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HB125-09 - VISION SITHOLE vs LESLIE KHUMALO and DEPUTY SHERIFF, BULAWAYO

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Procedural Law-viz stay of execution.

Procedural Law-viz stay of execution re eviction.
Procedural Law-viz recusal.
Procedural Law-viz recusal re bias.

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Approach


This is an application for a stay of eviction of the applicant from Number 6 Napier Flats, Bulawayo.

Recusal re: Approach, Presumption of Judicial Impartiality, Nemo Judex in Sua Causa and the Doctrine of Necessity

The applicant was, all along, being represented by his legal practitioners, who have since renounced agency a day or so before this matter was heard.

The applicant then appeared, in person, in Chambers, and asked that I be recused from hearing the said application as I might not be able to objectively deal with this matter as I am aware of a pending administrative issue involving himself, Mr. Mlotshwa, the High Court Registry Clerk, and Mrs. N.Tachiona, a legal practitioner.

I can confirm that various reports which touch on the applicant and Mr. Mlotshwa have been received by myself, and are currently under investigations.

What falls for determination before me is whether or not I should recuse myself in this matter.

It is the duty of a judge and/or court to dispense equal justice without fear, favour, or prejudice, at all times.

In order for a judicial officer to recuse himself in a matter where the possibility of bias is being alleged by a litigant, two essential requirements must be met, namely -

(1) That the bias must be in connection with the litigant in question; and

(2) Must be of such a nature that a real likelihood exists that the judicial officer would have a bias in favour of the litigants from kindred or other cause.

The principle was clearly laid down in S v Bam 1972 (4) SA 41..., where KATZE J stated -

“It should always be borne in mind that an applicant, or his representative, who finds it necessary to apply for the recusal of a judicial officer, is confronted with an unenviable task, and the propriety of his motives should not lightly be questioned.”

While a judicial officer is trained to dispense justice without bias, fear, or prejudice, human nature, being what it is, should not rigidly cling to the oath of office and completely shut out from his mind the likelihood of bias on his perception of a litigant. Where such likelihood exists, a judicial officer should consider the motives of the application. Where the application is actuated by the best motives, it should, no doubt, recuse him or herself.

In considering the issue of recusal, the judicial officer should always take into account the circumstances of the case, and, above all, ascertain what impression they would create upon a reasonable citizen, and in the eyes of the public – see Head and Fourtuin v Woolaston N.O. and De Villiers N.O. 1926 TPD 549 where STRATFORD J..., stated –

 “If I understand the authorities aright (sic), the disqualification arises whereas the judges relation to the parties is such, or his interest in the case is such, or his knowledge of the facts, or antecedents of the parties, is such as would tend to bias his mind at the trial. In short, any condition of things which, reasonably regarded, is liable to destroy his impartiality should disqualify him.”

The same principle was adopted in Sladie v The Pretoria Rent Board 1943 TPD 246.

In casu, the applicant's objection is with regards to a matter which has come to my attention after this matter had been set down. From his submissions, it appears that new circumstances that touch on the administration of the High Court, Bulawayo are unfolding, to an extent that his legal practitioner has abandoned him, as has now been instructed by Mr. Mlotshwa, who is also implicated in some wrongdoing involving both him and the applicant. I make no comments on that decision...,.

The first requirement is accordingly established, as laid down in S v Bam 1972 (4) SA 41..., that the likelihood of bias in favour of the litigants from whether kindred, or other, cause apply. The administrative issue referred to involving the applicant being the “other cause.”

The applicant, indeed, has reason to be apprehensive in view of his alleged misdemeanours, and my investigations of the issue in question. In my opinion, a reasonable citizen, and the eyes of the public, will see the existence of bias – which is what should be avoided by all judicial officers.

It is, therefore, my considered opinion that in the present circumstances, justice demands that a judicial officer who finds himself in these circumstances should not hesitate to recuse himself in order to allow the wheels of justice to glide along without let-up or hinderance.

In light of the above, the applicant's application succeeds.

CHEDA J:     This is an application for a stay of eviction of applicant from number 6 Napier Flats, Bulawayo.

Applicant was all along being represented by his legal practitioners who have since renounced agency a day or so before this matter was heard.

Applicant, then appeared in person in chambers and asked that I be recused from hearing the said application as I might not be able to objectively deal with his matter as I am aware of a pending administrative issue involving himself, Mr Mlotshwa, the High Court Registry Clerk and Mrs. N. Tachiona, a legal practitioner.

I can confirm that various reports which touch on applicant and Mlotshwa have been received by myself and are currently under investigations.

What falls for determination before me is whether or not I should recuse myself in this matter.

It is the duty of a judge and/or court to dispense equal justice without fear, favour or prejudice at all times.

In order for a judicial officer to recuse himself in a matter where the possibility of bias is being alleged by a litigant, two essential requirements must be met, namely:-

(1).       that the bias must be in connection with the litigant in question, and

(2)        must be of such a nature that a real likelihood exists that the judicial officer would have a bias in favour of the litigants from kindred or other cause.

   This principle was clearly laid down in S v Bam 1972 (4)SA 41 at p43 44 where Katze J stated:-

“It should always be borne in mind that an applicant, or his representative, who finds it necessary to apply for the recusal of a judicial officer is confronted with an unenviable task and the propriety of his motives should not lightly be questioned.”

 

While a judicial officer is trained to dispense justice without bias, fear or prejudice, human nature being what it is, should not rigidly cling to the oath of office and completely shut out from his mind the likelihood of bias based on his perception of a litigant.  Where such likelihood exists, a judicial officer should consider the motives of the application, where the application is actuated by the best motives, it should no doubt recuse him or herself.

In considering the issue of recusa, the judicial officer should always take into account the circumstances of the case and above all ascertain what impression they would create upon a reasonable citizen and in the eyes of the public, see Head and Fourtuin v Woolaston N.O and De Villiers, N. O 1926 TPD 549 where Stratford J at p558 stated:-

“If I understand the authorities aright, (sic) the disqualification arises whereas the judges' relation to the parties is such, or his interest in the case is such or his knowledge of the facts of the case or antecedents of the parties is such as would tend to bias his mind at the trial.  In short any condition of things which, reasonably regarded, is liable to destroy his impartiality should disqualify him.”  

 

The same principle was adopted in Sladie v The Pretoria Rent Board 1943 TPD 246.

In casu applicant's objection is with regards to a matter which has come to my attention after this matter had been set down.  From his submissions, it appears that new circumstances that touch on the administration of the High Court, Bulawayo are unfolding to an extent that his legal practitioner has abandoned him as he has now been instructed by Mr. Mlotshwa who is also implicated in some wrong doing involving both him and applicant.  I make no comments on that decision though the first requirement is accordingly established as laid down in Bram's case supra, that the likelihood of bias in favour of the litigants from whether kindred or other cause apply, the administrative issue referred to involving applicant, being the “other cause.”

            Applicant indeed has a reason to be apprehensive in view of his alleged misdemeanours and my investigations of the issue in question.  In my opinion, a reasonable citizen and the eyes of the public will see the existence of bias which is what should be avoided by all judicial officers.

            It is therefore, my considered opinion that in the present circumstances, justice demands that a judicial officer who finds himself in these circumstances should not hesitate to recuse himself in order to allow the wheels of justice to glide along without let-up or hindrance.

            In light of the above, applicant's application succeeds.

 

 

Cheda and partners, applicant's legal practitioners

Bulawayo Legal project centre, 1st respondent's legal practitioners
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