on business in Zimbabwe, participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of a business carried on by some other person outside Zimbabwe; or

(ii) Carrying on business outside Zimbabwe, participates directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of a business carried on by some other person in Zimbabwe; or

(iii) Participates, directly or indirectly, in the management, control, or capital both of a business carried on in Zimbabwe by some other person and of a business carried on outside Zimbabwe by some other person; and

(b) If conditions are made or imposed between any of the persons mentioned in paragraph (a) in their business or financial relations, which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, differ from those which would be made between two persons dealing with each other at arm's length;
determine the taxable income of the person carrying on business in Zimbabwe as if such conditions had not been made or imposed but in accordance with the conditions, which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, might be expected to have been made or imposed between two persons dealing with each other at arm's length.”

The first point to note is the anomalous reference in the heading to double taxation agreements which is not embodied in the provisions of the section.

I agree with the submission by counsel for the appellant, that, by virtue of section 7(a) of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:01] the reference to double taxation agreements should be disregarded in construing the section.

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

The OnusCounsel for the appellant submitted, on the authority of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…, that, the onus was on the Commissioner to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the arrangements between the ...

The Onus

Counsel for the appellant submitted, on the authority of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…, that, the onus was on the Commissioner to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the arrangements between the two related parties in question were not at arm's length.

I declined to follow the South African position in CRS (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH728-17…,.

For the reasons set out in that case, I remain of the view, that, the onus provisions of section 63 govern the interpretation of section 24 and the aligned provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to the extent, that, the taxpayer challenges the tax liability attributed to it by the Commissioner.

In other words, I hold, that, the onus is on the taxpayer to show that the Commissioner was wrong in forming the opinion that the arrangements concluded between the taxpayer and a related party were not at arm's length rather than on the Commissioner to show that his opinion was correct.

This finding accords with the general thrust of our common law principle that he who alleges must prove.

In an appeal such as this one, it is the taxpayer who is challenging the correctness of the Commissioner's opinion by averring that it was wrong. It is not the Commissioner who has come to court for the confirmation of the correctness of his opinion.

The duty to establish the error in the opinion must surely lie on the party that impugns the correctness of such an opinion.

In the present matter, the party driving the challenge is the appellant and the onus must squarely fall on it.

That is the further reason why I hold, that, the onus is on the appellant to show that the opinion of the Commissioner that the arrangements between the appellant and the intermediary were not at arm's length.

This approach appears to be consonant with the sentiments of MORTON ACJ in Elite Wholesale (Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia (1955) 20 SATC 33 (SR)…,.; 1955 (1) SA 350 (SR)…, where he said:

“In my view, the appellant has discharged the onus upon him, for, in the evidence before us, I find no feature connected with any of the transactions which would justify the exercise of the Commissioner's powers under section 28(1).”

Section 28(1) read:

“Whenever the Commissioner is satisfied that any transaction, or operation, has been entered into or carried out for the purpose of avoiding liability for the payment of any tax imposed by this Act, or reducing the amount of any such tax, any liability for any such tax and the amount thereof may be determined as if the transaction or operation had not been entered or carried out.”

In any event, what triggered the appeal in the present matter was that an amount was assessed to tax; which amount the appellant avers was not liable to tax because it was wrongly created.

While it is correct that this Court rehears the matter; the case remains an appeal lodged by the taxpayer challenging the process undertaken by the Commissioner in adjusting his tax liability.

The point missed in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA), so it seems to me, is that section 63 of the Income Tax Act, is engaged once the challenge relates, inter alia, to any amount not liable to the tax.

The onus therefore lies on the taxpayer to show, that, the Commissioner's opinion, or satisfaction, as the case may be, that the appellant infringed section 24 or section 98 of the Income Tax Act, was wrong.

In my view, the Commissioner does not bear the onus of establishing that his opinion was correct. All that is required of him is to set out, in the determination to the letter of objection, the basis for his opinion or satisfaction, and, as PONNAN JA indicated in Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services v Pretoria East Motors (Pty) Ltd [2014] 3 All SA 266 (SCA)…, this is derived from the averments made by the taxpayer during the investigation.

The Commissioner does not create any evidence, but bases his opinion or satisfaction on the information availed to him by the taxpayer.

The essential elements of section 24 of the Income Tax Act

The essential requirements envisaged by section 24 of the Income Tax Act are that:

1. Any person -

(a) Who carries on business in Zimbabwe, takes part, directly or indirectly, in the management, control or capital of a business of another person outside Zimbabwe; or

(b) Who carries on business outside Zimbabwe, takes part, directly or indirectly, in the management, control, or capital of a business of another in Zimbabwe; or

(c) Takes part, directly or indirectly, in the management, control, or capital of both a business operating in Zimbabwe by another person and a business operating outside Zimbabwe by another person; and

2. The business or financial conditions governing their interactions are, in the opinion of the Commissioner, inimical to those of two persons dealing with each other at arm's length;

3. Then, the Commissioner shall determine the taxable income of the person carrying on business in Zimbabwe by ignoring the conditions concluded by the parties and invoking the conditions which, in his opinion, would have been concluded by two parties acting at arm's length.

In accordance with the concluding words of section 24 of the Income Tax Act, these requirements are invoked against the person who carries on business in Zimbabwe.

The section was designed to deal effectively with business transactions between a taxpayer and another person that fail the arm's length test.

The transactions must fall within the ambit of the provisions of section 24 of the Income Tax Act before the Commissioner can determine the income tax liability of the taxpayer by ignoring the terms and conditions agreed to by the parties that are not at arm's length and supplanting them with the conditions the Commissioner believes would reasonably have been imposed between persons transacting with each other at arm's length.

In the language MORTON ACJ in Elite Wholesale (Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia (1955) 20 SATC 33 (SR)…,.; 1955 (1) SA 350 (SR)…, the Commissioner takes the “sale into the taxpayer's accounts.”

Any Person

It was common ground that the appellant was a person who carried on business in Zimbabwe in each of the four tax years in question.

It was also agreed that the intermediary carried on business outside Zimbabwe but it was in dispute whether or not it carried on business in Zimbabwe.

It was also agreed that the French holding company partook, directly or indirectly, in the management, control, and capital of both the appellant and the intermediary.

There was no evidence adduced to show that any of these three related parties participated, directly or indirectly, in the management, control, or capital of the conglomerate which manufactured and supplied the vehicles to the intermediary for the account of the appellant.

However, the Distribution Agreement permitted the conglomerate to participate in the management of the appellant.

Partakes, directly or indirectly, in the management, control or capital of a business of another outside Zimbabwe

The meaning of the phrase “business of another outside Zimbabwe” was the subject of considerable dispute between counsel.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the words referred to a business that was located outside Zimbabwe. He argued that the intermediary's business was located outside Zimbabwe and the appellant, who was located in Zimbabwe, therefore did not take part in the management, control, or capital of the intermediary.

Counsel for the respondent contended, that, the words equally applied to a business person located outside Zimbabwe but whose business was located either in Zimbabwe or outside Zimbabwe.

He contended, that, the intermediary operated a business in Zimbabwe that was managed by the appellant. He therefore argued that the relationship between the appellant and the intermediary fell into the ambit of this requirement.

The pleadings, the documentary exhibits, and the oral evidence of the appellant's Managing Director, which were not contradicted by any evidence led on behalf of the respondent, established that the appellant was not involved in the management, control, or capital of any business located in a foreign country.

It was not a shareholder in such a company nor did it manage or control, by itself or by proxy, any such company.

While it was a related company to the intermediary, it did not take part in the management, control, and capital of the intermediary.

The appellant did not participate in the management, control, or capital of the French holding company or the conglomerate.

The question of whether the appellant managed the bonded warehouse on behalf of the intermediary is determined by the answer to the question of who the importer of the consignment stock was.

The appellant maintained, that, it managed the bonded warehouse as the importer of the consignment stock, for its own account.

There was argument between counsel on whether the appellant was the importer of the consignment stock or not.

Counsel for the appellant relied on the bills of entry for the contention that the appellant was the importer while counsel for the respondent argued that it was the consignee.

The Chief Investigations Officer testified on the existence of three types of bills of entry in our law:

(i) The first was the Bill of Entry into Zimbabwe;

(ii) The second was the Bill of Entry into a bonded warehouse; and

(iii) The third was a Bill of Entry for removal from bond for consumption in or for export out of Zimbabwe.

His testimony was confirmed by the definition of both Bill of Entry and Entry in section 2 of the Customs and Excise Act.

A Bill of Entry is defined “as a prescribed form on which an entry is made.”

Entry is defined thus:

“'entry' in relation to clearance of goods for importation, warehousing, removal from a warehouse or exportation, means the presentation in accordance with this Act of a correctly completed and signed declaration on a bill of entry in writing, and, where direct trader input facilities exist, includes the recording of the required information on the Customs computer system, using procedures approved by the Commissioner, or using a computerised procedure approved by the Commissioner, together with such bills of lading, invoices, price lists and other documents showing the purchase value of the goods together with the freight, insurance and other charges on the goods required to be declared by any provision of this Act;”

In regards to import and importer, the Customs and Excise Act states that:

“'import' means to bring goods or cause goods to be brought into Zimbabwe;

'importer' in relation to goods, includes any owner of or other person possessed of or beneficially interested in any goods at any time before entry of the same has been made and the requirements of this Act fulfilled;”

In an almost analogous case of AT International Ltd v Zimra 2015 (2) ZLR 143 (H)…, by reference to the definition of 'import' 'importer' and 'entry' of section 2 of the Customs and Excise Act, I held that a foreign registered company was the importer of goods that had been purchased in South Africa and consigned to a local company in Zimbabwe.

In the present case, the intermediary met the definition of importer.

Whether the appellant was “any other person possessed of or beneficially interested in the goods at any time before their entry had been made and the requirements of the Act fulfilled” is a question of fact to be decided on the basis of the available evidence and the relevant provisions found in Part III of the Customs and Excise Act.

The appellant did not possess, but was, in terms of the Distribution Agreement and the Tripartite Agreement, beneficially interested in the goods before their entry into Zimbabwe.

These vehicles were coming to Zimbabwe in terms of the Distribution Agreement at the instance of the appellant and for the business of the appellant.

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the appellant, that, the appellant was the importer.

As the importer, the appellant carried the obligation to warehouse the vehicles. It was in the business of selling vehicles. The appellant was contractually bound by the Distribution Agreement not only to purchase and sell a prescribed minimum number of vehicles but also to grow the business and enhance its market share.

These objectives could only be achieved, among other ways, by promoting and advertising the brand.

Both our common law and statutory law recognise the reservation of ownership.

In Rennie Grinaker Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Sociedade Intercontinental de Compressors Hermeticos Sicom Ltda 1997 (1) ZLR 173 (SC)…, KORSAH JA approved and applied the dictum in Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola & Ors 1976 (4) SA 464 (A)…, where CORBETT JA said:

“According to our law, unlike certain other legal systems, ownership cannot pass by virtue of the contract of sale alone: there must, in addition, be at least a proper delivery to the purchaser of the contract goods…,. Whether delivery alone will suffice depends in general upon the intention of the parties…,.; and, in this connection, important considerations are;

(a) Whether the contract contains conditions affecting the passing of ownership…,.; and

(b) Whether the sale is for cash or credit.”

Again, section 17 of the Income Tax Act reads:

“17. Special provisions relating to hire-purchase or other agreements providing for postponement of passing of ownership of property

If any taxpayer has entered into any agreement with any other person in respect of any property the effect of which is that, in the case of movable property, the ownership shall pass, or, in the case of immovable property, transfer shall be effected from the taxpayer to that other person upon or after receipt by the taxpayer of the whole or a certain portion of the amount payable to the taxpayer under the agreement, the whole of that amount shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to have accrued to the taxpayer on the date on which the agreement was entered into:”

In any event, as was clearly pronounced in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Conhage (Pty) Ltd (formerly Tycon (Pty) Ltd 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA)…,; 61 SATC 391 (SCA)…, the passing of ownership is not an essential element to a sale.

It does not seem to me, that, the reservation ownership is synonymous with the operation by the appellant in the management, control, or capital of the business carried on by the intermediary outside Zimbabwe.

I accordingly find that the appellant did not manage any business of the intermediary in Zimbabwe.

However, in my view, section 24(a)(i) of the Income Tax Act locates the business outside and not inside Zimbabwe.

I therefore agree with counsel for the appellant, that, the appellant did not participate, directly or indirectly, in the business of the intermediary outside Zimbabwe.

Operates a business outside Zimbabwe and partakes, directly or indirectly, in the management, control, or capital of a business in Zimbabwe

In regards to this requirement, the person who operated a business outside Zimbabwe was the intermediary. The person who operated a business in Zimbabwe was the appellant.

The financial statements of the appellant showed that it paid management fees to the intermediary in respect of administrative, stock control, and management in the sum of US$130,000 in 2009; US$140,000 in 2010; US$256,629 in 2011; US$140,000 in 2012.

The scope of such management fees was covered in the agreement of 2 March 2009.

The appellant failed to establish the activities conducted on its behalf by the intermediary. It strenuously asserted, in correspondence of 19 May 2013 and even in the objection of 25 July 2014, that it received bona fide management services from the intermediary.

However, on 14 November 2014, the appellant made a half-hearted concession that it had erroneously paid management fees to the intermediary.

At the commencement of hearing, counsel for the appellant abandoned the appeal in respect of management fees.

I do not find, on the facts, that, the intermediary participated in the management or control or capital of the appellant.

I find that when the intermediary received orders from the appellant, and placed them with the conglomerate, it was managing its own business under the directing mind of its Board of Directors. The appellant did not play any role in this process.

Accordingly, the provisions of sub-paragraph (ii) of paragraph (a) of section 24 of the Income Tax Act was not met.

Partakes, directly or indirectly, in the management, control, or capital in some other business operating both in and outside Zimbabwe

The French holding company, and not the appellant or the intermediary, participated directly or indirectly in the management, control, or capital of the appellant who operated in Zimbabwe and the intermediary who operated outside Zimbabwe.

Accordingly, I also find, that, the provisions of that subparagraph were not met.

It is not necessary for me to consider the requirements of paragraph (b) of section 24 of the Income Tax Act as these are conjunctive with either of the sub-paragraphs in paragraph (a) of section 24 of the Income Tax Act.

I do it for the sake of completeness.

The business or financial conditions governing the relationship, in the opinion of the Commissioner, that differ to those of two people dealing at arm's length

The persons identified as “any of the persons” mentioned in paragraph (a) to which paragraph (b) applies were the appellant and the intermediary.

