KUDYA J: On 3 May 2007 the plaintiff issued summons out of this court
seeking the nullification of an agreement of sale that was entered
into between the first defendant and the late Gladys Mutasa; the
nullification of the appointment of the second defendant as an
executor in the estate of the late Augustine Katsiga; the
nullification of the distribution account that was confirmed by the
third defendant in that estate; a declaration that three minor
children of the late Augustine and Gladys Mutasa are the
beneficiaries of their late father's estate; the transfer of stand
6673 Ruwa Township of Dispute Estate measuring 609 m² into the names
of the three minor children and costs of suit against the first and
second defendants. The first and second defendants contested the
action.
The plaintiff and the first and second defendants gave evidence in
person. In addition, the plaintiff produced 14 documentary exhibits
and called two witnesses while the first defendant produced two
documentary exhibits and called four witnesses. The second defendant
produced three documentary exhibits and was the only witness in his
defence. The two witnesses who were called by the plaintiff were two
members of the Norton branch of the Jesus Embassy Church Gift
Chilengwe and Fadzisai Mutatabikwa while the four who were called by
the first defendant were her erstwhile legal practitioner based in
Murewa, Benjamin William Chirambasukwa; her nephew Briam Mafemba
Charlie; her maid Gaudencia Gula and Mafunasi Gula.
THE ISSUES
At the pre-trial conference that was held on 16 April 2008, seven
issues were referred to trial. They were worded as follows:
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Whether or not the late Gladys Mutasa had authority to sell stand
6673 Ruwa Township.
-
Whether or not the late Gladys Mutasa sold stand 6673 Ruwa Township
to the first defendant
-
Whether the sale should be declared a nullity
-
Whether the appointment of the second defendant as executor was
valid
-
Whether the confirmed distribution account is valid or not
-
Who is the rightful beneficiary of the estate of the late Augustine
Katsiga
-
Whether the stand should be transferred to the minor children of the
late Augustine Katsiga and the late Gladys Mutasa.
THE AGREED FACTS
These were the facts and events which were not disputed during
trial. The late Augustine Katsiga (Augustine) married the late Gladys
Mutasa (Gladys) by civil rites on 7 October 2000. The union was
blessed with three children, that is, Kelvin Philbert Katsiga born 11
June 1992; Tafadzwa Ignatious Katsiga born 8 March 1997 and Augustine
Tinotenda Katsiga born 4 December 2001. Augustine was the registered
owner of an undeveloped stand in Ruwa, commonly known as Stand 6673
of Ruwa Township (the stand). The title deeds were produced as
exhibit 4.
He died on 26 October 2002 and was survived by his wife and three
children. His wife died on 3 November 2005 and was survived by the
three children. The plaintiff was the sister to Augustine. On 16
April 2007 she was appointed the guardian of the three children by
the Children's Court. The information concerning the dates of death
and appointment as guardian are found in exhibits 1, 2 and 3,
respectively.
Exhibit 5, though in contention, was produce by consent. It consists
of three photocopied one paged documents. The originals of the second
and third documents were produced by the first defendant as exhibit
15. The three documents were prepared by the first defendant. While
the first and third documents are not dated, the second document is
dated 26 April 2005. These documents purport to be a memorial of an
agreement of sale entered into between Augustine and Gladys as the
sellers and the first defendant as the buyer.
Gladys and her children resided at D14 Flamingo Norton while the
first defendant lived at 3835 Instamac Norton. They all attended
Jesus Embassy Church in Norton together with Gift Chilengwe (Gift),
Fadzisai Mutatabikwa (Fadzisai) and Mafunasi Gula (Mafunasi). By the
end of October 2005 Gladys was seriously ill. She was in pain, could
not walk and was bedridden.
Gladys' condition deteriorated. The first defendant, who was an
influential member of her church, made an appeal in church for the
sum of $5 million to buy food and medicines for Gladys. The church
failed to raise the amount sought. The first defendant advanced the
required amount to Gladys. The church undertook to refund her.
The plaintiff came to know the first defendant towards the end of
October 2005. The first defendant telephoned her and demanded the sum
of $5 million. She indicated that she would not surrender the title
deed to the stand and other documents unless the money was repaid.
The plaintiff went to Norton to pay the money. The first defendant
increased her demand to $7, 2 million averring the new amount
included interest. When she attempted to pay the increased amount the
first defendant declined to accept it; intimating that the title deed
was in the possession of her legal practitioners in Murewa.
