GOWORA
JA:
[1]
Following their suspension from employment by the first respondent,
the appellants, on 2 February 2018, filed an application with the
High Court seeking a declaratur to the effect that such suspension
was unlawful as well as consequential relief.
On
3 October 2018 the High Court dismissed the application with each of
the parties being made to pay its own costs.
This
appeal is against that judgment.
BACKGROUND
FACTS
[2]
The first respondent is a municipal authority constituted in
accordance with the provisions of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter
29:15]. It is the authority responsible for running the affairs of
Harare. The second respondent is the government official tasked with
the administration of the Act. The third respondent is cited in his
official capacity as the acting Town Clerk for the first respondent.
The fourth and fifth respondents were members tasked with the hearing
of disciplinary proceedings against the two appellants.
[3]
The two appellants are senior officials within the employ of the
first respondent, (“City of Harare”). Such appointments are
governed by s134 and 135 of the Urban Councils Act.
[4]
Following allegations of gross mismanagement in the affairs of the
City of Harare, the government caused a special audit to be conducted
into the affairs of the municipality. On 20 December 2017, a special
meeting was convened by councilors to receive the report on the
special audit.
Following
upon the meeting aforesaid, the third respondent was directed by a
resolution passed at the meeting of the council to write letters of
suspension to the appellants.
On
31 December 2017, the third respondent addressed letters to the
appellants advising them of their suspension from employment with
immediate effect and without pay and benefits in terms of s6(1) of
the Labour (National Employment Code of Conduct) Regulations, 2006,
S.I. 15/2006 (the “National Code of Conduct”).
On
5 January 2018, the appellants were invited to attend a disciplinary
hearing on 15 January 2018 to enquire into the alleged offences
detailed in the letters of suspension.
[5]
On 10 January 2018, the appellants launched an application with the
High Court under urgent cover to interdict the conduct of the
disciplinary proceedings. The matter was deemed not urgent and was
not heard. The applicants then launched the proceedings which are the
subject matter of this appeal.
PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HIGH COURT
[6]
Before the High Court, the appellants contended that the Urban
Councils Act rigidly regulates the appointment and conditions of
service of senior officials. To that end, any aspect involving the
appointment, discipline, and dismissal of senior officials contrary
to the Act was void and of no effect.
[7]
They contended that s140 is specific and mandatory and that, in terms
of its provisions a senior official facing suspicion of misconduct
cannot be suspended by councilors. It was averred that, in terms of
s140, only the Town Clerk had the mandate to place a senior official
on suspension. It was suggested that the reliance by the first
respondent on S.I. 15 of 2006 in effecting the suspension and the
consequent disciplinary proceedings pursuant thereto was wrong and
unlawful.
[8]
Turning to the appointment of the disciplinary committee, the
appellants contended that there was no scope within s140 of the Urban
Councils Act for the mayor to appoint a disciplinary committee. His
decision to do so and the appointment itself were therefore illegal.
As a result, the failure to comply with the provisions of s140
rendered the entire process an illegality.
[9]
The application was opposed by the first and third respondents who
took a preliminary point. The respondents contended that the High
Court did not have the requisite jurisdiction to determine the
application.
It
was submitted that, although disguised as an application for a
declaratur, what the appellants were seeking was a review of the
suspension.
[10]
As regards the merits, the respondents averred that the employer was
the City of Harare and not particular individuals who were also
employees of the same. The councilors represent the City of Harare
and it was their mandate to make the decision to suspend the two
appellants. In that regard, the City of Harare had acted within the
confines of the law when it suspended the appellants in terms of the
Labour Act [Chapter 28:01] and the National Code of Conduct. The
respondents denied that the suspension and the scheduled disciplinary
proceedings were unlawful and prayed that the application be
dismissed with costs.
[11]
The learned judge in the court a quo, based on the relief sought in
the draft order, was of the considered view that the High Court had
the requisite jurisdiction to determine the application. This was
because, as he stated, the relief sought was that of a declaratory
order, and the Labour Court was not empowered in terms of its
enabling Act to grant declaratory orders. He discounted the
contention by the respondents that what the appellant's draft order
sought was an order for their reinstatement disguised as a
declarator. I am inclined to believe that the learned judge erred, in
that he then proceeded to determine the matter on the merits as to
whether the applicable law was the Labour Act or the Urban Councils
Act.