In regards to the conditions that were made or imposed between the intermediary and the appellant, both counsel for the respondent, in paragraph 10.4 and 10.5, and counsel for the appellant, in paragraph 31 of their respective written heads, agreed that the business or financial conditions related to the reservation of ownership and its consequential costs of advertising and promotion, rent, clearing charges, and management fees.

These were exclusively met by the appellant.

Counsel for the respondent submitted, that, it was the duty of the intermediary, as owner and importer, to meet the warehouse, marketing, promotion, and advertising costs on the one hand, and the clearing costs, as required by the definition of importer in section 2 of the Customs and Excise Act, on the other.

His submission collapses in the face of my finding that the same definition of importer also covered the appellant.

It would appear to me, that, the legal duty to pay these charges and imposts fell on the appellant.

Counsel for the respondent further contended, in paragraph 10.1 of his written heads, that, there was no real need for interposing the intermediary in place of the parent company in the purchase of the motor vehicles.

It does not seem to me, that, it was within the power of the Commissioner to dictate to taxpayers who their contracting parties should be.

In any event, the reasons stated by the appellant for interposing the intermediary, spelt out in its letter of 26 October 2007 in support of the value ruling, were not impeached.

The intermediary had the foreign currency required to meet the minimum purchase orders required of the appellant in the Distribution Agreement with the conglomerate.

In addition, our law does not discourage middleman from interposing for profit in any lawful commercial activity of their choice as did the intermediary.

This, the intermediary proceeded to do, by imposing a mark-up for its services as the intermediary and financier, which mark-up was incorporated in the transaction value, which, in turn, was equivalent to the purchase price paid by the appellant.

I do not find that the intermediary imposed these conditions on the appellant.

I also do not find that the appellant wrongly increased its deductible expenses and correspondingly transferred profits to the intermediary.

Opinion that they were not at arm's length and normal conditions

The reservation of ownership is an arm's length condition recognised both in our common law and by statute.

Rennie Grinaker Holdings (Pvt) Ltd v Sociedade Intercontinental de Compressors Hermeticos Sicom Ltda 1997 (1) ZLR 173 (SC) and Lendalease Finance (Pty) Ltd v Corporacion de Mercadeo Agricola & Ors 1976 (4) SA 464 (A) demonstrated, that, the reservation of ownership is a standard condition in contracts of sale governing international trade.

The use of bonded warehouses was also a common and normal internationally accepted standard in the motor industry designed to promote the free and easy flow of global trade and accessibility of the vehicles in the importing country.

It seemed to me, that, the cost structure of the intermediary incorporated all the ingredients that went into the landed price of the vehicles.

The evidence of the appellant, that the carriage insurance paid price comprised the free on board selling price of the manufacturer, the cost of freight to the bonded warehouse, insurance of the vehicles in transit to and in the bonded warehouse, and the mark-up of the intermediary was not impugned.

The respondent did not find the amounts charged to have been outside the normal open commercial terms charged in similar transactions by the appellant's competitors.

It seems to me that the appellant discharged the onus on it to show that the opinion of the Commissioner was wrong.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the determination under section 24 of the Income Tax Act was limited to the computation of taxable income, as defined in section 8(1) of the Income Tax Act as “the amount remaining after deducting from the income of any person all the amounts allowed to be deducted from income under this Act.”

He argued that the respondent was not empowered to raise notional vehicles sales gross profit, and, thereafter, derive taxable income from that figure.

The submission lacks merit for the reason, that, taxable income is a derivative of gross income and income and not a standalone amount.

Our Supreme Court, in Zimbabwe Revenue Authority v Murowa Diamonds (Pvt) Ltd 2009 (2) ZLR 213 (SC)…, requires courts to discard the literal textual construction in favour of the purposive contextual interpretation where the application of the former leads to an absurdity or repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the statute.

It seems to me, that, to adopt the submission moved by counsel for the appellant would lead to an absurdity and would be inconsistent with the rest of the statute.

The computation of taxable income is not a stand-alone process but is preceded by the computation of gross income from which all exemptions are deducted to arrive at the income from which further allowable deductions are removed before arriving at the taxable income: see also Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services v Pretoria East Motors (Pty) Ltd [2014] 3 All SA 266 (SCA)…, and Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Delfos 1933 AD 241…,.

I am, however, satisfied, that, the respondent wrongly invoked section 24 of the Income Tax Act in the present matter.

Accordingly, there was no room for it to apply the functional analysis principle in this matter.

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (AD)…, MACDONALD JP described tax avoidance in strong language as an evil.The imposition of penalties in fiscal infractions is predicated on both individual and general deterrence. Every taxpayer is required to shoulder its fair share of the tax burden for ...

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

Background

The 1996 Distributor-Assembler Agreement

The 1 August 2007 Memorandum of Understanding

The Distribution Agreement of 25 April 2011

The Memorandum on Sales and Purchase of the Conglomerate Vehicles of 25 April 2011

The Management Services Agreement between the Appellant and the Intermediary of 2 March 2009

The implementation and operation of the agreements

Summary of the Tripartite Arrangement

Concessions made at the commencement of the appeal hearing

Assessment of witnesses

The issues referred for determination

Sharing of profits/transfer pricing

Expenses relating to Leave Pay and Audit Fees

Penalties

1. What, if any, penalties are payable to the respondent.

I proceed to deal with each issue in turn....,.

Penalties

It was common ground that penalties are imposed by virtue of section 46 of the Income Tax Act, and, in the present matter, were derived from subsection (1)(b) and (c), (4) and (6) of section 46 of the Income Tax Act.

Initially, the respondent imposed 100% penalties, but, on objection, it reduced the penalty on the provisions to 50% and maintained the penalties in respect of the failure to deduct the correct amounts for marketing, promotion, and advertising in the purported profit sharing arrangement, the omission to levy interest on subsidiaries, and the deduction of management fees at 100%.

The argument advanced by counsel for the appellant, that, the obligation to pay tax only arose after the adjustments had been invoked under section 24 of the Income Tax Act was incorrect.

Section 24 of the Income Tax Act is invoked after the self-assessment, which is deemed to be the assessment by the Commissioner, has been filed.

The purpose of section 24 of the Income Tax Act is to determine whether the taxpayer paid the correct tax in the self assessment. Any shortfall disclosed by the invocation of section 24 of the Income Tax Act relates to the self-assessment and not to a new assessment.

In my view, the obligation to pay the correct tax arose when the self-assessment return was made and not at the time of re-assessment when the shortfall was discovered. Accordingly, the provisions of section 46 of the Income Tax Act cover the infractions committed by the appellant.

The imposition of penalties at 100% is done only where the appellant is found to have fallen foul of the provisions of section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act by omitting an amount which should have been included in the return or by rendering an incorrect statement or failing to disclose any relevant fact which results in the payment of less tax than would otherwise be due with intent to evade tax.

Where such an intention is missing, then, the Commissioner or the Court, on appeal, has a discretion on the quantum of penalty to impose.

Since this is an appeal in the wider sense, I am at large on penalty.

The appellant was generally a good corporate citizen which paid its fair measure of taxes. It co-operated with the respondent during the 4-year fatiguing and disruptive investigation which took its toll on management time and company resources. The objection letter and subsequent letters of 22 September 2014, 27 October 2014, and 14 November 2014 disclosed the financial stress the appellant experienced which contributed to the eventual loss of the franchise just before the objection was filed with the Commissioner.

The appellant's position on its relationship with two local related parties was only conceded by the respondent's counsel in his opening remarks at the commencement of the appeal hearing.

I am obliged to look into the interest of the wider community.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (AD)…, MACDONALD JP described tax avoidance in strong language as an evil.

The imposition of penalties in fiscal infractions is predicated on both individual and general deterrence. Every taxpayer is required to shoulder its fair share of the tax burden for the common good. The level of moral turpitude of the taxpayer is measured against its good points to arrive at an appropriate penalty.

In Elite Wholesale (Rhodesia) (Pvt) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes, Southern Rhodesia (1955) 20 SATC 33 (SR)…,.; 1955 (1) SA 350 (SR) equated “an intention upon the part of the purchaser or seller to evade assessment or tax” with “something which shows a lack of good faith or the presence of “moral dishonesty in the taxpayer's mind.”

Management Fees

The appellant vehemently maintained and asserted throughout the investigations, and in the letter of 14 March 2011, 30 May 2012, 19 June 2014 and the objection of 25 July 2014, against all odds and the available evidence, that, the intermediary had provided management services in strategy setting, pooling funds, and purchasing power from Mauritius in behalf of head office senior management.

It only abandoned the claim on 14 November 2014.

In that letter, the Managing Director made three telling and disingenuous points:

(i) The first was that the intermediary was, through a legal oversight, substituted for the holding company in the management fees/technical fees agreement of 2 March 2009.

(ii) The second was that the management fees were remitted to the holding company through the intermediary.

(iii) The third, which was also reiterated during the cross-examination of the Chief Investigations Officer, was that the only management fees ever paid were in the sum of US$130,000 reported in the 2010 financial statements while amounts reflected in the other years were provisions which were written back in subsequent years without any prejudice to the fiscus.

The Managing Director failed to demonstrate, by any hard evidence, the management intervention that was undertaken by the holding company or to explain why the management fees remained a continuing obligation payable to the intermediary in the 2011 and 2012 financial statements.

These prevarications eclipsed the good points exhibited by the appellant over the four years that it was under investigation.

The concession, however, demonstrated that the appellant made an incorrect return in respect of claims for management fees in each of the affected tax years.

It seems to me, that, the unsupported persistent assertions maintained by the appellant, even after the concession of 14 November 2014, were indicative of both corporate moral dishonesty and a lack of good faith.

I therefore find, that, the appellant, through the mind of its management, evinced the intention to evade the payment of the correct amount of tax as contemplated by section 46(6) of the Income Tax Act by claiming the deduction of management fees paid to the intermediary who was not entitled to such fees.

The Court or the Commissioner have no option but to impose a 100% penalty.

The penalty imposed by the Commissioner is accordingly confirmed.

The wording of section 46(1)(b) and (c) of the Income Tax Act incorporates within its ambit the amounts adjusted under section 24 of the Income Tax Act on rentals, marketing, advertising, and promotion charges.

These would not have affected the appellant's tax position for the reason that the intermediary would have incorporated them in the CIP price and passed them to the appellant who would have been entitled to deduct them from his income.

There would not have been any moral turpitude attached to the appellant's deduction of the amounts representing 39% of the fair share of the intermediary's expenses.

In these circumstances, the imposition of any level of monetary penalty would be wholly unjustified. I would have waived it in full.

The Leave and Audit Fee Provisions

The Tax Consultant called by the appellant was aware that the respondent disallowed leave pay provisions and audit fees in the tax year that they were made. However, the evidence disclosed that the appellant accessed the Assessors Handbook and genuinely believed that the respondent allowed deductions of these provisions.

It clearly lacked the intention to evade tax and was thus eligible for remission of penalty.

The amounts involved in each of the 4 years were minimal. The moral turpitude of the appellant was minimal.

It seems to me that a penalty of 10% in respect of each year for each head is appropriate.

The Tax Amnesty

It was common cause, that, the tax amnesty was not raised in the letter of objection of 25 July 2014 for the reason that it had not yet come into existence at that time.

The appellant raised it in paragraph 72 of its case on 18 December 2014 and the respondent responded to it in paragraph 43 of the Commissioner's case.

It was promulgated under the authority of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014 in the Finance Act (Tax Amnesty) Regulations 2014, SI163 of 2014 on 21 November 2014.

It exempted errant taxpayers, whose applications were approved, from paying any additional tax, penalty, or interest on the amounts for which the amnesty was granted.

It was common cause that both section 19 of the Finance Act and section 8 of the tax amnesty regulations, S.I.163 of 2014 specifically precluded from their ambit any taxpayers who had paid tax or rendered a return or declaration or had been assessed.

It was again common cause, that, the appellant fell into the category of taxpayers who were excluded from the ambit of the tax amnesty, and, as a result, did not apply for the amnesty.

At the tail end of his oral submissions, counsel for the appellant moved the Court, in terms of the proviso to section 65(4) of the Income Tax Act, to consider the introduction of the tax amnesty argument, which had not been raised in the notice of objection, on two grounds:

(i) The first was that it was physically and legally impossible to raise it in the objection; and

(ii) The second was that such exclusion offended the appellant's constitutional right to equal treatment, protection, and benefit of the law enshrined in section 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution.

Counsel for the respondent opposed the application on the ground that the constitutional argument was constrained by the absence of evidence on the point.

In both his written and oral submissions, counsel for the appellant emphasized, that, the enactment of the tax amnesty under consideration was constitutional, but, that the denial of the tax amnesty benefit to certain categories of taxpayers was unconstitutional.

In paragraph 108 of his written heads, counsel submitted that “if the tax amnesty is to be treated as being constitutional, and the concession is repeated that it is within the terms of the Constitution permissible to grant such an amnesty, it must apply to the appellant, who therefore cannot be obliged to pay penalties and interest on any unpaid taxes raised in an amended assessment as in the present case.”

In the alternative, he urged this Court to exercise its sentencing discretion in favour of the appellant by extending the benefits embodied in the tax amnesty legislation to the appellant.

The submission is obviously raising the constitutionality of the tax amnesty.

As I understand it, the submission is really, that, the tax amnesty is unconstitutional to the extent that it fails to cover all taxpayers. Looked at from another angle, the submission is that any law that does not treat all people equally does not provide them equal benefit to the law and is therefore unconstitutional.

The fallacy of the submission becomes self-evident when viewed in this wider context.

It is simply, that, all laws that do not treat all citizens equally are unconstitutional.

But, that is not what the Constitution contemplates or even says. I think it has always been recognised that no Constitution in the world is able to provide absolute equality to all its citizens.

The test of constitutionality of an enactment is not measured against absolute rights.

I intimated in CRS (Pvt) Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH728-17…, that, in our law, the test of constitutionality of an enactment is measured against the provisions of section 86(2) of our Constitution.

That provision allows the enactment of laws, such as the tax amnesty or any laws which restrict such a fundamental right as section 56(1), as long as it is a law of general application which is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom.

These constitutional imperatives are, in turn, measured against all relevant factors, including the six that are enumerated in section 86(2)(a) to (f) of the Constitution.

The submission made, as to the possible infraction of section 56(1) of the Constitution, fails to address these factors.