In the meantime, Fadzisai, Gift, the first defendant and Marvelous
Gula (also known as Floyd's mother) made what was to be their last
visit to Gladys. She failed to rise from her bed. When they were
identified as her fellow church members, she asked them to help her
recover the title deed, her national identity card, her marriage
certificate, her husband's death certificate and her children's
birth certificates from the first defendant. Apparently they had been
handed to her by the maid under the pretext that she required the
birth certificates to register the children for school. The
maid had given her the file with all the documents. Gift asked the
first defendant in the presence of Fadzisai to return the documents.
The first defendant stated that she would only do so after Gladys
refunded her the $5 million that she had loaned to her.
Gladys died at Kadoma on 3 November 2005. The first defendant was
advised of her death by the plaintiff but she did not attend the
funeral.
In November 2005, Mr. Chirambasukwa prepared exhibit 9, an
agreement for the sale of the stand in question, between the first
defendant and Laston Tachiona (Laston). The first defendant signed
the agreement in November at her residence in Norton while the
purchaser, Laston signed it on 14 December 2005 at Chirambasukwa and
Associates offices in Murewa. Laston paid the purchase price of $220
million on 13 December 2005. On 16 December 2005, the first defendant
executed a power of attorney authorizing Mr. Chirambasukwa to
transfer the stand to Laston. In both documents she misrepresented
that she was the registered owner of the stand. The transfer failed
and Laston reported her to the police for fraud before he cancelled
the agreement and demanded the purchase price. In exhibit 13, the
first defendant agreed to refund Laston the purchase price by 31
January 2006. She then sold the stand to Florence Sibongo on 18
January 2006 for $750 million.
On 9 January 2006, two events occurred. The plaintiff retrieved the
documents which Gladys's maid had given to the first defendant. She
also registered Augustine's estate, reference DR 50/06, oblivious
of the fact it had been registered by Gladys in 2003.
On 15 February 2006, the first defendant filed a court application,
case number HC 877/06, against Gladys seeking an order for the
transfer of the stand to her in terms of the Titles Registration and
Derelict Lands Act [Cap 20:20]. She falsely declared in both
her founding and supplementary affidavits, which were produced as
exhibit 19 and 8, respectively, that Gladys was the executor dative
in the estate of Augustine; that she last saw her in December 2005;
that she had only been advised of her death by the plaintiff in
February 2006 and that the plaintiff had declined to provide her with
the names of Gladys' relatives. In exhibit 16, her opposing
affidavit to the urgent application brought by the plaintiff to stop
the transfer of the stand to her, she indicated that she knew where
Gladys' mother resided. Her court application for transfer was
struck off the roll on 17 May 2006.
On 7 and 16 August 2006, at her instigation, the Master called for an
edict meeting in the estate of Augustine. The Master dispatched
notices of the meeting to the residence of the first defendant and
the house where Gladys used to reside in Norton. The first defendant
did not advise the Master of the address of Gladys's mother. She
was aware at the time that the plaintiff was a police woman based at
Mabelreign police station and had her contact details yet she did not
provide this information to the Master. The Master was prevailed upon
by the first defendant to appoint a neutral executor and appointed
the second defendant on 8 September 2006.
On 19 September 2006, the second defendant perused the Master's
file on the estate of Augustine. He noted that Gladys had not been
appointed an executor and that the purported sale of the stand had
not been sanctioned by the Master. He also noted that case number HC
877/06 had been struck off the roll. He however accepted the validity
of exhibit 5 and without receipts to prove that payment in the sum of
$135 million had been paid acknowledged that the first defendant had
done so before accepting payment for the balance of the purchase
price of $65 000.00 (after the removal of three zeroes from our
currency in August 2006).
The second defendant compiled exhibit 6, the distribution account in
the estate of Augustine on 1 November 2006. He awarded the stand to
the first defendant on the ground that she was a creditor to
Augustine's estate. He stated that Gladys as the surviving spouse
of Augustine was entitled to receive the stand.
He submitted his report to the Master and advertised it in the Herald
and Government Gazette of 16 February 2007. Before the
advertisements were flighted, the plaintiff came to his offices with
a police officer who was based at Norton police station and Laston.
She complained that he was conniving with the first defendant to
cheat the minor children of Augustine of their inheritance.
On 13 March 2007, at his request, the Master confirmed the account.