[12]
The court a quo found that the appellants were employees as defined
in s2 of the Labour Act. The learned judge concluded that the only
employees who were excluded from the Labour Act were those whose
conditions of service were covered by the Constitution and the
appellants did not fall in that category.
It
was common cause that the City of Harare did not itself have a code
of conduct providing for the discipline of its employees and
accordingly, in terms of s12B of the Labour Act, in the absence of a
code of conduct the National Code of Conduct was the default code for
disciplining employees.
The
court dismissed the application.
[13]
On the issue of costs, it was the view of the learned judge that
given the two pieces of legislation seemingly providing for the
discipline and dismissal of employees in the employ of the City of
Harare, it was to be expected that the appellants would bring an
application to court for the determination of their right to
administrative conduct that is lawful. In addition, he surmised that
the matter raised important legal issues. Accordingly, he ordered
that each party should bear its own costs.
THE
APPEAL
[14]
Aggrieved by the dismissal, the appellants have brought this appeal
on two grounds. It is contended that the court erred in law:
(i)
In finding that s140 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15] had
been repealed by s2A of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01];
(ii)
In not finding that the suspension of, and the disciplinary
proceedings against, the appellants were null and void and of no
force or effect for being in contravention of s140 of the Urban
Councils Act [Chapter 29:15].
[15]
The appellants pray that the appeal be allowed with the judgment of
the court a quo being set aside to allow the grant of the
application. They also pray for consequential relief in the form of
the declarator sought in the court below.
ISSUE(S)
ARISING FOR DETERMINATION
[16]
The sole issue for determination on appeal, therefore, is whether the
court a quo erred in finding that s140 had been implicitly repealed
by the Labour Act. However, before determing the merits of the appeal
it is necessary to determine whether or not the court a quo was
correct in assuming jurisdiction over the matter in the first place.
WHETHER
THE COURT A QUO CORRECTLY ASSUMED JURISDICTION
[17]
Subsequent to the promulgation of the 2013 Constitution, there has
arisen within the jurisdiction some confusion on the extent of the
jurisdiction enjoyed by the High Court as a court of first instance,
especially as relates to matters concerned with employment disputes.
The
Supreme Court has determined in Nhari v Mugabe & Ors SC161/20
that the High Court has no jurisdiction in issues of labour and
employment and that such issues fell to be determined under the
Laabour Act.
In
that case the court had to consider whether under s171 of the 2013
Constitution the High Court could be said to enjoy original
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters throughout Zimbabwe.
In
this exercise, the Supreme Court had to construe the provisions of
ss171 and 172 of the Constitution which specifically made provision
for the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Labour Court
respectively. The court said:
“[30]
The same Constitution that conferred original jurisdiction on the
High Court over all civil and criminal matters also made provision
for the creation of other specialised courts, whose jurisdiction over
specialised areas of the law and the exercise of such jurisdiction
was left entirely to Acts of Parliament.
In
other words, it is the Constitution itself which has permitted the
establishment of these specialised courts and, in the same breath,
provided for the issue of jurisdiction and exercise of such
jurisdiction to be left to an Act of Parliament.
Section
172 of the Constitution which establishes the Labour Court is not
made subject to s171 which creates the High Court.
The
two sections are in pari materia and must therefore be construed
together.
In
making provision for the establishment of specialised courts in Acts
of Parliament, the Constitution has not in any way attempted to
fetter or restrict the jurisdiction that is to be conferred upon such
courts, or to make such jurisdiction subject to s171 which creates
and provides for the jurisdiction of the High Court.
[31]
It could not, therefore, have been the intention of the legislature
that the High Court would have jurisdiction in all civil and criminal
cases without exception.
An
interpretation that the High Court has unlimited jurisdiction in all
cases would clearly lead to an absurdity.
The
High Court would then have jurisdiction to determine matters that are
in the province of say, the Military Courts. The High Court could, in
these circumstances, be called upon to deal with petty cases
involving the application of customary law at first instance or
discipline at the work place.
Were
the High Court to have jurisdiction to hear and determine every case
in Zimbabwe, it would get bogged down in matters over which it may
have very little expertise or in petty matters that should ordinarily
not detain the court.