Counsel for the appellant did not attempt to address these factors in his application for leave to introduce and rely on this ground.

He failed to show good cause for its introduction into argument.

He has failed to demonstrate the existence of a possible breach of the right to equality and equal protection and benefit of the law against the appellant and those taxpayers who have been excluded in the tax amnesty.

It seems to me, that, since the Constitution itself allows for the enactment of the tax amnesty legislation, it cannot be unconstitutional for that enactment to treat taxpayers differently.

Accordingly, I decline, yet again, to allow the introduction of the tax amnesty argument.

View Appeal
HH661-16 : M COMPANY (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

This is an income tax appeal filed in the High Court in terms of section 65 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06].

The two questions for determination are:

(i) Whether the appeal is valid; and

(ii) Whether the commission paid to two foreign agents for facilitating the sale of tobacco constituted fees for services of a technical, managerial, administrative or consultative nature as contemplated by section 30 of the of the Income Tax Act and the Seventeenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act.

THE BACKGROUND

The appellant, an exporter and seller of processed tobacco from Zimbabwe, is a locally registered company. It entered into two successive sales and marketing agreements with two foreign companies on 1 April 2004 (annexure 1 of respondent's case and p1-2 of appellant's bundle) and 1 April 2011 (annexure 2 of respondent's case and p3-4 of appellant's bundle) respectively, for the sale of export tobacco in foreign markets.

The sales were on commission of 7.5% of the aggregate net export sales and FCA Zimbabwe sales value of each export, respectively.

In 2007, the respondent audited the affairs of the appellant. It decided that the commission paid for the period to 2005 constituted fees for services of a technical and administrative nature performed by the overseas agent on behalf of the appellant for which the appellant was liable for withholding non-resident tax in terms of the Seventeenth Schedule to the Income Tax Act.

On 5 April 2007, the respondent submitted schedules showing the appellant's withholding tax liability on the tobacco sales commissions payable to the overseas agent.

The tax adviser of the appellant objected to the schedules and imposition of withholding tax on the sales commissions.

On 10 August 2007, the respondent disallowed the objection.

A notice of appeal was filed on 24 August 2007.

The appellant's case was not filed within 60 days of the service of the notice of appeal or at all. In accordance with the provisions of section 65(3) of the Income Tax Act, the appeal lapsed.

The appellant continued to remit non-residents withholding tax to the respondent until the advent of the multi-currency era.

On 24 October 2013, officials of the respondent conducted a routine audit visit at the premises of the appellant during which the Finance Director of the appellant indicated that further remittals had stopped in consequence of the unresolved 2007 appeal.

In a further meeting of 5 December 2013, the appellant requested and was provided with a schedule of the non-residents tax on fees payable from January 2009 to October 2013.

The schedules consisted of 11 columns showing the period covered, the amount of commission paid, the withholding tax rate, the witholding tax due, the penalty charged at 100%, the period covered in respect of interest computation, the period of delay in paying, the interest rate, and the amount of tax due.

The principal amount of the non-residents tax on fees due was in the sum of US$4,252,647=57. An equivalent amount was imposed as penalty and a further US$795,988=62 was imposed as interest.

The penalties were later reduced by half leaving the revised total liability of US$5,974,959=97.

The appellant responded to the schedule by way of the objection letter dated 10 December 2013, which was served on the respondent on the same day.

It disputed that the commissions constituted the fees contemplated in section 30 and the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. It undertook to pay the outstanding principal amount in four instalments between 13 December and 20 January 2014. In consequence of the undertaking, the respondent further waived the reduced penalty and interest by e-mail of 19 December 2013.

The appellant, however, paid the principal amount by 20 December 2013.

A meeting was held between the appellant's tax advisers and the respondent on 13 December 2013. The parties appeared to have agreed, in that meeting, that, the objection had been improperly made.

However, the appellant filed a notice of appeal on 25 March 2014 and served it on the respondent on the following day. The appeal was based on the deemed decision arising from the failure to respond to the letter of objection within three months as contemplated by section 62(4) of the Income Tax Act. The parties filed their respective cases on 28 May 2014 and 13 August 2014....,.

THE MERITS

The Facts

The facts in this matter are derived from the pleadings, the Rule 11 documents, and the appellant's bundle. Both the appellant and the respondent did not call any oral evidence.

The facts were as follows:

The appellant company executed two successive "Sales and Marketing Commission Agreements" with two foreign companies domiciled in Bermuda and Switzerland, respectively. The appellant was identified, in both Agreements, as the "Principal" while the two were specifically termed agents.

In the first agreement, the appellant was represented by its Managing Director and Finance Director while the agent was represented by its Management Committee member and secretary. In the second, the parties were represented by their respective Managing Director and President.

Except for the first two declarations in the preamble and the initial rate of commission in the first agreement, all the other terms of the two agreements were similar.

In terms of clause 6 of the agreements:

"…, the validity, interpretation and enforcement of the agreement shall be governed by the laws of Zimbabwe."

The preamble proclaimed that the agent had "demonstrated expertise in the international marketing and trading of leaf tobacco enabling it to provide such services with greater efficiency and lower costs" and was willing to utilize its sales and marketing capacity and render services on behalf of the appellant.

Four duties of the agent were set out in clause 1:

(i) The agent undertook to use its "best efforts" to help the principal in the export sale of leaf tobacco without incurring financial responsibility or obligations even where it did not disclose that it was an agent of the appellant;

(ii) The agent also undertook to promote the export sales by the appellant in all major markets based on prices and conditions set by the appellant;

(iii) It undertook to maintain and safeguard the quality of the product and image of the appellant; and

(iv) To supply personnel and materials necessary for the promotion of the appellant's exports.

In addition, the agreements authorised the agents to inform the appropriate local authorities in those export countries, where necessary, that it was the sales and marketing agent representing the principal's business interests for the sale of leaf tobacco exported from Zimbabwe.

The commissions under the first agreement were initially equal to 8.5% of the aggregate net sales from the export tobacco of the principal for each statutory year ending 31 March during the term of the agreement but was reduced to 7.5% in November 2005 to comply with the Zimbabwe Exchange Control approval.

Under the second agreement, the agent was paid commission of 7.5% of the Foreign Currency Account Zimbabwe sales value of each export of the principal during the term of the agreement.

Both the aggregate net sales and the FCA Zimbabwe sales value for exports were computed by deducting freight costs to the destination port from the gross invoice value CIF port of destination. These amounts were captured in the CD1 Form as gross FCA value.

The commissions payable were approved by the Exchange Control Authority.

In terms of paragraph 2 and 3 of the Exchange Control Authority, dated 1 February 2012, the authority was granted on condition the 7.5% commission, as well as value addition, would be declared on all the relevant Form CD1 prior to the export and "payment of the commission shall be from the appellant's local FCA".

The provisions of the sales agreement constituted the entire agreement between the parties.

It was certainly not a term of the agreement that the agents would deduct commission before remitting the balance into the FCA account of the appellant.

The suggestion, in the pleadings, that it was in the agreement was contrived.

A meeting was held, on 18 July 2013, at the premises of the appellant, between the appellant and the respondent.

As a result, the appellant wrote the letter of 30 July 2013 in which it set out the duties of the agent in detail.

The agent accompanied a major tobacco buyer and took part in price negotiations in Zimbabwe with the appellant. Other customers did not purchase their tobacco requirements in Zimbabwe. They were first supplied with samples of the available export tobacco before placing their orders. The customers assessed the colour and appearance (the styles) and the sugar and nicotine levels, texture and quality (the smoking characteristics) of the export tobacco.

Generally, price negotiations and marketing logistics for these customers were held outside Zimbabwe by the agent.

The shipping mandate was the final responsibility of the Sales Administration Director. The invoice papers of all export sales from the appellant flowed through the agent.

The agent's main function was to establish and maintain customer relationships on a global scale.

In the letter of 30 July 2013, the appellant listed eight functions of the agent.

The agent interacted with international customers by phone, e-mail, and visits and conducted reviews of previous purchases and deliveries and projected order indications of the new season. In addition, it arranged customer samples and volumes and assessed the price expectations of each customer and followed up customers shipping arrangements. All shipping documents were sent to the agent for processing. The agent also invoiced the customers, collected payments, and retained the commissions.

The appellant's bundle contains the kind of documentation handled by the agent during the process of facilitating and making a sale. They show that the agent played a major role in selling the export tobacco.

The appellant contended, that, as the commissions were not fees, as defined in the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act, it had no obligation to withhold non-residents tax.

In addition, the appellant further contended, that, as the commissions were deducted by the agents from the gross foreign currency account value outside Zimbabwe, before the balance was remitted to its account, it could not have withheld any non-residents tax nor would it have been obliged to remit any such tax to the respondent.

The respondent contended, that, the commissions were fees, as defined, and that the appellant, as the principal, was obliged to withhold and remit the non-residents tax on fees due to the respondent.

The Issues

The issues for determination are:

(i) Whether the commissions constituted fees as defined in the Seventeenth Schedule that were chargeable, leviable, and collectable under section 30 of the Income Tax Act?

(ii) Whether the appellant was liable for withholding and remittal of non-residents tax on fees arising from the deduction of these commissions outside Zimbabwe before any proceeds of the sales had been remitted to it?

The Legislative Provisions

The relevant tax is imposed by section 30 of the Income Tax Act which reads:

"30 Non-residents Tax on Fees

There shall be charged, levied, and collected throughout Zimbabwe for the benefit of the Consolidated Revenue Fund a non-residents tax on fees in accordance with the provisions of the Seventeenth Schedule at the rate of tax fixed from time to time in the charging Act."

The Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act defines fees, foreign company, non-resident person, payee, and payer in paragraph 1(1) in the following manner:

"1(1) In this Schedule, subject to subparagraph (2) —

'fees' means any amount from a source within Zimbabwe payable in respect of any services of a technical, managerial, administrative or consultative nature, but does not include any such amount payable in respect of — (none of the 8 apply herein)

'foreign company' means a body corporate that is incorporated in a state or territory other than Zimbabwe under the laws of that state or territory;

'Non-resident person' means -

(b) A partnership or foreign company which is not ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe;

'payee' means a non-resident person to whom fees are payable or paid;

'payer' means any person who or partnership which pays or is responsible for the payment of fees…,.”

The application of the two sections to the appellant and the agents

The non-residents tax is imposed on the agents.

The first agent was resident in Bermuda and the second in Switzerland. The two agents were foreign companies and non resident persons as defined in paragraph 1(1) and (1)(b) of the Seventeenth Schedule.

The two agents would also be payees, if the commissions constituted fees payable or paid.

Again, in the event that the commissions were fees, as defined, the appellant would be a payer, defined "as any person who…, pays or is responsible for the payment of fees."

A positive duty to withold such tax is thrust upon the payer by paragraph 2(1) of the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. It reads:

"2(1) Every payer of fees to a non-resident person shall withhold non-residents tax on fees from those fees and shall pay the amount withheld to the Commissioner within ten days of the date of payment or within such further time as the Commissioner may for good cause allow."

Such a payer is mandated, in subsection (2) of paragraph 2, to furnish the payee with a certificate showing the amount of fees paid and the amount of non-residents tax on fees deducted and kept back. A payee who fails to furnish such a certificate, or who furnishes an inaccurate certificate, is liable to suffer the criminal sanctions set out in paragraph 2(3) of the Schedule.

The duties and responsibilities of the payer, and the resultant sanctions stipulated in paragraph 2 above, apply in equal measure in terms of paragraph 3(1)(2) and (2a) of the same Schedule to an agent who receives the gross fees due to the payee from the payer.

In terms of sub-paragraph (3), the agent is deemed to be an agent of the payee if the payer records its address as the address of the payee and delivers the fees to that address. The agent is treated, under subparagraph (4), as an agent of a taxpayer who is absent from Zimbabwe.

It is apparent from the provisions of paragraph 6 of the Seventeenth Schedule that the agent contemplated by paragraph 3(3) and (4) of the same Schedule is one who is in Zimbabwe.

In terms of paragraph 5, the payer or agent attaches a prescribed form to the payment of the fees.

In terms of paragraph 6(1), a payer or agent who fails to withhold or pay the prescribed tax to the Commissioner, under paragraph 2 or 3, is personally liable for the payment not later than 10 days from the period that the actual amount was due and to an additional equivalent amount of such tax.

Counsel for the appellant listed six (6) other instances in the Income Tax Act where Parliament thrust a similar duty on a payer to withhold tax from a third party and remit it to the statutory tax collecting body.

He correctly submitted, that, the resident payer had no obligation to pay the non-resident tax unless it failed to deduct and keep back the tax from the fees paid or from the fees payable.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, paragraph 6 of the Schedule did not create a tax liability for a resident taxpayer, rather, it created a penalty for the resident taxpayer.

He suggested, that, the heading of the section be amended to reflect that it was a penalty for failure to withhold non-residents tax. He based his submission on the well-recognised and established common law principle that the Commissioner is not accorded any legal right to waive taxes.

I agree that the Commissioner is not accorded the legal right to waive taxes: see Foroma v Minister of Public Construction and National Housing and Anor 1997 (1) ZLR 447 (H)…,.; Ritch & Bhyat v Union Government (Minister of Justice) 1912 AD 719…,.; and SAR & H v Transvaal Consolidated Land & Exploration Co. Ltd 1961 (2) SA 467…,.

The Commissioner is only accorded the power to waive the equivalent penalty imposed under paragraph 6(1)(a). He cannot waive the amount of tax not withheld.

The logical conclusion of the argument by counsel, arising from such an inability to waive the tax not withheld, would be that this paragraph creates a tax liability and not a penalty for the appellant.

In my view, Parliament imposed a tax on the resident who failed to withhold the non-resident tax on fees. Paragraph 6(1)(a) therefore created a tax payable by the appellant if it is found that it failed to withhold the contemplated tax.

In this vein, counsel contended, in paragraph 13 of his written submissions, that:

"The resident becomes personally liable for the payment of the tax only if he, she, or it fails to withhold the tax from the fees payable, in the sense, that, he could do so and did not withhold the tax or thereafter failed to remit the tax so withheld to the Commissioner. But, in normal circumstances, the local resident is not the taxpayer in terms of section 30."

The word 'withhold' is defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as "to keep from doing something, to hold back, restrain, refrain from, to keep back, to keep in one's possession what belongs to or is due to."

I would accept the word "to keep back" as the best possible meaning of the word in the context of the provision.

Were the commissions fees as defined?

