The
defendant was married to one Clemens Westerhoff in terms of the
marriages Act [Chapter 5.11]. The marriage was dissolved by this
court on a date that is not readily ascertainable, and is, any event,
immaterial for the purposes of this trial.
During
the subsistence of the marriage, the parties had acquired an
immovable property called Stand 491 Mount Pleasant Township 13 of Lot
33 of Mount Pleasant. This they set up as the matrimonial home. Title
in the property was held freehold by a company called Westerhoff
Investments (Private) Limited. It is common cause that the parties
regarded the company as their joint alter ego, set up primarily for
the purposes of holding title in the property.
Prior
to divorce, and with the assistance of the judge who presided over a
pre-trial conference in their matter, the parties settled as between
themselves, a consent paper, which disposed of the issues of
paternity and maintenance for the minor child of the marriage and the
distribution of the joint estate. The consent paper was, at the time
of the divorce, incorporated into and became part of the divorce
order.
Regarding
the fate of the matrimonial home, the court ordered as follows,
following the wording of clause 5 of the consent paper:
“5.
After the results of the paternity tests, the following scenario will
obtain:
(a)
The property known as No.29 Morningside Drive, Mount Pleasant,
Harare, shall be valued for commercial purposes and the value shall
be divided in such a manner that:
(i)
If the plaintiff is the natural father of the minor child, plaintiff
gets a 40% share, the defendant a 40% and the minor child 20% share,
and the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff such amount as may be
the difference between the plaintiff's 40% share and the sum of
$110 million which is the lump sum payment for the maintenance of the
minor child in full and final settlement as provided for in clause 2
hereof; and
(ii)
If the plaintiff is found by results of the tests not to be (the)
natural father, then the ratio shall be 60% for the plaintiff and 40%
for defendant.
(b)
The valuation provided for in clause 5(a) hereof shall be conducted
by an independent valuer appointed by the Master of the High Court
from his list and such valuation shall be conducted and concluded
within 7 days of receipt by plaintiff (who shall serve the results on
the defendant's legal practitioner within 7 days of receipt of
them) of the results of the valuation.
(c)
The costs of the valuation shall be borne by plaintiff and defendant
in the ratio of 50% plaintiff and 50% defendant. The valuation costs
shall be paid for in full by plaintiff to facilitate the process and
he shall be refunded his share by defendant at the time that
defendant pays what is due to plaintiff either in terms of clause
5(a)(i) or clause 6.
(d)
Should the defendant fail to pay the amount payable to plaintiff
within 12 months of the date of valuation, then, and in that event,
and without notice to defendant, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
sell the immovable property, and from the proceeds pay $110 million
as provided for in clause 2, to defendant for the minor child and 40%
of the proceeds to the defendant as her share. In a sale in terms of
this clause, the defendant herein irrevocably appoints her legal
practitioner, failing him the Sheriff or his lawful deputy to sign
all documents necessary to effect the sale and resultant transfer,
and the rates duties and other taxes payable by reason of the
transfer including transfer fees shall be paid from the proceeds of
sale.
6….,.
7….,.
8….,.”
It
is common cause that in January 2006, the property was evaluated for
the purposes of clause 5(a) of the divorce order. This was to set the
value of the property at which the plaintiff before me, then
defendant, could “buy off” her former husband's share in the
property to enable her to acquire joint title with the minor child in
the property, to the exclusion of her former husband. The defendant
had a year in which to do this and the clock started ticking against
her in January 2006.
It
is further common cause that the defendant failed to raise the
requisite funding necessary to bring into effect the provisions of
clause 5(a)(i) of the order. She could not buy out her former husband
and her failure to raise the necessary funding triggered the
provisions of clause 5(d) of the divorce order. In terms of this
clause, the property had to be sold and the proceeds parceled out in
a pre-determined ratio.
Again,
it is not in dispute that in the course of time, the property was
sold to the plaintiff. Transfer of title was conveyed to the
plaintiff, and, in due course, the plaintiff sought the eviction of
the defendant from the property.
The
defendant resisted the plaintiff's claim for eviction and this is
the suit that came before me.
In
defending the eviction summons at the instance of the plaintiff, the
defendant pleaded that the agreement of sale to the plaintiff was
defective, transfer to the plaintiff was fraudulently procured and
was to the prejudice of the defendant and the minor child of the
marriage. In the plea, the defendant prays for the sale and
subsequent transfer of the property to be set aside.