It
would cease being the High Court as we know it.
Such
an absurdity could not have been in the contemplation of the
legislature when it provided for the jurisdiction and exercise of
such jurisdiction by the court in s171 of the Constitution.”
[18]
In the context of this case, the court a quo assumed jurisdiction on
the premise that the appellants were seeking relief in the form of a
declaratur and that the Labour Court was not empowered to grant
declaratory orders.
The
learned judge found that the matter was properly before him on the
sole premise that the relief sought was that of a declarator as
opposed to an application for reinstatement.
It
is a settled position in our law that, as a creature of statute, the
Labour Court has not been imbued with the power to issue declaratory
orders.
The
manner in which the relief was framed did indeed suggest that the
appellants were seeking declaratory orders.
In
order to decide whether or not the matter was properly before the
High Court I must have regard to the premise upon which the
appellants approached the court. In other words the resolution of the
question on jurisdiction is hinged on the dispute that was placed for
adjudication before the court a quo.
[19]
The contention made on behalf of the appellants was that the City of
Harare had, in effecting their suspensions and seeking to disciplne
them, used the wrong law and that, to that extent, they were entitled
to a declaration of rights, thus imbuing the High Court with the
necessary jurisdiction.
This,
it was argued, was due to the fact that the Labour Court, being a
special court set up in terms of the Labout Act, was a creature of
statute and could only do that which its eanabling Act provided for.
[20]
In deciding whether or not a litigant is seeking a declaratur or some
other relief, a court must be guided by the grounds upon which the
application is made and the evidence in support of the order prayed
for.
In
Geddes Ltd v Tawonezvi 2002 (1) ZLR 479 (S), at p484G-485D, MALABA JA
(as he then was), stated:
“In
deciding whether an application is for a declaration or a review, a
court has to look at the grounds of the application and the evidence
produced in support of them. The fact that an application seeks
declaratory relief is not in itself proof that the application is not
for review.
In
City of Mutare v Mudzime & Ors 1999 (2) ZLR 140 (S), MUCHCHETERE
JA quoted with approval from Kwete v African Publishing Trust &
Ors HH21-98, where at p3 of the cyclostyled judgment SMITH J said:
'It
seems to me with all due respect, that in deciding whether or not, in
an application for damages or reinstatement arising from alleged
wrongful dismissal, the provisions of r259 of the High Court rules
should be complied with, one should look at the grounds on which the
application is based, rather than the order sought…..It seems to me
anamolous that one should be permitted to file an application for
review out of time, without seeking condonation, as long as a
declaratory order is sought. A declaratory order is, after all,
merely one species of relief available on review.'
In
this case, the respondent was not attacking Mrs Madyara's decision
to suspend him from work, the disciplinary proceedings she presided
over, or the decision of the employer to dismiss him from employment.
He was in fact treating these decisions and proceedings as a nullity.
In other words, they were as good as not having happened and there
was no route leading to them upon which they could be reviewed. The
ground on which he was treating these decisions and proceedings as a
nullity, was that Mrs Madyara had no legal authority or jurisdiction
to make the decisions and institute disciplinary proceedings against
him.”
[21]
Contrary to the remarks of the learned MALABA JA (as he then was)
above, the appellants argue that in suspendeing them and preferring
charges of misconduct, the City of Harare had failed to give effect
to the provisions of s140 of the Urban Councils Act rendering such
conduct illegal. They contended that the employer was not at large to
ignore the specific provisions of the Act and find comfort in S.I. 15
of 2006.
The
order sought by the appellants in the court a quo was to the
following effect:
“1.
That it be and is hereby declared that the suspension of the
applicants pursuant to resolutions by a special Council meeting of
the first respondent held on 20 December 2017 and communicated to the
applicants by letters of the third respondent dated 31 December 2017
is in contravention of s140 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter 29:15]
and is null and void and of no force and effect.
2.
That it be and is hereby declared that the disciplinary proceedings
against the applicants flowing from the aforesaid resolutions by a
special Council meeting of the first respondent held on 20 December
2017 and implemented by letters of the 3rd respondent dated 5 January
2018 are in contravention of s140 of the Urban Councils Act [Chapter
29:15] and are null and void and of no force and effect.
3.
