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HB37-15 - LAWRENCE CLEMINSON vs BRIAN SHER and RUEBEN POSWELL (as executor in the Estate Late Sally Lieber also known as Sally Zella Lieber)

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Procedural Law-viz automatic bar re failure to file opposing papers iro Rule 50 of the High Court Rules.
Procedural Law-viz cause of action re failure to file opposition papers iro automatic bar.
Procedural Law-viz cause of action re effect of failure to file opposing papers iro Rule 50 of the High Court Rules.
Procedural Law-viz service of process re contractual service iro domicilium citandi et executandi.
Procedural Law-viz service of process re digital service iro email.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re digital evidence iro e-mail.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re digital evidence iro electronic mail.
Procedural Law-viz chamber application re upliftment of bar.
Procedural Law-viz automatic bar re upliftment of automatic bar.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re judicial deference iro assessment of prospects in the main matter.
Procedural Law-viz service of process re contractual service iro Rule 40 of the High Court Rules.
Legal Practitioners-viz right of audience before the court re self-actors.
Legal Practitioners-viz right of audience before the court re litigants in person.
Legal Practitioners-viz professional ethics.
Law of Contract-viz variation of contracts.
Law of Contract-viz variation of agreements.
Procedural Law-viz default judgment re unopposed proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz the audi alteram partem rule re upliftment of bar.
Procedural Law-viz automatic bar re upliftment of automatic bar iro the audi alteram partem rule.

Variation of Contracts re: Approach and Resolution of Contractual Lacunas


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature.

The explanation proffered by the applicant, for his failure to enter appearance, is contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his founding affidavit. They read:

“6. I did not see the summons as I had long vacated the premises where the summons were served and so I could not enter an appearance to defend within the time limit prescribed in the Rules.

7. I only got to know of the summons on the 18th of July, when the respondents legal practitioners sent me a copy through an e-mail and already the time within which I was supposed to have entered an appearance to defend had lapsed, which means I am automatically barred in terms of Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971.”

In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument, the applicant took a swipe at the respondents in these words:

“11….,. For the respondents to seek to cling on an (sic) application of default judgment will be tantamount to snatching of a judgment.

12. The respondents legal practitioners appear to be eager to obtain a default judgment at the slightest opportunity, disregarding the need for courtesy when dealing with fellow legal practitioners. The respondents legal practitioners are fully aware of the date when the applicant came to be aware of the summons, hence there is no need to oppose the present application except from malice.”

That applicant chose Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo as his domicilium is beyond caevil. Clause 24 of the lease agreement signed by the parties provides:

24. Domicilium and Notices

24.1 The parties choose domicilium citandi et executandi (“domicilium”) for the purposes of the giving of any legal notice or the serving of any process, as follows:

The Lessors

Room 24, SAVYON LODGE, CNR M. NDLOVU AVE AND ROBERT MUGABE WAY, BULAWAYO

The Lessee

5 LUTON STREET, BELMONT, BULAWAYO

24.2 Each of the parties shall be entitled, from time to time, by written notice to the other, to vary its domicilium to any other address which is not a post office address.”

It is trite, that, the purpose of choosing a domicilium address for the giving of a notice or service of process is to relieve the party giving the notice or serving the process, of the burden of proving actual receipt of the notice or process.

The manner of service of the summons in casu, of affixing it on the outer or principal door at the applicant's domicilium citandi, constitutes good and valid service permissible in terms of Rule 40(b) of the High Court Rules.

The applicant's explanation regarding his failure to enter appearance, in paragraph 6 of his founding affidavit, that he did not see the summons because he had long vacated his domicilium is neither here nor there.

As far as the respondents and the law are concerned, Number 5 Luton Street. Belmont, Bulawayo was, on 4 July 2014, still the correct address for service of the applicant.

The applicant very well knew, that, in terms of clause 24.2 he was obliged to write to the respondents advising them of his change of domicilium before, during, or after leaving 5 Luton Street.

He did not so do, thereby exhibiting a dearth of diligence regarding legal issues.