At
the pre-trial conference of the matter, where, in terms of our
procedures, all legal issues ought to have been crystallized, the
matter was referred to trial on the following issues:
1.
Whether or not the agreement of sale entered into by and between the
plaintiff and Westerhoff Investments (Private) Limited in respect of
the property known as No.29 Morningside Drive, Mt Pleasant, Harare,
and its subsequent transfer by the latter to the former, is valid at
law.
2.
Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to an order for the eviction
of the defendant from the premises.
3.
Who between the parties should bear the costs of suit?...,.
It
would appear that in terms of the defendant's summary of evidence,
and indeed according to the evidence led at the trial, the defendant
took issue with the fact that she was not consulted on the ultimate
price at which the house was sold to the plaintiff. She is of the
view that the property was sold at an unreasonably low price to her
prejudice as she then could not buy another property from her share
of the proceeds....,.
To
substantiate its claim, the plaintiff first called Joseph Mandizha.
He was approached by a third party to act on behalf of the
defendant's former husband. He was instructed to carry out the
terms of the divorce order as between the parties and as it related
to the distribution and disposal of the former matrimonial home.
In
January 2007, the witness advised the defendant that he had been
instructed to cause the sale of the property. His instructions had
been for him to proceed without informing the defendant as her time
to act had come and gone by. He met with the defendant and her legal
practitioner and they discussed the matter. He informed the defendant
and her legal practitioners on how he intended to dispose of the
property. He indicated to the defendant that while clause 5(d) did
not place any obligation on him to consult her in disposing of the
property, he would nevertheless keep her informed of developments out
of courtesy.
Before
putting up the property for sale, the witness caused a market
appraisal of the property to be done. The estate agents that were
approached to carry out this appraisal included Heaven on Earth, an
agency in which he is the majority shareholder. After the appraisal,
instructions were given to Heaven on Earth to sell the property. It
is at this stage that reports were received to the effect that the
defendant was objecting to the mandate given to Heaven on Earth Real
Estate to sell the property. She sought to introduce a new agent to
handle the sale.
Undeterred
by the efforts taken by the defendant to stall the selling of the
property, the witness had the property sold to the plaintiff in June
2007. The defendant was advised of the sale of the property through
correspondence to her legal practitioners. Requests were made for the
attendance of the defendant upon the witness for the signing of the
agreement of sale. It is at this stage that the defendant intimated
that the property could be sold for a higher price. It was indicated
to the witness, by the defendant's legal practitioners, that, in
view of the prices she was expecting, she was unlikely to sign the
agreement of sale which reflected a purchase price of $13 billion. He
received the purchase price for the property and then proceeded to
facilitate the registration of transfer of the property to the
plaintiff.
In
disposing of the property, he never had sight of the Articles of
Association of the company that held title in the property. He merely
followed the dictates of the court order as to how the property was
to be disposed and the proceeds distributed between the divorced
parties and their minor child. While the parties held a meeting
before the property was sold, it was never his intention to
re-negotiate the dispute between the parties or to be taken outside
the provisions of the divorce order. His instructions were not to
revisit the distribution of the property.
When
he was genuinely convinced that the defendant would not sign the
agreement of sale, he requested the Deputy Sheriff to sign on her
behalf in accordance with the court order.
The
witness gave his evidence well and was very candid with the court.
His explanations were full and while one may not agree that it was
prudent of him to instruct his own agency to sell the property, one
cannot, on that basis, find that he was an unreliable witness.
Next
to testify on behalf of the plaintiff was one Tongoringa Mubaiwa. He
is an estate agent working for Heaven on Earth Real Estate. He
handled the sale of the property in dispute. Prior to putting up the
property for sale he did a market appraisal of the property. He
compiled a report of his findings. He was then given instructions to
market the property which he did. Eventually he sold the property to
the plaintiff. He drafted the agreement of sale which was signed in
due course.
The
witness gave his evidence well. He fared well under
cross-examination. His answers and explanations were easy to follow.
I find him a credible witness.
The
plaintiff called Muriel Chengetai Dowa as its third witness. She
represented the directors of the plaintiff in the purchase of the
property.
She
was under instructions from the plaintiff to look for a property.