That, as a consequence, of 2 above, it be and is hereby declared that
the disciplinary proceedings presided over by the fourth and fifth
respondents are in contravention of s140 of the Urban Councils Act
[Chapter 29:15] and are null and void and of no force and effect.
4.
That it be and is hereby declared that in respect of senior officials
of a council, noncompliance with s140 of the Urban Councils Act
[Chapter 29:15] cannot be remedied merely by resorting to the use of
the procedures set out in the Labour (National Employment Code of
Conduct) Regulations 2006, S.I. 15/2006.
5.
That for the avoidance of doubt, it be and is hereby declared that
the first and second applicants are still the Human Capital Director
and Finance Director respectively of the first respondent.
6.
The respondents (if any oppose this order) shall pay the costs of
this application on a legal practitioner and client scale.”
[22]
The appellants seek to challenge their suspension under what they
term an illegal process not provided for by law. In my view, they
were challenging the choice of law by the employer and the legality
of the entire process.
[23]
The starting point in my view must be the Labour Act.
It
sets out which employees and employers are subject to its provisions
in the determination of disputes in the workplace. Sections 2A and 3
and are pertinent in this regard. Section 3 provides as follows:
“3
Application of Act
(1)
This Act shall apply to all employers and employees except those
whose conditions of employment are otherwise provided for in the
Constitution.
(2)
For the avoidance of any doubt, the conditions of employment of
members of the Public Service shall be governed by the Public Service
Act [Chapter 16:04].
(3)
This Act shall not apply to or in respect of —
(a)
members of a disciplined force of the State; or
(b)
members of any disciplined force of a foreign State who are in
Zimbabwe under any agreement concluded between the Government and the
Government of that foreign State; or
(c)
such other employees of the State as the President may designate by
statutory instrument.”
[24]
I begin this inquiry with a consideration of s3.
In
ss(1) it states in unequivocal terms that the Labour Act shall apply
to all employers and employees except for those whose conditions of
employment are governed by the Constitution.
In
subs (2) and (3) members of the Public Service and the disciplined
forces are specifically excluded from the application of the Act.
The
appellants have not argued that they fall within the category of
employees whose conditions of employment are excluded from the
application of the Labour Act.
[25]
In turn, section 2A is in the following terms:
“2A
Purpose of Act
(1)
The purpose of this Act is to advance social justice and democracy in
the workplace by —
(a)
giving effect to the fundamental rights of employees;
(b)
(repealed)….;
(c)
providing a legal framework within which employees and employers can
bargain collectively for the improvement of conditions of employment;
provided for under Part II;
(d)
the promotion of fair labour standards;
(e)
the promotion of the participation by employees in decisions
affecting their interests in the workplace;
(f)
securing the just, effective and expeditious resolution of disputes
and unfair labour practices.
(2)
This Act shall be construed in such manner as best ensures the
attainment of its purpose referred to in subs (1).
(3)
This Act shall prevail over any other enactment inconsistent with
it.” (my emphasis)
[26]
A perusal of the section makes it clear to the reader that the
intended purpose is to ensure that employees are accorded the legal
framework for the enforcement of their rights within the workplace as
guaranteed by law.
However,
for present purposes s2(1)(f) is the pertinent provision as it seeks
to ensure the securing of a just, effective and expeditious
resolution of disputes and unfair labour practices.
[27]
In casu, the dispute centres upon which statute the City of Harare
should have resorted to in disciplining the appellants.
The
City of Harare contends that s140 of the Urban Councils Act is
inconsistent with the Labour Act and to that extent is inapplicable
in the determination of labour disputes within its workplace.
The
appellants do not dispute that there is no code of conduct in
existence governing the discipline and dismissal of senior employees
within the workplace of the City of Harare. Their contention is that
s140 of the Urban Councils Act affords them all the protection they
require as employees and that to depart from the specific provision
of the said section and discipline them in terms of any other law is
to perpetuate an illegality.
Section
140 reads:
“140
Conditions of service of other senior officials
(1)
Subject to subsection (2) and to the conditions of service of the
senior official concerned, a council may at any time discharge a
senior official —
(a)
upon notice of not less than three months; or
(b)
summarily on the ground of misconduct, dishonesty, negligence or any
other ground that would in law justify discharge without notice.
