In the cases of Simross Vintners (Pty) Ltd v Vermeulen, VRG Africa (Pty) Ltd v Walters t/a Trend Litho, Consolidated Credit Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Van der Westhuizen 1978 (1) SA 779, the applicants, in three applications for compulsory sequestration, had used the notice of motion prescribed in Form 2 of the South African Uniform Rules of Court, which was a form appropriate to ex parte applications. The applicant in the first application had not served the notice on the respondent but the applicants in the other two applications had so served the notices on the respondents. It was held that in the first application the use of the Form 2 was perfectly in order as the application was brought ex parte. However, as to the other two applications, it was held that as they were not brought ex parte, the notices of motion used in these applications (i.e., the Form 2 notice) were nullities and their use could not be condoned and the applications had to be struck off the roll:

“…,. This applicant also relies on a nulla bona return, but, it chose not only to address the Form 2 notice of motion to the respondent, but also to serve it on him. Hence, it is not brought ex parte and Rule 6(5) applies. It was suggested in some of the other applications which were eventually struck off the roll that this non-compliance might be condoned under Rule 27(3). I have considered that possibility in this case, but, apart from the fact that no cause at all is shown why there should be condonation, the more fundamental difficulty arises that the document which purports to be a notice of motion is, as I have indicated above, a nullity, and I have grave doubt whether the Court has power, under this Rule, to repair a nullity, a concept in law which carries within itself all the elements of irreparability…,. In addition it must be emphasized that Form 2(a) contains a description of the procedural rights of the respondent after service of the notice of motion. These rights are considerable and substantial. How could a Court, even if it were not a nullity, put a blue pencil through all these rights in the absence of the person in whom they reside and without notice to him that such an order which abrogates his rights might be made? This application is struck off the roll.”

Our own Supreme Court has agreed with the above approach to non-compliance with mandatory rules of court.

In the case of Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 the superior court dealt with the non-compliance with provisions of Rule 29 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, RGN 380/1964 and said the following at p.220 A-D:

“The reason is that a notice of appeal which does not comply with the rules is fatally defective and invalid. That is to say, it is a nullity. It is not only bad but incurably bad, and, unless the court is prepared to grant an application for condonation of the defect and to allow a proper notice of appeal to be filed, the appeal must be struck off the roll with costs: De Jager v Diner & Anor 1957 (3) SA 567 (A) at 576 C-D.

In Hattingh v Pienaar 1977 (2) SA 182 (O) at p.183 KLOPPER JP held that a fatally defective compliance with the rules regarding the filing of appeals cannot be condoned or amended. What should actually be applied for is an extension of time within which to comply with the relevant rule. With this view I most respectfully agree; for if the notice of appeal is incurably bad, then, to borrow the words of LORD DENNING in McFoy v United Africa Co Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169 at 1172, 'every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it stay there. It will collapse.'”

On 12 December 2011, the applicant filed an application in this court under Case No. HC12336/11 seeking a prohibitory interdict against the respondents.

The remedy sought was to prevent the respondents from moving or accepting any motion from any member of the House of Assembly to dismiss the applicant without the matter of his dismissal first being brought before the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders (CSRO) or its sub-committee or other independent and impartial disciplinary authority.

On realising that, despite having filed the aforesaid application, the respondents were determined to proceed with the motion to have him dismissed, the applicant filed the instant urgent application whose amended interim relief is couched in the following terms:-

“1. Pending the determination of the Court Application under Case Number HC12336/11 the respondents are prohibited, restricted, and interdicted from continuing to debate and voting on any motion to dismiss the applicant.

2. Pending the determination of the Court Application under Case Number HC12336/11, any debate, voting, or decision on the motion to dismiss the applicant, with or without amendments, be and is hereby declared null and void ab initio and therefore of no force and effect.”...,.

ON MERITS

Having disposed of the preliminary points raised, I wish to focus on the substantive issues raised by the parties in this application.

The fundamental guiding principle in this case was eloquently summed up by Mr Shepherd Mushonga, the fourth respondent, when he put it in the following words:-

“The principle of separation of powers is he hallmark of a constitutional democracy which entails that the three (3) arms of State, namely, Parliament, the Executive, and the Judiciary are separate and independent of each other in so far as the exercise of their powers is concerned.

The Constitution vests Parliament with the powers to regulate its own affairs. Parliament exercise judicial powers in respect of certain matters that fall within its domain to the exclusion of the Courts.”…,.

I applaud the sentiments and indeed associate myself with same.

Be that as it may, one needs to appreciate the often overlapping function that characterize the legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary.

Whilst these three arms of Government must enjoy their independence, they do not exist outside each other. They play a complimentary role.

The sovereignty of Parliament, or, to put it simply, the power enjoyed by Parliament is not absolute, for if it were so the citizens would be extremely vulnerable. It would mean that Parliament would do virtually everything it desired, including violating its own Rules and Regulations, to the detriment of its citizen with impunity. Such a scenario, in my view, would not be tenable. There must be some control mechanism through which Parliament is to be held accountable by disgruntled citizens: see The British Constitution by J.S. DUGDALE, M.A, published by Bath James Brodie Ltd, London 1962…,.

From my reading of the applicant's urgent chamber application, and the notices of opposition filed by the respondents, I discern the following issues to be pertinent and decisive in this matter;

(a) Whether or not the House of Assembly violated Standing Order 62(d) of the House of Assembly Standing Orders by continuing to debate and voting on the motion to dismiss the applicant after the applicant had filed case no HC12336/11....,.

(a) Alleged violation of Standing Order 62(d)

It was contended, by the applicant, that, after he had filed his application in this court seeking, among other things, to interdict the respondents from continuing to debate on the issue of his dismissal, and to force compliance with proper disciplinary procedures, the House of Assembly was obliged to follow the dictates of Standing Order 62(d) of the House of Assembly Standing Orders.

In countering this argument, the respondents argued that the existence of a court application could not operate as a bar to the conduct of Parliamentary business and that only a court order had the capacity to stop further debate on the motion that was already before the House.

The argument, by the respondents, in this regard, is quite pronounced in paragraph 8 of the joint Notice of Opposition filed by the first, second, fifth, sixth and seventh respondents.

In supporting the same argument, the fourth respondent, on his behalf and also duly authorised by the third respondent, re-affirmed the position that Parliamentary debate on the issue could not be stopped by the Court application alluded to by the applicant.

It is evident from the Hansard of the day that the members of the House offered conflicting views on this issue.

It is necessary to refer to the specific section in issue. The section reads as follows:-

“62 No member shall, while speaking to a question…,.

(d) Use derogatory, disrespectful, offensive or unbecoming words against the Head of State, Parliament or its members, the Speaker, nor reflect upon a statute unless for the purposes of moving for its repeal; nor shall a member refer to any matter on which a judicial decision is pending;”…,.

It appears to me that if one were to concentrate on the ordinary grammatical meaning of the Standing Order in question one would find it extremely difficult not to understand what the House intended when it crafted these rules of debate.

It is trite that in interpreting statutes the very basic approach is first to ascribe to the words used their ordinary grammatical meaning.

It is clear to me that the Standing Order referred to simply meant that when a matter is pending before the Courts, or when a matter is sub judice, House members are obliged to respect the Court process until a determination on that matter is made.

In this regard, I feel more inclined to lean on the views of the learned judge VAN DEN HEEVER JA when he remarked on the use of the word 'shall' as follows:-

“If a statutory command is couched in such peremptory terms it is a strong indication, in the absence of considerations pointing to another conclusion, that the issuer of the command intended disobedience to be visited with nullity”: Messenger of the Magistrate's Court. Dupbata v Pillay 1952 (3) SA 678 (AD)…,.

It will be noted that during debate on the issue, those who spoke in favour of proceeding with the tabled motion suggested, strangely so in my view, that the members of the House could only be stopped from debating the issue if, at the time, there was a Court order barring them from so acting.

With respect, the Standing Order in question does not say what the respondents, and those who contributed in support of the motion, desire it to mean. If Parliament intended the Standing Order to mean what the respondents say, surely Parliament could have had no difficulty in crafting the Standing Order to that effect.

It is not in dispute that the respondents, despite having been duly served with case no. HC12336/11 continued to debate the motion in complete defiance or violation of the Standing Order in question.

This belligerent attitude displayed by the respondents can only lead to one inevitable conclusion. That disobedience by the House of its own Standing Orders must be visited with “nullity” over what it did because it was not competent for the House to stubbornly ignore the clear provisions of section 62(d) of the House of Assembly Standing Orders.

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ: This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court wherein PATEL J dismissed the appellants' application to have set aside the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as "the Speaker").

The appellants, as the applicants in the court a quo, sought the following relief set out in the draft order:

"WHEREUPON after perusing the documents filed of record and hearing counsel, it is hereby declared that:-

1. The election of (the) second respondent as the Speaker of the Parliament of Zimbabwe on 25 August 2008 is null and void and set aside.

2….,.

3. That the respondents jointly and severally pay the costs of suit."

(The applicants abandoned the relief set out in paragraph 2).

The appellants' main contention in the court a quo, and in this Court, is that the election of the Speaker was null and void because it was not conducted in terms of section 39 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), as read with Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders of Parliament of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Standing Orders").

PATEL J dismissed the application. The appellants now appeal against that judgment.

The grounds of appeal are set out in the Notice of Appeal, which, in relevant part, reads as follows:

"Grounds of Appeal

1. The learned Judge a quo erred in finding that a proper election of Speaker of Parliament was conducted in terms of the Constitution and the law.

2. The learned Judge erred in condoning the first respondent's failure to implement and enforce his own procedures for the election.

3. The learned Judge a quo erred in finding that the participants' exposure of their completed ballot papers was not a violation of the secret ballot.

4. The learned Judge a quo erred in finding that a secret ballot took place.

5. The learned Judge a quo erred in interpreting section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Ordinance 6 of the House of Assembly Standing Orders, as directory and not peremptory."

The grounds of appeal set out in the Notice of Appeal, as read with the record and submissions by counsel, raise essentially the following two issues for determination in this appeal –

(a) Whether the exposure of the secret ballot before the depositing of the ballot papers in the ballot box by some Members of Parliament amounts to a violation of the voting by secret ballot, and, if so, whether that rendered the election of the Speaker null and void; and

(b) Whether the failure by the Clerk of Parliament of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Clerk") to control the voting process and the consequent chaotic conditions constitute a failure by the Clerk to conduct an election in terms of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with the Standing Orders.

The background facts of this case are as follows:

The first respondent is the Clerk of the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Pursuant to Proclamation No.7 of 2008, the Clerk convened the first meeting of Parliament on 25 August 2008 for the purposes of swearing in the Members of Parliament and electing the presiding officers.

The Clerk's mandate to conduct these elections is derived from the Standing Orders – in the case of the House of Assembly, Standing Order No.6.

Two candidates were nominated for the office of Speaker, namely, Mr Paul Themba-Nyathi (hereinafter referred to as "Nyathi") and the second respondent (hereinafter referred to as "Moyo").

Standing Order No.6 provides that if more than one person is proposed as Speaker of Parliament, the Clerk shall conduct an election of the Speaker by ballot box.

The election took place and the Clerk announced that Nyathi had garnered ninety-eight votes and Moyo had garnered one hundred and ten votes. The Clerk accordingly declared Moyo the winner. Moyo assumed the office of Speaker.

The appellants want the election of Moyo as Speaker set aside.

I now wish to deal with the issue of whether the election was conducted by secret ballot as is required by section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order No.6 of the Standing Orders.

The appellants contend that some Members of Parliament from the MDC-T party, having marked their ballot papers in the secrecy of the polling booths, openly displayed their marked ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box. The appellants contend that the majority of the Members of Parliament from the MDC-T party did this, while the respondents' position is equivocal.

The court a quo, however, concluded that of the two hundred and eight Members of Parliament who voted, most probably only six Members of Parliament displayed their votes in the manner alleged by the appellants. The Members of Parliament who are named as having done this are the Honourable Biti, the Honourable Khupe, the Honourable Chambati, the Honourable Chibaya, the Honourable Denga and the Honourable Moyo, the second respondent. In this regard, the court a quo concluded as follows at p11 of the cyclostyled judgment (judgment no. HH28-10):

"It is fairly clear that Hon. Biti took the lead in brandishing his vote and that several of his colleagues were then emboldened into emulating his possibly impolitic example. However, they did so of their own free will and, more significantly, they did so after having cast their votes in secret."

The conclusion of the court a quo that at least the six Members of Parliament named displayed their ballot papers after marking them but before depositing the ballot papers in the ballot box cannot be faulted.

This conclusion is fortified by the following factors:

It is specifically alleged by the appellants that Moyo displayed his ballot paper before depositing it. Moyo filed an affidavit in this case in which he does not deny this allegation. Five other Members of Parliament are named as having displayed their ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box. None of these five Members of Parliament have deposed to affidavits denying the allegation.

In my view, it would have been easy for Moyo to secure such affidavits from the named Members of Parliament denying the conduct alleged. Moyo, instead, filed an affidavit from a Member of Parliament, the Honourable Mpariwa, in respect of whom no such allegation was made. The Honourable Mpariwa does not deny that the named Members of Parliament had conducted themselves in the manner alleged by the appellants. Indeed, if anything, she appears to concede that that in fact did occur.

In the result, I agree with the conclusion of the court a quo that at least six Members of Parliament displayed their ballot papers after marking them but before depositing them in the ballot box.

Having concluded that at least six Members of Parliament displayed their ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box, the issue that falls for determination is the legal consequences of such conduct.

Section 39 of the Constitution provides as follows:

"(2) The Speaker shall be elected in accordance with Standing Orders from among persons who are or have been members of the House of Assembly and who are not members of the Cabinet, Ministers, or Deputy Ministers:

Provided that a person who is not a member of the House of Assembly shall not be elected as the Speaker unless he is qualified in accordance with Schedule 3 for election to the House of Assembly."

Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders provides as follows:

"If more than one person is proposed as Speaker, the Clerk shall conduct the election of Speaker by a secret ballot."…,.

The Clerk issued specific instructions on how the secret ballot was to be conducted. According to the second appellant, Moses Mliza Ndlovu, the Clerk issued the following instructions:

"4. The first respondent announced the procedure to the effect that according to the Standing Rules, an election would be held by secret ballot. To this extent, he assured the Honourable Members present that all necessary provisions had been made to guarantee the secrecy of the ballot.

5. The first respondent then explained that in terms of the procedure, he would issue a ballot paper to each Member present. Thereafter, the Member would put a mark against the name of the candidate the Member would wish to be the Speaker of Parliament.

6. The ballot paper had two candidates for Speaker of Parliament, namely, the second respondent nominated by the Movement for Democratic Change (Tsvangirai) (MDC-T) and Mr Paul Themba-Nyathi nominated by the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).

7. The first respondent then explained that the ballot paper, having been duly marked in secret in a booth, would be folded by the voting Member and deposited in a ballot box.

8. The first respondent then explained that, having cast the vote, the Honourable Member would then leave the House."

The Clerk does not deny that the above accurately reflects the instructions he gave. From the above, three essential elements of the secret ballot emerge –

(a) Each Member of Parliament was to be issued with a ballot paper;

(b) Each Member of Parliament was to mark the ballot paper in the privacy or secrecy of the polling booth; and

(c) Having marked the ballot paper in secret, the Member of Parliament was to fold the ballot paper to maintain the secrecy of the vote and deposit it in the ballot box, thus completing the process of secret voting.

It admits of no debate that the Clerk would then be required to count the vote to complete the process.

In my view, the counting of the votes cast is an essential part of the process of the election by secret ballot….,.

The appellants' case is that Standing Order 6 is peremptory and enjoins the Clerk to conduct an election of the Speaker by secret ballot.

Counsel for the appellants submitted that the display of the ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box, by some Members of Parliament, is an aberration from the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders. He argued that such aberration rendered the election of the Speaker null and void.

