Pleadings re: Abandoned Pleadings

HH81-09 : SAFARI OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE TOURISM AUTHORITY and MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM and COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF POLICE
Ruled By: PATEL J

The applicant herein is an association that comprises licensed tour and safari operators and represents their interests. The first respondent is the Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (the Authority) which is established under the Tourism Act [Chapter 14:20] and is primarily responsible for administering that Act.Towards the end of 2007, the Zimbabwe ...

HH84-12 : CHRISTOPHER BARNSLEY vs HARAMBE HOLDINGS (PVT) LTD AND ANOTHER
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

The applicant was employed as Group Engineering Director by the first respondent, which represented itself as a holding company comprising several subsidies with the second respondent as its Chief Executive Officer.The letter of his appointment containing the terms of employment, dated 7 May 2009, was signed by the second respondent ...

The letter of his appointment containing the terms of employment, dated 7 May 2009, was signed by the second respondent in his capacity as the Chief Executive Officer. It reads as follows:

“REF: APPOINTMENT TO THE POSITION OF GROUP ENGINEERING DIRECTOR EFFECTIVE 1 JUNE 2009

Following the initial discussion with me, and the subsequent interview conducted at our Head Office, I wish to confirm your appointment to the above position whose duties include the following:

(i) Management of all Group Engineering Projects and Installations.

(ii) Production process improvements to include automation and plant simplifications.

(iii) Advise and liaison with divisions on safety matters.

(iv) Advise and liaison with divisions on procurement issues.

(v) Developing preventive maintenance programmes for all divisions.

(vi) Building inspections for structured works.

(vii) Introduction to best practices in all manufacturing processes.

As a Director, you will be expected to undertake full executive functions for the Group from time to time at fora and engagements inside and outside the Group.

Your initial package will be as follows:

Basic salary: US$3,000 per month
Education Allowance: US$ 500 per month
Cellphone Allowance: US$ 250 per month

Total ___________

Salaries are reviewed upward periodically in line with Group performance. After your 3 months probation you will be offered participation in the share options; have no doubt that you will be able to make immense contributions given your attitude to work and vast experience and that you will work well with our executive dynamic team that has created a very robust and fast growing organisation.

Yours faithfully

D. Govere
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER”

The appointment letter, which was copied to the Chief Operations Officer and Chief Finance Officer clearly refers to a “Group” of entities and “divisions” of what was presumably a family of businesses falling under the umbrella of Harambe Holdings.

In addition, an organogram was generated and made available to the applicant showing the structural layout of the group of subsidiaries making up the first respondent holding company.

The applicant remained in employment for 11 months, and, when he did not receive his salary and allowances in accordance with the employment contract, he referred the dispute to arbitration.

An arbitral award was issued in his favour in the sum of US$61,879.

He has been unable to execute against the first respondent's property to recover the judgment debt because each time an attachment of property is made, such property is claimed by a third party.

This has prompted the applicant to make this application seeking an order to compel the respondents to disclose the addresses and places of business of the subsidiaries of the first respondent.

In the event of failure to disclose, he wants the second respondent to be held personally liable for what is owed to him.

The basis of the application is that the respondents represented to him that the first respondent was a holding company or a conglomeration comprising, inter alia, of, The Vinyl Tile Company; Freshbak; Downings; Superbake; Ecoplastics (Pvt) Ltd; Horeca; Household Converters; Intertec (Pvt) Ltd; and Tacoola Beverages (Pvt) Ltd.

By such fraudulent misrepresentation, he was persuaded to take up employment as the Group Engineering Director of these entities - only for the employer to fail to pay him.

In support of that claim, the applicant has submitted, in addition to the organogram I have alluded to, a letter-head and trading brochures of the various entities representing each entity as “a division of Harambe Holdings.” This, according to the applicant, shows that both the first respondent and these other entities have been announcing to the whole world, and, indeed, the applicant, that they are one family.

He would therefore want the veil of incorporation to be lifted to expose them for what they are....,.

The respondents..., half-heartedly sought to challenge the jurisdiction of this court to entertain the application on the basis that it is a labour matter.

It is now settled that this court has jurisdiction over all matters where the cause of action and remedy are at common law while the Labour Court retains jurisdiction on those matters provided for in the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01]:see DHL International Ltd v Madzikanda 2010 ZLR 201…,; Moyo v Gwindingwi N.O. & Anor HB168-11…,.

Happily though, counsel for the respondents abandoned that line of argument in his submissions in court.

HH14-12 : JOEL MATONGO vs FLORA MATONGO (NEE JOE)
Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J

The plaintiff and the defendant were joined in holy matrimony on 13 June 1997, in terms of the Marriages Act [Chapter 5:11]. The marriage still subsists. They had, however, commenced living together as husband and wife, in terms of customary law, in August 1985. Their marriage was blessed with two children, one born on 31 March 1989 and the other born on 17 August 1994.

After several years of apparently happy marriage some unhappy differences arose culminating in the plaintiff issuing summons for divorce and other ancillary relief on 6 July 2010. The plaintiff alleged that the marriage has irretrievably broken down to such an extent that there are no reasonable prospects of restoration to a normal marriage relationship. He outlined the grounds for the breakdown as that:

(a) The defendant has been seeing other men;

(b) The parties are currently on separation; and

(c) Consequently, the parties have lost love and affection for each other.

In the circumstances, the plaintiff sought a decree of divorce.

During the subsistence of the marriage, the parties acquired an immovable property, namely, Stand No.7865 Budiriro 5B, Harare and various movable property. The plaintiff offered the defendant a 25% share in the immovable property with him retaining 75%.

On the movable property, he offered most of the property to the defendant.

He also asked to be given custody of the minor child born on 17 August 1994.

The defendant, in her plea, denied that she was seeing other men. She however did not deny that the marriage has irretrievably broken down as the parties have lost love and affection for each other. She made a counter claim for:

(a) A decree of divorce.

(b) 50% share in the immovable property.

(c) Custody of the minor child born on 17 August 1994.

(d) An order for maintenance in respect of herself in the sum of USD300 per month.

(e) Sharing of the movable property in terms of her counter-proposal in paragraph 6 of her counter claim.

At a pre-trial conference held on 9 March 2011 the parties agreed that:

1. The marriage has irretrievably broken down.

2. Custody of the minor child, born on 17 August 1994, be given to the defendant with the plaintiff enjoying reasonable rights of access.

3. The plaintiff pays maintenance in the sum of USD50 for the minor child.

4. The defendant shall get all the movable property except the following -

(i) Carpet;

(ii) Radio (with amplifier, turner, cassette player and 2 speakers);

(iii) 1 DSTV decoder;

(iv) DVD;

which shall be retained by the plaintiff as his sole and exclusive property.

The issues referred to trial pertained to –

1. The fair and equitable distribution of the immovable property, namely, Stand No.7865 Budiriro 5B, Harare;

2. The quantum of maintenance to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant for the defendant's upkeep; and

3. Who should pay the costs of suit?...,.

Another aspect worth mentioning at this stage is that whilst the issue of costs was referred to trial as contested, there was nothing from the testimony of the two parties to suggest that this was still an issue. Neither party asked for their costs to be paid by the other party. In fact, in their respective closing submissions, each party prayed that each party be ordered to bear their own costs.

Appealed
HH94-12 : ERIC MUSUNDIRE vs OK ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: BERE J

The claim for defamation was formerly abandoned by the plaintiff.

HH20-12 : JANE PHIRI vs PATSON NAWASHA
Ruled By: MUTEMA J

The dispute in casu is steeped in the sale of a deceased immovable property whose purchase price was paid by the applicant but transfer of which the respondent failed to effect. The draft order the applicant seeks is couched in these words: “IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 1. The respondent is hereby ordered to deliver and register a four roomed house; ...

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The respondent is hereby ordered to deliver and register a four roomed house; comprising two bedrooms, kitchen, dining room and a toilet in either Nyameni, Dombotombo, Rujeko or Rusike high density Suburbs of Marondera, to the plaintiff (sic) within thirty (30) working days of this order.

2. In the event of the respondent failing to perform in accordance with para 1 above, the applicant is hereby empowered to execute this order against respondent's property.

3. The respondent to pay costs of suit on a client legal practitioner scale.”

THE FACTS

The respondent is a co-director of Pricassons Investments (Pvt) Ltd, a company, as can be gleaned from its letterheads, whose core business is buying and selling of Stands and houses, developers and brokers, driving school, car hire, dealers in imported new and used cars, trucks and mini buses and construction of agreements of sale.

In December 2007, the respondent, acting on behalf of Joseph Tsamwayi, the appointed executor of the estate of the late Patrick Tsamwayi, entered into an agreement of sale with the applicant in terms of annexure A1-A5 wherein the applicant purchased Stand Number 8 Dziva, Dombotombo, Marondera for a purchase price of Z$18 billion. The salient terms of annexure A1-A5 are:-

(i) Clause 2(c), providing that all the moneys shall be deposited into Pricassons (Pvt) Ltd's Standard Chartered account number 0100254284900;

(ii) Clause 9, providing that in the event of the seller breaching any term or condition of this agreement and the seller fails to remedy the breach within 7 days of written notice to do so, then, without prejudice to his rights at law, the purchaser shall be entitled to either cancel the agreement and claim damages which shall be equal to the value of purchasing a similar comparable property at the time of such claim or seek an order of specific performance;

(iii) Clause 10, providing that the seller shall cede all rights in the property to the purchaser within three months of signing this agreement which time it is anticipated the seller would have been issued with the certificate of authority by the Master of the High Court; and

(iv) Clause 11, providing that the agent, Mr Patson Nawasha, of Pricassons (Private) Limited hereby undertakes and guarantees that the seller will perform as per the agreement, and, in the event of any material breach, he will be jointly responsible with the seller in paying damages to the purchaser.

