MATHONSI
JA: This
is an appeal against the whole judgment of the High Court (“the
court a
quo”)
handed down on 7 July 2022 in which it
declined
to assume jurisdiction in respect of an application filed by the
appellant for the review of the recommendations of the second, third
and fourth respondents in accordance with which the first respondent
removed her from the office of Judge of the High Court.
FACTS
Until
17 June 2021, the appellant was a sitting Judge of the High Court.
She was removed from that office by the first respondent, the
President of the Republic of Zimbabwe, acting in terms of section
187(8) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013 (“the Constitution”).
Whenever
the question of the removal of a sitting Judge arises, the Judicial
Service Commission informs the first respondent, who, in terms of
section 187(3) of the Constitution, is required to appoint a Tribunal
to inquire into that question.
The
second, third and fourth respondents are members of the Tribunal
appointed by the first respondent to inquire into the question of
removing the appellant from the office of Judge of the High Court.
The
salient facts are generally not in dispute and may be traced back to
9 October 2020, on which date the Judicial Service Commission advised
the first respondent that a question of whether the appellant had to
be removed from the office of Judge of the High Court had arisen. On
5 November 2020, by dint of Proclamation 7 of 2020 published in
Statutory Instrument 261B of 2020, the first respondent established a
Tribunal constituted by the second, third and fourth respondents to
inquire into the aforementioned question of the removal from office
of the appellant.
The
Tribunal would conduct its business for a period of five months from
the date of the swearing in of its members.
The
members of the Tribunal were duly sworn in on 18 November 2020,
thereby triggering their mandate.
On
8 December 2020, the Tribunal served the appellant with a letter
informing her of the matters into which it would inquire, chief among
which was whether she had been grossly incompetent in performing or
omitting to perform the acts mentioned in that letter.
The
particulars of the matters into which the Tribunal would inquire are
not germane to the resolution of this appeal.
The
hearing before the Tribunal commenced on 18 March 2021 and was
concluded on 22 April 2021 after several witnesses, and the appellant
herself, had presented evidence.
The
parties appearing before the Tribunal were thereafter requested to
file their closing submissions, with the appellant being requested to
submit her final response on 4 May 2021.
On
17 June 2021, having concluded its investigations, the Tribunal
presented its recommendations to the first respondent.
The
Tribunal found the appellant guilty of gross incompetence.
By
letter of the same day, the Chief Secretary to the President and
Cabinet advised the Honourable Chief Justice of Zimbabwe that the
Tribunal had recommended the removal of the appellant from office for
gross incompetence and that the first respondent had accordingly
removed the appellant from office.
PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE COURT A QUO
Against
this background, the appellant harboured grievances. On 25 August
2021, she filed a court application for review in terms of sections
26 and 27 of the High Court Act [Chapter
7:06]
as read with Rule 60 of the High Court Rules, 2021. The appellant
advanced multiple grounds of review.
Among
the grounds was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to inquire into
the question of her removal after 18 May 2021 since its five-month
tenure had lapsed.
She
added that it was grossly irregular for the Tribunal to disregard her
preliminary objections on the basis of what had occurred during an
earlier inquiry involving the removal of another Judge and not during
her own inquiry.
It
was also contended that it was a gross irregularity for the Tribunal
to find her guilty of gross incompetence when she had not been
charged with such a misconduct.
All
in all, the appellant advanced no less than eight grounds of review
on the basis of which she craved the grant of relief in the following
terms:
“1.
That the Applicant's application for review of the recommendations
of the 2nd,
3rd
and 4th
Respondents dated 17 June 2021 and the
subsequent decision of the 1st
Respondent
be and is hereby succeeds. (sic)
2.
The recommendation of the 2nd,
3rd,
and 4th
Respondents dated 17 June 2021 and the
subsequent decision of the 1st
Respondent be and are hereby reviewed and set aside.
3.
The
decision of the 1st
Respondent to remove the Applicant from the office of a Judge of the
High Court in terms of section 187(7) and (8) of the Constitution be
and is hereby set aside.
4.
The Appellant be and is hereby reinstated to her position as a Judge
of the High Court of Zimbabwe without loss to salary and benefits
from the date of publication of Proclamation 7 of 2020.
5.
The Respondents shall pay costs of suit.” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
The
first respondent opposed the application averring that the Tribunal
had not acted without jurisdiction and that, in removing the
appellant from office, he had acted in accordance with section 187 of
the Constitution. He, therefore, prayed for the dismissal of the
application.
Raising
a number of preliminary objections, inter
alia,
that the court a
quo
lacked
jurisdiction because the appellant had already noted an appeal to the
Labour Court against the decision she sought to have reviewed; that
in terms of the Commissions of Inquiry Act [Chapter
10:07],
they were not liable to any action or suit in respect of any matter
or thing done by them while they were members of the Tribunal; and
that there was a fatal non-joinder of the Judicial Service
Commission, the second, third and fourth respondents also opposed the
application.
On
the merits of the application, the second, third and fourth
respondents contended that none of the grounds of review had been
established.
The
hearing of the application proceeded before a panel comprising three
Judges of the court a
quo.
At
the commencement of the hearing, the court a
quo
requested counsel for the parties to address it on the question of
whether it still had review jurisdiction given that the appellant had
already been removed from office by the first respondent in terms of
the recommendations made to him. What exercised the mind of the court
a
quo
was whether it could entertain the application when a decision in
accordance with the Constitution had ensued.
In
its judgment, the court a
quo,
recorded that invitation thus:
“[6]
At the hearing before going into the preliminary issues raised and
the merits of the matter, the court invited submissions from the
legal practitioners on the following critical legal issue - given
that the first respondent acted on recommendations submitted to him
by a tribunal and made a decision in terms of the Constitution to
remove the applicant, does the court have jurisdiction to hear the
matter? It is trite that a court can raise mero
motu,
the
question of jurisdiction: see Boswinkel
v Boswinkel,
1995
(2) ZLR 58 (H) as cited with approval in Chikwenengere
v Chikwenengere,
SC
75-06.”
