GOWORA
JA:
This appeal from a decision by the Labour Court concerns the interpretation of
seemingly conflicting provisions within the Labour Act [Cap. 28:01],
and, additionally the conflict between the Labour Act itself, (“the Act”) and
the Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund (Conditions of Service and Misconduct)
Regulations S.I.258/1996, “the Regulations”.
The respondent is a statutory body
which is created in terms of s 47 of the Manpower Planning and Development Act
[Cap. 28:02]. In terms of s 69 of the same Act, the Minister is
empowered to enact regulations, which, in the opinion of the Minister, would
enhance the performance of the functions of the respondent. In the exercise of
those powers the Minister caused the promulgation of the Regulations.
The
appellants were employed by the respondent in various capacities. On 18 August
2009, the appellants were given instructions to sign declarations of secrecy
following upon the leakage of information of a confidential nature from the
respondent's office. All of the appellants refused to sign the declarations and
they were charged with disobeying a lawful instruction. A second charge of
hindering or obstructing another employee in the performance of his duties
which was preferred against the second appellant could not be sustained and was
dismissed.Following upon disciplinary proceedings all the appellants were found
guilty of the charges and dismissed from employment.Dissatisfied with their
dismissal, they appealed to the Trustee, who is the Minister of Higher and
Tertiary Education, in terms of s 44 of the Regulations and were unsuccessful.
Dissatisfied with the dismissal of that appeal, they noted an appeal to the
Labour Court. They were unsuccessful before the Labour Court which held that
there was no right of appeal to the Labour Court provided for in the
Regulations. They have as a consequence, appealed to this Court.
The
appellants have in their appeal to this Court raised issues on alleged
inconsistencies as relates to the interpretation of ss 2, 3, 12B and 92D of the
Act and s 44 (1) of the Regulations. The grounds upon which the appeal is
premised are the following:
1.
The court a quo erred in ruling as it did that it had no jurisdiction to
hear the appeal by the appellants.
2.
Having correctly ruled that the Labour Act [Cap. 28:01] applies to
the appellants, the learned president a quo erred in declining to
exercise jurisdiction to hear the appeal by the appellants.
3.
The court a quo further erred in concluding that s 44(1) of the
Zimbabwe Manpower Development Fund (Conditions of Service and Misconduct)
Regulations 1996 S.I. 258/96 provides that an appeal to the respondent's
Trustee is final and un-appealable.
4.
The proceedings taken by the Respondent under the Zimbabwe Manpower Development
Fund (Conditions of Service and Misconduct) Regulations 1996 S.I. 258/96
were null and void ab initio and of no force and effect by virtue
of the application of s 5 (a) and (b) of S.I. 15 of 2006 as read with the
peremptory provisions of section 12B of the Act. Accordingly the court a quo
erred in refusing to entertain the appeal.
The
learned President in the court a quo found that the Act applied to the
appellants. The learned President was unable to find that the Act confers
jurisdiction on the Labour Court to entertain the appeal principally due to the
wording of s 44 of the Regulations which does not bestow a right of appeal
beyond that of the Trustee.
The
finding by the court a quo was to the effect that whilst s 3 of the Act
provided that the Act applied to all employees except those specifically
excluded in the said section, it did not confer jurisdiction upon the court to
hear and determine appeals arising out dismissals effected under the
Regulations. The court said the following:
“Section 3 does not confer
jurisdiction on any court to apply the provisions of the Labour Act. The
question we are dealing with here is whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction
to hear appeals determined in terms of S.I 258/96 where the Statutory Instrument
does not provide for an appeal to the Labour Court? The Labour Court is a
creature of Statute and its jurisdiction is derived from the Statute creating
it.”
The
appellants contend however, that, notwithstanding the provisions of s 44 (1) of
the Regulations under which they were charged with misconduct and dismissed
from employment, they are, by virtue of the provisions of the Labour Act,
entitled to be heard by the Labour Court by way of appeal and that
consequently, their appeal was properly before the court a quo. They
contend further that the inconsistencies within the legislation do not oust the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain their appeal. With regard
to the conflict between the Regulations and the provisions of the Act, it is
contended by the appellants that in view of the provisions of s 2A of the Act,
the Act prevails over the Regulations and consequently there exists a right of
appeal to the Labour Court.
