MALABA
DCJ: On the
day of the hearing we allowed the appeal with costs and indicated that reasons
for the decision were to be availed in due course. These are they.
This is an appeal against the High Court decision
dismissing a claim for an order of eviction of the respondents by the appellant
(hereinafter referred to as the Trust), from the premises commonly known as 85
Baines Avenue, Harare. The facts of the matter are as follows.
The Leonard Cheshire Home Zimbabwe Central Trust was
established on 3 April 1981, by a Deed of Trust for the purposes of
raising funds and to provide means for the care and rehabilitation of permanently
physically impaired people. The affairs of the Trust are administered by six Trustees
who are appointed in terms of clause 5 of the Trust Deed for a period of 5
years. In pursuance of the objectives of the Trust, the Trustees established a
number of Homes within Harare, one of which is the Masterson Home which is
located at No. 85 Baines Avenue, Harare.
The policy of the Trustees has been to admit into
the Masterson Home a specific number of inmates at a given time, rehabilitate
them and release them for integration into the community. Many permanently physically
impaired persons have been rehabilitated by the Trust and have found settlement
in the public thereafter without any problem.
At a meeting held on 12 March 1998 the Trustees
decided that consideration be given to having the Masterson Home (“the Home”) closed
because it had become difficult to run the institution on the stringent budget
available. On 30 November 1999 a firm decision was taken by the Trustees that
the Home be closed. The proposal was
that the property would be sold and part of the proceeds used to help the respondents
(hereinafter referred to as Beneficiaries) to start their own income generating
projects in the communities into which they would be integrated. It was also decided
that those who were not ready for integration would be transferred to a home in
Kambuzuma, Harare.
Pursuant to the decision of the Trustees to sell
the Home, an assessment of the inmates was carried out in order to determine
the needs that were peculiar to each of them.
The purpose of the assessment of each beneficiary's needs was to ensure
that the programme envisaged did not adversely prejudice the beneficiaries. The
assessment exercise was undertaken by a consultancy firm which was mandated to look
at the feasibility of the anticipated programme and make recommendations. At
all material times the beneficiaries were advised of the fact that there would
be a need to vacate the premises to pave way for the sale of the Home. It was made clear to the beneficiaries that
they were not going to be thrown into the streets, but that each individual's
needs would be assessed and a program of rehabilitation or integration suitable
to him or her put in place. They were also advised that part of the proceeds
from the sale of the property would be used to finance integration projects in
the communities in which they were to be resettled. The beneficiaries were
asked to indicate the types of projects they wanted to undertake.
The beneficiaries accepted the proposals and
undertook to move out of the premises sometime in the year 2005. They later
reneged from their undertaking and refused to vacate the building arguing that
the Trustees who admitted them into the Home had promised to let them occupy
the premises for as long as they wanted. They started denying entry into the
Home to members of staff. They also let out part of the premises to medical
practitioners who converted them into surgeries. Some of the rooms were let out
to members of the public who used them as phone shops, tuck shops and living
rooms.
The beneficiaries collected monthly rentals from
the occupants of the rooms they let out illegally. The Home was turned into a commercial centre.
The beneficiaries did all these things without lawful authority from the
Trustees. The actions were against the
spirit of the Trust. The premises were not maintained causing deterioration in
the state of repair of the building and the general health conditions.
On 26 July 2004, a decision was taken by
the Trustees to sell the Home. On 2
August 2004 the Trustees instituted proceedings, in the name of the Trust, for
an order of eviction against the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries opposed the action. The Trustees made it clear in the declaration
that the action for eviction was being brought on behalf of the Trust. The averment
is contained in para. 13 of the declaration which reads as follows:
“13. All the
defendants are beneficiaries of the Leonard Cheshire Homes Zimbabwe Central
Trust, a trust duly registered, whose trustees are the Plaintiffs. The
Defendants all occupy the apartments at
the property referred to in paragraph 11 (above) in their capacity as
beneficiaries of the trust.” (My
emphasis)
In their plea, the beneficiaries admitted the
averment made by the Trustees that the eviction proceedings were instituted in
the name of the Trust by the Trustees who had authority to do so. In para. 1 of the plea which addressed the
averments in paras. 1– 13 of the declaration, the beneficiaries stated as
follows:
“1. Ad Para 1 – 13
This is admitted.”
The substance of the defence by the beneficiaries
to the claim by the Trustees was that they had a right to continued occupation
of the premises. They alleged that the Trustees who admitted
them to the Home had assured them that they would stay at the institution for
as long as it was necessary. Their defence did not challenge the right of the
Trustees to institute proceedings for their eviction from the premises. The locus standi of the Trustees in the
proceedings was not an issue between the parties. The issues that were referred to trial were:
1.
Whether Plaintiff has failed to
provide Defendants with the assistance and support set out in paragraph 3 (i)
(a) of the Trust Deed?
2.
Whether the Defendants are
entitled to remain in occupation of the property?
3.
If the answer to (ii) is No,
whether Plaintiff is entitled to an order evicting the Defendants from the
property?