I
note in passing that during the hearing, counsel for the second,
third and fourth respondents were put to task on the question of
whether their clients had any real interest in the application.
Following exchanges with the court a
quo,
they conceded that their interest in the matter was nominal and
indicated that they would abide by the court a
quo's
decision.
The
judgment of the court a
quo
was
solely devoted to resolving the question that it invited the parties
to address.
The
court a
quo
considered, correctly in my view, that the issue of the removal of a
sitting judge and a subsequent review application made to set aside
recommendations of a Tribunal, to be novel in this jurisdiction. It
made several findings and conclusions of law on the basis of which it
declined jurisdiction.
Firstly,
citing the decisions of this Court in Moyo
v Mkoba
2013
(2) ZLR 137 (S) and Marange
v Marange
S-1–21,
the court a
quo
stated that it is not and would not be the ultimate decision of the
first respondent that is subject to review but only the process
preceding it.
It
reasoned that what could be subjected to review was only the process
by which the Tribunal makes its recommendations.
Secondly,
it considered the legislative framework outlining its review
jurisdiction and also made a survey of approaches followed in
different jurisdictions in respect of the review of the decisions of
ad
hoc
Tribunals enquiring into the question of the removal of judges. These
comparator jurisdictions included Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa and
India.
Following
a lengthy discussion, the court a
quo
found
that once the first respondent has acted upon a recommendation by a
Tribunal on the question of whether a judge should be removed from
office, that action becomes a decision in terms of the Constitution,
whose validity cannot be reviewed. It stated;
“The
question then becomes whether or not the decision made by the first
respondent is subject to review by this court. Whatever
recommendation is made, the President must act in terms of section
187(8). In my view, once removal or no removal is recommended and
acted upon, it becomes a decision made in terms of the Constitution.
It could not have been the intention of the legislature that once
such removal is finalised in terms of the Constitution,
that this court assumes jurisdiction even under the guise of
'inherent' jurisdiction as contended by Mrs Mtetwa. Conversely,
in my view, it would be absurd for the Judicial Service Commission
for instance, to seek a reversal of a recommendation not to remove a
judge by way of an application for review in this court.” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
Finally,
while accepting that the President's exercise of his prerogative
power may be subject to review, the court a
quo
concluded that the first respondent did not exercise prerogative
power in acting upon the Tribunal's recommendations, which could be
reviewed.
In
its finding, the only executive powers of the President that are
subject to review are those in which he has discretion or where he is
required to act by a specific piece of legislation.
The
court a
quo
reasoned
that in the present matter, the first respondent had no discretion
whatsoever once recommendations had been made concerning the question
of the removal of a judge. In its view, he was required to act on
those recommendations.
It
was principally on the basis of the foregoing findings and
conclusions of law that the court a
quo
declined
jurisdiction.
PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THIS COURT
Again
the appellant was disenchanted and, dissatisfied with the decision of
the court a
quo.
She noted an appeal to this Court.
She
attacked the decision of the court a
quo
on
several bases. Essentially, the grounds of appeal are an attack on
the court a
quo
for
declining jurisdiction and on its reasoning in arriving at the
conclusion that it could not assume jurisdiction over the appellant's
application.
Thus,
the pre-eminent issue commending itself for determination is whether
or not the court a
quo
erred
in concluding that it had no jurisdiction over the appellant's
review application.
At
the commencement of the hearing, the court inquired from counsel for
the second to the fourth respondents whether they had any intention
to oppose the appeal since they had not filed any heads of argument
and were, in any event, barred.
Mr
Sinyoro,
for the second and fourth respondents, stated that his clients were
not opposing the appeal and that he had made an appearance out of
courtesy.
For
her part, Ms Vengai,
for the third respondent, indicated that her client was not opposing
the appeal and that she had made an appearance simply to observe the
proceedings.
Both
counsel stated that their clients will abide by the decision of this
Court.
There
was also the sticking issue of the first respondent's
non-appearance when he had strenuously contested the application in
the court below.
In
the end, following inquiry from counsel and examination of the
record, the court was satisfied that counsel for the first respondent
was aware of the set down. For unexplained reasons, he was not in
attendance.
It
is for that reason that the court proceeded to hear Mr Sitotombe
for
the appellant on the merits of the appeal, regrettably without the
benefit of submissions from counsel for the first respondent.
Mr
Sitotombe,
for the appellant, motivated the appeal in two parts.
In
the first part, he argued that the court a
quo
had
jurisdiction by dint of section 171(1)(a) of the Constitution and
section 26 of the High Court Act [Chapter
7:06].
On the basis of those provisions, counsel argued that the original
civil jurisdiction of the High Court is unlimited. The inherent power
of the High Court, so it was argued, clothes it with the authority to
adjudicate over any matter, being, in this case, the recommendations
that were made by the second, third and fourth respondents and acted
upon by the first respondent.
Relying
on the decision of this Court in Marange
v Marange & Ors
S-1–21,
counsel argued further that the court a
quo
grossly
misdirected itself in holding that once the first respondent has
acted upon the recommendations by the second to the fourth
respondents, they become non-reviewable.
He
contended that there is no law that ousts the review jurisdiction of
the High Court.
Counsel
questioned how the legality of the process of the removal of a Judge,
which process must be in accordance with the law as held in Bere
v Judicial Service Commission & Ors
S–1–22,
can be interrogated when the court “shies away” from its
jurisdiction.
In
the second part of his submissions, counsel for the appellant
submitted that the mere act of the first respondent in terms of the
Constitution does not take away the irregularities that bedevilled
the process of the removal of the appellant.
According
to counsel, the first respondent has a duty to ensure that the
Constitution and other laws are faithfully observed.
Thus,
in light of the duty of the first respondent, the irregularities
alleged by the appellant cannot be ignored once the first respondent
has acted upon the recommendations.
In
his view, an unlawful process can never give rise to a lawful
decision.
