MAWADZE
J:
The
plaintiff and the defendant are husband and wife respectively and
they married each other in Harare on 7 March 1990 in terms of the
Marriage Act [Cap
5:11].
Prior to that the parties had married traditionally on 21 January
1990 and the same marriage was blessed in church on 28 July 1990. The
parties have been married for 22 years.
The
marriage was blessed with two children, Sean, male child born 29
December 1990 (now 21 years old) and a female child, Nombulelo, born
16 August 1993 (now 18 years old). Despite attaining the majority
status both children are still dependant on their parents. Sean is at
a University in South Africa pursuing a degree in Architecture and is
in his second year of the five year degree programme. Nombulelo is
expected to start or commence her University education in Europe this
year.
It
is common cause that the plaintiff has the sole responsibility of
paying the children's college fees.
The
plaintiff issued summons out of this court on 25 March 2010 seeking a
decree of divorce on the basis of irretrievable breakdown of the
marriage, an order for custody of the then minor child, maintenance
in relation to the then minor child, division of matrimonial assets
and that each party bears its own costs.
As
per the joint pre-trial conference minute signed by counsel for both
parties on 14 March 2011 the parties could only agree that the
marriage has irretrievably broken down. The following issues were
referred to trial for determination:
“Issues
1.
Who should have custody of the minor child?
1.1
What would constitute a fair access regime for the non custodial
parent?
1.2
What would constitute a fair maintenance contribution to the
custodial parent in respect of the minor child?
2.
What constitutes the matrimonial estate?
2.1
What would constitute a fair and equitable division of the
matrimonial estate?”
As
already stated at the time the trial commenced items 1 to 1.2 of the
joint pre-trial conference minute was no longer an issue as the minor
child has attained majority status.
At
the commencement of the trial the parties were able to agree on what
constitutes the matrimonial estate and how the movable property
should be shared between the parties. Counsel for the parties agreed
during the trial to file a detailed list of all movable property
which constitutes the matrimonial estate and how it has been shared
between the parties. The schedule of the division of the movable
property, Exh 22, was filed with the court on 23 January 2012. It
outlines in meticulous detail how the parties have distributed the
movable property and Exh 22 would be incorporated in the order the
court would make as regards division of matrimonial estate.
The
only issue for determination during the trial related to the division
of the matrimonial estate in relation to the immovable property which
consists of two properties namely:
(a)
The matrimonial home, Stand number 51 Greystone Park Township 2 of
Lot A of Borrowdale Estate, also known as No.15 Alveston Avenue,
Borrowdale, Harare registered in the plaintiff's name (hereinafter
referred to as the Borrowdale property or house).
(b)
Stand No.78 Hartley Township in Chegutu registered in the defendant's
name and consists of Commercial premises (hereinafter referred to as
Chegutu property).
The
plaintiff lays no claim to the Chegutu property which he however
deems to be matrimonial property and that it should be awarded to the
defendant.
It
is the plaintiff's case that he should be awarded more than half
share of the Borrowdale property and offers the defendant 20% to 25%
share of the Borrowdale property. This is based on what the plaintiff
deems to be his direct contribution to the Borrowdale property and
that the defendant would have been awarded the Chegutu property.
On
the other hand the defendant contends that the Chegutu property is
not part of the matrimonial estate and falls outside the ambit of
section 7 of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap
5:13].
The defendant claims a 50% share of the Borrowdale property. I shall
revert to these issues later.
In
terms of section 5(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap
5:13]
(hereafter the Act) the court may grant a decree of divorce on the
grounds of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage if it is satisfied
that the marriage relationship between the parties has broken down to
such an extent that there is no reasonable prospect of the
restoration of a normal marriage relationship between the parties.
It
is common cause that the parties are agreed that their marriage
relationship has broken down. Although the parties still stay
together in the matrimonial house they were both clear in their
evidence to the court that their marriage relationship is beyond
resuscitation.
I
see no cause to deal with the reasons thereof suffice to state that
the parties blame each other for the breakdown of the marriage
relationship.
In
fact it is common cause that in 1998 barely 8 years into the marriage
defendant instituted divorce proceedings in this court and only
withdrew the matter at pre-trial conference stage as both parties
tried to salvage their marriage. It is clear that this did not
succeed as in 2010 the plaintiff decided to institute the current
divorce proceedings.