Ms Damiso and Mr Chaskalson, for the respondents, submitted that the appellants' complaint is based on a fundamental misconception relating to the nature of a secret ballot.

They submitted that when an election takes place, by secret ballot, each voter has the right to have his or her vote kept secret. This right to secrecy, like any other right, can freely be waived by a voter who chooses to make known how he or she voted. The fact that any voter chooses to disclose how he or she voted cannot in itself compromise the secrecy of the ballot. They submitted that it is only when a voter is factually prevented from maintaining the secrecy of his or her vote that there is a violation of the secrecy of the ballot. On this basis, they argued that the display by six Members of Parliament of their ballot papers before depositing the ballot papers in the ballot box is not a violation of the principle of a secret ballot.

This argument found favour with the learned Judge in the court a quo. In this regard, he had this to say at p11 of the cyclostyled judgment:

"Having regard to the dictionary definitions and the case authorities cited by counsel, the gravamen of a secret ballot, in my view, is that each voter is enabled to cast his vote privately and in secret, without fear of having his voting choice identified or ascertained by others. In this respect, it is incumbent upon the regulating authority to provide the requisite wherewithal for that purpose. The courts should not interfere unless it is shown that the objective conditions put in place for the election precluded the possibility of a secret vote. Beyond this, it is then a matter purely for the individual voter if he chooses to divulge, whether publicly or in private, the specific manner in which he has cast his vote. If he does so of his own volition, without any external coercion or intimidation, and howsoever his conduct might influence other voters, this cannot detract from the secrecy of his vote or vitiate the secrecy of the ballot as a whole."

It was further argued that all that was required of the Clerk was for him to provide the guarantee that Members of Parliament voted in secret if they so wished. Those who wished to penetrate the veil of secrecy, as did the six Members of Parliament, were entitled to do so without contaminating the process.

In support of the above contention, both counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the case of Steel and Engineering Industries Federation and Ors v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2) 1993 (4) SA 196 (T)…, and on the case of J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920)…,.

Mr Chaskalson, in particular, submitted that the right to secrecy of the ballot, like any other right, can freely be waived by any voter who chooses to make known how he or she voted. He further submitted that this point has been made clear by United States judgments dealing with unsuccessful challenges to electoral laws. For this submission, he relied on the following remarks of BROWN J in J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920)…,:

"…, this privilege, of voting a secret ballot, has been held to be entirely a personal one. The provision has been generally adopted in this country for the protection of the voter, and for the preservation of his independence, in the exercise of this most important franchise. But, he has the right to waive his privilege and testify to the contents of his ballot. The voter has the right, at the time of voting, voluntarily to make public his ballot, and its contents in such case may be proven by the testimony of those who are present. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy shall be impenetrable unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it."

Mr Chaskalson also relied on the following passage from State ex rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932)…,:

"…, it has been uniformly held that under such provisions as that contained in section 6 of Article VI of our Constitution the elector cannot be compelled to violate the right of secrecy of his ballot but the great weight of authority is to the effect that such constitutional provision guarantees a personal privilege which might be waived. In State vs Anderson 26 Fla 240, 8 So 1, this Court, speaking through MR CHIEF JUSTICE RAINEY, said:

'The Constitution provides, section 6, Article VI, that in all elections by the people the vote shall be by ballot, and in those by the Legislature it shall be viva voce. The material guarantee of this constitutional mandate of vote by ballot is inviolable secrecy as to the person for whom an elector shall vote. The distinguishing theory of the ballot system is that every voter shall be permitted to vote for whom he pleases, and that no one else shall be in position (sic) to know for whom he has voted, or shall know unless the voter shall of his own free will inform him.': COOLEY's Constitutional Limitations m.p. 604 et seq."…,.

Further reliance was placed on the following passage from COOLEY's work Constitutional Limitations 7ed 912:

"The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with what party he pleases and that no one is to have the right or be in position (sic) to question his independent action, either then or at any subsequent time. The courts have held that a voter, even in case (sic) of a contested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he voted; and for the same reason we think others who may accidentally, or by trick or artifice, have acquired knowledge on the subject should not be allowed to testify to such knowledge, or to give any information in the courts upon the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it; his ballot is absolutely privileged…,."

Mr Chaskalson further submitted that the fact that any voter chooses to disclose how he or she voted cannot compromise the secrecy of the ballot. He argued that if this were the case secret ballots would be open to abuse by voters who, fearing that their candidates were at risk of losing the election, could invalidate a vote by merely waving their ballots about. It is only when a voter is factually prevented from maintaining the secrecy of his vote or her vote that there is a violation of the secrecy of the ballot. He further argued that on the facts of this case there is no suggestion of any such violation of the secrecy of the ballot. Consequently, the primary complaint of the appellants must be rejected.

The two cases cited by Mr Chaskalson, namely, J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920) and State ex rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932), were concerned with the constitutionality of statutory provisions that permitted voting by absentee voters such as soldiers serving abroad. The basis of challenging the constitutionality of the statutes providing for the absentee voters was that they violated the secrecy of the ballot guaranteed by the State Constitution, Article VI section 6.

Section 6 of Article VI declared that all elections by the people shall be by ballot, and all elections by the General Assembly shall be viva voce….,.

The contention, which was dismissed in the above American cases in respect of which the above cited passages were made, was that statutes allowing absentee votes would of necessity lead to the identification of the voter, thereby violating the secrecy of the ballot guaranteed by the Constitution of the State of North Carolina. The ratio decidendi of the court, in dismissing the challenge, was that the impugned statutes, by allowing voters to vote by postal ballot, did not compel voters to disclose their votes leading to a breach of their right to voting in secrecy. The courts held that the impugned statutes simply provided the voter with a choice either to vote secretly by presenting himself or herself at the polling booth or vote by postal ballot if he so wished, thereby compromising the secrecy of his or her vote. The court held, in both cases, that a secret ballot is not compulsory so far as the voter is concerned, for the statute provides that the ballot may be deposited for the voter by the Registrar or by one of the judges of the election or by the voter himself if he so chooses.

I wish to make the following observations regarding the above cases.

The judgments cited above are judgments of foreign courts. They are not binding but they are persuasive. The higher the courts are in their jurisdictions the more persuasive are their judgments. The cited judgments are not from the highest courts in North Carolina.

The second observation I wish to make is that the courts in the cited cases were interpreting statutes in their jurisdictions. They were not making pronouncements on general jurisprudential principles.

When interpreting statutes, courts are guided primarily by the wording and the context of the statutes. A court should not simply translocate one court's interpretation of a statute in that court's jurisdiction to an interpretation of a statute differently worded in its own jurisdiction.

In the above judgments, the courts of North Carolina were interpreting Article VI section 6 of the Constitution of North Carolina, which provided that:

"In all elections by the people, the vote shall be by ballot, and, in those by the Legislature, it shall be viva voce."

The courts, in both J Jenkins v State Board of Elections of North Carolina & Ors 180 NC 169 (1920) and State ex rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932) interpreted Article VI section 6 as conferring a right to vote in secret, which can be waived. They ascribed this meaning to Article VI section 6 despite the use of the peremptory word "shall" in the section. I have some doubts about the correctness of this interpretation.

Be that as it may, I accept the conclusion in those two cases that where a Constitutional provision confers on the voter the right to vote by secret ballot that right is intended to protect the voter and the voter has the right to waive that right without violating the secrecy of the ballot.

I also accept the proposition that public policy requires that the veil of secrecy shall be impenetrable unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it: see also Boyer v Teague 106 NC 625; McRary on Elections 3ed…,; and Crolly Con. Lim. 7Ed…,.

However, section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is not a constitutional or statutory provision conferring the right to vote on a voter in the form of the Member of Parliament.

Section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, prescribes how a particular officer in Parliament, namely, the Speaker, is to be elected. It expressly provides that if more than one person is proposed as Speaker the Clerk of Parliament shall conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot. In other words, the use of the words "by a secret ballot" in the statute is prescribing the method by which a Speaker is to be elected.

The language is peremptory language.

It would be a different story if the wording of Standing Order 6 were to the effect: "If more than one Member is proposed Members of Parliament may vote by secret ballot to elect the Speaker."

The golden rule of interpretation is that one has to give the words of a statute their primary meaning.

If that rule is applied to Order 6 of the Standing Orders, then, the inescapable inference is that the Order is addressing the Clerk and is dictating to him the manner by which a Speaker should be elected.

In view of the explicit language of the statute, it is not open to the Clerk, or any Member of Parliament, to substitute the method of electing a Speaker with another method of their own choice, such as by open ballot. Put differently, it was not open, for instance, to Members of Parliament to tell the Clerk that they were waiving their right to vote for the Speaker by secret ballot or that they wished to vote for the Speaker by open ballot either individually or as a group. That option was not open to the Members of Parliament as a whole or to individual Members of Parliament.

Voting by secret ballot, as I have already stated, involves the following three essential procedures:

(i) Firstly, that each Member of Parliament receives a ballot paper;

(ii) Secondly, that each Member of Parliament indicates on that ballot paper the candidate of his choice in private and to the exclusion of the public; and

(iii) Thirdly, that, having done so, the Member of Parliament deposits his or her ballot paper into the ballot box privately without disclosing his or her ballot paper to the world.

Once the ballot paper has been deposited into the ballot box the process of voting by secret ballot, so far as the voter is concerned, is completed.

It would not be a violation of voting by secret ballot if the person discloses whom he has voted for at that stage. The voting by secret ballot by the voter is complete: see Steel and Engineering Industries Federation and Ors v National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (2) 1993 (4) SA 196 (T).

The next stage to complete the process provided for in terms of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is for the Clerk to count the votes cast to determine the winner.

This stage, in my view, is an essential process in the election of the Speaker of Parliament by secret ballot:

Because of the peremptory language of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, the Clerk has no discretion over what procedure is to be followed when electing the Speaker. It has to be by secret ballot. The use of any other method to elect the Speaker would be a failure to comply with the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

In casu, the appellants alleged that some Members of Parliament received ballot papers, marked the ballot papers in the privacy of the polling booth, and then, instead of folding the ballot papers to maintain the secrecy of their vote and before depositing them in the ballot box, they displayed them to fellow Members of Parliament to show them how they voted. Thereafter, they deposited the ballot papers in the ballot box.

The court a quo concluded that six Members of Parliament conducted themselves in this manner. The conclusion that only six out of the two hundred and eight voters voted in this manner is supported by the evidence and it cannot be faulted.

The learned Judge in the court a quo also concluded that the six Members of Parliament who displayed their votes complied with the requirement of a secret ballot because they were entitled to pierce the veil of secrecy without falling foul of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

I respectfully disagree with the learned Judge in this regard.

The six Members of Parliament, by displaying their ballot papers before depositing them in the ballot box, violated the secrecy of their ballots, thereby rendering their votes invalid for the purposes of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6. This rendered their votes ineligible for counting for the purpose of determining the election of the Speaker.

The Clerk proceeded to count these six votes as valid votes in determining the outcome of the election. This contaminated the process.

Put differently, he counted oranges and apples in a process where the law provides that only oranges be counted.

In short, the Clerk failed to act as directed by section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, namely, to conduct an election by secret ballot. He conducted a cross-breed election, in that it was partly secret and partly open. That is not what the law provides for.

In this regard, I am satisfied that the Clerk failed to comply with the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

Having concluded that the Clerk did not comply with the statutory requirements in his conduct of the election, the issue that falls for determination is, what are the legal consequences that flow from the failure to comply with the statutory provisions?

Section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, has directed that the Clerk shall conduct an election of a Speaker by secret ballot but has not provided what should be the consequence of the non-compliance with this peremptory direction by Parliament.

This Court recently had occasion to deal with the issue of interpreting a statute that does not prescribe the consequences of non-compliance with a statutory provision in the case of Doctor Daniel Shumba and Anor v The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Anor Judgment No. SC11-08.

In that case, I cited with approval a passage from BENNION Statutory Interpretation…, which sets out how courts should approach that issue.

The learned author states that a court charged with the enforcement of a statute that does not state the consequences of non-compliance needs to decide what consequence Parliament intended should follow from such failure to comply. In that case, I had this to say at pp21-23 of the cyclostyled judgment:

"It is the generally accepted rule of interpretation that the use of peremptory words such as 'shall' as opposed to 'may' is indicative of the legislature's intention to make the provision peremptory. The use of the word 'may' as opposed to 'shall' is construed as indicative of the legislature's intention to make a provision directory. In some instances the legislature explicitly provides that failure to comply with a statutory provision is fatal. In other instances, the legislature specifically provides that failure to comply is not fatal. In both of the above instances no difficulty arises.

The difficulty usually arises where the legislature has made no specific indication as to whether failure to comply is fatal or not.

In the present case, the consequences of failure to comply with the provisions of section 18 of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act are not explicitly spelt out.

In those statutory provisions where the legislature has not specifically provided for the consequences of failure to comply, it has to be assumed that the legislature has left it to the Courts to determine what the consequences of failure to comply should be.

The learned author FRANCIS BENNION in his work Statutory Interpretation suggests that the courts have to determine the intention of the legislature using certain principles of interpretation as guidelines. He had this to say at pp21-22:

'Where a duty arises under a statute, the court, charged with the task of enforcing the statute, needs to decide what consequence Parliament intended should follow from breach of the duty.

This is an area where legislative drafting has been markedly deficient. Draftsmen find it easy to use the language of command. They say that a thing 'shall' be done. Too often they fail to consider the consequence when it is not done. What is not thought of by the draftsman is not expressed in the statute.

Yet the courts are forced to reach a decision.

It would be draconian to hold that in every case failure to comply with the relevant duty invalidates the thing done. So, the courts' answer has been to devise a distinction between mandatory and directory duties.

Terms used instead of "mandatory" include 'absolute', 'obligatory', 'imperative' and 'strict'. In place of "directory", the term 'permissive' is sometimes used. Use of the term 'directory' in the sense of permissive has been justly criticised: see CRAIES Statute Law (7th edn, 1971) p61 n74. However, it is now firmly rooted.

Where the relevant duty is mandatory, failure to comply with it invalidates the thing done. Where it is merely directory the thing done will be unaffected (though there may be some sanction for disobedience imposed on the person bound). {As to sanctions for breach of statutory duty see section 13 of this Code (criminal sanctions) and section 14 (civil sanctions)}.'

Thereafter, the learned author sets out some guiding principles for the determination of whether failure to comply with a statutory provision is fatal or a mere irregularity.

One of these guiding principles is the possible consequences of a particular interpretation. If interpreting non-compliance with a statutory provision leads to consequences totally disproportionate to the mischief intended to be remedied, the presumption is that Parliament did not intend such a consequence and therefore the provision is directory."

MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed…, says much the same as the above cited excerpt from BENNION.

Thus, the issue before this Court is to determine what Parliament intended to be the consequence of the Clerk's breach of the statutory requirement to count only regular votes in determining the outcome of the election of the Speaker.

I have come to the conclusion that Parliament intended to render invalid an election wherein the Clerk fails to comply with the provisions of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6. I have come to this conclusion for two reasons -

(i) Firstly, because of the peremptory language of the provision in question; and

(ii) Secondly, because of the use of different language from the one used by Parliament when it legislated on the same subject matter in another statute, namely, section 177 of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13].

Dealing with the issue of the use of peremptory language in section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, there can be no doubt that the language of the relevant section is peremptory, having regard to the use of the word "shall".

I accept that there has been movement from the principle of strict exaction of compliance with the wording of the statute to avoid invalidity to a more flexible approach giving the courts some latitude in determining the consequences of non-compliance.

