MALABA
DCJ: At
the end of hearing argument for both parties the Court dismissed this
application with no order as to costs. It was indicated at the time
that reasons for the decision would follow in due course. These are
they.
The
applicant approached the Court in terms of s24(1) of the former
Constitution of Zimbabwe (“the Constitution”) which gave any
person alleging that the Declaration of Rights has been, is being or
is likely to be contravened in relation to himself the right to apply
to the Supreme Court for redress.
The
applicant challenged the constitutional validity of ss23(3) and 71 of
the Electoral Act [Cap.
2:31]
(“the Act”) as interfering with his right to vote as enshrined in
s23A(2) of the Constitution. More specifically, the applicant alleged
that s23(3) of the Act, which required that a voter be resident in a
constituency in order to vote and that if such voter was absent from
the constituency for a period of over twelve months his or her name
be removed from the voters roll, infringed his right to vote.
The
applicant further contended that s71 of the Act, limiting the right
to postal voting to any person who, on all polling days in the
election, would be outside Zimbabwe on duty in the service of the
Government or as the spouse of such a person and would be unable to
vote at a polling station in his or her constituency, violated his
right to vote.
His
contention was that every voter who is outside the country on polling
days in an election must be afforded the opportunity to vote at a
designated place in the country where he or she is at the time.
The
applicant's personal circumstances made it evident why he had
launched the application. The applicant averred that he is a
Zimbabwean by birth residing in South Africa. He said he was
gainfully employed in that country. The applicant did not say when he
went to South Africa and how long he had been living in that country.
He did not disclose the nature of employment he was engaged in. He
was, however, emphatic that he was unlikely to return to Zimbabwe in
the foreseeable future or at least until the economy recovered enough
to guarantee him employment if he returned.
The
applicant further alleged that he was a registered voter in the
Mabvuku constituency. The extract from the voters roll he provided as
proof of the averment, however, indicated that his residential
address at the time of registration as a voter was in Kadoma.
At
the hearing of the application, Mr Ochieng
for the applicant, argued that the provisions of s23(3) of the Act,
by requiring that a voter be resident in his or her constituency and
must not have been absent therefrom for more than a continuous period
of twelve months in order to vote at a polling station in the
constituency, imposed an unjustifiable limitation on the right to
vote.
It
was his submission that s71 of the Act, by restricting the right to
vote by postal ballot only to those who were outside the country on
duty in the service of the Government or their spouses, infringed the
applicant's right to vote.
Mr
Ochieng
argued that s23A(2) of the Constitution gave every Zimbabwean who was
a registered voter the right to vote. As such the State had an
obligation to put in place mechanisms in every country where there
are Zimbabwean citizens to enable them to cast the ballot in every
election. It was his suggestion that every Zimbabwean embassy should
be turned into a polling station on election day to allow Zimbabwean
citizens in the diaspora to vote.
The
respondents opposed the application.
The
second respondent denied the allegation that ss23(3) and 71 of the
Act deprived a registered voter of the right to vote.
He
pointed out that the purposes of the provisions of s23(3) of the Act
were administrative in that they related to the conduct of the
election. They were not intended to limit the right to vote. In his
view, the provisions gave effect to the right to vote by prescribing
the way that right was to be exercised. He argued that nothing
stopped a registered voter who had voluntarily left the country from
coming back to exercise his or her right to vote at a polling station
in the constituency in which he or she is registered to vote.
The
fourth respondent argued that the State was not under any legal duty
to establish polling stations outside Zimbabwe or to extend the
postal ballot to Zimbabwean citizens who left the country of their
own accord and were unable to attend personally to cast their ballots
at polling stations in the constituencies in which they were
registered to vote.
Section
23A of the Constitution provided:
“23A
Political rights
(1)
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, every Zimbabwean
citizen shall have the right to -
(a)
free, fair and regular elections for any legislative body, including
a local authority, established under this Constitution or any Act of
Parliament;
(b)
free, fair and regular elections to the office of the President and
to any other elective office;
(c)
free and fair referendums whenever they are called in terms of this
Constitution or an Act of Parliament.
(2)
Subject to this Constitution, every adult Zimbabwean citizen shall
have the right -
(a)
to vote in referendums and elections for any legislative body
established under this Constitution and to do so in secret; and
(b)
to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office.”