The applicant paid the full purchase price for the house, which was brick under asbestos, composed of two bedrooms, kitchen, lounge and toilet.

The respondent failed to fulfil his part of the agreement and admitted that he had sold a deceased estate house which had a dispute – the minor children of the deceased having refused to approve of the sale.

On 4 July 2008 the parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (annexure 'B') clause two of which stipulated that the respondent would deliver to the applicant an alternative house within 14 days of signing of the memorandum. Despite this undertaking, the respondent still did not deliver the alternative house. On 26 July 2008 the respondent wrote to the applicant and her then husband, Gideon Muchada, reiterating that he wanted to honour his undertaking in annexure 'B' vide annexure 'C'. However, to date the respondent has not fulfilled his undertaking.

THE DEFENCE

In his opposing papers, as well as the heads of argument, the respondent basically raised three issues or defences.

The first is that there exists a material dispute of fact which cannot be resolved on the papers without hearing viva voce evidence. This is premised on the allegation by the respondent that the applicant averred that the respondent knew that the estate property had a dispute and despite that knowledge he fraudulently misrepresented to the applicant to enter into the contract of sale. Because the respondent disputes this averment this necessitates the hearing of viva voce evidence.

The second issue raised is one of supervening impossibility. This is premised on the fact that the purchase price was deposited into the respondent's trust account and it remained there until the Zimbabwe dollar currency became moribund through no fault of the respondent. This was out of his control hence constitutes a supervening impossibility to perform. He could not provide the alternative house he had guaranteed to do because the purchase price paid had been rendered valueless.

The third issue raised relates to non-joinder of the principal, viz Joseph Tsamwayi. For this averment, the respondent relies on clause 11 of the agreement of sale alluded to supra, viz that in the event of any material breach of the agreement by the seller the respondent will be jointly responsible with the seller in paying damages to the purchaser. The non-joinder of the seller, so the argument went, is fatal to the application.

Mr Mahuni is from the law firm Matsanura and Associates who are corresponding attorneys of Messrs Laita and Partners representing the respondent. The latter firm drafted the respondent's opposing papers including the heads of argument. At the hearing of argument Mr Mahuni conceded, correctly in my view, that the averments that there exist a material dispute of fact and also supervening impossibility have no legal leg to stand on. The concession's propriety is hinged on the fact that the alleged material dispute of fact is misplaced because the applicant's cause of action is founded not on the agreement of sale annexure 'A1-A5' but on annexures 'B' and 'C' and also that for more than a year the purchase price lay in the respondent's trust account without the respondent either purchasing an alternative house for the applicant or reversing the transfer of the deposited funds.

The sole issue that is left for my resolution is the one relating to the alleged non-joinder of the principal.

SC17-09 : ELIZABETH MUTIZHE vs LOVENESS GANDA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS and FANNIE MUTIZHE
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ

In Chambers in terms of Rule 31 of the Rules of the Supreme Court (“the Rules”).

This is an application for an extension of time in which to note an appeal against the whole judgment of the High Court given on 27 February 2008.

The applicant and the third respondent were married to each other until the High Court granted him a decree of divorce on 22 February 2005 in case no. HC8877/03. The High Court made an order with regard to the division of the assets of the spouses.

Of relevance to the determination of this application is the fact that the third respondent was awarded 80% of the market value of the matrimonial house situated at Stand No.2711 Mahogany Circle, New Marlborough, Harare (“the property”). The applicant was awarded 20% of the market value of the matrimonial house.

The order further directed that:

“5. If the parties cannot agree on the value of the matrimonial home within ten (10) days of the date of this order, the property is to be evaluated within 30 days thereafter by a registered firm of Estate Agency agreed upon by the parties legal practitioners or failing such agreement by an Estate Agent nominated by the Registrar of this Court.

6. The cost of evaluation are to be borne by both parties in equal shares.

7. The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant on or before the 1st of November 2005, 20% of the net value of the property.

8. Failing compliance with the provisions of clause 7 above, the matrimonial home shall be sold on the open market to the best advantage and the net proceeds therefrom to be shared between the parties as set out in the paragraph above.”

On 16 June 2004, the applicant had obtained, from the High Court, an interdict prohibiting the second respondent from registering transfer of the property without her prior written consent.

On 11 August 2005, the first respondent entered into an agreement of sale with the third respondent in terms of which he sold and she purchased the property for $750,000,000. She paid the purchase price to the third respondent's conveyancers.

At the time she entered into the agreement of sale, the first respondent was not aware of the court order awarding the applicant 20% of the value of the property.

When she subsequently got to know of the order, she raised the question of its possible effects on the sale of the property. The third respondent assured her that the order would not affect transfer of the property into her name provided the applicant was paid the 20% share of the value of the property.

Upon request by the third respondent, she authorized the release of $150,000,000, which was 20% of the purchase price, into his bank account for payment to the applicant.

The applicant confirmed, in the founding affidavit, that an amount of $149,000,000 was paid into her bank account.

After the payment of the purchase price by the first respondent, the applicant instituted an appeal against the order of the High Court.

A perusal of the record in case no. HC8877/03 shows that the appeal had been noted out of time.

It appears that there was an application for an extension of time in which to note the appeal which was granted.

The Notice of Appeal, however, remained fatally defective for non-compliance with Rule 29(1)(d) of the Supreme Court Rules. Under the heading 'Grounds of Appeal' it is stated as follows:

“1. With new evidence before the court, the court a quo's apportionment of shares in the matrimonial house called House No.2711 Mahogany Circle, New Marlborough, Harare is amendable.

2. Without all evidence, the court a quo failed to award Stand 6839 Borrowdale.”

By no stretch of imagination can it be said that what is stated constitutes grounds of appeal against the order given by the court a quo on 22 February 2005 in case no. HC8877/03?

In light of the appeal which the applicant had purported to institute, the third respondent sought to cancel the Agreement of Sale.

The first respondent rejected the cancellation and commenced action in case HC1545/06 claiming an order against the third respondent of specific performance of his obligation to transfer the property into her name. She also claimed an order of upliftment of the caveat of 16 June 2004 and eviction of the applicant and all those claiming the right of occupation of the property through her.

The third respondent did not appear at the trial to oppose the claim. A default judgment was entered against him. That had the effect of confirming the third respondent's right to transfer of the property.

The court a quo found that the first respondent had adduced sufficient evidence to establish her entitlement to an order of upliftment of the bar. It granted the order. The decision took into account the fact that the applicant had not adduced evidence in opposition of the granting of the order.

The applicant had defended the claim on the ground that the order of 22 February 2005 gave her a real right in the property.

The court held that her right was to have 20% of the proceeds of the sale of the house. It held that the right was enforceable against the third respondent and could not operate to defeat the transfer of the property to the first respondent in terms of the Agreement of Sale.

The judgment was given on 27 February 2008.

The Registrar had given notice to the parties, through the roll of the court relating to unopposed matters for that day, that the judgment was to be handed down.

Whilst the legal representative of the first respondent attended court to note the handing down of the judgment; neither the applicant nor her legal practitioner attended.

No appeal was instituted against the judgment within fifteen (15) days as is required by Rule 30(a) of the Supreme Court Rules.

The applicant averred, in the founding affidavit, that she had knowledge of the judgment for the first time on 22 August 2008 when a copy of it was served on her by the Deputy Sheriff.

On 26 August she filed a notice of appeal with the Registrar. The document contained all the formalities required by Rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules to be stated in a Notice of Appeal.

Strict compliance with the mandatory requirements of the provision of Rule 29 suggests that the applicant had read the relevant Rules before noting the appeal.

The Notice of Appeal was, however, fatally defective because it was filed six months after the date the judgment appealed against was given.

Rule 30(a) of the Supreme Court Rules had not been complied with.

No application for condonation of failure to institute the appeal within fifteen (15) days of the date the judgment was given and extension of time in which to appeal was made in terms of Rule 31 of the Supreme Court Rules.

The explanation given by the applicant for non-compliance with the Rules was that she was a self-actor. She said she did not know that she was required to make an application for condonation of non-compliance with Rule 30(a) of the Supreme Court Rules and extension of time in which to appeal.

She said she did not know that the Notice of Appeal was defective.

On 13 November 2008, the first respondent's legal practitioners wrote to the Registrar drawing her attention to the defective Notice of Appeal. The letter was copied to the applicant.

Notwithstanding the fact that the letter made it clear that the effect of the defective Notice was that there was no appeal against the judgment, the applicant did not act to regularize the situation.

On 25 November 2008, the Registrar wrote to the first respondent's legal practitioners accepting the contention that there was no appeal against the judgment of the High Court given on 27 February 2008. The letter was copied to the applicant.

