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HB69-09 - ALEX MUDZINGWA vs SAI ENTERPRISES (PRIVATE) LIMITED

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Procedural Law-viz default judgment.

Procedural Law-viz upliftment of bar.
Procedural Law-viz default judgment re service of process.
Procedural Law-viz default judgment re upliftment of bar.
Procedural Law-viz default judgment re dies induciae iro filing of opposing papers out of time.
Procedural Law-viz notice of appearance to defend re notice of appearance to defend filed after the expiry of the dies induciae.
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re High Court Rules iro Rule 50.
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re Rule 50 iro notice of appearance to defend iro failure to enter appearance before the expiry of the dies induciae.
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re condonation iro filing of court papers out of time.

Default Judgment re: Default Judgment and Snatching at a Judgment iro Approach and Unopposed Proceedings

This is an application for default judgment on account that the respondent has been served.

The salient facts of this case are the following.

The applicant issued out summons on this court on 15 December 2008 wherein he claimed damages against the respondent. The summons were served on the respondent on 16 December 2008. The dies induciae expired on 6 January 2009. The respondent's legal practitioners filed an appearance to defend a day out of time, on 7 January 2009. On 8 January 2009, the applicant's legal practitioners became aware of this fact and addressed a two-sentence minute to the respondent's legal practitioners in the following terms -

“We thank you for appearance to defend issued on 7th January 2009. It is out of time and thus invalid.”

This issue was brought to the attention of the Deputy Registrar of this court, who, in turn, returned the appearance to defend to the respondent's legal practitioners on 23 March 2009 with a note couched in the following terms -

“I refer to the above-mentioned matter and return herewith your notice of appearance to defend filed on 7 January 2009. The dies induciae expired on 6 January 2009. In terms of Rule 50 of the High Court of Zimbabwe Rules, as amended, a defendant who fails to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred. It is trite that a defendant has to enter appearance before the expiry of the dies induciae.”

The respondent's legal practitioners wrote to the applicant's legal practitioners on 5 February 2009 undertaking to notify them of the respondent's position “next week”. This did not happen, and about a month later the applicant's legal practitioners sent a reminder on 26 February 2009 and threatened -

“If, therefore, we do not hear from you by the 5th March 2009 – exactly one month (and one week) from your said letter – we shall proceed to apply for default judgment. We hope it will not have to come to that.”

The respondent did nothing, and on 4 March 2009, the applicant's legal practitioners wrote to the respondent's legal practitioners -

“We are proceeding with our application for default judgment.”

The respondent did nothing until 24 March 2009 when the legal practitioners wrote to the applicant's legal practitioners as follows -

“Sincere apologies for any inconveniences, as far as the above matter is concerned, our client sought a second opinion from another legal practitioner, and we are still waiting for the outcome. Please bear with us, and we really appreciate your patience.”

The applicant's legal practitioners responded on 25 March 2009 as follows -

“The matter is now beyond redemption. Our letters have been ignored and your client is taking his “sweet time” to furnish you with instructions. No urgency at all is being exhibited by either of you. We are thus proceeding in our client's best interests.”

Once more, the respondent did nothing until 14 April 2009 when the legal practitioners addressed a minute to the applicant's legal practitioners in the following terms -

“We refer to our last letter dated 24th March 2009.

This is to inform you that our client has received the second opinion, and we will be advising you of its final decision next Monday the 20th of April 2009, so that we can all know the way forward.”

Nothing happened on 20 April 2009.

The applicant's legal practitioners responded on 20 April 2009 -

“You totally surprise us. Your client is barred. We told you we are applying for default judgment. You have ignored that and not even applied to uplift the bar. You obviously know what you are doing.

Our only interest, though, in your client's decision today will be in whether they are prepared to pay what our client has claimed without need to execute.”

The respondent did nothing until this matter was set down, and on 12 May 2009 they filed an application for upliftment of the bar. This was only done as a direct result of the set down of this matter.

