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HB24-09 - SIKHULILE MOYO vs THABANI KHUMALO and ESTATE LATE SIBONILE MLILO (represented by Bongani Ndlovu) and ASSISTANT MASTER OF HIGH COURT, BULAWAYO and CITY OF BULAWAYO

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Law of Contract-viz specific performance re specific performance ex contractu.
Procedural Law-viz citation re party acting in an official capacity iro nominee officii.
Procedural Law-viz citation re party acting in an official capacity iro nominus officiae.
Law of Contract-viz termination of contracts.
Law of Contract-viz cancellation of agreements.
Law of Property-viz res litigiosa re judicial caveat.
Law of Property-viz the anti-dissipation interdict.
Procedural Law-viz disputes of fact.
Procedural Law-viz dispute of facts.
Procedural Law-viz conflict of facts.
Procedural Law-viz ex parte applications.
Procedural Law-viz proceedings without notice.
Law of Contract-viz essential elements re consensus ad idem iro mistake.
Procedural Law-viz costs re punitive order of costs.
Procedural Law-viz final orders re discharge of an interlocutory order.
Procedural Law-viz final orders re confirmation of a provisional order.

Citation and Joinder re: Party Acting in Official Capacity, Statutory or Peremptory Citation and Delegated Authority

This is an application for an enforcement of a contract.

The first respondent is Thabani Khumalo, a male adult who is in the business of contracting, acquiring and developing residential Stands for sale. He resides at House No.8774 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo, which is his address for service.

The second respondent is the Executor in the Estate of the Late Sibonile Mlilo, cited as such in his official capacity. His address for service is Chelmsford Executors and Trust (Pvt) Ltd, Suite 112, 1st Floor, Parkade Centre, Fife Street, Bulawayo.

The third respondent is the Assistant Master of the High Court of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, cited in his official capacity as a responsible authority over matters to do with, amongst other things, deceased estates administration. He is overseeing the winding up of the estate of the late Sibonile Mlilo registered in his office under DRBY 267/08.

Disputes of Fact or Conflict of Facts re: Approach, Factual, Non-Factual, Questions of Law and Material Resolutions

This is an application for an enforcement of a contract....,.

The salient facts of this matter are that the applicant and the first respondent entered into an agreement of sale wherein the first respondent sold and the applicant bought Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo for $224 billion as the purchase price. The first respondent initially acquired the Stand from one Sibonile Mlilo who has since died and her estate is being handled by the second respondent.

The purchase price was fully paid....,.

All was well until the first respondent began advising the applicant and her husband of his intention to cancel the agreement of sale. The reason for the cancellation is that the purchase price was no longer enough for him to purchase a developed Stand, but, rather, enough to purchase an undeveloped Stand.

Upon receipt of these threats, the applicant applied for an urgent chamber application and obtained a provisional order interdicting the first respondent from selling or transferring the property to any other person pending the finalization of the dispute which first the respondent opposed.

In his opposition, the first respondent argues that the applicant should have, in this urgent application under discussion, disclosed that there was a dispute relating to the estate which was raised at the edict meeting. For that reason, the matter cannot be resolved on the papers. He, however, did not tell the court, what this dispute was about.

It is necessary for the first respondent to have disclosed the nature of the dispute in order to enable the court to assess whether it is the kind of dispute which would necessitate a referral to trial.

The legal position with regards to referral of a matter brought to court by way of an ex parte application is that such a matter can be determined on the basis of affidavits filed of record as long as there is no dispute of facts. In the event of the existence of dispute of facts, the said facts should be such that the matter cannot be determined without resort to oral evidence.

The issue then is; is this the kind of matter which can be resolved on the papers? In my view, it can be.

The dispute, as referred to by the first respondent, is the edict meeting which does not tell the court much. The hurdle as to implementation of this agreement is as a result of the first respondent's second thought about the purchase price.

He freely priced this property and an agreement was reached on that basis. The purchase price was subsequently fully paid. What is left for him is to be honourable enough and fulfil his part of the contract.

The facts are, therefore, very clear, there are no facts which require oral evidence in this matter. The fact that he unilaterally made a mistake about the purchase price, by reason of miscalculation in view of the prevailing inflationary environment is not a legal reason which can justify his resiling from this contract.