The Labour
Court is a creature of statute and can exercise only those powers that it has
bestowed upon it by its enabling Act. The powers of the Labour Court in
relation to appeals are spelt out in s 89 (1) of the enabling Act. They are
stated as follows:
The Labour
Court shall exercise the following functions:
“(a)
Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any
other enactment.”
In my view, the starting point in
determining the dispute is s 3 of the Act which provides as follows:
“3 Application of Act
(1)
This Act shall apply to all employers and employees
except those whose conditions
of employmentare otherwise provided for in the Constitution.
(2) For
the avoidance of any doubt, the conditions of employment of members of the Public
Service shall be governed by the Public Service Act [Cap. 16:04].
(3) This Act shall not apply to or
in respect of—
(a) members of a disciplined
force of the State; or
(b)
members of any disciplined force of a foreign State who are in
Zimbabwe under any agreementconcluded between the Government and the Government
of that foreign State; or
(c)
such other employees of the State as the President may designate by statutory
instrument.”
As is evident from the provisions of
section 3, the Act applies to all employers and employees except for those
whose conditions of employment are governed by the Constitution or the Public
Service Act [Chapter 16:04]. The precursor to the Labour Act, the Labour
Relations Act 16 of 1985, now repealed provided in s 3 thereof:
“3. Application of Act
This Act
shall apply to all employers and all employees except those whose conditions of
employment are otherwise provided for by or under the Constitution.”
As a consequence of the above
provision, prior to the promulgation of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01], in
construing the section, courts within this jurisdiction concluded that the Act
was not of universal to all employees in Zimbabwe. See City of Mutare v Matamisa
1998 (1) ZLR 512, wherein despite the wording of the section providing that the
Act applied to all employees, this court held that it was not obligatory for
the City of Mutare to obtain the approval of the Minister as provided for in s
2 of the Labour Relations (General Conditions of Employment) (Termination of
Employment) Regulations S.I 371/1985. Effectively, therefore, the court found
that employees of urban councils were not covered by the Act.[1]
Subsections 2 and 3 of the current
Act were promulgated by Act 7 of 2005 and as a consequence, with the exceptions
of those specifically excluded by the section, all employees were brought under
the umbrella of the Act. In the circumstances of this case it seems to me that
the finding by the court that in terms of s 3 thereof the Act applied to the
appellants was clearly contradictory to the subsequent finding that the court
did not have jurisdiction to determine the appeal filed by the
appellants.
It follows therefore that under s
89(1) employers and employees whose conditions of employment are covered under
s 3 are impliedly given the right to appeal to the Labour Court. It is only those
employers and employees who are excluded by s 3 who cannot have access to the
Labour Court for the resolution of disputes.
It is the contention of the
appellants which contention finds favour with me, that, notwithstanding the
absence of a provision in the Regulations for an appeal process against the
decision of the Trustee, the appellants are not deprived of a remedy against
their dismissals under the Regulations. The appellants contend that an appeal
lies to the Labour Court which has jurisdiction in terms of sections 2A, 3 and
92D of the Act.
The appellants suggest that the
failure to provide for an appeal process beyond the Trustee is inconsistent
with s 3 of the Act, wherein every employee except those specifically excluded
therein, is provided for. As there is no specific provision denying the
appellants a right of appeal to the Labour Court, it is the contention of the
appellants that the court has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under the
circumstances of this particular case. I agree.
The
appellants have argued that the provisions of s 44 (1) of the Regulations
are inconsistent with the Act, in particular ss 3 and 2A thereof. They argue
further that the Regulations are subservient to the Act in relation to the
manner of termination of employment, and in particular s 2A (3).Section 2A
provides as follows:
“2A Purpose of Act
(1)
The purpose of this Act is to advance social justice and democracy in the
workplace by—
(a)
giving effect to the fundamental rights of employees
provided for under Part II;
(b) ….
[Paragraph repealed by section 3 of Act 7 of 2005]
(c)
providing a legal framework within which employees and employers can
bargain collectively for the improvement of conditions of employment;
(d) the promotion of fair
labour standards;
(e) the promotion of the participation by employees in
decisions affecting their interests in the work
place;
(f) securing the just, effective and expeditious resolution of disputes
and unfair labour practices.