Counsel
drew an analogy between what the appellant seeks to do and what
occurred in the case of Gonese
& Anor v Parliament of Zimbabwe & Ors
CCZ–4–20.
In
that case, the Constitutional Court set aside the passage of a
Constitutional Bill in the Senate after the President had assented to
it.
On
this score, it was submitted that it is legally permissible for the
court a
quo
to
review the procedure followed in the appellant's removal even after
the first respondent has acted upon the recommendations emanating
from that process.
THE
LAW
A
focused discussion of the applicable law requires that it be prefaced
with an examination of the nature of the proceedings before the court
a
quo,
the nature of the jurisdiction it was called upon to exercise and the
parties who were before it.
As
already observed, the appellant launched an application in terms of
the High Court Act and the rules of the High Court for the review of
the recommendations of the Tribunal that inquired into the question
of her removal.
Had
the application succeeded, not only did the appellant pray that the
court a
quo
exercise
its power to review and set aside the recommendations by the second,
third and fourth respondents, but also review and set aside the
subsequent decision of the first respondent.
This
much is readily apparent from the appellant's draft order filed in
the court a
quo.
It
is common cause that the second, third and fourth respondents were
mandated in terms of section 187 of the Constitution to consider the
question of the appellant's removal from office and to thereafter
provide recommendations to the first respondent.
In
turn, the first respondent was required in terms of subsection [8] of
section 187, which is of peremptory application, to act in accordance
with the recommendations made to him.
Having
said that, it is important, in developing the discussion further, to
consider the rudimentary concept of jurisdiction.
In
essence, jurisdiction connotes the power reposed in a court to
adjudicate upon, determine and dispose of a matter. See Sadziwani
v Natpak (Pvt) Ltd & Others
CCZ-15-19
at p18.
Ordinarily,
a superior court such as the court a
quo
has inherent and unbridled jurisdiction.
However,
such jurisdiction may and is often limited by a statute, and in some
cases the common law may place or develop limitations on the
jurisdiction of a court.
Limitations
may, among other aspects, be placed on the subject-matter, monetary
value, persons or territory over which a court may exercise its
jurisdiction.
The
following passage in Herbstein
and Van Winsen, The Civil Practice of the High Courts and Supreme
Court of Appeal of South Africa,
5ed, (2009) at p52, illustrates the varying nature of limitations
usually placed upon a court's jurisdictional powers:
“Generally
speaking, limitations may be placed upon the power of a court in
relation to factors such as territory, subject-matter, amount in
dispute, and parties. Each High Court has jurisdiction with regard to
a specific territory within the Republic of South Africa. The power
of the High Courts may be limited by legislation which assigns
certain types of matters to other courts.”
The
learned authors go on to add that:
“The
limitations upon the jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme
Court of Appeal are mainly statutory, though the common law also
imposes some limitations. The
Constitution itself provides limitations by reserving certain matters
for the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court
....” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
It
is also instructive to examine the provisions of the Constitution
which delineate the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters that
are directly permeated by the Constitution.
Section
171(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that:
“(1)
The High Court —
(a)
has original jurisdiction over all civil and criminal matters
throughout Zimbabwe;
(b)
has jurisdiction to supervise magistrates courts and other
subordinate courts and to review their decisions;
(c)
may
decide constitutional matters except those that only the
Constitutional Court may decide;
and
(d)
has such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred on it by an Act
of Parliament.” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
Although
the High Court has constitutional jurisdiction, its jurisdiction in
such matters is ousted in respect of matters that are within the
exclusive power of the Constitutional Court.
So,
by clear and unambiguous legislative pronouncement, that court has no
jurisdiction whatsoever over those constitutional matters “that
only the Constitutional Court may decide”.
It
follows that subsections (2) and (3) of section 167, outlining part
of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, have a bearing on
the resolution of this matter. They provide:
“(2)
Subject to this Constitution, only the Constitutional Court may —
(a)
advise on the constitutionality of any proposed legislation, but may
do so only where the legislation concerned has been referred to it in
terms of this Constitution;
(b)
hear and determine disputes relating to election to the office of
President;
(c)
hear and determine disputes relating to whether or not a person is
qualified to hold the office of Vice-President; or
(d)
determine
whether Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a
constitutional obligation.
(3) The
Constitutional Court makes the final decision whether an Act of
Parliament or conduct of the President or Parliament is
constitutional,
and must confirm any order of constitutional invalidity made by
another court before that order has any force.” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
Section
167(2)(d) exclusively gives the jurisdiction to determine whether the
President or Parliament has failed to fulfil a constitutional
obligation to the Constitutional Court.
The
provision inherently implies that where the disposition of a matter
is dependent on a finding relative to the question of whether the
President or Parliament failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation,
no other court besides the Constitutional Court will have
jurisdiction over the subject-matter.
This
point was emphasised by the Constitutional Court in Chirambwe
v President of the Republic of Zimbabwe & Others
CCZ–4–21
at p22, para. 49, where the court said:
“[49]
Section 110(2)(d) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises, as an
executive function, the making of appointments by the President. The
question whether the President has failed to properly make an
appointment as directed by the Constitution is a matter that requires
the Court to intrude into the executive functions of the President
and hence it falls squarely within the exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court. In Von
Abo v President of the Republic of South Africa
2009 (5) SA 345 (CC) the South African Constitutional Court held that
a decision of the President that flows directly from the Constitution
and that relates to the relationship between the judicial and
executive branches of the State generally falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of this Court.”
(The
underlining is for emphasis)
There
is also another provision of the Constitution that sheds light on the
constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. It is section 175(1),
which provides for the powers of the courts in constitutional matters
thus:
“(1)
Where a court makes an order concerning the constitutional invalidity
of any law or any conduct of the President or Parliament, the order
has no force unless it is confirmed by the Constitutional Court.”
There
is no gainsaying that section 175(1) is critical on the exercise of
the constitutional jurisdiction of all courts in whom such
jurisdiction is invested in matters that are not within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
The
harmonious relationship between section 167(2)(d) of the Constitution
which allows only the Constitutional Court to determine whether the
President has failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation and
section 175(1) which allows “a court” to make an order concerning
the constitutional invalidity of the conduct of the President has
implications on the jurisdiction of the High Court in matters
involving the conduct of the President.
