Urgent
Application
MOYO
J:
This
is an urgent application. The interim relief sought is couched in the
following manner:
(1)
That execution of case number 2167/14 be and is hereby stayed pending
the finalization of the application for rescission of judgment under
HC141/15.
(2)
The respondents be and are hereby interdicted from interfering with
the mine in question and the mining equipment thereof.
(3)
The respondents be and are hereby interdicted from interfering with
the mine in question and executing the order under HC2167/14 pending
the application for rescission of judgment under HC141/15.
The
facts of the matter show that the dispute between the applicants and
the respondents centre on a mine situated in Filabusi.
Apparently
in September 2014, the respondents filed an urgent chamber
application and served it on the applicant's legal practitioners.
The applicant's legal practitioners filed a notice of opposition
thereto. The file was taken to a judge in chambers and he granted the
provisional order without setting the matter down as he was at large
in terms of the rules regarding the set down or otherwise of the
matter.
Respondent
claims that upon receipt of the provisional order they served same on
the applicant's legal practitioners and that no notice of
opposition was filed to the confirmation of the provisional order
leading them to confirm same on 15 January 2015.
In
the confirmation proceedings they filed a certificate of service
confirming that indeed the provisional order had been served on the
applicants.
Prior
to the confirmation of the provisional order, applicant's legal
practitioners were served by respondents' legal practitioners with
an affidavit of evidence and a notice of set down of the matter on
the unopposed roll. Such service was effected on 9 January 2015.
Applicants
filed an application for rescission of judgment on 21 January 2015.
This
is an application to rescind the confirmation of the provisional
order.
Applicants
now seek to stay execution of the provisional order pending the
hearing of their application for rescission of judgment.
They
seek rescission on the basis that they were not served with the
provisional order, and that they would want to be given an
opportunity to challenge same. They further contend that the relief
that was in the provisional order and the one that was obtained upon
confirmation of same were materially different.
The
terms of the final order in the provisional order that was originally
issued read as follows:
“(a)
The respondents be and are hereby ordered not to sale the mine in
question.
(b)
The respondents be and are hereby interdicted from selling mining
equipment situate on the mine in question or anywhere else unless in
terms of the law.
(c)
The respondents pay the costs of suit on an attorney and client
scale.”
The
terms of the final order granted on confirmation reads as follows:
“(1)
The respondents be and are hereby ordered not to sell the mine in
question.
(2)
The respondents be and are hereby ordered not to interfere with the
applicant's operations at the mine and not to interfere with the
equipment thereat.
(3)
The respondents be and are hereby interdicted from selling mining
equipment situate on the mine in question or anywhere else unless in
terms of the law.
(4)
The respondents be and are hereby interdicted from going to the mine
known as Eric 21, Trianic Investments Filabusi.
(5)
The respondents pay costs at an attorney and client scale.”
The
interim relief as per the provisional order that was granted on 20
November 2014 is as follows:
“(a)
The respondents be and are hereby ordered not to interfere with the
mine in question and the mining equipment thereof.
(b)
The second respondent to fourth respondents be and are hereby
interdicted from interfering with whatever nature of threats upon
their persons or their family.”
Respondents
have challenged the order sought on the basis that the matter is not
urgent.
I
now turn to look at the issues in this application.
I
would first deal with the certificate of urgency. The certificate of
urgency gives the following grounds of urgency:
1.
The first and second respondents clearly fraudulently got an order
which they are currently executing.
2.
The first and second respondents are mining and exhausting gold
resources at the applicants' mine. Gold will be depleted if the
respondent is not interdicted from executing the unlawful order.
3.
The applicants are suffering great prejudice and irreparable harm in
that all mining operations have been stopped based on an unlawful
order which was granted based on fraud and due to first and second
respondents misleading of this Honourable court.
4.
The applicants have applied for rescission of the fraudulently gotten
order under case number HC141/15. The applicants will suffer
irreparable harm if the conduct of the first and second respondents
is not challenged.
Thus
the final decision of this Honourable court under case number 141/15
will be rendered a brutum
fulmen
if the respondents are not interdicted.
5.
The applicants have a legitimate fear that the mine can be exhausted
at any time by the first and second respondents.