As
was stated in the case of Ncube
v Ncube
1993 (1) ZLR 39 where the parties are consenting to divorce it may
not be necessary for a court to hear evidence solely for the purpose
of ascribing fault for the breakdown of the marriage. In the premise
a decree of divorce should be granted.
I
now proceed to deal with the contentious issue of the division of the
immovable property being the Borrowdale house and the Chegutu
property.
THE
CHEGUTU PROPERTY
It
has not been disputed in any serious manner by the plaintiff that the
Chegutu property was acquired by the defendant in the manner she
alleged in her evidence. The defendant's uncontroverted evidence is
that her father who apparently has large family decided to apportion
part of his estate amongst all his children both males and females
during his lifetime as a way of possibly averting the acrimony which
may arise after his demise in relation to his estate.
This
was confirmed by Rosa Shorai Tunduwani defendant's young sister
whose evidence was not challenged in any manner by the plaintiff.
All
the children were given immovable property either residential
property or business property which was transferred into each child's
respective name. The defendant was clear that her father advised all
those of his children who were married to advise their spouses. She
said she in turn advised the plaintiff. This is not disputed by the
plaintiff.
It
is therefore clear to my mind that the defendant acquired the Chegutu
property in the manner she explained and that it was during the
subsistence of the marriage. This means that it is part of the
matrimonial estate.
The
issue which then falls for determination is whether in Chegutu
property falls within the exceptions outlined in section 7(3) of the
Act which provides as follows;
“7
Division of assets and maintenance orders
(1)
……………………………………………
(2)……………………………………………..
(3)
The power of an appropriate court to make an order in terms of
paragraph (a) of subsection (1) shall not extend to any assets which
are proved, to the satisfaction of the court, to have been acquired
by a spouse, whether before or during the marriage…………………………….
(a)
by way of inheritance; or
(b)
in terms of any custom and which, in accordance with such custom, are
intended to be held by the spouse personally; or
(c)
in any manner and which have particular sentimental value to the
spouse concerned.”
It
is clear to my mind that the Chegutu property was not acquired by the
defendant by way of inheritance. The defendant's father is alive.
The defendant's father bequeathed to the defendant the Chegutu
property (Exh 13 being the title deed of the property in defendant's
name) as a donation during his lifetime, although the defendant and
her young sister Rosa Shorai Tunduwani may perceive this as some sort
of inheritance.
I
am not persuaded by this perception.
No
evidence was led in my view which established the existence of a
custom which would entitle the defendant to hold the Chegutu property
personally and therefore excludes it from the division of the
matrimonial estate in terms of section 7 of the Act. The mere fact
that the defendant's father decided to donate part of his estate to
his children cannot be deemed to be a custom in existence and
practiced by the community to which the defendant and her father
belong to.
The
question this court has to answer in my view is whether the Chegutu
property which was donated to the defendant by her father has
particular sentimental value to the defendant and therefore falls
within the exceptions provided for in section 7(3) of the Act.
The
ENCANTA ENGLISH DICTIONARIES defines sentimental value as;
“value
based on emotional association” or “a value placed on something
because of its emotional associations rather than its monetary
worth.”
The
defendant in her evidence told the court that she would not want the
Chegutu property to be subject to sharing between the parties on
account of her strong view that it constitutes part of what she
deemed to be her “inheritance”.
While
the Chegutu property is some commercial premises which can be
utilised for that purpose by defendant herself or by renting it out
to other parties the defendant did not give this as the reason for
her desire to have the property excluded from the matrimonial estate
by virtue of section 7(3) of the Act. The reason she gave is that it
is property given to or donated to her by her father just like all
other children and her father has good reasons for doing so to all
his children.
It
is my considered view that the Chegutu property has sentimental value
to the defendant. She is emotionally attached to it taking into
account how she acquired the property from her father. The value she
places on the Chegutu property in my view is not much of monetary
worth but the fact that her father in some special way decided to
bequeath this property to her.
The
plaintiff in my view has no interest in the property and simply wants
to use it to ward off the defendant's claim to Borrowdale property
– a bargain tool as it were.
It
is therefore my finding that the Chegutu property falls within the
exception provided for in section 7(3)(c) of the Act.
I
shall therefore proceed to deal with the Borrowdale property as the
sole immovable asset of the spouses subject to distribution.