She did not act immediately to secure compliance with the Rules of Court. It was sixteen (16) days later that the applicant made an application for extension of time in which to appeal.

The explanation for failure to act, after having been made aware of the defective Notice of Appeal and consequences thereof was again that the applicant was a self actor. She pleaded ignorance of the requirements of Rule 31 of the Supreme Court Rules.

The factors a court has to consider in the determination of an application for condonation and extension of time in which to appeal have been stated in numerous decisions of this Court and the High Court.

In Maheya v Independent African Church SC58-07, it is stated…, that:

“In considering application for condonation of non-compliance with its Rules, the court has a discretion, which it has to exercise judicially, in the sense that it has to consider all the facts and apply established principles bearing in mind that it has to do justice. Some of the relevant factors that may be considered and weighed one against the other are:

(i) The degree of non-compliance;

(ii) The explanation therefor;

(iii) The prospects of success on appeal;

(iv) The importance of the case;

(v) The respondent's interests in the finality of the judgment;

(vi) The convenience to the Court; and

(vii) Avoidance of unnecessary delays in the administration of justice.”

See De Kuszab Dabrowski Uxor v Steel N.O. 1966 RLR 60 (A)…,; Bishi v Secretary for Education 1989 (2) ZLR 240 (H)…,; Director of Civil Aviation v Hall 1990 (2) ZLR 354 (S).

The period of time marking the delay by the applicant in taking steps to note a valid appeal is nine months. The right to appeal is now dependent on the exercise of the court's discretion.

The application was made on 8 December 2008. The inordinate delay may be divided into three parts:

(i) The first part extended from 27 February to 26 August 2008.

(ii) The second extended from 27 August to 25 November.

(iii) The last part extended from 26 November to 7 December 2008.

The applicant gave different explanations for her inaction during each of the three periods of delay:

(i) In relation to the first period of delay, she said that she had no knowledge that the judgment had been given on 27 February.

(ii) In respect of her inaction in the second part of the period of delay, she said, as a self-actor, she was not aware of the requirements of Rule 30(a) of the Supreme Court Rules. She said she was also not aware of the provisions of Rule 31 of the Supreme Court Rules providing a remedy to a party who would have failed to exercise the right to appeal against a judgment of the High Court timeously.

(iii) She had no explanation for her inaction during the last part of the period of delay.

Is the explanation of the delay reasonable?...,.

In Director of Civil Aviation v Hall 1990 (2) ZLR 354 (S)…, GUBBAY CJ cited with approval from Bosman Transport Works Committee & Ors v Piet Bosman Transport (Pty) Ltd 1980 (4) SA 794 (A) where…, MULLER JA said:

“Where there has been a flagrant breach of the Rules of this Court in more than one respect, and where, in addition, there is no reasonable explanation for some periods of delay, and, indeed, in respect of other periods of delay, no explanation at all, the application should not be granted whatever the prospects of success may be.”

As I am unable, in this case, to go so far as to hold that the applicant was in flagrant breach of the Rules of this Court, I have considered the question whether there are good prospects of the appeal succeeding despite the finding that there is no reasonable explanation for the inordinate delay in making the application for extension of time in which to appeal.

The grounds of appeal were stated as being that:

“1. The court a quo erred at law and in fact in failing to uphold that the appellant's appeal in HC8877/03 had an effect of suspending the whole judgment of the High Court in the divorce proceedings.

2. The court a quo erred in fact and at law by holding that the appellant had no real rights over the disputed property known as Stand 2711 Marlborough Township of Stand 2575 Marlborough Township.

3. The court a quo misdirected itself by failing to regard the appellant's evidence that the interdict obtained by the appellant on 16 June 2004 had an effect of interdicting any transfer of the disputed property pending the determination of the appeal in case no. HC8877/03.

4. The court a quo erred in fact and at law by failing to uphold that the cancellation of the agreement of sale by the third respondent was valid and lawful.”

One looks at the founding affidavit for evidence of the facts stated as grounds of appeal.

Considering these facts together with the reasons for the judgment appealed against and applying the relevant law, one can decide whether there are good prospects of success on appeal.

All that is stated in the founding affidavit on the grounds of appeal is this: the applicant said:

“20. I strongly believe that there are prospects of success on appeal. I say so because -

1. As appears from the Notice of Appeal, I insist that there was a valid and lawful cancellation of the Agreement of Sale.

2. I was also not satisfied by the court's ruling that the issue between me and the first respondent was whether or not I had a real right to the property.

3. For instance, if the Appeal Court in case no. HC8877/03 were to up my share from the 20% given by the court a quo to a higher percentage, this would affect the issues of enforceability of the judgment. This aspect is normally addressed by way of giving one party a time frame within which to pay out the other party of its share failing which that property can be sold and the proceeds are shared.

4. Assuming the transfers were to be done to the so-called innocent buyer, and then the Appeal Court were to up my share, such court order would be difficult to enforce. The house, in a case of this nature, is a surety that one gets their share.”

Nothing is said in the founding affidavit about the first ground of appeal.

HH32-08 : LOVENESS SENGEREDO vs ERIC CABLE N.O.
Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

On 12 September 2006, the applicant obtained an order from this court compelling Africa International Removals to pay her the sum of $4,441,841=67 together with interest thereon; to deliver to her vehicle and a mobile phone together with a line for use in that phone.

A warrant of execution was taken out against the defendant and some vehicles belonging to the defendant were attached in execution.

A few days after the attachment, the defendant paid the amount levied on the warrant in full.

The motor vehicle, and the mobile phone handset, were not delivered, prompting the applicant to approach this court for an order committing the respondent to prison for contempt.

The application was opposed.

In his opposing affidavit, the respondent averred, that, it was not necessary to deliver the motor vehicle and the mobile phone to the applicant as she had always had possession of these. It was specifically averred, in the opposing affidavit, that, the applicant has always had possession of these assets and did not surrender them when she left employment.

The respondent further averred, that, after receiving a letter from the applicant's legal practitioners demanding delivery of the vehicle and the mobile phone, the respondent caused the legal practitioners for Africa International Removals to surrender to the applicant the registration book of the motor vehicle as the applicant already had the motor vehicle.

On the basis of its belief that the applicant already had in her possession the mobile phone and the line that she used during the course of her employment with the removals, the respondent averred that the approach to court, by the applicant, in the proceedings before me, was an abuse of process.

In answer to the opposing affidavit, the applicant admitted, that, the respondent has complied with some of the terms of the order but has not delivered to her the handset and has not paid the sales commission that was due to the applicant together with accrued interest.

On that basis, the applicant persisted with the proceedings for contempt and prayed that the respondent be sentenced accordingly.

The answering affidavit, by the applicant, is rather terse and does not assist the court much in resolving the dispute between the parties….,.

At the hearing of the matter, the applicant's legal practitioner submitted, from the Bar, that all that the respondent has not caused to be delivered to the applicant is the handset that she has always had when she was employed by International Removals.

It is on account of the non-delivery of this handset that the applicant seeks the imprisonment of the respondent.

It was accepted that the other aspects of the court order had been complied with although details of such compliance were not given.

It may be impertinent of me to note, at this stage, that, the issue of the line for use in the handset was not persisted with.

HH13-12 : YVONNE CHISESE vs ALLUVIAL EXPLORATION SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

The respondent raised a preliminary issue on the basis of which it contended that this application is fatally defective. It contended that the applicant filed a similar application in the Magistrates Court which application was opposed by the respondent….,. This preliminary issue was not persisted with in the respondent's heads of argument. I take it that the ...

HH71-10 : FELISTAS MUTSETA vs ELLIOT ENOCK MUTSETA
Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

The joint pre-trial conference minute, in terms of which this matter was referred to trial, records that the defendant abandoned his claim for maintenance.

HH20-08 : DANIEL SHUMBA vs CONSTITUENCY REGISTRAR, MR MUSHANGWE and CHAIRMAN OF ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Ruled By: UCHENA J

The appellant was an aspiring Presidential candidate in the 29 March 2008 harmonized elections. On the 15th of February 2008, he presented his nomination papers to the first respondent who refused to accept them.

He alleges that he arrived at the Nomination Court at around quarter to four while another aspiring candidate, Advocate Justin Chihota, was being attended to. He approached the first respondent who told him to await his turn as he the first respondent was attending to another candidate.

He alleges that in spite of his having been asked to await his turn he was eventually told that he could not be attended to as the Nomination Court had closed at 16:00 hours.

It was contented, on his behalf, that the first respondent's conduct was contrary to the provisions of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] herein after called the Electoral Act.

The first respondent is the Constituency Registrar, who presided over the Nomination Court for Presidential candidates. The second respondent is the Chairman of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, which oversees the conducting of elections in Zimbabwe.

Before the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the respondents raised a point in limine.

He submitted that the appeal was out of time as it was lodged after the four days prescribed by section 46(19)(c) of the Electoral Act.

Section 46(19)(c) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13] provides as follows:-

“If no appeal in terms of paragraph (b) is lodged within four days after the receipt of notice of the decision of the Nomination Officer, the right of appeal of the candidate shall lapse and the decision of the Nomination Officer shall be final.”