My understanding of the new approach is that, while the use of the word "shall" is no longer conclusive of the intention of Parliament to render invalid non-compliance, it certainly still remains cogent evidence of such intention. This Court has, in a number of recent cases, held that failure to comply with the peremptory direction of a statute leads to invalidity. In this regard, Rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules provides as follows:

"29 Entry of appeal

(1) Every civil appeal shall be instituted in the form of a notice of appeal signed by the appellant or his legal representative, which shall state –

(a) The date on which, and the court by which, the judgment appealed against was given;

(b) If leave to appeal was granted, the date of such grant;

(c) Whether the whole or part only of the judgment is appealed against;

(d) The grounds of appeal in accordance with the provisions of Rule 32;

(e) The exact nature of the relief which is sought;

(f) The address for service of the appellant or his legal practitioner."…,.

In Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 this Court held that by use of the word "shall" compliance with the requirement of Rule 29 was peremptory and that failure to comply with the Rule rendered the Notice of Appeal a nullity and that such a notice cannot be condoned or amended.

KORSAH JA, at 219D, had this to say about the Notice of Appeal that did not comply with Rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules:

"This Notice of Appeal was defective for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of Rule 29, subrules (c), (d) and (e) which require the applicant or his legal representative to state: (i) whether the whole or only part of the judgment is appealed against; (ii) the ground of appeal to be set forth concisely and in separately numbered paragraphs; and (iii) the exact nature of the relief which is sought."

The learned JUDGE OF APPEAL further stated, at pp219H-220D:

"The Notice of Appeal, being bad for non-compliance with the Rules, was not cured by the filing, on 3 January 1990, of grounds of appeal without a prayer. Indeed, even if the grounds of appeal filed on 3 January 1990 had contained a prayer for relief, it would not have been effectual in validating the defective Notice of Appeal.

The reason is that a Notice of Appeal which does not comply with the Rules is fatally defective and invalid. That is to say, it is a nullity. It is not only bad but incurably bad, and, unless the court is prepared to grant an application for condonation of the defect and to allow a proper Notice of Appeal to be filed, the appeal must be struck off the roll with costs: De Jager v Diner & Anor 1957 (3) SA 567 (A) at 574 C-D.

In Hattingh v Pienaar 1977 (2) SA 182 (O)…, at 183, KLOPPER JP held that a fatally defective compliance with the Rules, regarding the filing of appeals, cannot be condoned or amended. What should actually be applied for is an extension of time within which to comply with the relevant Rule.

With this view I most respectfully agree; for if the Notice of Appeal is incurably bad, then, to borrow the words of LORD DENNING in McFoy v United Africa Co. Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC) at 1172I, 'every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse'."

GUBBAY CJ and MANYARARA JA concurred.

In Matanhire v BP & Shell Marketing Services (Pvt) Ltd 2004 (2) ZLR 147 (S) MALABA JA…, expressed the same sentiments when he stated at 149E-G:

"A nullity cannot be amended. In Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 (S) KORSAH JA at 220B said that the reason why a fatally defective Notice of Appeal could not be amended was that:'…, it is not only bad but incurably bad.'

Citing Hattingh v Pienaar 1977 (2) SA 182 (O) at 183 for authority, the learned JUDGE OF APPEAL said that what should actually be applied for is an extension of time within which to comply with the relevant Rule and condonation of non-compliance.

In Business Equipment Corp v Baines Imaging Group 2002 (2) ZLR 354 (S), a Notice of Appeal which did not state the date on which the judgment appealed against was given, in contravention of section 29(1)(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, was held to be fatally defective, and the procedure stated in Jensen's case supra was approved as the appropriate remedy in having a proper Notice of Appeal placed before the court. See also Talbert v Yeoman Products (Pvt) Ltd S-111-99, SC111-99."

The learned JUDGE OF APPEAL further stated at p150B-C:

"As no valid Notice of Appeal was delivered and filed within fifteen days of the date when the decision of the Labour Court was given, there was no appeal before the court and to merely insert the relevant date in the defective Notice of Appeal, as suggested by Mr Muskwe, without an application for an extension of time within which to institute the appeal and for condonation of non-compliance with the Rules of Court, would be grossly irregular. The matter had to be struck off the roll."

It is quite clear from the above authorities that failure to comply with peremptory language of a statute can lead to a nullity.

Equally, there are decisions of this Court wherein it has been held that non-compliance with peremptory statutory provisions does not necessarily lead to a nullity. See Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S) and the cases referred to therein.

The above authorities can be reconciled on the basis that the use of peremptory language is one of a number of indicators of the legislative intent where such intent is not explicitly stated. This obviously is a departure from the principle of strict exaction of compliance with the wording of the statute that I referred to earlier.

In my view, the use of peremptory language, such as the words "shall" or "must" in a statute is no longer conclusive evidence of the intention of Parliament, but remains cogent evidence of such intention.

As I have already stated, I concluded that Parliament intended to render null and void an election in which irregular or invalid votes were counted together with valid votes to determine the outcome of the election of the Speaker for two reasons; namely, the peremptory language of the section and the use of different language from the one used by the Legislature on the same subject matter in a different statute.

The proposition that generally speaking Parliament, just like an individual, uses the same words or language to evince the same intent and different words or language to evince a different intent is grounded in elementary common sense.

MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed devotes a whole chapter on the presumptions arising from the change of language in statutory interpretation…,. His opening paragraph of this subject matter reads:

"From the general presumption that the same expression is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout an Act or series of cognate Acts, there follows the further presumption that a change of wording denotes a change in meaning; Ricket v Metropolitan Railway Co. (1867) LR 2 HL 175, per LORD WESTBURY; ex p. Haines [1945] KB 183; Evans v Evans [1948] 1 KB 175.

'Where the Legislature,' said LORD TENTERDEN CJ, 'in the same sentence uses different words, we must presume that they were used in order to express different ideas'; R v Inhabitants of Great Bolton (1828) 8 B & C 71 at p74)."

For the presumption to arise, the change of words does not necessarily have to be in the same section or the same Act. It can be from one statute to another; see MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes…, where the learned author states that:

"There are many modern cases on change of wording, and they fall roughly into three groups, according to whether the language alters (i) within the same section, (ii) within the same Act, (iii) from one statute to another."

For authority for the third category, which bears resemblance to the facts in casu, the learned author cites the following authorities; Att-Gen. for Northern Ireland v Gallagher [1963] AC 349; B v B and H (L intervening) [1962] 1 All ER 29; Re P. (infants) [1962] 1 WLR 1296; Irwin v White, Tomkins and Courage, Ltd [1964] 1 WLR 387; Att.-Gen. of the Duchy of Lancaster v Simcock [1966] Ch.1; Seabridge v H.Cox & Sons (Plant Hire) Ltd [1968] 2 QB 46; Wild v Wild [1968] 3 WLR 1148.

While the authorities cited by MAXWELL relate mainly to historically connected statutes, I see nothing in principle that should limit the presumption to preceding statutes to the exclusion of statutes on the same subject matter but not historically connected. After all, Parliament is presumed to be familiar with its own Acts. The corollary, that Parliament is ignorant of its own Acts, is simply untenable.

Thus, at the time of enacting Standing Order 6, in 2005, in terms of which the Clerk acted, Parliament was familiar with the provisions of section 177 of the Electoral Act, which was enacted earlier. This particular provision has been included in no less than nine electoral Acts in this country since 1928.

In my view, it is permissible for a court to look at the language of another statute on similar or the same subject matter in the exercise to ascertain the intention of Parliament.

Section 177 of the Electoral Act, as appears from its heading, deals with the subject of the consequences of non-compliance with the Electoral Act. It provides as follows:

"177 When non-compliance with this Act invalidates election

An election shall be set aside by the Electoral Court by reason of any mistake or non-compliance with the provisions of this Act if, and only if, it appears to the Electoral Court that –

(a) The election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in this Act; and

(b) Such mistake or non-compliance did affect the result of the election."

Section 177 of the Electoral Act clearly provides that it is only when non-compliance with the Act affects the result of the election that the election should be set aside. In effect, this section incorporates into the Electoral Act the doctrine of substantial compliance.

Section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, provides for the election of the Speaker, but does not incorporate the principle of substantial compliance. In my view, if Parliament had intended that only non-compliance that affected the outcome of the election of the Speaker would render invalid such an election it would have used the same or similar language.

Also, in determining the intention of Parliament, I took into account the fact that no draconian consequences would flow from a declaration of invalidity of the election.

Parliament consists of a little over two hundred Members and ordering a re-election of the Speaker does not pose financial or logistical problems of any magnitude. If properly organised, as it should be, I do not see the election of the Speaker taking more than an hour and it should require only a minimum of resources.

I am also mindful of the fact that Parliament is one of the most revered institutions in our, or any, society. It consists of the highest concentration of political leadership of the country. Parliament makes the laws that we all obey. Parliament should, therefore, lead by example and should scrupulously obey its own laws.

The election of the Speaker should be an example of how an election should be conducted. This is particularly so in Zimbabwe which is plagued by contestation of election results. Parliament should use the election of the Speaker to set the best example to the rest of the country. It is unacceptable that Parliament should seek to salvage a shambolic and chaotic election of a Speaker through the doctrine of substantial compliance.

I do not wish to be understood as setting aside the election of the Speaker on the ground that it was chaotic. I am satisfied that the chaos and the conduct of Members of Parliament, generally, did not, on their own, affect the election to the extent that it can be concluded that the Clerk did not conduct an election. I am merely expressing concern that the Clerk failed to stamp his authority on the election and insist that Members of Parliament conduct themselves in accordance with his instructions. I, however, do not think that conduct, alone, is sufficient, on its own, to constitute a basis for setting aside the election of the Speaker.

Before concluding, I feel constrained to make the following observation in the interests of clarity.

I have read the judgment of SANDURA JA.

It is a mis-interpretation of this judgment to conclude that it seeks to reinstate the old principle of strict compliance with the letter of the statute to avoid invalidity. This judgment is based on what I considered to be the intention of Parliament as evinced by the language of the statute, and by contrasting the language of section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, with the language of section 177 of the Electoral Act.

I also do not agree that the principle that a peremptory enactment must be obeyed was abandoned in the case of Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S).

My understanding of Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S) is that it modified the principle by endorsing the movement away from strict compliance to a more flexible application of the principle. This is the only basis on which one can reconcile GUBBAY CJ's concurrence with the judgment of KORSAH JA in Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 (S) and his judgment in Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S). MANYARARA JA concurred with both judgments. This Court re-affirmed the modification of the principle in Doctor Daniel Shumba and Anor v The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Anor Judgment No. SC11-08.

In the result, I have come to the conclusion that the six named Members of Parliament did not vote by secret ballot, and, therefore, their votes were irregular. The inclusion of the irregular votes in the determination of the final outcome of the election of the Speaker constitutes a failure to comply with section 39 of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, providing for the election of the Speaker of Parliament by secret ballot, thereby rendering it invalid.

For the foregoing reasons I would allow the appeal. In the result, I make the following order –

1. The appeal is allowed with costs to be paid by the respondents jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved.

2. The order made by the court a quo is set aside and the following substituted –

"The application succeeds and the election of the second respondent as Speaker is hereby set aside."

ZIYAMBI JA: I agree

GARWE JA: I agree

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ: This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court wherein PATEL J dismissed the appellants' application to have set aside the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as "the Speaker").

The appellants, as the applicants in the court a quo, sought the following relief set out in the draft order:

"WHEREUPON after perusing the documents filed of record and hearing counsel, it is hereby declared that:-

1. The election of (the) second respondent as the Speaker of the Parliament of Zimbabwe on 25 August 2008 is null and void and set aside.

2….,.

3. That the respondents jointly and severally pay the costs of suit."

(The applicants abandoned the relief set out in paragraph 2).

The appellants' main contention in the court a quo, and in this Court, is that the election of the Speaker was null and void because it was not conducted in terms of section 39 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Constitution"), as read with Standing Order 6 of the Standing Orders of Parliament of Zimbabwe (hereinafter referred to as "the Standing Orders").

PATEL J dismissed the application. The appellants now appeal against that judgment....,.

MALABA DCJ: I have read the opinion expressed by the learned CHIEF JUSTICE. I regret that I am unable to agree with the decision that section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order No.6 of the House of Assembly Standing Orders ("Standing Order 6"), by implication, compels the nullification of the election upon proof that the Clerk of Parliament ("the Clerk"), who was under the obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker of the House of Assembly ("the Speaker") by a secret ballot, unlawfully counted invalid votes as secret ballots.

This case came to the Supreme Court by way of an appeal against the judgment of the High Court. The court a quo dismissed with costs an application for an order declaring that the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of the House of Assembly ("the House") on 25 August 2008 is null and void and set aside.

The applicants, who are members of the House who had taken part in the election of the Speaker, disavowed the application as an application for review. The substance of the relief sought and the reliance on the provisions of section 4(1) of the Administration of Justice Act [Chapter 10:28], however, show that it was an application for review.

The applicants alleged, in effect, that the Clerk who, as the administrative authority, was given the power to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, in accordance with the machinery prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, failed to act in accordance with the requirements of the rule against counting invalid votes as secret ballots, and, as a result, affected their rights or legitimate expectation in the election.

A perusal of the papers filed in support of the application shows that the relief was sought on two grounds:

(i) The first ground was that there was "noise, utter chaos, and disorder" in the Chamber of the House at the time appointed by the Clerk for the holding of the election of the Speaker such that the environment never became conducive for conducting the election by a secret ballot.

(ii) The second ground was that, in violation of the secrecy of the ballot, and in defiance of the procedure laid down by the Clerk, some members of the MDC-T party came out of the polling booth with ballot papers, on which they had marked their votes, unfolded. The allegation was that they displayed the ballot papers to others to disclose for whom they had voted before folding the ballot papers and depositing them in the ballot boxes.

As part of the second ground, it was alleged that the Clerk was under a duty to stop or prevent the members of the MDC-T party from doing what they did, but, in disobedience of his duty, failed to do so.

It was not the applicants' case that the election of the second respondent, as the Speaker of the House, should be declared null and void because the Clerk counted invalid votes as secret ballots, thereby distorting the result of the election. The reason is that to do so would have involved an admission by the applicants of the fact that there was counting of secret ballots produced by the electoral process the applicants alleged had not taken place.

As the learned CHIEF JUSTICE arrived at the conclusion, with which I disagree, on the ground that the Clerk counted invalid votes as secret ballots, I will deal with the question whether in the machinery for the election of the Speaker, prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, the unlawful conduct of the Clerk, in counting invalid votes as secret ballots, automatically nullifies the election.

My view of the case is that the application ought to have been dismissed or granted on the grounds on which the applicants made it.

Before determining the question whether the applicants established the grounds on which they sought the relief from the court a quo, I set out and construe the law in terms of which the election of the Speaker, by a secret ballot, was required to be conducted.

It is for the Legislature to make provision, by legislation, for matters relating to elections to office in institutions of a democratic Government. All matters relating to the organisation and procedure for election to the office of the Speaker of the House must be determined on the construction of the broad terms of the legislation enacted for the purpose by Parliament.

Section 39(1) of the Constitution imposes on the House an obligation to elect a presiding officer, to be known as the Speaker, at its first meeting after dissolution of Parliament and before proceeding to transact any other business. The election must therefore be held at the time prescribed under section 39(1) of the Constitution.

It is required to be an election by a secret ballot - only a secret ballot under the statute can give rise to a "result of the election."

The right to vote in the election of the Speaker, where more than one person is proposed for the post, is given to members of the House who would have subscribed the oath of loyalty and are present in the Chamber of the House at the time the election is called by the Clerk.

By section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, the Clerk is appointed as the official to conduct the election required by section 39(1) where more than one person is proposed as Speaker. By the same provisions, the Clerk is enjoined to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

When the members elect a Speaker from candidates nominated they do so in their individual capacity. They are not acting as representatives of the people who elected them to the House.

Where the words "conduct the election" are used as they are used in section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, in respect of a situation where more than one person is proposed for election for a post, it is clear that the word "election" is used with the intention that it should be understood to mean the whole combined and continuous process for bringing about the result of the election. It is a process consisting of a number of material steps prescribed by law, beginning with the call for the election and ending in the declaration of the result of the election.

