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HB56-09 - BENTONS (PVT) LTD vs SWAN PROPERTIES (PVT) LTD

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Procedural Law-viz provisional order.

Procedural Law-viz interim interdict.
Law of Property-viz property given grantis re donation.
Law of Property-viz agreement of lease re eviction.
Law of Property-viz eviction re lease agreement iro jurisdiction of the courts viz a viz the Rent Board.
Law of Property-viz eviction proceedings re agreement of lease iro jurisdiction of the courts viz a viz the Rent Board.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re eviction proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz summary judgment re eviction proceedings.
Damages-viz proof and evidence of damages re quantum iro improvements made by lessee on leased premises.
Procedural Law-viz default judgment re summary judgment proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz rescission of judgment re ejectment order.
Procedural Law-viz appeal re rescission of judgment.
Procedural Law-viz leave to execute pending appeal re eviction proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz leave to execute pending appeal re section 40 of the Magistrates' Court Act [Chapter 7:10].
Law of Property-viz lease agreement re improvements iro value of improvements.
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re Magistrates Court iro monetary jurisdiction.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re monetary jurisdiction iro Magistrates' Court.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re testimony from the bar.
Procedural Law-viz review re jurisdiction of the court.
Procedural Law-viz stay of execution.
Procedural Law-viz appeal re notice of appeal iro suspension of judgment appealed against.
Procedural Law-viz principle of finality to litigation.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re review proceedings iro introduction of new evidence not tendered before the trial court.

Jurisdiction re: Monetary, Cause of Action and Domestic Territorial Jurisdiction

The applicant seeks a provisional order in the following terms:-

Terms of the final order sought

That the provisional order granted by this honourable court be confirmed in the following manner:-

(a) The eviction of applicant be and is hereby set aside until the review matter under case number HC648/09 is finalized.

(b) The respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay costs of suit if it opposes the application.

Interim relief granted

Pending the finalization of the matter, the applicant be granted the relief:-

1. The eviction of applicant be and is hereby set aside until the review matter under case number HC648/09 is finalized.”

The salient facts of the matter are the following.

In September 2007, the applicant's Managing Director, one Elijah Makhulumo, was approached by his acquaintance, one Regis Sibanda. The latter informed him that the respondent's Managing Director, Hetnesh Sunan Patel, was looking for someone who may be interested in taking occupation of his property known as Number 49 Robert Mugabe Way in Bulawayo.

The applicant eventually took occupation of the property.

According to the applicant, it was given the property grantis. The property was derelict and required improvements.

According to the respondent, the applicant occupied the premises under a lease.

On 27 October 2008, the respondent issued summons proceedings in the Magistrates' Court, under case number 704/08, wherein the respondent sought ejectment of the applicant from the said disputed property. The applicant entered appearance to defend.

The applicant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the court at that stage.

Thereafter, the respondent applied for summary judgment on 25 November 2008. The applicant opposed the application for summary judgment in the following terms -

“(a) The building was verbally given to me by the applicant.

(b) I renovated the building to cost more than ten times that it was before (sic).

(c) The applicant is acting in bad faith by wanting the building back because of its new value.

(d) I have done a lot of improvements to the building...,.

It is very difficult for the court to just evict me when there is not even a certificate of eviction from the Rent Board.”

Even at this stage, the applicant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Magistrates, Court.

The magistrate granted the application for summary judgment in favour of the respondent on 11 December 2008. The application was granted by default.

On 19 December 2008, the applicant applied for rescission of the said summary judgment.

Once more, there were no averments challenging the jurisdiction of the court.

On 27 March 2008, the magistrate dismissed the application for rescission filed by the applicant. The applicant filed a notice of appeal against this dismissal of the application for rescission.

In the notice of appeal, the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court was not challenged.

The respondent filed an application in terms of section 40 of the Magistrates' Court Act [Chapter 7:10], on 9 April 2009, for leave to execute pending appeal.

In opposing this application, the applicant, for the very first time, challenged the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court. For the first time, the applicant placed a value of UD$70,000= as the value of the improvements.