Counsel for the respondents referred to this court's decision in the case of Edson Nyamapfeni v The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and 3 Others E/P 7/08, in which I held that the time within which an appeal should be noted is reckoned from the second day after the day on which the candidate's nomination is rejected, and that the period includes Saturdays and Sundays.

In Heads of Argument prepared by Mr Samkange, but argued in chambers by Mr Chinyama, it was contented that the filing of the urgent application which was dismissed by GUVAVA J interrupted the running of prescription and the four days prescribed by section 46(19)(c) of the Electoral Act only started running on the 21st February 2008, the day GUVAVA J dismissed that application.

The Heads of Argument do not indicate which section of the Prescription Act [Chapter 8:11], hereinafter called the Prescription Act, the appellant is relying on.

A reading of the Prescription Act leaves no doubt that only Part IV would apply to prescription through the lapsing of time periods prescribed in statutes. Sections 13(1)(a) and (b) and 14 refers.

The appellant's counsel's argument is not consistent with the provisions of section 19(2) and (3) of the Prescription Act which provides for judicial interruption of prescription as follows:-

“(2) The running of prescription, shall, subject to subsection (3), be interrupted by the service on the debtor of any process whereby the creditor claims payment of the debt.

(3) Unless the debtor acknowledges liability, the interruption of prescription, in terms of subsection (2), shall lapse and the running of prescription shall not be deemed to have been interrupted, if the creditor:-

(a) Does not successfully prosecute his claim under the process in question to final judgment; or

(b) Successfully prosecutes his claim under the process in question to final judgment, but abandons the judgment or the judgment is set aside.”

It is clear, from subsection (2), that the service of process interrupts prescription. That is, however, subject to subsection (3) which makes the confirmation of such interruption subject to:-

(1) The debtor acknowledging liability in which case the proceedings need not result in a final judgement in the creditors favour; or

(2) The creditor successfully prosecuting his claim to final judgment - which means the creditor should win the case.

If the above does not happen, as was the case in the application which was dismissed by GUVAVA J, prescription is not interrupted.

In this case, the respondents, who are the debtors, did not, in the application proceedings, acknowledge that the appellant, then applicant's nomination papers had been incorrectly refused. On the contrary, the respondents successfully raised points in limine which led to the dismissal of the appellant's application.

Success was therefore not on the appellant's side; yet, that is what could have interrupted the running of prescription against him.

Therefore, since the appellant did not succeed to final judgement in his favour in the application proceedings, and the respondents did not concede that he should have been nominated, the interruption of prescription by service of the application lapsed, and the running of prescription is not deemed to have been interrupted.

The appellant's claim, that the running of prescription against the four day period was interrupted, could only have succeeded if he had succeeded in the application proceedings to final judgment.

I therefore find that the period during which the appeal should have been lodged lapsed on the 19th February 2008 two days before this appeal was lodged.

Mr Chinyama also argued that in view of the provisions of section 165(4) of the Electoral Act and Order 1 Rule 4A of the High Court Rules, Saturdays and Sundays are not included in the reckoning of time.

Counsel for the respondents submitted that, that issue had already been decided in Edson Nyamapfeni v The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and 3 Others E/P 7/08, and stressed that Rule 4A refers to time periods within which “anything is required by these rules or an order of court to be done.”

Mr Chinyama persisted with his argument and asked for time so that he could identify a rule in the High Court Rules which specifies time periods for the noting of appeals which is relevant to these proceedings.

An adjournment was granted after which he came back conceding that he could not find the Rule and was no longer persisting with his argument.

In Edson Nyamapfeni v The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and 3 Others E/P 7/08, commenting on the provisions of section 165(4) of the Electoral Act and Order 1 Rule 4A of the High Court Rules, I…, said:-

“It is true that this court can rely on High Court Rules, but, the issue to be determined is whether or not the provisions of Rule 4A extend to time limits prescribed in an Act of Parliament.”

I, thereafter, commenting on Rule 4A, said:-

“The key words in Rule 4A are 'where anything is required by these rules or in any order of the court to be done within a particular number of days.'

This means the Rule applies to anything required to be done by any rule in the High Court Rules or an order of the court. It does not extend to situations not provided for by the rules or court orders. It therefore does not assist in the construction of section 46(19)(c) of the Electoral Act, which is not a provision of the High Court Rules, but a provision of the Electoral Act.”

I am therefore satisfied that Mr Chinyama has properly conceded that his argument on this point is untenable.

HH47-08 : TSITSI MUZENDA vs PATRICK KOMBAYI and ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Ruled By: KUDYA J

At the management meeting held on 21 May 2005, four preliminary issues were referred to trial. These were;

(i) Whether or not the petition was served on time;

(ii) Whether there was proper service on the second respondent;

(iii) Whether security for costs was provided; and

(iv) Whether or not the second respondent was properly joined to the petition.

At the hearing, on noticing that the petition had been lodged with the Registrar of this Court on 15 April 2008, I raised the further issue of whether it was presented within the time limits set out in section 168(2) of the Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13], hereinafter called the Act.

The brief facts were these:

Tsitsi Veronica Muzenda, the petitioner, of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) ZANU (PF) party, stood as a Senatorial candidate for the Gweru-Chirumanzu senatorial constituency during the harmonized elections held in Zimbabwe on 29 March 2008. She competed for office with Patrick Kombayi, the first respondent, of the Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai party MDC-T. The election was run and conducted by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, the second respondent.

The petitioner became aware that the first respondent had won the seat on 5 April 2008 and filed the petition on 15 April 2008.

It was served on 6 May 2008, by the Deputy Sheriff, at Harvest House, the headquarters of the first respondent's political party. The return of service indicates that a court application was served on one Muzuva, a security officer, who accepted service on behalf of the first respondent.

Another copy was served on the second respondent at its place of business on the same day.

The petition did not show that security for costs had been furnished. The first respondent was not served with any recognizance.

Counsel for the petitioner was to advise the Court, from the bar, in argument, that the security for costs was paid in the sum set by the Registrar, and, out of an abundance of caution, recognizance entered at the same time on 23 April 2008.

The first respondent received the petition on 19 May 2008.

The petitioner provided minimal facts of the events that triggered the application. She did not provide the date on which the first respondent was declared the winner by the Constituency Election Officer in terms of section 66(1) of the Electoral Act. She referred to a recount of votes but did not provide any details on the date it was held and its outcome. Some of the facts that appear in her heads of argument were not pleaded in her founding affidavit.

The duty to present an election petition is cast on the losing candidate by section 167 of Electoral Act [Chapter 2:13].

Its format and period of presentation are set out in section 168 of the Electoral Act.

It has to be presented within 14 days after the date on which the declaration of the result in the last constituency for Senatorial elections is made.

The duty is placed by the Electoral Act on the petitioner to establish this fact. It is this fact alone which triggers this legal right for her. Failure by her to establish it would be fatal to her case for the reason that she would have failed to bring her self into the protective ambit of the Electoral Act.

The facts alleged in the affidavit deal with corrupt practices which occurred before and during the election but not after the elections.

It is only illegal practice, as defined, that occurred after the announcement by the Constituency Elections Officer in the last constituency that triggers the 30-day notice period from the date of the alleged illegal practice that is provided in the proviso to section 168(2) of the Electoral Act. The petitioner could only bring her petition within the 14 day period.

I, however, requested that the information that is required to initiate the petition be provided by the second respondent.

At the hearing counsel for the second respondent produced a document from the second respondent which showed that the declaration of the last result in a House of Assembly constituency had been made on 4 April 2008 for the Kariba constituency.

Counsel for the first respondent, correctly in my view, abandoned argument on whether or not the petition had been filed on time.

I accept his reasoning, that, if the result for the House of Assembly seat was announced in Kariba on 4 April 2008, it was unlikely that the result for the Senatorial constituency, which incorporated the Kariba constituency, would have been declared earlier given its size.

The effect of 4 April was that in terms of section 33(4) of the Interpretation Act [Chapter 1:01] the petitioner had at least until 21 April 2008 to present her petition as the 14-day period would have ended on 18 April, a public holiday, which was followed by a Saturday and Sunday: see Nyamapfeni v The Constituency Registrar for Mberengwa East & Others HH27-08 and the cases cited therein.

In casu, the petition, having been filed on 15 April 2008, was presented on time. The issue that I raised, therefore, falls away.

Appealed
SC28-10 : JONATHAN MOYO and MOSES NDLOVU and PATRICK DUBE and SIYABONGA NCUBE vs AUSTIN ZVOMA N.O., CLERK OF PARLIAMENT and LOVEMORE MOYO
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA and GARWE JA

This is an appeal against the judgment of the High Court wherein PATEL J dismissed the appellants' application to have set aside the election of the second respondent as the Speaker of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as "the Speaker").The appellants, as the applicants in the court a quo, sought the ...

HH91-09 : SANANGURAI GWARADA vs KEVIN JOHNSON and MR WILLIAMSON and BERNARD CHOTO
Ruled By: GOWORA J

This matter came before me by way of an urgent chamber application.

At the initial set down date, the legal practitioners indicated that they wished to file written submissions and the matter was accordingly postponed for that purpose.