I turn to determine whether the commissions constituted fees as defined in the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act.

I dealt with a similar question in G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH207-15. The facts in that case are distinguishable with those in the present case in two material respects:

(i) In that case, the appellant used the term bank charges interchangeably with bank fees, while, in the present matter, the appellant used the term "commissions" for the contract payments that it was obliged to pay.

(ii) Again, G Bank admitted paying the charges directly to the foreign banks while in the instant case the appellant disputed making any direct payments.

At paragraph 109 [p29-30 of the cyclostyled judgment] I said:

"Mr de Bourbon submitted, that, the Nostro bank charges were not subject to withholding tax as they did not fall under any one of the four categories of technical, administrative, managerial or consultative.

It seems to me that the four categories in question are merely adjectives which describe a particular activity.

According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 'administer' means inter alia 'to manage'; 'to handle'; while 'administrative' is defined as 'pertaining to management.'

One of the many permutations of 'to manage' is 'to deal with carefully'. Like McDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v 1 supra at 115F, where he was of course referring to 'transaction, operation or scheme' I would agree that each of the words 'technical, managerial, administrative and consultative' that is used in the para under consideration is of wide and general import and there are a few activities of a taxpayer which will not be appropriately described by one or other of them.”

Counsel for the appellant vigorously attacked my finding, that, the four categories in the definition of fees are of wide and general application and suffice to cover almost every activity undertaken by a taxpayer.

My finding was based on the meaning I ascribed to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the adjectives "technical, managerial, administrative or consultative".

The Income Tax Act itself does not define any of these words.

The established position in Zimbabwe is to adopt the ordinary, literal, and grammatical meaning of words unless doing so leads to glaring absurdity or to results which Parliament would never have intended (per GARWE J…, in Mashamhanda v Mpofu 1999 (1) ZLR 1…, and CHATIKOBO J in Expedite Haulage (Pvt) Ltd v Scotfin Ltd 2000 (2) ZLR 113 (H)…,.

See also Madoda v Tanganda Tea Company 1999 (1) ZLR 374 (S)…,. and the cases cited thereat.

In doing so, the Court must be mindful of the words of WESSELS AJA…, in Stellenbosch Farmers Winery Ltd v Distillers Corp (SA) Ltd 1962 (1) SA 458 (A)…, on the importance of the textual context in which words sought to be interpreted are found, that:

“In my opinion, it is the duty of the court to read the section of the Act which requires interpretation sensibly, i.e. with due regard, on the one hand, to the meaning or meanings which permitted grammatical usage assigns to the words used in the section in question, and, on the other hand, to the contextual scene, which involves consideration of the language of the rest of the statute as well as the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and, within limits, its background.”

See also the sentiments of CHEDA J in Sunfresh Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd v Zimra 2004 (1) ZLR 506 (H)…,.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, our established position is better expressed by WALLIS JA in Natal Joint Municipal Pension v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)…, in these words:

"The present state of the law can be expressed as follows:

Interpretation is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence.

Whatever the nature of the document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears, the apparent purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its production.

Where more than one meaning is possible, each possibility must be weighed in the light of all these factors.

The process is objective not subjective.

A sensible meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or un-businesslike results or undermine the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to and guard against the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the actual words used. To do so, in regard to a statute or statutory instrument, is to cross the divide between interpretation and legislation; in a contractual context, it is to make a contract for the parties other than the one they in fact made.

The inevitable point of departure is the language of the provision itself, read in context and having regard to the purpose of the provision and the background to the preparation and production of the document."…,.

Again, the same learned judge of appeal emphasised, in Firstrand Bank Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa 2015 (1) SA 38 (SCA)…, that:

"The process of interpretation is no longer one in which we seek out a notional plain meaning of the words used, ignoring context and the circumstances in which the document being interpreted, whether a contract or a statute or a patent specification, came into being. Nonetheless, it must start with the actual words used."

It seems to me, that, barring the semantics used, the formulation advanced by WALLIS JA is not different from the approach followed in Zimbabwe. A court is not concerned with the notional meaning but with the practical application of the principles that emerge from the formulation.

I proceed to deal with the essential requirements of fees as defined.

Before I do so, I emphasize, that, what constitutes fees is defined; therefore, all reference by counsel for the appellant, in oral argument, to the perceived notional meanings of 'fees' with reference to advocates and 'commissions' by reference to commodity brokers is of no significance.

The meaning of fees, in the present case, is delineated by the definition in the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act.

Any amount from a source within Zimbabwe

The first amount is defined in section 2 of the Income Tax Act, in relation to the determination of gross income, income, and taxable income in terms of section 8(1) as "money or any other property, corporeal or incorporeal property having an ascertainable money value".

The commissions would constitute part of the gross income of the agents.

It was common cause that the amount was received by or accrued to or was in favour of the agents from a source deemed to be within Zimbabwe by virtue of paragraph 1(2)(a) of the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. It reads:

"(2) For the purposes of this Schedule —

(a) Fees shall be deemed to be from a source within Zimbabwe if the payer is a person who…, is ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe;"

The appellant was, at all material times, ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe.

Counsel for the appellant made a conditional concession, that, if the commissions were found to constitute fees, then, they would be deemed to have been from a source within Zimbabwe. He contended that the agent, and not the appellant, was the payer.

Payable

The word payable connotes a payment that is due, which ordinarily arises from an unconditional obligation on the payer to pay: see Edgar Stores Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1988 (3) SA 876 (A) at 889A-C; 50 SATC 81 (A) and ITC 1587 (1994) SATC 197 at 103-104.

The sales commission and marketing agreements, in clause 2, imposed such an unconditional obligation to pay on the appellant. The responsibility of paying the commissions was imposed on the appellant by the agreements and by the Exchange Control Authority.

Payer is defined as "any person who pays…, or is responsible for the payment of fees."

In my view, a payer could be one of two persons, between the one who actually pays and the one who has the unconditional obligation to pay.

Thus, while on the contention of the appellant, that the agent paid itself, I would find that the person who was responsible for the payment of the fees was the appellant. If the commissions constitute fees, I would therefore find the appellant to have been the payer.

Any services of a Technical, Managerial, Administrative or Consultative nature

The starting point is that the four categories of services are disjunctive rather than conjunctive.

A finding that the physical activities of the agents fell into any one of these categories would suffice to found liability for the payment of non-residents tax on each category.

It was common cause that the agents supplied a service to the appellant. The appellant and the agents termed the service a sales and marketing of export leaf tobacco service.

The physical activities carried out by the agents, on behalf of the appellant, were first outlined in the minutes of 18 July 2013 whose accuracy was confirmed by the signatures of both parties on 6 and 7 August 2013. These activities were further listed in the letter of the appellant to the respondent of 30 July 2013.

The sales and marketing of export leaf tobacco involved negotiating prices with foreign purchasers. There were two types of foreign purchasers:

(i) The first was the major purchaser from the Far East, which accounted for between 40 and 50% by volume and between 50 and 60% by value of the appellant's exports.

The purchaser in question negotiated with the appellant in Zimbabwe. The tone of the minutes indicated that these meetings were facilitated and co-ordinated by the agent. While the directors of the appellant had the final say on the prices and volumes allocated to the major purchaser, the agent played a prominent role in the negotiations. In terms of the sales and marketing agreement the agent assisted the appellant by exerting its best efforts and demonstrated expertise in international marketing and trading of the export leaf tobacco.

(ii) The second type of buyer was the one who did not come to Zimbabwe to negotiate and assess the packed tobacco.

This type of buyer requested a sample of the tobacco on sale. The "price negotiations and other marketing logistics" for this buyer were done by the agent.

The four adjectives that describe the nature of fees are not defined in the Income Tax Act.

WALLIS JA recognised, in both Natal Joint Municipal Pension v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) and Firstrand Bank Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa 2015 (1) SA 38 (SCA), the primacy of the actual words used in the statute.

The appellant did not refer to any dictionary for the meanings of each of these four words. The respondent referred to the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. I relied on the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.

The Definition of Technical

Counsel for the appellant, without reference to any dictionary, suggested that the word "technical" was a term of art which referred to manufacturing, engineering or architectural activities.

The Selling Dictionary renders the word as 'connected with the skills needed for a particular job'; 'an adjective relating to a particular subject, art or craft or its techniques'.

The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines the word as follows: "of a person; skilled in or practically conversant with some particular art or subject, belonging to or relating to an art or arts; appropriate or peculiar to or characteristic of a particular art, science profession, occupation; also pertaining to the mechanical arts and applied sciences generally;"

I am unable to agree with counsel for the appellant, that, there exists, in the context of the Income Tax Act, any limitation for this meaning of the word to applied sciences only, when, by definition, it also applies to the mechanical arts.

Thus, whether one considers the skills needed in selling tobacco as mechanical arts or applied sciences, the "best efforts" and "demonstrated expertise" of the agent is covered in the definition of technical.

The practical application of the knowledge possessed by the agent of the climatic and soil conditions, the style and smoking characteristics of the export leaf necessary for determination of the appropriate blend required by the customers fell into the ambit of technical services provided by the agent to the customer on behalf of the appellant.

But, even if the narrow definition advocated by counsel for the appellant were adopted, the appellant did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that, the agent did not require knowledge of the type of export blending leaf required in the manufacture of cigarettes in order to make a sale.

The averment made, that knowledge of these characteristics was not a requirement to effect a sale, were contrary to the averment in the letter of 30 July that the appellant used such technical knowledge to purchase the appropriate blend on the auction floors and from contract farmers for export.

This technical knowledge was the expertise that the appellant required in making local purchases from both auction floors and contract farmers, and, in negotiating suitable prices with the major purchaser.

The appellant also relied on this technical knowledge to purchase the tobacco that met these specifications from both auction floors and contract farmers in order to satisfy the ultimate manufacturing requirements of the end customers.

The Bill of Lading…, indicates the expertise of the agents in regards to the shipping of export tobacco.

The six documents required were Bills of Lading, EUR 1 certificates, fumigation certificates, detailed weight lists, container packing lists, and invoices. These were all distributed to the agent. The agent gave special instructions on the time frames for dispatching documents and the type of containers used for carrying export tobacco and the manner of storage and fumigation standards applicable to the tobacco.

I would find, that, the agent supplied technical services to the appellant.

Definition of Managerial

In paragraph 19 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant contended, that, the word managerial was synonymous with directing the activities of the appellant.

In paragraph 1.3 of the minutes on p5 of the Rule 11 documents, the appellant indicated the agent was responsible for "price negations and other marketing logistics."

In my view, these activities were carried out on behalf of the appellant by the agent. The agent was directing the activities of the appellant in these foreign markets and was required to even advise the local authorities that it was acting for the appellant.

I find that the practical activities of the agents fell into the ambit of the definition of managerial advocated by counsel for the appellant.

Again, applying the definition of "manage" derived from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary; the agents were running the affairs of the appellant in those markets. The agents exercised actual authority on behalf of the appellant.

Indeed, the letter of 30 July established that the eight functions of the appellant that were managed by Sales Administration Director in Zimbabwe were mirrored by the eight functions run by the agents outside Zimbabwe on behalf of the appellant.

I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, some of the functions constituted both managerial and administrative services.

The Definition of Administrative

The word is defined in the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary as "relating to the running of a business, organisation, etc."

The synonyms accorded to the word include 'managerial'.

In both his oral and written submissions, counsel for the appellant was unable to make any practical distinction between administrative and managerial services. He conceded, that, filling forms, rendering reports, filing documentation, and making payments constituted administrative functions.

These administrative services were, in my view, inseparable from managerial services.

These were carried out by the agent on behalf of its principal - the appellant.

The documentation consisted of sales confirmation invoices, orders, shipping instructions, bills of lading, EUR 1 certificates, fumigation certificates, detailed weight lists, container packing lists, and customs clearance invoices which were dispatched to the agent for processing exports in the countries of destination.

I find that the practical activities of the agents administrative services.

Definition of Consultative

In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, consultative means “pertaining to consultation, deliberative, advisory, take counsel, deliberate, confer, to plan, advise, have recourse to professional advice."

The preamble to the agreements proclaim the purpose for selecting the agents was based on their professionalism and ability to promote, supply, safeguard, and maintain personnel and materials required to make a sale.

In paragraph 19 of his written submissions, counsel for the appellant contended, that, the word 'consultative' connoted the offering of expert professional services and not "simply speaking to the appellant."

The suggestion, that, the agents were engaged for their expertise in "simply speaking" to the appellant is devoid of merit.

The very fact that the agents accompanied an accomplished and major international buyer of export tobacco demonstrates the high pedigree of the professional services rendered to the appellant by these agents.

Again, I find, as a matter of hard fact, that, the agents provided consultative services to the appellant.

The four words appear in the context of section 30 of the Income Tax Act.

That section is designed to tax fees that are payable or paid to an agent who is based outside Zimbabwe but from a source in Zimbabwe.

In my view, the words 'payable' and 'paid' as used in the definition of 'payee' in paragraph 1(1) to the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act are synonymous with 'received by' or 'accrued to' or 'in favour of' that are used in section 8(1) of the Income Tax Act.

The overall purpose of the Income Tax Act is to tax taxable income "received by or accrued to or in favour of” the targeted taxpayer - including the non-resident in question.

The objective and sensible application of the meaning of each of these words is one which discards the notional plain meaning of the words in favour of the contextual meaning.

It seems to me, that, the real test of the pudding prepared by WALLIS JA is in the actual application of the facts found in each matter to the principles that he outlined.

The narrow meaning contended by counsel for the appellant does violence to the context and purpose of enacting the provision.

The true essence of a sale involves technical, managerial, administrative, and consultative competencies of the agent. That is why I maintain, that, there are hardly any activities of a taxpayer that can escape the wide embrace of the definition of fees that is found in the Seventeenth Schedule.

Accordingly, I am satisfied, that, the commissions in question constitute the type of fees contemplated by section 30 and paragraph 1 of the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, paragraph 6(1) merely imposed a penalty and not a tax on the payer or agent who failed to deduct and keep back or pay the appropriate non-resident tax on fees to the Commissioner in the stipulated period.

He argued, that, the personal obligation did not extend to a payer who could not physically deduct the non-resident tax on fees in Zimbabwe retained outside Zimbabwe. He contended, that, as the appellant did deduct and keep back the fees from the gross FCA value of the legal obligation to remit any non-residents tax on fees to the Commission.

The Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act reads:

“Penalty for non-payment of tax

"6. Subject to subparagraph (2), a payer or an agent in Zimbabwe who fails to withhold or pay to the Commissioner any amount of non-residents tax on fees as provided in paragraph 2 or 3 shall be personally liable for the payment to the Commissioner, not later than the date on which payment should have been made in terms of paragraph 2 or 3, as the case may be, of —

(a) The amount of non-residents tax on fees which the payer or the agent, as the case may be, failed to pay to the Commissioner; and

(h) A further amount equal to one hundred per centum of such non-residents tax on fees.

(2) The Commissioner, if he is satisfied in any particular case, that, the failure to pay to him non-residents tax on fees was not due to any intent to evade the provisions of this Schedule, may waive the payment of the whole or such part as he thinks fit or repay the whole or such part as he thinks fit of the amount referred to in subparagraph (b) of subparagraph (1).

(3) If a defaulting payer or agent referred to in subparagraph (1) does not pay the penalty in full on the date on which the default has ceased, interest, calculated at a rate to be fixed by the Minister by statutory instrument, shall be payable on so much of the penalty as remains unpaid by the payer or agent during the period beginning on the date the default has ceased and ending on the date the penalty is paid in full, and, such interest shall be recoverable by the Commissioner by action in any court of competent jurisdiction; provided, that, in special circumstances, the Commissioner may extend the time for payment of the penalty without charging interest."

In my view, whether the above cited paragraph is regarded as a penalty or non-residents tax on fees charging provision, it creates a legal liability for the holder or agent who fails to withhold or pay this type of tax to the Commissioner.

I have already found, that, the commissions in question constituted fees as contemplated by both section 30 and the Seventeenth Schedule of the Income Tax Act.

The next sub-issue to determine is: whether the appellant was the payer of the fees.

It was agreed, that, the appellant was required, by Exchange Control Authority, to pay the fees from its local foreign currency account.

In terms of clause 5 of the Sales and Marketing Commission Agreements these agreements were negotiated and executed within the laws of Zimbabwe. The validity, interpretation and enforcement of the agreements were, also in terms of the same clause, governed by the laws of Zimbabwe.

That the Exchange Control Authority had the force of the laws of Zimbabwe is beyond dispute.

The powerful influence of this Exchange Control Authority was highlighted by the reduction of the commission payable for the first agent from 8.5% to the 7.5% in compliance with the requirements of the Foreign Exchange Control Authority.

The appellant did not disclose the basis on which the offshore payment arrangements of the commission were made. They were certainly made outside the order of the Exchange Control Authority, and were, to that extent, illegal.

If seems to me, that, the illegality conducted by the appellant would obviously impact the decision on whether or not to waive the penalty equivalent to the unpaid non-residents tax on fees under paragraph 6(2) to the Schedule. If adjudged illegal, then, it would not qualify for waiver as the intention on the part of the appellant would be to evade withholding such tax arising from any payments from its local foreign currency account.

HH728-17 : C R S (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax ...

This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

On 28 October 1996, the appellant concluded a lease agreement and a separate logistical agreement with a South African company, hereinafter referred to as the related party, for the lease of its mechanical trucks, trailers, and tankers for a fixed rental. The agreements took effect from the date of signature. The lease agreement was further renewed on 8 October 2003, 16 August 2006, and 6 July 2009.

In February 2013, the respondent commenced a tax compliance investigation on the appellant. It was triggered by the shared common ancestry, logo, name, and Managing Director between the two companies.

The Commissioner identified five (5) areas of dispute, which resulted in the exchange of a number of e-mails with the appellant between 8 August and 8 October 2013. Only two areas of dispute remained unresolved by 8 October 2013:

(i) The first concerned the payment by the appellant of the salaries and wages of the local drivers used by the related party;

(ii) While the second was in respect of under-invoicing.

The issue relating to the drivers was resolved on 23 April 2014.

The failure to reach agreement on the second issue prompted the respondent to raise the disputed amended assessments on 23 June 2014.

The appellant objected to these amended assessments on 22 July 2014. The respondent disallowed the objection on 14 November 2014. The appellant gave notice of its intention to appeal on 18 November 2014 and filed its notice of appeal on 28 November 2014 and case on 18 December 2014. The respondent duly filed the Commissioner's case on 30 March 2015.

The appellant contended, that, the rentals in the agreements were fair and reasonable while the respondent contended, that, they were outrageously low so as to constitute under invoicing and therefore tax avoidance.

The respondent compared the local charges imposed by the appellant on three (3) local tobacco companies on pp1.1 to 3.2 of exhibit 2 against the Currency Declaration Form, CD3 income received from the related party on pp4.1 to 9.2 of exhibit 2.

The income earned from local operations and from CD3 rentals was conveniently summarised by the appellant in tabular form…, which I reproduce below as Table 1.

Table 1

	2009	2010	2011	2012
CD3-revenue R	2 579 685.00	2 429 399.00	1 815 806.00	1 795 380.00
CD3 revenue USD	298 658.98	336 530.44	257 329.12	224 855.18
Other local income USD	144 730.00	245 493.00	321 525.47	298 391.98
Total US$ in FSs	443 388.98	582 023.44	578 854.59	523 247.16
Av exchange rate	8.64	7.22	7.06	7.98

Notwithstanding the absorption of running costs by the related party, the respondent maintained, that, the rentals were outrageously low and unrealistic in comparison with the charges imposed by local cross border hauliers.

It applied the related party's 2013 rate of R22.47 on the distance covered in each year to compute the taxable income set out on page 50.2 of exhibit 1, which formed part of the amended assessments.

It was common cause that the rate was in tandem with the market rates charged by third parties in 2013.

At the appeal hearing, the appellant relied on the evidence of one of its directors and public officer and nephew to its 80 year old founder and Managing Director, who has stood in the position of a General Manager since 1995 and has been a member of the executive committee of the Transport Operators Association of Zimbabwe, one HJR and the 374 paged lever arch file, exhibit 1, and one paged exhibit 4.

The respondent called the evidence of two of its Chief Investigations Officers, one of whom was a purported transfer pricing specialist and relied on the 32 paged exhibit 2 and 6 paged exhibit 3A, 3B and 3C in addition to the Rule 11 documents filed of record.

At the pre-trial hearing of 1 June 2015, the following six issues were referred on appeal for determination:

(i) Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income.

(ii) Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes.

(iii) Whether or not the transactions that were being carried out by the appellant with its related company fall within the ambit of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], and, if not, whether the respondent was entitled, as a matter of law, to utilise section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

(iv) In the event of any such additional income, or deemed income, having been correctly assessed by the respondent, whether the respondent was obligated to deduct from that income the expenses which would have been incurred had the appellant undertaken such transactions; in particular, the cost of the diesel that would have been expended in conducting such transactions.

(v) Whether or not SI163 of 2014 is applicable in casu.

(vi) The appropriate penalty.

At the commencement of the appeal hearing, on 14 September 2015, counsel for the appellant abandoned the fourth issue and persisted with the remaining five issues.

The evidence was mostly common cause.

The appellant was incorporated on 12 June 1960 under a different name and adopted its present name on 10 June 1983. The major shareholders of the appellant were the 80 year old Managing Director and a registered trust.

The Managing Director also held the same position in the related party, a company he promoted in 1978.

It was common cause, that, even though the two entities did not have common shareholders, they were related parties….,.

The appellant operated in the local and regional transport industry with a complement of 24 mechanical horses, 83 trailers, and 11 tankers. A common recurring statement in the Director's report in each of the four tax years under consideration was that it was “engaged in transport and operated principally in Africa.”

The operations were manned by 7 Head Office staff, 10 workshop employees, and 110 local, highly skilled articulated truck and trailer, internationally certified drivers with mostly over 10 years driving experience.

The transport business is dependent on the availability of imported fuel, spare parts, and tyres.

In 1996, the appellant had difficulties in sourcing scarce foreign currency locally to service its cross border operations. In the aftermath of the demise of apartheid in South Africa, in 1994, the South African economy became more integrated with other regional economies.

The appellant alleged, that, it staved off the spectre of liquidation by concluding the 1996 rental agreement with the related party through which the related party used the appellant's equipment to carry goods, by road, between South Africa and the designated countries to the north.

The agreement was executed on 28 October 1996 and renewed for three years on 8 October 2003 and then extended for a further 3 years on 16 August 2006. On 6 July 2009, in deference to the introduction of the multi-currency regime in Zimbabwe, the agreement was infused with an indefinite lifespan.

The 2003 agreement was signed by the uncle and nephew on behalf of the related party and the appellant, respectively. The 2006 and 2009 agreements were signed by other representatives of the related party with the nephew.

The notable terms and conditions of the agreements were that the related party used the appellant's excess fleet based on an agreed fixed fee per leg per trip and not on the distance covered.

With effect from 1 July 2009, the rental was fixed at ZAR1,000 per journey for the use by the related party of any locally registered trailer drawn by a South African registered horse. The rental for a horse, and a horse and trailer, were indicated on pages 15 and 16 of exhibit 1.

These rentals were all increased annually by 10%.

In addition, the related party was responsible, at its own cost, for running maintenance and repairs of the equipment comprising of the cost of insurance, tyres, rims, spare parts and fuel and regulatory requirements such as road toll fees, environmental and port health fees attached to the equipment but not to any damage attributable to the negligence of the appellant's drivers or third parties.

The appellant employed and remunerated the local drivers seconded to the related party and did not receive any compensation from the related party.

However, the appellant invoiced the related party for any maintenance and repairs carried out in Zimbabwe on all equipment used by the related party.

It was the uncontroverted testimony of the nephew, that, a portion of the fee was surrendered to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe and another used to purchase the requirements of the appellant's local fleet, while the balance was sold on the inter-bank market to meet local expenses and staff salaries and wages.

This situation continued until hyperinflation adversely affected the viability and pricing of the domestic transport services in 2008.

The appellant, however, deliberately failed to disclose the 2003 agreed rentals in appendices C1, C2 and C3 to that agreement that were adopted by both the 2006 and 2009 agreements and the logistical and rental agreements of 1996 but elected to reveal the escalation clause set out on page 12.29 of exhibit 1.

However, the agreed rentals for the rented horses were indicated on page 15 and 16 of the exhibit 1 for each of the four (4) tax years and for each of the routes covered.

The southbound trip to Harare and Kwekwe in Zimbabwe from Lusaka, the Copperbelt, Blantyre and Lilongwe accrued different rentals, denominated in South African rands from the north bound trips as indicated in the following table 2:

Table 2

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620

LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400

Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160

The northbound routes to Zimbabwe consisted of the Johannesburg to Harare, Johannesburg to Bulawayo, Johannesburg to Midlands, and Johannesburg to Livingstone routes. The rental was the same for each route in each of the four (4) years, respectively.

In 2009 it was R5,050; in 2010 it was R5,555; in 2011 it was R6,400; and, in 2012 it was R7,300.

The north-bound routes from Zimbabwe were the Harare-Lusaka, Harare-Copperbelt, Kwekwe-Blantyre, Harare-Blantyre and Harare-Lilongwe routes.

The rentals were different on each route and in each year. The cheapest was the Harare to Lusaka route ranging between R2,310 in 2009 and R3,420 in 2012. The most expensive was the Harare to Copperbelt route, which ranged between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,700 in 2012.

The transit routes were the Johannesburg to Livingstone and Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lusaka route, for which the related party paid between R2,950 in 2009 and R4,200 in 2012 and the Johannesburg to Harare destined for Copperbelt for which the related party paid R3,650 in 2009 and R5,200 in 2012 to the appellant.

The last transit route was from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Blantyre and from Johannesburg to Harare destined for Lilongwe. The related party paid the appellant between R3,470 in 2009 and R5,000 in 2012 for the route to Blantyre and between R3,930 in 2009 and R5,600 in 2012 for the route to Lilongwe.

The rental for the trailer only was R1,270 in 2011 and R1,450 in 2012.

The south bound journeys were the exact opposite of the north bound ones.

The rates from the Zimbabwe centres to Johannesburg were the same in each year. The rentals were R2,810 in 2009, and R3,091 in 2010 and R3,560 in 2011 and R4,060 in 2012.

The south bound transit rates were Lusaka to Johannesburg via Harare that ranged between R1,320 in 2009 and R1,900 in 2012 while the Copperbelt to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,570 in 2009 and R2,280 in 2012; and, lastly, the transit rate between Blantyre and Johannesburg via Harare ranged between R1,560 in 2009 and R2,300 in 2012 while the Lilongwe to Johannesburg via Harare route ranged between R1,740 in 2009 and R2,500 in 2012.

The related party paid R1,270 for the trailer per leg per trip on each of these routes. In 2012, the north bound trailer rental was R1,450.

The journey from Johannesburg to Harare and back consisted of two trips while the journey from Johannesburg to any of the destinations outside Zimbabwe and back consisted of four (4) trips.

The maintenance and running expenses incurred by the related party, in respect of 21 mechanical horses, between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2012 amounted to R1,854,841 for spares and maintenance…,.; US$436,983 for labour on repairs and maintenance.

In the same period, tyres worth R1,151,777 were purchased by the related party and R536,021=51 was expensed on 69 trailers. The related party also spent the sum of R9,128,122 on fuel, US$1,809,460 on insurance, and US$40,992 on lubricants.

The mechanical horses traversed 1,771,964km…, during the four year period in question. The distance covered by each identified mechanical horse, and the cost of maintenance and running expenses, tyres and fuel in each year was listed on pages 23 to 24.6 of exhibit 1.

The yearly amounts expensed on each line item by the related party on the leased equipment was conveniently summarised by the appellant on pp24 and 42.5 of exhibit 1.

I reproduce the essential costs in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Km travelled	359 478	505 748	456 664	450 074	1 771 964
Spares in R	684 101	282 918	413 281	474 541	1 854 841
Labour in R	161 168	66 653	97 365	111 797	436 983
Tyres in R	233 661	328 736	296 832	292 548	1 151 777
Fuel in R	1 406 193	2 198 516	2 484 789	3 039 323	9 128 822
Insurance in R	489 000	489 000	440 100	391 360	1 809 460
Lubricants in R	15 119	6 252	9 134	10 487	40 992
Total cost in R	2 989 241	3 372 076	3 741 501	4 320 058	14 422 875
Average cost per km in R	8.32	6.67	8.19	9.60	8.14

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

“The basis or rate of R22.47 that was used to determine the taxable income on estimated assessments was the rate that was used by yourselves in the tax year 2013. In the absence of information on other companies that could be compared with the appellant dealings when they were determining taxable income, this rate becomes the only basis for estimating income. Please note that if you have information pertaining to the actual and correct rates that were used in the tax years under contention, you are free to submit it for consideration.”