Professional Ethics, Legal Duty to the Court and Clients, Dominus Litis and Correspondence with the Court


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature.

The explanation proffered by the applicant, for his failure to enter appearance, is contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his founding affidavit. They read:

“6. I did not see the summons as I had long vacated the premises where the summons were served and so I could not enter an appearance to defend within the time limit prescribed in the Rules.

7. I only got to know of the summons on the 18th of July, when the respondents legal practitioners sent me a copy through an e-mail and already the time within which I was supposed to have entered an appearance to defend had lapsed, which means I am automatically barred in terms of Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971.”

In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument, the applicant took a swipe at the respondents in these words:

“11….,. For the respondents to seek to cling on an (sic) application of default judgment will be tantamount to snatching of a judgment.

12. The respondents legal practitioners appear to be eager to obtain a default judgment at the slightest opportunity, disregarding the need for courtesy when dealing with fellow legal practitioners. The respondents legal practitioners are fully aware of the date when the applicant came to be aware of the summons, hence there is no need to oppose the present application except from malice.”

That applicant chose Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo as his domicilium is beyond caevil. Clause 24 of the lease agreement signed by the parties provides:

24. Domicilium and Notices

24.1 The parties choose domicilium citandi et executandi (“domicilium”) for the purposes of the giving of any legal notice or the serving of any process, as follows:

The Lessors

Room 24, SAVYON LODGE, CNR M. NDLOVU AVE AND ROBERT MUGABE WAY, BULAWAYO

The Lessee

5 LUTON STREET, BELMONT, BULAWAYO

24.2 Each of the parties shall be entitled, from time to time, by written notice to the other, to vary its domicilium to any other address which is not a post office address.”

It is trite, that, the purpose of choosing a domicilium address for the giving of a notice or service of process is to relieve the party giving the notice or serving the process, of the burden of proving actual receipt of the notice or process.

The manner of service of the summons in casu, of affixing it on the outer or principal door at the applicant's domicilium citandi, constitutes good and valid service permissible in terms of Rule 40(b) of the High Court Rules.

The applicant's explanation regarding his failure to enter appearance, in paragraph 6 of his founding affidavit, that he did not see the summons because he had long vacated his domicilium is neither here nor there.

As far as the respondents and the law are concerned, Number 5 Luton Street. Belmont, Bulawayo was, on 4 July 2014, still the correct address for service of the applicant.

The applicant very well knew, that, in terms of clause 24.2 he was obliged to write to the respondents advising them of his change of domicilium before, during, or after leaving 5 Luton Street.

He did not so do, thereby exhibiting a dearth of diligence regarding legal issues.

The applicant's lack of diligence did not end there.

Even after he got to know of the summons on 18 July 2014, and that the summons had been served at his last known address for service, on 4 July 2014, he adopted a lackadaisical approach to the matter.

He could still have entered appearance on 18 July 2014, either as a self actor and engage a legal practitioner thereafter, or through one, for. by that date, the automatic bar was not yet operative.

That was the last day of the dies induciae.

The applicant is not such an unsophisticated individual as not to be unable to draft an appearance to defend, simple as it is. Very unsophisticated litigants have managed to enter appearance as self-actors in this court.

In light of the above inexcusable shortcoming, the applicant had neither a moral nor a legal ground to pour scorn on the respondents or their legal practitioners using the verbiage he employed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument quoted supra.

Such indecent and intemperate language must be censored and discouraged - especially by legal practitioners whose client's cause looks doomed....,.

Again, there was absolutely no plausible reason for the applicant's legal practitioner…, to get overly excited, in paragraph 18 of his Heads of Argument. wherein he poured further vitriol upon the respondents legal practitioners by alleging that their conduct is not only unethical but they should be ordered to pay costs “de bonis proprisii” (sic).

If any costs de bonis propriis were to be ordered, between the two sets of legal practitioners, it is counsel for the applicant himself who qualifies to be so mulcted, for launching an application that was hopeless from the outset.

Jurisdiction re: Judicial Deference iro Assessment of Prospects on Appeal, Review or Main Proceedings


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature....,.