She, at one stage, responded to an advertisement by Heaven on Earth
for a property in Mt Pleasant. The deal fell through. She then
advised the estate agency to contact her should they have another
property in the same area for sale. After some time, she was informed
of the property in dispute. She was advised that the property was
being sold as a result of a divorce. She could not view the property
but was shown pictures of the same. The directors of the plaintiff
advised her to seek legal advice before proceeding. She did and
proceeded to buy the property. Eventually, the property was
transferred to the plaintiff and when she tried to gain access to the
property, after transfer, she was denied same by the defendant.
I
find no fault with the evidence and manner of testifying of this
witness. I shall rely on her evidence.
After
the evidence of this witness, the plaintiff closed its case.
The
defendant called one Bruce Beaven Mujeyi to give evidence first. He
was acting as the legal practitioner of the defendant during the
hearing of the divorce matter and was especially instructed to deal
with the matter of the disposal of the matrimonial home.
At
the time he received instructions to act in the matter, the matter
had received a lot of publicity and tensions were high on either
side. The legal practitioner who had acted for the defendant's
husband during the divorce proceedings had renounced agency and he
had to deal with Mr Mandizha, who, like him, had been instructed to
act in the matter after the divorce had been granted. Mr Mandizha
wrote to the defendant advising her that he was now handling the
matter. He responded to the letter by telephoning Mr Mandizha. They
agreed to meet. In view of the fact that neither he nor Mr Mandizha
had handled the much publicized divorce, he suggested that the best
way forward was for the parties to negotiate their way through the
disposal of the former matrimonial home. He was aware of the divorce
order and the consent paper on which the order was based.
In
the meeting, Mr Mandizha agreed to keep him abreast of developments
as he had the company documents and the Deed of Transfer in respect
of the property. He also understood that the draft agreement would be
forwarded to him for his input.
Regarding
the agency of Heaven on Earth in the matter, the defendant was
clearly uncomfortable that an agency in which Mr Mandizha had an
interest should be used to sell the property. On the instructions of
the defendant, he addressed a letter to Mr Mandizha expressing these
concerns. When Mr Mandizha responded showing little concern for this
since his client had no problem with the arrangement, he filed an
urgent application on behalf of the defendant seeking to interdict
Heaven on Earth from proceeding. Regrettably, the matter was not
determined as the judge before whom the urgent application was placed
ruled that the matter was not urgent as there were other remedies
available to the defendant.
His
further understanding was that if the property was to be evaluated,
this had to be done by an estate agent on the Master of the High
Court's roll.
The
defendant also informed him that she had problems with people coming
to view the house. Since the parties had agreed to negotiate, they
had not agreed on who was to carry out the evaluation of the
property. His client was aggrieved by this as it went against the
spirit of the meeting while Mr Mandizha was equally aggrieved by what
he perceived as lack of co-operation from the defendant. He was
somewhat caught in the middle.
On
25 June 2007, he received notification that the property had been
sold and requesting his client to sign the draft agreement of sale.
He had not been shown a copy of the draft. He was constrained to
write to Mr Mandizha informing him that he could not sign the
agreement on behalf of his client; that his client was out of the
country; and that she would take issue with the price at which the
property had been sold. From the response he received, he gained the
impression that he should wait for Mr Mandizha's further advice.
The letter read:
“Your
letter of 26 the instant received in fax form refers. (Sic)
We
advise that it has been referred to our client. We will revert to you
once his instructions are to hand.”
When
his client returned, he contacted Mr Mandizha to advise him that the
parties could now move forward. He was advised that the property had
been sold. For his client's signature, Mr Mandizha had approached
the Deputy Sheriff. He then advised his clients of the developments
and the two parted company after he felt that it was best that
another law firm takes over the matter as the defendant felt that she
had been let down.
The
witness gave his evidence well. He was quite clear in his responses
to questions and while his reading of the divorce order may have been
different to mine, in some respects, that is not a basis for
impugning his credibility.
The
defendant also gave evidence.
During
the subsistence of her marriage to her former husband, the two bought
a property that was registered in the name of a company. At the time
of the divorce, the parties entered into a consent paper.
She
tried to raise money to “buy the defendant out” but failed. She
is living openly with HIV/AIDS and was not in gainful employment at
the time. When she realized that she could not raise the necessary
funds to buy him out, she tried to sell the property within the one
year stipulated in clause 5 of the divorce order. She failed.
