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HH221-11 - PARTSON ZVANDASARA vs DR M. MAKONESE N.O. (as Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the 2nd respondent) and BELVEDERE NURSING HOME (PVT) LTD

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Procedural Law-viz citation re party acting in an official capacity iro nominus officiae.
Procedural Law-viz citation re party acting in an official capacity iro nominee officii.
Procedural Law-viz citation re party acting in an official capacity iro non-officio.
Procedural Law-viz citation re party acting in an official capacity iro nomine officio.
Company Law-viz proceedings against an incorporated entity re citation of company executives.
Labour Law-viz employment contract re termination iro resignation.
Law of Contract-viz verbal contract.
Law of Contract-viz oral agreement.
Law of Contract-viz undocumented transactions.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re documentary evidence iro the best evidence rule.
Law of Property-viz spoliation order.
Law of Property-viz mandament van spolie.
Labour Law-viz contract of employment re termination iro possession of company property.
Procedural Law-viz declaratory order.
Procedural Law-viz declaratur.
Procedural Law-viz urgent chamber application re spoliation proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz urgent application re mandament van spolie proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz urgent chamber application re provisional order iro interim interdict pendente lite.
Procedural Law-viz urgent application re interim interdict iro provisional order pendente lite.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re statutory jurisdictional ousting iro section 89 of the Labour Act.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re labour proceedings iro section 89 of the Labour Act.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re cause of action jurisdiction.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re specialised courts iro section 89 of the Labour Act.
Procedural Law-viz cause of action re the doctrine against benefiting from one's own wrongdoing.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re admissions iro unchalllenged statements.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re admissions iro undisputed averments.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re admissions iro uncontroverted submissions.
Procedural Law-viz the dirty hands principle.

Jurisdiction re: Approach, Concurrent Jurisdiction, Statutory, Procedural and Contractual Jurisdictional Ousting


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact it, was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by counsel for the respondents, viz, that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue; suffice it to say, that, that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and, if it does, then, subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction re: Labour Proceedings


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact it, was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by counsel for the respondents, viz, that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue; suffice it to say, that, that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and, if it does, then, subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction re: Monetary, Cause of Action and Domestic Territorial Jurisdiction


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact it, was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by counsel for the respondents, viz, that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue; suffice it to say, that, that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and, if it does, then, subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction re: Judicial Deference iro Specialised Courts and Tribunals


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact it, was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by counsel for the respondents, viz, that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue; suffice it to say, that, that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and, if it does, then, subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Spoliation or Mandament van Spolie re: Approach, Claim of Abandonment and Freedom from Arbitrary Eviction


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact, it was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions....,.

Regarding the second point in limine, I am constrained to uphold it. The reason, therefore, is simple and straightforward.

The applicant alleges he was despoiled of the office as well as his personal belongings lodged therein which he uses for his private life and business. The respondents have offered that the applicant is at liberty, at his earliest convenience, to come and collect his personal items.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of that offer.

However, as regards the office, that is a different kettle of fish.

While the applicant alleges spoliation, the respondents papers clearly show that it is him who is the spoliator.

He had been away for some 8 months and Saungweme was in lawful /and undisturbed possession of that office. He was denied occupation of the office, but, he locked it to the exclusion of everyone - except himself.

This, despite the exitant dispute between the parties, amounts, on the applicant's part, to self-help.

I did not hear the applicant to dispute the respondents version, either on paper or in oral submissions, of how he ended up re-occupying the office. He therefore did not come to Court with clean hands.

He is the spoliator.

To allow him audience would be tantamount to sanctioning unlawfulness.

On the basis of the second preliminary point raised by the respondents, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.

Cause of Action and Framing of Draft Orders re: Doctrine Against Benefitting from One's Own Wrongdoing


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact, it was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions....,.

Regarding the second point in limine, I am constrained to uphold it. The reason, therefore, is simple and straightforward.