Regarding the merits, the applicant, in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit gives this explanation:

“8. Further, there are prospects of success on the merits. The amount being claimed by the respondent is disputed as there was an agreement between the parties for the reduction of the rentals. For the months of February and March the rent was reduced from the original US$2,500 to US$1,250, but, surprisingly, in their claim, the respondents are still claiming US$2,500 for the above mentioned months.”

There are no facts which the applicant has set out upon which he relies for the alleged defence to enable the court to form some opinion of its merits or bona fides as is required by the law.

Clause 26 of the lease agreement provides, in clear and unambiguous language, what should happen in the event of any variations to the lease agreement in these words:

26. Whole Agreement

This agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the parties and no variations, alterations, or collateral agreements shall be of any force or effect unless and until recorded in writing in a document signed by the parties.”

Such a document, satisfying the requirements stipulated in clause 26 above, was not produced, neither was there even the slightest allusion to its existence save the applicant's mere allegation that there was an agreement pertaining to a reduction of rentals for February and March.

So, where are the prospects of success vaunted by the applicant in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit?

Clearly, the applicant has no defence no matter how reluctant the court may be to reach a decision that would result in giving leeway to a judgment against a person without him being heard in spite of his protestations that he has a valid defence.

Variation of Contracts re: Approach and Resolution of Contractual Lacunas


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature....,.

Regarding the merits, the applicant, in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit gives this explanation:

“8. Further, there are prospects of success on the merits. The amount being claimed by the respondent is disputed as there was an agreement between the parties for the reduction of the rentals. For the months of February and March the rent was reduced from the original US$2,500 to US$1,250, but, surprisingly, in their claim, the respondents are still claiming US$2,500 for the above mentioned months.”

There are no facts which the applicant has set out upon which he relies for the alleged defence to enable the court to form some opinion of its merits or bona fides as is required by the law.

Clause 26 of the lease agreement provides, in clear and unambiguous language, what should happen in the event of any variations to the lease agreement in these words:

26. Whole Agreement

This agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the parties and no variations, alterations, or collateral agreements shall be of any force or effect unless and until recorded in writing in a document signed by the parties.”

Such a document, satisfying the requirements stipulated in clause 26 above, was not produced, neither was there even the slightest allusion to its existence save the applicant's mere allegation that there was an agreement pertaining to a reduction of rentals for February and March.

So, where are the prospects of success vaunted by the applicant in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit?

Clearly, the applicant has no defence no matter how reluctant the court may be to reach a decision that would result in giving leeway to a judgment against a person without him being heard in spite of his protestations that he has a valid defence.

Audi Alteram Partem Rule re: Approach, Orders Granted Without a Hearing and the Doctrine of Notice


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature....,.

Regarding the merits, the applicant, in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit gives this explanation:

“8. Further, there are prospects of success on the merits. The amount being claimed by the respondent is disputed as there was an agreement between the parties for the reduction of the rentals. For the months of February and March the rent was reduced from the original US$2,500 to US$1,250, but, surprisingly, in their claim, the respondents are still claiming US$2,500 for the above mentioned months.”

There are no facts which the applicant has set out upon which he relies for the alleged defence to enable the court to form some opinion of its merits or bona fides as is required by the law.

Clause 26 of the lease agreement provides, in clear and unambiguous language, what should happen in the event of any variations to the lease agreement in these words:

26. Whole Agreement

This agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the parties and no variations, alterations, or collateral agreements shall be of any force or effect unless and until recorded in writing in a document signed by the parties.”

Such a document, satisfying the requirements stipulated in clause 26 above, was not produced, neither was there even the slightest allusion to its existence save the applicant's mere allegation that there was an agreement pertaining to a reduction of rentals for February and March.

So, where are the prospects of success vaunted by the applicant in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit?

Clearly, the applicant has no defence no matter how reluctant the court may be to reach a decision that would result in giving leeway to a judgment against a person without him being heard in spite of his protestations that he has a valid defence.