For the purposes of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, all these steps were driven by the free exercise of the right to vote by the electors directed by the Clerk entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the election by a secret ballot.

The words "conduct the election" compendiously describe the number of duties the Clerk would be expected to carry out to ensure that members who were desirous to elect the Speaker by means of a secret ballot did so freely. So, to "conduct the election" in the context of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, denotes the concept of legality, in the sense that it contemplates the making of decisions or the taking of actions in the performance of duties, the effect of which is to direct or manage the activities of the voters according to the prescribed requirements of the law to achieve the object or purpose of ensuring the election of the Speaker based on universal, equal, direct, and personal vote freely expressed by a secret ballot.

In construing section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, it is important to bear in mind that the right to vote vested in the members present and voting at the first meeting of the House is not affected by the requirement that the election should be conducted by a secret ballot. The statute relates to procedure alone and directs the mode in which the right to vote is to be exercised by the electors.

The Legislature chose the secret ballot for its optimum benefits and prescribed it as the only method by which the elector would validly exercise his or her right to vote for the Speaker. At the same time, it imposed on the Clerk the general obligation to provide the mechanisms and procedures for the recording, processing, and protection of the secret ballot to bring about the election of the Speaker.

Every voter was entitled to express his or her will on the candidates by voting "for" or "against" through the legally permitted form of voting.

As section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, prescribes a secret ballot and its attendant requirements as a condition the elector has to perform if he or she is desirous to give a valid vote for a candidate in the election of the Speaker, it is addressed to both the voter and the Clerk who has to conduct the election by a secret ballot. The validity of a vote and of any act performed by the Clerk must be measured in terms of its conformity with the requirements of a secret ballot prescribed as the essence of the election of the Speaker.

In my view, it is wrong to place on section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, a narrow construction which views it as directed at the Clerk only. The Clerk does not vote. He does not produce the result of the election. His functions are managerial. The elector is the driver of the election by a secret ballot. The Clerk and the voter must be viewed in the context of the legal relationship of the rights and duties they have to exercise or discharge to achieve the statutory objective or purpose.

The prescription of a secret ballot, as the method for the election of the Speaker, is based on the acceptance of the principle that it promotes and protects freedom of expression of choice of a preferred candidate without undue influence, intimidation, and fear of disapproval by others. The elector is given the right to mark the choice of one candidate from another, or others, in secret. The words "secret ballot" are used in the wide and narrow sense to mean the process by which the ballot is recorded, processed, and protected, as well as the ballot in which there is complete and inviolable secrecy designed to drive away the fear of disclosure and secure to the voter freedom from undue influence, intimidation, and fear of disapproval by others.

A "secret ballot" is therefore a ballot cast freely by a voter, in secret, when no other person is present and aware of what is happening.

The ballot is secret to the voter, in the sense that he or she is the only person who knows for whom he or she is voting.

Whilst the caster of the vote remains unknown, the secrecy of the ballot is maintained and the vote has been effectively cast in the election of the Speaker. It is the valid vote to be counted to ascertain the result of the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

To maintain the secrecy, made to be extremely material as the foundation to the validity of the vote itself, the voter must meet certain conditions.

He or she is required not to put on the ballot paper, on which the vote is given, any writing or mark by which his or her identity as the voter can be known by any other person looking at the ballot paper. The voter is also required not to display or expose the ballot paper after he or she has given the vote so as to disclose to any other person for whom he or she voted before depositing the ballot paper in the ballot box.

So essential is the secrecy of the ballot to its validity that any departure by the voter from these conditions, designed for the purpose of ensuring the maintenance thereof, must render the vote void.

The mandatory obligation imposed on the Clerk was to perform the duties put on him to provide the mechanisms and procedures that enabled the voter who was desirous to exercise the right to vote by a secret ballot to do so. The duties he had to perform were to ensure that the vote, given in secret, was recorded, processed, protected, and counted, to bring about the election of the Speaker.

The primary object of any act performed by the Clerk in the discharge of the obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot would have been the maintenance of the secrecy of the ballot given by the voter, unless the voter himself or herself failed to observe, strictly, the conditions essential to the validity of the vote as a secret ballot. The Clerk, as the official appointed by the Legislature, and given the responsibility of conducting the election of the Speaker by means of a secret ballot, was under an absolute duty not to do anything in the execution of his duties that would have the effect of compelling the voter to violate the secrecy of the ballot.

Although it does not say in express terms that the Clerk cannot record the vote in some other way, it is clear that section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, makes the prescribed manner of recording the ballot by means of a ballot paper, properly drawn up and with the names of the candidates and the appropriate spaces where the mark by which the vote would be given, the only manner in which a secret ballot was to be given.

The Clerk has no discretion as to how the election should be conducted. He must conduct it by a secret ballot.

The valid vote in an election had to be one given for a candidate by means of a secret ballot. It was, therefore, the duty of the Clerk to provide the official ballot papers. It was his duty to put in place the polling booth in which the voters would mark the ballot papers, screened from observation by other potential voters. It was his duty to provide sealed and translucent ballot boxes in which the voters would deposit the marked ballot papers for safekeeping before counting.

The Clerk discharged these duties in accordance with the requirements of the law. He put in the Chamber of the House the polling booth and two ballot boxes and provided the ballot papers.

It was also the Clerk's duty to provide the procedure by which the secret ballot was to be recorded, processed, protected, counted, and results of the election based on it declared.

He, again, complied with this requirement.

The Clerk explained to the members that the voter would only mark his or her vote on a ballot paper delivered by him just before proceeding to the polling booth and that the ballot paper had to have an official stamp marked on the back. Upon receipt of the ballot paper, the member was to go immediately into the polling booth and there mark his or her ballot paper to express his or her choice. The voter was then required to fold the ballot paper up whilst in the polling booth, so as to conceal the vote, and then go and deposit the ballot paper, so folded up, into the ballot box. The voter was required to exhibit to the Clerk the official stamp on the back of the folded ballot paper before dropping it into the ballot box.

The procedure met the purpose of the legislation of ensuring equality of conditions for election to the office of Speaker for the candidates and the occurrence of an election based on universal, equal, direct, and personal suffrage freely expressed by a secret ballot.

It was the duty of the Clerk to monitor the proceedings and keep a continuous oversight of the actions of the voter as he or she moved from the polling booth to drop the ballot paper into the ballot box. In that way he would be able to detect conduct inconsistent with the exercise by the voter of the right to elect the Speaker in accordance with the procedure prescribed to ensure the maintenance of the secrecy of the ballot.

Once he detected such conduct, it was the Clerk's duty to act judicially and determine that the conduct of the voter had stripped the ballot of secrecy and declare the vote invalid and not to be counted.

At the end of the poll, the Clerk was required to open the ballot box in the presence of the agents of the candidates. It was his duty to empty the ballot box and open each and every folded ballot paper and inspect it to ensure that only those ballot papers which were not contrary to the provisions and spirit of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, as to secrecy, were counted in the election of the Speaker.

Before counting the valid ballot papers, the Clerk was required to group and arrange them under the names of the respective candidates by placing, in separate parcels, those which were secret ballots opposite the name of the same candidate and rejecting all invalid ballot papers.

The results of the election to be declared by the Clerk in an election of the Speaker conducted in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, would not be the number of votes cast. The reason is that some of the votes would have lost their secrecy as they moved through the process, from the time they were given on the ballot paper in the polling booth to the time they were canvassed after the opening of the ballot box. The result of the election, under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is the outcome of secret ballots counted as such.

The result of an election cannot include invalid votes because it is unlawful to count invalid votes as secret ballots. Courts do not ordinarily nullify that which has been done lawfully. Nullification is a remedy intended to be used to redress a wrong.

There is yet another important aspect of the right to secrecy of the ballot which needs to be considered before the determination of the question whether the applicants established the grounds on which they sought relief in the court a quo.

It is that the right to secrecy of the ballot, protected under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is subject to the principle that everyone has a right to waive an advantage of a law made solely for his or her benefit and protection in his or her private capacity. He or she may dispense with the benefit or advantage, provided he or she does so without infringing any public right or public policy. See MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed…,.

There is no legal obligation that a voter must vote by secret ballot.

The requirement of a vote by a secret ballot is justified on the principle which, without unacceptably encroaching on the rights of the persons concerned to stay out of the prescribed system of election, fosters the values of honesty, freedom, and reliability that should characterise electoral choice. As the voter must exercise the right to vote for the Speaker by a secret ballot given on the ballot paper freely, he or she can waive the right to the secrecy of the ballot at the time the vote is cast or at any time before he or she deposits the ballot paper in the ballot box.

The right to vote by a secret ballot includes the right of the voter to disclose to any other person for whom he or she voted. He or she can, in the exercise of that freedom, decide to put a writing or mark on the ballot paper at the time he or she casts the vote by which he or she can be identified as the voter and for whom he or she voted. He or she may decide to display to others the ballot paper so as to share the knowledge for whom he or she voted. So, a voter can, of his or her own free will, inform whomsoever he or she chooses for whom he or she voted. A secret ballot is not compulsory insofar as the voter who is not desirous of taking part in the election by a secret ballot is concerned.

The rule that there should be no writing or mark put by the voter on the ballot paper by which his or her identity as the voter can be revealed, and that the ballot paper should not be displayed to any other person so as to disclose for whom the vote was given, prescribes a condition of the validity of the vote.

The question whether there is a secret ballot for the purposes of the validity of the vote will depend for its answer on the actions of the individual voter.

In Jenkins v Board of Elections 180 NC 169 (1920), cited by Mr Chaskalson, it is correctly stated by BROWN J that:

"…, voting by ballot, as distinguished from viva voce voting, means a secret ballot, and…, the elector, in casting his ballot, has the right to put it in the box and to refuse to disclose for whom he voted and that he cannot be compelled to do so. But, this privilege of voting a secret ballot has been held to be entirely a personal one. The provision has been generally adopted…, for the protection of the voter and for the preservation of his independence in the exercise of this most important franchise. But, he has the right to waive his privilege and testify to the contents of his ballot."

In State Ex Rel. Hutchins v Tucker et al 106 Fla 905 (1932), also cited by Mr Chaskalson in argument, BUFORD CJ quoted from COOLEY Constitutional Limitations 7ed…, where the learned author states:

"The system of ballot-voting rests upon the idea that every elector is to be entirely at liberty to vote for whom he pleases and with what party he pleases and that no one is to have the right or be in a position to question his independent action either then or at any subsequent time. The courts have held that a voter, even in case of a contested election, cannot be compelled to disclose for whom he voted; and, for the same reason, we think others who may accidentally or by trick or artifice have acquired knowledge on the subject should not be allowed to testify to such knowledge or to give any information in the courts upon the subject. Public policy requires that the veil of secrecy should be impenetrable, unless the voter himself voluntarily determines to lift it, his ballot is absolutely privileged."

I turn now to determine the question whether the applicants established the grounds on which they based the application for the relief sought.

On the first ground, the first applicant, in the founding affidavit, said that there was "too much noise in the House" at the beginning of the process for the election of the Speaker.

The intention was to show that the Clerk was unable to manage the activities of the members according to the prescribed procedure for the achievement of the purpose of the electoral law.

He said the noise was caused by members belonging to MDC-T party who were pacing up and down the Chamber conferring noisily with each other in support of the second respondent. He said that was done "in a manner that created utter disorder and raised very serious tensions in the House."

After describing how the Honourable Biti displayed the ballot paper, after he had cast his vote in the polling booth, so as to disclose to others for whom he had voted, before folding the ballot paper up and depositing it into the ballot box, the first applicant said, in paragraph 32 of the founding affidavit:

"Honourable Biti's shocking and unprecedented conduct caused more than a fracas in the House as Honourable Members started shouting objections and counter objections, including trading insults, at the top of their voices, while the voting process degenerated into total disorder…,."

In paragraphs 3.9, 3.10, 3.15, 5, 6, and 11 of the opposing affidavit the Clerk said:

"3.9 The mood and atmosphere in the House of Assembly, on the occasion, was neither unique nor unprecedented. Members of the House of Assembly were meeting together for the first time after a fiercely contested general election. As can be expected, under the circumstances, the conversation was lively and the exchanges exuberant. There was a fair amount of good-humoured raillery, including political taunting, verbal sparring and bantering, all done by Members from all the political parties represented in what appeared to be a good spirit of joviality. This kind of conduct is not unusual in our Parliament or any other Parliament for that matter, and, accordingly, I did not consider it a cause for concern on this occasion.

3.10 It is my submission that what has been described by (the) applicant as 'gross disorder, chaos or fracas' in the House was actually nothing more sinister than increased hustle and bustle in the House, in turn the result of the increase in number of Members of the House (an increase in the membership from 150 to 210 as a result of Constitutional Amendment No.18)…,.

3.15 Notwithstanding the environment in the House that I have described in paragraphs 3.9 and 3.10 of this affidavit I was able to manage the entire proceedings of the day according to my present programme without a hitch of any kind. It is, therefore, my submission that quite contrary to (the) applicants' allegations of 'utter disorder and fracas' the proceedings progressed exceptionally smoothly…,.

5. I deny that at the time immediately before the elections took place there was too much noise and there existed a state of utter disorder in the House. I also totally deny witnessing any manifestation of serious tensions. What I did witness in the House was the atmosphere that I have described in paragraphs 3.9 and 3.10 of this affidavit.

6. Save to confirm that I did call the House to order whenever I deemed it necessary, and, by so doing, achieved a continuing level of order which enabled me to discharge my obligation and safeguard the progress and integrity of the voting process as well as all other proceedings of that day the contents of this paragraph (25 of the founding affidavit) warrant no comment….,.

11. I totally deny that there was total disorder in the House which I failed to control. If such a state of disorder had existed, the process of voting would have been impossible - which it was not. Generally, Members remained in their places, heard their names being called, followed the order on the list, approached, took possession of the ballot papers, and proceeded to vote privately. After voting they resumed their places without impediment in an exceptionally orderly manner given their numbers and the congestion in the Chamber."

The court a quo found, on the facts, that there was not so much noise as to cause chaos or utter disorder, as described by the first applicant.

The finding was justified by the evidence.

The relevance of raising the issue of noise was to show that the Clerk was disabled from performing his duties to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot. The applicants did not refer to specific duties the Clerk failed to perform because of the noise. To the contrary, the facts showed that all the Members who were present and desirous to vote did so.

Each of the two hundred and eight members received a ballot paper from the Clerk and went into the polling booth where he or she marked his or her vote on the ballot paper in secret. Some of the members came out of the polling booth with their ballot papers folded to conceal the vote and dropped the ballot papers into the ballot boxes after exhibiting the official stamp on the back to the Clerk. Other members came out of the polling booth with their ballot papers unfolded and displayed them to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted before folding them and dropping the ballot papers into the ballot box.

All the members responded to the alphabetical order in which their surnames were called.

They could not have done that in the context of the environment of chaos or utter disorder described by the applicants.

The first applicant conceded, in paragraph 25 of the founding affidavit, that the Clerk occasionally intervened to restore order when it was necessary to do so.

It was indeed the duty of the Clerk to maintain order during the electoral process.

By that admission, the first applicant corroborated the Clerk, who said that he was able to act and control the situation when he considered that the noise would interfere with his ability to conduct the election by a secret ballot as required by the law.

The Clerk was not a mere moderator. He was the governor of the electoral process for the purposes of securing the proper conduct of the election. As such, his evidence had to be accorded appropriate weight, where it was supported by that given by the applicants.

It is of interest to note that the Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment, the Honourable Kasukuwere, and the Honourable Member, Mr Zhuwawo, admit, in the affidavits filed in support of the applicants, that when they called out to draw the attention of the Clerk to the objections they were raising to what they considered was a violation of the requirements of a secret ballot by members of the MDC-T party, who displayed their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted, the Clerk told them not to make noise.

