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HB25-09 - MEKIYA NYATHI vs JOYCE MUVEZWA and B. TADERERA and SENDRA MUVEZWA and THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS (BULAWAYO)

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Procedural Law-viz provisional order re interim interdict iro interdict barring the selling of immovable property.

Procedural Law-viz provisional order re interim interdict iro interdict barring the transfer of immovable property.
Law of Contract-viz specific performance ex contractu.
Law of Contract-viz specific performance ex contractu re agreement to swap immovable properties.
Law of Contract-viz swapping agreement.
Law of Contract-viz swapping arrangement re disposal of asset which is the subject of the swap.
Law of Contract-viz consensus ad idem re specific performance ex contractu.
Procedural Law-viz dispute of facts re application procedure.
Procedural Law-viz disputes of fact re specific performance ex contractu.
Procedural Law-viz dispute of facts re motion proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz disputes of fact re motion proceedings iro irreconcilable dispute of facts.
Law of Contract-viz specific performance ex contractu re dispute of facts.
Procedural Law-viz disputes of fact re specific performance ex contractu.

Interim Interdict Pendente Confirmation or Discharge Proceedings re: Approach, Return Date and the Prima Facie Concept

This is an urgent application barring the first and second respondents from selling, or transferring, property. The relief sought is couched as follows:-

TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

That First, Second, and Fourth Respondents show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:-

(1) That the First Respondent should honour her obligations under the swapping agreement and transfer her right, title, and interest to Stand Number 35 Plumer Road, North End, Bulawayo, to the Applicant within ten days of service of the Final Order on her, failing which, the Deputy Sheriff, Bulawayo be authorized to act in her stead.

(2) That First, Second, and Third Respondents be and are hereby barred from selling and/or transferring in any way the First Respondent's right, title, and interest to Stand Number 35 Plumer Road, North End, Bulawayo, to any third party other than the Applicant.

(3) That the First, Second, and Third Respondent pay the costs of this application on an Attorney-client scale.

INTERIM RELIEF SOUGHT

That pending the determination of this Application by the Court:-

(a) The First, Second, and Third Respondents be and are hereby barred from selling and/or transferring in any way the First Respondent's right, title, and interest to Stand Number 35 Plumer Road, North End, Bulawayo to any party pending the determination of this matter.”

This application was filed on the 11th of November 2002, and I granted the Provisional Order on the 12th of November 2002.

Specific Performance re: Approach, Impossibility of Performance and the Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus

According to the applicant, an Agreement to swap houses was entered into between himself and the first respondent sometime in 1994. The original agreement was lost but, however, the parties entered into a second Agreement in 2001.

The first respondent, in accordance with the swapping arrangement, took occupation of the applicant's house in Chitungwiza while he took occupation of her house in North End, Bulawayo.

What has prompted this application is that the first respondent threatened to dispose of the same house which is the subject of the swap.

It was the applicant's evidence that between the 5th and the 6th of November 2002, two Estate Agents visited the North End house with a view of selling it for and on behalf of the first respondent.

Consensus Ad Idem re: Approach iro Foundation, Sanctity, Privity, Retrospectivity & Judicial Variation of Contracts


The respondents..., argued that there was no such agreement, and if there was, the parties were not in ad idem.

Disputes of Fact or Conflict of Facts re: Approach, Factual, Non-Factual, Questions of Law and Material Resolutions

It is also the respondent's argument that there is a dispute of facts, and, accordingly, the applicant should not have proceeded by way of application.

The legal position is that in motion proceedings the court can only decide issues on affidavit(s) only, if there is no irreconciliable dispute of facts, and can do so without doing an injustice to the other party. See Lalla v Spafford N.O. and Others 1974 (1) SA 191 (R).

The dispute of facts, according to the respondent, are:-

(1) The first respondent's inability to transact as a result of a strike in 1991;

(2) The authenticity of an affidavit filed of record as the signature is being queried; and

(3) The circumstances surrounding the swapping of the properties in question.

There are, in my view, serious and irreconcilable, dispute of facts which cannot be decided without the benefit of oral evidence.

It is trite law that where a dispute of facts arise, the courts can do either of the following:-

(1) Dismiss the application with costs; or

(2) Order that oral evidence be heard; or

(3) Order the parties to go to trial.

