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HH94-09 - MATANDA (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs ONIAS GOTORE

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Procedural Law-viz contempt of court.
Procedural Law-viz service of court process re personal service proceedings iro contempt of court proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz service of process re Rule 42 of the High Court Rules.
Procedural Law-viz service of court process re proof of service iro the return of service.
Procedural Law-viz service of process re the return of service iro Form 5a.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re documentary evidence.
Procedural Law-viz the audi alteram partem rule.

Contempt of Court re: Defiance of Court Orders

On 3 October 2007, this court granted a provisional order in favour of the applicant. The litigants were not present but were represented by counsel.

On 23 November 2007, the applicant instituted the present proceedings for contempt of court.

The applicant avers that the respondent has defied the provisional order. He was legally represented when the order was granted. It is its belief that same was communicated to him or a copy of the order was sent to him.

The respondent admits that the order was granted in the presence of his legal practitioner. He, however, avers that his legal practitioner advised him that he would be served with the order.

Up to the time of filing his opposing papers he had not been served with the court order.

It was submitted, on behalf of the applicant, that the conduct of the respondent was intended to and indeed undermines the authority of this court. The court was urged to redeem its dignity, reputation, and authority by imposing an appropriate penalty on the respondent.

It was further submitted that if the court were to accept the respondent's defence, it should still find him to be in contempt of court. He has since been served with the order at the time that he was served with the present application. He has not purged his contempt.

Contempt of court is continuous until it is purged by compliance. The court should therefore find him to be in contempt of court based on this fact.

It was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that in order for the conduct of a party to constitute contempt of court, such conduct must be wilful or intended and calculated to impair the dignity or reputation of the court. The conduct complained of must be in violation of an obligation imposed on such person by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey a court order until its discharge. The respondent was not served with the order. His conduct cannot be said to be unlawful, intentional, and willful.

The provisional order had a provision to the effect that leave was granted to the Deputy Sheriff to serve the provisional order upon the respondent. It is clear from the applicant's papers that no such service took place.

In terms of Rule 42B(1)(a) where service has been effected by the Sheriff or his deputy, proof of service shall be by return of service in Form No.5A or by endorsement on the process concerned.

There is no such proof attached to the applicant's papers.

The applicant advances the argument that the respondent must have been aware of the terms of the provisional order as his legal practitioner was present when it was granted.

This argument cannot succeed. As I have already alluded to, the provisional order had to be served on the respondent.

It appears that cases whereby parties institute contempt of court proceedings, where the order in issue has not been served, are on the rise. There might be need to re-state the elementary requirement in relation to service of court orders.

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order being put in issue cannot be over emphasized. This point was made by C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition…, when he wrote:

“In all cases, it must be shown that the person against whom it is sought to apply the sanction of the law of contempt has sufficient notice of the terms of the judgment or order which it is alleged he has disobeyed.”

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order becomes clearer when one looks at the essential elements in contempt proceedings.

GILLESPIE J, in Scheelite King Mining Co. (Pvt) Ltd v Mahachi 1998 (1) ZLR 173 (H)…, had this to say:

“Before holding a person to have been in contempt of court, it is necessary to be satisfied both that the order was not complied with and that the non-compliance was willful on the party of the defaulting party.”

See also Lindsay v Lindsay 1995 (1) ZLR 296 (S)…,.

For one to establish wilfulness, he must establish that the defaulting party was fully aware of the terms of the court order and he chose not to comply with the order. As C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition, puts it…,:

“In so far as possible, that person should know, with precision, what it is he is required to do or to abstain from doing.”

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, in Minister of Lands & Ors v Commercial Farmers Union 2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S), made the same point and quoted from the same author…,:

“Before a finding of contempt can be made, it is necessary to determine whether there has been a factual breach of an order or understanding on the part of the body or person brought before the court. This necessarily demands that the terms of the order be expressed in clear unambiguous language, and, in so far as possible, the person should know, with complete precision, what it is he is required to do.”

This can be achieved if the defaulting party is served with the court order - unless if he was present when the order was pronounced.

In casu, the respondent was not present when the order was pronounced and was not served with the order as was ordered by the court.

The applicant has not, therefore, established wilfulness on the part of the respondent.

The applicant further contends that the respondent should be found to be in contempt of court as he has now been served with the provisional order and has not purged his contempt.

It is my view that, to date, the provisional order has not been served on the respondent.

What was served on the respondent was the court application in this matter to which the provisional order was attached as an annexure. That cannot constitute service of the order as is required by the provision of service in the order itself.

