1.
HLATSHWAYO
JCC:
One of the crucial elements of the new constitutional dispension
ushered in by the 2013 Constitution
is to make a decisive break from turning a blind eye to
constitutional obligations. To achieve this goal, the drafters of the
Zimbabwean Constitution
Amendment (No.20) Act, 2013 (“the Constitution”)
adopted the rule of law and supremacy of the Constitution
as some of the core founding values and principles of our
constitutional democracy.
2.
For this reason, public office bearers ignore their constitutional
obligations at their own peril. Left unchecked those clothed with
state authority or public power may quite often find the temptation
to abuse such powers irresistible, as Lord Acton famously remarked:
“Power
tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely!”
John
Emerich Dalberg-Acton,
1st Baron Acton, coined the proverbial saying in 1857, using similar
ideas expressed by several of his contemporaries. The fuller
expression reads:
“Power
tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men
are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not
authority; still more when you superadd the tendency of the certainty
of corruption by authority”.
3.
Mechanisms to oversee how public power and state authority is
exercised by those so entrusted must be tightened and strengthened.
More importantly, if such mechanisms are by command of the supreme
law of the land “the constitution” they must be put in place
within a reasonable time to actualise the constitution as a living
document. To this end, the State, its organs and functionaries
cannot, without consequence, be allowed to adopt a lackadaisical
attitude, at the expense of the public interest, in bringing into
operation institutions and mechanisms commanded by the supreme law.
See the case of Mashongwa
v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2016
(3) SA 528 (CC)
at para 25.
4.
However, this case also illustrates the need on the part of the
litigants to move away from old fashioned private law habits when it
comes to constitutional law litigation. While constitutional
litigation may entail the vindication of a private right, it differs
from private law litigation in that over and above that it seeks to
entrench legality and the deepening of the constitutional order for
the benefit of the broader public.
5.
This is why it has been said that:
“where
a matter concerns the constitutionality of a law...the need for
certainty may require the court to decide the matter irrespective of
whether or not the party advancing the challenge had standing:” Max
du Plessis et all 'Constitutional
Litigation' Juta, 2013 quoting the South African cases of Lawyers
for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs 2004
(4) SA 125 (CC)
para 24 and South African Liquor Traders Association v Chairperson,
Gauteng Liquor Board 2006 (8) BCLR 901 (CC) para 6.
6.
This application seeks to enforce the enactment of the law envisioned
in section
210 of the Constitution
to provide for “an effective and independent mechanism for
receiving and investigating complaints from members of the public
about misconduct on the part of members of the security services, and
for remedying any harm caused by such misconduct.”
7.
It also seeks a declarator that the respondents have breached the
Constitution
by failing to enact such a law timeously after the coming into
operation of the new Constitution
and a mandamus for the respondents to gazette the Bill envisioned in
section
210
thereof within forty five days.
8.
At the time of hearing of the application, a period of two years and
four, five months had lapsed from the time of coming into operation
of the rest of the Constitution
on 22 August 2013, when the President-elect under the Constitution
assumed office. That delay of less than two and a half years might
not have been sufficient to satisfy a finding of violation of the
Constitution
and the application might have failed on that score, with a period
of, say, three being deemed to be the sufficient one.
9.
However, post hearing, intimations or overtures that the matter might
be settled by consent of the parties were made necessitating the
holding of three Court-presided meetings of the parties over time on
the basis that both sides were agreed that the envisaged legislation
had to be enacted. And indeed both sides agreed that the application
was essentially not opposed, but differed slightly on the appropriate
timelines for the enactment of the law. Herein lies the nub of this
matter.
10.
Had the constitutional legality principle been put above all else,
the application could have been granted immediately with immense
public benefit. However, the private law litigation habit of “winner
takes all”
of wanting the other side to be declared a violator of the
Constitution
stood in the way as did the attitude on the other side of not wanting
to make any move unless so ordered.
11.
Had the Court appreciated then how deeply entrenched these arcane
positions were – relics of private law litigation habits – a
different approach could have been adopted of immediately issuing the
order, with reasons to follow. It is regretted that this approach was
not followed.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND
12.
The applicants are citizens of Zimbabwe who have taken it upon
themselves to see to it that the respondents adhere to the
constitutionally created obligations imposed on them by section
210 of the Constitution.