THE
BORROWDALE PROPERTY / HOUSE
The
Law
Section
7(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act [Cap
5:13]
(the Act) deals with the division, apportionment or distribution of
assets of the spouses upon the dissolution of the marriage. Section
7(4)(a) to (g) of the Act outlines the factors the court should
consider in the exercise of its discretion in order to achieve an
equitable distribution of the matrimonial estate; see
Hatendi
v Hatendi
2001 (2) ZLR 530.
In
the case of Ncube
v Ncube
1993 (1) ZLR 39 (S) at 40H–41A KORSAH JA had this to say in
relation to the provision of section 7(4)(a) to (g) of the Act;
“The
above provisions, to my mind, do more than furnish broad guidelines
for deciding what is a fair order in all circumstances, adjusting
property rights if need be, under the wide powers bestowed on the
court. The determination of strict property rights of each spouse in
such circumstances, involving, as it may, factors that are not easily
quantifiable in terms of money, is invariably a theoretical exercise
for which the courts are indubitably imbued with a wide discretion.”
See
also Shenje
v Shenje
2001 (2) ZLR (160) (H) at 163 F in which GILLESPIE J had this to say
in relation to the provisions of section 7(4) of the Act;
“In
deciding what is reasonable, practical and just in any division, the
court is enjoined to have regard to all the circumstances at this
case. A number of the more important and more usual, circumstances
are listed in the subsection. The list is not complete. It is not
possible to give a complete list of all possible relevant factors.
The decision to property division order is an exercise of judicial
discretion, based relevant factors, aimed at achieving a reasonable,
practical and just division which secures for each party the
advantage they can fairly expect from having been married to one
another, and avoids the disadvantages, to the extent they are not
inevitable, of becoming divorced.”
It
is therefore clear to my mind that in dealing with the Borrowdale
property the court
is
imbued with the wide discretionary powers which should be exercised
judiciously taking into account all factors listed and section 7(4)
of the Act and all the relevant factors in the case.
The
bulk of the evidence led by both parties in my view focussed mainly
on each party's direct and indirect contribution to the acquisition
of the Borrowdale property and to the marriage generally.
The
plaintiff gave very detailed evidence on how the Borrowdale property
was acquired through his sole effort – direct contribution. The
defendant in her evidence, while conceding that she had little direct
contribution in the acquisition of the Borrowdale property,
maintained that she should be awarded an equal share on account of
her indirect contributions and other factors.
While
I agree that these are important factors to consider, I find the
poignant views expressed by GILLESPIE J in Shenje
v Shenje supra
at 163 H–164A to be crucial in dealing with the factors listed in
section 7(4) of the Act;
“The
factors listed in subsection deserve fresh comment. One might form
the impression from decisions of the court that the crucial
consideration is that of the respective contribution of the parties.
This would be an error. The matter of the contributions made to the
family is the fifth listed of the seven considerations. The first
four listed considerations all address the needs of the parties
rather than their dues. Perhaps, it is time to recognise that the
legislative intent, and the objective of the courts, is more weighed
in favour of ensuring that the parties' needs are met rather than
that their contributions are recouped.”
I
am inclined to adopt this approach in dealing with the evidence led
by the parties in relation to the Borrowdale property and how it
should be apportioned between the parties.
The
Evidence
I
find both parties to be very impressive witnesses in most material
respect. In fact there is very little to choose between the parties
as it were. They were both eloquent, focussed and admirably candid
with the court on many issues.
The
evidence led by plaintiff in relation to the Borrowdale property is
largely unchallenged just like the defendant's evidence on her
employment history and part of indirect contributions.
Let
me briefly turn to the relevant evidence.
The
plaintiff acquired Flat No.4 Cherryington Crescent in Kamfinsa,
Greendale before he married the defendant through mortgage finance
facility granted by his employer Zimbank now ZB Bank for Zimbabwean
$95,000.00. See
Exh 2. In March 1990 plaintiff again obtained mortgage finance to
renovate the flat granted by the same employer. see
Exh 3. When the parties married to each other in 1990 they stayed in
his flat until 1991 when they acquired the Borrowdale property.
It
is common cause that the Borrowdale property was acquired through
mortgage finance extended to plaintiff by his employers Zimbank and
that the plaintiff solely paid for the loan through his salary. This
was also after the plaintiff has disposed of the flat in Greendale
and used the proceeds to also purchase the Borrowdale property.