According to the two members, what was shouted were objections to the conduct of displaying ballot papers. The objections were not intended to obstruct the Clerk in the conduct of the election. They were not the confused and undesirable sounds characteristic of noise. The environment cannot be accurately described as characterized by complete absence of order.

In view of the fact that all the two hundred and eight members went through the process by which they gave their votes on the ballot papers and dropped them into the ballot boxes, with some displaying their ballots to others so as to show for whom they had voted, the allegation that there was so much noise that the atmosphere was not conducive for conducting the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot was not substantiated. The atmosphere was characterised by the factors described by the Clerk, which enabled him to conduct the election of the Speaker fairly and efficiently.

The first ground on which the application for relief was based was not proved.

The second ground was based on the allegation that it was unlawful for the members of the MDC-T party who displayed their ballot papers to do so and for the Clerk not to stop or prevent them from doing what they did.

The intention was to show that the actions of the voters concerned, and the failure to act by the Clerk, undermined the process by which the object of the electoral law was to be achieved, thereby violating the rights of the applicants to elect the Speaker, or be elected as the Speaker, by a secret ballot. In that regard, the first applicant said, in the answering affidavit:

"100: It is particularly notable that (the) second respondent himself was one of the Honourable Members from the MDC-T party that unlawfully opened and displayed their marked ballot papers and this fact alone, which is captured in the DVD evidence, is enough to show that his claim to be Speaker is legally vacuous….,.

103. The fact that some Honourable Members, actually most of them belonging to (the) second respondent's MDC-T party including (the) second respondent, defiantly opened and displayed their marked ballot papers simply means that there was no lawful election and (the) second respondent is wishfully wrong to claim that he was lawfully elected from an election that was in fact unlawful."…,.

The applicants invariably described the conduct of the members of the MDC-T party, in displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted, in terms which show that they considered the conduct unlawful.

They said it was "shocking behaviour"; "a brazen violation of the secret ballot"; a "deliberate and defiant violation of the election procedure"; "open and defiant violation of the secret ballot"; "blatant misconduct"; "the failure to observe and respect a fundamental Parliamentary Rule in the election of (the) Speaker"; "the rampant and systematic violation of the secret ballot"; "the failure to conduct the votes in secret as required"; and "an irregularity which is a grave breach of the Rules of Parliament."

The effect of the contention advanced by counsel for the appellants, on appeal, was that the members of the MDC-T party, who displayed the ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted, had no right to do so.

In paragraph 6 of the answering affidavit, the first applicant emphasised the fact that he considered the failure by the Clerk to stop or prevent the members of the MDC-T party who displayed their ballots from doing so as unlawful. He said:

"6. His failure principally arose from his inability or unwillingness, for whatever reasons, to ensure that no Member left the polling booth, after voting, with an unfolded ballot paper, and that no Member openly displayed his or her marked ballot paper to any other Member for whatever reason."

In paragraph 178 of the answering affidavit, the first applicant summarized the issue for determination by the Court as follows:

"At issue is only the unchallenged fact in the papers, namely, that unfolded and marked ballot papers were displayed by many Honourable Members of the MDC-T party, including (the) second respondent, outside the polling booth during the election and that this was in violation of the procedure that marked ballot papers should be folded in the polling booth and (the) first respondent did nothing to stop this violation."

Counsel for the appellants argued, on appeal, that the failure by the Clerk to prevent or stop the members of the MDC-T party from displaying their ballot papers was evidence of breach by him of the duty to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The court a quo found, on the facts, that only six members of the MDC-T party were shown to have come out of the polling booth with unfolded ballot papers and to have displayed the ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted.

The finding was, again, justified.

Although the first and second applicants had alleged, in their affidavits, that "many" members of the MDC-T party had displayed their ballots, no evidence was produced to support the allegation.

The use of the word "many", in a case in which they were not able to state the number of the members of the MDC-T party who acted in the manner alleged, suggests that there was an element of exaggeration.

This is particularly so when regard is had to the fact that the applicants also said "some" members of the MDC-T party displayed their ballot papers so as to disclose to others for whom they had voted.

Given the fact that the applicants were seeking an order of nullification of the election, it was necessary that their case be based on clear evidence of the number of voters who displayed their ballot papers. The legal consequence would have been that the voters concerned had disenfranchised themselves by their own conduct.

Proceeding as the parties did on appeal, on the basis that six members displayed their ballots so as to disclose for whom they had voted, did the applicants show that those voters acted unlawfully? Did they ipso facto show that the Clerk acted unlawfully in failing to stop or prevent those voters from behaving in the manner they did?

I must add that the only reasonable inference from the circumstances of the case is that the six members displayed their ballot papers to other members of the MDC-T party to disclose to them that they had voted for the second respondent.

All members, including the six who displayed their ballot papers, had the right to waive the right to the secrecy of their votes.

In displaying the ballot papers to others, the six members exercised their right to share with any other person the knowledge for whom they voted.

As long as they were not coerced or compelled to expose their ballot papers to others, the voters acted lawfully. The power conferred on the Clerk, to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, is limited by the right of the voter not to maintain the secrecy of his or her ballot.

The Clerk was not under any duty to stop or prevent the voters from voluntarily displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted.

Whilst the duty on the Clerk, to maintain the secrecy of the ballot given by the voter, requires that he should refrain from doing anything that would compel the voter to disclose to any other person how he or she voted, it cannot be relied upon to justify conduct by which the voter would be prevented from freely exercising the right to disclose to whomsoever he or she chooses for whom he or she voted because the secrecy of the ballot is protected under the law for the benefit of the voter.

The Clerk owed the duty not to do anything to compel the voter to disclose for whom he or she voted to the voter. He cannot discharge the duty to the detriment of the interests of the voter by preventing or stopping him or her from exercising the right of disclosure of information as to how he or she voted.

It is clear that the duty on the Clerk was not to interfere with the recording, processing, and protection of a secret ballot as long as the voter maintained the secrecy of the ballot.

The applicants did not show that the Clerk acted unlawfully by not stopping or preventing the six members from displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose that they had voted for the second respondent. His duty was to manage and direct the activities of the electors in accordance with the rules designed to ensure a free and fair election by a secret ballot.

The applicants failed to establish the two grounds on which they sought the relief from the High Court by way of an order declaring the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of the House null and void and set aside.

The application ought to have been dismissed at that stage of the proceedings.

As I disagree with the learned Judge, on the comments he made on the legal consequences of the conduct of the six members in displaying their ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they voted, and also disagree with the learned CHIEF JUSTICE on the conclusion he reached that the counting by the Clerk of invalid votes cast by the six members as secret ballots nullified the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of the House, and not just the affected votes, I proceed to express my opinion on these matters.

The words "shall conduct the election of Speaker by a secret ballot" are placed in a statute by the provisions of which the Legislature recognised the possession by the members of the House present at its first meeting of the right to vote for the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The rule of law is that a right to vote must be exercised strictly according to the terms of the statute which confers it.

What this means, on the facts of this case, is that when the six members displayed their ballot papers to others, so as to disclose for whom they had voted, they voluntarily took their votes out of the system of the election by a secret ballot prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6. By the same conduct by which they waived the right to the secrecy of their ballots, the voters lifted the veil of secrecy from the ballots rendering them void and of no value in the election of the Speaker.

I do not accept, as a correct statement of the law, the contention advanced by Mr Chaskalson and Ms Damiso, on behalf of the respondents, and accepted by the learned Judge in the court a quo, that the six ballots remained valid votes, notwithstanding the fact that they had been displayed by the voters concerned to others so as to disclose for whom they had been given.

The learned Judge, at p11 of the cyclostyled judgment, said:

"The courts should not interfere unless it is shown that the objective conditions put in place for the election precluded the possibility of a secret vote. Beyond this, it is then a matter purely for the individual voter if he chooses to divulge, whether publicly or in private, the specific manner in which he has cast his vote. If he does so of his own volition, without any external coercion or intimidation and howsoever his conduct might influence other voters, this cannot detract from the secrecy of his vote or vitiate the secrecy of the ballot as a whole."…,.

The statement that, a voluntary display by a voter of the ballot paper so as to disclose to other people for whom he or she voted does not "detract from the secrecy" of the vote, cannot be a correct statement of the legal effect of such conduct on the secrecy of the ballot affected.

The object of the ballot prescribed under section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is to secure complete secrecy as a condition of its validity, to be maintained not only by the voter desirous to elect the Speaker but by the official entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the election by a secret ballot during the electoral process, including the time when the counting of the votes takes place.

How can the official be able to maintain complete secrecy of a ballot in the face of conduct by the voter which removes the secrecy from the ballot? How the ballot can retain its secrecy thereafter I cannot imagine.

The secrecy is conferred on the ballot at the time the vote is given on the ballot paper in the polling booth. It must, however, be maintained thereafter to ensure the validity of the vote in the election of the Speaker.

It is clear, from the object of the statute and the procedure for voting, that a ballot paper which has a writing or mark made on it by which the identity of the voter can be known or one that is displayed to other people so as to disclose for whom the vote was cast, gets stripped of the secrecy of the ballot. The secret as a secret ceases to exist.

The ballot becomes void and cannot be counted in the election by a secret ballot.

The view expressed by the learned Judge did not take into account the effect of the requirement of the procedure provided by the Clerk for voting by a secret ballot.

The duty put on the voter desirous of maintaining the validity of his or her ballot in the election of the Speaker was that, after marking the ballot paper in the privacy of the polling booth, he or she would fold the ballot paper so as to conceal the ballot and keep it so folded until he or she deposited the ballot paper in the ballot box for safekeeping. The rule was to ensure the preservation of the secrecy of the ballot for the purpose of its validity in the election.

The direct effect of the voter displaying the ballot paper to other people, so as to disclose to them for whom he or she voted, is the invalidation of the ballot as a secret ballot.

Without pretending that there was no criterion by which a secret ballot had to be identified, I think the conclusion that the ballots displayed by the six voters to others, so as to disclose to them for whom they had voted, did not lose their secrecy, does not accord with what seems to have been the intention of the Legislature.

The proposition that the invalidity of the votes does not occur at the time the ballot papers are displayed so as to disclose for whom the vote was given would create a situation which would be quite unclear, and, to a certain extent, even illogical. Every exercise of a right has a direct consequence. The exercise of the right to vote which removes the secrecy of the ballot cannot have the same consequence as the exercise of the right which maintains the secrecy of the vote.

Failure by the Clerk to respond to the actions of the six voters and formally declare the ballots void did not change the fact that the ballots had been rendered invalid by the very actions of the voters.

The votes remained invalid at the time the Clerk counted them as secret ballots. He was not under any duty to count invalid votes as secret ballots. The statute is, in effect, clear that in no case will votes be allowed which are in any form other than the form of a secret ballot.

The result of the election of the Speaker, by a secret ballot, was not the number of votes cast, as some of them would have lost the essential element of secrecy as they travelled in their journey from the time they were cast to the time of counting. The result of the election was who was elected by a secret ballot.

The counting of invalid votes that had lost their secrecy affected two classes of voters:

(a) The first class is of voters who deliberately exercised their right to waive the benefits of the secrecy of the ballot by displaying the ballot papers to others so as to disclose for whom they had voted.

(b) The second class is that of voters who kept the knowledge for whom they voted to themselves.

The first class of voters had no right or legitimate expectation that their votes would be counted as valid votes. In this case, they did not, as a matter of fact, seek to enforce any such right or legitimate expectation. They appreciated the fact that they did not have such a protection. If anything, the legitimate expectation would have been that the votes they had voluntarily stripped of secrecy be not counted as secret ballots.

The second class of voters had the right or legitimate expectation that their votes and the election based on them be declared lawful. The applicants belonged to this class of voters. It appears that they are acting against their own interests and those of other voters in this class.

What right did they seek to protect or enforce by an order of nullification of the election?

If it is the right to a fair and free election by a secret ballot, they had to first show that it was violated by the respondents. They failed to show that violation.

Where there is proof of violation of electoral rights, such as the right to vote or to stand for election, the need to enforce the rights under judicial protection may require that the election be set aside if it was shown that the violation had undue influence on the result of the election.

There cannot be a remedy without proof of violation of a right.

The learned CHIEF JUSTICE reached the conclusion that nullification of the election was the only remedy for the unlawful conduct by the Clerk, of counting invalid votes as secret ballots. The reason was that, whilst imposing on the Clerk the mandatory obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, did not provide a remedy for the disobedience of the command.

The conclusion that nullification of the election was the only remedy for what, in reality, was a nullity in respect of the six votes, could only have been reached by implication of what is the intention of Parliament. It would be based on a construction of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, which presumes that it is the intention of the Legislature that voters who had complied strictly with the law and voted by a secret ballot for the Speaker should lose their valid votes on account of a failure by an official to discharge his duty not to count invalid votes as secret ballots.

The principle of law to be applied is that where an enactment imposes an obligation but is silent as to the remedy to be awarded for disobedience, a court must ascertain, from the language by which the obligation is imposed, whether it is the intention of the Legislature that nullification of the offending conduct should be the remedy to be awarded without any limit as to the scope of its operation or application.

MAXWELL on The Interpretation of Statutes 12ed…, summarises the principles to be applied as follows:

"…, when a statute requires that something shall be done or done in a particular manner or form, without expressly declaring what shall be the consequence of non-compliance: is the requirement to be regarded as imperative (or mandatory) or merely as directory (or permissive)?

In some cases, the conditions or forms prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the act or thing regulated by it and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the regard to them involving nothing more than liability to a penalty, if any, were imposed for breach of the enactment.

'An absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially.' Woodward v Sarsons (1875) LR 10 CP 733.

It is impossible to lay down any general rule for determining whether a provision is imperative or directory.

'No universal rule', said LORD CAMPBELL LC, 'can be laid down for the construction of statutes, as to whether mandatory enactments shall be considered directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience. It is the duty of Courts of Justice to try to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute to be construed.' Liverpool Borough Bank v Turner (1860) 2 De. G F & J 502 at pp507, 508.

And LORD PENZANCE said:

'I believe, as far as any rule is concerned, you cannot safely go further than that in each case you must look to the subject-matter; consider the importance of the provision that has been disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act; and, upon a review of the case in that aspect, decide whether the matter is what is called imperative or only directory.' Howard v Bodington (1877) 2 PD 203 at p211."

See also Sterling Products International Ltd v Zulu 1988 (2) ZLR 293 (S).

There is no question that section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, is a mandatory enactment, the subject-matter of which is the election of the Speaker of the House. The object of the statute is to secure an election of the Speaker by members of the House qualified to vote by a secret ballot. The object is also to ensure, by the imposition of the obligation on the Clerk to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, that there is provided mechanisms and procedures for the recording, processing, protecting, and counting of the secret ballot.

In other words, it is to ensure the establishment of an effective system for the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot conducted fairly, efficiently, and impartially.

The Clerk did put in place the mechanisms and procedures for the recording, processing, protection and counting of secret ballots.

Of the two hundred and eight members who voted, two hundred and two complied strictly with the requirements of the law for the exercise of their right to vote for the Speaker by a secret ballot - that is the main object for the achievement of which the provisions of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, were enacted.

He had assembled together all the necessary mechanisms which were required by the law governing the election to be put in place at the time prescribed to ensure delivery of the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The six members who displayed their ballot papers to others, so as to disclose for whom they had voted, did so in the context of the mechanisms and procedures.

The failure committed by the Clerk was not to declare the invalid ballots void. It was the unlawful conduct of counting invalid ballots as secret ballots that has been used as a justification for the proposed award of the order of nullification of the election of the Speaker.

The disobedience did not relate to a secret ballot.

In other words, it is not a case of the Clerk failing to record, process, or count a secret ballot or declaring a secret ballot to be an invalid vote.

Had that been the case, the result of the election of the Speaker would have been affected by the disobedience of the Clerk to the duty to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

He had no power to decide what should be counted to ascertain the result of the election. He was told by the law what to count and for what purpose.