Cause of Action and Draft Orders re: Appearance to Defend iro Effect of Non-Appearance


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature.

The explanation proffered by the applicant, for his failure to enter appearance, is contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his founding affidavit. They read:

“6. I did not see the summons as I had long vacated the premises where the summons were served and so I could not enter an appearance to defend within the time limit prescribed in the Rules.

7. I only got to know of the summons on the 18th of July, when the respondents legal practitioners sent me a copy through an e-mail and already the time within which I was supposed to have entered an appearance to defend had lapsed, which means I am automatically barred in terms of Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971.”

In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument, the applicant took a swipe at the respondents in these words:

“11….,. For the respondents to seek to cling on an (sic) application of default judgment will be tantamount to snatching of a judgment.

12. The respondents legal practitioners appear to be eager to obtain a default judgment at the slightest opportunity, disregarding the need for courtesy when dealing with fellow legal practitioners. The respondents legal practitioners are fully aware of the date when the applicant came to be aware of the summons, hence there is no need to oppose the present application except from malice.”

That applicant chose Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo as his domicilium is beyond caevil. Clause 24 of the lease agreement signed by the parties provides:

24. Domicilium and Notices

24.1 The parties choose domicilium citandi et executandi (“domicilium”) for the purposes of the giving of any legal notice or the serving of any process, as follows:

The Lessors

Room 24, SAVYON LODGE, CNR M. NDLOVU AVE AND ROBERT MUGABE WAY, BULAWAYO

The Lessee

5 LUTON STREET, BELMONT, BULAWAYO

24.2 Each of the parties shall be entitled, from time to time, by written notice to the other, to vary its domicilium to any other address which is not a post office address.”

It is trite, that, the purpose of choosing a domicilium address for the giving of a notice or service of process is to relieve the party giving the notice or serving the process, of the burden of proving actual receipt of the notice or process.

The manner of service of the summons in casu, of affixing it on the outer or principal door at the applicant's domicilium citandi, constitutes good and valid service permissible in terms of Rule 40(b) of the High Court Rules.

The applicant's explanation regarding his failure to enter appearance, in paragraph 6 of his founding affidavit, that he did not see the summons because he had long vacated his domicilium is neither here nor there.

As far as the respondents and the law are concerned, Number 5 Luton Street. Belmont, Bulawayo was, on 4 July 2014, still the correct address for service of the applicant.

The applicant very well knew, that, in terms of clause 24.2 he was obliged to write to the respondents advising them of his change of domicilium before, during, or after leaving 5 Luton Street.

He did not so do, thereby exhibiting a dearth of diligence regarding legal issues.

The applicant's lack of diligence did not end there.

Even after he got to know of the summons on 18 July 2014, and that the summons had been served at his last known address for service, on 4 July 2014, he adopted a lackadaisical approach to the matter.

He could still have entered appearance on 18 July 2014, either as a self actor and engage a legal practitioner thereafter, or through one, for. by that date, the automatic bar was not yet operative.

That was the last day of the dies induciae.

The applicant is not such an unsophisticated individual as not to be unable to draft an appearance to defend, simple as it is. Very unsophisticated litigants have managed to enter appearance as self-actors in this court.

In light of the above inexcusable shortcoming, the applicant had neither a moral nor a legal ground to pour scorn on the respondents or their legal practitioners using the verbiage he employed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument quoted supra.

Such indecent and intemperate language must be censored and discouraged - especially by legal practitioners whose client's cause looks doomed.

Regarding the merits, the applicant, in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit gives this explanation:

“8. Further, there are prospects of success on the merits. The amount being claimed by the respondent is disputed as there was an agreement between the parties for the reduction of the rentals. For the months of February and March the rent was reduced from the original US$2,500 to US$1,250, but, surprisingly, in their claim, the respondents are still claiming US$2,500 for the above mentioned months.”

There are no facts which the applicant has set out upon which he relies for the alleged defence to enable the court to form some opinion of its merits or bona fides as is required by the law.