Automatic Bar re: Approach, Notice to Plead, Notice of Intention to Bar, Upliftment of Bar and the Dies Induciae

On the eve of the hearing of this application, the respondent filed an application for the upliftment of the bar.

The respondent seeks the postponement of this matter pending the hearing of the application for the upliftment of the bar.

It has taken the respondent about four months to file the application for upliftment of the bar. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the postponement is for the respondent to consider a second legal opinion, and decide whether to settle or pursue the application for the upliftment of the bar.

Counsel for the applicant persists with the position that the respondent has been given more than sufficient time (and advice) to apply for the upliftment of the bar but chose not to do so timeously. Therefore, the court should not indulge the respondent. As the respondent is barred, the applicant submits that the default judgment be entered in its favour.

Condonation or Judicial Indulgence re: Approach, Time-Barred Proceedings, Extension of Time and Interests of Justice

From what I have sketched above, it is evident that the respondent is litigating at a pace that is slower than a tortoise's. There is a flagrant disregard of the times set in the Rules. The correspondence from the other side is attended to at the respondent's leisure.

Does the respondent's case merit postponement in such circumstances? Can this conduct be dealt with by way of a postponement coupled with a punitive order for costs?

It is trite that granting a postponement in such circumstances is within my discretion. However, I have to exercise this discretion judiciously.

I have outlined what has transpired in this case, in a detailed fashion, by design. The facts clearly show the respondent's lackadaisical approach in these proceedings. Such a lacklustre way of litigating comes at a price. The long and short is that such a litigant risks a default judgment made against them or a postponement coupled with a punitive award of costs. The respondent has been dilatory in answering the applicant's claim.

Although I am disinclined to allow the respondent to abuse the court process, I propose to allow it one last chance to put its house in order. This, as alluded to, will come at a cost, and will also be coupled with conditions that will act as a major disincentive to the respondent.

Accordingly, I hereby make an order in the following terms:-

(1) The matter be and is hereby postponed to 10 July 2009 for the respondent to have its application for the upliftment of the bar under HC727/09 determined.

(2) In the event that the respondent fails to comply with paragraph (1) above, the matter shall be regarded as unopposed, and set down on the unopposed motion roll without notice to the respondent.

Costs re: Punitive Order of Costs or Punitive Costs


The respondent is ordered to pay costs of this hearing on the legal practitioner and client scale.

NDOU J:               This is an application for default judgment on account that the respondent has been served.  On the eve of the hearing of this application the respondent filed an application for the upliftment of the bar.  The salient facts of this case are the following.  The applicant issued out summons on this court on 15 December 2008 wherein he claimed damages against the respondent.  The summons were served the respondent on 16 December 2008.  The dies induciae expired on 6 January 2009.  The respondent's legal practitioners filed an appearance to defend a day out of time on 7 January 2009.  On 8 January 2009 the applicant's legal practitioners became aware of this fact and addressed a two sentence minute to respondent's legal practitioners in the following terms:

“We thank you for appearance to defend issued on 7th January 2009.  It is out of time and thus invalid.”

                This issue was brought to the attention of the Deputy Registrar of this court who in turn returned the appearance to defend to respondent's legal practitioners on 23 March 2009 with a note couched in the following terms:

“I refer to the above-mentioned matter and return herewith your notice of appearance to defend filed on 7 January 2009.  The dies induciae expired on 6 January 2009.  In terms of Rule 50 of the High Court of Zimbabwe Rules as amended, a defendant who fails to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.  It is trite that a defendant has to enter appearance before the expiry of the dies induciae.”

                The respondent's legal practitioners wrote to the applicant's legal practitioners on 5 February 2009 undertaking to notify them of the respondent's position “next week”.  This did not happen and about a month later applicant's legal practitioners sent a reminder on 26 February 2009 and threatened.