The
above section could not be read in isolation. It had to be read
together with s3(1) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution which
provided:
“Qualifications
and disqualifications for voters
(1)
Subject to the provisions of this paragraph and to such residence
qualifications as may be prescribed in the Electoral Law for
inclusion on the electoral roll of a particular constituency, any
person who has attained the age of eighteen years and who –
(a)
is a citizen of Zimbabwe; …
shall
be qualified for registration as a voter.”
Reading
the two sections together makes it obvious that the right to vote is
not an absolute right that can be exercised without limitation.
The
Constitution limited the exercise of the right to vote to a citizen
who had attained the age of eighteen. Consistent with the provisions
of s3(1)(g) of the Third Schedule to the Constitution, the
Legislature added the residence qualification as one of the
conditions of the exercise of the right to vote. It required that the
prospective voter be registered on the roll of voters for the
constituency in which he or she ordinarily resided.
There
can be no doubt that the provisions of s23(3)(g) of the Act were
authorised under s3(1)(g) of the Third Schedule of the Constitution.
Section
23 of the Act provided:
“23
Residence qualifications of voters
(1)
Subject to the Constitution and this Act, in order to have the
requisite residence qualifications to be registered as a voter in a
particular constituency, a claimant must be resident in that
constituency at the date of his or her claim:
Provided
that if a claimant satisfies the Registrar-General of Voters that he
or she is or intends to be a candidate for election as a member of
Parliament for a particular constituency in which he or she is not
resident, the claimant may be registered as a voter in that
constituency.
(2)
For the purposes of subsection (1), a claimant shall be deemed to be
residing in a constituency while he or she is absent therefrom for a
temporary purpose.
(3)
A voter who is registered on the voters roll for a constituency,
other than a voter who has been registered in that constituency in
terms of the proviso to subsection (1), shall not be entitled to have
his or her name retained on such roll if, for a continuous period of
twelve months, he or she has ceased to reside in that constituency.
…” (The emphasis is mine)
Section
71 of the Act also provided:
“71
Applications for postal ballot papers
(1)
When an election is to take place in a constituency, a voter
ordinarily resident in Zimbabwe who is resident in that constituency,
or was, within twelve months preceding the polling day or first
polling day, as the case may be, fixed in relation to that
constituency, resident therein and has good reason to believe that he
or she will be absent from the constituency or unable to attend at
the polling station by reason of being:
(a)
on duty as a member of a disciplined force or as an electoral officer
or monitor; or
(b)
absent from Zimbabwe in the service of the Government of Zimbabwe; or
(c)
a spouse of a person referred to in paragraph(a) or (b);
may
apply to the Chief Elections Officer for a postal ballot paper.”
The
two sections are clear and unambiguous.
Section
23(3) required that a voter be ordinarily resident in the
constituency in which he or she was to vote for purposes of being
qualified for registration on the voters roll for that constituency.
If the voter became absent from the constituency in which he or she
was registered as a voter for a continuous period of twelve months,
his or her name had to be removed from the voters roll of that
constituency as he or she would be deemed to have ceased being a
resident of that constituency.
The
postal ballot was reserved for a specific class of registered voters
who, because they would be on duty in the service of the Government,
would be forced to be absent from their constituencies on the polling
days in the election.
The
class of registered voters with the right of access to the use of the
postal ballot was clearly defined.
The
definition was exclusive of any other registered voter not belonging
to that class. The applicant and other registered voters who would
have been outside the country on polling days in the election and
unable to attend personally to cast their votes at the polling
stations in the constituencies where they were registered as voters
are excluded because they did not satisfy the prescribed criteria for
the members of the class entitled to the use of the postal ballot.
There
could be no serious argument that the Legislature acted unlawfully in
enacting the two sections, when the Constitution specifically vested
it with the power to impose residence qualifications on voters and
thus limit the exercise of the right to vote. The Legislature clearly
had the power to prescribe conditions for the exercise of the right
to vote.
In
support of the contention that the restriction of the right to the
use of the postal ballot to the specific class of registered voters
specified in s71 of the Act was an unjustifiable limitation of the
right to vote, the applicant referred to the case of Richter
v The Minister of Home Affairs and Others
(with the Democratic
Alliance and Others Intervening and with Afriforum and Another as
Amici Curiae)
[2009] ZACC 3.