Ex Parte Applications, Proceedings Without Notice and Snatching at a Judgment

The legal position with regards to referral of a matter brought to court by way of an ex parte application is that such a matter can be determined on the basis of affidavits filed of record as long as there is no dispute of facts. In the event of the existence of dispute of facts, the said facts should be such that the matter cannot be determined without resort to oral evidence.

Specific Performance re: Approach, Impossibility of Performance and the Exceptio Non Adimpleti Contractus

This is an application for an enforcement of a contract.

The first respondent is Thabani Khumalo, a male adult who is in the business of contracting, acquiring and developing residential Stands for sale. He resides at House No.8774 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo, which is his address for service.

The second respondent is the Executor in the Estate of the Late Sibonile Mlilo, cited as such in his official capacity. His address for service is Chelmsford Executors and Trust (Pvt) Ltd, Suite 112, 1st Floor, Parkade Centre, Fife Street, Bulawayo.

The third respondent is the Assistant Master of the High Court of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, cited in his official capacity as a responsible authority over matters to do with, amongst other things, deceased estates administration. He is overseeing the winding up of the estate of the late Sibonile Mlilo registered in his office under DRBY 267/08.

The fourth respondent is the City of Bulawayo, a municipal body established by law and under whose jurisdiction the property in question presently falls. Its administrative officers are located at the City Hall, Bulawayo, which will be its address for service.

The salient facts of this matter are that the applicant and the first respondent entered into an agreement of sale wherein the first respondent sold and the applicant bought Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo for $224 billion as the purchase price. The first respondent initially acquired the Stand from one Sibonile Mlilo who has since died and her estate is being handled by the second respondent.

The purchase price was fully paid.

As an indication of his commitment to the agreement, the first respondent handled the agreement between himself and the late Sibonile Mlilo together with the Registration book of his motor vehicle.

All was well until the first respondent began advising the applicant and her husband of his intention to cancel the agreement of sale. The reason for the cancellation is that the purchase price was no longer enough for him to purchase a developed Stand, but, rather, enough to purchase an undeveloped Stand.

Upon receipt of these threats, the applicant applied for an urgent chamber application and obtained a provisional order interdicting the first respondent from selling or transferring the property to any other person pending the finalization of the dispute which first the respondent opposed.

In his opposition, the first respondent argues that the applicant should have, in this urgent application under discussion, disclosed that there was a dispute relating to the estate which was raised at the edict meeting. For that reason, the matter cannot be resolved on the papers. He, however, did not tell the court, what this dispute was about.

It is necessary for the first respondent to have disclosed the nature of the dispute in order to enable the court to assess whether it is the kind of dispute which would necessitate a referral to trial.

The legal position with regards to referral of a matter brought to court by way of an ex parte application is that such a matter can be determined on the basis of affidavits filed of record as long as there is no dispute of facts. In the event of the existence of dispute of facts, the said facts should be such that the matter cannot be determined without resort to oral evidence.

The issue then is; is this the kind of matter which can be resolved on the papers? In my view, it can be.

The dispute, as referred to by the first respondent, is the edict meeting which does not tell the court much. The hurdle as to implementation of this agreement is as a result of the first respondent's second thought about the purchase price.

He freely priced this property and an agreement was reached on that basis. The purchase price was subsequently fully paid. What is left for him is to be honourable enough and fulfil his part of the contract.

The facts are, therefore, very clear, there are no facts which require oral evidence in this matter. The fact that he unilaterally made a mistake about the purchase price, by reason of miscalculation in view of the prevailing inflationary environment is not a legal reason which can justify his resiling from this contract.

This principle was clearly laid down in University of Zimbabwe v Gudza 1996 (1) ZLR (S)…, quoted with approval in Smith v Zesa 2003 (1) ZLR 158 where PARADZA J stated:

Where an offeror mistakenly makes an offer that is accepted by the offeree, the offeror will only be able to rescind the contract if -

(a) The offer was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation by the offeree; or

(b) The mistake was a material one the offeree knew or ought to have known that the offer had been made in error.”

This was not the position in the present case.