In any event, the facts establishing contempt after the alleged service have not been placed before me. The respondent has not been given an opportunity to comment. The applicant's argument in that regard can therefore not succeed.

Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1) The application is dismissed.

(2) The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs.

Proof of Service, Return of Service, Address and Manner of Service re: Personal Service Proceedings

On 3 October 2007, this court granted a provisional order in favour of the applicant. The litigants were not present but were represented by counsel.

On 23 November 2007, the applicant instituted the present proceedings for contempt of court.

The applicant avers that the respondent has defied the provisional order. He was legally represented when the order was granted. It is its belief that same was communicated to him or a copy of the order was sent to him.

The respondent admits that the order was granted in the presence of his legal practitioner. He, however, avers that his legal practitioner advised him that he would be served with the order.

Up to the time of filing his opposing papers he had not been served with the court order.

It was submitted, on behalf of the applicant, that the conduct of the respondent was intended to and indeed undermines the authority of this court. The court was urged to redeem its dignity, reputation, and authority by imposing an appropriate penalty on the respondent.

It was further submitted that if the court were to accept the respondent's defence, it should still find him to be in contempt of court. He has since been served with the order at the time that he was served with the present application. He has not purged his contempt.

Contempt of court is continuous until it is purged by compliance. The court should therefore find him to be in contempt of court based on this fact.

It was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that in order for the conduct of a party to constitute contempt of court, such conduct must be wilful or intended and calculated to impair the dignity or reputation of the court. The conduct complained of must be in violation of an obligation imposed on such person by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey a court order until its discharge. The respondent was not served with the order. His conduct cannot be said to be unlawful, intentional, and willful.

The provisional order had a provision to the effect that leave was granted to the Deputy Sheriff to serve the provisional order upon the respondent. It is clear from the applicant's papers that no such service took place.

In terms of Rule 42B(1)(a) where service has been effected by the Sheriff or his deputy, proof of service shall be by return of service in Form No.5A or by endorsement on the process concerned.

There is no such proof attached to the applicant's papers.

The applicant advances the argument that the respondent must have been aware of the terms of the provisional order as his legal practitioner was present when it was granted.

This argument cannot succeed. As I have already alluded to, the provisional order had to be served on the respondent.

It appears that cases whereby parties institute contempt of court proceedings, where the order in issue has not been served, are on the rise. There might be need to re-state the elementary requirement in relation to service of court orders.

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order being put in issue cannot be over emphasized. This point was made by C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition…, when he wrote:

“In all cases, it must be shown that the person against whom it is sought to apply the sanction of the law of contempt has sufficient notice of the terms of the judgment or order which it is alleged he has disobeyed.”

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order becomes clearer when one looks at the essential elements in contempt proceedings.

GILLESPIE J, in Scheelite King Mining Co. (Pvt) Ltd v Mahachi 1998 (1) ZLR 173 (H)…, had this to say:

“Before holding a person to have been in contempt of court, it is necessary to be satisfied both that the order was not complied with and that the non-compliance was willful on the party of the defaulting party.”

See also Lindsay v Lindsay 1995 (1) ZLR 296 (S)…,.

For one to establish wilfulness, he must establish that the defaulting party was fully aware of the terms of the court order and he chose not to comply with the order. As C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition, puts it…,:

“In so far as possible, that person should know, with precision, what it is he is required to do or to abstain from doing.”

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, in Minister of Lands & Ors v Commercial Farmers Union 2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S), made the same point and quoted from the same author…,:

“Before a finding of contempt can be made, it is necessary to determine whether there has been a factual breach of an order or understanding on the part of the body or person brought before the court. This necessarily demands that the terms of the order be expressed in clear unambiguous language, and, in so far as possible, the person should know, with complete precision, what it is he is required to do.”

This can be achieved if the defaulting party is served with the court order - unless if he was present when the order was pronounced.

In casu, the respondent was not present when the order was pronounced and was not served with the order as was ordered by the court.

The applicant has not, therefore, established wilfulness on the part of the respondent.

The applicant further contends that the respondent should be found to be in contempt of court as he has now been served with the provisional order and has not purged his contempt.

It is my view that, to date, the provisional order has not been served on the respondent.

What was served on the respondent was the court application in this matter to which the provisional order was attached as an annexure. That cannot constitute service of the order as is required by the provision of service in the order itself.

In any event, the facts establishing contempt after the alleged service have not been placed before me. The respondent has not been given an opportunity to comment. The applicant's argument in that regard can therefore not succeed.

Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1) The application is dismissed.

(2) The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs.

Proof of Service, Return of Service, Address and Manner of Service re: Approach

On 3 October 2007, this court granted a provisional order in favour of the applicant. The litigants were not present but were represented by counsel.

On 23 November 2007, the applicant instituted the present proceedings for contempt of court.

The applicant avers that the respondent has defied the provisional order. He was legally represented when the order was granted. It is its belief that same was communicated to him or a copy of the order was sent to him.

The respondent admits that the order was granted in the presence of his legal practitioner. He, however, avers that his legal practitioner advised him that he would be served with the order.

Up to the time of filing his opposing papers he had not been served with the court order.

It was submitted, on behalf of the applicant, that the conduct of the respondent was intended to and indeed undermines the authority of this court. The court was urged to redeem its dignity, reputation, and authority by imposing an appropriate penalty on the respondent.

It was further submitted that if the court were to accept the respondent's defence, it should still find him to be in contempt of court. He has since been served with the order at the time that he was served with the present application. He has not purged his contempt.

Contempt of court is continuous until it is purged by compliance. The court should therefore find him to be in contempt of court based on this fact.

It was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that in order for the conduct of a party to constitute contempt of court, such conduct must be wilful or intended and calculated to impair the dignity or reputation of the court. The conduct complained of must be in violation of an obligation imposed on such person by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey a court order until its discharge. The respondent was not served with the order. His conduct cannot be said to be unlawful, intentional, and willful.

The provisional order had a provision to the effect that leave was granted to the Deputy Sheriff to serve the provisional order upon the respondent. It is clear from the applicant's papers that no such service took place.

In terms of Rule 42B(1)(a) where service has been effected by the Sheriff or his deputy, proof of service shall be by return of service in Form No.5A or by endorsement on the process concerned.

There is no such proof attached to the applicant's papers.

The applicant advances the argument that the respondent must have been aware of the terms of the provisional order as his legal practitioner was present when it was granted.

This argument cannot succeed. As I have already alluded to, the provisional order had to be served on the respondent.

It appears that cases whereby parties institute contempt of court proceedings, where the order in issue has not been served, are on the rise. There might be need to re-state the elementary requirement in relation to service of court orders.

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order being put in issue cannot be over emphasized. This point was made by C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition…, when he wrote:

“In all cases, it must be shown that the person against whom it is sought to apply the sanction of the law of contempt has sufficient notice of the terms of the judgment or order which it is alleged he has disobeyed.”

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order becomes clearer when one looks at the essential elements in contempt proceedings.

GILLESPIE J, in Scheelite King Mining Co. (Pvt) Ltd v Mahachi 1998 (1) ZLR 173 (H)…, had this to say:

“Before holding a person to have been in contempt of court, it is necessary to be satisfied both that the order was not complied with and that the non-compliance was willful on the party of the defaulting party.”

See also Lindsay v Lindsay 1995 (1) ZLR 296 (S)…,.

For one to establish wilfulness, he must establish that the defaulting party was fully aware of the terms of the court order and he chose not to comply with the order. As C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition, puts it…,:

“In so far as possible, that person should know, with precision, what it is he is required to do or to abstain from doing.”

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, in Minister of Lands & Ors v Commercial Farmers Union 2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S), made the same point and quoted from the same author…,:

“Before a finding of contempt can be made, it is necessary to determine whether there has been a factual breach of an order or understanding on the part of the body or person brought before the court. This necessarily demands that the terms of the order be expressed in clear unambiguous language, and, in so far as possible, the person should know, with complete precision, what it is he is required to do.”

This can be achieved if the defaulting party is served with the court order - unless if he was present when the order was pronounced.

In casu, the respondent was not present when the order was pronounced and was not served with the order as was ordered by the court.

The applicant has not, therefore, established wilfulness on the part of the respondent.

The applicant further contends that the respondent should be found to be in contempt of court as he has now been served with the provisional order and has not purged his contempt.

It is my view that, to date, the provisional order has not been served on the respondent.

What was served on the respondent was the court application in this matter to which the provisional order was attached as an annexure. That cannot constitute service of the order as is required by the provision of service in the order itself.

In any event, the facts establishing contempt after the alleged service have not been placed before me. The respondent has not been given an opportunity to comment. The applicant's argument in that regard can therefore not succeed.

Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1) The application is dismissed.

(2) The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs.