Clause 26 of the lease agreement provides, in clear and unambiguous language, what should happen in the event of any variations to the lease agreement in these words:

26. Whole Agreement

This agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the parties and no variations, alterations, or collateral agreements shall be of any force or effect unless and until recorded in writing in a document signed by the parties.”

Such a document, satisfying the requirements stipulated in clause 26 above, was not produced, neither was there even the slightest allusion to its existence save the applicant's mere allegation that there was an agreement pertaining to a reduction of rentals for February and March.

So, where are the prospects of success vaunted by the applicant in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit?

Clearly, the applicant has no defence no matter how reluctant the court may be to reach a decision that would result in giving leeway to a judgment against a person without him being heard in spite of his protestations that he has a valid defence.

Again, there was absolutely no plausible reason for the applicant's legal practitioner…, to get overly excited, in paragraph 18 of his Heads of Argument. wherein he poured further vitriol upon the respondents legal practitioners by alleging that their conduct is not only unethical but they should be ordered to pay costs “de bonis proprisii” (sic).

If any costs de bonis propriis were to be ordered, between the two sets of legal practitioners, it is counsel for the applicant himself who qualifies to be so mulcted, for launching an application that was hopeless from the outset.

In the result, the application for the removal of the automatic bar be and is hereby dismissed with costs.

Automatic Bar re: Approach, Notice to Plead, Notice of Intention to Bar, Upliftment of Bar and the Dies Induciae


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature.

The explanation proffered by the applicant, for his failure to enter appearance, is contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his founding affidavit. They read:

“6. I did not see the summons as I had long vacated the premises where the summons were served and so I could not enter an appearance to defend within the time limit prescribed in the Rules.

7. I only got to know of the summons on the 18th of July, when the respondents legal practitioners sent me a copy through an e-mail and already the time within which I was supposed to have entered an appearance to defend had lapsed, which means I am automatically barred in terms of Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971.”

In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument, the applicant took a swipe at the respondents in these words:

“11….,. For the respondents to seek to cling on an (sic) application of default judgment will be tantamount to snatching of a judgment.

12. The respondents legal practitioners appear to be eager to obtain a default judgment at the slightest opportunity, disregarding the need for courtesy when dealing with fellow legal practitioners. The respondents legal practitioners are fully aware of the date when the applicant came to be aware of the summons, hence there is no need to oppose the present application except from malice.”

That applicant chose Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo as his domicilium is beyond caevil. Clause 24 of the lease agreement signed by the parties provides:

24. Domicilium and Notices

24.1 The parties choose domicilium citandi et executandi (“domicilium”) for the purposes of the giving of any legal notice or the serving of any process, as follows:

The Lessors

Room 24, SAVYON LODGE, CNR M. NDLOVU AVE AND ROBERT MUGABE WAY, BULAWAYO

The Lessee

5 LUTON STREET, BELMONT, BULAWAYO

24.2 Each of the parties shall be entitled, from time to time, by written notice to the other, to vary its domicilium to any other address which is not a post office address.”

It is trite, that, the purpose of choosing a domicilium address for the giving of a notice or service of process is to relieve the party giving the notice or serving the process, of the burden of proving actual receipt of the notice or process.

The manner of service of the summons in casu, of affixing it on the outer or principal door at the applicant's domicilium citandi, constitutes good and valid service permissible in terms of Rule 40(b) of the High Court Rules.

The applicant's explanation regarding his failure to enter appearance, in paragraph 6 of his founding affidavit, that he did not see the summons because he had long vacated his domicilium is neither here nor there.

As far as the respondents and the law are concerned, Number 5 Luton Street. Belmont, Bulawayo was, on 4 July 2014, still the correct address for service of the applicant.

The applicant very well knew, that, in terms of clause 24.2 he was obliged to write to the respondents advising them of his change of domicilium before, during, or after leaving 5 Luton Street.

He did not so do, thereby exhibiting a dearth of diligence regarding legal issues.

The applicant's lack of diligence did not end there.

Even after he got to know of the summons on 18 July 2014, and that the summons had been served at his last known address for service, on 4 July 2014, he adopted a lackadaisical approach to the matter.