(2)
This Act shall be construed in such manner as best ensures the attainment of
its purpose referred to in
subsection (1).
(3)
This Act shall prevail over any other enactment inconsistent with it.
[Subsection substituted by section 3
of Act 7 of 2005]
[Section inserted by section 4 of
Act 17 of 2002]”
In terms
of s 2A (3) thereof, the Labour Act shall prevail over any other enactment the
provisions of which are inconsistent with its own. The Regulations do not
permit any appeal beyond the Trustee. Section 44(1) is worded as follows:
“(1) An employee who is aggrieved by
a decision of the Director or the Chief Executive may, within fourteen days of
being notified of such decision appeal;
(a)
In the case of a decision by the Director to the Chief Executive;
(b)
In the case of a decision by the Chief Executive to the Trustee.”
There is a general rule of statutory
interpretation that where two statutes are in conflict with each other, the
later statute, by virtue of the principle of lex posterior derogate priori,
is deemed to be the superior one on the basis of implied repeal. This is
because it is presumed that when the legislature passes the latter Act it is
presumed to have knowledge of the earlier Act.
In Heavy
Transport & Plant Hire (Pty) Ltd &Ors v Minister of Transport Affairs
& Ors 1985 (2) SA 597, NESTADT J stated:[2]
“The principle is that statutes must
be read together and the later one must not be so construed as to repeal the
provisions of an earlier one or to take away rights conferred by an earlier one
unless the later statute expressly alters the provisions of the earlier one in
that respect, or such alteration is a necessary inference from the terms of the
later statute. The inference must be a necessary one and not merely a possible
one. (Kent N.O. v South African Railways and Another 1946 AD 398 at 405)
As KOTZE AJA stated in New Modderfontein Gold Mining Co v Transvaal
Provincial Administration 1919 AD 367 at 400:
“It is
only when the language used in the subsequent statute is so manifestly
inconsistent with that employed in the former legislation that there is a
repugnance and contradiction, so that the one conflicts with the other, that we
are justified in coming to the conclusion that the earlier Act has been
repealed by the later one”.”
In Wendywood
Development (Pty) Ltd v Rieger & Ano 1971 (3) SA 28 DIEMONT AJA, stated
at 38A-C
“That sec 30 must be modified to
give it efficacy can hardly be gainsaid. Indeed Mr Smallberger, who appeared
for the respondent conceded that some modification was necessary, but I am not
persuaded that the modification need be so extensive as to make it impossible
to reconcile the sections. It is necessary to bear in mind a well-known
principle of statutory construction, namely, that statutes must be read
together and the later one must not be so construed as to repeal the provisions
of the earlier one, unless the later statute expressly alters the provisions of
the earlier one or such alteration is a necessary inference from the provisions
of the later statute.”
DIEMONT
AJA in the Wendywood case had occasion to quote with approval the
remarks of WATERMEYER CJ in Kent, N.O. v South African Railways and Another
1946 AD 398, to the following effect:[3]
“The language of every enactment
must be so construed as far as possible to be consistent with every other which
it does not in express terms modify or repeal. The law, therefore, will not
allow the revocation or alteration of a statute by construction when the words
may have their proper operation without it. But it is impossible to will
contradictions; and if the provisions of a later Act are so inconsistent with
or repugnant to those of an earlier Act that the two cannot stand together, the
earlier stands impliedlyrepealed by the later.”
In view of the provisions of s 3 and
s 2A (3) the only logical conclusion is that the Labour Act applies to the appellants
and, that consequently they would be entitled to redress under the provisions
of the Act and thatthe Labour Court would have jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal. In my view the absence of an appeal process to the Labour Court in the
Regulations could not have overridden, and was never intended by the
Legislature to override the peremptory provisions of s 2A, which the court a
quo should have had recourse to. To the extent that an apparent
conflict would be manifest due to absence of a specific provision in the
Regulations for an appeal beyond the Trustee, then it seems to me that the
Labour Act prevails over the Regulations, suggesting an implicit repeal of the
Regulations.