The
reason for this is that there is a thin line between a failure by the
President to fulfil a constitutional obligation and the conduct of
the President that is constitutionally invalid.
One
may suppose that in most cases, a failure to fulfil a constitutional
obligation will also involve conduct that is constitutionally
invalid.
In
saying so, I am mindful of the celebrated principle of constitutional
interpretation that the provisions of the Constitution must be
considered holistically to find the legislative intendment.
The
Constitutional Court has had occasion to pronounce on that principle
in a number of cases. In Mupungu
v Minister of Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & Ors
CCZ-7-21 at pp46-47, PATEL JCC made the point that all relevant
provisions that bear on the subject for interpretation must be
considered together and as a whole, so as to give effect to the
objective of the Constitution having regard to the nature and scope
of the rights, interests and duties that form the subject matter of
the provisions to be construed.
See
also Chamisa
v Mnangagwa & Ors
CCZ–21-19 at pp32–33; Museredza
& Ors v Minister of Agriculture, Lands, Water and Rural
Resettlement & Ors
CCZ-1–22 at p18 para 34; and Mawere
v Registrar General
CCZ-4–15 at p7 para 20.
Where
a court of competent jurisdiction, other than the Constitutional
Court, is faced with the question of whether the case before it
involves a failure by the President to fulfil a constitutional
obligation or constitutionally invalid conduct by the President, such
a court must, perforce, be certain of the nature of the case before
it lest it unlawfully assumes jurisdiction over a matter that is
within the preserve of the Constitutional Court in terms of section
167(2)(d) of the Constitution.
In
that regard, the views expressed by the Supreme Court of Appeal of
South Africa in the case of King
and Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control and Another
2006
(1) 474 (SCA) at 482 et
seq.
are
apposite:
“[12]
The main question is whether this Court is precluded from pronouncing
on the appellants complaint. Though
an order of constitutional invalidity has no force unless it is
confirmed by the Constitutional Court, this Court and the High Courts
have jurisdiction to 'make an order concerning the constitutional
validity of an Act of Parliament' (s172(2)(a)). Section 167(4)(e),
however, allows only the Constitutional Court to 'decide that
Parliament or the President has failed to fulfil a constitutional
obligation'.
[13]
Before the hearing, this Court invited the parties to make
submissions on this issue, which was not argued before Chetty J. Both
sides rightly submitted that the words 'constitutional obligation'
in s167(4)(e) must bear a restricted meaning. The Constitutional
Court has said as much.
In
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby
Football Union and Others,
a case concerning the conduct of the President, the Court pointed out
that if s167(4)(e) were construed as applying to all questions
concerning constitutional validity of conduct of the President, it
would conflict with s172(2)(a).
It
therefore considered that when the two sections are read together a
'narrow meaning' should be given to 'fulfil a constitutional
obligation' in s167(4)(e), though it found it unnecessary to decide
what that meaning should be.
[14]
The purpose of the constitutional provisions giving exclusive
jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court is 'to preserve the comity
between the judicial branch of government, on the one hand, and the
legislative and executive branches of government, on the other, by
ensuring that only the highest Court in constitutional matters
intrudes into the domain of the principal legislative and executive
organs of State'.
Since
the Constitutional Court bears 'the responsibility of being the
ultimate guardian of the Constitution and its values' s167(4) vests
it with exclusive jurisdiction in 'crucial political areas' and
it bears the duty 'to adjudicate finally in respect of issues which
would inevitably have important political consequences'.
[15]
These are the clear premises. The
question is whether they leave space for this Court and the High
Courts to grant an order of statutory invalidity when the defect is
alleged to arise from breach of a constitutional obligation.…
[16]
In our view these approaches [contended for by counsel in the case]
impermissibly
attenuate the jurisdictional exclusion in s167(4).
Although s172(2) grants power to this Court and the High Courts 'to
make an order concerning the constitutional validity of an Act of
Parliament' the co-existence of the two provisions requires that we
distinguish between different ways in which the Constitution
envisages that statutes may be invalid.” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
While
I have selectively and carefully relied on the King's
case supra
in light of the reservations expressed by the Constitutional Court in
the Chirambwe
case
as to its compatibility with our jurisprudence, I find the
observations made therein somewhat illustrative of the necessity to
determine whether a matter involving an act, conduct or decision of
the President would be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court.
In
the Chirambwe
case supra
at
para. 48, the Constitutional Court set out the test to determine
whether a matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court as being “whether the issues raised involve an
intrusion into the domain of either Parliament or the President's
executive powers”.
See
also Mujuru
v The President of Zimbabwe & Ors
CCZ-8-18
at paras. 24–27 for a discussion on the term “constitutional
obligation”.
The
import of the above is that notwithstanding section 175(1) where a
court with constitutional jurisdiction has been approached to set
aside, either directly or as consequence of some other
constitutionally invalid act or conduct, an act or decision of the
President on the basis it falls short of the constitutional
requirements, such a court must be certain that the matter before it
is not one involving a failure by the President to fulfil a
constitutional obligation.
Any
such matter is obviously within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court.
The
comity demanded among the arms of the State necessitates that only
the highest court in constitutional matters pronounces upon the
defiance of the Constitution by the President or Parliament. See
Mliswa
v Parliament of the Republic of Zimbabwe
CCZ-2-21
at 8 and Chirambwe
supra.
In
the words used in the King's
case supra
subordinate courts must not impermissibly attenuate the
jurisdictional exclusion of section 167(2)(d) because it could not
have been the intention of the legislature in enacting section 175[1]
to dilute the exclusivity enjoined by the Constitutional Court by
opening the floodgates for courts inferior to it to join the fray on
such matters.
This
case also brings to the fore the presumption of constitutionality or
constitutional validity. The presumption of constitutionality can be
understood in a couple of senses.