“If therefore, we do not hear from you by the 5th March 2009 – exactly one month (and a week) from your said letter – we shall proceed to apply for default judgment.  We hope it will not have to come to that.”

 

                The respondent did nothing and on 4 March 2009 the applicant's legal practitioner wrote to respondent's legal practitioners. “ We are proceeding with our application for default judgment.”  The respondent did nothing until 24 March 2009 when the legal practitioners wrote to the applicant's legal practitioners as follows:

“Sincere apologies for any inconveniences, as far as the above matter is concerned.  Our client sought a second opinion from another legal practitioner and we are still waiting for the outcome.  Please bear with us and we really appreciate your patience.”

                The applicant's legal practitioners responded on 25 March 2009 as follows:

“The matter is now beyond redemption.  Our letters have been ignored and your client is taking his “sweet time” to furnish you with instructions.  No urgency at all is being exhibited by either of you.  We are thus proceedings in our client's best interests.”

                Once more the respondent did nothing until 14 April 2009 when the legal practitioners addressed a minute to the applicant's legal practitioners in the following terms:

                “We refer to our last letter dated 24th March 2009.

This is to inform you that our client has received the second opinion and we will be advising you of its final decision next Monday the 20th of April 2009, so that we can all know the way forward.” 

Nothing happened on 20 April 2009.  The applicant's legal practitioners responded on 20 April 2009:

“You totally surprise us.  Your client is barred.  We told you we are applying for default judgment.  You have ignored that and not even applied to uplift the bar.  You obviously know what you are doing.

Our only interest though in your client's decision today will be in whether they are prepared to pay what our client has claimed without need to execute.”

                The respondent did nothing until this matter was set down and on 12 May 2009 they filed an application for upliftment of the bar.  This was only done as direct result of the set down of this matter.  The respondent seeks postponement of this matter pending the hearing of the application for the upliftment of bar.  It has taken the respondent about four months to file the application for upliftment of the bar.  Ms Mkwananzi, for respondent, submitted that the postponement for the respondent to consider second legal opinion and decide whether to settle or pursue the application for the upliftment of the bar.  Mr Ncube, for the applicant, persists with the position that the respondent has been given more than sufficient time (and advice) to apply for the upliftment of the bar but they chose not to do so

 

 

timeously.  Therefore the court should not indulge the respondent.  As the respondent is barred, the applicant submit that the default judgment be entered in its favour.

                From what I have sketched above, it is evident that the respondent is litigating at a pace that is slower than a tortoise's.  There is a flagrant disregard of the times set in the Rules.  The correspondence from the other side is attended to at the respondent's leisure.  Does the respondent's case merit postponement in such circumstances?  Can this conduct be dealt with by way of a postponement coupled with a punitive order for costs?  It is trite granting a postponement in such circumstances is within my discretion.  However, I have to exercise this discretion judiciously.  I have outlined what has transpired in this case in a detailed fashion by design.  The facts clearly show that the respondent's lackadaisical approach in these proceedings.  Such lacklustre way of litigating comes at a price.  The long and short is that such a litigant risks a default judgment made against or a postponement coupled with punitive award of costs.  The respondent has been dilatory in answering the applicant's claim.  Although I am disinclined to allow the respondent to abuse the court process, I propose to allow it one last chance to put its house in order.  This, as alluded to will come at a cost, and will also be coupled with conditions that will act as a major disincentive to the respondent.

                Accordingly, I hereby make an order in the following terms:

(1)    Matter be and is hereby postponed to 10 July 2009 for the respondent to have its application for the upliftment of the bar under HC 727/09 determined.

(2)    In the event that the respondent fails to comply with paragraph (1) above the matter shall be regarded as unopposed and set down on the unopposed motion roll without notice to the respondent.

(3)    The respondent is ordered to pay costs of this hearing on the legal practitioner and client scale.

 

 

 

Coghlan & Welsh, applicant's legal practitioners

Joel Pincus, Konson & Wolhuter, respondent's legal practitioners
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