The Regulations were promulgated in
1996 and when read together with s 2A of the Act, in view of the provisions of
s 2A the only construction available to the court is that s 44 (1) of the
Regulations has been repealed by implication, not merely because s 2A is a
later statutory provision, but also by virtue of the wording of s 2A which
provides that the Labour Act prevails over any other statute or piece of
legislation whose provisions are inconsistent with its own. In any event, the
Regulations, being subsidiary legislation are subordinate legislation. They are
not an Act of Parliament. They are made under delegated powers. In his book
Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, P. St. J. Langan refers to statutory
instruments as being an inferior form of legislation. As a consequence, s44 of
the Regulations is subservient to the Act and by virtue of s 2A (3) the Act
must supersede the Regulations.[4]
I am further fortified in this view
by the fact that the Regulations are not an employment code and in terms of s
12B, the Labour Act makes it mandatory for any dismissal to be effected in
terms of a registered code of conduct or the Labour National Employment Code of
Conduct, S.I. 15/2006.
The appellants have not argued that
their appeal to the Labour Court was premised under the Regulations in terms of
which they were dismissed. Indeed, it is accepted that the Regulations do not
provide for an appeal process beyond that provided for to the Trustee. The
issue is whether they could claim a right of appeal directly to the Labour
Court despite being dismissed under a statutory instrument which was not an
employment code as defined by the Act.
The Regulations do not deny an
appeal process beyond that available to the Trustee. They are silent and in my
view, the omission to provide for such an appeal process to the Labour Court is
not in itself constitutive of the denial of a right of appeal. What would be of
importance is if a right of appeal is provided for in the Labour Act
itself.
The issue
that then arises is whether in the Act itself there is provided a right of
appeal in favour of the appellants. The right of an employer or an employee to
appeal to the Labour Court is encapsulated in ss 92D and 92E of the Act which
provide:
“92D Appeals to the Labour Court
not provided for elsewhere in this Act
A person who is aggrieved by a
determination made under an employment code, may, within such time and insuch
manner as may be prescribed, appeal to the Labour Court.
[Section substituted by section 32
of Act 7 of
2005]
92E Appeals to the Labour Court
generally
(1)
An appeal in terms of this Act may address the merits of the
determination or decision appealed against.
(2) An appeal in terms
of subsection (1) shall not have
the
effect of suspending the determination or
decision
appealed against.
(3)
Pending the determination of an appeal the Labour Court may make such interim
determination in
the
matter as the justice of the case requires.”
The respondent has conceded that the
Regulations under which the appellants were dismissed is not an employment
code. Clearly, the appellants are not amongst the specie of employees whose
conditions of employment are governed by the Constitution or the Public Service
Act. It stands to reason therefore that their conditions of employment are
governed by the Labour Act.The logical conclusion therefore is that they would
have the right to approach the Labour Court by way of appeal.
However,
on the face of it, s 92D seems to be in conflict with s 3 of the Act, which
conflict stems from the fact that s 92D appears to exclude from its ambit
any employee whose grievance does not emanate from a determination made under
an employment code. This would suggest further that an employee in the same
position as the appellants who is dismissed except in terms of an employment
code has no right to appeal to the Labour Court.
It is a
well established canon of construction that courts should endeavour to
reconcile prima facie conflicting statutes as well as apparently
conflicting provisions in the same statute. Courts therefore do not readily
come to the conclusion that there is a conflict and by using all means at their
disposal they attempt to effect a reconciliation. It is also an established
canon of construction that different parts of the same statute should, if
possible, be construed so as to avoid a conflict between them. See Amalgamated
Packaging Industries Ltd v Hutt & Anor 1975 (4) SA 943 at 949H.
Accordingly,
where there are two sections in an Act which seem to clash but which can be
interpreted so as to give full force and effect to each, then such an
interpretation is to be preferred as opposed to an interpretation that will
partly destroy the effect of one of them. It is also an elementary principle of
construction that the Legislature will not be presumed to take away any
acquired rights. The intention to do so must be expressed or very clearly
implied from the language of the statute. In Principal Immigration
Officer v Bhula 1931 AD 323 WESSELS JA stated:[5]
“It would be extremely difficult in
such a case to say that Parliament has by implication in a later section
modified rights which in an earlier section it safeguarded explicitly. The
implied intention of Parliament must be so clear as to leave no doubt whatever
in the mind of the Court. The Legislature is presumed to be consistent with
itself.
.......
