1.
BERE
J:
The facts which are fairly straightforward and common cause in this
matter can safely be summarised as follows:
2.
The applicant is a company duly registered and incorporated in terms
of the laws of Zimbabwe. The respondent is a registered commercial
bank with a number of branches in Zimbabwe.
3.
The applicant runs two distinct corporate bank accounts with the
respondent's Kwekwe branch. As of October 2007 the applicant's
two
accounts had an aggregate credit balance of forty seven thousand
seven hundred and thirty nine dollars and eighty six cents
(US$47,739-86).
4.
The applicant's accepted position is that it is a foreign investor
company which is legally in Zimbabwe carrying out a specific purpose,
viz
the refurbishment of the blast furnaces of a Zimbabwean Company
called Zisco Steel. The applicant maintained it was not involved in
any “foreign exchange” activities.
5.
In October 2007 the respondent's
two
corporate accounts were debited with an aggregate amount of forty
seven thousand seven hundred and thirty nine dollars and eighty six
cents (US$47,739-86) without its consent and approval.
6.
The applicant engaged the respondent with a view to recovering its
money to no avail hence the instant application.
The
Respondent's Position
7.
The respondent has offered a two-pronged defence to the application
filed by the applicant for the recovery of its money.
8.
Firstly, the respondent has contended as a point in limine
that it is improper for the applicant to file a Court Application to
recover a debt that is due to it. The correct position is that the
applicant ought to have instituted proceedings by way of summons, so
the argument went.
9.
The second point raised in
limine
is
that the applicant has targeted the wrong respondent. It was
contended on behalf of the respondent that since the funds in issue
are held by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, it is against the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe that this application should have been directed.
10.
Intricably linked to the second point in
limine
is the argument that by debiting the applicant's corporate foreign
currency account the respondent was merely complying with a directive
issued by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to so act.
11.
In elaboration, the respondent's position is that in October 2007
the respondent together with all other Commercial Banks in Zimbabwe
were directed by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe to lodge all foreign
currency accounts balances in respect of corporate and
non-governmental organization accounts with the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe and to maintain mirror accounts in its own books for
purposes of keeping track with these accounts.
12.
I propose to deal with the issues raised by the respondent
seriatim.
POINTS
IN LIMINE
13.
Was
it competent for the applicant to institute proceedings by way of
motion proceedings as opposed to issuing out summons?
14.
It is not a rule of thumb that proceedings to recover a debt due must
be instituted by way of summons as opposed to motion proceedings. It
is clear to me that what determines the nature of the proceedings to
initiate is whether or not there are material disputes of facts in
the action contemplated.
15.
Where the action contemplated is likely to have material disputes of
facts, motion proceedings would be incompetent. Institution of
proceedings would have to be by way of summons.
16.
With respect, it is not the correct position of law that a creditor
in a proper case for a claim sounding in money owing to him cannot
initiate its recovery by way of notice of motion as argued by the
respondent's counsel in the instant case.
17.
DE VILLIERS J summed up the correct legal position in Regal
Trading Co. (Pvt) Ltd v Coetzee
after
carrying out a survey of a number of South African decisions when he
stated as follows:
“I
have come to the conclusion that legally it is not incompetent for a
creditor in a proper case to claim money owing to him by way of
notice of motion, provided at least that the facts are not in
dispute. This does not, however, refer to unliquidated claims for
damages. The court has a discretion whether it will allow a creditor
to depart from the more usual procedure of rauw actie, and that
discretion will depend upon all the circumstances of the case. …”
18.
It is correct that application procedure is inappropriate where
disputes of facts exist. Where a party alleges the existence of
dispute of facts, one is expected to clearly spell out the basis of
such dispute as it must be distinct from an “illusory
dispute of fact”:
see Zimbabwe Bonded Fireglass (Pvt) Ltd v Peech 1987
(2) ZLR 338 (SC)
at p339.
That
explanation must be rooted in the respondent's opposing papers as
opposed to giving them a magnified stature in the heads of argument
like what seems to have happened in this case.
19.
I am unable to locate any dispute of facts in this matter except that
the parties are unable to agree on the legal implications of the
directive given to the respondent. That is certainly not a dispute of
facts but a legal issue that must be determined on the papers.
Did
the Applicant Target the Wrong Respondent?
20.
The agreed facts are fairly simple and straightforward in this
matter. The respondent as a commercial banker undertook to keep the
applicant's money and pay it out to the applicant upon demand. The
respondent failed to do so when called upon to do so by the
applicant. The respondent claimed it had transferred the money into
another third party's account. There was no privy of contract
between that other third party and the applicant. The easy to see
party and with whom the applicant had entered into a contractual
arrangement was none other than the respondent.
21.
I do not see how the applicant would have initiated any action
against the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe which for all intents and
purposes is a stranger to the applicant for purposes of the deposit
in issue.
22.
I was not persuaded at all by the points in limine
and it was for the above reasons that I had no hesitation at the
hearing in ordering that the matter be heard on merits.
On
Merits
23.
The main thrust of the respondent's position is that it debited the
applicant's account pursuant to a directive given by the Reserve
Bank of Zimbabwe and reference was made to the Exchange Control
Regulations of 1996 as the authority behind this directive and
section
35
up to section
40
contained in SI109/1996 were relied upon as the specific sections
which the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe relied upon in literally ordering
the expropriation of the applicant's deposits.
24.
It will be noted that the legislature in its wisdom qualified the
operations of the exchange control regulations by making a specific
provision of section
40(3)
thereof which read as follows:
“40(3)
Orders made under subsection 1 shall not have effect until they have
been approved by the Minister and published in the Gazette.”
25.
It appears to me such checks and balances were meant to guard against
improper use of the exchange control regulations and it follows that
non-compliance with this mandatory requirement would render any
directive unlawful.