At the
hearing the plaintiff called one B Chikwanha as a witness. When he was being cross examined by Mr Mehta for the defendants, it was put to
him that his term of office and terms of office of Mr Gomwe, Mr Mills and Mr
Hungwe had expired at the time the decisions to evict the defendants and sell the
Home were made. Mr Mehta suggested
that the decisions were invalid. Mr Magwaliba
who represented the Trustees objected to the line of cross examination on the
ground that it raised a question of fact of the expiry of the terms of office
of the Trustees. Mr Magwaliba argued
that the matter of expiry of the terms of office of the Trustees had not been
put in issue in the pleadings. He
indicated that in light of the admission made by the defendants that those who
instituted the proceedings were Trustees of the plaintiff it was not open to Mr
Mehta to challenge the validity of
the decisions made by the Trustees on the allegation that their terms of office
had expired at the time the decisions were made.
The learned
Judge took the view that the question of the expiry of the tenures of office of
the Trustees had a bearing on the validity of the decisions that were made in
respect of the closure of the Home on 30 November 1999 and 26 July 2004. He ruled that the issue was a question of law
which the defendants could raise at any time during the proceedings and as a
result overruled the objection by Mr Magwaliba.
Mr Mehta was allowed to
cross examine Mr Chikwanha on the alleged expiry of the terms of office of
the Trustees who made the respective decisions.
The evidence showed that although the terms of office of some of the
Trustees who made the decision of 30 November 1999 had expired, the number of Trustees
whose terms of office had not expired formed a quorum in terms of clause 5 of the Deed of Trust. In respect of the decision made on the 26
July 2004 the evidence was not conclusive as to whether the terms of office of
Mr Mills and Mr Muzondo had expired. The fact that the evidence was
inconclusive did not justify a finding that the terms of office of the Trustees
had expired.
As to the other Trustees the evidence suggested
that their terms of office had not expired. Mr Choto was appointed in 2004. The evidence suggested that Mr Muzondo
could have been appointed on 9 February 2004. There was no evidence to suggest
that he had already been appointed Trustee prior to that date. The evidence also
suggested that Mr Mills would not have been a Trustee before 30 of November
1999. That meant he could not have been
appointed before that date. The terms of office of Mills, Muzondo and Choto
were current on 26 July 2004, when the decision to evict the beneficiaries was
made.
When the learned Judge made the decision on the
expiry of the terms of office of the Trustees, he had considered the matter to
be a question of law. He however found
as a matter of fact that the terms of office of the Trustees, who made the
decision of 30 November 1999, had not expired. On the basis of that evidence the learned
Judge found that the decision of 30 November 2004 was valid. The learned Judge also held that there was
inconclusive evidence on the question of expiry of the terms of office of Mr Mills
and Muzondo.
The learned Judge held that the plaintiff bore the
onus of proving that the decision taken on the 26 July 2004 was valid. As a result he held that the plaintiff had
not discharged the evidential burden of establishing the facts on which the
question of invalidity of the decision could be made. The learned Judge misplaced the evidential
onus on the plaintiff because he misunderstood the content of the matter in
issue. The question to be decided was
whether the decision was invalid. It was
the defendants who raised the question of the invalidity of the decision of 26
July 2004. They bore the burden of
producing evidence to prove the facts of the expired terms of office of the
Trustees on which the question of invalidity of the decision could be
determined.
The learned Judge determined that the decision made
by the Trustees on 26 July 2004 to evict the beneficiaries was invalid. The
plaintiff's case was dismissed with costs. Aggrieved by the decision of the
court a quo, the appellants noted the
appeal on the following grounds:
1.
That the court a quo misdirected itself in finding that
the issue whether the Appellants had exceeded their five year terms in terms of
Clause 5 (c) of the Deed of Trust was a question of law as opposed to an issue
of fact.
2.
The court a quo further fundamentally misdirected itself in allowing the
respondents to raise the new issue which was not pleaded in their pleadings with
the first witness for the Appellant. The court a quo therefore erred in over – ruling the appellant's objection to
the respondents' raising of a new defence at the trial.
3.
The court a quo further misdirected itself in finding that the appellant had
the onus to prove that the Trustees had not exceeded their five year terms and
were therefore entitled to make a resolution for the ejectment of the respondents
thereby making the appellant liable to prove the respondents' new defence.
4.
The court a quo further erred in making findings of fact on the question of
whether the Trustees had exceeded the five year term limit in terms of the Deed
of Trust based on incomplete and inconclusive evidence led by the parties
thereby contradicting an earlier finding that the issue was a point of law.
5.
The court a quo further misdirected itself in failing to find that the
respondents had abandoned and not proved their pleaded defence, that is that
upon being accepted as beneficiaries to the trust, they were promised to live
at the premises in issue, No. 85 Baines Avenue, Harare for life or for as long
as they wished.
6.
In the event therefore, the court
a quo erred in dismissing the appellants claim.