In
January 2007, she received a letter from Mr Mandizha advising her
that he wanted to sell the property. She attended a meeting with Mr
Mandizha in the company of her legal practitioner. It was agreed at
the meeting that the fighting between the parties should come to an
end; that the parties would henceforth resolve all issues amicably;
and that the parties would be in constant communication over the
disposal of the former matrimonial home. At the meeting, no mention
was made of the estate agency that would dispose of the property.
A
day after the meeting, an agent from Heaven on Earth came to the
property to carry out an evaluation of the property. She allowed him
in. Later on, she did not open her gate to him and to people who
wanted to view the property. She had issues with the whole process as
she had not received the valuation report to compare it with her own
idea of how much the property should fetch. When she finally received
the evaluation report, she then realized that Mr Mandizha was one of
the directors of Heaven on Earth. She raised the issue with her legal
practitioner. She felt that there was an obvious conflict of interest
in that Mr Mandizha represented her former husband, was selling the
property through his agency, would do the conveyancing, and then
distribute the proceeds from the sale to the parties as between the
parties and the minor child. The matter came to court, but,
unfortunately, the urgent application was not granted.
While
waiting for developments in the matter, she instructed her lawyers to
place a caveat against title to the property as she felt that she had
real rights in the property that needed protection. She was also
protecting the interests of the minor child.
Some
time later she sent an e-mail to her lawyer suggesting that an
independent estate agent be appointed to handle the sale. She
suggested one. She copied the email to Mr Mandizha. In the e-mail she
also gave her own suggestion of the fetching price for the property.
She
left Harare for some time and when she returned she was advised that
the property had been sold. She was not happy. She went to her legal
practitioner and asked him to stop the transfer and he filed an
urgent application. She went to the Anti-corruption
Unit
and lodged a complaint. Before the urgent application to stop the
transfer could be heard, Mr Mandizha appeared and showed them the
Deed of Transfer. She then withdrew the case.
At
one point she expected her former husband to call for a company
resolution on the disposal of the property.
In
her view, her former husband did not comply with the court order from
the beginning. Her legal practitioners ought to have been shown a
copy of the draft agreement. They were not. At the same time she was
also looking for another house to buy. The price fetched for the
former matrimonial property was not sufficient to meet her
obligations in procuring another property.
In
conclusion, she prayed for an order setting aside the sale and
transfer to the plaintiff and for the property to be resold under the
supervision of the Master of this court.
The
defendant was understandably highly emotional when she gave her
evidence. This however did not deter her from giving her opinion on
how the former matrimonial home should have been disposed of. Her
testimony was to a large extent corroborated by that of her former
legal practitioner. I have no cause to disbelieve her on fact. Due to
the emotion which the defendant testified and presumably which she
attaches to this matter, I have reproduced her testimony in greater
detail than for any other witness deliberately as I shall try and
examine each issue that she has raised in her evidence and upon which
she rests her defence.
It
is not in dispute that the plaintiff has brought the
rei vindicatio
against the defendant.
As
aptly summarized by counsel for the plaintiff,
in his closing submissions, the plaintiff has approached this court
as an owner of the property to seek the ejectment of the defendant
simply on the basis that it is the owner and is thus entitled, as
such, to enjoyment of its property.
The
rei
vindicatio
is an action that is founded in property law. It is aimed at
protecting ownership. It is based on the principle that an owner
shall not be deprived of his property without his consent. So
exclusive is the right of an owner to possess his or her property
that, at law, he or she is entitled to recover it from wherever found
and from whomsoever is holding it without alleging anything further
than that he or she is the owner and that the defendant is in
possession of the property. Thus, it is an action
in rem
enforceable against the world at large.
This
is settled law in this jurisdiction which hardly requires authority.
See Sibanda
v The Church of Christ 1994 (1) ZLR 74 (SC); Musanhi v Mt Darwin
Rushinga Cooperative Union 1997 (1) ZLR 120 (SC); Mashave v Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd 1998 (1) ZLR 436 (S); Jolly v A Shannon &
Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 78 (HC); and Stanbic Finance Zimbabwe Ltd v
Chivungwa 1999 (1) ZLR 262 (HC).