On the basis of this new averment, the applicant attacks the magistrate for not declining to hear the matter for want of monetary jurisdiction.

It is not clear how this value was supposed to have come to the attention of the magistrate if it was not pleaded, or averred, in the earlier proceedings...,. The applicant did not raise the defence of lack of jurisdiction when it opposed the summons, neither did the applicant do so during other proceedings.

On 28 April 2009, the magistrate granted the respondent leave to execute pending the appeal. Both parties' legal practitioners were present when the magistrate pronounced the judgment.

Professional Ethics, Legal Duty to the Court and Clients, Dominus Litis and Correspondence with the Court

On 27 April 2009, the applicant filed a notice of withdrawal of the notice of appeal.

Counsel for the applicant “testified” from the bar that the date stamp of 27 April 2009 by the Registrar of this court is by error. He said the notice of withdrawal was filed on 28 April 2009. He said the office of the Registrar accepted this error.

Counsel for the respondent opposed this and stated that in fact the date stamp shows the correct date of filing. He challenged counsel for the applicant to prove the so-called error by obtaining an affidavit from the Registrar's office.

Counsel for the applicant opted not to do so.

If the Registrar's above-mentioned date stamp is correct, then the applicant's legal practitioners acted unethically by not informing the magistrate that the appeal was in fact withdrawn the previous day. It would mean that they waited for the pronouncement and then launched an application for review, and this application, in bad faith.

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Approach

It is clear that the applicant seeks review on the basis of the magistrate's alleged lack of jurisdiction.

I have chronicled all the opportunities the applicant had to raise this lack of jurisdiction and failed to do so. The applicant only raised it as a last resort when the respondent applied for leave to execute pending appeal.

It is trite that execution is a process of the court, and the court has inherent power to control its own process. Where a stay of execution is sought, it should be granted on the basis of real and substantial justice. Where injustice would otherwise be caused, the court has the power, and would, generally speaking, grant the relief – Cohen v Cohen 1979 (3) SA 420 (R)...,.; Chibanda v King 1983 (1) ZLR 116 (H)...,.; and Santam Insurance Co. Ltd v Paget 1981 ZLR 132 (H).

The onus rests on the applicant to satisfy me that injustice would otherwise be caused to it, or to express the proposition in a different form, of the potentiality of its suffering irreparable harm or prejudice – Zaduck v Zaduck 1966 (1) SA 550 (SR)...,.

In casu, it is common cause that the applicant did not purchase the property in question. The applicant's case is that the property was donated to it by the respondent.

The respondent's case is that the applicant occupied the premises via a lease and has defaulted on payment of rentals.

The basis of the application for review is the value of the improvements.

The applicant states that it effected improvements to the tune of US$70,000= and purports to attach some evaluation from Bulawayo Real Estate. In fact, there is no such evaluation attached. In any event, the evaluation was not part of the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court.

The application for review was filed after the applicant enjoyed occupation for about a month via suspension of the execution of the magistrate's order through a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was withdrawn a day before the judgment in the application for leave to execute was delivered. The applicant's legal practitioner knew about the alleged lack of jurisdiction all along but did not apply for review.

These proceedings are clearly being used to buy time.

The applicant will suffer no irreparable prejudice. It can sue for damages for the alleged improvements.

In the exercise of my wide discretion, I find that there is no merit at all in the application and it should fail.

Costs re: De Bonis Propriis, Deceased Estates and the Abuse of Representative Capacity Positions

The respondent's legal practitioner has prayed that I grant costs de bonis propriis against the applicant's legal practitioner.

The tendency is to award costs de bonis propriis against erring legal practitioners only in reasonably serious cases, such as cases of dishonesty, wilfulness, or negligence, in a serious degree – Law of Costs A.C.CILLIERS...,.; Jenkins v Loubser 1974 (3) SA 816 (A); and Machumela v Santam Insurance Co. Ltd 1977 (1) SA 660 (A).

In this case, counsel for the applicant must have known all along about the alleged lack of monetary jurisdiction of the magistrate.