In
the first sense, the presumption operates in favour of certain
executive, administrative or legislative acts, which are taken to be
constitutionally valid unless proven to be otherwise.
The
presumption was lucidly set out by BHUNU JA in Econet
Wireless (Pvt) Ltd v Minister of Public Service, Labour and Social
Welfare & Ors
S–31–16
at 6 as follows:
“What
this means is that all questioned laws and administrative
acts enjoy a presumption of validity
until declared otherwise by a competent court. Until the declaration
of nullity, they remain lawful and binding, bidding obedience of all
subjects of the law.” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
In
the case of Gonese
& Anor v Parliament of Zimbabwe & Ors
CCZ-4-20 at pp42–43 the court held that the presumption of
constitutionality also applies to the conduct of the business of the
National Assembly.
In
the most common sense, the presumption of constitutional validity is
invoked in respect of legislation.
Where
legislation is capable of two meanings, one of which accords with the
Constitution, it is always presumed that the meaning that is
consistent with the Constitution is the meaning that Parliament
intended to ascribe to the legislation.
In
that regard any person alleging that a piece of legislation is
unconstitutional bears the onus to rebut the presumption. See
Zimbabwe
Electoral Commission & Anor v Commissioner-General, Zimbabwe
Republic Police & Ors
2014
(1) ZLR 405 at p411C–H; In
Re: Prosecutor General of Zimbabwe on his Constitutional Independence
and Protection from Direction and Control
CCZ—13—17 at 7; Mujuru
v President of Zimbabwe & Ors
CCZ—8—18
at paras. 14–16; and Kawenda
v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & Ors
CCZ-3–22
at p17.
This
case partly hinges upon the first sense in which the presumption of
constitutionality is used. If a decision, act or conduct of the
President is susceptible to being set aside on the basis that the
President failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation, then only the
Constitutional Court would have the jurisdiction to make such a
declaration.
In
the meantime, that decision will remain valid until the presumption
operating in its favour is appropriately negated following
proceedings in a court with the requisite jurisdiction.
SYNTHESIS
The
court a
quo's
starting
point was to ask the question whether its review jurisdiction had
been ousted since a decision in terms of the Constitution had been
made by the first respondent.
It
occurs to me that that was somewhat the wrong question to ask since
the finality of the first respondent's decision is not a
determinant factor on the question of jurisdiction.
All
that the court a
quo
had
to do was consider the statutory framework on its jurisdiction and
then decide whether there was anything in that framework ousting its
jurisdiction to review the recommendations of the Tribunal after the
first respondent had acted upon them.
It
is not the conclusiveness or finality of a constitutional step, act
or conduct that ousts the jurisdiction of a court to review that
step, act or conduct.
The
court a
quo,
in determining its review jurisdiction over what it called “a
decision in terms of the Constitution to remove the [appellant]”
ought to have been guided by the presumption against the ouster of
the jurisdiction of the High Court, which would have compelled it to
identify a positive, clear and unambiguous provision limiting the
jurisdiction of the High Court in constitutional matters, which is
section 167(2)(d).
Drawing
on an analogy of the facts in the case of Gonese
& Anor v Parliament of Zimbabwe & Ors
CCZ-4-20, Mr Sitotombe,
for
the
appellant, correctly argued that it is possible for an act, law,
conduct or decision to be set aside even after it has been concluded
or finalised.
Though
that analogy is compelling, it does not establish a basis for the
High Court to assume jurisdiction in this case.
In
any event, that case is distinguishable on the basis that the court
which assumed jurisdiction there was the Constitutional Court and not
the High Court.
It
is correct, as argued by Mr Sitotombe,
that the High Court has original civil jurisdiction to review the
proceedings of any inferior court or tribunal. However, the
provisions of section 171(1) of the Constitution are not the only
provisions of the Constitution shedding light on the jurisdiction of
the High Court.
As
already observed, the jurisdiction of the High Court in
constitutional matters is limited to those matters that are not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court.
Accordingly,
the High Court does not have jurisdiction over a matter falling
within the ambit of section 167(2)(d) of the Constitution.
It
is with this consideration in mind that I have already adverted to
the exhortation that a court must be careful not to assume
jurisdiction over a matter that only falls within the exclusive
competence of the Constitutional Court.
I
entertain the view that the question of whether or not the court a
quo
had
the requisite jurisdiction over the appellant's causa
is
better understood and resolved in the context of the appellant's
draft order wherein she sought relief to set aside the decision of
the first respondent. In order to determine whether only the
Constitutional Court would have the jurisdiction to set aside the
decision of the first respondent, there is a need to ascertain that
the constitutional invalidity of that decision is based on a failure
to fulfil a constitutional obligation.
But
before that is even determined the appellant's founding affidavit a
quo
must
set out the basis upon which the court a
quo
was
called upon to review and set aside the decision of the first
respondent.
The
nature of proceedings before the court a
quo
In
carrying out the enquiry whether this matter is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, one must first be satisfied
that there is a constitutional matter.
In
Moyo
v Chacha & Ors
2017 (2) ZLR 142 (CC) at p.150D, while commenting on the definition
of a “constitutional matter” that is provided by the
Constitution, the Constitutional Court stated as follows:
“The
import of the definition of 'constitutional matter' is that the
Constitutional Court would be generally concerned with the
determination of matters raising questions of law, the resolution of
which require the interpretation, protection, or enforcement of the
Constitution.
The
Constitutional Court has no competence to hear and determine issues
that do not involve the interpretation or enforcement of the
Constitution or are not connected with a decision on issues involving
the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution.”
The
defining character of a constitutional matter is the interpretation
or enforcement or protection of the Constitution.
Thus,
it has been stressed that the mere reference to a provision of the
Constitution does not imbue a matter with constitutional character.
The
opposite, though less persuasive, may also true.
The
absence of a reference to the Constitution does not mean that a
matter is not a constitutional matter although in most constitutional
matters there generally would be reference to the Constitution. See
Bere
v Judicial Service Commission & Ors
CCZ–10–22
at p7.