There is no legal justification for the cancellation of this contract. The only reason for the first respondent's conduct is the desire to catch up with the ever escalating cost of immovable properties. This, however, is not a good reason which can justify the cancellation of the contract.

It is not the applicant's duty to educate him about the pitfalls of a failure to foresee economic downturns or upturns in life.

The applicant, as such, was an innocent purchaser and needs to be protected….,.

The provisional order granted on the 2nd of July 2008 be and is hereby confirmed and the following order is made:-

(a) That the first respondent, or, in the alternative, the second respondent, be and is hereby ordered to cede the property called Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo to the applicant or her duly authorized nominees or agents.

(b) That failing the above the Deputy Sheriff, Bulawayo be and is hereby given leave to do all such things in his powers as to cause the property to be ceded to the applicant by signing all necessary papers at the offices of the fourth respondent.

Consensus Ad Idem re: Mistake, Error, Justus Error or Reasonable Mistake and the Language of Record

This is an application for an enforcement of a contract.

The first respondent is Thabani Khumalo, a male adult who is in the business of contracting, acquiring and developing residential Stands for sale. He resides at House No.8774 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo, which is his address for service.

The second respondent is the Executor in the Estate of the Late Sibonile Mlilo, cited as such in his official capacity. His address for service is Chelmsford Executors and Trust (Pvt) Ltd, Suite 112, 1st Floor, Parkade Centre, Fife Street, Bulawayo.

The third respondent is the Assistant Master of the High Court of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, cited in his official capacity as a responsible authority over matters to do with, amongst other things, deceased estates administration. He is overseeing the winding up of the estate of the late Sibonile Mlilo registered in his office under DRBY 267/08.

The fourth respondent is the City of Bulawayo, a municipal body established by law and under whose jurisdiction the property in question presently falls. Its administrative officers are located at the City Hall, Bulawayo, which will be its address for service.

The salient facts of this matter are that the applicant and the first respondent entered into an agreement of sale wherein the first respondent sold and the applicant bought Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo for $224 billion as the purchase price. The first respondent initially acquired the Stand from one Sibonile Mlilo who has since died and her estate is being handled by the second respondent.

The purchase price was fully paid.

As an indication of his commitment to the agreement, the first respondent handled the agreement between himself and the late Sibonile Mlilo together with the Registration book of his motor vehicle.

All was well until the first respondent began advising the applicant and her husband of his intention to cancel the agreement of sale. The reason for the cancellation is that the purchase price was no longer enough for him to purchase a developed Stand, but, rather, enough to purchase an undeveloped Stand.

Upon receipt of these threats, the applicant applied for an urgent chamber application and obtained a provisional order interdicting the first respondent from selling or transferring the property to any other person pending the finalization of the dispute which first the respondent opposed.

In his opposition, the first respondent argues that the applicant should have, in this urgent application under discussion, disclosed that there was a dispute relating to the estate which was raised at the edict meeting. For that reason, the matter cannot be resolved on the papers. He, however, did not tell the court, what this dispute was about.

It is necessary for the first respondent to have disclosed the nature of the dispute in order to enable the court to assess whether it is the kind of dispute which would necessitate a referral to trial.

The legal position with regards to referral of a matter brought to court by way of an ex parte application is that such a matter can be determined on the basis of affidavits filed of record as long as there is no dispute of facts. In the event of the existence of dispute of facts, the said facts should be such that the matter cannot be determined without resort to oral evidence.

The issue then is; is this the kind of matter which can be resolved on the papers? In my view, it can be.

The dispute, as referred to by the first respondent, is the edict meeting which does not tell the court much. The hurdle as to implementation of this agreement is as a result of the first respondent's second thought about the purchase price.

He freely priced this property and an agreement was reached on that basis. The purchase price was subsequently fully paid. What is left for him is to be honourable enough and fulfil his part of the contract.

The facts are, therefore, very clear, there are no facts which require oral evidence in this matter. The fact that he unilaterally made a mistake about the purchase price, by reason of miscalculation in view of the prevailing inflationary environment is not a legal reason which can justify his resiling from this contract.