In this case, the Clerk counted what was at law a nullity as a secret ballot. His conduct did not give value to the invalid votes and did not in any way affect the result of the election of the Speaker.

The discounting of the invalid votes as well as the declaration of the conduct of the Clerk to be unlawful would not give rise to any difficulty in the determination of who the winner of the election of the Speaker was. The result of the election would not change.

The nullification of the election, based on a secret ballot, would subvert the purpose of the statute.

The general rule is that a declaration of nullity must be confined to the conduct in respect of a particular vote or class of votes, the invalidity of which has been established, unless the non-observance of the requirements of the law governing the specific duty is of a character which is contrary to the principle of an election by a secret ballot and is so great that it might have permeated the process and affected the result of the election: Phillips v Goff (1886) 17 QB 805.

There are numerous cases in which courts have struck off the invalid votes and declared conduct in respect of them void without affecting the election. The principle applied has been that to nullify the results of the election based on votes given by a secret ballot in strict compliance with the requirements of the law governing the election would imply that the provisions of the law complied with are misleading.

Had the Clerk declared the invalidity of the six votes at the appropriate stage in the election process, the declaration would have affected those votes only and not the other votes validly cast.

Why should the court, upon review of his conduct, in failing to do the right thing at the right time, go farther than the remedy the law had placed at his disposal had he acted lawfully?

The purpose of voting is not only the differentiation of the electorate and the expression of the will of the individual voters but also the ability to accept such decisions based on the will of the majority.

In my view, the principle of majority rule, on the basis of which results of democratic elections are determined, requires that courts should refrain from interfering with the will of the majority of voters expressed in accordance with the requirements of the law, on the ground that the official entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the election by a secret ballot unlawfully counted non-secret ballots as secret ballots - especially where there would be no confusion at all as to who is the winner following the discounting of the invalid votes.

An election may be set aside if it is not clear, upon determination of the conduct forming the ground on which the validity of the election is impugned, who was the winner.

In this case, there is clear evidence of the election of the Speaker of the House in accordance with the mode of voting prescribed by the law governing the election concerned.

The general principles of the law on which I have based my decision in this case and believe are applicable in the resolution of the questions raised were stated by LORD COLERIDGE CJ in Woodward v Sarsons (1875) LR 10 CP, referred to with approval in Chanter v Blackwood (1904) 1 CLR 39…,. He said:

"As the first point, we are of opinion that the true statement is that an election is to be declared void by the common law applicable to Parliamentary elections, if it was so conducted that the tribunal which is asked to avoid it is satisfied, as matter of fact, either that there was no real electing at all, or that the election was not really conducted under the subsisting election laws.

As to the first, the tribunal should be so satisfied, i.e., that there was no real electing by the constituency at all, if it were proved, to its satisfaction, that the constituency had not in fact had a fair and free opportunity of electing the candidate which the majority might prefer.

This would certainly be so, if a majority of the electors were proved to have been prevented from recording their votes effectively according to their own preference, by general corruption or general intimidation or to be prevented from voting by want of the machinery necessary for so voting, as by polling stations being demolished, or not open or by other of the means of voting according to law not being supplied, or supplied with such errors as to render the voting by means of them void, or by fraudulent counting of votes or false declaration of numbers by a Returning Officer, or by other such acts or mishaps.

And we think the same result should follow if, by reason of any such or similar mishaps, the tribunal, without being able to say that a majority had been prevented, should be satisfied that there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority of the electors may have been prevented from electing the candidate they preferred.

But, if the tribunal should only be satisfied that certain of such mishaps had occurred, but should not be satisfied either that a majority had been, or that there was reasonable ground to believe that a majority might have been, prevented from electing the candidate they preferred, then we think that the existence of such mishaps would not entitle the tribunal to declare the election void….,."

I am of the view that the construction of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6, for the purpose of establishing the intention of the Legislature regarding the nullification of the election for the unlawful conduct of the Clerk, in counting invalid votes as secret ballots, does not justify the conclusion that it is the intention of the Legislature that breach of any of the numerous duties imposed on the Clerk, under the general obligation to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot, should attract an order of nullification of the election regardless of the nature of the neglect of duty and its effect on the "result of the election".

There can be no doubt that the majority of the voters freely expressed their preference of the candidate they wished to be the Speaker in the secrecy of the polling booth and exercised their right to maintain the secrecy of the ballot in accordance with the requirements of section 39(2) of the Constitution, as read with Standing Order 6.

The majority of the voters were enabled by the process conducted by the Clerk to freely elect, by a secret ballot, the Speaker from the two candidates.

To declare such an election void would be to declare void what is lawful.

The remedy awarded would be wholly disproportionate to the wrong committed. There was, in fact, no failure by the Clerk to conduct the election by a secret ballot within the meaning of the statute. The ballots which were effectively cast decided who was elected as the Speaker of the House.

The fact that the Clerk counted invalid votes as secret ballots because he had not seen the conduct by which they were rendered void did not change their invalid status.

The question is whether the purpose for which the powers to conduct the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot were conferred on the Clerk was fulfilled.

A close interpretation of the facts leads to the conclusion that the purpose of the statute was accomplished.

An appropriate remedy is one which accords with the intention of the Legislature.

In this case, it is the one that upholds the result of the election of the Speaker by a secret ballot.

The valid result is that the second respondent was elected the Speaker of the House by a majority of voters who cast secret ballots.

It would, in my view, be contrary to fairness and justice to say, as a matter of principle, that the Legislature intended that the election of the Speaker conducted by a secret ballot in terms of the law be nullified on account of, say, a single invalid vote counted by the official conducting the election as a secret ballot. The intention of the Legislature must be that only irregularities which undermined the achievement of the object or purpose of the legislation, of ensuring an election of the Speaker based on universal, equal, direct, and personal vote freely expressed by a secret ballot, should vitiate the election.

In the exercise of review powers, the court a quo came to the conclusion that the improper counting of invalid votes as secret ballots was not an irregularity of the class the Legislature intended would vitiate the election.

The conclusion is, in my view, not evidence of a misdirection on the part of the court a quo.

It is when the irregularity affected the actual discharge of the positive duty to conduct the election by a secret ballot, and not by any other type of vote, that it may be used as a ground for challenging the validity of the election by a secret ballot.

The Legislature prescribed the standard which had to be used by everyone, including the court, as an accurate and reliable criterion for determining the ballot papers which had to be counted to ascertain the result of the election.

Applying the test, the Clerk came to a wrong conclusion in respect of the six ballots cast for the second respondent. They were not secret ballots qualified to be counted.

The court a quo was, on the facts, in a position to apply the criterion to the ballot papers and arrive at the conclusion the Clerk ought to have reached in respect of the invalidity of the six ballots had he properly applied the prescribed test.

If it had to set aside anything, the court a quo should have set aside the counting of the ballot papers made by the Clerk and not the election itself.

The legality of the election was dependent upon the will of the electorate having been freely expressed by a secret ballot reflected by accurate and reliable results. The unlawful act of counting six invalid votes as secret ballots because of the wrong application of the prescribed standards of differentiating secret ballots from non-secret ballots did not disable the court, which had jurisdiction to do so, from objectively scrutinising the facts and obtaining a reliable result of the election. The court would be acting within the bounds and limits of the requirement that there should have been brought about an election of the Speaker by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and personal right to vote freely expressed according to the principle of majority rule.

I would therefore dismiss the appeal....,.

The appeal is dismissed with no order for costs.

The plaintiff sues for the eviction of the defendant from her plot while the defendant counter-sues for the transfer of title, rights and interest in a portion of the same plot.

The plaintiff testified and called the evidence of two other witnesses who were her daughter, Eneresi Simon, and an employee of the Epworth Local Board, Cagewell Muzangaza. The defendant gave evidence and called the testimony of two other witnesses who were Pastor Elizabeth Nyakudanga and Tedius Kagande. A total of six (6) documentary exhibits were produced by both parties.

THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE

The plaintiff is an 83 year old woman. She cannot read or write. She has difficulty in walking. According to her summary of evidence, her husband died on 18 February 1982. In their pleadings, both parties accepted that she was appointed an executrix dative on 22 August 2007 and subsequently became the legal holder of the rights, title, and interest in Stand 1125 Makomo Extension, Epworth in Harare.

After the death of her husband she survived on handouts from well-wishers. She became a member of the Ambassadors for Christ Ministries; a church led by, amongst others, Tedius Kagande. Kagande doled out handouts to her, and, purporting to act under the auspices of the church, built for her a more habitable two roomed structure on the Stand in question. He requested her to sign a certain document on which he purportedly wrote out her grandchildren's names and the materials required for the construction of the more habitable structure. She did not know whether he built it from his or church funds. Thereafter, he introduced her to the defendant, who was a teacher by profession, and a member of the same church. The defendant was supposed to look after her. She allowed the defendant to build another two-roomed house for his use on the Stand after she was assured that he would be there for a short while. The defendant has been ensconced on her Stand for the past nine (9) years. He neither pays rentals nor municipal charges.

She was adamant that she did not sell the smaller portion for $16,000= or the bigger one for $23,000=. She disputed executing exhibit 1A and 1B averring that she was illiterate. She denied seeking the subdivision of the Stand in 2000. She averred that it was in 2008 that she went with the defendant to the Epworth Local Board to have the dispute resolved; and not to seek the subdivision of the Stand.

She was cross examined.

She considered Tedius Kagande as a leader of the church in Epworth and did not know Pastor Nyakudanga and Pastor Matyora. She disputed that she advised Kagande, in 1999, that she was selling a portion of her Stand. She denied receiving $16,000= in the presence of Tedius Kagande, the defendant's wife, and her daughter, Eneresi Simon. She disputed that the amount in question was used by Tedius Kagande in the construction of her two rooms. She denied requesting Eneresi Simon to sign exhibit 1A on her behalf before a Commissioner of Oaths. She also denied executing exhibit 1B. She disputed using her daughter to sign legal documents on her behalf.

She related how the defendant sought to evict her from her Stand at the Magistrates' Courts. She did not appear to be aware of exhibit 2, the warrant for the ejectment of the defendant which she obtained on 3 August 2001 in the Magistrates Court; exhibit 3, the affidavit signed on 16 May 2001, in her name, in the hand similar to that of her daughter in exhibit 1A and exhibit 4; her application for a peace order dated 13 December 2001 in which she graphically set out how the defendant was disturbing her peace. She denied attending a funeral in Malawi using the proceeds of the sale of a portion of the Stand. She was given money by her daughter who was her breadwinner. She denied informing Pastor Nyakudanga and Charles Shamuyarira of the sale of a portion of her Stand to the defendant.

Eneresi Simon stated that her mother never sold a portion of the Stand to the defendant. She identified exhibit 1A as the blank document on which she wrote out the plaintiff's name and national identity number. She stated that her mother did not sell a portion of the Stand for $16,000= or $23,000=. She denied signing exhibit 1A before a Commissioner of Oaths.

She stated that her mother's trip to Malawi was funded by her daughter-in-law in Malawi. In 2008, she accompanied her mother and the defendant to the Epworth Local Board offices where they saw Mr. Muzangaza. The plaintiff was against the subdivision of her Stand.

She was cross-examined.

She admitted to signing a blank exhibit 1A but denied signing exhibit 1B. She stated that the defendant sought to evict the plaintiff notwithstanding that exhibits 2 and 3 indicated her mother as the plaintiff. That the defendant sought to evict the plaintiff from the Stand was confirmed by exhibit 6, the summons issued out of the Magistrates' Court by him on 27 June 2002. She denied signing for her mother in exhibit 3 and 4. She disputed that $16,000= was paid in her presence. She averred that her mother, who is of Nyanja origin, could not converse in Shona.

Cagewell Muzangaza is a Building Inspector for the Epworth Local Board. In that capacity he deals, inter alia, with sub-divisions of residential Stands in Epworth. He told the court that the Stand is registered in the plaintiff's name. He stated that temporary structures, which are not based on an approved plan, are on the Stand. He explained that a subdivision of a Stand is initiated by the registered holder who writes to the local authority and fills in a special document to this effect identifying to whom the sub-division is to be registered. The Housing department vets the information and makes its recommendations and forwards these to his department. The witness checks the Stand on his master plan prepared by town planners and approved by the Department of Physical Planning in the Ministry of Local Government to satisfy himself whether it is feasible to subdivide the Stand. He forwards his recommendations to the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP). He stated that it is only the local authority which approaches UDCORP and not the registered holder, or, for that matter, anyone else.

He stated that in the file of the Stand in his custody is a request purportedly made by the plaintiff in 2000 for a subdivision in favour of the defendant. The application was rejected for two reasons. Firstly, she was not the registered holder; her husband was, and, secondly, there was no subdivision permit for the Stand.

He further revealed that on 20 December 2007 the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP) wrote an unsolicited letter, exhibit 5, to the local authority. The local authority ignored it because it had not originated from it. He categorically stated that a sale of a portion of a Stand cannot be approved by the local authority prior to sub-division.

He was cross examined.

He disputed the averment that he was interested in the portion that was allegedly disposed to the defendant. He denied that the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP) wrote its letter in response to that of the local Board. At one time in 2008 the parties came to see him. The defendant wanted sub division but the plaintiff was against it as the matter was pending in Court and alleged that the defendant was forcing her to sub-divide the Stand.

As will more fully appear when I determine the issues referred to trial, I believed the plaintiff and her witnesses. They gave consistent and credible testimony.

THE DEFENDANT'S CASE

The defendant stated that he purchased a portion of the Stand from the plaintiff through the medium of Tedius Kagande. He paid $16,000= to the plaintiff in the presence of his wife, Tedius Kagande and Eneresi Simon in September 1999. They drove into town to Mr. Gode, a Commissioner of Oaths, before whom Eneresi Simon signed for her illiterate mother on exhibit 1A. The plaintiff persuaded him to buy the bigger portion of the Stand by an additional payment of $7,000=. She accepted periodic payments.

The latter agreement was recorded as exhibit 1B and executed for the plaintiff by her daughter, Eneresi Simon.

He commenced construction and started to reside on the Stand on 1 February 2000. Even though the Stand was in her late husband's name, the plaintiff submitted an application for sub-division to the local Board. The application failed because the plaintiff had not constructed the main house on the Stand. The plaintiff was not in a position to do so; so he suggested that he build the main house and have it registered in his name. She took the view that he wanted to evict her and all hell broke loose.

The plaintiff issued summons for his eviction and obtained a default judgment on 19 May 2001, in case number 7926/2001, as shown in exhibit 2. She deposed in an affidavit, exhibit 3, on 16 May 2001, that the defendant was her grown up son who was giving her problems. It was purportedly signed by her; her full names were handwritten above her typed name.

He confirmed the visit to Cagewell Muzangaza in 2008 where the plaintiff refused to have the Stand sub-divided into his name. He produced exhibit 5, a letter written to the local Board by the Urban Development Corporation (UDCORP) on 20 December 2007 for Stand 1171. The typewritten Stand number 1171 was cancelled by pen and the number 1125 inserted. The cancellation was not countersigned. It does not refer to any previous correspondence from the local authority. Its authenticity is questionable. In my view, it does not assist the defendant in his case.

He was cross-examined.

He stated that he borrowed $16,000= from his employers. Tedius Kagande told him of the purchase price and it was confirmed by the plaintiff. Tedius Kagande's young brother authored exhibit 1A. He further averred that the sum of $16,000= was paid in the presence of the young brother after he had drafted exhibit 1A. On 28 October a new agreement on the additional payment for the bigger portion was executed. The typed agreement, exhibit 1B, was typed by Tedius Kagande at his town offices. By then, the plaintiff had commenced building her two roomed structure. He commenced building on the portion sold to him after the execution of exhibit 1B. He paid the installments of $7,000= in two batches of $3,000= and 4,000= in February and April 2000, respectively, to the plaintiff in the presence of Eneresi Simon.