After
the parties acquired the Borrowdale property extensive extensions and
improvements were done on the property for a long period of time
using mortgage finance facility extended to the plaintiff by his
employer and that plaintiff shouldered this burden.
In
1994 as per Exh 4 plaintiff was granted mortgage finance to erect a
durall way and in 1995 as per Exh 5 to sink a borehole. Extensive
extensions were done in 1996 as per Exh 6 which included the
extension of the kitchen, addition of new master bedroom, new guest
room, gym, new lounge, converting garage to dining room, addition of
new domestic quarters, paving of the drive way, installation of
outside jacuzzi.
The
defendant's father provided additional finance of Zimbabwean
$100,000.00 for this massive extensions to the parties and
plaintiff's parents also helped financially see
Exh
7(a) to (e) 1995–96 for the numerous mortgage facilities granted to
plaintiff by his employers to finance the extensions of this
Borrowdale property.
It
is not in dispute that the plaintiff had a more secure and rewarding
job than the defendant. During most period of the marriage
consequently the plaintiff bore the most financial burden in fending
for the family. He solely paid for the children's full school
account and met most of the household expenses. The plaintiff
conceded that the defendant bought clothes for the family and
groceries especially as he concentrated in servicing the mortgage.
See also Exh 8 a bundle of documents also relating to mortgage
finance.
The
plaintiff in his evidence sought in my view to down play or minimise
the role played and contributions made by the defendant during the
subsistence of the marriage. I did not find the plaintiff credible in
this respect.
As
already said that plaintiff conceded that the defendant would buy
clothes and groceries for the family. He admitted that she would at
times pay for the maid.
It
is however plaintiff's contention that the defendant had been
secretive about her income especially now in her new role as a
consultant, see
Exh 9 and that she had not used such income for the benefit of the
plaintiff and children but solely for herself. see Exh 10 documents
various invoices issued to defendant using international credit card.
In fact the plaintiff said the defendant as per Exh 11 had the
temerity to seek a contributory maintenance order against the
plaintiff in the Magistrates Courts despite the fact that she was
able to support herself and that plaintiff had the sole burden of
fending for the family as per the schedule of his expenses Exh 12.
Under
cross examination the plaintiff while admitting to have been married
to the defendant for almost 20 years insisted that her overall
contribution to the marriage is only 20% and not 50% hence she should
be awarded a 20% share of the Borrowdale property.
The
plaintiff grudgingly conceded that the defendant looked after their
two children and would do household chores. It was clear that the
plaintiff had much difficulty in accepting the normal motherly role
the defendant played as his wife.
As
regards the Borrowdale property plaintiff said the defendant bought
some garden furniture and that she at one time supervised the massive
extension at the property. The plaintiff was grateful for the
donation of a motor vehicle to him by defendant's family and that
defendant was active as a member of the Parent Liason Committee at
the school their children attended. The plaintiff however maintained
that he played a major role during the marriage and at one point
opened a Bank Account Exh 16 for the sole benefit of the defendant.
The
defendant in her evidence chronicled her role and contributions
during the marriage and submitted that on that basis she is entitled
to a 50% share of the Borrowdale house. The defendant was not only a
housewife and mother but at most of the times was also gainfully
employed. At the time she married the plaintiff and they were staying
at a flat in Greendale she was employed by her father's company M &
M Enterprises now Zimbabwe Motor Distributors from 1989 to 1996 a
period of 7 years.
Despite
being employed she said she had time to play her role as a wife to
the plaintiff hence their relationship was very balanced during that
time. She would also perform household chores like cooking,
supervising the maid and also the biological role of giving birth to
the children (in 1990 & 1993).
Whilst
at the flat she said she also bought household goods like desk,
curtains, small lounge suite, fridge, watch dresser, and plates.
In
1996 the defendant said she was employed, now part time, at M & M
and at the same time working for Lonrho Enterprises involved in
marketing and developing the Borrowdale Brooke Country Club and
housing project. In 1997 she said she stopped working as a result of
marital problems hence she commenced divorce procedures in 1997 and
only withdrew the case at pre-trial conference stage in 1998. Between
1998–2000 she worked for a management consultancy People Assistance
Inclusive and also embarked on a Master's degree programme. From
2001 to 2005 she worked for Price Waterhouse Coopers as an Assistant
Manager Consultancy in Public Sector donor funded programmes and
cooperative sector. The defendant said she started to do consultancy
work in 2005 to date. See Exh 18(a) to (e) which are relevant
documents to defendant's employment history.