He did not advise the Master of the complaint he had received from
the plaintiff. He prepared exhibit 18, the Consent to Transfer of
Immovable Property E.D. 16 form for the transfer of the property from
the Estate of Augustine to the first defendant. The Master gave his
consent to the transfer on the same date. He then referred it to the
first defendant's legal practitioners for conveyancing. The
defendant attempted to sell the stand to Nyarai Nyandoro on 17 April
2007. On that day, the plaintiff registered her complaints with the
Master, who on 23 April 2007 recalled the distribution account and
directed the executor to stop the transfer of the property to the
first defendant pending the resolution of the complaints.
The transfer was stopped by the urgent chamber application which was
launched by the plaintiff and the subsequent consensual order of this
Court of 17 May 2007. Despite, the interdict against her, she
attempted to sell the stand to Nyikayaramba in October 2007.
THE DISPUTED FACTS
The contentious issues between the parties were on the authenticity
of the documents that make exhibit 5 and the validity of the
appointment of the second defendant as the executor in the estate of
Augustine. The plaintiff was adamant both in her evidence in chief
and under cross- examination that exhibit 5 was a forgery. She also
maintained that the second defendant was appointed as result of a
flawed process that was driven by the first defendant. The first
defendant insisted that exhibit 5 was authentic and denied misleading
and manipulating the Master into appointing the second defendant. The
second defendant, on the other hand, opined that he did not solicit
for appointment and stated that once appointed he acted
professionally and scrupulously observed the dictates of the law.
I resolved the disputed facts in favour of the plaintiff for the
full reasons that appear in the determination of each issue that was
referred to trial. Suffice it to add that I found the plaintiff and
her two witnesses to be truthful witnesses. Her two witnesses were
unknown to her until after the death of Gladys. They volunteered to
testify on her behalf. They were closer to the first defendant. On
the other hand, I did not believe the first defendant and her
witnesses where their evidence differed with that of the plaintiff.
The defendant was a pathological liar. She prevaricated in her
testimony. The version of her witnesses was not canvassed with the
plaintiff's witnesses when they were cross examined. Her witnesses
also differed with her on matters in which agreement was expected.
Mr. Chirambasukwa did not assist her in her bid to show that exhibit
5 was genuine. He also drew misleading documents which falsely
painted her as the registered owner of the stand.
As for the second defendant, I was satisfied that his appointment was
based on a flawed process that was designed to exclude Augustine's
relatives. By his own admission in cross- examination, the executor
failed to make a diligent search for Augustine's relatives. When
the plaintiff presented herself to him, instead of working with her,
he rebuffed her. He awarded the stand to the first defendant well
knowing that the purported sale was invalid. He had no proof that the
first defendant had paid $135 million in reduction of the purchase
price. He deliberately misrepresented that Gladys had been appointed
an executrix. His fees were paid by the first defendant and he was
defended by her legal practitioner in this trial.
RESOLUTION
I turn to determine each issue that was refereed to trial.
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Whether or not the late Gladys Mutasa had authority to sell stand
6673 Ruwa Township
The evidence led at the trial demonstrated that Gladys registered the
estate of her late husband but was never appointed executrix. It was
common cause that the stand in question belonged to her late husband.
Exhibit 4, demonstrated beyond doubt that he held title to the stand.
On his death, the stand vested in his estate. In our law, an executor
is the only person who is looked upon by the court as the person to
represent the estate of the deceased. This position was enunciated in
1890 by DE VILLIERS CJ in Fischer v Liquidators of the Union Bank
8 SC 46 at 52. It has been religiously followed by our courts
ever since in such cases as Clarke v Barnacle, NO & Two Ors
1958 R&N 348 (SR) at 349B; Mhlanga v Ndlovu HB 54/2004 and
Nyandoro & Anor v Nyandoro & Ors HH 89/2008. I agree
with the submission by Mrs. Nyemba, for the plaintiff, that
Gladys did not have the legal power to dispose of the property.
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Whether or not the late Gladys Mutasa sold stand 6673 Ruwa
Township to the first defendant
The basis of the alleged sale was exhibit 5. Gladys purportedly sold
the stand in question, which was a vacant piece of land. The
provisions of section 7 of the Contractual Penalties Act [Cap
8:04] would apply to such a sale. The section reads:
7
Instalment sales of land to
be in writing
Every instalment sale of land shall be reduced to writing:
Provided that, where any such contract or any term or condition
thereof has not been reduced to writing, the onus of proving the
existence of that contract, term or condition, as the case may be,
shall rest on the person alleging its existence.