As
stated in the Moyo
case supra,
one must simply be satisfied that a matter raises questions of law,
the resolution of which require the interpretation, protection, or
enforcement of the Constitution.
A
related issue of important consideration is the point at which a
matter assumes constitutional character.
In
the Bere
case supra,
the Constitutional Court held that a constitutional matter cannot
arise for the first time on appeal when it was not available or in
existence in the subordinate court.
At
p14, it was stressed that:
“in
order to determine whether or not there was a constitutional matter
before the court a
quo,
the
dispute must be traced back to the court of origin,
in this case, the High Court”.
Turning
to the facts of this case, the application a
quo
had
all characteristics of a non-constitutional matter.
The
court application plainly declared that it was for review in terms of
Rule 60 of the High Court Rules, 2021 as read with sections 26 and 27
of the High Court Act [Chapter
7:06].
The
application further stated that the subject of the review was the
first respondent's decision made in terms of section 187(7) and (8)
of the Constitution on 17 June 2021.
In
para 12 of her founding affidavit, the appellant unequivocally stated
that:
“The
present application is for the review of the decisions of the
Respondents that led to my removal from the office of a judge.”
The
application a
quo
is
ostensibly based on common-law grounds of review.
There
are scant references to any provisions of the Constitution. In fact
those references were merely intended to buttress the common law
grounds on which the application is based.
For
instance, the appellant made reference to section 190(4) of the
Constitution intending to explain that the Tribunal ignored the
preliminary point that she raised.
As
a preliminary point, she had argued that she was first supposed to be
subjected to the constitutional disciplinary procedure provided for
in section 190(4) of the Constitution before the Tribunal could
proceed to enquire into the matters that were before it.
The
appellant also referred to section 69 of the Constitution suggesting
that the preliminary points she raised were of crucial importance to
her right to a fair hearing before an independent and impartial
Tribunal.
Given
that the matter was not heard on the merits, it suffices for me to
simply observe that the resolution of the allegation that the
preliminary points she raised were not considered is unlikely to have
yielded a constitutional matter.
Further
on, the appellant also made reference to section 56 of the
Constitution in para. 15.5 of her founding affidavit to support her
contention that the Tribunal did not consider the preliminary
objection that the Judicial Service Commission submitted her matter
to the first respondent without following the provisions of Statutory
Instrument 107 of 2012.
She
sought to make the point that the same provisions were followed in
the case involving Mr Justice Bere who had earlier on been subjected
to an inquiry.
Thus,
reference to section 56 was intended to demonstrate, bearing in mind
the imperativeness of the right to equality, that the Tribunal failed
to pronounce on an important preliminary point.
Therefore,
the ineluctable conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of the
appellant's founding affidavit is that it did not present a
constitutional matter.
The
issue however does not end there.
It
must be remembered that the appellant sought the review and setting
aside of the second, third and fourth respondents recommendations and
the subsequent decision of the first respondent.
In
particular, there must be clarity as to the nature of the
jurisdiction required to set aside the decision of the first
respondent.
The
appellant's pleaded jurisdictional basis for setting aside the
first respondent's decision
It
is important to specifically advert to the grounds upon which the
appellant intends to have the decision of the first respondent set
aside.
The
grounds appear to have been canvassed simultaneously in the founding
affidavit with the basis upon which the appellant sought to have the
recommendations of the second, third and fourth respondents set
aside.
For
good measure, regarding the allegation that the recommendations of
the second, third and fourth respondents were made at a time when
there was no longer any valid Tribunal, the appellant averred in
para. 13.13 that:
“This
means that the recommendations... were made at a time when there was
no valid Tribunal which could present a valid report and as such the
recommendations are a legal nullity and ought to be set aside. Once
the recommendations became unlawful, and therefore a legal nullity,
the
1st
Respondent could not act on them as he is constitutionally barred
from acting on unlawful actions.
Consequently, his accession to an unlawful recommendation is tainted
and must itself be set aside.” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
On
the allegation that she was not given a right to address the Tribunal
in mitigation and to be heard on the appropriate penalty, the
appellant averred in para 14.7 of her founding affidavit that:
“the
1st
Respondent was misled when the Tribunal members claimed that there
were no extenuating circumstances when these could not be considered
in the absence of a hearing in mitigation”.
On
that score, she added that the recommendations to the first
respondent and his subsequent decision ought to be set aside because
he “ought only to act on recommendations properly reached after
following due legal process”.
On
the failure to determine the preliminary points she raised before the
Tribunal, the appellant avowed that such a failure constituted a
gross irregularity that vitiated the recommendation by the second,
third and fourth respondents as well as the subsequent decision of
the first respondent.
This
is set out in para. 15.7 of the appellant's founding affidavit.
Thereafter,
the appellant canvassed the allegation that she was not provided with
documents that would be relied on during the Tribunal proceedings. On
that point, she concluded in para. 17 of her founding affidavit thus:
“It
is my view that I have made a case for the review of the
recommendations of the 2nd,
3rd
and 4th
Respondent to be set aside, together
with the subsequent decision of the 1st
Respondent on this additional ground.”
Beyond
these averments, one would not find any other averment on the basis
of which the decision of the first respondent would be reviewed and
set aside.
The
effect of the application a
quo
would
have been that the decision of the first respondent would be set
aside as a consequence of findings made by the court a
quo
on
non-constitutional grounds of review.
The
question of the jurisdiction required to set aside the first
respondent's decision
In
light of the relief sought against the decision of the first
respondent, the question that begs an answer on the jurisdiction of
the court a
quo
is
whether it would have had the power to set aside that decision on the
basis of the averments in the applicant's founding affidavit.
A
fortiori,
would the High Court even have the jurisdiction to set aside the
decision in the circumstances?
The
decision having been apparently made on the basis of the procedure
and provisions of section 187 of the Constitution, it necessarily
follows that the invalidity of the first respondent's decision must
ordinarily be predicated upon a breach of the provisions of section
187.