In view of the legal issues that were apparent from the affidavits, and that had not been canvassed, I required the legal practitioners to file supplementary heads of argument, which counsel did, and, I am indebted to counsel for the same.

I had also requested a copy of a translation of a South African judgment referred to by the applicant's counsel, but, unhappily, that was not given to me expeditiously, with the result that this judgment was then delayed.

The facts relevant to this dispute are as follows:

The dispute centers around Dana Farm. This farm is now owned by the State after it was gazetted for resettlement under the land reform program.

The first and second respondents are referred to on the papers as former owners of the farm, although the exact nature of that ownership has not been stated nor is it relevant for present purposes.

What is relevant is that they were in occupation at the time the farm was acquired.

The third respondent is a beneficiary of the land reform program but he occupies a neighbouring farm. He is, however, a majority shareholder in a company in which the first and second respondents also own shares and which is undertaking certain farming operations on Dana A Farm.

According to the papers, the first and second respondents occupy subdivisions 2 and 3 of the farm.

The applicant was issued with an offer letter for subdivision 1 which he occupies.

The applicant seeks an interdict, both in interim and final terms, against the respondents from use and occupation of subdivision 1 of Dana Farm. In addition, he seeks their eviction from the same.

After he and counsel for the respondents had made submissions on the application, counsel for the applicant moved for an amendment to the draft order.

Counsel for the respondents did not object to its amendment.

The new draft order merely sought an interim interdict against the three respondents with the eviction being reserved for the final relief.

I find it difficult to comprehend the logic of seeking an amendment of that nature, at that stage, as counsel for both sides had argued the matter fully on the merits as related to the interdict and the eviction.

In my view, no prejudice will occur to any of the litigants if I dispose of the matter on the merits as if it were an opposed application rather than for relief in interim terms.

Although the applicant sought to file an amendment to the draft order, the application to amend the same was only introduced after both parties had addressed the court in argument on the basis of the original draft order. It seems to me, therefore, that the dispute between the parties has been ventilated in full and it does not assist either of the parties for this court to ignore that fact.

I also agree with the submission in the respondents heads of argument that the nature of relief sought is in final terms.

Even if I considered the matter on the basis of the amended draft order, it would not change much as the relief being sought is not materially different in the two draft orders.

I proceed now to consider the other point in limine raised by the respondents.

The respondents had contended, that, the failure to join the Provincial Lands Inspectorate was fatal to the applicant's case.

I disagree.

The farm was acquired, and now vests in the State, which is the owner of the land. I have to consider whether there is any effect to the application consequent to the non-citation of the responsible Minister.

It becomes necessary, therefore, that I consider the nature of the relief being sought by the applicant.

The sum total of the relief sought by the applicant is an interdict against the respondents from utilizing the permanent structures and improvements on the subdivision that he has been offered by Government.

It is common cause, that, although the entire farm was gazetted, and has since been acquired, the former owners, in the guise of the second and third respondents, are still in occupation. It also seems that the third respondent is the majority shareholder in a company that is running farming operations on the farm.

Although the third respondent made this averment, there was challenge from him that the wrong person had been brought to court; he has deposed to an affidavit opposing the application on the merits and did not persist with the challenge when the matter was called.

HH92-09 : SUPA PLANT INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD vs EDGAR CHIDAVAENZI
Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

The facts giving rise to this application are largely common cause. They are as follows:

The applicant is in the farming business, operating a farm in Chakari. In October 2006, it set out to acquire a centre pivot irrigation system for its farm. Its Managing Director, duly authorized to act on behalf of the applicant, approached one Douglas Chihuri (“Chihuri”) who was selling a center pivot system on behalf of the respondent.

An agreement of sale was concluded between the plaintiff and Douglas Chihuri, acting for his principal, regarding a 140HA center pivot system belonging to the respondent.

A purchase price in the sum of $12,000,000 and installation charges of $3,000,000 were agreed upon.

Pursuant to the agreement, an invoice was made out to the applicant giving the total amount payable as $15 million.

It was made clear to Douglas Chihuri that payment would be made through the African Banking Corporation and would take a few weeks to be processed.

A month later, payment was effected in the agreed sum. This was made in favour of Chartered Enterprises, Douglas Chihuri's trading mantle.

A week after payment had been made, the applicant met with the respondent to discuss the details of the delivery of the centre pivot. Douglas Chihuri was in attendance. At the meeting, the respondent unilaterally increased the purchase price of the centre pivot. Instead of holding the respondent to the agreed price, the applicant agreed to pay an additional $5million and executed an acknowledgement of debt to this effect.

The seller also appended his signature to the acknowledgement. So did Douglas Chihuri.

Payment of the $15 million was then made to the respondent according to his instructions. Still acting as the seller's agent, Douglas Chihuri agreed to have the centre pivot delivered to the applicant.

The respondent did not deliver the centre pivot, prompting the applicant to bring this application seeking an order compelling the respondent to deliver a 140HA center pivot to it.

In opposing the application, the respondent denies knowledge of what transpired between the applicant and Douglas Chihuri, but admits that he was, at that time, selling two centre pivots, the details of which he gave to Douglas Chihuri. He further confirmed, that, in time, Douglas Chihuri advised him that he had secured a buyer for one of the centre pivots. He also confirmed that he received the sum of $14 million dollars for the centre pivot that Douglas Chihuri had sold to the applicant on his behalf and that a balance in the sum of $5 million would be paid in due course.

It was also suggested to him that a further $15 million would be paid for the same pivot after the applicant had sold his beasts or that he could collect the beasts himself as further payment for the sold pivot. He however opted for a cash payment. He did not agree to the delivery of the pivot in the absence of full payment and did not deliver the center pivot because he did not receive the full purchase price of $35 million.

At the hearing of the application, it emerged that the respondent had sold the centre pivot, the subject of this dispute, after being served with this application but before the matter was determined.

This emerged from supplementary affidavits filed by both parties days before the hearing and which were filed with my leave. I granted leave to the parties to file the supplementary affidavits as, in my view, they air the full dispute between the parties and bring out the real issue for determination in this matter.

In his supplementary affidavit, the respondent deposed, that, after the filing of the above application, a director of the applicant caused his arrest on allegations of fraud. It was alleged, in the criminal proceedings, that the respondent had fraudulently misrepresented to the said director that the centre pivot was available for sale when he knew that it was not as it was to be sold to a third party. The respondent was duly prosecuted but was acquitted at the close of the trial.

In it own supplementary affidavit, the applicant admitted the facts given in the respondent's additional affidavit but urged me to find the contents of the affidavit inadmissible on the basis of irrelevancy.

Before proceeding further, I will dispose of the admissibility of the contents of the affidavit.

In my view, once a court grants leave to a party to file an additional affidavit, that grant of leave necessarily implies that the contents of the affidavit are admissible. Supplementary affidavits should only be filed if their contents are relevant to the dispute before the court.

It is a general rule of evidence that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.

Section 26 of the Civil Evidence Act [Chapter 8.01] provides that evidence that is irrelevant or immaterial and cannot lead to the proving or disproving of any point in issue shall not be admissible.

This section is simply a codification of the position at common law which holds that all facts relevant to the issue in legal proceedings may be proved and where a legally recognized exception to this rule is not invoked, relevancy remains the fundamental rule governing the admissibility of evidence.

As indicated above, this is the rule that a court summarily employs before granting leave to file additional affidavits in motion proceedings.

In my view, the rule against admissibility of irrelevant evidence is rooted more in common sense than in a legal principle. It is a common sense approach by the court to govern that which it will accept or reject lest it be inundated by evidence of all facts surrounding a dispute and trials will take longer than is necessary to resolve if the parties were left at liberty to drag in all they wish or think is necessary.

It however remains clear that the rule against irrelevant evidence is against evidence of facts that have little to do with the issue in dispute.

In casu, I was of the view that the disposal of the centre pivot pending litigation is the issue in dispute and thus facts tending to prove the disposal cannot be irrelevant. Further, and in any event, the facts sought to be rendered inadmissible by the applicant are common cause and thus no party will be prejudiced by its admission into evidence.

It is on the basis of the above that I ruled admissible the contents of the two supplementary affidavits.

I now turn to consider the merits of the application.

The issues that fall for determination in this application are mainly two in my view:

(i) Firstly, I have to determine whether or not there was an agreement between the applicant and the respondent for the sale of the centre pivot for $20 million.

The respondent has sought to argue that the agreed purchase price was $35 million. He deposed in his opposing affidavit that after the applicant had paid the first $15 million and had promised a further $5 million, by way of the acknowledgement of debt; the parties agreed to a further payment of $15 million after the applicant had sold its beasts.

Relying on these averments by the respondent, counsel for the respondent argued that the correct purchase price of the center pivot cannot, in the circumstances, be ascertained without the leading of oral evidence and thus the application should fail on this basis.

It is common cause that Douglas Chihuri, acting as the agent of the respondent, agreed to sell the centre pivot to the applicant for $15 million. The parties agreed, later, to vary the purchase price to $20 million, when, after making payment of the initial purchase price, the applicant promised, by way of an acknowledgement of debt, to pay an additional $5 million.

The agency of Douglas Chihuri to represent the respondent, whilst challenged in the opposing affidavit, was not advanced in argument.