(2)
A council shall not discharge a senior official unless the discharge
has been approved by the Local Government Board: Provided that the
discharge of a medical officer of health shall in addition be subject
to the approval of the Minister responsible for health in terms of
section 11 of the Public Health Act [Chapter 15:09].
(3)
If it appears to a town clerk that any other senior official of the
council has been guilty of such conduct that it is desirable that
that official should not be permitted to carry on his work, he —
(a)
may suspend the official from office and require him forthwith to
leave his place of work; and
(b)
shall forthwith notify the mayor or chairman of the council, as the
case may be, in writing, of such suspension.
(4)
Upon receipt of a notification of suspension in terms of subsection
(3) the mayor or chairperson shall cause the suspension to be
reported at the first opportunity to the council.
(5)
Where a council has received a report of a suspension in terms of
subs (4), the council shall without delay —
(a)
conduct an inquiry or cause an inquiry to be conducted into the
circumstances of the suspension; and
(b)
after considering the results of the inquiry, decide whether or not —
(i)
to lift the suspension; or
(ii)
to do any one or more of the following —
(A)
reprimand the senior official concerned;
(B)
reduce the salary any allowance payable to the senior official;
(C)
transfer the senior official to another post or grade, the salary of
which is less than that received by him or her at the date of the
imposition of the penalty;
(D)
impose a fine not exceeding level five or three months' salary,
which fine may be recovered by deductions from the salary of the
senior official;
(E)
subject to subsection (2), discharge the senior official.”
[28]
Subsection (1) above makes for uncomfortable reading as it seems to
suggest that the council can summarily dismiss an employee on the
grounds of misconduct, dishonesty, negligence, or any other ground in
law that would justify such discharge without notice.
In
his judgment, the learned judge in the court a quo stated that Mr
Madhuku had conceded that s140 contained repugnant provisions
authorizing the Council to summarily dismiss an employee and that
this would inevitably be inconsistent with the Labour Act, protecting
as it does, social justice within the workplace and safeguarding the
rights of employees against unfair dismissal.
This
provision is not only inconsistent with s2(1) of the Labour Act but
is also in violation of the audi alteram partem principle. It is
particularly inconsistent with ss(1)(f) of the Labour Act which
ensures that an employee is afforded a just and effective legal
framework for the resolution of disputes in the workplace.
[29]
Before this Court, Mr Madhuku accepted that the provision is inimical
to the interests of the employee at large. He suggested that the
court not have regard to subs (1) of s140 of the Urban Councils Act.
In
a somewhat novel submission, he argued that ss (2) and (3) of s140 of
the Urban Councils Act must be read with the provisions of the
National Code of Conduct.
[30]
I venture to suggest that this departure in position on the initial
submissions would tend to suggest that he has accepted that the
reliance by the City of Harare on the National Code as opposed to
s140 of the Urban Councils Act was lawful.
It
is also an acceptance of the position that the appellants stand to be
disciplined in accordance with the provisions of the Labour Act as
they are employees to whom the Labour Act applies and that the
absence of a code of conduct within the workplace of the City of
Harare results in the National Code of Conduct being the default code
of conduct for disciplining employees, whether they are junior or
senior employees.
[31]
This shift in position must dispose of the appeal.
I
cannot envisage a situation where a tribunal would, in the course of
conducting a disciplinary hearing, move from one legislative
instrument to another in an effort to find those provisions that best
suit the employee.
A
tribunal can only have regard to one instrument recognizable at law
as being the applicable law.
In
this instance for all the reasons stated above, the Labour Act as
read with S.I. 15 of 2006 is the law applicable in the disciplining
of the two appellants herein.
The
appellants have not justified their exclusion from the provisions of
the Labour Act in the determination of the allegations of misconduct
laid against them.
[32]
Section 2(3) provides that the Labour Act shall prevail over any
enactment or provision inconsistent with it.
Section
12B requires that an employee be dismissed in accordance with the
provisions of a code of conduct. It provides as follows:
“12B
Dismissal
(1)
Every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.
(2)
An employee is unfairly dismissed —
(a)
if, subject to subsection (3), the employer fails to show that he
dismissed the employee in terms of an employment code; or
(b)
in the absence of an employment code, the employer shall comply with
the model code made in terms of section 101(9).”
