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HH95-09 - FORRESTER ESTATE P/L vs MUTUMWAPAVI CHARLES RITCHIE VENGESAYI

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Property Law-viz mandament van spolie re land acquisition.

Property Law-viz spoliation order re land acquisition.
Procedural Law-viz urgency re spoliation order.
Property Law -viz mandament van spolie re urgency.
Property Law-viz mandament van spolie re unlawful deprivation of property.
Property Law-viz spoliation order re disturbance of possession.

Spoliation or Mandament van Spolie re: Approach, Claim of Abandonment and Freedom from Arbitrary Eviction

The applicant sought, and was granted a mandament van spolie. The judgment was handed down on 8 September 2009, with reasons. However, the respondent has approached me for written reasons for my judgment. The following are my reasons.

The applicant, through its Director, one Heinrich von Pezold, made the following averments in the founding affidavit:

The applicant is the owner of, and carries on farming operations on Frogmore, situate in the district of Mazowe. The farm was not acquired by the State, and a number of orders have been issued by the High Court confirming this.

On 29 August 2009, the respondent came to the farm and demanded keys to the gate, and to the house on the farm. He showed Heinrich von Pezold a copy of a letter purporting to be an instruction to the applicant to cease farming. Heinrich von Pezold refused to give the respondent the keys, and also refused to let him move onto the farm.

The respondent left the farm. He, however, left behind seven employees sitting under a tree on the farm. At the time when the application was made, the seven were still on the farm, although they were not interfering with the applicant's farming activities.

The applicant contended that it had been in peaceful possession of the farm until the respondent left seven employees. Counsel for the applicant submitted that the respondent left his personnel without an order of court or the applicant's consent.

It is on this basis that it sought a mandament van spolie.

The respondent opposed the application.

Urgency re: Land Reform, Spoliation or Mandament van Spolie Proceedings and Property Disputes

Counsel for the respondent raised a point in limine that the application was not urgent because the respondent's conduct did not amount to spoliation.

He submitted that the determination of the preliminary issue would entail determination of the merits of the application.

On that basis I considered it expedient to deal with the merits.

Spoliation or Mandament van Spolie re: Approach, Claim of Abandonment and Freedom from Arbitrary Eviction

In an application of this nature, the applicant must establish, on a balance of probability, that:

(a) It was in peaceful possession of the property; and

(b) The possession was unlawfully interrupted by the respondent.

See Botha & Anor v Barret 1996 (2) ZLR 73; Van t'Hoff v Van t'Hoff & Ors (1) 1988 (1) ZLR 294 (HC); Chisveto v Minister of Local Government and Town Planning 1984 (1) ZLR 248 (H); and Karoi (Pvt) Ltd & Anor v Brigadier Mujaji HH23-07.

Counsel for the respondent conceded that the applicant was in peaceful possession of the property. He conceded that the respondent had left seven employees on the farm. He, however, contended that this did not amount to unlawful deprivation of property. He referred me to The Law of Property, SILDERBERG and SCHOEMAN, 3rd ed..., where it is observed..., that –

“8.2 A mandament van spolie is aimed only at the recovery of lost possession, and does not lie where there is mere disturbance of possession, or threat that possession will be disturbed. In these latter circumstances, the possessor may apply for a prohibitory interdict instead...,.”

The only issue for determination is, therefore, whether or not the respondent's conduct amounted to deprivation of property.

It appears to me that occupation of the farm by the respondent goes beyond “a mere disturbance”. Counsel for the respondent did not substantiate why the respondent considered his conduct in issue as having been “a mere disturbance”. The act of leaving behind seven employees, coupled with the indications by the respondent that he intended to take occupation of the homestead, and the entire piece of land allocated to him, amounts, in my view, to dispossession. The applicant can no longer claim to be in control of that piece of land currently occupied by the respondent's employees.

Had the respondent left the farm with all his personnel, then one would have classified his visit to the farm as a mere disturbance, as envisaged in The Law of Property, SILDERBERG and SCHOEMAN, 3rd ed...,.

It also appears that counsel for the respondent was selective in his reference to The Law of Property, SILDERBERG and SCHOEMAN, 3rd ed...,. At page..., of The Law of Property, SILDERBERG and SCHOEMAN, 3rd ed..., it is observed that –

“A possessor need not have been dispossessed of the whole thing before he is entitled to claim a spoliation order. Even where he has been deprived of possession of only a part thereof, he is entitled to this relief.”

The same observations were made in Bennet Pringle (Pty) Ltd v Adelaide Municipality 1977 (1) SA 230 (E) where it was held that a disturbance of possession amounts to spoliation. ADDLESON J observed..., as follows –

“The possession on which he relies need not be of the whole of the property, and he need not have lost the whole of that property at the hands of the invader, before he is entitled to claim a spoliation order. A disturbance of possession, without deprivation of the whole of it, is sufficient. See Van Rooyen en'n Ander v Burger 1960 (4) SA 356 (O) at pp 362-3; confirmed on appeal in 1961 (1) SA 159 (O).”

See also The Civil Practice of the Magistrates Court in South Africa, JONES and BUCKLE, 8th ed...,.

The respondent did occupy part of the farm.