The applicants submit that the respondents have done nothing to
fulfil their constitutional obligations clearly outlined in the
supreme law. Section
210 of the Constitution
requires the enactment of a law to provide for an effective and
independent mechanism for receiving and investigating complaints from
members of the public about misconduct on the part of members of the
security services, and for remedying any harm caused by such
misconduct.
13.
The applicants aver that it has been over two years since the
inception of the Constitution
and the Act required in terms of section
210 of the Constitution
has not been put in place.
14.
It is further the applicant's contention that the failure by the
respondent's to enact the law in terms of section
210
is a breach of the Constitution.
The right to equal protection of the law under section 56(1) of the
Constitution is under threat, according to the applicants, due to
failure or delay in enacting the law directed by section
210 of the Constitution.
15.
The application is opposed.
The
respondents submit that the law-making process cannot be carried out
overnight. Respondents further submitted that they are working on
making sure that the Act is in place and filed of record a working
document they are allegedly focused on as a roadmap towards the
eventual enactment of the law in question.
16.
The timeline within which the Act envisaged by section
210 of the Constitution
should be enacted sits at the heart of this application. The
applicants in their final submission to this Court are seeking the
following relief:
1.
The respondents failure, to enact the law, provided for in terms of
section
210 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe,
is in breach of the Constitution
of Zimbabwe.
2.
The failure by the respondents, to enact the law to bring into effect
section
210 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe
is a violation of the applicant's right to equal protection and
benefit of the law as defined by section 56(1) of the Constitution.
3.
The respondents must gazette the Bill envisaged by section
210 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe
within 45 days from the date of this order.
4.
The respondents jointly and severally each paying the other to be
absolved pay costs of suit.
ISSUES
17.
The first question this Court is seized with is whether or not the
applicants have locus
standi
to bring this matter before this Court. This question shall be
disposed of first before delving into questions arising from the
merits of the application.
18.
On the merits of the application, three questions arise and they are
the following:
(1)
Whether or not the respondent's delay in enacting the law, provided
for in terms of section
210 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe,
constitutes an unreasonable delay in fulfilling constitutional
obligations in terms the Constitution
of Zimbabwe.
(2)
Whether or not the requirements for a mandamus
have
been satisfied to order the respondents to gazette the Bill envisaged
by section
210 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe
with forty five days from the date of this order.
19.
The aforementioned questions on merit will be disposed of separately
hereunder after addressing preliminary and standing issues.
PRELIMINARY
ISSUES
20.
Before proceeding to deal with the merits, there are a number of
preliminary issues that call for the Court's attention, although not
raised by the parties, but being questions of law.
21.
Their determination is paramount in clarifying what really is before
this Court as opposed to what is purportedly so.
THE
APPLICANTS FOUNDING AFFIDAVIT IS DEFECTIVE
22.
The founding affidavit in this application is replete with anomalies
which render it defective. It is deposed to by the first applicant.
He is the one who under oath swears to and undertakes to depose to
the founding statement forming the basis of the suit. Thereafter, the
very same affidavit identifies the second applicant by naming him and
states that the second applicant brings the application 'in his own
right'.
23.
It is pertinent to note that the second applicant does not at any
point take the oath or undertake to depose to the founding affidavit.
24.
Neither does he sign the affidavit which is signed by the first
applicant. It does not end there. The founding affidavit of the first
applicant then purports to tell the story of both the applicants.
This it does in the most unusual way. The first applicant appears to
be the author of the first to fifth paragraphs of the founding
affidavit. He refers to himself in the first person where he states
thus: “I am the Applicant herein:” and refers to the second
applicant in the second person were he states: “The Second
Applicant is Rashid Stuart Mahiya.”
25.
It is not clear at what stage the second applicant takes over the
reins of authorship to the first applicant's founding affidavit,
but it appears to be possibly at about the sixth paragraph of the
founding affidavit. At para 6.2 the first applicant is referred to in
the second person where it says:
“In
my line of work I have witnessed the agonies of the violence
perpetrated against our citizens in unmitigated proportions, in
particular the first applicant, by the State and its agents.”
26.
It appears from the above remarks that it is the second applicant who
now puts forth his own story through the first applicant's founding
affidavit.
27.