He could still have entered appearance on 18 July 2014, either as a self actor and engage a legal practitioner thereafter, or through one, for. by that date, the automatic bar was not yet operative.

That was the last day of the dies induciae.

The applicant is not such an unsophisticated individual as not to be unable to draft an appearance to defend, simple as it is. Very unsophisticated litigants have managed to enter appearance as self-actors in this court.

In light of the above inexcusable shortcoming, the applicant had neither a moral nor a legal ground to pour scorn on the respondents or their legal practitioners using the verbiage he employed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument quoted supra.

Such indecent and intemperate language must be censored and discouraged - especially by legal practitioners whose client's cause looks doomed.

Regarding the merits, the applicant, in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit gives this explanation:

“8. Further, there are prospects of success on the merits. The amount being claimed by the respondent is disputed as there was an agreement between the parties for the reduction of the rentals. For the months of February and March the rent was reduced from the original US$2,500 to US$1,250, but, surprisingly, in their claim, the respondents are still claiming US$2,500 for the above mentioned months.”

There are no facts which the applicant has set out upon which he relies for the alleged defence to enable the court to form some opinion of its merits or bona fides as is required by the law.

Clause 26 of the lease agreement provides, in clear and unambiguous language, what should happen in the event of any variations to the lease agreement in these words:

26. Whole Agreement

This agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the parties and no variations, alterations, or collateral agreements shall be of any force or effect unless and until recorded in writing in a document signed by the parties.”

Such a document, satisfying the requirements stipulated in clause 26 above, was not produced, neither was there even the slightest allusion to its existence save the applicant's mere allegation that there was an agreement pertaining to a reduction of rentals for February and March.

So, where are the prospects of success vaunted by the applicant in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit?

Clearly, the applicant has no defence no matter how reluctant the court may be to reach a decision that would result in giving leeway to a judgment against a person without him being heard in spite of his protestations that he has a valid defence.

Again, there was absolutely no plausible reason for the applicant's legal practitioner…, to get overly excited, in paragraph 18 of his Heads of Argument. wherein he poured further vitriol upon the respondents legal practitioners by alleging that their conduct is not only unethical but they should be ordered to pay costs “de bonis proprisii” (sic).

If any costs de bonis propriis were to be ordered, between the two sets of legal practitioners, it is counsel for the applicant himself who qualifies to be so mulcted, for launching an application that was hopeless from the outset.

In the result, the application for the removal of the automatic bar be and is hereby dismissed with costs.

Proof of Service, Return of Service, Address and Manner of Service re: Contractual Service and the Domicilium Citandi


Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi, Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July 2014.

On 17 July 2014, the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to the applicant and also alerted the applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July 2014, the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now, in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance, that litigant should set out, briefly, his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out, briefly, some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature.

The explanation proffered by the applicant, for his failure to enter appearance, is contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his founding affidavit. They read:

“6. I did not see the summons as I had long vacated the premises where the summons were served and so I could not enter an appearance to defend within the time limit prescribed in the Rules.

7. I only got to know of the summons on the 18th of July, when the respondents legal practitioners sent me a copy through an e-mail and already the time within which I was supposed to have entered an appearance to defend had lapsed, which means I am automatically barred in terms of Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971.”

In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument, the applicant took a swipe at the respondents in these words:

“11….,. For the respondents to seek to cling on an (sic) application of default judgment will be tantamount to snatching of a judgment.

12. The respondents legal practitioners appear to be eager to obtain a default judgment at the slightest opportunity, disregarding the need for courtesy when dealing with fellow legal practitioners. The respondents legal practitioners are fully aware of the date when the applicant came to be aware of the summons, hence there is no need to oppose the present application except from malice.”