In
that case, the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that
s33(1)(e) of the South African Electoral Act constituted an
unjustifiable limitation of the right to vote by restricting classes
of registered voters who were absent from the Republic on election
day who were afforded the opportunity to participate in the election.
In that case the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that such
a limitation infringed the right to vote.
The
applicant argued on the authority of Richter's
case supra
that the right to vote is a democratic right and no law limiting the
right could be justifiable in a democratic society. He urged the
Court to hold that every registered voter was entitled to exercise
the right to vote where he or she was and the State had to ensure
that facilities were made available to record his or her vote.
The
Court was not persuaded by the argument.
The
Richter
case supra
could not be applied to the applicant's case. Zimbabwe and South
Africa have different electoral systems.
The
South African electoral system is based on the concept of
proportional representation. This means that voters vote for a
political party, not individuals. The political party then gets a
share of seats in Parliament in direct proportion to the number of
votes it got in the election. Each party then decides on members who
fill the seats it won. As such, no matter where the voter casts his
or her vote from, he or she would not be voting for an individual to
represent him or her as a resident of a constituency.
The
Zimbabwean electoral system is different. It is based on the concept
of constituency representation.
Section
38 of the Constitution provided that there shall be 210 members of
the House of Assembly, each elected by and representing 210
constituencies. Registered voters vote for individual candidates,
even though they may belong to political parties that sponsor them.
Any person who is qualified to stand for elected office can offer
himself or herself for election in the capacity of an independent
candidate and be voted for as such.
Under
the Zimbabwean electoral system, a voter votes not only as a citizen
of this country but also to protect his or her rights and interests
as a resident of the constituency in which he or she is registered.
He or she votes for a candidate best suited to address the
developmental problems of the constituency.
The
constituency based electoral system requires that a candidate should
campaign in the constituency for which he or she seeks to be elected.
If a voter is not resident in the constituency and has not been so
resident for a continuous period of twelve months, the presumption is
that he or she has lost touch with the constituency and has
insufficient information about the candidate's ability to address
the developmental problems of the constituency.
A
distinction must be drawn between a situation where there is no right
to vote and one where the right to vote is provided for under the law
but a voter chooses not to exercise the right.
In
Registrar
General of Elections & Ors v Morgan Tsvangirai
SC 2002 (1) ZLR (S) 204, CHIDYAUSIKU CJ, in a case in which the
applicants alleged that failure by the State to put in place
mechanisms to enable voters outside their constituencies to vote
violated their right to vote, said at 211E:
“The
contention that the failure to provide the above facility amounts to
the disenfranchisement of a voter is simply untenable. The voter does
not lose his right to vote. He is disabled from exercising the right
by being in a wrong constituency at the time he is expected to vote.
The disability would not, in the circumstances, have resulted from
any action by the Registrar General.”
The
Constitution did not place an obligation upon the State to make
arrangements for voters who for personal reasons were unable to
attend at the polling stations to vote.
In
Madzingo and Others v Minister of Justice and Others
2005 (1) ZLR 171 (S) at 177F-G, it was said that:
“It
is important to appreciate the fact that there is no express
provision in the Constitution and the Act requiring electoral
authorities to establish machinery in foreign countries to record
votes of Zimbabwean citizens registered as voters on voters rolls for
constituencies who live in those countries. The provisions that are
there require a registered voter to attend personally on polling day
to cast his or her ballot at a polling station in the constituency
for which he or she is enrolled. The requirement applies to every
registered voter and its object is to give effect to the entitlement
to vote provided under s3 of Schedule 3 of the Constitution. The only
exception to this general rule is created in s71 of the Act.”
It
was for these reasons that the Court was satisfied that ss23(3) and
71 of the Electoral Act did not violate the applicant's right to
vote and consequently dismissed the application with no order as to
costs.
CHIDYAUSIKU
CJ (Rtd): I
agree
ZIYAMBI
JA:
I agree
GWAUNZA
JA: I
agree
GARWE
JA: I
agree
GOWORA
JA: I
agree
HLATSHWAYO
JA: I
agree
PATEL
JA: I
agree
CHIWESHE
AJA: I
agree
D
Ochieng,
applicant's legal practitioner
Messrs
Nyika, Kanengoni & Partners,
first respondent's legal practitioners
Civil
Division of the Attorney-General's Office,
second, third and fourth respondents' legal practitioners