It was on the basis of this section that Mrs. Nyemba submitted
that the onus lay on the first defendant to show on a balance of
probabilities that the sale took place. Her submission is not
supported by the wording of the section. After all, the first
defendant relied on exhibit 5 as the memorial of the terms and
conditions of the agreement. It was an instalment sale that was
reduced to writing and which captured the agreed terms. The onus was
therefore on the plaintiff to show on a balance of probabilities that
Gladys was not a party to this agreement. After all, she was the one
who averred that the agreement was a forgery. The onus would be on
the first defendant to prove those terms that she alleged were agreed
but were not written into the agreement.
On the face of it exhibit 5 would satisfy the basic tenets of an
agreement of sale. The thing to be sold is identified and the price
is indicated. The intention to sell and buy is presupposed. In
addition, the signatures of the seller, buyer and witnesses are
appended in the agreement.
The plaintiff did not provide a sample of Gladys's signature nor
call expert evidence of a questioned document examiner. Rather, she
interrogated the documents which form exhibit 5. She took issue with
the reference in all the three documents to Augustine as a party to
the agreement when he had long died. The first and third documents
did not indicate the dates on which they were executed. A date was
shown on the second document. The format of the first document was
unusual. The signatures were appended above the content of the
agreement; a situation which created room for mischief. The terms of
payment in the first document are different from those in the second
document. The third document does not indicate the dates on which the
12 sums of money were paid. The first defendant did not prove that
those moneys were ever paid. The third document contradicted the
terms of payment in the first document. It was unclear whether the
first defendant paid a deposit of $5 million or $100 million. Tariro
Mutasa did not exist and the national identification number
attributed to her in the first and second documents was for Mary
Bvungwe. There are 8 signatures in the three documents that were
attributed to Gladys which, even to the untutored eye of a non-expert
in questioned documents, are all different.
She also used extrinsic factors to attack exhibit 5. When the first
defendant first contacted her, she did not indicate to her that she
had purchased the stand. She handed the title deed back to her on 9
January 2006 without claiming ownership of the stand. She did not
claim ownership to her fellow church members Gift and Fadzisai when
they asked her to return the documents. Her witnesses did not agree
with her that Heather Charlie lived in their neighborhood or that she
witnessed the agreement. The only Heather Charlie who was known to
them was her daughter who went to the United Kingdom in 1999 and had
not been back to Zimbabwe since then. She waited until Gladys had
died to claim the stand. The first defendant was a proven liar. Her
affidavits demonstrated that she held no qualms about gilding the
lily. She tailored her evidence to that of her witnesses that
Fadzisai masqueraded as Heather. The point was not taken with
Fadzisai during cross- examination. It was an after thought designed
to discredit Fadzisai's evidence. That allegation also demonstrated
that it was not beyond the first defendant to recruit others to
assist her to forge the agreements. After all, she had the file which
had Gladys's details.
The above factors that the plaintiff highlighted satisfied me that
she had discharged the onus on her to show that the agreement was not
authentic. It was a forgery. I, accordingly, hold that Gladys did not
sell the stand to the first defendant.
3. Whether the sale should be declared a nullity.
Mr. Harvey, for the first and second defendants, made the
ingenious submission that the sale had been validated by the Master
when he approved the distribution account on 13 March 2007. Neither
the Master nor for that matter a court of law could validate an
invalid sale. Such a sale does not exist. It is well to remember the
timeless words of LORD DENNING in McFoy v United Africa Co Ltd
[1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC) at 1172I which were quoted with approval in
Jensen v Acavalos 1993 (1) ZLR 216 (S) at 220 C that:
“Every proceeding which is founded on it is also bad and incurably
bad. You cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there.
It will collapse.”
The Master could not validate a sale that never was. He recalled the
confirmed distribution account in exhibit 7 on 23 April 2007 after
his error had been brought to his attention by the plaintiff.
The only reasonable conclusion to draw from either of my findings in
answer to the first and second issues is that the sale was a nullity.
Firstly for the reason that there was no sale in the first place and
secondly that even if the sale was executed, it was invalid because
Gladys was not an executor to the estate of her late husband. It
would also appear that even if she were the executor, the absence of
the Master's prior consent to the sale by private treaty would in
terms of section 120 of the Administration of Estates Act have been
invalid.