The
bedrock of all the above decisions is Chetty v Naidoo 1974 (3) SA 13
(A) where…, JANSEN JA had this to say:
"It
is inherent in the nature of ownership that possession of the res
should
normally be with the owner, and, it follows that no other person may
withhold it from the owner unless he is vested with some right
enforceable against the owner (eg. a right of retention or a
contractual right). The owner, in instituting a rei vindicatio, need,
therefore, do no more than allege and prove that he is the owner and
the defendant is holding the res
-
the onus being on the defendant to allege and establish any right to
continue to hold against the owner."
There
are primarily two defences to the rei vindicatio, each aimed at
destroying each of the two essential elements of the action;
1.
The first one seeks to destroy the claim of ownership completely by
denying that the plaintiff is the owner of the property in question
or seeks to diminish his rights in the property by admitting his or
her ownership but by alleging that the plaintiff has parted, under
some recognized law, with the right to exclusive possession of the
property.
2.
The second defence, of course, is to deny possession of the property
at the time the action is brought or the claim is instituted.
There
are no equities in the application of the rei vindicatio. Thus, in
applying the principle, the court may not accept and grant pleas of
mercy or for extension of possession of the property by the defendant
against an owner for the convenience or comfort of the possessor once
it is accepted that the plaintiff is the owner of the property and
does not consent to the defendant holding it.
It
is a rule or principle of law that admits no discretion on the part
of the court. It is a legal principle heavily weighted in favour of
property owners against the world at large and is used to ruthlessly
protect ownership.
The
application of the principle conjures up in my mind the most
uncomfortable image of a stern mother standing over two children
fighting over a lollipop. If the child holding and licking the
lollipop is not the rightful owner of the prized possession and the
rightful owner cries to the mother for intervention, the mother must
pluck the lollipop from the holder and restore it forthwith to the
other child notwithstanding the age and size of the owner-child or
the number of lollipops that the owner-child may be clutching at the
time. It matters not that the possessor child may not have had a
lollipop in a long time or is unlikely to have one in the foreseeable
future. If the lollipop is not his or hers, he or she cannot have it.
In
casu,
the plaintiff has not denied that the plaintiff is the owner of the
property. She has not denied that she is in possession of the
property in issue. She has however sought to attack the right of the
plaintiff to exclusive use of the property on the basis that she was
unfairly treated by her former husband and his agents when the
property was disposed
of.
In
my view, the defendant's case is hampered by the application of
three legal principles.
(a)
Firstly, she is relying on the consideration of equities in the
matter to deny the plaintiff exclusive enjoyment of its property.
I
repeat her evidence in this regard. She could not raise enough funds
to purchase her former husband's share in the property as she was
not in gainful employment at the time. She could not raise any loans
as she is publicly known to be living with the HIV/AIDS virus. She
intended to purchase another property for herself and for the minor
child of the marriage. She could not do so from the proceeds of the
sale of the property as her share was too low. The success of this
suit against her will literally make her and the minor child of the
marriage homeless.
On
the other hand, the plaintiff has bought the property for investment
purposes. It does not require the property for its own accommodation
but as an income-generating investment. Thus, on equities alone, the
defendant has a strong case.
Having
heard and seen the defendant testifying and having listened to the
impassioned plea that she was making to the court for a break for
herself and the minor child of the marriage and having heard the
anguish in her voice, I would have, if I had any, used my discretion
in her favour and granted her prayer.
I
have none. The law gives me none. I have no power to abrogate any to
myself to change the principles of the rei
vindicatio
to bring in the consideration of equities into the matter. My hands
are tied. I must apply the law that denies her a remedy even if I am
keenly aware of her circumstances.
(b)
Secondly, the defendant has not raised any personal relationship with
the plaintiff in terms of which the plaintiff may be estopped from
taking possession of the property from her.
The
legal authorities are all clear that in a rei
vindicatio,
where the defendant shows that he or she has some right of possession
enforceable against the owner, then the action cannot succeed. To
succeed in defeating the action, a defendant must therefore set up
facts that establish a legal relationship in terms of which
possession of the property by the defendant is justifiable.
It
is a settled position at law that it is only when the wife in the
position of the defendant proves that the plaintiff has associated
with her former husband to defraud her of her rights in the former
matrimonial home can she resist an action of eviction at the instance
of the plaintiff.
See
Ferris v Weaven 1952 (2) ALL ER 23: Maganga v Sakupwanya 1996 (1) ZLR
217; and Nene v Nyatwa SC119-91.