Audi Alteram Partem Rule re: Approach, Orders Granted Without a Hearing and the Doctrine of Notice

On 3 October 2007, this court granted a provisional order in favour of the applicant. The litigants were not present but were represented by counsel.

On 23 November 2007, the applicant instituted the present proceedings for contempt of court.

The applicant avers that the respondent has defied the provisional order. He was legally represented when the order was granted. It is its belief that same was communicated to him or a copy of the order was sent to him.

The respondent admits that the order was granted in the presence of his legal practitioner. He, however, avers that his legal practitioner advised him that he would be served with the order.

Up to the time of filing his opposing papers he had not been served with the court order.

It was submitted, on behalf of the applicant, that the conduct of the respondent was intended to and indeed undermines the authority of this court. The court was urged to redeem its dignity, reputation, and authority by imposing an appropriate penalty on the respondent.

It was further submitted that if the court were to accept the respondent's defence, it should still find him to be in contempt of court. He has since been served with the order at the time that he was served with the present application. He has not purged his contempt.

Contempt of court is continuous until it is purged by compliance. The court should therefore find him to be in contempt of court based on this fact.

It was submitted, on behalf of the respondent, that in order for the conduct of a party to constitute contempt of court, such conduct must be wilful or intended and calculated to impair the dignity or reputation of the court. The conduct complained of must be in violation of an obligation imposed on such person by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey a court order until its discharge. The respondent was not served with the order. His conduct cannot be said to be unlawful, intentional, and willful.

The provisional order had a provision to the effect that leave was granted to the Deputy Sheriff to serve the provisional order upon the respondent. It is clear from the applicant's papers that no such service took place.

In terms of Rule 42B(1)(a) where service has been effected by the Sheriff or his deputy, proof of service shall be by return of service in Form No.5A or by endorsement on the process concerned.

There is no such proof attached to the applicant's papers.

The applicant advances the argument that the respondent must have been aware of the terms of the provisional order as his legal practitioner was present when it was granted.

This argument cannot succeed. As I have already alluded to, the provisional order had to be served on the respondent.

It appears that cases whereby parties institute contempt of court proceedings, where the order in issue has not been served, are on the rise. There might be need to re-state the elementary requirement in relation to service of court orders.

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order being put in issue cannot be over emphasized. This point was made by C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition…, when he wrote:

“In all cases, it must be shown that the person against whom it is sought to apply the sanction of the law of contempt has sufficient notice of the terms of the judgment or order which it is alleged he has disobeyed.”

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order becomes clearer when one looks at the essential elements in contempt proceedings.

GILLESPIE J, in Scheelite King Mining Co. (Pvt) Ltd v Mahachi 1998 (1) ZLR 173 (H)…, had this to say:

“Before holding a person to have been in contempt of court, it is necessary to be satisfied both that the order was not complied with and that the non-compliance was willful on the party of the defaulting party.”

See also Lindsay v Lindsay 1995 (1) ZLR 296 (S)…,.

For one to establish wilfulness, he must establish that the defaulting party was fully aware of the terms of the court order and he chose not to comply with the order. As C J MILLER in his book Contempt of Court, 2nd edition, puts it…,:

“In so far as possible, that person should know, with precision, what it is he is required to do or to abstain from doing.”

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, in Minister of Lands & Ors v Commercial Farmers Union 2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S), made the same point and quoted from the same author…,:

“Before a finding of contempt can be made, it is necessary to determine whether there has been a factual breach of an order or understanding on the part of the body or person brought before the court. This necessarily demands that the terms of the order be expressed in clear unambiguous language, and, in so far as possible, the person should know, with complete precision, what it is he is required to do.”

This can be achieved if the defaulting party is served with the court order - unless if he was present when the order was pronounced.

In casu, the respondent was not present when the order was pronounced and was not served with the order as was ordered by the court.

The applicant has not, therefore, established wilfulness on the part of the respondent.

The applicant further contends that the respondent should be found to be in contempt of court as he has now been served with the provisional order and has not purged his contempt.

It is my view that, to date, the provisional order has not been served on the respondent.

What was served on the respondent was the court application in this matter to which the provisional order was attached as an annexure. That cannot constitute service of the order as is required by the provision of service in the order itself.

In any event, the facts establishing contempt after the alleged service have not been placed before me. The respondent has not been given an opportunity to comment. The applicant's argument in that regard can therefore not succeed.

Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1) The application is dismissed.

(2) The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs.


MAKONI J: On 3 October 2007, this court granted a provisional order in favour of the applicant. The litigants were not present but were represented by counsel.