That applicant chose Number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo as his domicilium is beyond caevil. Clause 24 of the lease agreement signed by the parties provides:

24. Domicilium and Notices

24.1 The parties choose domicilium citandi et executandi (“domicilium”) for the purposes of the giving of any legal notice or the serving of any process, as follows:

The Lessors

Room 24, SAVYON LODGE, CNR M. NDLOVU AVE AND ROBERT MUGABE WAY, BULAWAYO

The Lessee

5 LUTON STREET, BELMONT, BULAWAYO

24.2 Each of the parties shall be entitled, from time to time, by written notice to the other, to vary its domicilium to any other address which is not a post office address.”

It is trite, that, the purpose of choosing a domicilium address for the giving of a notice or service of process is to relieve the party giving the notice or serving the process, of the burden of proving actual receipt of the notice or process.

The manner of service of the summons in casu, of affixing it on the outer or principal door at the applicant's domicilium citandi, constitutes good and valid service permissible in terms of Rule 40(b) of the High Court Rules.

The applicant's explanation regarding his failure to enter appearance, in paragraph 6 of his founding affidavit, that he did not see the summons because he had long vacated his domicilium is neither here nor there.

As far as the respondents and the law are concerned, Number 5 Luton Street. Belmont, Bulawayo was, on 4 July 2014, still the correct address for service of the applicant.

The applicant very well knew, that, in terms of clause 24.2 he was obliged to write to the respondents advising them of his change of domicilium before, during, or after leaving 5 Luton Street.

He did not so do, thereby exhibiting a dearth of diligence regarding legal issues.

Opposed Application

MUTEMA J: Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules 1971 provides that a defendant who has failed to enter appearance shall be deemed to be barred.

In case number HC1508/14 the respondents issued summons against the applicant on 2 July, 2014 claiming arrear rentals and eviction as a result of breach of a lease agreement entered into by the parties.

The summons was served at the applicant's domicilium citandi et executandi number 5 Luton Street, Belmont, Bulawayo on 4 July 2014 by affixing it thereat on the door after unsuccessful diligent search.

The dies induciae expired on 18 July, 2014.

On 17 July, 2014 the respondents legal practitioners, out of courtesy, e-mailed the summons to applicant and also alerted applicant that they had served the summons at his domicilium citandi on 4 July, 2014.

The applicant did not enter appearance to defend.

On 31 July, 2014 the applicant filed a chamber application for the upliftment of the automatic bar.

The respondents opposed that application hence this opposed application.

Now in an application by a defendant for the removal of a bar from entering appearance that litigant should set out briefly his/her defence and the facts upon which he/she relies for that defence so that the court can form some opinion of its merits.

He or she must also set out briefly some facts which the court can scrutinize to gain some idea whether the defence is bona fide: see Broadley N.O. v Stevenson 1973 (1) SA 585 (R) and the cases cited therein.

This is the legal position pertaining to an application of this nature.

The explanation proffered by the applicant for his failure to enter appearance is contained in paragraphs 6 and 7 of his founding affidavit. They read:

6. I did not see the summons as I had long vacated the premises where the summons were served and so I could not enter an appearance to defend within the time limit prescribed in the Rules.

7. I only got to know of the summons on the 18th of July, when the respondents legal practitioners sent me a copy through an e-mail and already the time within which I was supposed to have entered an appearance to defend had lapsed, which means I am automatically barred in terms of Order 7 Rule 50 of the High Court Rules, 1971.”

In paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument applicant took a swipe at respondents in these words:

11… For the respondents to seek to cling on an (sic) application of default judgment will be tantamount to snatching of a judgment.

12. The respondents legal practitioners appear to be eager to obtain a default judgment at the slightest opportunity, disregarding the need for courtesy when dealing with fellow legal practitioners. The respondents legal practitioners are fully aware of the date when the applicant came to be aware of the summons, hence there is no need to oppose the present application except from malice.”

That applicant chose number 5 Luton Street Belmont, Bulawayo as his domicilium is beyond caevil. Clause 24 of the lease agreement signed by the parties provides:

24. Domicilium and Notices

24.1 The parties choose domicilium citandi et executandi (“domicilium”) for the purposes of the giving of any legal notice or the serving of any process, as follows:

The Lessors

Room 24, SAVYON LODGE, CNR M. NDLOVU AVE AND ROBERT MUGABE WAY, BULAWAYO

The Lessee

5 LUTON STREET, BELMONT, BULAWAYO

24.2 Each of the parties shall be entitled from time to time by written notice to the other, to vary its domicilium to any other address which is not a post office address.”