In casu, there is a need for the trial court to have an opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses before coming to a conclusion, and hear oral evidence regarding the full facts, and surrounding circumstances. See Peterson v Cuthbert and Co. Ltd 1945 AD 420..., and De Villiers v Pyott 1947 (1) SA 381...,.

In my view, this matter involves a mixture of both law and facts, which facts are in dispute, and is, therefore, a proper case to be referred to trial.

The following order is therefore made:-

It is ordered that -

(1) The matter is referred to trial and the notice of this application shall stand as summons in the action.

(2) The pleadings should be filed so as to clearly define the issues.

(3) Costs to be costs in the cause.

Urgent Chamber Application

 

            CHEDA J:     This is an urgent application barring first and second respondents from selling or transferring property.  The relief sought is couched as follows:-

            “TERMS OF FINAL ORDER SOUGHT

 

            That First, Second, Third and Fourth Respondents show cause to this Honourable Court why a final order should not be made in the following terms:-

 

(1)        That the First Respondent should honour her obligations under the swapping agreement and transfer her right, title and interest to Stand Number 35 Plumer Road, North End, Bulawayo to the Applicant within 10 days of service of the Final Order on her failing which the Deputy Sheriff, Bulawayo be authorized to act in her stead.

(2)        That First, Second and Third Respondents be and are hereby barred from selling and/or transferring in any way the First Respondent's right, title and interest to Stand Number 35 Plumer Road, North End, Bulawayo to any third party other than the Applicant.

(3)        That the First, Second and Third Respondents pay the costs of this application on an Attorney-client scale.

 

INTERIM RELIEF SOUGHT

 

That pending the determination of this Application by the Court:-

 

(a)        The First, Second and Third Respondents be and are hereby barred from selling and/or transferring in any way the First Respondent's right, title and interest to Stand Number 35 Plumer Road, North End, Bulawayo to any party pending the determination of this matter.

 

            This application was filed on the 11 November 2002 and I granted the Provisional Order on the 12th November 2002.  Third Respondent filed a notice of opposition on the 20th January 2003 according to applicant on agreement to swap houses was entered into between himself and First respondent sometime in 1994.  The original agreement was lost but, however, the parties entered into a second agreement in 2001.  First respondent in accordance with the swapping arrangement took occupation of applicant's house in Chitungwiza while he took occupation of her house in North End, Bulawayo.

            What has prompted this application is that first respondent threatened to dispose of the same house which is the subject of the swap.  It was applicant's evidence that between the 5th and 6th November 2002 two Estate Agents visited the North End house with a view of selling it for and on behalf of first respondent.

Respondents on the other hand argued that there was no such agreement and if there was the parties were not in ad litem.  It is also their argument that there is a dispute of facts and accordingly applicant should not have proceeded by way of application.

The legal position is that in motion proceedings the court can only decide issues on affidavit(s) only if there is no irreconcilable dispute of facts and can do so without doing an injustice to the other party, see Lalla v Spafford, N.O and Others 1974(1) SA 191(R)

 

 

            The said dispute of facts according to respondent are:-

(1)        first respondent's inability to transact as a result of a strike in 1991.

(2)        the authencity of an affidavit filed of record as the signature is being queried; and

(3)        the circumstances surrounding the swapping of the properties in question.

            There are in my view serious and irreconcilable dispute of facts which can not be decided without the benefit of oral evidence.

            It is trite law that where a dispute of facts arise the courts can do either of the following:-

(1)        dismiss the application with costs, or

(2)        order that oral evidence be heard; or

(3)        order the parties to go to trial,

            In casu there is a need for the trial court to have an opportunity of seeing and hearing the witnesses before coming to a conclusion and hear oral evidence regarding the full facts and the surrounding circumstances, see Peterson v Cuthbert and Co. Ltd 1945 AD 420 at 428 and De Villers v Pyott 1947(1) SA 381 at 387.

            In my view, therefore, this matter involves a mixture of both law and facts which facts are in dispute and is therefore a proper case to be referred to trial.   The following order is therefore made:-

It is ordered that:-

(1)        The matter is referred to trial and the notice of this application shall stand as summons in the action.

(2)        The pleadings should be filed so as to clearly define the issues.

(3)        Costs to be costs in the cause.

 

 

 

Sansole and Senda, applicant's legal practitioners

Shenje and Company, respondents's legal practitioners
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