The applicant alleges he was despoiled of the office as well as his personal belongings lodged therein which he uses for his private life and business. The respondents have offered that the applicant is at liberty, at his earliest convenience, to come and collect his personal items.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of that offer.

However, as regards the office, that is a different kettle of fish.

While the applicant alleges spoliation, the respondents papers clearly show that it is him who is the spoliator.

He had been away for some 8 months and Saungweme was in lawful /and undisturbed possession of that office. He was denied occupation of the office, but, he locked it to the exclusion of everyone - except himself.

This, despite the exitant dispute between the parties, amounts, on the applicant's part, to self-help.

I did not hear the applicant to dispute the respondents version, either on paper or in oral submissions, of how he ended up re-occupying the office. He therefore did not come to Court with clean hands.

He is the spoliator.

To allow him audience would be tantamount to sanctioning unlawfulness.

On the basis of the second preliminary point raised by the respondents, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.

Dirty Hands Principle and the Doctrine of Obedience of the Law Until its Lawful Invalidation or Repeal re: Approach


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact, it was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions....,.

Regarding the second point in limine, I am constrained to uphold it. The reason, therefore, is simple and straightforward.

The applicant alleges he was despoiled of the office as well as his personal belongings lodged therein which he uses for his private life and business. The respondents have offered that the applicant is at liberty, at his earliest convenience, to come and collect his personal items.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of that offer.

However, as regards the office, that is a different kettle of fish.

While the applicant alleges spoliation, the respondents papers clearly show that it is him who is the spoliator.

He had been away for some 8 months and Saungweme was in lawful /and undisturbed possession of that office. He was denied occupation of the office, but, he locked it to the exclusion of everyone - except himself.

This, despite the exitant dispute between the parties, amounts, on the applicant's part, to self-help.

I did not hear the applicant to dispute the respondents version, either on paper or in oral submissions, of how he ended up re-occupying the office. He therefore did not come to Court with clean hands.

He is the spoliator.

To allow him audience would be tantamount to sanctioning unlawfulness.

On the basis of the second preliminary point raised by the respondents, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Approach


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact, it was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by counsel for the respondents, viz, that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue; suffice it to say, that, that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and, if it does, then, subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Regarding the second point in limine, I am constrained to uphold it. The reason, therefore, is simple and straightforward.

The applicant alleges he was despoiled of the office as well as his personal belongings lodged therein which he uses for his private life and business. The respondents have offered that the applicant is at liberty, at his earliest convenience, to come and collect his personal items.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of that offer.

However, as regards the office, that is a different kettle of fish.

While the applicant alleges spoliation, the respondents papers clearly show that it is him who is the spoliator.

He had been away for some 8 months and Saungweme was in lawful /and undisturbed possession of that office. He was denied occupation of the office, but, he locked it to the exclusion of everyone - except himself.

This, despite the exitant dispute between the parties, amounts, on the applicant's part, to self-help.

I did not hear the applicant to dispute the respondents version, either on paper or in oral submissions, of how he ended up re-occupying the office. He therefore did not come to Court with clean hands.

He is the spoliator.

To allow him audience would be tantamount to sanctioning unlawfulness.

On the basis of the second preliminary point raised by the respondents, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.

Interim Interdict Pendente Confirmation or Discharge Proceedings re: Approach, Return Date and the Prima Facie Concept


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact, it was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by counsel for the respondents, viz, that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue; suffice it to say, that, that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and, if it does, then, subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Regarding the second point in limine, I am constrained to uphold it. The reason, therefore, is simple and straightforward.

The applicant alleges he was despoiled of the office as well as his personal belongings lodged therein which he uses for his private life and business. The respondents have offered that the applicant is at liberty, at his earliest convenience, to come and collect his personal items.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of that offer.

However, as regards the office, that is a different kettle of fish.

While the applicant alleges spoliation, the respondents papers clearly show that it is him who is the spoliator.

He had been away for some 8 months and Saungweme was in lawful /and undisturbed possession of that office. He was denied occupation of the office, but, he locked it to the exclusion of everyone - except himself.