From the above, it is clear that apart from being mentioned by the
first applicant, there is no affidavit before the court that can be
attributed to the second applicant. Therefore, the founding affidavit
before the court is that of the first applicant. The second
applicant, in a strange and unusual manner 'infuses'
his
own averments in an affidavit sworn to and signed by the first
applicant. Thus, effectively there is no affidavit placed before this
Court by the second applicant.
28.
The founding affidavit also only identifies two respondents, the
first and second respondents. The third and fourth respondents are
not identified as respondents save for their citation on the face of
the application.
29.
Further to that, at para 8.1 of the founding affidavit, the
authorship appears to have reverted back to the first applicant were
it is stated that: “The Applicant and I are ordinary citizens of
Zimbabwe and Human rights activists.” Such back and forth approach
is unacceptable. It leaves the facts muddled, not being clear which
averments are to be attributed to which applicant. Such
breadth-taking bundling is unacceptable, embarrassing and an unworthy
handiwork of one who is a senior legal practitioner.
30.
Further to that, and more seriously, the applicant's affidavit also
makes serious allegations against persons who are not cited as
parties to the application. Neither were they served with the
application to enable them to answer to the allegations made therein.
The founding affidavit at paras 8.4 to 8.12 (inclusive) alleges that
certain individuals believed to be members of the security sector
terrorised the first applicant and his family. It alleges vicious
assaults and intimidation which resulted in the death of some of the
first applicant's family members.
31.
It is now well established at law that, in the face of such serious
allegations, the persons whose conduct is impugned ought be cited and
afforded a chance to put across their own case.
In
view of the fact that this has not been done, the allegations should
be struck out and paras 8.4 to 8.12 inclusive are accordingly struck
off the record.
32.
The second applicant then purports to affirm the first applicant's
affidavit through a supporting affidavit that merely states that the
second applicant confirms the first applicant's averments and makes
them his own. In addition, the second applicant deposes to an
answering affidavit in circumstances where he has not deposed to a
proper affidavit.
33.
That cannot be. This Court ought not to consider it the answering
affidavit of the second applicant as it stands on nothing. It is
trite that an application stands or falls on the averments made in
the founding affidavit. See Herbstein & van Winsen 'the
Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa'
3rd
ed (hereinafter 'Herbstein
& Van Winsen or the Authors')
p80 where the authors stated that:
“The
general rule, however, which has been laid down repeatedly is that an
applicant must stand or fall by his founding affidavit and the facts
alleged therein, and that although sometimes it is permissible to
supplement the allegations contained in that affidavit, still the
main foundation of the application is the allegation of facts stated
therein, because these are the facts which the respondent is called
upon either to affirm or deny. If the applicant merely sets out a
skeleton case in his supporting affidavits any fortifying paragraphs
in his replying affidavits will be struck out.”
34.
From the above remarks, it is clear that the second applicant's
replying affidavit ought to be struck out as well. It is pertinent to
note that the second applicant's answering affidavit of five pages
purports to answer to a number of issues that include locus standi
and a substantial portion of it relates to section
210 of the Constitution.
Therefore if struck out, in addition to other anomalies identified,
this Court is left with very little on which the application is
premised and from which this Court ought to be informed.
35.
However, because the application raises the issue of legality, the
court would want to be slow in dismissing such an application offhand
even in the face of these glaringly gross technical glitches,
notwithstanding the invidious position which the few remaining valid
threadbare averments place the court in.
36.
The application seeks to enforce the constitutional obligations as
set out in section
210 of the Constitution,
and this Court as the apex court on constitutional matters is equally
obligated to see to it that constitutional obligations are fulfilled.
RESPONDENTS
NOTICE OF OPPOSITION
37.
There is no real objection by the respondents to the applicants
claim. The respondents objection in varying language is to the effect
that there has not been a violation of the applicants rights by the
respondents. The respondents argument is that the gazetting of the
Bill envisaged by section
210 of the Constitution
takes time and that due diligence requires the process not to be
rushed. Therefore, the respondents in substance are not opposed to
the gazetting of the Bill.
38.
If anything they affirm the need to honour constitutionally created
obligations such as section
210 of the Constitution.
39.
On the other hand the applicants insist on the need for prompt
adherence to constitutionally created obligations by the respondents
in line with the Constitution.