It is trite that the purpose of choosing a domicilium address for the giving of a notice or service of process is to relieve the party giving the notice or serving the process, of the burden of proving actual receipt of the notice or process.

The manner of service of the summons in casu of affixing it on the outer or principal door at applicant's domicilium citandi constitutes good and valid service permissible in terms of Rule 40(b) of the High Court Rules.

Applicant's explanation regarding his failure to enter appearance in paragraph 6 of his founding affidavit that he did not see the summons because he had long vacated his domicilium is neither here nor there.

As far as the respondents and the law are concerned, number 5 Luton Street Belmont, Bulawayo was, on 4 July, 2014, still the correct address for service of the applicant.

Applicant very well knew that in terms of clause 24.2 he was obliged to write to the respondents advising them of his change of domicilium before, during or after leaving 5 Luton Street.

He did not so do thereby exhibiting a dearth of diligence regarding legal issues.

Applicant's lack of diligence did not end there.

Even after he got to know of the summons on 18 July, 2014 and that the summons had been served at his last known address for service on 4 July, 2014 he adopted a lackadaisical approach to the matter.

He could still have entered appearance on 18 July, 2014 either as a self actor and engage a legal practitioner thereafter or through one for by that date the automatic bar was not yet operative.

That was the last day of the dies induciae.

Applicant is not such an unsophisticated individual as not to be unable to draft an appearance to defend, simple as it is. Very unsophisticated litigants have managed to enter appearance as self actors in this court.

In light of the above inexcusable shortcoming the applicant had neither a moral nor a legal ground to pour scorn on the respondents or their legal practitioners using the verbiage he employed in paragraphs 11 and 12 of his Heads of Argument quoted supra.

Such indecent and intemperate language must be censored and discouraged especially by legal practitioners whose client's cause looks doomed.

Regarding the merits, applicant, in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit gives this explanation:

8. Further, there are prospects of success on the merits. The amount being claimed by the respondent is disputed as there was an agreement between the parties for the reduction of the rentals. For the months of February and March the rent was reduced from the original US$2,500,00 to US$1,250,00 but surprisingly in their claim the respondents are still claiming US$2,500,00 for the above mentioned months.”

There are no facts which applicant has set out upon which he relies for the alleged defence to enable the court to form some opinion of its merits or bona fides as is required by the law.

Clause 26 of the lease agreement provides in clear and unambiguous language what should happen in the event of any variations to the lease agreement in these words:

26. Whole Agreement

This agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the parties and no variations, alterations or collateral agreements shall be of any force or effect unless and until recorded in writing in a document signed by the parties.”

Such a document satisfying the requirements stipulated in clause 26 above was not produced neither was there even the slightest allusion to its existence save applicant's mere allegation that there was an agreement pertaining to a reduction of rentals for February and March.

So where are the prospects of success vaunted by applicant in paragraph 8 of his founding affidavit?

Clearly applicant has no defence no matter how reluctant the court may be to reach a decision that would result in giving leeway to a judgment against a person without him being heard inspite of his protestations that he has a valid defence.

Again there was absolutely no plausible reason for the applicant's legal practitioner Mr Ndlovu to get overly excited in paragraph 18 of his Heads of Argument wherein he poured further vitriol upon respondents legal practitioners by alleging that their conduct is not only unethical but they should be ordered to pay costs de bonis proprisii” (sic).

If any costs de bonis propriis were to be ordered, between the two sets of legal practitioners, it is Mr Ndlovu himself who qualifies to be so mulcted, for launching an application that was hopeless from the outset.

In the result, the application for the removal of the automatic bar be and is hereby dismissed with costs.



Mlweli Ndlovu & Associates, applicant's legal practitioners

Messrs Webb, Low & Barry Inc Ben Baron & Partners, respondents legal practitioners

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