This, despite the exitant dispute between the parties, amounts, on the applicant's part, to self-help.

I did not hear the applicant to dispute the respondents version, either on paper or in oral submissions, of how he ended up re-occupying the office. He therefore did not come to Court with clean hands.

He is the spoliator.

To allow him audience would be tantamount to sanctioning unlawfulness.

On the basis of the second preliminary point raised by the respondents, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Labour Proceedings


The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of Employment Law.

The bare bones are that the applicant, who is the largest shareholder in the second respondent, with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by the second respondent as the Managing Director - (this in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties; the respondents aver that the applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May 2010, chaired by the applicant, at which he introduced Doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new Managing Director, while the applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some Managing Director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fundraising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When the applicant went away, he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as Managing Director.

In about March 2011, the applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his Managing Director's post; forced himself into the office, and locked it off from everyone except himself, thereby despoiling the incumbent Managing Director, and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed, prompting the first respondent to issue a memo, on 20 September 2011, to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding the applicant's status vis-a-vis the Managing Director post of the second respondent.

This did not help matters, and, on 24 September 2011, the respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the Managing Director's office thereby denying the applicant access to that office.

On 26 September 2011, the applicant issued summons against the second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming, inter alia, $50,000 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September 2011, the applicant filed a court application against both respondents, in case number HC9592/11, seeking, inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful Managing Director of the second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September 2011, the applicant then lodged this application, via the Chamber Book, for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That, the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That, pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11, the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office, situated at second respondent's premises, is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter, the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff, or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police, is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing, counsel for the respondents raised two main preliminary issues. They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue, and, as such, it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy, but, in casu, there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation, in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit, that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact, it was the current Managing Director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by counsel for the respondents, viz, that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue; suffice it to say, that, that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act, and, if it does, then, subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Regarding the second point in limine, I am constrained to uphold it. The reason, therefore, is simple and straightforward.

The applicant alleges he was despoiled of the office as well as his personal belongings lodged therein which he uses for his private life and business. The respondents have offered that the applicant is at liberty, at his earliest convenience, to come and collect his personal items.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of that offer.

However, as regards the office, that is a different kettle of fish.

While the applicant alleges spoliation, the respondents papers clearly show that it is him who is the spoliator.

He had been away for some 8 months and Saungweme was in lawful /and undisturbed possession of that office. He was denied occupation of the office, but, he locked it to the exclusion of everyone - except himself.

This, despite the exitant dispute between the parties, amounts, on the applicant's part, to self-help.

I did not hear the applicant to dispute the respondents version, either on paper or in oral submissions, of how he ended up re-occupying the office. He therefore did not come to Court with clean hands.

He is the spoliator.

To allow him audience would be tantamount to sanctioning unlawfulness.

On the basis of the second preliminary point raised by the respondents, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.

Urgent Chamber Application

MUTEMA J: The dispute between the parties is steeped in the realm of employment law.

The bare bones are that applicant who is the largest shareholder in second respondent with a 19.42% shareholding, used to be employed by second respondent as the managing director - (This in fact constitutes the main bone of contention between the parties – respondents aver that applicant verbally resigned the post in early 2010 as can be gleaned from minutes of a meeting held on 3 May, 2010 chaired by the applicant at which he introduced doctor Saungweme who took over from him as the new managing director, while applicant denies resigning averring that he only relinguished some managing director's duties to Saungweme while he was engaged in a fund raising mission aimed at expanding the hospital and Saungweme was merely chair warmer for him).

When applicant went away he vacated the office taking with him his personal belongings therefrom.

Saungweme occupied the office in his new capacity as managing director.

In about March, 2011 applicant returned to the institution claiming that he had come back to reclaim his managing director's post, forced himself into the office and locked it off from everyone except himself thereby despoiling the incumbent managing director and started issuing orders and instructions to staff and threatened to assault or injure anyone who tried to stop him or make him see reason.