This means the enactment and promulgation by the respondents of the
Act envisioned by section
210 of the Constitution
within a reasonable time.
LOCUS
STANDI AND DIRECT ACCESS
40.
There was ultimately no debate in relation to standing. The
applicants averred that they had standing and the right to directly
approach the Court under section
167(5)
as read with section 85(1)(a) and (d) of the Constitution.
Ordinarily, the applicant would have required leave to approach the
court directly, but since the rules were promulgated only in June
2016, this requirement cannot be taken against him. At any rate, the
applicant does satisfy the requirements for direct access.
41.
Section
167(5) of the Constitution
confers to any person a right to bring a constitutional application
directly to this Court in the interest of justice. The applicant
(because in essence there is only one who is properly before the
court) as a citizen of Zimbabwe does qualify as “any person”
identified in section
167(5) of the Constitution
authorized to bring a matter to the Constitutional
Court.
What
has been brought before the court is a constitutional matter and the
application is being brought in the interest of justice.
42.
With regard to the constitutionality of the matter, section
332 of the Constitution
defines a constitutional matter as:
“...
a matter in which there is an issue involving the interpretation,
protection or enforcement of this constitution;”
43.
Clearly the application brings to this Court a constitutional matter
by seeking to enforce compliance with section
210 of the Constitution.
It is also in the interest of justice for the applicant to seek to
uphold the constitution by compelling the realisation of
constitutionally created obligation.
The
applicant therefore has the right to approach the Court directly in
terms of section
167(5) of the Constitution
and his locus
standi
is not in doubt nor is it challenged.
WHETHER
THE DELAY IN ENACTING THE LAW IS UNREASONABLE
44.
Section
210 of the Constitution
quoted verbatim reads as follows:
“210
Independent complaints mechanisms
An
Act of Parliament must provide an effective and independent mechanism
for receiving and investigating complaints from members of the public
about misconduct on the part of members of the security services, and
for remedying any harm caused by such misconduct.”
45.
The section is in clear and unambiguous language couched in
peremptory language. The provision of an effective and independent
mechanism for receiving and investigating complaints from members of
the of the public about misconduct on the part of members of the
security services, and for remedying any harm caused by such
misconduct must be empowered by an Act of Parliament. Section
210 of the Constitution
does not specify the time frame within which the Act must be enacted
and promulgated. Section
324 of the Constitution,
however, requires that all constitutional obligations must be
performed diligently and without delay.
46.
The South African Constitution
contains a similar provision which was subject to interpretation in
the case of Minister
of Justice and Constitutional
Development v Chonco and
Others
2010
(4) SA 82 (CC).
The South African Constitutional
Court in interpreting the equivalent to section 324 of the Zimbabwe
Constitution
had this to say:
“...
good governance and social trust are premised at least partly on
reasonable responsive decision making.”
(my underlining).
47.
Reasonable and responsive decision making is therefore what is
contemplated in section
324 of the Constitution.
The question arising is whether a reasonable time frame has been
exceeded since the inception of the Constitution.
Section
210 of the Constitution
came into effect on the day the President elected under the
Constitution
in the first elections assumed office. See para 32 of the Sixth
Schedule of the Constitution.
48.
The President of the Republic of Zimbabwe assumed office on 22 August
2013. If one is to calculate the time from 22 August to date of
filing of this application, on 15 October 2015, a period of twenty
seven months two weeks had elapsed, or slightly over two years. And
if the time taken into reckoning is the hearing date, then, as
already noted, the period would be less than two years and a half –
hardly sufficient to support a finding of undue delay. However, one
must be alive to the fact that up to date, more than seven years
later, the Act in question has not been enacted.
49.
The Constitution
is clear on the point that all constitutional obligations must be
performed diligently and without delay. In answering the question
whether or not the respondents have failed in discharging their
constitutional obligation without delay, regard must be had to the
process of the origination of Bills.
50.
Public Bills generally go through preliminary stages before they are
brought to Parliament. The responsible Minister first presents
proposals to cabinet. Once cabinet is satisfied that the proposals
are in line with government policy the responsible Minister is
directed to prepare a draft Bill along agreed lines. The Legal
Drafting Department in the Attorney General's office prepares a
draft bill for consideration by the Cabinet Committee on Legislation.