I hold that the purported sale was a nullity.
4. Whether the appointment of the second defendant as executor was
valid.
Mrs. Nyemba submitted that the appointment of the second
defendant was invalidated by the fraudulent misrepresentations that
were made to the Master by the first defendant. She further submitted
that even if he had been properly appointed, he would be removed from
office for failing to protect the estate. Mr. Harvey did not
counteract these submissions. It was clear from the contents of the
first defendant's founding and supplementary affidavits in case HC
877/2006 that were filed on 15 February and 8 June 2006 that she
portrayed the false impression that Gladys was still alive when she
knew that she had died. The second defendant was appointed to
accommodate her false claims that she had a valid sales agreement.
She was the only party in attendance at the edict meting of 16 August
2006. She was aware of the existence of the plaintiff and
deliberately failed to inform the Master of her whereabouts. It
transpired in evidence that she knew that the plaintiff was a police
woman who was based at Mabelreign police station. She could still
have referred the Master to Norton police station where the plaintiff
had made her report in January 2006 if she really wanted the
plaintiff to be party to the edict meeting. She was eager to have the
stand transferred to her in the absence of the late Augustine's
relatives. The Master dispatched notices to the addresses where the
first defendant knew the deceased Gladys would not be found. Her
misrepresentations prejudiced the estate in that it lost the stand to
the first defendant who was not even one of its creditors. Her
misrepresentations to the Master are a good and sufficient reason to
declare the appointment of the second defendant invalid.
Accordingly, I hold that the appointment was invalid.
The second defendant, however, opposed his removal on the basis that
he acted professionally in administering the estate. It is now
accepted in our law that there are two ways in which an executor may
be removed from office. The first is by the Master in terms of
section 117 (1) of the Administration of Estates Act and the second
is through the common law. The first method is demonstrated in Siziba
v Siziba & Anor HB 25/2004 while the second is highlighted in
Katirawu v Katirawu & Ors HH 58/2007. In the Katirawu
case, supra, at page 5 the LEARNED JUDGE PRESIDENT held
thus:
“While s117 (1) empowers the Master to approach the court for the
removal of an executor for the listed grounds, in my view, such a
power granted to the Master was not intended to take away the right
of all those having an interest in the estate from approaching the
court at common law to have the executor removed if they can
establish to the satisfaction of the court that the continuance in
office of the executor does not augur well for the future welfare of
the estate and beneficiaries. The power granted to the Master by s117
is in my view complementary to the inherent power of the court at
common law. In any event, if it was the intention of the legislature
to revoke the common law power of the court in this regard, it would
have done so in express language for the jurisdiction of the court is
not ousted other than in clear language.”
The plaintiff approached the court as the lawfully appointed guardian
of the minor children. She followed in the footsteps of the
petitioner in Volkwyn NO v Clarke & Damant 1946 WLD 456.
The bases for such removal are set out in the following cases:
In The Master v Edgcombes Executors and Administrators
1910 AD 271 at 266-7 Mason J stated that:
“the authorities are quite clear that any unfaithful dealing by an
executor, whether connected directly with the administration of the
estate under his charge or whether consisting in breach of trust in
connection with other matters will justify his removal from office
Voet 26, 10, 102; Bronkhorst v Rasmus 1907 TS 486.”
At page 271 he concluded thus:
“I have come to the conclusion that the court has exactly the same
power to remove the respondents from the position of trustees and
administrators as it would have to remove them under the common law
from the position of executors.”
In Volkwyn's case, supra, Murray J stated in similar
vein at p 462 that:
“This Court, it has been held, possesses under common law, the same
power of removal in regard to administrators and trustees, though
these offices are not mentioned in the statute, as it has in regard
to executors.(The Master v Edgecombe's Executors 1910 TPD at
p271) The paramount consideration in deciding whether the executor or
administrator should be removed is apparently whether his
continuation in office will prejudicially affect the future welfare
of the trust estate placed under his control”.
Under the common law the first consideration is whether the
executor's continuation in office is detrimental to the future
welfare of the estate. Sandura JP, as he then was, in Vermaak &
Anor v Nish N.O. HH 166/88 at p 7 phrased this requirement in
similar language when he stated that:
“The acts complained of are such as to stamp the executor as
dishonest, grossly inefficient or untrustworthy person whose future
conduct can be expected to expose the estate to actual loss or of
administration in a way not contemplated by the will”
To the same effect was Solomon ACJ in Sackville West v Nourse &
Anor 1925 AD 516 with reference to trustees that:
“The continuance of the trustees would prevent the trusts being
properly executed or would be detrimental to the welfare of the
beneficiaries.”