It appears from the above authorities that it is irrelevant that a small part of the farm is occupied. Any such occupation amounts to dispossession.

It is my view that the applicant has, therefore, established its entitlement to the relief sought.

CHATUKUTA J:        The applicant sought and was granted a mandament van spolie.   The judgment was handed down on 8 September 2009 with reasons.  However, the respondent has approached me for written reasons for my judgment.   The following are my reasons.

The applicant, through its director, one Heinrich von Pezold made the following averments in the founding affidavit.  The applicant is the owner of and carries farming operations on Frogmore, situate in the district of Mazowe.  The farm was not acquired by the State and a number of orders have been issued by the High Court confirming this. 

On 29 August 2009, the respondent came to the farm and demanded keys to the gate and to the house on the farm.  He showed Heinrich von Pezold, a copy of a letter purporting to be an instruction to the applicant to cease farming.  Pezold refused to give the respondent the keys and also refused to let him move onto the farm.  The respondent left the farm.  He however, left behind seven employees sitting under a tree on the farm.  At the time when the application was made the seven were still on the farm although they were not interfering with the applicant's farming activities.

The applicant contended that it had been in peaceful possession of the farm until the respondent left seven employees.  Mr. Shekede, for the applicant, submitted that the respondent left his personnel without an order of court or the applicant's consent.  It is on this basis that it sought a mandament van spolie.  

The respondent opposed the application.  Mr. Mlotshwa, for the respondent, raised a point in limine that the application was not urgent because the respondent's conduct did not amount to spoliation.  He submitted that the determination of the preliminary issue would entail determination of the merits of the application.  On that basis, I considered it expedient to deal with the merits.

In an application of this nature, the applicant must establish on a balance of probability that:

(a)                it was in peaceful possession of the property; and

(b)               the possession was unlawfully interrupted by the 2nd respondent

(See Botha & Anor v Barret 1996 (2) ZLR  73, van t'Hoff v van t'Hoff & Ors (1)1988 (1) ZLR 294 (HC), Chisveto v Minister of Local Government and Town Planning 1984 (1) ZLR 248 (H) and Karori (Pvt) Ltd & Anor v Brigadier Mujaji HH 23-07.)

            Mr. Mlotshwa conceded that the applicant was in peaceful possession of the property.  He conceded that the respondent had left seven employees on the farm.  He however, contended that this did not amount to unlawful deprivation of property.  He referred me to The Law of Property, Silberberg and Schoeman, 3rd Ed, (Silberberg) where it is observed at p146 that

 

 

“8.2 A mandament van spolie is aimed only at the recovery of lost possession and does not lie where there is mere disturbance of possession or a threat that possession will be disturbed.  In these latter circumstances the possessor may apply for a prohibitory interdict instead…”

 

            The only issue for determination is therefore whether or not the respondent's conduct amounted to deprivation of property. 

            It appears to me that occupation of the farm by the respondent goes beyond “a mere disturbance”.  Mr Mlotshwa did not substantiate why the respondent considered his conduct in issue as having been “a mere disturbance”.  The act of leaving behind seven employees coupled with the indications by respondent that he intended to take occupation of the homestead and the entire piece of land allocated to him amounts, in my view, to dispossession.  The applicant can no longer claim to be in control of that piece of land currently occupied by the respondent's employees.  Had the respondent left the farm with all his personnel, then one would have classified his visit to the farm as a mere disturbance as envisaged in Silberberg.

            It also appears that Mr Mlotshwa was selective in his reference to Silberberg.  At page 139-140 of Silberberg it is observed that:

 

“A possessor need not have been dispossessed of the whole thing before he is entitled to claim a spoliation order.  Even where he has been deprived of possession of only a part thereof, is he entitled to this relief.”

 

The same observations were made in Bennett Pringle (Pty) Ltd v Adelaide Municipality 1977 (1) SA 230 (E) where it was held that a disturbance of possession amounts to spoliation.  ADDLESON J observed, at p233, as follows:

 

The possession on which he relies need not be of the whole of the property and he need not have lost the whole of that property at the hands of the invader before he is entitled to claim a spoliation order. A disturbance of possession, without deprivation of the whole of it, is sufficient. See Van Rooyen en 'n Ander v Burger, 1960 (4) SA 356 (0) at pp. 362 - 3; confirmed on appeal in 1961 (1) SA 159 (O).” (See also The Civil Practice of the Magistrates Court in South Africa, Jones and Buckle 8th Ed at p98-99.

 

            The respondent did occupy part of the farm.  It appears from the above authorities that it is irrelevant that a small the part of the farm is occupied.  Any such occupation amounts to dispossession.  It is my view that the applicant has therefore established its entitlement to the relief sought.

 

In the result, it is ordered that:

 

1.                  A mandament van spolie be is hereby granted restoring the status quo ante which prevailed prior to 29 August 2009 and to the respondent's occupation of a certain piece of land, known as Frogmore and situate in the District of Mazowe and that such restoration be achieved by the eviction of the respondent and all persons holding occupation through him from the property in question.

 

2.         That respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay the costs of suit.

 

 

 

Wintertons, applicant's legal practitioners

Antonio, Mlotshwa & Co, respondent's legal practitioners
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