In my view, counsel for the respondent was well advised not to advance the argument in view of the affidavit by Douglas Chihuri and the fact that the respondent accepted the sum of $15 million paid by the applicant through Chihuri.

By his own conduct, of accepting the payment, the respondent put paid to whatever argument he may have had against the agency of Douglas Chihuri. By this conduct, he gave out and confirmed that Douglas Chihuri was indeed selling the centre pivot on his behalf and is thus bound not only by what Douglas Chihuri did but by what he also personally did.

If there was any doubt about the agency of Douglas Chihuri, the respondent personally removed that doubt by accepting the part payment of the purchase price and agreeing with the applicant that the balance now stood at $5 million, thereby putting beyond doubt that the purchase price was $20 million.

In my view, he is thus condemned by his own actions as revealed by the papers filed of record.

HH122-09 : EMMANUEL NEMUSESO vs DOROTHY MASHITA and LOVEMORE KATAYI and PAULINE MANDINGO and PANGANAYI MASHITA and INNOCENT WOYO and MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS NO
Ruled By: GUVAVA J

The fifth defendant told the court that he was abandoning his claim for holding over damages and merely pursing the claim for eviction of the plaintiff….,. The fifth defendant abandoned his claim for holding over damages at trial and the claim therefore falls away….,. The fifth defendant had claimed costs on a legal practitioner and client scale, but, in ...

View Appeal
HH28-10 : JONATHAN MOYO and MOSES NDLOVU and PATRICK DUBE and SIYABONGA NCUBE vs AUSTIN ZVOMA N.O. CLERK OF PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE and LOVEMORE MOYO
Ruled By: PATEL J

The applicants in this matter are all duly elected Members of Parliament. The first respondent is the Clerk of Parliament, cited herein in his official capacity. The second respondent was elected to the position of Speaker of the House of Assembly on the 25th of August 2008.The applicants challenge the ...

HH35-10 : RUTH MUSONZA (nee MTANAUKWA) vs ESHMAEL MUSONZA
Ruled By: GUVAVA J

Counsel for the plaintiff also sought an amendment, which was granted by consent of the defendant, to remove the claim for maintenance for the plaintiff...,.The plaintiff stated that she was abandoning the claim for maintenance for herself.

HH95-10 : TIISO HOLDINGS (PTY) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE IRON & STEEL COMPANY LIMITED
Ruled By: PATEL J

The plaintiff in this matter has issued summons for payment of the sum of EUR6,640,295=94 together with interest and costs of suit.The claim arises pursuant to a default judgment of the Regional Court of Frankfurt entered in favour of Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KFW) as against the defendant on 25 July ...

HH160-10 : TONDERAI HAMANDISHE and GAMUCHIRAI SANGARE vs MAFFACK PROPERTIES (PVT) LTD
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

At the hearing of this matter the applicants abandoned clause 2 of their relief and persisted that they wanted the court to determine the status of the Agreement of Sale.

HH173-10 : TAMBUDZAI MAFUSIRE vs LEWIS GREYLING and ELGREY INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

The plaintiff abandoned her claim for the following damages:(a) Hospital, x-rays, and other related expenses;(b) Orthopaedic surgeon's costs;(c) Charges for towing the damaged motor vehicle;(d) Costs of replacing spectacles; and(e) Value of the groceries lost in the accident....,.The defendant abandoned his counter-claim for special damages.

HH174-10 : SAMSON MARTIN MEKI vs VHURAMAYI VHUSHANGWE and OTHERS
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

The plaintiff issued summons on 23 July 2007 claiming the following relief:“(a) An order declaring that the only families entitled to the Mapanzure chieftainship are the following families:1. Chimbuya.2. Magwirokona.3. Mavhengere.4. Bwangundoga.5. Mupandasekwa.6. Gwenhamo.7. Shumbayaonda.(b) An order declaring that according to customary principles of succession to the Mapanzure chieftainship, the ...

HH227-10 : MIKE MAKOPE vs GEOFFREY DZUMBUNU and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS N.O. and MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

During the trial, and as the plaintiff gave his evidence, he indicated that he was abandoning the claim for specific performance. As a result, the outstanding issue for the determination of this court is the claim for damages.

HH58-11 : ART CORPORATION LIMITED t/a CHLORIDE ZIMBABWE vs PENCASH INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and ADAM SENI ABDULA
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

In his submissions in court, counsel for the respondents did not make reference to the point in limine raised in the heads of argument. I therefore assumed that by so doing he had abandoned the point in limine.

HH60-13 : IMMACULATE BLESSING MABIZA vs IVON NGWIRA
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

The defences raised by the defendant in her plea appear to have been abandoned as the defendant did not raise them and they were not identified as issues for trial at the pre-trial conference. It is therefore unnecessary for me to determine them.

HH190-14 : AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION OF ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs SUNJET DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: MAKONI J

The respondent also took issue with the second paragraph of the Draft Order on the basis that the property in issue does not belong to the respondent but to a third party and that the third party had not been cited….,. I will first of all deal with the claim in paragraph 2 of the ...

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HB08-14 : JONATHAN MOYO vs ROSELINE NKOMO
Ruled By: MAKONESE J

The applicant was a candidate for the National Assembly seat for Tsholotsho North constituency in Matabeleland North Province in the Harmonised General Elections held on 31st July 2013 as a nominee of ZANU (PF). The respondent was declared winner of the National Assembly election in respect of the said constituency. ...

CC05-16 : PITTY MPOFU and SAMUKELISIWE MLILO vs THE STATE
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

This matter is brought by way of referral in terms of section 24(2) of the former Constitution of Zimbabwe (“the former Constitution) which provides as follows:“24 Enforcement of protective provisions(1)…,.(2) If, in any proceedings in the High Court or in any court subordinate to the High Court, any question arises ...

This matter is brought by way of referral in terms of section 24(2) of the former Constitution of Zimbabwe (“the former Constitution) which provides as follows:

“24 Enforcement of protective provisions

(1)…,.

(2) If, in any proceedings in the High Court or in any court subordinate to the High Court, any question arises as to the contravention of the Declaration of Rights, the person presiding in that court may, and, if so requested by any party to the proceedings, shall, refer the question to the Supreme Court unless, in his opinion, the raising of the question is merely frivolous or vexatious.”

The questions referred for decision concern the constitutionality of section 79 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act [Chapter 9:23] (“the Code”).

The applicants claim, that, section 79 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act violates their right to protection of the law as well as their right not to be discriminated against in terms of sections 18 and 23, respectively, of the former Constitution.

THE BACKGROUND

The first applicant is a 42 year old male. On 5 September 2012, he was arrested and subsequently charged with contravening section 79 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (the Code), briefly “deliberate transmission of HIV/AIDS.”

It was alleged, that, the applicant had deliberately infected his wife, Geziwe Ncube, with HIV.

On 27 September 2012, the applicant appeared before the magistrate for a remand hearing and requested that the matter be referred to the Supreme Court (formerly the Court which determined constitutional matters) on the following grounds:

1. Section 79 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (the Code), with which he is charged, is too wide, broad, and vague so as to render the law uncertain thereby infringing his right to protection of the law as set out in section 18 of the Constitution.

2. Section 79 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (the Code) violates the applicant's fundamental right guaranteed under section 23 of the Constitution, not to be discriminated against on any basis (including his HIV/AIDS status).

The second applicant is a woman aged 34 years. She was customarily married to one Joseph Marozva during the period 2008 to 2010. It was alleged, and proved, at her trial, that, in 2009, she fell pregnant and had to undergo routine HIV testing. Although the result was positive, she did not disclose this fact to her husband but continued to have unprotected sexual intercourse with him until he stumbled upon her antenatal card which disclosed she was taking medication for HIV/AIDS.

She was convicted of contravening section 79 of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act (the Code) and remanded for sentence.

At the resumption of the trial, on 9 July 2012, an application was made, and granted on 10 July 2012, referring the matter to the Supreme Court on the two grounds set out above as well as the following additional grounds:

(3) Whether or not the criminalization of consensual sexual conduct whereby the complainant voluntarily engaged in a sexual encounter with the accused amounts to a violation of the applicant's right to protection of the law as enshrined in section 18 of the Constitution.

(4) Whether or not the remand and prosecution of the accused, on the criminal charge under section 79 of the Criminal Code are not, on the facts, a violation of the applicant's fundamental right to personal liberty and the protection of the law.

These additional grounds were, however, not pursued by counsel for the applicants who confined himself to the first two questions.

Accordingly, this judgment will deal with the two questions set out above.

CC03-17 : CUTHBERT CHAWIRA and OTHERS vs MINISTER OF JUSTICE LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS and THE COMMISSIONER OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GARWE JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, BHUNU JCC and UCHENA JCC

This matter was heard on 13 January 2016 with judgment being reserved.

On 27 January 2016, this court determined, that, in view of the fact that this case raises similar issues as that of Farai Lawrence Ndlovu & Anor v The Minister of Justice Legal & Parliamentary Affairs, Constitutional Application No.50 of 2015, it was convenient that the two cases be consolidated and heard simultaneously.

To that extent, the court issued the following order:

“IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The matter be and is hereby postponed sine die to enable this case to be heard by the same bench that heard the matter of Cuthbert Chawira & Ors vs Minister of Justice CCZ47/2015. The Registrar is directed to set this matter at the earliest convenient date for hearing.”