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal.

Determination of the issues

Did the appellant in fact receive the additional income assessed by the respondent, and, if so, what was the source of the income?

It was common cause, that, the appellant did not receive the additional income that was assessed by the respondent. Rather, the respondent imputed notional income to the appellant by invoking the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

I hold, as a matter of hard fact, that, the appellant did not receive the assessed income.

Whether or not the transactions between the appellant and the related party resulted in the appellant being deemed to have received additional income for tax purposes?

It seems to me, that, the second issue requires some recasting to reflect the real dispute between the parties.

The issue contemplated by the parties was whether or not the respondent was entitled to deem additional income from the nature of the transactions between the two related parties.

The respondent did not in any way suggest that these undertakings constituted simulated transactions.

Accordingly, the sentiments pronounced in Inland Revenue Commissioners v Duke of Westminister [1936] AC 1 (HL)…, and adopted by the Federal Supreme Court in The Master v Thompson's Estate 1961 (2) SA 20 (FSC)…, and Barnett v Commissioner of Taxes 1959 (2) SA 713 (FSC)…, and the South African cases of Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Kohler 1953 (2) SA 584 (A)…, and MacKay v Fey NO and Anor 2006 (3) SA 182 (SCA)…, have no application in the present matter.

While the respondent did not challenge the genuineness of the agreements. it compared the rates charged by the appellant with the charges imposed by the related party to its own clients, and the charges of some of the local trans-border hauliers and determined, that, the charges were deliberately designed to avoid the payment of income tax from the leased equipment.

The respondent accordingly invoked the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act to bring the appellant to book....,.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act were not applicable to the transactions between the appellant and the related party, both from a factual and legal perspective, while counsel for the respondent made contrary submissions....,.

Section 98 of the Income Tax Act states:

“98 Tax avoidance generally

Where any transaction, operation or scheme (including a transaction, operation or scheme involving the alienation of property) has been entered into or carried out, which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for any tax or of reducing the amount of such liability, and which, in the opinion of the Commissioner, having regard to the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out —

(a) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; or

(b) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and the Commissioner is of the opinion, that, the avoidance or postponement of such liability or the reduction of the amount of such liability was the sole purpose or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme, the Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement, or reduction.”

The requisite elements that must all be fulfilled before the Commissioner can invoke the section were set out in Secretary for Inland Revenue v Geustyn, Forsyth and Joubert 1971 (3) SA 567 (A)…, thus:

(a) A transaction, operation or scheme entered into or carried out;

(b) Which has the effect of avoiding or postponing liability for tax on income or reducing the amount thereof, and which;

(c) In the opinion of the Secretary, having regard of the circumstances under which the transaction, operation or scheme was entered into or carried out was entered into or carried out;

(i) Was entered into or carried out by means or in a manner which would not normally be employed in the entering into or carrying out of a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question;

(ii) Has created rights or obligations which would not normally be created between persons dealing at arm's length under a transaction, operation or scheme of the nature of the transaction, operation or scheme in question; and that

(d) The avoidance, postponement, or reduction of the amount of such liability was, in the opinion of the Secretary, the sole or one of the main purposes of the transaction, operation or scheme.

See ITC 1631 (1997) 60 SATC 63 (Z)…,.; Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…,.; A v Commissioner of Taxes 1985 (2) ZLR 223 (H)…,.; G Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 2015 (1) ZLR 348 (H)…,.; H Bank Zimbabwe Ltd v Zimbabwe Revenue Authority HH575-15.

Whether or not the agreement constituted a transaction, operation or scheme?

It was common ground that the agreements between the related parties fell into the category of a transaction, operation or scheme.

Whether the agreement had the effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the income tax liability of the appellant?

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the transactions were conceived in circumstances that
precluded the contemplated effect of avoiding, postponing, or reducing the appellant's taxable income.

Counsel for the respondent argued that they had such an effect.

In Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A)…, MACDONALD JP described it as the “stipulated effect” and held that the Commissioner was obliged to exercise his powers under the section if the transaction, operation or scheme had the stipulated effect.

The practical results of the agreements were captured in the unaudited financial statements of the appellant in respect of each tax year.

It made losses of US$41,675 in 2009; US$115,920 in 2010; US$138,663 in 2011; and US$94,535 in 2012. It was common cause that the appellant made assessed losses before, during, and after the period covered by the assessments.

The appellant never declared dividends despite the bullish going concern Annual Reports.

In 2010, 2011 and 2012 it procured loans from the related party of US$36,412, US$82,559 and US$114,346, respectively.

That Zimbabwe taxes were in the related parties contemplation when they executed the 2003 agreement was apparent from the note on p12.29 of exhibit 1 which reads:

“The rates set out above may be adjusted from time to time to provide for any taxes or other charges levied by Central Government or any local authority in Zimbabwe, as the case may be, which may directly or indirectly effect the said rates, provided such increase will only be effective on the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the related party has received written notice thereof from the appellant.”

Accordingly, I agree with counsel for the respondent, that, the agreements had the stipulated effect of avoiding or reducing the appellant's liability for income tax....,.

The offence of tax avoidance was described by MACDONALD JP in Commissioner of Taxes v F 1976 (1) RLR 106 (A), in rather strong language, as an evil.

Of course, taxpayers are allowed to employ legitimate means to lessen their tax burden and these do not invite public opprobrium. Tax avoidance certainly places the burden of taxation on other taxpayers to the exclusion of the offender.

Courts emphasize both personal and general deterrence in imposing suitable penalties....,.

The interests of society require that taxpayers abide by the law and pay their fair share of taxes. Those who deliberately break the law must feel the pinch.

HH728-17 : C R S (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

This is an appeal against the four amended assessments issued by the respondent against the appellant on 23 June 2014 in respect of the four consecutive tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.

The real issue for determination posed by these assessments is whether the respondent can tax non-existent income through the deeming provisions of section 98 of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06]....,.

Table 1

	2009	2010	2011	2012
CD3-revenue R	2 579 685.00	2 429 399.00	1 815 806.00	1 795 380.00
CD3 revenue USD	298 658.98	336 530.44	257 329.12	224 855.18
Other local income USD	144 730.00	245 493.00	321 525.47	298 391.98
Total US$ in FSs	443 388.98	582 023.44	578 854.59	523 247.16
Av exchange rate	8.64	7.22	7.06	7.98

Table 2

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

LSK-HRE

HRE-LSK

1420

2 310

1 562

2 541

1 800

3 000

2 050

3 420

2 260

3 760

CPBLT-HRE

HRE-CPBLT

1 970

3 930

2 167

4 323

2 500

5 000

2 850

5 700

3 140

6 270

BLA-KWE

KWE-BLA

NIL

3 110

NIL

3 421

NIL

4 000

NIL

4 560

NIL

5 020

BLA-HRE

HRE-BLA

1620

2 910

1 782

3 201

2 050

3 680

2 330

4 200

2 570

4 620

LLE-HRE

HRE-LLE

2 080

3 370

2 288

3 707

2 630

4 300

3 000

4 900

3 300

5 400

Transit rates

LSK-HRE –JBG

JBH-HRE-LSK

1 320

2 950

1 452

3 245

1670

3 730

1 900

4 200

2 100

4 620

CBLT-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-CBLT

1 570

3 650

1 727

4 015

2 000

4 620

2280

5 200

2 500

5 720

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

BLA-HRE-JBG

JBG-HRE-BLA

1 560

3 470

1 716

3 817

2 025

4 390

2 300

5 000

2 530

5 500

LLE-HRE-JHB

JHG-HRE-LLE

1 740

3 930

1 914

4 323

2 200

4 970

2 500

5 600

2 750

6 160

Table 3: Expenses paid by related party on leased equipment

	2009	2010	2011	2012	Total
Km travelled	359 478	505 748	456 664	450 074	1 771 964
Spares in R	684 101	282 918	413 281	474 541	1 854 841
Labour in R	161 168	66 653	97 365	111 797	436 983
Tyres in R	233 661	328 736	296 832	292 548	1 151 777
Fuel in R	1 406 193	2 198 516	2 484 789	3 039 323	9 128 822
Insurance in R	489 000	489 000	440 100	391 360	1 809 460
Lubricants in R	15 119	6 252	9 134	10 487	40 992
Total cost in R	2 989 241	3 372 076	3 741 501	4 320 058	14 422 875
Average cost per km in R	8.32	6.67	8.19	9.60	8.14

The respondent derived the gross charges of cross-border transactions from the third party verification exercise that it conducted on three local cross-border hauliers, TCS, CT and CCC.

It wrote exhibits 3A, 3B and 3C between 2 July 2013 and 16 September 2013 seeking the gross rates in both United States dollars and South African rands charged in respect of each tax year under investigation on 19 regional routes traversed by the related party.

The responses…, were received between 5 August and 19 September 2013.

These parties did not offer a separate truck and trailer service. They factored into the freight rates the operational costs of fuel, vehicle inspection, toll and environmental management fees, insurances and driver's allowances, the distance covered, the nature of the cargo, and competition.

The freight rates ranged between US$1.60 per km and US$2.30 per km for both south and north bound routes during the period to the end of the 2012 tax year.

In respect of the 2013 tax year, the average rate was US$2.50 per km.

One of the local hauliers supplied very detailed information on the freight rates. It used the cost plus mark-up model where the mark-up ranged between 7% and 12%. It charged between US$750 and US$1,300 for the south bound routes and between US$1,300 and US$2,500 for the north bound routes. While it charged per trip like the related party, it translated these charges to between US$1.60 and US$2.30 per km.

The nephew listed 11 advantages that accrued to the appellant from the rental agreement.

The appellant was, inter alia, assured of prompt and steady flow of income and a regular foreign currency supply, accounted through the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe CD3 forms, to meet local expenses from a single client; it's fleet was maintained at no cost to it and prevented from deteriorating from disuse; it was able to offer limited local transport services; it did not incur marketing and clearing and depot expenses in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Malawi; it had a guaranteed free source of fuel at its depot in Zimbabwe for local use; and, lastly it was able to retain a pool of experienced internationally certified drivers starving it off liquidation and heavy retrenchment costs.

On the other hand, the related party benefited from the use of authorised equipment on Zambian, Malawian, Batswana and Mozambican public roads and highly skilled drivers who were unable and unwilling to secure work permits in South Africa.

It was common cause, that, the respondent treated the appellant as a cross-border haulier and applied the 2013 freight rate charged by the related party, of R22.47 per km, retrospectively to each of the tax years in dispute. It ignored the aggregate expenses of R21.20 per km incurred in raising this amount.

It computed the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment by multiplying this amount by the number of kilometres travelled in each year and converted the total to United States dollars using the uniform and inaccurate cross rate of 1US$ to R10.

The respondent further calculated the yearly running maintenance and repair costs expensed on the leased trucks and converted it to United States dollars using the inaccurate exchange rate of 1US$ to R10 and added the figure to the transport services income in the annual financial statements derived from the CD3 forms.

It then deducted the aggregate amount from the gross revenue earned from the leased equipment aggregate figure from the CD3 revenue and running maintenance and repair costs. The variance, whether positive or negative, was added to income in the computation of taxable income.

The appellant gave contrary evidence in two respects:

(i) The first was on whether it operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only or whether it also operated across our borders.

(ii) The second was on whether it charged per trip or per km in respect of the local transport services.

The sole witness called by the appellant testified that the appellant operated a transport service in Zimbabwe only.

In each of the tax years in issue the same witness signed the Director's report in which he proclaimed that the appellant operated principally in Africa.

In regards to the second aspect, he averred, in paragraph 39 of his statement, which he adopted in his evidence in chief, that, the appellant charged a United States dollar denominated daily rate.

At p50.1 paragraph 12 of exhibit 1, the appellant's South African based external accountants wrote that “the appellant does operate its own vehicles locally within Zimbabwe and in those instances it charges a US$ rate per km.”

In fact, under cross-examination, the witness maintained, that, the local expenses were based on operational overheads comprised of running costs, lubricants, fuels, salaries and wages, and not on the distance or the nature of the load.

He maintained, that, the dominant intention behind these charges was to cover overheads and remain viable and not the avoidance or reduction of tax. He was adamant, that, even though the appellant was a perpetual loss maker before, during, and after the tax years in question, the rentals were market based.

He sought to demonstrate, by reference to a random selection of charges on p31.3 to 31.5 of exhibit 1 that the CD3 income constituted 42% of the related party's Group profit….,.

It was common cause, that, the fees charged on north bound routes were higher than those on south bound routes because the former carried finished products while the latter conveyed raw materials. It was common cause, that, the exchange rate used in the computation of the disputed income tax of 1US$ to R10 was inaccurate in respect of each of the tax years under consideration.

The sole witness applied the “correct rates” used by the related party in each of these tax years to the formula invoked by the respondent including the use of the wrong exchange rate and produced different results in exhibit 4.

The correct gross revenue rates per km were ZAR16.55 in 2009; ZAR17.52 in 2010; ZAR19.45 in 2011; and ZAR20.04 in 2012.

The appellant would have incurred a loss of US$129,377 instead of a profit of US$65,433=97 in 2009; a loss of US$33,160 instead of a profit of US$217,185=16 in 2010; a loss of US$64,793 instead of a profit of US$73,119=91 in 2011 and a loss of US$53,304 and not a profit of US$56,063=46 in 2012….,.

The respondent did not use these comparative rates but the 2013 figure suggested by the appellant's South African based external accountants as acknowledged by the Commissioner-General in her determination of 14 November 2014…,. She wrote that:

I turn to determine the issues that were referred on appeal....,.

Whether or not SI 163 of 2014 is applicable in casu?

It was common cause that the Finance Act Tax Amnesty Regulations, SI163 of 2014 were promulgated in terms of section 23 of the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014. They targeted tax defaulters and evaders. The period covered by the tax amnesty ran from 1 October 2014 to 31 March 2015 and was further extended to 30 September 2015.

The application was made on the prescribed form and full disclosure was required. All taxpayers who had made self-assessments, paid tax, were under investigation or audit, or were challenging their assessments were not eligible.

The appellant fell into the excluded category of taxpayers.

The eligible taxpayers were exempted from paying additional tax, penalties, and interest once the application was granted.