The test is therefore whether the acts or omissions of the executor
were detrimental to the estate property and his continuance in office
would prevent the proper execution of his mandate or would be against
the interests of the beneficiaries of the estate.
It was an undeniable fact that the second defendant did not act to
protect the interests of the estate. He was eager to assist the first
defendant divest the stand from the estate. He did not make a
diligent search for the relatives of Augustine and Gladys. He
perpetuated the lie that Gladys had been appointed an executor. He
accepted exhibit 5 without demur. He failed to act with
professionalism when the plaintiff confronted him with the
allegations that the first defendant was acting dishonestly. He did
not alert the Master of the complaint he had received from the
plaintiff. He acted with indecent haste to transfer the estate
property to the first defendant. His actions undermined the estate
whose only valuable asset was the stand. Even though he had almost
completed his task, he had not been discharged by the Master from
office.
He would have been a ripe candidate for removal had I not been
satisfied that his appointment was invalid by reason of the
fraudulent misrepresentation that was perpetrated by the first
defendant.
5. Whether the confirmed distribution account is valid or not
The distribution account is grounded in false misrepresentations
made by the executor and the first defendant. It is the product of a
void agreement of sale. It is built on nothing and cannot exist. I
hold that it is invalid and must be set aside.
6. Who is the rightful beneficiary of the estate of the late
Augustine Katsiga?
It was agreed by counsel that the late Augustine died intestate. The
spouse of the deceased was incorporated as an heir by section 3 of
the Deceased Estates Succession Act [Cap 6:02]. This repealed
the customary law principle that a wife could not inherit from her
husband's estate. The other beneficiaries besides Gladys in the
present estate were the three minor children. The stand in question
was not the matrimonial home where Gladys resided at the time of her
husband's death. Gladys and her children were thus each entitled to
an equal share in the stand. She could not legally dispose of the
children's shares without the authority of this Court.
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Whether the stand should be transferred to the minor children
The net effect of my findings is that the estate of Augustine should
be properly administered by an executor appointed by the Master after
a proper edict meeting attended by Augustine and Gladys's
relatives. The appointment of the second defendant was invalid
because of the misrepresentations that were made by the first
defendant. The sale agreement was invalid. The first defendant does
not have a share in the estate of Augustine. She would also have no
share in Gladys's estate. The child's share that Gladys had in
the stand vested in her estate on her death. In terms of section 3 of
the Deceased Estates Succession Act her children would be the
beneficiaries in her estate of the child share she would receive from
her husband's estate.
It would be necessary that the estate of their late mother be
registered before the stand can be transferred into their joint
names. It seems to me, therefore, that the estates of both their
parents should be administered first before they can inherit the
whole stand in their names.
COSTS
The plaintiff has succeeded in her suit. It would be inequitable to
order the estate to meet the costs of the parties in the light of the
perverse conduct of the first and second defendants in the
administration of the estate. Rather, the two defendants will be
ordered to meet the plaintiff's costs, jointly and severally, the
one paying the other to be absolved.
DISPOSITION
Accordingly, it is ordered that:
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The agreement of sale in respect of Stand Number 6673 Ruwa Township
of Dispute Estate entered into between the first defendant and the
late Gladys Mutasa be and is hereby declared null and void.
-
The appointment of the second defendant as the executor dative in
the Estate of the Late Augustine Katsiga (DR 2653/2003) be and is
hereby declared null and void.
-
The First and Final Liquidation and Distribution Account in the
Estate of the Late Augustine Katsiga which was confirmed by the
Master on 13 March 2007 be and is hereby set aside.
-
It is declared that the minor children Kelvin Philbert Katsiga born
11 June 1992 and Tafadzwa Ignatious Katsiga born 8 March 1997and
Augustine Tinotenda Katsiga born 4 December 2001 are equal and joint
beneficiaries with their deceased mother Gladys Mutasa in the Estate
of the Late Augustine Katsiga.
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The first and second defendants shall pay the plaintiff's costs
jointly and severally the one paying the other to be absolved.
V. Nyemba & Associates, plaintiff's legal practitioners
Granger & Harvey, 1st and 2nd
defendants' legal practitioners.