[33]
It is common cause that the City of Harare does not have a code of
conduct for discipline purposes within the workplace. It has always
relied on the provisions of the Urban Councils Act.
Such
reliance in the light of the clear provisions of the Labour Act is
misplaced.
The
City of Harare is subject to the Labour Act and must comply with its
provisions in all respect. It does not belong to the category of
employers exempted from the application of the Labour Act. In the
premises, in the light of the provisions of s12B above, the City of
Harare must have resort to the National Code of Conduct in the
resolution of employment disputes. It cannot have recourse to s140 of
the Urban Councils Act, which, as admitted by Mr Madhuku, is not a
code of conduct.
[34]
As a consequence, the view I take is that what was before the court a
quo was an issue dealing with an employment relationship and that is
a dispute that falls for determination under the Labour Act by the
Labour Court and the other structures below it.
[35]
The issue as to whether the High Court is empowered to exercise
jurisdiction as a court of first instance is now settled – see
Nhari's case (supra).
[36]
I respectfully associate myself with the remarks by GARWE JA in the
above decision.
In
this appeal, in order to resolve the dispute between the parties, the
court a quo had to delve into the contentious issue of the applicable
law. It had to decide whether or not the appellants were emplyees as
defined in s2 of the Labour Act. It had to decide whether or not the
same Act applied to the appellants or whether they were exempt from
its application. It had to consider whether or not the suspensions
were illegal.
[38]
It stands to reason that, in casu, the High Court misdirected itself
in assuming jurisdiction in this matter.
Although
the court ultimately came to the correct conclusion that it was the
National Code of Conduct that applied to this matter, it should have
declined jurisdiction on the same basis resulting in the matter being
struck off the roll for want of jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION
[39]
When one has regard to the substance of the application and the
averments contained therein, the unmistakable conclusion is that the
appellants were seeking to challenge their suspensions on the basis
that the wrong law had been applied in suspending them.
That
argument speaks to a process of review as opposed to a declaration of
rights.
The
law being impugned was the Labour Act. The issue for determination
was whether or not the appellants were suspended according to law
and, if not, were the suspensions illegal entitling them to the
setting aside of the suspension.
The
fact that they clothed the application as a declarator is not
material. The result they sought is what guides the court.
The
dispute lends itself to adjudication under thr Labour Act which
specifically empowered the Labour Court to review the decisions or
actions by employers within the workplace. The Act also empowers
labour officers to deal with unfair labour practices dismissals. See
s93 of the Act.
[40]
That being the position, the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue
a declaratur in respect of issues of labour and employment. Section
2A of the Labour Act makes it clear that, notwithstanding the powers
of the High Court to issue declaraturs, the Labour Act prevails over
all other laws inconsistent with it.
Accordingly,
in my view, the issue of the jurisdiction of the High Court fell for
determination first. But I also accept that the issue of which law is
applicable is inextricably tied up with the question of jurisdiction.
[41]
For the additional reason that this was not in fact a declaratur but
an employment and labour matter, the High Court clearly had no
jurisdiction to entertain the claim in the first place. The High
Court was wrong in assuming jurisdiction in a matter where the issues
for determination involved the resolution of an employment dispute.
It should have declined jurisdiction.
[42]
Although the High Court had no jurisdiction, it made a determination
on the merits. That determination cannot be allowed to stand. It has
to set aside as being an irregularity.
The
Supreme Court is empowered, in terms of s25(2) of the Supreme Court
Act [Chapter 7:13] and in the exercise of its powers of review, to
set aside any irregular proceedings.
In
this instance, the court must exercise those powers and set aside the
proceedings as being irregular. Accordingly, the following order will
issue.
IT
IS ORDERED THAT:
1.
The appeal be and is hereby dismissed with costs.
2.
In the exercise of the powers of review of the Supreme Court in terms
of s25(2) of the Supreme Court Act [Chapter 7:13], the proceedings of
the High Court under HC Number 991/18 be and are hereby set aside for
want of jurisdiction on the part of the High Court.
GUVAVA
JA: I agree
MAKONI
JA: I agree
Lovemore
Madhuku Lawyers, appellants' legal practitioners
Mbidzo,
Muchadehama & Makoni, 1st and 3rd respondents' legal
practitioners
