Civil
Appeal
CHITAKUNYE
J:
The
appellant at some time in the past had been a tenant at the
respondent's house in Glen View, Harare. The appellant moved house
but he still had some monetary issues to resolve with the respondent.
Sometime in August 2011 the appellant visited the respondent's
residence and a physical altercation arose. The physical altercation
involved the appellant on the one side and the respondent and her two
sons on the other side.
As
a consequence of the physical altercation, the respondent made a
police report leading to the appellant paying an admission of guilt
fine.
In
December 2012 the respondent issued summons in the magistrates court
claiming a total sum of USD10,000-00 from the appellant in respect of
damages for pain and suffering, disability, embarrassment endured,
medical expenses incurred and future medical expenses. She alleged
that the appellant assaulted her with clenched fists and booted feet
on 7 August 2011 resulting in her suffering a ruptured eardrum.
The
appellant denied the claim for damages contending that it was a fight
whereby both parties suffered some injuries.
At
the end of a contested trial the trial magistrate awarded respondent
damages of USD3,500-00 being USD1,000-00 for past and future medical
expenses and USD2,500-00 for pain and suffering.
The
appellant appealed against that award.
The
appellant challenged the manner in which the trial magistrate arrived
at the award and her failure to take into account that this was a
fight and he also suffered injuries. She also erred in accepting as
proved the nature and extent of injuries suffered by respondent when
there was no sufficient evidence.
After
a careful perusal of the record of proceedings this court was of the
view that the learned trial magistrate erred in accepting the medical
affidavit when the document appears not to have been properly
commissioned.
The
facts show that after the altercation the respondent reported to the
police and later went to hospital for treatment. The respondent was
only examined by a doctor on 17 August 2011. The medical affidavit
that was supposed to provide the evidence and on which the trial
magistrate relied upon for the nature and extent of injuries
sustained was signed by the doctor on 28 August 2011 and was only
commissioned by a commissioner of oaths on the on 10 June 2012.
An
affidavit is a written statement made on oath before a commissioner
of oaths or other person authorised to administer oaths. The deponent
to the statement must take the oath in the presence of the
commissioner of oaths and must append his or her signature to the
document in the presence of such commissioner. Equally the
commissioner must administer the oath in accordance with the law and
thereafter must append his or her signature onto the statement in the
presence of the deponent. The commissioner must also endorse the date
on which the oath was so administered. These acts must occur
contemporaneously.
In
S
v Hurle & Others (2)
1998 (2) ZLR 42 Gillespie J had this to say on what is expected in
commissioning a document:
“A
justice of the peace, or a commissioner of oaths, called upon to
attest a document, has a duty, exemplified by the solemnity of the
oath he is permitted to administer. He is obliged, without fail, to
have the deponent appear before him. He has no excuse for not
administering the oath, for not calling upon the deponent to swear
that the deposition is, to the best of his knowledge true in every
respect. A deponent's signature has to be affixed in the presence
of the commissioner. The commissioner's own signature is an
assurance that all these procedures have been complied with.”
In
casu,
the deponent signed the deposition on a different date and the
commissioner commissioned it several months after that. There is no
assurance that the deponent signed in the presence of the
commissioner or even that he ever took the requisite oath.
Clearly
the affidavit was not properly commissioned and so should not have
been accepted as an affidavit.
If
at all reliance was to be placed on medical evidence the examining
doctor ought to have testified on his findings.
There
is therefore no credible medical evidence.
Another
aspect to note is on the assessment of damages for past and future
medical expenses. The trial magistrate awarded a sum of $1,000-00 for
what she termed past and future medical expenses without specifying
how much she found proved in respect of each category of expenses.
The trial magistrate ought to have separated the two claims and
assessed each claim separately.
Past
medical expenses are usually proved by the production of receipts for
the expenses being claimed.
The
record of proceedings shows that the only proof of past medical
expenses tendered were two medical receipts both dated 20 February
2013. There was no medical evidence linking the medical treatment of
that date to the assault of 7 August 2011.
It
was imperative to produce or call medical evidence on the nature and
extent of the injuries suffered and observed by a medical
practitioner when respondent visited hospital soon after the assault
and when she was examined. Such evidence would then need to be
expertly linked to the treatment respondent received on 20 February
2013.
Without
such a linkage it was highly risky for the trial magistrate to accept
that the treatment for that date was a result of the assault of about
2 years prior to that date.
It
may also be noted that the receipts referred to are for a total sum
of $33-00.
Had
the respondent proved the linkage that is what she would have been
entitled to for past medical expenses.
On
future medical expenses there was not much evidence other than the
respondent's mere say so.
This
is again an issue that required medical opinion from a medical
practitioner.
There
was no adequate evidence on future medical needs for the trial
magistrate to have properly assessed the quantum of damages to award
in this regard.
I
thus find that the trial magistrate misdirected herself in arriving
at $1,000-00 for past and future medical expenses.
Regarding
the claim for pain and suffering the trial magistrate awarded a sum
of $2,500-00. The trial magistrate indicated that in arriving at that
sum court considered the duration and intensity of the pain from the
plaintiff's testimony. The respondent's assertion that she now
suffers from headache in the morning and when it is cold was also key
to the assessment of the level of damages.
It
is unfortunate that like in the previous assessment the trial
magistrate fell into the trap of relying on the respondent's mere
say so without medical evidence in support thereof.
This
category of claim requires clear evidence of the nature and extent of
the injuries suffered and the resultant pain. It is also a category
where court is expected to consider the level of awards in previous
cases of a comparable nature.
This
was not done in this case. The trial magistrate seemed to have used
gut feeling in arriving at the quantum of the award.
The
award of $2,500-00 made for pain and suffering was not justified from
respondent's evidence.
Whilst
the respondent may have suffered some injury and discomfort she
lamentably failed to justify the amount awarded. This court is of the
view that not enough evidence was tendered from which the trial
magistrate could have made an appropriate assessment.
This
is a case where the court a
quo
should have granted an absolution from the instance.
Accordingly,
the appeal is hereby allowed and the judgement by the court a
quo
is hereby set aside and is substituted by the following:
An
order for absolution from the instance is hereby granted.
Each
party shall bear their own costs of this appeal.
MAKONI
J: Agrees …………
Nyikadzino,
Simango and Associates,
appellant's legal practitioners