To
exemplify this conclusion, the logic behind the appellant's basis
of review must be laid bare. Essentially, the appellant argues that
the decision of the first respondent is invalid simply because it is
predicated upon recommendations that are null and unlawful due to the
procedural irregularities cited.
It
is trite that if an act is a nullity, then nothing can stand on it.
Thus,
taken to its logical conclusion, the appellant's basis for
impeaching the first respondent's decision is that his decision is
invalid since there were no lawful and valid recommendations in terms
of which a decision could be taken as stipulated by section 187(8) of
the Constitution.
Whether
the recommendations of the second, third and fourth respondents are
null and unlawful is a question that has not been adjudicated upon
and determined. They can only be regarded as such when so declared by
a court of competent jurisdiction.
They
are presumed to be valid. As things stand, the recommendations are
only voidable.
In
this regard, the famous remarks of LORD DENNING in MacFoy
v United Africa Company Limited
[1961] 3 All ER 1169 (PC) at p1172 remain true:
“But
if an act is only voidable,
then it is not automatically void. It is only an irregularity
which
may be waived. It is not to be avoided unless something is done to
avoid it. There must be an order of the Court setting it aside: and
the Court has discretion whether to set it aside or not. It will do
so if justice demands but not otherwise. Meanwhile it remains good
and a support for all that has been done under it.”
For
the decision of the first respondent to be set aside in turn, a
competent court must also necessarily find that the decision is
invalid because the first respondent acted on the basis of null
recommendations.
In
other words, the first respondent would have constructively failed to
comply with section 187(8) since, at law, there would not have been
valid recommendations in accordance with which he could have made a
decision.
Surely,
where the decision of the first respondent is set aside on the basis
that it is predicated on null recommendations, that decision would
have not have been made in accordance with the Constitution.
The
decision would essentially be set aside because the first respondent
would have failed to comply with the Constitution.
We
know of course that only the Constitutional Court can determine
whether the first respondent has failed to act in accordance with the
Constitution as he is obliged to.
But
to my mind, this outcome can only be achieved by a litigant who has
properly pleaded a constitutional basis upon which the first
respondent's decision ought to be set aside.
In
the case of Sibangani
v Bindura University of Science Education
CCZ–7–22 at p10, the Constitutional Court set out the importance
of properly pleading jurisdiction in constitutional matters. The
Court stated:
“[20]...
An
applicant must set out either the facts or the law that would form
the basis of the jurisdiction of the Court in his or her cause.
It is insufficient for an applicant, without more, to merely cite a
provision of the Constitution and assume that the Court's
jurisdiction is triggered. The
existence of jurisdiction is an objective fact derived from the
founding affidavit. It must also find expression in a draft order
which speaks to the relief concerned with a constitutional matter for
adjudication by the Court.....”
(The
underlining is for emphasis)
The
court went on to state:
“[22]
The need to plead jurisdiction, which in our jurisdiction is laid
down in the rules of this Court, was more incisively pronounced in
another decision of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, namely,
Gcaba
v Minister for Safety and Security
[2009] ZACC 26; 2010 (1) SA 238 (CC) at para 75. The Court held that:
'Jurisdiction
is determined on the basis of the pleadings,
as LANGA CJ held in Chirwa,
and not the substantive merits of the case.…
In
the event of the Court's jurisdiction being challenged at the outset
(in limine),
the applicant's pleadings are the determining factor. They
contain the legal basis of the claim under which the applicant has
chosen to invoke the Court's competence.
While
the pleadings – including in motion proceedings, not only the
formal terminology of the notice of motion but also the contents of
the supporting affidavits – must be interpreted to establish what
the legal basis of the applicant's claim is, it
is not for the Court to say that the facts asserted by the applicant
would also sustain another claim, cognisable only in another court.'
(My
emphasis).”
(Emphasis
in original)
I
have already demonstrated that the relief that the appellant sought
against the first respondent would be, in effect, based on the
invalidity of the decision as a result of the absence of valid
recommendations that would trigger the provisions of section 187(8).
That
determination is a constitutional matter requiring a court to
interpret and enforce the Constitution by ensuring that the first
respondent makes his decision in accordance with section 187.
The
appellant did not properly plead a jurisdictional basis upon which
the court a
quo
could
set aside the decision of the first respondent.
It
was incumbent on her to show in her founding affidavit that the court
a
quo
had
the requisite power to set aside the decision of the first respondent
not having, as she impliedly contends, been made on the strength of
recommendations contemplated by section 187.
But
even if the appellant had properly pleaded a proper jurisdictional
basis for the relief she sought, the High Court would still not have
the competence to set aside the decision of the first respondent for
yet another reason.
It
is that only the Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to set
aside the decision of the first respondent on the ground that it is
at variance with and predicated upon a failure to fulfil his
constitutional obligations.
The
decision sought to be set aside, which relates to the role of the
Executive in the removal of Judges, can also be said, on the
authority of Mliswa
supra,
to be a constitutional decision bearing upon the comity between the
Executive and the Judicial arms of the State.
For
that reason it must be passed upon by the highest court in
constitutional matters.
On
the test espoused in Chirambwe
for
determining whether a matter falls within section 167(2)(d), the
unavoidable conclusion is that the issues raised and the relief
sought against the first respondent would demonstrably constitute an
intrusion into the domain of the President's powers and obligations
in the removal of Judges.
What
fortifies this view is the fact that before this Court, the
submissions made on behalf of the appellant strongly suggested that
the basis upon which the decision of the first respondent would be
set aside is that the first respondent has a duty to ensure that the
Constitution and other laws are faithfully observed.
That
suggestion is reinforced in the appellant's heads of argument filed
with this Court.
In
para 3.14 of the appellant's heads of argument, after citing
section 90(1) of the Constitution providing for the first
respondent's duty to uphold, defend, obey and respect the
Constitution as the supreme law of the nation and to ensure that the
Constitution and all the other laws are faithfully observed, the
submission is made that:
“3.1.4.