He disputed issuing summons to evict her contrary to exhibit 6, the summons in his name dated 27 June 2002, for the eviction of the plaintiff alleging he had purchased the Stand. He maintained buying the bigger portion of the Stand and denied conniving with Tedius Kagande to defraud the plaintiff of a portion of her Stand.

He called the evidence of Elizabeth Nyakudanga, a pastor of the church attended by the parties in 1999. The pith of her testimony was that the plaintiff informed her that she had sold a portion of the Stand so that she could use the proceeds to build a better house. Her church was not involved in humanitarian work at the time of the sale.

Under cross examination, she alleged that the defendant paid the full amount of $23,000= in 1999. She revealed that the defendant refreshed her memory of the events of 1999 in January 2009.

The last witness to testify for the defendant was Tedius Kagande. He stated that he was asked by the plaintiff to find a buyer and he connected her to the defendant. He took him to the plaintiff and handed $16,000= to Eneresi Simon who was with the plaintiff. On his suggestion exhibit 1A was executed. It was drawn up by his young brother and signed before a Commissioner of Oaths.

He built the cottage of cement blocks for her after listing the required materials. The materials cost half the amount paid by the defendant. He did not charge her for his labour. He did not supply her with free food handouts. She later approached him for the sale of the bigger portion and he referred her to the defendant. He was not involved in the latter agreement.

Under cross examination, he revealed that the defendant raised the purchase price without viewing the Stand. The price was fixed by the plaintiff and her daughter. His brother was not at the plaintiffs where the money was paid but was in town. The first agreement was signed at his town offices and taken to a commissioner for affirmation only. He denied cheating the plaintiff.

For the reasons that will become apparent when I determine the issues referred to trial, I found the defendant and his witnesses incredible witnesses.

THE ISSUES

At the pre-trial conference that was held on 1 July 2009, the matter was referred to trial on the issues set out in the defendant's minute of 20 May 2009. The issues for determination are as follows:

1. Whether the plaintiff sold to the defendant a subdivision of Stand 1125 Makomo, Epworth.

2. Whether the plaintiff should cede or assign her rights, interests and title to the subdivision to the defendant.

3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant from the property.

RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUES

1. Whether the plaintiff sold to the defendant a subdivision of Stand 1125 Makomo, Epworth

The onus to show that an agreement of sale was executed lies on he who avers that such an agreement was concluded. In the present matter the incidence of proof falls on the defendant.

He relied on exhibit 1A and 1B.

Exhibit 1A is a pro forma of an affidavit that is sold at Kingstons Booksellers and Stationers. It was common cause that the name of the deponent and her national identity number and address were handwritten by Eneresi Simon. Eneresi stated that she was the one who wrote out the plaintiff's name, national identity card, address and signature in exhibit 1A.

The plaintiff purportedly swore that she had sold a subdivision of Stand 1125 Makomo to the defendant who had paid the full amount of $16,000=. She further indicated that she was granting him change of ownership. The affidavit was purportedly executed on 23 September 1999 before R. Gode, a Commissioner of Oaths.

The defendant did not disclose where exhibit 1A was drawn. He stated that it was signed before the Commissioner of Oaths by Eneresi Simon in the presence of the plaintiff because the plaintiff could not read or write.

The defendant's witness, Tedius Kagande, disclosed that the affidavit was purchased at Kingstons when the parties were on their way to his town offices. Kagande further indicated that the contents of the affidavit were written by his young brother at his town offices and signed by Eneresi Simon before the parties proceeded to a commissioner of oaths. The commissioner of oaths simply confirmed with the plaintiff the contents of the affidavit.

The version of the plaintiff and her daughter differed from that adduced by the defendant. The plaintiff stated that Tedius Kagande brought the affidavit, in the absence of her daughter, and requested her to fill in her personal details and signature ostensibly as a record of the building materials he would purchase for her. The daughter confirmed that when she visited her mother, as she was wont to do at the end of each month, she wrote out her mother's details and signed the affidavit for her. Both mother and daughter were adamant that Eneresi Simon signed a blank document and denied the present contents in the affidavit.

The versions of the defendant and Tedius Kagande were contradictory on whether Eneresi Simon signed the document before a commissioner of oaths or prior to the visit.

A commissioner of oaths worthy his salt would have requested the plaintiff to append her mark and thumb print on the document. He would have known that it was improper for Eneresi Simon to sign as the plaintiff without indicating that she was signing as her duly authorised agent.

The defendant did not disclose why and how Tedius Kagande's young brother became involved in the matter.

It does not appear that the plaintiff was ever given a copy of the affidavit in question.

Neither Tedius Kagande's young brother nor the Commissioner of Oaths was called to confirm the versions of the defendant and Tedius Kagande.

The two defence witnesses also contradicted each other on when the money was paid. Tedius Kagande averred that it was paid at the plaintiff's home. The defendant prevaricated. In his evidence in chief he averred that it was paid at the plaintiff's home while under cross examination he alleged that it was paid after the affidavit had been compiled.

While the defendant stated that Tedius Kagande's young brother was present at the plaintiff's home when the money was paid, Tedius Kagande stated that his young brother was never at the plaintiff's home. Notwithstanding that, Kagande was of the view that the purchase price of $16,000 was too high in comparison with similar Stands in Glen View at the time. The defendant borrowed the money and paid it before he had visited the site. He did not negotiate for a lower price.

The contradictions in the defendant and Tedius Kagande's testimonies and the other shortcomings that I have highlighted show that exhibit1A is a questionable document. I am not satisfied that the defendant has discharged the onus on him to show, on a balance of probabilities, that it was executed by the plaintiff.

Exhibit 1B was purportedly executed on 28 October 1999.

The plaintiff purportedly sold her rights in the portion of the Stand where the main house was to be built for an additional payment of $7,000=. The amounts were to be paid on 30 February and 30 April 2000 in the sum of $4,000= and $3,000= respectively.

Again, the document indicates that the plaintiff signed the document. The defendant averred that it was signed by Eneresi Simon for her mother. The signature in exhibit 1B appears to be similar to the one in exhibit 1A and exhibit 3. The latter was an affidavit filed by the plaintiff for default judgment against the defendant but is different from the one in exhibit 4, an ex parte application for a peace order that she filed on 13 December 2001.

The defendant alleged that exhibit 1B was typed by Tedius Kagande. In his testimony, Tedius Kagande expressed ignorance about it. Unlike the defendant, Kagande alleged that he facilitated the purchase of the larger portion of Stand 1125. The defendant alleged that he paid the $7,000= on the due dates. He did not produce any proof of payment. The agreement records 30 February as a date for the payment of the first installment. Such a date does not exist. The application failed because the plaintiff was not then the registered holder of rights in the property, as averred by Cagewell Muzangaza and not because of the absence of a main house on the Stand, as alleged by the defendant.

The contradictions outlined above call into question the authenticity of exhibit 1B, especially in the face of the denials by the plaintiff and her daughter that they were involved in its creation and execution.

Counsel for the defendant submitted that the agreements were authentic. He predicated his submission on the basis that the plaintiff permitted the defendant to build a cottage on the Stand and allowed him to reside thereat without paying rentals.

The plaintiff stated that she fell under the influence of Tedius Kagande, whom she trusted as an elder in her church and as a philanthropist who helped her with food handouts and built a two-roomed cottage for her.

I found that her age and low intellect adequately explained her naivety, which Tedius Kagande and the defendant exploited to the latter's advantage.

In any event, notwithstanding his allegations that he had purchased a portion of the Stand, the defendant never volunteered to pay for his proportional measure of the supplementary charges due to the local Board.

I am unable to find the non-payment of rentals by the defendant indicative of the authenticity of the agreements.

Counsel for the defendant further submitted that the attempt by the plaintiff, in 2000, to register a portion of the Stand in the defendant's name was conclusive evidence that she had disposed her rights to him.

It was common cause that the plaintiff is illiterate.

Cagewell Muzangaza highlighted the elaborate paper work that is required of the registered holder in seeking a subdivision permit. The defendant did not produce the application in question. He did not adduce evidence on how the plaintiff applied for the subdivision in his favour. As she is illiterate it could very well be that someone else completed and signed the forms that are required. The plaintiff denied ever having done so. The defendant did not produce any credible evidence to show that she made the application in person. Cagewell Muzangaza's statement as to what he found in his file is insufficient to show that the plaintiff sold the Stand to the defendant.

There were unsatisfactory features in the plaintiff's version concerning her professed inability to understand Shona; her apparent ignorance that she once sued the defendant for eviction and the source of the funds she used to go to Malawi. These were, however, irrelevant to the resolution of the first issue.

Pastor Elizabeth Nyakudanga did not assist the defendant discharge the onus on him as it became clear when she was cross-examined that she was relying on what the defendant said to her in January 2009 rather than on her own recollection of events. She contradicted herself on the terms of the agreement of sale. I found her evidence unreliable.

Accordingly, I hold that the plaintiff did not sell her rights in a portion of Stand 1125 Makomo Extension to the defendant.

In any event, it was common cause that when the purported agreements of sale were executed, the rights in Stand 1125 vested in the deceased estate of the plaintiff's late husband. The only person who has control of property in a deceased estate is the executor duly appointed to that office by the Master of the High Court. The plaintiff was appointed an executrix dative on 22 August 2007. At the time she allegedly disposed of rights in the property she lacked the legal capacity to do so. She could not lawfully dispose of rights that she did not have. See Nyandoro & Anor v Nyandoro & Ors HH89-08…,.

In the case of Schiourt v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99…, INNES CJ held as follows:

"It is a fundamental principle of our law that a thing done contrary to the prohibition of the law is void and of no effect. So that what is done contrary to the prohibition of the law is not only of no effect but must be regarded as never having been done - and that whether the law-giver has expressly so decreed or not; the mere prohibition operates to nullify the act."

The same sentiments were expressed by SANDURA JA in the case of Mugwebie v Seed Co Ltd & Anor 2000 (1) ZLR 93 where the respondents had not complied with the provisions of the Code of Conduct in suspending an employee. He stated as follows;

"There is no doubt in my mind, whatsoever, that it was null and void. It was a complete nullity. In this respect, I can do no better than quote what LORD DENNING said in MacFoy v United Africa Co Ltd [1961] 3 ALL ER 1169 (PC) at 11721:

'If an act is void then it is, at law, a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of the court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without further ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.'"

Where an act is a nullity, the innocence or otherwise of the other party to the act is of no assistance at all. This is so because nothing can be built on nothing.

In F. Katirawu v D. Katirawu and 3 Others HH58-07 the second respondent had claimed to be an innocent purchaser of rights and interests in a property where the purported executor was found to have acted fraudulently in obtaining the Letters of Administration. After holding that the sale was a non-sale, MAKARAU JP went on to say that:-

“In conclusion, the rights that the second respondent believes to have purchased and acquired from the first respondent are tainted by the same illegality and amount to nought by token of the same reasoning. It is as if there was never a sale between her and the first respondent, and, consequently, no rights can flow from a non-sale in her favor. The sale and the consequent cession of rights in her favor amount to nothing at law for nothing legal can flow from a fraud.”…,.

In casu, the purported sale was contrary to the provisions of the Will and was done without following the law…,. The first respondent went clearly against the intention of the testator. One can say he acted dishonestly and clearly contrary to the provisions of the Will he was supposed to execute. In my view, whatever he did was a non-sale. He purported to sell something he had no power and was in fact prohibited from selling.

The issue of innocent purchaser would thus not turn a non-sale into a valid sale. There was nothing for the first respondent to sell and for the second respondent to purchase as the law and provisions of the Will did not allow the sale. The first respondent's purported sale was an act of illegality.

The plaintiff was married, at customary law, by the late Vito Bhero (the deceased) who died intestate on 15 January 2004. She had five children with the deceased who are now all majors. Prior to the deceased's marriage to the plaintiff he was married to the first defendant in terms of the African Marriages Act.

After the death of the deceased, the first defendant registered the estate and was appointed executor of the estate. She proceeded to transfer the only immovable property, which was Stand 32 Manga Street, New Mabvuku into her name and subsequently sold it to the second defendant….,.

The evidence led did not disclose how the property was transferred into the first defendants name from the name of the deceased. The Letters of Administration granted to the first defendant did not give her the right to make such a transfer. As an executor she could only have sold the property after being given authority by the Master of the High Court in accordance with section 120 of the Administration of Estates Act [Chapter 6:01].

It seems to me that the act of transferring the property from the deceased to the first defendant could only have been accomplished through fraud as mere appointment of a person as executor does not grant them the right to transfer estate property into their name. The property, being estate property, could only have been transferred into the name of an individual once the Master of the High Court had, in terms of section 68E of the Administration of Estates Act, considered and approved the proposed distribution plan. The evidence led showed that, to date, the estate has not been finalized with the Master of the High Court. No distribution plan has been lodged.

In my view, therefore, the failure by the first defendant to comply with the provisions of the Administration of Estates Act [Chapter 6:01] renders her actions in selling the property a nullity, and, as such, the sale must be set aside.

Having determined that her actions are a nullity it is unnecessary for this court determine whether or not the second defendant was an innocent bona fide purchaser. The transaction being illegal makes the sale a nullity. In the case of Katirawu v Katirawu & Anor HH58-07 MAKARAU JP…, stated as follows:

“In conclusion, the 'rights' that the second respondent believes to have purchased and acquired from the first respondent are tainted by the same illegality and amount to nought by token of the same reasoning. It is as if there was never a sale between her and the first respondent, and, consequently, no rights flow from a non-sale in her favour. The sale and the consequent cession of rights in her favour amount to nothing at law - for nothing can flow from a fraud.”

The Court is of the view that the principle of the effect of a nullity, based on the obiter dictum of LORD DENNING in Macfoy v United Africa Co. Ltd [1961] 3 ALL ER 1169, cannot be used to nullify acts which are permitted and given effect by a separate law from that which created the nullity.

In this case, the act of withdrawal of membership from the Church was an exercise of the right to freedom of choice whilst the nullity arose from a breach of the rule on the status of a diocese in a Province.

Nullification of an act by one rule, because it is in breach of its requirements, cannot be applied to nullify an act permitted and given effect by another rule. The principle that there should be harmony between rules of the same legal order prevents such an internal contradiction arising in the legal order.

The applicant, at paragraph 41 of its founding affidavit, avows that the notice and grounds of appeal filed by its erstwhile legal practitioners are fatally defective. The irony is that it now wants to reinstate the fatally defective notice and grounds of appeal….,.

It is trite and a matter of elementary law that a fatally defective application is a nullity. It is dead and non-existent; it cannot be resuscitated or resurrected as it is beyond redemption. In other words, there is no cure or remedy for a fatally defective application which is a nullity in the eyes of the law. In the words of LORD DENNING, in the famous case of Macfoy v United Africa Co. Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC)…,:

“If an act is void, then it is, in law, a nullity. It is not only bad but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of the court to be set aside. It is automatically null and void without more ado although it is sometimes convenient to have a court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.”

What this means is that since this application is founded on an application which is fatally defective, it undoubtedly follows that an application founded on it is also incurably bad and a nullity at law. A valid application cannot be founded on a void application which is a nullity at law. If the fatally defective original application be the mother of the current application, it follows that its offspring is equally defective and a nullity at law.

A nullity cannot be reinstated, it is dead at law and hence it cannot be resuscitated by means of an application for re-instatement of an appeal. This point was clearly made in Bindura Municipality v Mugogo SC32-15 where GUVAVA JA stated that:

“It however seems to me that the applicant has filed a wrong application. Where a matter has been struck off the roll because it has failed to comply with the rules of court, one cannot simply apply for reinstatement of the appeal as such an appeal is a nullity. This position has been stated in a number of decisions of this Court.”