Why did he not raise it as a response to the summons? Why did he not raise it in the opposition to the summary judgment? Why did he not raise it in the application for rescission? Why did he not straight away file an application for review instead of first filing a notice of appeal which automatically suspended the execution of the judgment? Why did the applicant file the application for review only after the magistrate granted leave to execute pending appeal?

Whether by design or accident, these omissions had the effect of delaying the eviction of the applicant.

The conduct of counsel for the applicant in these proceedings is either mala fide or grossly negligent. Whichever is the case, he cannot escape costs de bonis propriis.

Accordingly, the application is dismissed with costs de bonis propriis awarded against counsel for the applicant.

NDOU J:        The applicant seeks a provisional order in the following terms:-

            “Terms of the final order sought

That the provisional order granted by this honourable court be confirmed in the following manner:-

 

(a)                The eviction of applicant be and is hereby set aside until the review matter under case number HC 648/09 is finalized.

(b)               The respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay costs of suit if it opposes the application.

 

Interim relief granted

 

Pending the finalization of the matter, the applicant be granted the relief:-

 

1.                  The eviction of applicant be and is hereby set aside until the review matter under case number HC 648/09 is finalized.”

 

The salient facts of the matter are the following.  In September 2007, the applicant's managing director, one Elijah Makhulumo, was approached by his acquaintance, one Regis Sibanda.  The latter informed him that the respondent's managing director Hetnesh Sunan Patel was looking for someone who may be interested in taking occupation of his property known as number 49 Robert Mugabe Way in Bulawayo.  The applicant eventually took occupation of the property.  According to the applicant, it was given the property grantis.  The property was derelict and required improvements.  According to the respondent, the applicant occupied the premises under a lease.  On 27 October 2008 the respondent issued summons proceedings in the Magistrates' Court under case number 704/08 wherein the respondent sought ejectment of the applicant from the said dispute property.  The applicant entered appearance to defend.  The applicant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the court at that stage.  Thereafter, the respondent applied for summary judgment on 25 November 2008.  The applicant opposed the application for summary judgment in the following terms:-

“(a)      The building was verbally given to me by the applicant.

(b)        I renovated the building to cost more than ten times that it was before [sic].

(c)                The applicant is acting in bad faith by wanting the building back because of its new value.

(d)               I have done a lot of improvements to the building …

It is very difficult for the court to just evict me when there is not even a certificate of eviction obtained from the Rent Board.”

 

Even at this stage the applicant did not challenge the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court.  The magistrate granted the application for summary judgment in favour of the respondent on 11 December 2008.  The application was granted by default.  On 19 December 2008, the applicant applied for the rescission of the said summary judgment.  Once more there were no averments challenging the jurisdiction of the court.  On 27 March 2008 the magistrate dismissed the application for rescission filed by the applicant.  The applicant filed a notice of appeal against this dismissal of the application for rescission.  In the notice of appeal the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court was not challenged.  The respondent filed an application in terms of section 40 of the Magistrates' Court Act [Chapter 7:10] on 9 April 2009 for leave to execute pending appeal.  In opposing this application, the applicant, for the very first time challenged the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court.  For the first time, the applicant placed a value of US$70 000 as the value of the improvements.  On the basis of this new averment, the applicant attacks the magistrate for not declining to hear the matter for want of monetary jurisdiction.

It is not clear how this value was supposed to have come to the attention of the magistrate if it was not pleaded or averred in the earlier proceedings as I have alluded above.  The applicant did not raise the defence of lack of jurisdiction when it opposed the summons, neither did the applicant do so during other proceedings.  On 27 April 2009 the applicant file a notice of withdrawal of the notice of appeal.  Mr Hara, 'testified” from the bar that the date stamp of 27 April 2009 by the Registrar of this court is by error.  He said the notice of withdrawal was filed on 28 April 2009.  He said the office of the Registrar accepted this error.  Mr Dube-Banda opposed this and stated that in fact the date stamp shows the correct date of filing.  He challenged Mr Hara to properly prove the so-called error by obtaining an affidavit from the Registrar's office.  Mr Hara opted not to do so.