Once the Bill has been approved by Cabinet it is then published in
the Government Gazette about fourteen days before its introduction in
Parliament. The process described above relates only to Bills
introduced by members of the Executive. Private members Bills have to
be brought in by motion. If that motion is approved by the House the
Bill is then printed and introduced in Parliament.
51.
One should also note that a Bill can also be introduced in Parliament
by a Minister responsible for a particular Ministry. The first
respondent is one such Minister who may introduce a Bill in
Parliament. The Bill envisaged in section
210 of the Constitution
has not yet been introduced in Parliament let alone gazetted. What
has been filed of record is what the respondents term a “working
document” which ex facie are notes on the alignment of laws to the
constitution focusing on section
210 of the Constitution.
Although the process of how proposals become Bills is largely
shrouded in secrecy, L Madhuku “Introduction to Zimbabwean Law”
enumerates stages of a Bill before it is gazetted and introduced in
Parliament. The stages are stated hereunder:
“1.
Cabinet makes a policy decision that a certain law is to be made.
2.
The decision is communicated to the relevant government department by
the relevant Minister. It must in turn prepare a set of detailed
principles to govern the legislation.
3.
These principles are sent to the Cabinet Committee on Legislation
(CCL). This is a sub-committee of cabinet tasked with supervising
legislative drafting. Its function is to debate and approve the
principles in the light of policy spelt out by the full cabinet.
4.
From the CCL, the principles are sent to the Attorney General's
Office, where a drafts person is appointed and assigned the role of
drafting the piece of legislation. He or she must work in constant
consultation with the relevant government department.
5.
When the department is satisfied with the draft, it sends a draft
Bill together with an accompanying memorandum to the CCL, which must
scrutinize it in light of the principles and the policy articulated
by the full cabinet.
6.
After approval by the CCL, the Bill may either be sent to the full
cabinet, in case of important or controversial Bill, or to
Parliament, if the CCL has been mandated to follow that route.”
52.
Subsequently to the above noted stages, the Bill is then introduced
to Parliament by the relevant minister after it is gazetted.
Paragraph 3(c) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution
mentions who may introduce a Bill to Parliament. The section provides
that:
“any
Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister may introduce into motion
for debate in or present any petition to either the Senate or the
National Assembly.”
53.
After the introduction of the Bill to Parliament, the Constitution
and Standing Rules and Orders of Parliament provides the procedure to
be followed until a Bill is assented to by the President to become
law. Paragraph 5 of the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution
sets out how the transmission of Bills between Houses happens after
their introduction to Parliament.
54.
What is pertinent to note is that the process starting from when a
Bill is introduced in Parliament is beyond the control of the
respondents. The respondents do not have powers to control what
happens in Parliament. It is the lack of diligence during the
pre-Bill stage that the applicants take issue with.
55.
Although the Constitution
is silent on the exact timelines within which the Act envisaged in
section
210 of the Constitution
should be enacted, the same constitution requires all constitutional
obligations to be performed diligently and without delay. A period of
over seven years has passed since the coming into force of the
constitution. That period of time in my view exceeds reasonable time
within which the respondents should have discharged their
constitutional obligation. Good governance and social trust are
premised at least partly on reasonable, responsive and forthright
decision making.
56.
The crafting of section
210 of the Constitution is
peremptory. The constitution is the conscience of the nation and the
courts are its guardians or custodians. See case of South
African Revenue Authority v Commissioner for Conciliation, Mediation
and Arbitration and Others
[2016]
ZACC 38. On this Court's shoulder rests the very important
responsibility of holding our constitutional democracy together and
giving hope to all our people that their constitutional aspirations
will be realised and protected.
57.
Whilst the court remains alive to the fact that coming up with Bills
or legislation does not happen overnight, one can take judicial
notice of the shortest timelines within which a Bill can take from
its formulation to it becoming an Act. The Labour Amendment Act of
2015, for example, took less than thirty days from its formulation to
its promulgation.
The
respondents failure, to present a Bill before Parliament for a period
in excess of seven years therefore constitutes an unreasonable delay.
WHETHER
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A MANDAMUS HAVE BEEN SATISFIED
58.
The applicant in his draft order is also seeking a mandamus to the
effect that the respondents be ordered to gazette the Bill envisaged
by section
210 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe within
forty five days from the date of this order.
59.