The second letter of 27 November 2009 was purportedly the cancellation letter. It relied on the first letter. But since there was no evidence that the first letter had been delivered in accordance with the Agreement of Sale, or at all, and since the letter was, in any event, not the notice of breach required by the agreement, the second letter, or rather its purpose, was invalid. It stood on nothing.

You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse. Per LORD DENNING MR in Macfoy v United Africa Co. Ltd [1961] 3 ALL ER 1169.

As such, there is no need for me to decide whether the second letter was properly delivered in accordance with the Agreement of Sale.

It was submitted that General Notice 380 of 2013 seeks to rely upon General Notice 313 of 2012 for its validity, and that, for this reason, both General Notices are null and void ab initio.

The court was referred to the celebrated case of Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 (SC)…, where the court said that:

“In Hattingh v Pienaar 1977 (2) SA 182 (O) 182 at 183, KLOPPER JP held that a fatally defective compliance with the rules regarding the filing of appeals cannot be condoned or amended. What should actually be applied for is an extension of time within which to comply with the relevant rule. With this view I most respectfully agree; for if the notice of appeal is incurably bad, then, to borrow the words of LORD DENNING in McFoy v United Africa Co Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC) at 1172 I 'every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.'"

If the court makes a finding that General Notice 313/2012 was null and void for contravening section 113 as read with section 136 of the Environmental Management Act [Chapter 20:27] (EMA) then it should follow that General Notice 380/2013 be null and void, being founded on General Notice 313/2012.

General Notice 380 of 2013 would collapse because it is based on something incurably bad.

A court cannot give effect to a patent nullity.

This is a chamber application for leave to appeal, condonation for late filing of the application for leave to appeal, and exemption from security for the respondents costs.

The applicant was formerly employed by the third respondent. Sometime in 2004 he obtained judgment in the Labour Court, awarding him damages for unlawful termination of employment. The quantum of damages that he was granted came to ZW$26,076,252= after quantification by the Labour Court.

However, before the third respondent could make any payment, it was placed under judicial management.

The first respondent, who works for the second respondent, was appointed the Judicial Manager.

The applicant then filed, with the Master of the High Court, a claim for his debt to be placed on the list of the third respondent's other creditors. The claim was provisionally accepted, but, later revoked at the instance of the first respondent. This was because, while the applicant's debt was denominated in Zimbabwe dollars, he had lodged his claim in United States dollars amounting to USD3,057,199= without an order of court converting his Zimbabwe dollars claim to United States dollars.

It seems that he had done the conversion of the amount himself.

The applicant then approached the High Court seeking to be reinstated on the list of creditors. The specific order that he sought read as follows:

“It is ordered that:

1. The applicant's claim be and is hereby reinstated to the creditors of the third respondent.

2. Within 48 hours of the issuance of this order, the fourth respondent avails to the applicant the payment schedule for the third respondent's judicial management creditors.

3. On a jointly and severally basis (sic) and within 21 days of the issuance of this order, the first, second and third respondents pay the applicant:

(a) The full amount of his claim in accordance with the schedule of payment of creditors of the same class.

(b) Interest at the prescribed rate on all overdue payments.

(c) The first, second and third respondents pay costs of suit.”

A point in limine was raised by the first respondent, on behalf of the second respondent, to the effect, that, there was no legal basis for the applicant to sue the latter, as this was done solely for the reason that the first respondent worked for the second respondent.

The High Court upheld the point in limine and also dismissed the whole application on the merits for the following reasons:

(a) At the time the applicant filed the application before the High Court, the third respondent was no longer under judicial management. The relief he sought could no longer bind the first respondent because he had ceased being the third respondent's Judicial Manager when it was removed from judicial management; and

(b) The claim lodged by the applicant before the Master of the High Court was an amount which had not been properly converted at law. The court could not direct the Master to reinstate the claim.

Aggrieved by the High Court's decision, the applicant approached the Supreme Court, on appeal, seeking the following relief:

“It is prayed that:

1. The High Court judgment be set aside.

2. Leave be granted for registration with the High Court in Harare, for purposes of enforcement, my claim of USD3,057,199 against the third respondent which was proved and admitted in the creditors meeting held on 13 February 2013 pursuant to the company's judicial management and has never been set aside or varied.

3. Interest at the prescribed rate be paid on the claim amount from 3 November 2015, the day following the date of cancellation of the final judicial management order, to the date of final settlement.

4. The respondents pay the whole litigation costs for this matter.”

In the heads of argument filed in the court a quo, the respondents raised three points in limine in regard to the relief sought:

(i) Firstly, they contended, that, the applicant failed to pray for the success of the appeal, hence the relief sought was incompetent.

(ii) Secondly, they argued, that, the relief which the applicant was seeking on appeal before the Supreme Court was different from that which he sought in the High Court.

(iii) Thirdly, the respondents argued, that, the relief sought was fatally defective, in that the applicant sought an order for costs against all the respondents but did not seek any substantive relief against the first and second respondents.

In response to the points in limine, the applicant, in his heads of argument, argued, that, there is no provision in the Rules of the Supreme Court 1964 which requires a party to expressly state whether or not the appeal should succeed, as the Judges can themselves simply state that the appeal succeeds or not. He explained that the intention that the appeal succeeds is apparent from the very act of appealing.

With regard to the allegation that he was seeking what he did not seek in the High Court, the applicant's position was that only the method of enforcement had changed but he still sought the same relief.

On the point that he was not seeking any substantive relief against the first two respondents except for costs, the applicant argued that it is clear from his papers that the first two respondents were liable to him under delict for the third respondent's failure to pay his debt.

The Supreme Court found, that, there was merit in the respondents points in limine, in particular that the applicant's Notice of Appeal did not satisfy the provisions of Rule 29 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1964.

The appeal was dismissed and not struck off the roll.

In explaining its decision, in Edward Madyavanhu v Reggie Francis Saruchera and Two Ors SC75-17, the court stated…, as follows:

“However, in this case, the court found that the appeal was not only incurably defective but wrong and bad in law. The appeal could therefore not properly be struck off the roll because the appellant had no avenue, legally or procedurally, to follow in case he was inclined to bring the same appeal before this Court.

It is emphasised in this respect, that, the appellant could not have secured the relief that he sought in the court below from the first respondent, for the simple reason that he had ceased to be the Judicial Manager of the third respondent, which, in turn, had ceased to be a company under judicial management. There was, therefore, no longer a list on which the appellant's claim could be included.

In addition to this, the second respondent was improperly sued from the beginning because it was not an interested party in the dispute, it being the first respondent's employer.”

Once the court a quo found that the performance based bonus scheme was illegal, it should not have upheld an order awarding back pay based on an illegal scheme….,.

A court cannot lend itself to an illegality. See Dube v Khumalo 1986 (2) ZLR 103; Foroma v Min of Public Construction & Anor 1997 (1) ZLR 447 (H).

The court a quo failed to appreciate the point that an arbitral award cannot be founded on an illegality. An illegal act is void and cannot be enforced. As LORD DENNING stated in MacFoy v United Africa Co Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC)…,.:

“If an act is void, then it is, in law, a nullity. It is not only bad, but incurably bad. There is no need for an order of the court to set it aside. It is automatically null and void without more ado, though it is sometimes convenient to have the court declare it to be so. And every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will collapse.”

Appeal Against Dismissal

As regards the second matter, the court below found as follows:

“Applicant was initially represented by a (Trade) Union, which withdrew at the last minute, having realized that it had not submitted the grounds of appeal in time. Despite advice by the Union, that the case must not go on because no grounds of appeal had been filed when the appeal was noted, Appellant decided to go on on his own. He, therefore, approached the court without any proper grounds of appeal.

Mr Maguchu argued that the appeal could not be entertained by the court because the grounds of appeal were filed six months after the notice of appeal was made. This was contrary to the law and therefore the appeal was a nullity. The appellant was supposed to withdraw those grounds of appeal and then proceed to make an application for condonation.

I agree…,.

The rules were not followed in this case, so the appeal, on its own, is a nullity. It ought to be dismissed.”

The above finding that the appeal before the court a quo was a nullity has not been challenged in this appeal. As long as the finding remains extant, the appellant cannot challenge the merits of an appeal which was held to be a nullity. By not appealing against that finding, he has accepted the appeal to be a nullity. See First Banking Corporation Ltd v Marimo SC57-05 and Dlodlo and Ors v Road Motor Services (Pvt) Ltd SC59-06.

Since it is improper for this Court to determine the merits of what is admittedly a nullity, the grounds of appeal pertaining to the appellant's dismissal are irregular and ought to be dismissed.

Disposition

The purported appeal by the appellant against his dismissal from employment ought to be dismissed. Costs on the ordinary scale would naturally follow upon such an outcome….,.

Accordingly, it is ordered as follows:

1. The appeal succeeds in part.

2. The appeal against his dismissal from employment is dismissed with the appellant bearing the costs thereof on the ordinary scale.

On 8 August 2017, the parties were invited by the Honourable Chief Justice to attend in his chambers concerning the Notice of Appeal. Following a discussion, it was conceded by the applicant that the notice of appeal was defective in two respects. Firstly, the preamble to the notice of appeal did not state whether the appeal was directed against the whole or part of the judgment, and, secondly, the relief sought did not comply with the Rules.

As a result of the defects, the applicant withdrew the appeal.

During the course of submissions by counsel, it became apparent that the review proceedings in Case No. HC5385/17 were not actually pending at the time that the urgent chamber application was heard and determined by the court a quo. It was common cause that the decision of the trial officer was made on 29 March 2017. However, the application for review of that decision was only filed on 15 June 2017, well beyond the eight weeks prescribed by the High Court Rules….,.

In our view, there was no review properly pending before the High Court at the time that the urgent chamber application was heard and determined by the court a quo. Therefore, the entire proceedings before the court a quo were premised on an erroneous factual background. Consequently, and by the same token, the present appeal was also predicated on the same erroneous set of facts.

In the result, we are of the unanimous view that the appeal, having been lodged on an improper footing, should be dismissed rather than being struck off the roll.

As matters stand, the High Court, in my view, went outside the purview of its jurisdictional mandate and determined a bail application that was never before the court a quo, dealing with a supposed appeal that lacked jurisdictional foundation. This renders the basic foundation upon which the appeal was noted shaky. It also affects the matter before me.

If there was nothing before the court a quo, it follows that there is no appeal to be dealt on the merits before me….,.

That being so, it then becomes evident that the appellant's appeal suffered an incurable defect and should not have been entertained by the court a quo. The appeal was a nullity and it is a trite position of our law that nothing can stand on a nullity. See McFoy v United Africa Co. Ltd 1961 93 ALL ER 1169 (CPC).

The appellant approached the court expressing disagreement with the Chinhoyi Magistrate Court judgement wherein the court ordered the appellants to be evicted from House Number 14317 Brundish, Chinhoyi.

It is apparent from the record of proceedings that the appellants and the respondent, at different times and for different purchase prices, purchased the house in question from the seller, one Solomon Mukwidza. The scenario envisaged by evidence is that of double sale.

The appellant raised eight (8) grounds of appeal.

(a) The learned magistrate erred in holding that the appellants were aware of the dispute between Phiona Moyo and Solomon Mukwidza before cession was effected.

(b) The learned magistrate erred in holding that the appellants deliberately ignored the court case that was pending before the Chinhoyi Magistrates Court between the respondent and the seller of the House 14317 Brundish, Chinhoyi.

(c) The learned magistrate erred in holding that the appellants were aware that House 14317 Brundish, Chinhoyi had been sold to a third party before taking occupation and making improvements.

(d) The learned magistrate erred in holding that the appellants had not extended that house in question from four to seven rooms.

(e) The learned magistrate erred in accepting the evidence of the Chamber Secretary of the Municipality of Chinhoyi despite its glaring inconsistencies.

(f) The learned magistrate erred in holding that cession of right, title and interest in the appellants names was improperly done, hence was null and void.

(g) The learned magistrate erred in holding that they were no appeal circumstances justifying the appellants in defeating the eviction proceeding.

At the hearing, the applicants counsel raised a legal issue that the judgement was a nullity, and, on that basis, the trial court's judgement ought to be set aside. It is settled, a legal issue may be raised at any stage in an appeal.

The record of proceedings…, shows that the matter was heard before magistrate Gayikayi who recorded and heard viva voce evidence from witnesses for the plaintiff and defendant respectively. The magistrate left service and joined private practise before attending to writing and delivery of judgement. The parties subsequently agreed that another magistrate peruse the record and come up with judgement. Indeed, a magistrate attended to judgement and delivered a judgment which forms the subject of this appeal.

The legal issue raised is that the judgement by a magistrate who did not preside over the proceedings is a nullity, and, as such, it cannot stand.

Counsel for the respondent whereas conceding that ordinarily only the presiding magistrate ought to have assessed, analysed, and come up with judgment presented argument that in circumstances of this case the judgement was valid. He based his argument on the fact that the appellant is the one who initiated the request for a different magistrate to write and come up with a judgement. The parties agreed and acceded to having the judgment delivered, and, as such, it was not a nullity.

The question that begs of answer is whether or not by the agreement of parties would clothe a nullity to be legally binding

For a concise and precise answer to this question to come out one has to look at the rationale or basis of the settled position that the presiding magistrate ought to come up with judgement.

It is not in dispute that the trial magistrate, in coming up with a judgment, has to assess not only the evidence adduced but demeanour. It is a holistic assessment and analysis of evidence which leads the magistrate to choose which story carries the day. Credibility of witnesses is best tested by the person who observes and hears witnesses testify. A new magistrate, on simply reading the record, may not appreciate the unwritten aspects such as demeanour and thus might come up with a judgement prejudicial to either of the parties.

Once appreciative of the rationale behind the desire for the presiding magistrate to write judgment it becomes abundantly clear that an agreement by the parties does not have the effect of clothing a nullity to become valid. The fact that parties agree to an illegality does not change the complexion of an illegality to be legal.

I subscribe fully to the sentiments echoed by BARTLETT J in S v Likwenga and Ors 1999 (1) ZLR 498 wherein he quoted with approval GILLESPIE J's reasoning in S v Tsangaiza 1997 (2) ZLR 47. Both judges where of the opinion that where a magistrate retires or is incapacitated or recuses him/herself or becomes functus officio the proceedings are a nullity. The proceedings are deemed abortive and have to be started afresh before a different magistrate.

In situations where a magistrate will have transferred or resigned before completing a partly heard matter the correct and expedient approach is to utilise administrative remedies of recalling the magistrate to come in and complete the partly heard matters. Also, in the case of a resigned or retired magistrate, like in casu, again, administrative remedies of recalling and having the individual take the oath of office to finalise the partly head matter would cure the anomaly of delay of proceedings starting de novo.

Handing over record of proceedings for assessment of evidence and judgment before a new magistrate, albeit by consent of the parties, does not paint the proceedings a legality. There are obvious prejudices which are occasioned by not having a complete assessment of the matter.

It is my considered view that the fact that civil proceedings are party-driven does not make them any different from criminal proceedings. The Civil Court, just like the Criminal Court, is duty bound to appreciate full facts, evidence, and then assess. The court is the umpire and has to come up with the judgement and this duty is not on the parties to the proceedings.

It is clear, therefore, that a wrong procedure was adopted to come up with a judgement, and, as such, the judgment by a magistrate who did not preside over the hearing is invalid and thus a nullity. Having pointed out that there is no judgment before this court it is therefore not necessary to look into the grounds of appeal for there is, strictly speaking, nothing before the court since the court a quo judgment is a nullity.

In the premises the judgement of the court a quo must be set aside.

Accordingly it is ordered that;

1. The judgement of the court a quo be and is hereby set aside.

2. The matter is referred to the trial court for the original presiding magistrate to finalise the matter, or, in the event that the magistrate is not available, for trial de novo before another magistrate who has not dealt with the matter.

3. Each party is to bear its costs.

The supporting affidavits, as the word “supporting” meaning, entails buttressing a founding affidavit properly before the court. Once the founding affidavit cannot stand so do the supporting affidavits.