26.
It has not been demonstrated to me by the respondent's counsel that
the directive by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was lawful or above
board.
27.
It occurs to me that given the special relationship that existed
between the respondent and the applicant, the decision by the former
to interfere with the applicant's deposits was not one that could
have been taken lightly. In my view the onus was on the respondent to
ascertain the lawfulness of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe's
directive instead of blindly or religiously following same. The
respondent could have satisfied itself by simply relying on its
compliance division within its institution or by simply seeking
counsel's views before taking such a drastic action with the
applicant's deposits.
28.
Advocate Nyakabawo
who
appeared for the respondent put up a spirited and persuasive argument
in support of what she referred to as the predicament faced by the
respondent pursuant to a directive given to it by the Reserve Bank of
Zimbabwe which required all authorised dealers (respondent inclusive)
to transfer to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe all corporate foreign
currency account balances and to maintain a mirror account for
tracking purposes.
29.
In support of her position counsel relied on the views of MW Jones
and HC Schoeman who described the relationship between a banker and a
customer in the following terms:
“….
the banker customer relationship is not based solely on contract but
imposes many additional duties on banks and customers alike. These
duties are established by banking practice and custom, legislation
and court decisions. The relationship between a bank and its customer
can thus be described as a contract sui generis, or a unique type of
contract”.
30.
Building on the views of the two authors, the respondent's counsel
argued that the directive given by the Reserve Bank was decisive at
the material time as the respondent could not have risked losing its
banking licence by refusing to comply with the directive in question.
31.
With respect, I am unable to agree with the simplistic interpretation
of the relationship between the bank (the respondent) and the
customer (the applicant in the instant matter) by counsel. That
interpretation is too narrow and dangerous. It is dangerous and risky
in the banking business because it turns to depart from the
legitimate expectations of the two contractual parties when they
entered into a contract, a unique type of contract.
32.
I take a very strong view that the respondent had a natural
obligation thrust upon it to protect the applicant's deposits. As
already highlighted elsewhere in this judgment, that duty entailed
inter
alia
verifying the legality or otherwise of the directive given by the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe because the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was not
privy to the contractual relationship between the applicant and the
respondent.
33.
I am extremely impressed by the view taken by their Lordships in the
case of Attorney
General for Canada v Attorney General for the Province of Quebec and
Ors
when they described the relationship between the bankers and customer
in the following terms:
“Their
Lordships cannot but think that the receipt of deposits and the
repayment of the sums deposited to the depositors or their successors
as defined is an essential part of the business of banking. The
relationship between bankers and customer who pays money into the
bank is stated in Foley v Hill (1) as 'the ordinary relation of
debtor and creditor, with a super added obligation arising out of the
custom of bankers to 'honour the customer's drafts'. No
question of possession of or property in the deposit arises. The
obligation is mutuum not commodatum. Once a deposit is made there
remains only a debt due from the banker to the customer.”
34.
It is clear to me, and it must be the most logical conclusion that
once money is placed in the custody of a banker, that banker must be
held accountable to the depositor of that money. The banker must be
able to repay the depositor upon demand. It is as simple as it comes.
It requires no complicated interpretation. It therefore naturally
follows that the respondent must account to the applicant of the
deposits made to it by the applicant. To hold otherwise would be to
create chaos in the banking sector. It would be to allow banks like
the respondent to ride roughshod on innocent and unsuspecting
customers like the applicant and would in addition severely undermine
the assumed integrity of the banking sector.
35.
The penalty which the respondent feared would have visited it if it
had not blindly followed the directive was specifically provided for.
In terms of section
37
the Exchange Control Regulations the respondent as an authorised
dealer was to be given an adequate opportunity to make
representations if it felt it had an obligation to protect the
deposits made by the applicant. Not only that but the Regulations
further provided for the process of appeal by the respondent against
any decision by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
36.
It occurs to me that what the respondent did in this case was to
blindly expropriate the applicant's deposits without due regard to
the law and this was obviously ultra vires even the constitution of
this country.
37.
In conclusion, I find that it is inevitably befitting that the
respondent should be ordered to reimburse the monies due to the
applicant without putting the applicant into further unnecessary cost
of insisting that it joins the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in these
proceedings for the simple reason that there was never any privy of
contract between the applicant and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe.
38.
It is up to the respondent to take appropriate action against the
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe if it so desires.
Costs
39.
It was ironic that despite what appears to be reckless execution of
its mandate by the respondent in transferring the applicant's
deposits to a third party's account without the consent and/or
approval of the applicant, the respondent had the audacity to ask for
costs on attorney-client scale against the applicant as its counsel
argued for the dismissal of the claim.
40.
I am convinced that the inverse must in fact be true. The respondent
has been stubborn in refusing to accede to the applicant's claim.
The respondent took an extremely dangerous or casual approach in
paying out the applicant's deposits to a third party without the
approval and/or consent of the latter let alone before attempting to
verify the lawfulness or otherwise of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
directive.
41.
I believe the conduct exhibited by the respondent is deplorable and
must be punished by an appropriate order for costs.
Accordingly
I grant the following order:
1.
That the respondent pays to the applicant US$38,843-88 and
US$8,895-98 being monies unlawfully debited from the applicant's
accounts, namely, Account number 8740064001800 and 8740064001801
respectively totalling to US$47,739-86 (forty seven thousand seven
hundred and thirty nine dollars and eighty six cents) within seven
(7) days of this order.
2.
The respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay interest at the
prescribed rate from the date of this application to date of full
payment.
3.
The respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay costs of suit at a
higher scale.
Masawi
& Partners, applicant's legal practitioners
Gill,
Godlonton & Gerrans, respondent's legal practitioners