In view of the above directive, the handing down of judgment in this case was postponed pending the completion of Case No.50/15.

The matter however dragged on and on until it was eventually struck of the roll on 1 January 2017 thereby paving way for the completion and delivery of judgment in this case.

The application is in terms section 85(1)(a) and (d) of the Constitution which entitles both natural and juristic subjects to approach this Court for relief as a court of first instance whenever their fundamental human rights, enshrined in Chapter 4, have been infringed or threatened.

All the fifteen applicants are condemned prisoners on death row awaiting execution after being sentenced to death by the High Court. They have been on death row for varying periods of time ranging from 2 to 18 years of incarceration.

They have now approached this court complaining that the length of their stay on death row is an affront to their human dignity and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in violation of sections 51 and 53 of the Constitution.

Section 51 of the Constitution provides that:

“51 Right to Human Dignity

Every person has inherent dignity in their private and public life, and the right to have that dignity respected and protected.”

Section 53 of the Constitution goes on to protect subjects against torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. It provides that:

“53 Freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment

No person may be subjected to physical or psychological torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Initially, the applicants sought commutation of their respective death sentences to life imprisonment.

That relief was, however, abandoned at the hearing through an amended draft order seeking to quash the sentences of death and remittal of the cases to the High Court for re-sentencing.

SC59-17 : RAYMOND KASEKE vs A A MUSUNGA and PATRICIA DHLAKAMA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, GUVAVA JA and BHUNU JA

It is noted that although the appellant had, in his Notice of Appeal, cited two additional grounds of appeal, he made no reference to them in his heads of argument as well as in argument. The court thus took the view that he had thus abandoned the two grounds.

HB83-16 : PROFERT ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD vs MACDOM INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD
Ruled By: MAKONESE J

I did not deal with the rest of the preliminary issues raised in the papers as these were not pursued in oral argument and were therefore deemed abandoned.

HH138-15 : GOLD DRIVEN INVESTMENTS vs WILLEMSE FARMING ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD and FREDRICK CHRISTIAN MULLER
Ruled By: MATHONSI J

Counsel for the respondents, while taking a number of points in limine in her heads of argument, appeared to abandon them in submissions.

CC04-16 : SISTER BERRY (NEE NCUBE) and JESSE AARON BERRY vs THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICER and THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

This is an application in terms of subsections 85(1)(a) and 85(1)(b) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No.20/2013) (“the Constitution”). The first applicant is acting in both her own interest and that of her husband who is the second applicant.In their heads of argument, the applicants submit that they have ...

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HH319-17 : BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION vs TETRAD INVESTMENT BANK LTD (Under Provisional Judicial Management) and THE SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE (N.O.)
Ruled By: ZHOU J

At the commencement of the hearing, the legal practitioners indicated that the applicants and the first respondent were abandoning the points in limine taken in their papers and would debate the merits of the matter.

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CC22-17 : MOVEN KUFA and VOICE FOR DEMOCRACY TRUST vs THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and OTHERS
Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and OMERJEE AJA

In his objection in limine, the Attorney General, inter alia, drew attention to the allegation by the appellants, as applicants, that the right they were relying on was the protection of the law guarantee enshrined in section 18(9) of the Constitution. It was the Attorney General's contention that section 18(9) ...

SC71-15 : SIMBI (STEELMAKERS) (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs M. SHAMU and OTHERS
Ruled By: GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and PATEL JA

At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant abandoned the last ground of appeal relating to prescription, presumably on the basis that this issue was not raised before the arbitrator or the Labour Court.

SC58-15 : ERICKSON MVUDUDU vs AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, GWAUNZA JA and PATEL JA

The issues raised in the notice of appeal herein are largely identical to those before the Labour Court and may be summarized as follows:(i)...,. (ii) What was the effective date of termination of employment? (This issue was not pursued by counsel for the appellant and appears to have been abandoned).(iii)...,.(iv)...,.(v)...,.

SC48-13 : STANLEY MAJURIRA vs TREDCOR (ZIMBABWE) (PVT) LTD
Ruled By: PATEL JA

The final ground of appeal, pertaining to the award of costs by the court a quo, is not addressed at all in the applicant's founding and answering affidavits. Nor was it pursued at the hearing of the application. It must therefore be deemed to have been abandoned.

Appealed
SC45-15 : SAMMYS GROUP (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs JOHN MEYBURGH N.O. and NUGLO INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and C.W. ELECTRICAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED and REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES N.O.
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and MAVANGIRA AJA

It was further submitted that the special plea and exceptions were abandoned when the matter was, by consent, referred to trial for the determination of the sole issue agreed upon by the parties.It appears to me that the matter, having proceeded to trial, the court a quo ought to have ...

SC30-15 : DUNMORE MUPANDASEKWA vs GREEN MOTOR SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED
Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, GOWORA JA and GUVAVA JA

Counsel for the appellant concedes the point made by counsel for the respondent and confirms that the appellant has abandoned all of his grounds of appeal except the one that reads as follows...,.

SC25-14 : DAVID GOVERE vs ORDECO (PRIVATE) LIMITED and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and PATEL JA

The notice of appeal filed of record contains five grounds of appeal. At the hearing of the matter, counsel for the appellant conceded that the second ground of appeal referred to the wrong section of the Companies Act and that the third ground, as it was framed, was utterly nonsensical. ...

SC24-14 : KUNDAI MAGODORA AND OTHERS vs CARE INTERNATIONAL ZIMBABWE
Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, PATEL JA and GUVAVA JA

At the hearing of the appeal, the additional claim for the payment of retrenchment packages, in the event of reinstatement not being possible, was abandoned on the basis that such relief was not competent as it was inconsistent with the primary relief sought.

SC22-16 : MICHEAL HENRY BROWNE vs TANGANDA TEA COMPANY
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA, PATEL JA

The appellant alleges that the Disciplinary Committee that found him guilty and imposed the penalty of dismissal was not properly constituted as set out in the respondent's employment Code of Conduct....,.The record shows that Mr Kuhuni then proceeded to address the court on a completely different aspect of the case. ...

SC02-17 : GUOXING GONG vs MAYOR LOGISTICS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS
Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

Counsel for the appellant…, raised the point that the…, default judgment was unenforceable because it has superannuated at common law through the effluxion of time as it was issued more than three (3) years ago.He however later abandoned the objection conceding that superannuation was not in issue as the first ...

HMA31-17 : CHAMU MINING SYNDICATE vs SIBONGILE MPINDIWA N.O. and CHAMWANDOITA SYNDICATE
Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

In the course of argument, counsel for the applicant evidently realised the futility of the applicant's case. She changed tack.At first, she sought an alternative order, without abandoning the original one....,. When I intimated that the original remedies and the alternative ones seemed mutually exclusive, counsel for the applicant ...

HMA20-17 : FRANK NYAKU BADZA vs SMM HOLDINGS [PVT] LTD [Under Reconstruction] t/a SMM Properties
Ruled By: MAWADZE J and MAFUSIRE J

In his appeal to this court, the appellant raised six grounds. Grounds 1 to 3 were couched as follows:1. That the magistrate erred in finding that the plaintiff could institute the proceedings without attaching the leave from the Administrator stating the conditions imposed by him;2. That the magistrate erred in ...

HH97-15 : RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE vs ALLIED BANK LIMITED and UNILIVER SOUTH EAST AFRICA PENSION FUND and MESSENGER OF COURT, HARARE
Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

The parties first appeared before me on 15 January 2015. Initially, counsel for the third respondent submitted that the third respondent would only be prevented from proceeding to execute by an order of this court. She however abandoned this argument and all the parties agreed to the court granting a ...

HH59-10 : INTERCONTINENTAL HOLDINGS (PVT) LTD vs VERONICA NECHITIMA AND TEN MWANZA AND FOUR OTHERS
Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

Upon being served with this application on 26 August 2009, one Mr.A.Windimani of Suite 4, Alpha House, Kwame Nkrumah Avenue, Harare purporting to represent the six respondents, filed a notice of opposition to the applicant's application.The notice was supported by an affidavit from the first respondent only. The rest of ...

HH58-14 : MICHAEL P. HITSCHMAN and PESCA (PVT) LTD vs COMMISSIONER - GENERAL OF POLICE and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and ATTORNEY GENERAL and SUPERINTENDENT ARNOLD DHLIWAYO
Ruled By: NDEWERE J

In the Draft Order, the first applicant seeks the return of his watch Trade Mod S3001B and a Hewlett Packard laptop. During the hearing, the applicant's counsel abandoned the claims for the return of the wrist watch and laptop.

HH461-15 : PATTERSON TIMBA vs REGGIE SARUCHERA N.O. and RESERVES BANK OF ZIMBABWE and NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY AUTHORITY and RENNAISSANCE FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LTD and RENAISSANCE MERCHANT BANK LTD
Ruled By: MAKONI J

I agree with counsel for the first and fifth respondents that the fact that the other respondents have abandoned their claim for costs does not dis-entitle the first and the fifth respondents to claim their costs.