Counsel for the appellant contended, that, the appellant, as a law abiding citizen, was being discriminated against by being asked to pay additional tax and interest in violation of section 56(1) of the Constitution which required that all persons be treated equally before the law and have equal benefit of the law. He prayed for the extension of the benefits to the appellant.

He submitted, in the alternative, that, in exercising its discretion, this Court exempts the appellant from payment of any additional tax and interest.

Sections 56(1) and (6) of the Constitution stipulate that:

“(1) All persons are equal before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.

(6) The State must take reasonable legislative and other measures to promote the achievement of equality and to protect or advance people or classes of people who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, and —

(a) Such measures must be taken to redress circumstances of genuine need;

(b) No such measure is to be regarded as unfair for the purposes of subsection (3).”

Section 56 of the Constitution falls under the cluster of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

In terms of section 45(3) of the Constitution, they apply to both natural and juristic persons and must be construed in terms of section 46 of the Constitution, which, amongst other requirements, prescribes the promotion of the founding values and principles in section 3 of the Constitution that underlie a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality and freedom by a court of law.

The right to equality before the law and equal benefit to the law are, however, not absolute rights.

They are limited in extent and application by section 86(2) of the Constitution which states that:

“(2) The fundamental rights and freedoms set out in this Chapter may be limited only in terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is fair, reasonable, necessary and justifiable in a democratic society based on openness, justice, human dignity, equality, and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including —

(a) The nature of the right or freedom concerned;

(b) The purpose of the limitation, in particular, whether it is necessary in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, regional or town planning or the general public interest;

(c) The nature and extent of the limitation;

(d) The need to ensure that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms by any person does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others;

(e) The relationship between the limitation and its purpose, in particular, whether it imposes greater restrictions on the right or freedom concerned than are necessary to achieve its purpose; and

(f) Whether there are any less restrictive means of achieving the purpose of the limitation.”

The inarticulate major premise embodied in counsel for the appellant's submission was that the tax amnesty provisions were, to the extent that they discriminated against the appellant, unconstitutional.

He did not disclose how the Finance Act (No.2) of 2014, on which these amnesty provisions are founded failed the test of constitutionality stipulated in section 86(2) of the Constitution.

I await proper and well-reasoned, rather than bald and unsubstantiated legal submissions on the point that would serve justice to both the taxpayer and the Commissioner.

The arguments advanced are inadequate to convince me, on a balance of probabilities, that, the appellant should be accorded the same treatment by the Commissioner or this Court as the truant taxpayers contemplated in the tax amnesty provisions.

The main and alternative submissions are devoid of depth and are accordingly dismissed.

I therefore hold, that, the statutory instrument in question has no application in the present matter.

SC03-22 : DELTA BEVERAGES (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, UCHENA JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA

This is an appeal and cross-appeal against parts of the judgment of the Special Court (for Income Tax Appeals) dated 11 October 2019 dismissing some of the appellant's objections against the respondent's amended assessments, and setting aside some of the respondent's amended assessments.In this judgment, I will refer to the ...

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The detailed facts of the case can be summarised as follows:

The main appellant is a company registered in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe and a subsidiary of Delta Corporation (the Holding Company). The two companies are separate and distinct from each other but share the same acronym. The holding company carries on business in the beverages and agro-industrial sectors of the Zimbabwean economy.

The cross-appellant is, in terms of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], the authority responsible for the collection of taxes in Zimbabwe.

In 1958, the predecessor to the holding company entered into an exclusive franchise agreement with a Canadian Company which owned the LL beverage trademark.

In 1970, two further trademarks, CB and CBL were included in the franchise agreement.

The last trademark, EL, was added to the franchise agreement in 2004.

The franchisee is the owner of four local beverage trademarks CL, BL, ZL and GPL. The parties interchangeably referred to trademarks as brands in their franchise agreements.

In terms of the 1970 agreement, the holding company had the right, subject to the terms and conditions of each agreement, to transfer, assign and sub-licence its subsidiaries to manufacture and sell the trademarked beverages. The holding company was obliged to pay to the franchisor royalty fees for the trademarks computed against prescribed sales and technical fees for the technical assistance provided and calculated on a cost-recovery basis.

Before the court a quo, evidence was led to the effect, that, in 2002, the Canadian Company was taken over by the Dutch company, International Management BV, which, in turn, executed an undated and unsigned Technical Support and Assistance (“TSA”) agreement with the holding company retrospectively to 1 January 2002.

The Dutch company was a subsidiary of SAB Miller International BV, an English public company.

The Dutch company undertook to provide, in person or by proxy, to the local holding company, its accumulated international expertise and know-how in the manufacture, management and distribution of beverages.

The Group of the holding company was defined as the holding company and “any existing and future subsidiaries.”

Know-how was elaborately defined to include all aspects of purchasing raw materials, product manufacture and brand development, plant and waste management, packaging and distribution, consumer research, and performance management systems.

The term subsidiary carried five different meanings which ranged from majority shareholder control, to majority votes garnered by agreement with other shareholders in financial policy, management, and supervision of the holding company by the Dutch company.

The term turnover encompassed Group gross sales revenue from all beverages and malt inclusive of taxes and excise duties.

Clause 3 contemplated the provision of know-how to the Group and “the relevant company in the Group” under the direction of the Board of the holding company.

The holding company undertook to do all such things and pass all such resolutions necessary to effect the terms of the agreement. It also agreed to ensure that its subsidiaries adopt, ratify, or confirm any lawful support rendered by the Dutch company to such subsidiaries.

In terms of clause 5, the holding company was responsible for the payment of an annual fee equal to 1.5 percent of the total Group turnover payable quarterly, on a pro rata basis, within 30 days after the end of each quarter.

The payment was to be in United States dollars, at the best available market rate in Zimbabwe, but, subject to the necessary exchange control and other Governmental approvals.

In the absence of foreign currency, the holding company would apply the fee to purchase its ordinary shares on behalf of the Dutch company in the name of an affiliate.

A new agreement was concluded on 1 September 2006 and renewed on 1 August 2011.

The Dutch company continued to provide know-how in the production, distribution, and management of beverages in the Group and the relevant company in the Group.

In the interim, on 30 April 2007, the holding company executed a royalty agreement with the Dutch company, International BV, which replaced the royalty agreement of 14 December 2001.

On 1 February 2008, the main appellant's Board of Directors resolved to execute an administrative and contractual services agreement with the holding company authorising the holding company to enter into administrative, technical, and contractual services arrangements with third parties on its behalf.

It resolved to be bound by such agreements and to bear the costs and benefits arising therefrom.

The contemplated Administrative, Technical and Contractual Service Agreement was concluded on 8 February 2008.

The main appellant bound itself to assume all royalty and exploitation of user rights and brands and trademarks agreements, services agreements, lease agreements, bonds, supplier contracts, employment contracts, and any other routine matters authorised for execution by the Board or its management executed by the holding company as its own.

On 19 August 2011, the exchange control authority granted authority to the holding company to pay royalties of up to 5 percent to the Dutch company less withholding tax.

Again, on 18 March 2013, the exchange control authority granted the main appellant authority to renew the Technical Services Assistance agreement and make payment of fees of up to 1.5 percent of the Group's annual turnover excluding sales of CBL, LL and EL less withholding tax and an additional 1 percent of the holding company's turnover less withholding tax on another product, CL, in recognition of the invention, design and know-how of the franchisor.

The turnover and fees were to be certified by a reputable firm of auditors.

On 14 April 2016, the cross appellant issued six (6) amended manual Notices of Assessment for Income Tax to the main appellant. The amended assessments related to the tax years ending on 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014. The cross-appellant levied a payment by the main appellant of over US$42 million, including penalty and interest.

By letter dated 20 April 2016, the main appellant objected to the assessments.

In response, the cross appellant issued revised assessments and sent these to the main appellant without an explanation.

In its revised assessments, the cross-appellant conceded several issues raised by the main appellant in its objection and reduced the total amount claimed to around US$30 million.

By letter dated 9 May 2016, the main appellant revised and re-lodged further objections.

The cross appellant disallowed all grounds of the main appellant's further objections.

Aggrieved by that decision, the main appellant appealed to the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals.

The issues placed before the court a quo for determination, as per the joint pre-trial conference minute, are as follows:

“1. Whether or not the respondent was correct in disallowing royalties pertaining to the brands/trademarks?

2. Does the fact that a written technical services agreement exists between Delta Corporation and SAB Miller Management BV prevent the appellant from deducting such fee payments as expenses?

3. Did the appellant incur technical fees, which it sought to deduct as expenses?

4. Was the respondent correct in disallowing technical fees, which are expressed as a percentage of turnover?

5. Had Delta's tax affairs, relating to the tax year ending 31 December 2009, prescribed as at the date of the assessment?

6. If not, whether the respondent correctly disallowed the expenditure apportioned by the holding company as management charges?

7. Whether or not the respondent was correct in disallowing consumable stocks claimed by the appellant.

8. Whether or not the respondent was correct in disallowing prepaid expenses claimed by the appellant?

9. Is appellant entitled to deduct the inventory revaluation in question?

10. Whether or not the respondent was correct in disallowing expenses described as computer software cost in the tax computation?

11. Is respondent's imposition of penalties of 50% justified?

12. Whether or not interest should be payable by the appellant.”

After hearing the parties and perusing documents filed of record, the court a quo ordered that:

“1. The revised manual assessments numbers 0006754, 0006755, 0006756, 0006757, 0006758 and 0006759 issued by the Commissioner on 5 May 2016 for the tax years ended 31 December 2009, 2010, 2011, 2013 and 2014 respectively be and are hereby set aside.

2. The Commissioner is directed to issue further revised assessments that incorporate the contents of this judgment. He shall specifically:

(a) Allow in full the deductions claimed by the appellant for royalties and technical fees in respect of the 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014 tax years.

(b) Reopen the 2009 assessment and add back the sum of US$150,722 in respect of head office expenses, to the appellant's taxable income.

(c) Add back all the deductions, if any, made by the appellant in respect of head office expenses to the appellant's taxable income for the years 2010 to 2014.

(d) Add back the deductions for consumable stock, in their respective amounts, to the appellant's taxable income in respect of each tax year in issue.

(e) Add back the prepayments, in their respective amounts, in each tax year in issue.

(f) Allow the deduction in the sum of US$603,792 in respect of the stock revaluation adjustment in the 2010 tax year.

(g) Add back the computer software deductions of US$2,059,238 in their respective amounts, in the 2013 and 2014 tax years.

(h) Charge a penalty of 10% on the additional tax payable in each respective tax year.

(i) Waive in full any interest from the additional tax.”

Aggrieved by the decision of the court a quo, the main appellant noted an appeal against part of the judgment to this Court. The cross appellant cross-appealed against part of the same decision.

The appeals were noted on the following grounds:

GROUNDS OF APPEAL (MAIN APPEAL)

“1. The court a quo erred in law by holding, that, the legislative intent behind the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] was clearly to match the expense incurred to the income produced in the same tax year.

2. The court a quo erred in law by holding, that, when determining the deductibility of the expense of unused consumables the relevant question was whether 'the appellant had an unconditional legal obligation to purchase' them.

3. The court a quo erred in law by finding, that, the appellant decided to 'purchase consumables in excess of its annual requirements' in circumstances where there was no evidence warranting such a finding before the court.

4. The court a quo erred by disallowing all deductions for consumable stocks in circumstances where it has found that deductions for consumables are allowed in the year when they were consumed.

Relating to issue 5: 'Prepaid expenditure'

5. The court a quo erred in law by apparently expecting opinion evidence, on a question of law relating to the requirement of paying excise duty, from a witness of fact.

6. The court a quo erred in law by appearing to hold, without expressly stating its finding, that, the appellant's obligation to pay excise duty on clear beer removed from the excise bonded warehouse constituted a 'premature discharge of a contingent liability.'

7. The court a quo erred in law by appearing to hold, without expressly stating its finding, that, the appellant's obligation to pay for an annual insurance premium that straddled two tax years constituted a 'premature discharge of a contingent liability.'”

GROUNDS OF APPEAL (CROSS APPEAL)

“1. The Special Court for Income Tax Appeals erred in allowing as a deduction, in terms of section 15(2(a) of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06], expenses relating to royalties in respect of each tax year in issue when the cross-respondent was not a party to the agreement in terms of which such royalties were payable.

2. The court a quo further erred in finding that payments made in respect of trademarks or brands were expenditure incurred for the purposes of the cross-respondent producing income.

3. The court a quo further erred in finding, that, the cross-respondent was entitled to pay fees in terms of the Technical Services Agreement which was concluded between Delta Corporation Limited and SAB Miller Management BV to which the cross-respondent was not a party.

4. The court a quo erred in finding, that, the cross-respondent was entitled to pay fees in terms of the Technical Services Agreement at the rate of 1.5% of turnover when it was clear that SAB Miller itself was charged fees on a cost-plus mark-up basis by its South African sub-contractors and when the Group policy was that the cost plus mark-up basis was the method of charging such fees.

5. The court a quo further erred in finding, that, the cross-respondent was entitled to pay and deduct the amount of US$603,792 in respect of inventory revaluation, as an expense incurred against its income in terms of section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act when the value of the stock adjusted had already been factored into the computation of the gross profit which was subject to the income tax.

6. The court a quo further grossly erred in finding, that, the cross-appellant was not correct in imposing a penalty of 50% of the taxes due upon the assessments on the cross-respondent.

7. The court a quo further grossly erred in setting aside the interest imposed upon the cross-respondent when it was not shown that the Commissioner of the cross-appellant had been grossly unreasonable in imposing such interest at 10%.”

THE MAIN APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL

Counsel for the main appellant, in the main appeal, submitted, that, the appellant bought consumables which did not run out in the first year and were carried into the second year. He further submitted, that, deductions could only be made in the first year and that the matching principle did not apply.

Counsel for the appellant submitted, that, the matching principle cannot be used as it apportions costs over two tax years as there were un-utilised consumables carried over from the year of purchase.

He contended, that, the cause of action arose when the consumables were bought and the expense was incurred in year one. To that end, he argued that the appellant has to deduct the expenses of the purchases in year one and that there should be no splitting of the expenses into both years.

Counsel for the main appellant asserted, that, the statutory prepaid expenditure on record, establishes that the expenditure was incurred in terms of statute and cannot therefore be a prepayment as alleged by the respondent. He submitted, that, the court a quo was correct in allowing the deductions but it was not clear how it went on to make a finding in favour of the respondent.

Counsel for the main appellant submitted, that, the court a quo erred by disallowing all deductions for consumable stocks in circumstances where it had found that deductions for consumables are allowed in the year when they were consumed.