This principle was clearly laid down in University of Zimbabwe v Gudza 1996 (1) ZLR (S)…, quoted with approval in Smith v Zesa 2003 (1) ZLR 158 where PARADZA J stated:

Where an offeror mistakenly makes an offer that is accepted by the offeree, the offeror will only be able to rescind the contract if -

(a) The offer was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation by the offeree; or

(b) The mistake was a material one the offeree knew or ought to have known that the offer had been made in error.”

This was not the position in the present case.

There is no legal justification for the cancellation of this contract. The only reason for the first respondent's conduct is the desire to catch up with the ever escalating cost of immovable properties. This, however, is not a good reason which can justify the cancellation of the contract.

It is not the applicant's duty to educate him about the pitfalls of a failure to foresee economic downturns or upturns in life.

The applicant, as such, was an innocent purchaser and needs to be protected….,.

The provisional order granted on the 2nd of July 2008 be and is hereby confirmed and the following order is made:-

(a) That the first respondent, or, in the alternative, the second respondent, be and is hereby ordered to cede the property called Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo to the applicant or her duly authorized nominees or agents.

(b) That failing the above the Deputy Sheriff, Bulawayo be and is hereby given leave to do all such things in his powers as to cause the property to be ceded to the applicant by signing all necessary papers at the offices of the fourth respondent.

Final Orders re: Confirmation or Discharge of Interlocutory Restraining Orders and Provisional Orders

This is an application for an enforcement of a contract.

The first respondent is Thabani Khumalo, a male adult who is in the business of contracting, acquiring and developing residential Stands for sale. He resides at House No.8774 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo, which is his address for service.

The second respondent is the Executor in the Estate of the Late Sibonile Mlilo, cited as such in his official capacity. His address for service is Chelmsford Executors and Trust (Pvt) Ltd, Suite 112, 1st Floor, Parkade Centre, Fife Street, Bulawayo.

The third respondent is the Assistant Master of the High Court of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, cited in his official capacity as a responsible authority over matters to do with, amongst other things, deceased estates administration. He is overseeing the winding up of the estate of the late Sibonile Mlilo registered in his office under DRBY 267/08.

The fourth respondent is the City of Bulawayo, a municipal body established by law and under whose jurisdiction the property in question presently falls. Its administrative officers are located at the City Hall, Bulawayo, which will be its address for service.

The salient facts of this matter are that the applicant and the first respondent entered into an agreement of sale wherein the first respondent sold and the applicant bought Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo for $224 billion as the purchase price. The first respondent initially acquired the Stand from one Sibonile Mlilo who has since died and her estate is being handled by the second respondent.

The purchase price was fully paid.

As an indication of his commitment to the agreement, the first respondent handled the agreement between himself and the late Sibonile Mlilo together with the Registration book of his motor vehicle.

All was well until the first respondent began advising the applicant and her husband of his intention to cancel the agreement of sale. The reason for the cancellation is that the purchase price was no longer enough for him to purchase a developed Stand, but, rather, enough to purchase an undeveloped Stand.

Upon receipt of these threats, the applicant applied for an urgent chamber application and obtained a provisional order interdicting the first respondent from selling or transferring the property to any other person pending the finalization of the dispute which first the respondent opposed.

In his opposition, the first respondent argues that the applicant should have, in this urgent application under discussion, disclosed that there was a dispute relating to the estate which was raised at the edict meeting. For that reason, the matter cannot be resolved on the papers. He, however, did not tell the court, what this dispute was about.

It is necessary for the first respondent to have disclosed the nature of the dispute in order to enable the court to assess whether it is the kind of dispute which would necessitate a referral to trial.

The legal position with regards to referral of a matter brought to court by way of an ex parte application is that such a matter can be determined on the basis of affidavits filed of record as long as there is no dispute of facts. In the event of the existence of dispute of facts, the said facts should be such that the matter cannot be determined without resort to oral evidence.

The issue then is; is this the kind of matter which can be resolved on the papers? In my view, it can be.

The dispute, as referred to by the first respondent, is the edict meeting which does not tell the court much. The hurdle as to implementation of this agreement is as a result of the first respondent's second thought about the purchase price.