On 28 April 2009, the magistrate granted the respondent leave to execute pending the appeal.  Both parties' legal practitioners were present when the magistrate pronounced the judgment.  If the Registrar's above-mentioned date stamp is correct, then the applicant's legal practitioners acted unethically by not informing the magistrate that the appeal was in fact withdrawn the previous day.  It would mean that they waited for the pronouncement and then launched an application for review and this application in bad faith.

It is clear that the applicant seeks review on the basis of the magistrate's alleged lack of jurisdiction.  I have chronicled all the opportunities the applicant had to raise this lack of jurisdiction and failed to do so.  The applicant only raised it as a last resort when the respondent applied for leave to execute pending appeal.  It is trite that execution is a process of the court and the court has inherent power to control its own process.  Where a stay of execution is sought it should be granted on the basis of real and substantial justice.  Where injustice would otherwise be caused, the court has the power and would, generally speaking grant the relief – Cohen v Cohen 1979(3) SA 420 (R) at 423B-C; Chibanda v King 1983(1) ZLR 116 (H) at 119C-H and Santam Insurance Co Ltd v Paget 1981 ZLR 132 (H).  The onus rests on the applicant to satisfy me that injustice would otherwise be caused to it or to express the proposition in a different form, of the potentiality of its suffering irreparable harm or prejudice – Zaduck v Zaduck 1966 (1) SA 550 (SR) at 551E.  In casu, it is common cause that the applicant did not purchase the property in question.  Applicant's case is that the property was donated to it by the respondent.  The respondent's case is that the applicant occupied the premises via a lease and has defaulted on payment of rentals.  The basis of the application for review is the value of the improvements.  The applicant states that it effected improvements to the tune of US$70 000,00 and purports  to attach some evaluation form Bulawayo Real Estate.  In fact there is no such evaluation attached.  Without such evaluation on what basis can it be said that the magistrate lacked jurisdiction.  In any event, the evaluation was not part of the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court.  The application for review was filed after the applicant enjoyed occupation for about a month via suspension of execution of the magistrate's order through a notice of appeal.  The notice of appeal was withdrawn a day before the judgment in the application for leave to execute was delivered.  The applicant's legal practitioner knew about the alleged lack of jurisdiction all along but did apply for review.  These proceedings are clearly being used to buy time.  The applicant will suffer no irreparable prejudice.  It can sue for damages for the alleged improvements.  In exercise of my wide discretion I find that there is no merit at all in the application and it should fail.

The respondent's legal practitioner has prayed that I grant costs de bonis propriis against Mr Hara.  The tendency is to award costs de bonis propriis against erring legal practitioners only in reasonably serious cases, such as case of dishonesty, willfulness or negligence in a serious degree – Law of Costs A C Cilliers at page 165; Jenkins v FJJ de Souza & Co (Pvt) Ltd 1968 (4) SA 559 (R); Immelman v Loubser 1974 (3) SA 816 (A) and Machumela v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1977(1) SA 660 (A).

In this case, Mr Hara must have known all along about the alleged lack of monetary jurisdiction of the magistrate.  Why did he not raise it as a response to the summons?  Why did he not raise in the opposition to the summary judgment?  Why did he not raise it in the application for rescission?  Why did he not straight away file an application for review instead of first filing a notice of appeal which automatically suspended the execution of the judgment?  Why did the applicant file the application for review only after the magistrate granted leave to execute pending appeal?  Whether by design or accident these omissions had the effect of delaying the eviction of the applicant.  The conduct of Mr Hara in these proceedings is either mala fide or grossly negligent.  Whichever is the case, he cannot escape costs de bonis propriis.

Accordingly, the application is dismissed with costs de bonis propriis awarded against Mr T. Hara.

 

 

 

 

 

Messrs T Hara & Partners, applicant's legal practititioners

Dube-Banda, Nzarayapenga & Partners, respondent's legal practitioners
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