Concerning the fifth ground of appeal, relating to stock and trading stock, counsel for the main appellant argued, that, deductions were meant for stock in general to avoid double deductions.

On the imposition of penalties, counsel for the main appellant averred, that, the matter would have to be remitted to the court a quo for it to determine whether or not section 98 of the Income Tax Act applies.

In relating to the cross appellant's grounds of appeal number six and seven, on penalty and interest, counsel for the main appellant argued, that, the proceedings were neither an appeal in the strict sense nor a review, as the court a quo can consider evidence placed before it and come up with a decision on penalty and interest based on its own discretion.

On whether or not brands and trademarks contribute towards the making of income, counsel for the main appellant submitted, that, they significantly contribute in the making of income.

In respect of inventory revaluation, he submitted that they were correctly allowed in terms of paragraph 4 of the Second Schedule of the Income Tax Act.

In respect of the technical services, he argued that the court a quo correctly found that they were deductible.

THE CROSS APPELLANT'S SUBMISSIONS ON APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL

Counsel for the cross appellant submitted, that, the consumables the main appellant sought to deduct were not utilized in the year of purchase, therefore, in terms of section 15(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act, one cannot interpret the section without taking into consideration the purpose for which the expense was incurred.

He argued, that, the matching principle applied as the purchase of consumables should be for the purpose of making an income in the tax year in which the purchases were made.

Counsel for the cross-appellant contended, that, the consumables were bought in excess and could not all be deducted in the same tax year. He submitted, that, the excess consumables were not consumed and did not generate income.

He further submitted, that, it is by the reasonable interpretation of the law that the matching principle must be applied.

He argued, that, the deduction for payments of royalties should not be allowed as there is no nexus between the main appellant and the holder of the royalties.

Concerning ground of appeal number two, he submitted, that, trademarks, brands, and the know-how generate little money unless advertised.

He further submitted, that, the advertising costs are deductible and that it is the advertising that generates income and that if the products are not advertised they remain as stock.

Counsel for the cross appellant asserted, that, there was no evidence proving that brands and trademarks contribute towards the making of income.

In relation to the main appellant's third and fourth grounds of appeal, he submitted, that, the court a quo found that the main appellant's witness was not a credible witness.

He contended, that, it was the SAB Miller policy to pay on a cost-plus mark-up basis, but, the court a quo found that the appellant was obliged to pay the holding company on a turnover basis of 1.5 percent.

Concerning prepayment of excise duty insurance premiums, counsel for the cross-appellant averred that the court a quo did not hear evidence on this issue as none was placed before it.

On technical fees, counsel for the cross-appellant submitted, that, the court a quo should have determined whether or not the agreement between the Dutch company and Delta Corporation (Private) Limited and that between the main appellant and Delta Corporation was not aimed at tax avoidance.

In respect of inventory revaluation, he submitted that the deduction should not have been allowed as that would amount to a double deduction.

THE MAIN APPELLANT'S RESPONSE

Counsel for the main appellant submitted, that, the question of whether or not the main appellant was a party to the agreement was a factual finding on which the cross appellant had made a concession to the effect, that, the agreement was genuine.

He averred that the cross appellant's case was whether or not a deduction could be allowed, and, on the other hand, its case was that deductions were justified if there was an obligation to pay.

He therefore argued, that, the cross-appellant was approbating and reprobating.

In respect of the use of trademarks to make an income, counsel for the main appellant submitted, that, one can make an income from brands or trademarks, which is a sign of the quality of the product. He argued that section 8(1) of the Income Tax Act defines gross income and income in a way which establish that income can be generated by a brand or a trademark.

Counsel for the main appellant averred, that, the Exchange Control Act allowed the charging of these fees and sets an upper limit of 3 percent.

ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION

The appeals raise the following issues for determination:

IN RESPECT OF THE MAIN APPEAL

1. Whether or not the court a quo correctly found, that, the legislative intent behind the Income Tax Act was to match the expenses incurred to the income produced in the same tax year and to allow the deduction of statutory prepayments which cover a period beyond the year of taxation in the tax year of payment.

2. Whether or not the court a quo erred in ordering the Commissioner to add back to the main appellant's taxable income deductions for consumables used to make an income in the year of taxation.

IN RESPECT OF THE CROSS APPEAL

1. Whether or not the court a quo erred in allowing the deduction of royalties by the main appellant when it was not a party to the agreement between the Dutch company and its holding company for the use of the Dutch company's brands and trademarks.

2. Whether the court a quo erred when it allowed the main appellant's deduction of payments of technical services without resolving whether or not such deductions contravened section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

3. Whether the court a quo erred when it allowed the main appellant's deduction of US$603,792 for inventory revaluation.

4. Whether or not the court a quo was correct in reducing to 10 percent the 50 percent penalty imposed and waiving in full the interest charged.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS

It must be stressed, that, the Special Court for Income Tax Appeals is not a court of appeal in the strict sense because when it hears these appeals, it is a re-hearing of the matter and it exercises its own discretion. It can even hear and rely on evidence and submissions which were not placed before the Commissioner.

This position was stated in Sommer Ranching (Pvt) Ltd v Commissioner of Taxes 1999 (1) ZLR 438 (SC)…, where GUBBAY CJ emphasized that:

“Presently, it is well settled that in an appeal against a decision where the Commissioner exercised a discretion, the Special Court is called upon to exercise its own original discretion. Nor is it restricted to the evidence which the Commissioner had before him. The appeal to the Special Court is not only a rehearing, but, can involve the leading of evidence and the submission of facts and arguments of which the Commissioner was unaware: see also Commissioner for Inland Revenue v da Costa 47 SATC 87 (A) at 95; 1985 (3) SA 768 (A) at 775B-G; K v Commissioner of Taxes 1993 (1) ZLR 142 (S) at 147B-F; 55 SATC 276 (ZS) at 281.”

The appeal before the court a quo was therefore not merely a review of the correctness of the Commissioner's determination, but, the court was required to exercise its own independent discretion unaffected by that of the Commissioner....,.

IN RESPECT OF THE CROSS APPEAL

2. Whether the court a quo erred when it allowed the main appellant's deduction of payments of technical services without resolving whether or not such deductions contravened section 98 of the Income Tax Act

In determining this issue, the court a quo commented on its perception that there might have been tax avoidance in the manner in which the Technical Services Agreement was concluded between the parties.

It commented, that, if the Commissioner had attacked the deduction of these services from the main appellant's taxable income it would have been fatal to the main appellant's claim.

In his heads of argument and submissions before this court, counsel for the cross appellant argued, that, the court a quo erred when it raised this issue and did not deal with it conclusively.

He argued, that, the Special Court for Income Tax has jurisdiction to rehear matters brought before it on appeal. He submitted, that, such appeals are not appeals in the strict sense, therefore, the court a quo should have fully inquired into whether or not there was tax avoidance in the main appellant's holding company's agreement with the Dutch company.

He submitted, that, the Dutch company, Delta Corporation (Private) Limited, and the main appellant are related companies which could have colluded to agree on the payment to the Dutch company at the percentage of 1.5 percent, when services by the Dutch company's South African subsidiaries to the main appellant were being made at cost price plus margin. He submitted, that, this was meant to benefit the Dutch company to the prejudice of Zimbabwe's tax collection system.

Counsel for the main appellant submitted, that, there was no tax avoidance, but, concentrated on the deductibility of the technical services instead of the tax avoidance issue.

The determinant factor is whether or not the court a quo inquired into and determined the issue of tax avoidance.

In determining the issue, the court a quo said:

“The witness failed to explain why the Dutch company paid the South African entity that supplied the technical services to the appellant on its behalf on a cost plus mark-up basis but charged the local holding company on a percentage of turnover basis.

Such a failure may have been fatal to the appellant's case had the Commissioner disallowed the technical fees in terms of section 98 the Income Tax Act.

In the absence of a finding by the Commissioner, that, the charging of a percentage of turnover as opposed to a cost plus basis was a transaction, operation, or scheme designed to and which did avoid the payment of the appropriate tax due as contemplated by section 98 of the Income Tax Act, the contracted choice between the Dutch company and the local holding company, of applying the percentage of turnover instead of the cost plus mark-up formula, cannot be impugned.”…,.

It is apparent from the court a quo's comments, that, it perceived that there might have been a case of tax avoidance by the main appellant's holding company and the Dutch company.

It is also apparent, that, it took no further steps to inquire into that possibility but proceeded to determine the appeal on other factors not connected to tax avoidance as if the appeal before it was an appeal in the strict sense.

It thus left the issue of tax avoidance hanging as no further inquiry into it was made, nor did it make a decision on the issue.

Section 98 of the Income Tax Act provides as follows:

“98 Tax avoidance generally

The Commissioner shall determine the liability for any tax and the amount thereof as if the transaction, operation or scheme had not been entered into or carried out, or in such manner as in the circumstances of the case he considers appropriate for the prevention or diminution of such avoidance, postponement or reduction.”…,.

It is clear from the underlined part of the quotation, that, the issue of avoidance should be determined to enable the Commissioner, or, as in this case the Special Court, to determine how the tax payer should be taxed.

The determination of tax issues require clarity and incisiveness in decision making.

This is because the law requires that those who should pay tax should do so and those who fall outside that requirement should not be taxed.

There should be no room for those within the group which should be taxed escaping through failure by the Commissioner to net them in, and, if he fails, the Special Court, in the exercise of its full jurisdiction, should net them in.

In the case of Parkington v Attorney General 1869 LR 4 H.L. 100, 122 LORD CAIRNS, commenting on interpretation of fiscal statutes, said:

“As I understand the principle of all fiscal legislation, it is this: if a person sought to be taxed comes within the letter of the law he must be taxed, however great the hardship may appear to the judicial mind to be. On the other hand, if the Crown, seeking to recover the tax, cannot bring the subject within the letter of the law, the subject is free, however apparently within the spirit of the law the case might otherwise appear to be.”

It is therefore my view, that, once the court a quo realised that there might be tax avoidance it should have exhaustively inquired into and made a determination on it. It should have sought to determine the correct position of the law instead of identifying a possible error by the Commissioner and allowing it to pass.

Taxation is by the law and not official errors or laxity: see also the case of Commissioner of Taxes v CWP (Pvt) Ltd 1989 (3) ZLR 361 (SC)…,.

In the case of Commissioner of Taxes v Astra Holdings (Pvt) Ltd 2003 (1) ZLR 417 (S) MALABA JA…, said:

“The question must be stated and answered. Can it be said, that, in writing the letter of 1 July 1995, which contained the error of law, the Commissioner, by the Revenue Officer, purported to contract with Astra Holdings or purported to represent to it that the statement was true and that thereafter he would not asses it to unpaid tax which was, by law, due to revenue?

In other words, did the Commissioner bind himself to accept as valid the actions of Astra Holdings regarding the non-payment of the sales tax based upon the error of law?

There is no doubt, that, the purported contract would have been born out of the mistake of the law requiring that sales tax be charged and collected by the motor dealer on all motor vehicles sold locally. Although unknown to the parties, it would have been in contravention of the law for Astra Holdings not to charge and collect the sales tax which the statute required it to collect.

In my view, such an arrangement would be null and void ab initio.

It is a bargain the Commissioner could not make at law because it would have the effect of being in breach of his statutory duty to collect tax due to revenue.

It is one thing for revenue to enter into an arrangement with a taxpayer on how, in the exercise of its managerial powers, it will collect tax; but, it is another for it to seek to decide that a particular tax imposed by Parliament is not due from a taxpayer when in fact it is, and, in so doing, disclaim the right to the tax and abandon the statutory power to collect it.

In R v Board of Inland Revenue ex p. MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd and Ors [1990] 1 All ER 91 BINGHAM LJ said…,.:

'I am, however, of opinion, that, in assessing the meaning, weight, and effect reasonably to be given to statements of the Revenue, the factual context, including the position of the Revenue itself, is all important.

Every ordinary, sophisticated taxpayer knows that the Revenue is a tax-collecting agency, not a tax-imposing authority.

The taxpayer's only legitimate expectation is, prima facie, that, he will be taxed according to statute, not concession or a wrong view of the law: see R v AG ex p. Imperial Chemical Industries PLC (1986) 60 TC 1 at 64 per LORD OLIVER.

Such taxpayers would appreciate, if they could not so pithily express, the truth of WALTON J's aphorism: 'One should be taxed by law, and not be untaxed by concession.'”…,.

I respectfully agree, and would add, that, where a tax matter has been placed before the Special Court for adjudication, a taxpayer should not escape liability simply because the Commissioner failed to invoke the appropriate taxing provision.

In casu, the omission by the court a quo to determine the issue of tax avoidance will have the effect of allowing the main appellant to get away with tax avoidance - if that can be proved on inquiry.

That view is strengthened by the court a quo's view, that, the failure by the main appellant's witness to explain the noted anomaly would have been fatal to its case if the Commissioner had taken into consideration the issue of tax avoidance.

I am therefore satisfied, that, the decision of the court a quo on this issue should be set aside and the case be referred back to it, for it to inquire into and determine whether or not the agreements between the Dutch company, Delta Corporation (Private) Limited and the main appellant do not constitute tax avoidance....,.

In the result, it is ordered as follows:

1....,.

2....,.

3. The cross appellant's appeal partially succeeds.

4. The decision of the court a quo, on technical services, be and is hereby set aside.

5. The case is referred back to the court a quo for it to determine whether or not the agreement between the Dutch company and Delta Corporation (Private) Limited, on the basis of which the main appellant sought the deduction of technical services, contravenes section 98 of the Income Tax Act.

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HH207-15 : G BANK ZIMBABWE LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
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View Appeal HH207-15 : G BANK ZIMBABWE LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: KUDYA J

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HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY Ruled By: KUDYA J

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HH207-15 : G BANK ZIMBABWE LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
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Ruled By: HLATSHWAYO J

SC140-21 : MBCA BANK (PRIVATE) LIMITED (Now known as Nedbank Zimbabwe Limited) vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: GUVAVA JA, UCHENA JA and MAKONI JA

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HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
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HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
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HH99-18 : C F (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
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HH661-16 : M COMPANY (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH728-17 : C R S (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

HH728-17 : C R S (PVT) LTD vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: KUDYA J

SC03-22 : DELTA BEVERAGES (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE REVENUE AUTHORITY
Ruled By: GWAUNZA DCJ, UCHENA JA and CHITAKUNYE AJA