HH38-14 : JULIET HOMODZA vs CHITUNGWIZA MUNICIPALITY
Ruled By: TAKUVA J

The applicant filed her heads of argument wherein she abandoned her claim with respect to arrear salaries but maintained her claim in respect of outstanding terminal benefits.

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Pleadings re: Abandoned Pleadings

HH81-09 : SAFARI OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF ZIMBABWE vs ZIMBABWE TOURISM AUTHORITY and MINISTER OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM and COMMISSIONER GENERAL OF POLICE Ruled By: PATEL J

HH84-12 : CHRISTOPHER BARNSLEY vs HARAMBE HOLDINGS (PVT) LTD AND ANOTHER Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH14-12 : JOEL MATONGO vs FLORA MATONGO (NEE JOE) Ruled By: CHITAKUNYE J

Appealed HH94-12 : ERIC MUSUNDIRE vs OK ZIMBABWE Ruled By: BERE J

HH20-12 : JANE PHIRI vs PATSON NAWASHA Ruled By: MUTEMA J

SC17-09 : ELIZABETH MUTIZHE vs LOVENESS GANDA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS and FANNIE MUTIZHE Ruled By: MALABA DCJ

HH32-08 : LOVENESS SENGEREDO vs ERIC CABLE N.O. Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

HH13-12 : YVONNE CHISESE vs ALLUVIAL EXPLORATION SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

HH71-10 : FELISTAS MUTSETA vs ELLIOT ENOCK MUTSETA Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

HH20-08 : DANIEL SHUMBA vs CONSTITUENCY REGISTRAR, MR MUSHANGWE and CHAIRMAN OF ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION Ruled By: UCHENA J

HH47-08 : TSITSI MUZENDA vs PATRICK KOMBAYI and ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL COMMISSION Ruled By: KUDYA J

Appealed SC28-10 : JONATHAN MOYO and MOSES NDLOVU and PATRICK DUBE and SIYABONGA NCUBE vs AUSTIN ZVOMA N.O., CLERK OF PARLIAMENT and LOVEMORE MOYO Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, SANDURA JA, ZIYAMBI JA and GARWE JA

HH91-09 : SANANGURAI GWARADA vs KEVIN JOHNSON and MR WILLIAMSON and BERNARD CHOTO Ruled By: GOWORA J

HH92-09 : SUPA PLANT INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD vs EDGAR CHIDAVAENZI Ruled By: MAKARAU JP

HH122-09 : EMMANUEL NEMUSESO vs DOROTHY MASHITA and LOVEMORE KATAYI and PAULINE MANDINGO and PANGANAYI MASHITA and INNOCENT WOYO and MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS NO Ruled By: GUVAVA J

View Appeal HH28-10 : JONATHAN MOYO and MOSES NDLOVU and PATRICK DUBE and SIYABONGA NCUBE vs AUSTIN ZVOMA N.O. CLERK OF PARLIAMENT OF ZIMBABWE and LOVEMORE MOYO Ruled By: PATEL J

HH35-10 : RUTH MUSONZA (nee MTANAUKWA) vs ESHMAEL MUSONZA Ruled By: GUVAVA J

HH95-10 : TIISO HOLDINGS (PTY) LIMITED vs ZIMBABWE IRON & STEEL COMPANY LIMITED Ruled By: PATEL J

HH160-10 : TONDERAI HAMANDISHE and GAMUCHIRAI SANGARE vs MAFFACK PROPERTIES (PVT) LTD Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

HH173-10 : TAMBUDZAI MAFUSIRE vs LEWIS GREYLING and ELGREY INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

HH174-10 : SAMSON MARTIN MEKI vs VHURAMAYI VHUSHANGWE and OTHERS Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

HH227-10 : MIKE MAKOPE vs GEOFFREY DZUMBUNU and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS N.O. and MINISTER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT Ruled By: MAVANGIRA J

HH58-11 : ART CORPORATION LIMITED t/a CHLORIDE ZIMBABWE vs PENCASH INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and ADAM SENI ABDULA Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

HH60-13 : IMMACULATE BLESSING MABIZA vs IVON NGWIRA Ruled By: MATHONSI J

HH190-14 : AFRICAN BANKING CORPORATION OF ZIMBABWE LIMITED vs SUNJET DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: MAKONI J

View Appeal HB08-14 : JONATHAN MOYO vs ROSELINE NKOMO Ruled By: MAKONESE J

CC05-16 : PITTY MPOFU and SAMUKELISIWE MLILO vs THE STATE Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

CC03-17 : CUTHBERT CHAWIRA and OTHERS vs MINISTER OF JUSTICE LEGAL AND PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS and THE COMMISSIONER OF PRISONS AND CORRECTIONAL SERVICES and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GARWE JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, BHUNU JCC and UCHENA JCC

SC59-17 : RAYMOND KASEKE vs A A MUSUNGA and PATRICIA DHLAKAMA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, GUVAVA JA and BHUNU JA

HB83-16 : PROFERT ZIMBABWE (PVT) LTD vs MACDOM INVESTMENTS (PVT) LTD Ruled By: MAKONESE J

HH138-15 : GOLD DRIVEN INVESTMENTS vs WILLEMSE FARMING ENTERPRISES (PVT) LTD and FREDRICK CHRISTIAN MULLER Ruled By: MATHONSI J

CC04-16 : SISTER BERRY (NEE NCUBE) and JESSE AARON BERRY vs THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION OFFICER and THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, MALABA DCJ, ZIYAMBI JCC, GWAUNZA JCC, GOWORA JCC, HLATSHWAYO JCC, PATEL JCC, GUVAVA JCC and MAVANGIRA AJCC

View Appeal HH319-17 : BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION vs TETRAD INVESTMENT BANK LTD (Under Provisional Judicial Management) and THE SHERIFF OF ZIMBABWE (N.O.) Ruled By: ZHOU J

View Appeal CC22-17 : MOVEN KUFA and VOICE FOR DEMOCRACY TRUST vs THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE REPUBLIC OF ZIMBABWE and OTHERS Ruled By: CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, ZIYAMBI JA, GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and OMERJEE AJA

SC71-15 : SIMBI (STEELMAKERS) (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs M. SHAMU and OTHERS Ruled By: GARWE JA, GOWORA JA and PATEL JA

SC58-15 : ERICKSON MVUDUDU vs AGRICULTURAL AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, GWAUNZA JA and PATEL JA

SC48-13 : STANLEY MAJURIRA vs TREDCOR (ZIMBABWE) (PVT) LTD Ruled By: PATEL JA

Appealed SC45-15 : SAMMYS GROUP (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs JOHN MEYBURGH N.O. and NUGLO INVESTMENTS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and C.W. ELECTRICAL (PRIVATE) LIMITED and REGISTRAR OF COMPANIES N.O. Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and MAVANGIRA AJA

SC30-15 : DUNMORE MUPANDASEKWA vs GREEN MOTOR SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED Ruled By: GWAUNZA JA, GOWORA JA and GUVAVA JA

SC25-14 : DAVID GOVERE vs ORDECO (PRIVATE) LIMITED and REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, HLATSHWAYO JA and PATEL JA

SC24-14 : KUNDAI MAGODORA AND OTHERS vs CARE INTERNATIONAL ZIMBABWE Ruled By: MALABA DCJ, PATEL JA and GUVAVA JA

SC22-16 : MICHEAL HENRY BROWNE vs TANGANDA TEA COMPANY Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, GWAUNZA JA, PATEL JA

SC02-17 : GUOXING GONG vs MAYOR LOGISTICS (PRIVATE) LIMITED and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS Ruled By: ZIYAMBI JA, BHUNU JA and UCHENA JA

HMA31-17 : CHAMU MINING SYNDICATE vs SIBONGILE MPINDIWA N.O. and CHAMWANDOITA SYNDICATE Ruled By: MAFUSIRE J

HMA20-17 : FRANK NYAKU BADZA vs SMM HOLDINGS [PVT] LTD [Under Reconstruction] t/a SMM Properties Ruled By: MAWADZE J and MAFUSIRE J

HH97-15 : RESERVE BANK OF ZIMBABWE vs ALLIED BANK LIMITED and UNILIVER SOUTH EAST AFRICA PENSION FUND and MESSENGER OF COURT, HARARE Ruled By: CHATUKUTA J

HH59-10 : INTERCONTINENTAL HOLDINGS (PVT) LTD vs VERONICA NECHITIMA AND TEN MWANZA AND FOUR OTHERS Ruled By: MTSHIYA J

HH58-14 : MICHAEL P. HITSCHMAN and PESCA (PVT) LTD vs COMMISSIONER - GENERAL OF POLICE and CO-MINISTERS OF HOME AFFAIRS and ATTORNEY GENERAL and SUPERINTENDENT ARNOLD DHLIWAYO Ruled By: NDEWERE J

HH461-15 : PATTERSON TIMBA vs REGGIE SARUCHERA N.O. and RESERVES BANK OF ZIMBABWE and NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY AUTHORITY and RENNAISSANCE FINANCIAL HOLDINGS LTD and RENAISSANCE MERCHANT BANK LTD Ruled By: MAKONI J

HH38-14 : JULIET HOMODZA vs CHITUNGWIZA MUNICIPALITY Ruled By: TAKUVA J

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