Moreover where there are two
sections in an Act which seem to clash, but can be so interpreted as to give
full force and effect to each, then such an interpretation is to be adopted
rather than one which will partly destroy the effect of one of them. More
especially in this case where the interpretation of the later statute would
violate or modify rights which had beensafeguarded in the former section.”
In casu,
it cannot have been the intent of the Legislature to exclude any employee from
obtaining access to an appeal upon the termination of his employment. The
appellants have, under s 3, been guaranteed a right to redress from the Labour
Court. It would therefore amount to an absurdity to find that in terms of s 92D
they cannot have their appeal heard on the grounds that their dismissal was not
effected in terms of an employment code. It would be difficult for this Court
to state in the circumstances of this case, that Parliament has by implication,
in s 92D modified rights which it had guaranteed in an earlier section of the
Act. The implied intention of the Legislature must be so clear as to leave no
doubt in the mind of the court as the Parliament is presumed to be consistent
with itself.
In R v
Pashda 1923 AD 281, INNES CJ stated:[6]
“…………..It is competent to Parliament
to oust the jurisdiction of courts of law if it considers such a course
advisable in the public interest. But where it takes away the right of an
aggrieved person to apply to the only authority which can investigate and,
where necessary, redress his grievance, it ought surely to do so in the
clearest language. Courts of law should not be astute to construe doubtful
words in a sense which will prevent them from doing what is prima facie their
duty, namely, from investigating cases of alleged injustice or illegality.”
Consequently, the rights and
obligations set out in the Act govern the terms and conditions of the
employment relationship between the appellants and the respondent. In view of
the provisions of s 3 therefore, employees covered by the Act are entitled to
the rights, benefits and obligations provided for in the Act as read with s 2A
thereof, which rights include the access to an appeal process to the Labour
Court.
It is
appropriate in construing the pertinent sections to have regard to s 12B in
order to place a proper perspective on the intention of the legislature as
regards the Act in issue. S 12B read:
“12B Dismissal
(1) Every employee has
the right not to be unfairly dismissed.
(2) An employee is
unfairly dismissed—
(a) if, subject to subsection (3), the employer fails to show
that he dismissed the employee in terms of an employment code; or
(b) in the absence of an
employment code, the employer shall comply with the model code made in terms of
section 101(9).”
In my
view, the intent of the legislature as manifested in the provisions of s 12B is
to ensure that no employee is dismissed unfairly by making it mandatory that
any dismissal be effected in accordance with a registered employment code.
Added to this, it is my view that, aperusal of ss 2, 3 and 92D leads to an
inescapable conclusion that the intent of the Legislature, in enacting the
provisions in question was, to ensure that the employment relationship was
governed by the provisions of one Act and that disputes were settled in terms
of procedures regulated by the provisions of that Act. I am bolstered in this
view by reference to the provisions of s 12B of the Act, requiring that no
dismissal be effected in the absence of an employment code. There is thus an
obvious contradiction between the provisions of s 3 and those of s 12B and 92D
of the Labour Act. If regard is had to the provisions of s 2A, 3, 12B and
92D of the Labour Act, it becomes evident that there is discord and
contradiction in the Act. There is a suggestion of a lack of cohesion. I would
venture to suggest that the law giver consider the need to bring cohesion to
the entire Act in order to avoid instances where persons whose rights are
covered and guaranteed under the Act fail to access such rights by virtue of the
unintended inconsistencies within the legislation.
It seems
to me that the right to an appeal under the Act cannot be taken away through a
provision which is inconsistent with the clear and unambiguous provisions of
ss 3, and 2A. It is a well- recognised rule in the interpretation of
statutes that, in order to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law, it must be
clear that such was the intention of the Legislature. See De Wet v Deetlefs1928
AD 286 at 290.
It is
accordingly, inconceivable that the Legislature would have intended to oust the
jurisdiction of the Labour Court to determine appeals in respect of employers
and employees whose conditions of employment are governed by the Labour Act. I
find therefore that notwithstanding the provisions of s 92D of the Act the
Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine the appeal filed by the appellants
and accordingly the appeal was properly before the court a quo.
Although,
the appellants have not argued as such, the Labour Court is empowered with
review jurisdiction. In terms of s 89 (1) (d1) the Labour Court shall “exercise
the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect
of labour matters”. In the exercise of its powers the court a quo was therefore
empowered to enquire into the manner in which the appellants were dismissed
from employment.