It
is the defendant's contention that while employed for that period
she was earning money and contributing to the family income. She also
had a motor vehicle allowance which she converted to the benefit of
the family. The defendant produced Exh 19 – a cheque book stubs
showing her account with Zimbank and the various cheques she issued
out to buy goods for the family. In fact the defendant said when the
plaintiff was promoted and transferred to Bulawayo in 1992 she had to
resign from her job to support the plaintiff and followed him to
Bulawayo where they stayed from 1992 to 1993 and had their second
child while in Bulawayo. She said she was for that period a full time
housewife performing all the duties including curtaining the house,
packing and unpacking the goods and look after the children.
The
plaintiff told the court that when the parties moved to Borrowdale
house she did all the curtains and supervised the painting and
gardening. She also supervised the three maids and buying household
goods like kitchen utensils, glassware, pots, blankets and towels.
It
is plaintiff's evidence that when they moved back to Harare in 1993
from Bulawyo and embarked on massive extension of the Borrowdale
house she also played a role by supporting the plaintiff. She also
bought items for the house like iron table, kitchen table and outside
furniture, beds for children, dressers, draws, coffee table, the bed
in spare bedroom and various paintings to decorate the house.
The
defendant said she used the Jaggers account used by her father's
company to purchase furniture and that while employed by Price
Coopers 2001–5 she was allowed to buy furniture using an equivalent
of 10% of her salary. See Exh 17(a)–(b) on her employment and
benefits at Price Coopers.
According
to the defendant she supported the plaintiff morally and with ideas
in the massive extension project at the Borrowdale house. She said
both of them mutually agreed to extend the house and she approached a
mutual family friend one Mwamuka to work on the plans and
architectural work. During the extension of the house she would
assist by obtaining quotations for materials from various
construction companies.
Lastly
the defendant chronicled her role as a mother. She said when they had
their first child she would take him to and from the nursery and
would later take him to and from school. According to the defendant
she said her children were virtually her life and she did all a good
mother could do for her children. She said she played a key role in
the placement of the second child at Chisipite Junior School, would
take children to and from school, assist them with homework,
attending parents meetings at their respective schools, involved in
Parents Liason Committees, fundraising activities at St Johns
College. See Exh 20.
The
plaintiff denied that she has been secretive about her income and
pointed out that she holds a foreign account for the purposes of her
current consultancy work and would utilise the funds held in the
account as her per diems when she is asked to travel at short notice
by buying tickets and booking hotels. She uses the credit card for
that purpose and said that on average that account would have a
balance of US$1,000-$2,000.
The
plaintiff was very clear that she had played her due role in the
marriage and that she had put her soul and heart in the marriage to
such an extent that she deserves a 50% share of the Borrowdale house.
Under
cross examination the defendant conceded that plaintiff made all the
direct financial contributions for the renovation and extension of
the Borrowdale house. She strenuously denied suggestion that she did
not contribute in buying food and other household needs for the
family. She accepted that plaintiff paid all the school fees for the
children. She indicated that it was unfair to put much emphasis of
her contributions or lack thereof arising from her consultancy work
which she only embarked on 15 years into the marriage in 2005 while
ignoring her role from 1990 to 2005. She admitted buying expensive
items like mobile phone handset and jewellery using her income from
consultancy work indicating that as a consultant she had to build a
profile and look well.
The
defendant was asked to justify her claim for 50% share of the
Borrowdale house as follows;
“Q.
What is your basis for claiming a 50% share of the house?
A.
I contributed too. Marriage is not only about money. We have two
children whom I spent time with and made sacrifices for.”
The
plaintiff said she prefers the Borrowdale house to be revalued again
despite that both parties have valuation reports. She said she would
prefer the house to be sold on an open market and for each party to
get his own share although she is not opposed to the plaintiff buying
her out if he has means to do so and her share allows her to acquire
a house in a comparable affluent residential area.
CONCLUSION
I
am satisfied that both parties are sufficiently equipped to fend for
themselves after the divorce in view of the various economic
interests each party is pursuing. I am alive to the fact that the
plaintiff will carry the financial burden of paying for both
children's university fees for quite some time.