As is clear from this constitutional provision, the 1st
Respondent has a duty to ensure that the constitution and all other
laws of the land are faithfully observed. That
this duty extends to decisions made in terms of section 187(8) of the
Constitution is without a doubt.
Section 187(8) of the Constitution states that;
'The
President must
act in accordance with the tribunal's recommendation in terms of
subsection 7.'” (The
underlining is for emphasis)
The
appellant contends that it is compliance with the Constitution and
all other laws of the land that makes the first respondent's
decision a decision in terms of the Constitution.
In
para 3.15 of her heads of argument, the appellant adds that the first
respondent acts in accordance with the recommendation of a Tribunal
established in terms of section 187(3) of the Constitution in his
capacity as the President of Zimbabwe, and thus “he remains
duty-bound
to ensure that the removal of a Judge from office is in accordance
with the Constitution and all other laws”.
In
para 3.16 she further argues that the word 'ensure' means that
the first respondent “has a constitutional responsibility to make
sure that the removal process is done in accordance with the law”.
Without
repeating what I have already said, it suffices to state that from
the heads of argument, the appellant also appreciates that her basis
for setting aside the decision of the first respondent would be his
failure to fulfil a constitutional obligation.
That
requires a determination that can only be made by the Constitutional
Court.
The
decision in Gula Ndebele v Bhunu S–29–11
Mr
Sitotombe
also
sought to argue that the court a
quo
had
jurisdiction on the basis of the decision of this court in Sobusa
Gula Ndebele v Bhunu
S–29–11.
In
that case, the appellant therein, a former Attorney-General,
approached the High Court seeking the review of the proceedings of
the Tribunal whose inquiry led to a decision to have him removed from
the office of Attorney-General by the President.
Having
failed to cite the President, the High Court held that the President
was a necessary party who ought to have been cited. On that basis,
the High Court dismissed the application because of the non-joinder
of the President.
It
was Mr Sitotombe's
view
that the fact that on appeal, this Court did not raise the
jurisdictional question, meant that the High Court had jurisdiction
to review the recommendations of a Tribunal after the President has
acted upon them.
The
Gula
Ndebele
case
is distinguishable.
This
is principally because it predates the current Constitution in terms
of which certain constitutional matters, such as the application a
quo
which
invites a court to set aside a decision in the domain of the
President's constitutional powers, fall within the exclusive remit
of the Constitutional Court unlike in the Gula
Ndebele
case.
Quite
differently, this case concerns the jurisdiction of the High Court to
review a decision of the President removing a judge from office.
It
inherently involves a question whether the President would have
failed to fulfil a constitutional obligation.
As
I have already stated, the power to determine the appertaining
question and to set aside the decision is effectively reposed in the
Constitutional Court by section 167(2)(d) of the current
Constitution.
It
follows that the Gula
Ndebele
case may not be relied on to persuade this court to find that the
court a
quo
could
have jurisdiction that is manifestly at variance with the provisions
of section 167(2)(d) of the Constitution, an obvious aberration of
our current Constitution.
DISPOSITION
This
appeal essentially requires this court to determine whether the court
a
quo
would
have jurisdiction to review the recommendations of the second, third
and fourth respondents and the subsequent decision of the first
respondent, especially considering that the decision of the first
respondent completed the process of the removal of the appellant from
office.
For
different reasons, than those advanced by the court a
quo,
I
conclude, in light of the relief sought by the appellant in respect
of the first respondent's decision and the apparent failure to
plead a proper jurisdictional basis, that the High Court would not
have the requisite jurisdiction to set aside the first respondent's
decision.
Once
it is accepted that the court a
quo
would
not have had complete jurisdiction over the application that was
before it, this appeal cannot succeed.
The
next important inquiry would be the appropriate order to be made.
One
has to advert to the decision of this Court in Chombo
v National Prosecuting Authority & Ors
S–158–21 at 6, on that score. The Court held that:
“In
Mutukwa
v National Dairy Co-operative Ltd
1996 (1) ZLR 341 (S), with respect to the High Court but applicable
with equal force to this Court, it was held as follows:
'In
any case, a question of jurisdiction is one which a court imbued with
review powers may raise mero
motu;
for parties cannot confer jurisdiction on an adjudicating authority
where such jurisdiction has not been conferred on that adjudicating
authority by statute.'
In
fact, for a court with review and/or appellate jurisdiction to
overlook or fail to address the lack of jurisdiction of the court or
tribunal whose decision or proceedings have been placed before it is
to compound the irregularity as that reviewing or appellate court's
proceedings would be marred by the initial lack of jurisdiction of
the court of first instance rendering them in turn to be a nullity.”
In
the Chombo
case
the court struck the appeal off the roll because it was based on a
decision reached without jurisdiction. In other words, no appeal
could lie against a decision marred by lack of jurisdiction.
However,
in this case, the court a
quo
did not pass upon the application before it. It only determined the
question, which it was entitled to raise, of whether or not it had
jurisdiction.
The
instant appeal is restricted to the question of the court a
quo's
findings
on its lack of jurisdiction.
The
court a
quo
did not exercise jurisdiction which it did not have on the merits of
the application, which would have afflicted the validity of this
appeal. It stuck to the jurisdictional issue which it could lawfully
determine.
In
turn, the appeal against the finding as to jurisdiction is valid.
Having
found that, indeed, the court a
quo
had
no jurisdiction, this appeal cannot be allowed. It must accordingly
fail and as such the appropriate order is the dismissal of the
appeal.
On
the question of costs, there is no basis for ordering the appellant
to pay the costs of the appeal given that the appeal was not opposed.
It would, in my view, be appropriate to dispose of the appeal with
each party to bear its own costs.
In
the result, it be and is hereby ordered as follows:
The
appeal is dismissed with each party to bear its own costs.
CHATUKUTA
JA: I
agree
MWAYERA
JA: I
agree
Mtetwa
& Nyambirai,
appellant's legal practitioners
Sinyoro
and Partners,
second and fourth respondents legal practitioners
Warara
& Associates,
third respondent's legal practitioners