He freely priced this property and an agreement was reached on that basis. The purchase price was subsequently fully paid. What is left for him is to be honourable enough and fulfil his part of the contract.

The facts are, therefore, very clear, there are no facts which require oral evidence in this matter. The fact that he unilaterally made a mistake about the purchase price, by reason of miscalculation in view of the prevailing inflationary environment is not a legal reason which can justify his resiling from this contract.

This principle was clearly laid down in University of Zimbabwe v Gudza 1996 (1) ZLR (S)…, quoted with approval in Smith v Zesa 2003 (1) ZLR 158 where PARADZA J stated:

Where an offeror mistakenly makes an offer that is accepted by the offeree, the offeror will only be able to rescind the contract if -

(a) The offer was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation by the offeree; or

(b) The mistake was a material one the offeree knew or ought to have known that the offer had been made in error.”

This was not the position in the present case.

There is no legal justification for the cancellation of this contract. The only reason for the first respondent's conduct is the desire to catch up with the ever escalating cost of immovable properties. This, however, is not a good reason which can justify the cancellation of the contract.

It is not the applicant's duty to educate him about the pitfalls of a failure to foresee economic downturns or upturns in life.

The applicant, as such, was an innocent purchaser and needs to be protected….,.

The provisional order granted on the 2nd of July 2008 be and is hereby confirmed and the following order is made:-

(a) That the first respondent, or, in the alternative, the second respondent, be and is hereby ordered to cede the property called Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo to the applicant or her duly authorized nominees or agents.

(b) That failing the above the Deputy Sheriff, Bulawayo be and is hereby given leave to do all such things in his powers as to cause the property to be ceded to the applicant by signing all necessary papers at the offices of the fourth respondent.

Consensus Ad Idem re: Offer and Acceptance, Counter-Offer and the Concept of Vinculum Juris

The fact that the first respondent unilaterally made a mistake about the purchase price, by reason of miscalculation in view of the prevailing inflationary environment is not a legal reason which can justify his resiling from this contract.

This principle was clearly laid down in University of Zimbabwe v Gudza 1996 (1) ZLR (S)…, quoted with approval in Smith v Zesa 2003 (1) ZLR 158 where PARADZA J stated:

Where an offeror mistakenly makes an offer that is accepted by the offeree, the offeror will only be able to rescind the contract if -

(a) The offer was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation by the offeree; or

(b) The mistake was a material one the offeree knew or ought to have known that the offer had been made in error.”

This was not the position in the present case.

Costs re: Punitive Order of Costs or Punitive Costs


Costs

The applicant has asked for costs at a higher scale.

The courts, as a general rule, are loathe to granting punitive costs. They are ordered, for instance, among others, where the losing party is shown to have lacked bona fides in his prosecution of his defence.

The first respondent has absolutely no defence on the merits at all. All he was doing was to try to deny the applicant his legal right of enforcing a clear contract. By so doing he abused court process as his conduct was dishonest. The court, in the present matter, is therefore obliged to show its indignation by awarding punitive costs against him….,.

(a)…,.

(b)…,.

(c) That the first respondent pays costs of suit on the legal practitioner and client scale.


Urgent Chamber Application

CHEDA J: This is an application for an enforcement of a contract.

The first respondent is Thabani Khumalo, a male adult who is in the business of contracting, acquiring and developing residential stands for sale. He resides at House No. 8774 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo, which is his address for service.

The second respondent is the Executor in the Estate of the Late Sibonile Mlilo, cited as such in his official capacity. His address for service is Chelmsford Executors and Trust (Pvt) Ltd, Suite 112, 1st Floor, Parkade Centre, Fife Street, Bulawayo.

Third respondent is the Assistant Master of the High Court of Zimbabwe, Bulawayo, cited in his official capacity as a responsible authority over matters to do with, amongst other things, deceased estates administration. He is overseeing the winding up of the Estate of the late Sibonile Mlilo registered in his office under DRBY 267/08.

The fourth respondent is the City of Bulawayo, a municipal body established by law and under whose jurisdiction the property in question presently falls. Its administrative officers are located at the City Hall, Bulawayo, which will be its address for service.