All attempts to make him see sense failed prompting first respondent to issue a memo on 20 September 2011 to all stakeholders restating the correct position regarding applicant's status vis-a-vis the managing director post of second respondent.

This did not help matters and on 24 September 2011 respondents installed new locks and put bars to the entrance of the managing director's office thereby denying applicant access to that office.

On 26 September, 2011 applicant issued summons against second respondent in case number HC9444/11 claiming inter alia $50,000.00 which he claimed was owed to him.

On 29 September, 2011 applicant, filed a court application against both respondents in case number HC9592/11 seeking inter alia, a declaratory order that he is the lawful managing director of second respondent.

The two suites are being opposed.

On 30 September, 2011 applicant then lodged this application via the chamber book for a provisional order whose relief is couched in the following terms:

PROVISIONAL ORDER

(a) That the first respondent be and is hereby ordered to return possession of the applicant's office situated at the second respondent's premises.

(b) That pending the determination of the matter in case number HC9592/11 the first respondent is ordered to ensure that the possession by the applicant of his office situated at second respondent's premises is not violated.

(c) The respondents are to pay the costs of this application at an attorney–client scale wholly (sic) and severally the one paying to absolve the other.

INTERIM ORDER GRANTED

Pending the determination of this matter the first applicant (sic) is granted the following relief:

(a) The second respondent is ordered to restore applicant's possession of office situated at first respondent's premises (sic).

(b) Should the respondent not restore such possession within twenty–four hours of this order, the Deputy Sheriff or any attested member of the Zimbabwe Republic Police is hereby authorised to do all is necessary to ensure that such possession is restored.”

At the hearing Mr Chihambakwe raised two main preliminary issues, They are these:

1. The dispute is a labour issue and as such it should have been directed to its proper forum which is the Labour Court.

Section 89 of the Labour Act confers virtually as wide a jurisdiction as the High Court, so he submitted. It is one of the requirements for an interdict that there be no other satisfactory remedy but in casu there is a remedy in the Labour Court.

2. The applicant makes a serious allegation in paragraph 21 of his Founding Affidavit that he was in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the office prior to the actions of the first respondent and her subordinates.

There was no such peaceful and undisturbed possession enjoyed by the applicant.

In fact it was the current managing director who enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession prior to the applicant's actions.

I do not deem it fit to delve into the first point in limine that was raised by Mr Chihambakwe, viz that the dispute should have been referred to the Labour Court because it is a labour issue suffice it to say that that point would only be relevant either at confirmation or discharge of the provisional order or at the hearing of the application in case number HC9592/11.

It is then that the issue would fall for determination whether the matter is a labour dispute falling exclusively within the purview of section 89(1) of the Labour Act and if it does then subsection (6) would oust this Court's jurisdiction.

Regarding the second point in limine, I am constrained to uphold it. The reason therefore is simple and straightforward.

Applicant alleges was despoiled of the office as well as his personal belongings lodged therein which he uses for his private life and business. Respondents have offered that applicant is at liberty at his earliest convenience, to come and collect his personal items.

I have no reason to doubt the sincerity of that offer.

However, as regards the office that is a different kettle of fish.

While applicant alleges spoliation respondents papers clearly show that it is him who is the spoliator.

He had been away for some 8 months and Saungweme was in lawful /and undisturbed possession of that office. He was denied occupation of the office but he locked it to the exclusion of everyone except himself.

This, despite the exitant dispute between the parties, amounts, on the applicant's part, to self-help.

I did not hear applicant to dispute respondents version either on paper or in oral submissions, of how he ended up reoccupying the office. He therefore did not come to Court with clean hands.

He is the spoliator.

To allow him audience would be tantamount to sanctioning unlawfulness.

On the basis of the second preliminary point raised by the respondents, the application is hereby dismissed with costs.


Mambosasa Legal Practitioners, applicant's legal practitioners

Chihambakwe, Mutizwa & Partners, respondents legal practitioners

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