It
is clear from the evidence led that both parties have been enjoying a
measure of affluence in their marital life and one would want to
ensure that each party would be able to retain residency in an area
of comparable standards.
There
is no doubt that the parties have been married for a long period of
time from 1990 to date a period of about 21 years. It is therefore
clear each party had invested heavily in the marriage and the better
part of their prime life has been spent together. Both their children
are now at University level.
An
assessment of all these factors would in my view suggest that each
party has made an equal contribution to the marriage.
As
already said the bulk of the evidence led by the parties relates to
direct and indirect contribution made by each party for the family. I
have already dealt sufficiently with the plaintiff's direct
contribution to the acquisition and extension of the Borrowdale house
which I put at 100%.
Let
me deal briefly with defendant's indirect contribution.
In
the case of Freddy
Chinyavanhu v Letwin Chinyavanhu,
HH156-09 GUVAVA J had this to say about direct and indirect
contribution of the spouses see p 8 of cycostyled judgment;
“There
can be no doubt that all contributions are important in a marriage
whether they be material or otherwise. Some contributions are not
even tangible as they related to moral support given to a husband as
he goes about his work and ensuring that he comes home to a
comfortable and happy home. Although such contributions cannot be
quantified in any monetary terms they are no doubt important in
building of a happy home.”
In
the case of Masiwa
v Masiwa
2007 (1) ZLR 167 (S) GWAUNZA JA at 172D had this say on indirect
contributions;
“It
has been generally accepted that indirect contributions made, in
particular by a wife during the marriage include taking care of all
household chores like cooking for and feeding the husband and the
family, washing ironing and child minding. Many studies have been
conducted locally and internationally and books written about how
this type of work is not only unappreciated but under valued as
well.”
On
how the court should treat the direct and indirect contribution the
learned Judge of Appeal in Masiwa
v Masiwa
supra
at
172F had to say;
“To
the extent that the applicant's claim was premised on both direct
and indirect contributions. My view is that the court a
quo
should have combined the assessed value of the two types of
contributions made by the appellant, in order to determine her
entitlement. This would accord with the spirit of section 7 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act which specifically refers to direct and
indirect contributions.”
In
casu,
the defendant's claim for a 50% share of the Borrowdale house is
premised on both direct and indirect contributions. She contributed
directly as she was also gainfully employed and indirectly in the
manner explained. I would therefore assess the defendant's direct
contributions to be about 20% and indirect contribution to be about
50%. I also have to take into account the other factors to be
considered in terms of section 7(4) of the Act in particular section
7(4)(a), (b), (c), (d) and (g). I will therefore take into account
all these factors in making the order in relation to the Borrowdale
house or property.
Accordingly,
it is ordered as follows;
1.
A decree of divorce is hereby granted.
2.
Each party is awarded as his or her sole exclusive the movable
property outlined in Exhibit 22 jointly signed by the parties and
herewith attached to this order.
3.
The immovable property registered in the plaintiff's name known as
Stand 51 Greystone Park T/Ship 2 of Lot A of Borrowdale Estate, also
known as No. 15 Alveston Avenue, Borrowdale, Harare is hereby
distributed by awarding 60% share to the plaintiff and 40% share to
the defendant.
3.1
The property shall be valued by a registered estate agent nominated
by both parties within 30 days of this order.
3.2
In the event that the parties fail to agree on the estate agent, the
Registrar shall appoint an estate agent from his list to conduct an
evaluation of the property upon request by either party.
3.3
The estate agent shall submit his or her report to the parties within
15 days of his or her appointment.
3.4
The cost of evaluation shall be shared between the parties with the
plaintiff paying 60% and the defendant 40%.
3.5
The plaintiff is hereby granted the right to buy out the defendant's
40% share within 90 days of the date of evaluation of the property.
3.6
In the event that the plaintiff fails to buy out the defendant in
terms of para (3.5) above the property shall be sold at the best
advantage by the Deputy Sheriff and the net proceeds shared between
the parties with the plaintiff awarded 60% share and the defendant
40% share as per para (3) above.
4.
Each party shall bear his or her own costs.
Mtetwa
& Nyambirai,
plaintiff's legal practitioners
Chikumbirike
& Associates,
defendant's legal practitioners