As already adverted to earlier on in
this judgment, in terms of s 12B a dismissal must be in terms of an employment
code or the national code. A dismissal effected other than in terms of that section
is an unfair dismissal. The appellants would have recourse to the Labour Court
on the basis of the unfair dismissal in terms of s 12B. The only conflict lies
in the provisions of the Regulations which provided for dismissal other than in
in terms of s 12B. To that extent the Regulations are in conflict with s 12B
and the provisions of s 12B should prevail.
The
appellants have contended that the proceedings under which they were found
guilty of misconduct were null and void by virtue of the fact that the
respondent did not proceed under an employment code as required under the law.
They premise this argument on the provisions of s12B of the Actwhich places an
onus upon an employer to establish that the dismissal of an employee was not
effected unfairly. The section further provides that if an employee is
dismissed in the absence of an employment code then such dismissal constitutes
unfair dismissal for purposes of the Act. The respondent is not in a position
to show that the dismissal of the appellants was effected in terms of a
registered code of code as required by s 12B of the Act. To the extent that s
44(1) of the Regulations which provides for the dismissal of employees of the
respondent in contradiction with the provisions of ss 12B and 92D and most
importantly s 2A of the Act, then it is taken as having been repealed and not
to be given effect to.
The
contention by the appellants as to the alleged irregularity of the proceedings
invites this court to review the proceedings under which the appellants were
dealt with by the respondent and subsequently dismissed. This Court derives the
power of review in this instance from s 25 of the Supreme Court Act which reads
in relevant part:
25 Review powers
(1) Subject to this section, the
Supreme Court and every judge of the Supreme Court shall have the same
power, jurisdiction and authority as
are vested in the High Court and judges of the High Court, respectively, to
review the proceedings and decisions
of inferior courts of justice, tribunals and administrative authorities.
(2) The power, jurisdiction and
authority conferred by subsection (1) may be exercised whenever it comes to
the notice of the Supreme Court or a
judge of the Supreme Court that an irregularity has occurred in any proceedings
or in the making of any decision
notwithstanding that such proceedings are, or such decision is, not the
subject of an appeal or application
to the Supreme Court.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be
construed as conferring upon any person any right to institute any review
in the first instance before the
Supreme Court or a judge of the Supreme Court, and provision may be made in
rules of court, and a judge of the
Supreme Court may give directions, specifying that any class of review or any
particular review shall be instituted before or shall be referred or remitted
to the High Court for determination.
The
respondent failed to comply with the provisions of S12B of the Act. An employer
who terminates the contract of employment with an employee must proceed either in
terms of a registered employment code or the Labour National Employment Code
S.I. 15/06. The respondent utilised the Regulations and it has failed to
establish that the dismissals were effected in terms of the provisions of S12B.
Any disciplinary procedures which have been effected outside the peremptory
provisions of s 12B are clearly unlawful. The dismissal of the appellants was
therefore nulland void.
The
appellants have prayed that the appeal be allowed with costs and in addition
that the matter be remitted to the court a quo for a determination on
the merits. In view of the conclusion that the proceedings conducted by the
respondent were null and void the inevitable result is that the dismissals are
of no force and effect by operation of law. As a consequence, the appellants
are entitled to an order of reinstatement to their former positions without
loss of salary and benefits.
The
appeal is allowed with costs.
The
judgment of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the
following:
It is ordered
as follows:
1.
The dismissal of the appellants by the respondent from employment be and is
hereby set aside.
2.
The respondent be and is hereby ordered to reinstate the appellants to their
former positions without loss of salary and other benefits.
3.
The respondent shall bear the appellants' costs for the appeal.
ZIYAMBI JA:
I agree
OMERJEE
AJA: I
agree
G Machingambi Legal Practitioners, appellant's legal practitioners
Matsikidze & Mucheche, respondent's legal practitioners
1
This decision was followed in Mutare City Council v Mudzime &Ors 1999 (2)
ZLR 140.
[2]604B-D
[3]At 405
(quoting from Maxwell Interpretation of Statutes 4ed p 233)
[4]12 ed at p
74
[5]At 335
[6]At
304