A
mandamus
is a judicial remedy available to enforce the performance of a
specific statutory duty or remedy the effect of an unlawful action
already taken. See, the case of Oil
Blending Enterprises (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of Labour 2001
(2) ZLR 446 (H) at 450.
The Court in
Nkomo
& Anor v Minister of Local Government,supra,at
page 9 stated:
“...
it was within the powers of a court before which a constitutional
matter is argued to grant, in an appropriate case, a mandatory
interdict or mandamus. While not necessarily bound by them, the Court
is generally guided by common law principles relating to interdicts.”
60.
The requirements to access the judicial remedy were spelt out in the
case of Setlogelo
v Setlogelo 1914 AD
at
227.The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe noted with approval the
requirements of mandamus in the case of Tribatic
(Pvt) Ltd v Tobacco Marketing Board 1996
(2) ZLR 52 (S)
at
p56. The requirements the applicants must prove for a mandamus
are
that:
(1)
A clear or define right –this is matter of substantive law.
(2)
An injury actually committed or reasonable apprehended- an
infringement of the right established and resultant prejudice.
(3)
The absence of a similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.
61.
With regard to the first requirement, according to Herbstein &
Van Winsen “The
Civil Practice of the High Courts of South Africa”
5th Edition, at p1457, whether the applicant has a right is a matter
of substantive law. The authors state that one has to prove a clear
and definite right in terms of substantive law, a right which can be
protected, a right existing at common law or statutory law. The
applicants right is derived from constitutional law.
62.
Section
167(5) of the Constitution
gives the applicants a right to enforce compliance with section
210 to
ensure that the Act contemplated by the section is enacted. The
applicant's rights also arise automatically in law, through section
210.
According to the authors, it is unnecessary for the applicant to
allege any facts in order to establish the rights, when a right
arises automatically at law, more so in the case of constitutional
rights.
In
that regard, the first requirement for a constitutional mandamus
has
been established.
63.
The second requirement as noted earlier is that injury must actually
have been committed or reasonably apprehended. The authors Herbstein
& Van Winsen
at p1464 state that injury must be understood in the wide sense.
According to them, the harm must be caused by the respondent;
alternatively the prevention of the harm must be within the
respondent's power.
64.
It is pertinent to note that the respondents are in a position to
enact and promulgate the Act envisaged by section
210 of the Constitution.
The perceived injury or harm for the purpose of the mandamus
being sought is to curtail the further delay by the respondents and
to compel them to put in motion and complete its part in the
formulation of a Bill to satisfy section
210 of the Constitution.
The
continued delay by the respondents to formulate a Bill for
consideration by Parliament constitutes the reasonable apprehension
on the part of the applicant that the delay may persist.
65.
The third requirement to granting a mandamus
is that there must be no other remedy affording the same protection.
There is no other remedy to move the respondents to give effect to
section
210 of the Constitution.
The
requirement for granting a mandamus have been satisfied and this
Court is satisfied that the legal remedy sought must be granted.
66.
There been no dispute as to the need to comply with section
210 of the Constitution
in order to fulfil the constitutional obligations, but given the
delay already experienced, it is fair and reasonable to order that
the respondents comply with the order in a period of forty five days
as originally prayed, the challenges of the COVID 19 pandemic
notwithstanding.
In
the light of the foregoing, I am satisfied that the application has
merit.
Accordingly,
it is hereby ordered as follows:
1.
Paragraphs 8.4 to 8.12 inclusive of the applicant's founding
affidavit are struck out as they make serious allegations against
persons who were not made part of these proceedings through citation
and service.
2.
The application is granted with costs.
3.
The respondents failure to formulate within a reasonable time a Bill
to give effect to the Act envisaged in section
210 of the Constitution
is in breach of the Constitution
of Zimbabwe.
4.
The respondents are ordered to gazette the Bill envisaged by section
210 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe
within forty five days from the date of this order.
MALABA
DCJ: I agree
ZIYAMBI
JCC: I agree
GWAUNZA
JCC: I agree
GARWE
JCC: I agree
GOWORA
JCC: I agree
PATEL
JCC: I agree
BHUNU
JCC: I agree
UCHENA
JCC: I agree
Tendai
Biti, applicant's legal practitioners
Civil
Division of the Attorney General's Office, respondents legal
practitioners