In
casu, no suggestion was ever made, in evidence, that the plaintiff
fraudulently associated with the defendant's former husband to
defeat her just claims in the former matrimonial home. If anything,
all the blame was heaped on the legal practitioner acting for the
defendant's former husband for violating the consent order in more
than one respect.
I
have been referred to two decisions of this court that seem to go
against the finding that I make in this matter. See Ndlovu v Ndlovu
HH15-04 and Chapeyama v Chapeyama HH96-05.
In
Ndlovu v Ndlovu HH15-04 I made the finding that the personal rights
that the wife had in that matter were equal to the personal rights
that the third party had from his agreement of sale with the
respondent/husband. It is worth noting that in that case, no transfer
of the property had been effected in favour of the third party when
the wife/applicant approached the court for relief. The facts of that
matter are therefore distinguishable from the facts in this matter.
The competition in that case was between two equal rights. The
applicant wife and the respondent/purchaser had personal rights
against the respondent/husband, and, on a balance of equities, the
applicant succeded.
In
Chapeyama v Chapeyama HH96-05 the suit was between the former
spouses, and, in my view, GOWORA J correctly held that as between the
two of them the wife had breached the terms of the divorce order in
having transfer registered in her favour before first affording her
former husband the right to purchase her out. She therefore ordered
the two parties to proceed in terms of the divorce order.
In
any event, the above two cases were each instituted by the wives to
protect their rights in the properties in question. The causes of
action in both cases were different and called for different
considerations. As indicated above, the applicant in this matter is
bringing a rei vindicatio.
The considerations that I have to take into account when dealing with
this specific cause of action are different from the considerations
that arose in the above cases. Such is the law.
Finally,
the defendant has raised issues with the manner in which the property
was disposed of in terms of the divorce order. She alleges that the
terms of the consent paper, incorporated into the divorce, were
violated to her prejudice.
Two
issues arise here.
(1)
Firstly, the divorce order is only a judgment in
rem
as far as it regulates the status of the former spouses. When it
deals with the distribution of the matrimonial estate, it becomes a
judgment inter
partes
and is only binding as between the parties. It creates personal
rights in favour of the divorcing parties and where it is violated,
the injured former spouse can seek recourse against the other former
spouse. The injured party cannot seek recourse against the world at
large for an injury occasioned by a judgment that is personal.
(2)
Secondly, the rights to property in the matrimonial estate that a
divorcing party is afforded by the divorce order are founded on
principles of equity as provided for in section 7 of the Matrimonial
Causes Act [Chapter 5.13]. Such rights, even if granted by a court
order, are not rights in
rem.
Where
a spouse has been awarded a share in the matrimonial estate by a
court order, until that share is transferred to them, no rights of
ownership are created in favour of that spouse by the mere issuance
of the divorce order. At best, the court order serves as a declarator
of the respective rights that the former spouses have in the
property.
It
has been the position in this jurisdiction that the rights that a
wife has against her husband in terms of family law are personal
against her husband and do not enter the realm of property law to
clog the rights of an owner.
The
chasm between family law considerations and property law
considerations has been the subject of many debates in this
jurisdiction. This court is getting hoarse from bemoaning the
injustice that this chasm has wrought on wives and from imploring the
legislature to redress the injustice by enacting appropriate
legislation. The situation has not yet been addressed and many wives
in the position of the defendant will have to wait a while longer for
redress and justice. See
Muswere v Makanza HH16-05 and P.M. Semwayo and Another v C Chitara
and Another HH48-07.
In
casu, and for my purposes, it is not therefore material for me to
determine whether or not the property was sold strictly in terms of
the divorce order. Even if the defendant is correct and I find that
the property was not sold strictly in accordance with the provisions
of the court order, that finding will not assist the defendant's
case. She cannot raise a defence from the principles of the law of
husband and wife to defeat a rei vindicatio at the instance of a
third party.
On
the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff's claim must succeed….,.
In
the result, I make the following order:
1.
The defendant and all those occupying through her are to give vacant
possession of the property called Stand Number 491 Mount Pleasant
Township 13 of Lot 33 Mount Pleasant to the plaintiff within 30 days
of this order failing which the Deputy Sheriff is hereby authorised
to evict the defendant and all those occupying through her from the
property and give vacant possession to the plaintiff.