The salient facts of this matter are that applicant and first respondent entered into an agreement of sale wherein first respondent sold and applicant bought Stand No.5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo for $224 billion as the purchase price. First respondent initially acquired the stand from one Sibonile Mlilo who has since died and her estate is being handled by second respondent.

The purchase price was fully paid.

As an indication of his commitment to the agreement, first respondent handled the agreement between himself and the late Sibonile Mlilo together with the Registration book of his motor vehicle.

All was well until first respondent began advising applicant and her husband of his intention to cancel the agreement of sale. The reason for the cancellation is that the purchase price was no longer enough for him to purchase a developed stand but rather enough to purchase an undeveloped stand.

Upon receipt of these threats, applicant applied for an urgent chamber application and obtained a provisional order interdicting first respondent from selling or transferring the property to any other person pending the finalization of the dispute which first respondent opposed.

In his opposition first respondent argues that applicant should have, in this urgent application under discussion disclosed that there was a dispute relating to the Estate which was raised at the edict meeting. For that reason, the matter cannot be resolved on the papers. He, however, did not tell the court, what this dispute was about.

It is necessary for first respondent to have disclosed the nature of the dispute in order to enable the court to assess whether it is the kind of dispute which would necessitate a referral to trial.

The legal position with regards to referral of a matter brought to court by way of an exparte application is that such a matter can be determined on the basis of affidavits filed of record as long as there is no dispute of facts. In the event of the existence of dispute of facts, the said facts should be such that the matter cannot be determined without resort to oral evidence.

The issue then is, is this the kind of matter which can be resolved on the papers. In my view, it can be.

The dispute as referred to by first respondent is the edict meeting which does not tell the court much. The hurdle as to implementation of this agreement is as a result of first respondent's second thought about the purchase price.

He freely priced this property and an agreement was reached on that basis. The purchase price was subsequently fully paid. What is left for him is to be honourable enough and fulfil his part of the contract.

The facts are, therefore, very clear, there are no facts which require oral evidence in this matter. The fact that he unilateral made a mistake about the purchase price, by reason of miscalculation in view of the prevailing inflationary environment is not a legal reason which can justify his resiling from this contract.

This principle was clearly laid down in University of Zimbabwe v Gudza 1996 (1) ZLR (S) p249 quoted with approval in Smith v Zesa 2003 (1) ZLR 158 where PARADZA J stated:

“where an offeror mistakenly makes an offer that is accepted by the offeree, the offeror will only be able to rescind the contract if-

(a) the offer was induced by fraudulent misrepresentation by the offeree; or

(b) the mistake was a material one the offeree knew or ought to have known that the offer had been made in error.”


This, was not the position in the present case.

There is no legal justification for the cancellation of this contract. The only reason for first respondent's conduct is the desire to catch up with the ever escalating cost of immovable properties. This, however, is not a good reason which can justify the cancellation of the contract.

It is not applicant's duty to educate him about the pitfalls of a failure to foresee economic downturns or upturns in life.

Applicant, as such was an innocent purchaser and needs to be protected.

Costs

Applicant has asked for costs at a higher scale. The courts, as a general rule are loathe to granting punitive costs. They are ordered for instance among others, where the losing party is shown to have lacked bona fides in his prosecution of his defence.

First respondent has absolutely no defence on the merits at all. All he was doing was to try to deny applicant his legal right of enforcing a clear contract. By so doing he abused court process as his conduct was dishonest. The court in the present matter is therefore obliged to show its indignation by awarding punitive costs against him.

The provisional order granted on the 2nd July 2008 be and is hereby confirmed and the following order is made:-

(a) that 1st Respondent or in the alternative, 2nd Respondent, be and is hereby ordered to cede the property called Stand No. 5495 Cowdray Park, Bulawayo to the Applicant or her duly authorized nominees or agents.

(b) that failing the above the Deputy Sheriff, Bulawayo be and is hereby given leave to do all such things in his powers as to cause the property to be ceded to the Applicant by signing all necessary papers at the offices of the 4th Respondent.

(c) that 1st Respondent pays costs of suit on the legal practitioner and client scale.








Shenje and company, applicant's legal practitioners

Mabhikwa, Hikwa and partners, respondent's legal practitioners

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