I
am not sure if the certificate of urgency seeks to allege that even
the provisional order issued on 20 November 2014 was a fraud as
clearly the court record does not point at that.
The
only issues that perhaps applicants could contend were done
unproceduraly would be the confirmation of the provisional order as
they dispute receipt of the order.
As
for the issue of the provisional order on 20 November 2014, whilst
there could have been a notice of opposition in the court record it
is common cause that the learned judge was not compelled in terms of
the rules to first set the matter down before granting it. The
learned judge had a wide disrection in this regard.
This
is clearly proper in terms of Rule 246(2) which provides as follows:
“Where
in an application for a provisional order the judge is satisfied that
the papers establish a prima
facie
case he shall grant a provisional order either in terms of the draft
or as varied.”
The
harm stated in the certificate of urgency in my view is not founded
for the simple reason that the interim relief granted in the
provisional order, which would be operative with or without the
confirmation of the provisional order, had the effect of allowing
respondent to take effective control of the farm from 20 November
2014 to date.
That
would mean, in my view that the confirmation or otherwise of the
order did not bring anything new in, so far as applicants fears as
stated in the certificate of urgency are concerned.
If
Respondent had effective control of the mine since 20 November then,
they should have been mining there since then.
Even
if the terms of the final order which applicants allege were
fraudulently gotten, were to be suspended, the interim relief which
was seemingly obtained above board would still be operational.
Applicants
would still suffer the harm stated in the certificate of urgency as a
result of operation of the interim relief which is an order of this
court that was not obtained through unlawful means.
It
would appear from applicants papers that they seek a provisional
order that would counter and reverse the effects of the provisional
order in HC2167/14.
This
in my view is not desirable.
This
court can issue a provisional order denying applicants interference
with a mine, and later issue a counter provisional now allowing the
applicant's interference and denying respondent same.
In
my view if applicants are not satisfied with the relief sought and
granted in HC2167/14, they should seek rescission, but they cannot
seek another provisional order that renders ineffective the relief
that respondents got from this court on 20 November 2014.
Provisional
orders cannot be used in the rescission of an order, for the result
would be that we now have two provisional orders, one giving rights
to respondents, and a second one now taking away those rights from
respondents and giving them to the applicants.
This
kind of approach would result in an absurdity.
The
only proper platform to challenge the confirmation of the provisional
order would be through an application for rescission of judgment
which applicants have correctly launched.
The
application has to fail for this reason.
The
other issue is that of urgency.
The
applicants got to know of the imminent confirmation of the
provisional order they were apparently not served with on 9 January
2015. They did nothing despite knowledge that the matter had been set
on the unopposed roll since they had been served with a notice of set
down.
It
is important to note that the application for rescission of judgment
was filed on 21 January 2015. However, the urgent application was
filed on 16 February 2015, almost a month later.
Counsel
for the applicants sought to bring up the issue of the placement
under curatorship of the firm Cheda
and Partners.
This however, he submits occurred on 30 January 2015, more than 9
days after the filing of the rescission of judgment, which itself was
filed almost two weeks after applicants lawyers had been served with
a notice of set down.
Applicants
have not sought to explain in the founding affidavit why no action
was taken from 9 January.
In
the case of Kuvarega
vs
Registrar General,
1998 (1) ZLR 188 (HC) the position regarding the undesirability of
delaying to launch urgent applications was cogently stated at page
193; this is what the learned judge had to say:
“What
constitutes urgency is not the only imminent arrival of the day of
reckoning, a matter is urgent, if, at the time the need to act
arises, the matter cannot wait. Urgency which stems from a deliberate
or careless abstention from action until the deadline draws near is
not the type of urgency contemplated by the rules. It necessarily
follows that the certificate of urgency or the supporting affidavit
must always contain an explanation of the non-timeous action if there
has been a delay---.”
In
my view applicants inaction from 9 January 2015 to 16 February 2015
is found wanting.
There
is no explanation either in the certificate of urgency or the
founding affidavit for this very long delay. The application does not
in my view meet the test on urgency. It has to fail on that basis as
well.
I
accordingly dismiss the application with costs for the aforegoing
reasons.
Messrs
Cheda and Partners,
applicants legal practitioners
Messrs
Mugiya and Macharaga Law Chambers,
1st and 2nd
respondents legal practitioners