On the question whether or not the court a quo correctly decided that the issue
of the expiry of the terms of office of the Trustees was a question of law, the
Court holds that the decision was wrong. The question was a question of fact
which could only be answered by reference to facts established by
evidence. The court a quo would have had to ask itself the question whether or not
sufficient evidence had been placed before it to prove on a balance of
probabilities the facts on which it would make a finding that the terms of
office of the Trustees had expired. The court would not have gone into the question
of evidence on the expiry of the terms of the Trustees to answer a question of
law. The law on the matter was clear in that a Trustee could only serve a term
of 5 years. The issue of whether a particular Trustee had exceeded his term of
office at the time a decision was made did not need an explanation of what the
law was. Once a question requires a
court to consider whether certain facts have been established in order to
answer it, the court is to determine a question of fact.
The court a quo
appears to have appreciated the position when it determined the question
whether the decision of 30 November 1999 was valid or not. To arrive at that
decision it analysed the evidence led on the terms of office of the Trustees concerned
and concluded that, the fact of the expiry of the terms of office of the Trustees
who constituted a quorum had not been proved. That was a contradictory position
taken by the court if the question whether the terms of office of the Trustees
had expired was a question of law. The
same goes for the question whether the decision to sell the Home taken on 26
July 2004 was valid. The court a quo
found itself having to go into the evidence of the fact of the expiry of the
terms of office of the Trustees. It came to the conclusion that there was no
sufficient evidence to prove whether or not the terms of office of Mr Mills and
Mr Muzondo had expired.
The court erroneously placed the evidential burden
on the plaintiff when it was the defendants who had raised the issue of the
expiry of tenure of office of the Trustees. If the question of the fact of the
expiry of the terms of office of the Trustees had been properly placed before
the court for determination, the onus would have been on the defendants who
made the allegations.
The finding by the court a quo on the inconclusiveness of the evidence on the expiry or
otherwise of the terms of office of Mr Mills and Mr Muzondo, was wrong. The
evidence showed that when the decision to evict the respondents was made, Mr Muzondo
had served 3 years as a Trustee. Under
cross examination, Mr Chikwanha explained that Mr Muzondo was appointed in
February 2004. To say the evidence was
inconclusive when there was no evidence to contradict what Mr Chikwanha said
was a misdirection. The evidence showed that Mr Mills could not have been in office
before 30 November 1999. In the absence of proof by the defendants to the
contrary, the court a quo was bound,
in light of the admission made in the plea, to accept that the terms of office
of the Trustees concerned had not expired when the decision to evict the
defendants from the premises was made on 26 July 2004.
Mr Mpofu
sought to impugn the validity of the proceedings in the court a quo on the ground that each Trustee
was not named as plaintiff in the document commencing proceedings.
On the issue of the failure to cite as plaintiff,
each Trustee by name in the document commencing the proceedings, Mr Magwaliba made reference to the High
Court Rules, 1971. The effect of r 8A of
Order 2A is that it is not necessary to list Trustees by name when they sue on
behalf of a Trust. It is clear that the proceedings were instituted by the
Trust. The Deed of Trust grants the Trust the power to sue and be sued. The respondents had challenged the locus standi of the Trustees to sue on
behalf of the Trust.
The relevant rules provide as follows:
“ORDER
2A
PROCEEDINGS
BY OR AGAINST ASSOCIATIONS, ETC
7. Interpretation in Order 2A
In
this Order—
“associate”,
in relation to—
(a) a trust, means a trustee;
(b)
an association other than a trust, means a member of the association;
“association”
includes—
(a) a trust; and
(b)
a partnership, a syndicate, a club or any other association of persons which is
not a body corporate.
8. Proceedings by or against
associations
Subject to this Order, associates may sue and be
sued in the name of their association.
8A. Naming of associates
(1) In any proceedings to which an association is a
party, any other party may, by written notice to the association, require a
statement of the names and places of residence of the persons who were the
association's associates at the time the cause of action accrued.
(2) A person who receives a notice in terms of
subrule (1) shall, within five days after receiving it—
(a)
furnish the party concerned with a written statement containing the required
information; and
(b)
file a copy of the written statement with the registrar; and the proceedings
shall continue in the same manner, and the same consequences shall follow, as
if the associates had been named in the summons or notice commencing the
proceedings:
Provided that the proceedings shall continue in the
name of the association except where a writ of civil imprisonment is sought
against an associate, in which event the associate shall be specifically named
in the civil imprisonment proceedings.”
A proper reading of the provisions of r 8A of the
High Court Rules establishes that it is not a requirement for the names of Trustees
to be listed when they bring an action on behalf of the Trust. The
only place where the issue of the listing of the names of Trustees when an
action has been instituted on behalf of the Trust is where a defendant to a
suit by the Trustees on behalf of the Trust, has requested from the Trust names
and addresses of the individual Trustees. This would be in line with r 8A (1)
of the High Court Rules, 1971.
It was
for these reasons that the Court found that the decision of the court a quo could not stand and accordingly
allowed the appeal with costs.
GARWE JA: I
agree
MAVANGIRA AJA: I
agree
Magwaliba
and Kwirira, appellants' legal practitioners
Lawman Chimuriwo Attorneys At Law, respondent's legal practitioners