On 23 November 2007, the applicant instituted the present proceedings for contempt of court.

The applicant avers that the respondent has defied the provisional order. He was legally represented when the order was granted. It is its belief that same was communicated to him or a copy of the order was sent to him.

The respondent admits that the order was granted in the presence of his legal practitioner. He, however, avers that his legal practitioner advised him that he would be served with the order. Up to the time of filing his opposing papers he had not been served with the court order.

It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the conduct of the respondent was intended to and indeed undermines the authority of this court. The court was urged to redeem its dignity, reputation and authority by imposing an appropriate penalty on the respondent.

It was further submitted that if the court were to accept the respondent's defence, it should still find him to be in contempt of court. He has since been served with the order at the time that he was served with the present application. He has not purged his contempt.

Contempt of court continuous until it is purged by compliance. The court should therefore find him to be in contempt of court based on this fact.

It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that in order for the conduct of a party to constitute contempt of court, such conduct must be willful or intended and calculated to impair the dignity or reputation of the court. The conduct complained of must be in violation of an obligation imposed on such person by a court of competent jurisdiction to obey a court order until its discharge. The respondent was not served with the order. His conduct cannot be said to be unlawful, intentional and willful.

The provisional order had a provision to the effect that leave was granted to the Deputy Sheriff to serve the provisional order upon the respondent. It is clear from the applicant's papers that no such service took place.

In terms of Rule 42B(1)(a) where service has been effected by the sheriff or his deputy, proof of service shall be by return of service in Form No.5A or by endorsement on the process concerned.

There is no such proof attached to the applicant's papers.

The applicant advances the argument that the respondent must have been aware of the terms of the provisional order as his legal practitioner was present when it was granted.

This argument cannot succeed. As I have already alluded to, the provisional order had to be served on the respondent.

It appears that cases whereby parties institute contempt of court proceedings where the order in issue has not been served are on the rise. There might be need to re-state the elementary requirement in relation to service of court orders.

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order being put in issue cannot be over emphasized. This point was made by C J Miller in his book Contempt of Court 2nd edition p423 when he wrote:

“In all cases it must be shown that the person against whom it is sought to apply the sanction of the law of contempt has sufficient notice of the terms of the judgment or order which it is alleged he has disobeyed”.

The need for sufficient notice of the terms of the order becomes clearer when one looks at the essential elements in contempt proceedings.

GILLESPIE J in Scheelite King Mining Co (Pvt) Ltd v Mahachi 1998 (1) ZLR 173 H at 177 H and 178 A had this to say:

“Before holding a person to have been in contempt of court, it is necessary to be satisfied both that the order was not complied with and that the non-compliance was willful on the party of the defaulting party.”

See also Lindsay v Lindsay 1995 (1) ZLR 296 S at 299 B.

For one to establish willfulness, he must establish that the defaulting party was fully aware of the terms of the court order and he chose not to comply with the order. As C J Miller supra puts it at p 424:

“In so far as possible that person should know with precision what it is he is required to do or to abstain from doing”.

CHIDYAUSIKU CJ in Minister of Lands & Ors v Commercial Farmers Union 2001 (2) ZLR 457 (S) made the same point and quoted from the same author at p 453 to 424:

“Before a finding of contempt can be made, it is necessary to determine whether there has been a factual breach of an order or understanding on the part of the body or person brought before the court. This necessarily demands that the terms of the order be expressed in clear unambiguous language and, in so far as possible, the person should know with complete precision what it is he is required to do”.

This can be achieved if the de-faulting party is served with the court order unless if he was present when the order was pronounced.

In casu the respondent was not present when the order was pronounced and was not served with the order as was ordered by the court.

The applicant has not therefore established willfulness on the part of the respondent.

The applicant further contends that the respondent should be found to be in contempt of court as he has now been served with the provisional order and has not purged his contempt.

It is my view that to date the provisional order has not been served on the respondent.

What was served on the respondent was the court application in this matter to which the provisional order was attached as an annexure. That cannot constitute service of the order as is required by the provision of service in the order itself.

In any event the facts establishing contempt after the alleged service have not been placed before me. The respondent has not been given an opportunity to comment. The applicant's argument in that regard can therefore not succeed.

Accordingly, I make the following order:

(1) The application is dismissed.

(2) The applicant is to pay the respondent's costs.





Mhiribidi Ngarava & Moyo, applicant's legal practitioners

C Mpame & Associates, respondent's legal practitioners

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