Urgent
chamber application
MAFUSIRE
J:
[1] The
first respondent is the ruling party in Zimbabwe. The second
respondent is a minister of Government in charge of primary and
secondary education. He is a member of the first respondent. The
matter before me was an urgent chamber application by the applicants
for an interdict against the respondents. The first applicant is a
trade union of primary and secondary school teachers in rural
Zimbabwe. It is duly registered. It has corporate personality,
capable of suing and being sued in its own name. The second applicant
is a teacher. He is the current president of the first applicant. The
interdict was sought to restrain the respondents from certain
activities that the applicants considered harmful to themselves and
the school children under their care. These activities included:
(i)
coercing
school children to attend and participate in political rallies or
other activities of the first respondent;
(ii)
causing
the closure of schools to accommodate the first respondent's
political activities;
(iii)
compelling
teachers to attend the first respondent's political rallies;
(iv)
compelling
teachers to wear the first respondent's party regalia, and to
prepare performances for school children to deliver at its rallies;
(v)
compelling
teachers to make contributions in cash or kind towards the first
respondent's rallies;
(vi)
commandeering
school premises, school buses, furniture, or other property for first
respondent's political rallies;
[2] The
chief architect of that abuse was said to be the first respondent,
the second respondent being a willing agent.
[3] The
core of the applicants' evidence was a report by the Zimbabwe Human
Rights Commission, a body established in terms of section 242 of the
Constitution with wide-ranging functions that include the promotion
of awareness; respect; protection; attainment and observance of human
rights at all levels of society, and the protection of the public
against the abuse of power and any maladministration by the State;
public institutions and their officers. The report was compiled at
the instance of the applicants. They had complained to that body
about the desecration of the rights of school children and school
teachers as aforesaid. The report covered the period from July 2017.
It is not clear when it was actually published. Its major findings
were the following infringements:
(i)
A
breach of the children's right to education as enshrined in section
75 and section 81[1][e]
of the Constitution. It was said that children periodically missed
school after being forced to attend the first respondent's rallies
to provide entertainment through, among other things, participating
in provocative dances. Children were said to be exposed to hate
speeches and inflammatory language.
(ii)
A
breach of the right to freedom of assembly and association as
enshrined in section 58 of the Constitution and Article 8 of the
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. It was said
the children's attendance at the first respondent's rallies was
secured without their parents' consent or knowledge; that they
were being forced to wear the first respondent's regalia, and that
not only were their teachers forced to attend those rallies as well
but also that they had to compose praise poems for recital by the
children and to make financial contributions towards the costs of
holding such rallies.
(iii)
School
vehicles like buses and lorries being commandeered to ferry
communities to the first respondent's rallies; school equipment,
utensils and furniture such as tables, chairs and sofas being
requisitioned for those rallies.
[4] That
was the skeleton of the applicants' case. The flesh comprised
sample findings. Below are some of them:
(i)
Teachers'
forced contributions to the costs of the rallies ranged from $1 to
$10. Failure invited threats of harm or expulsion from certain
districts.
(ii)
At
one rally held in Gweru in the Midlands Province, school children
from grades 4 to 7 walked 11 [eleven] kilometres to the venue and 11
kilometres back. Teachers took turns to walk and catch rides: one
batch walking with the children to the venue whilst the other batch
using public transport at their own cost, and swapping roles for the
return trip.
(iii)
On
9 September 2017 there was a Youth Interface Rally for the first
respondent that was held in Bindura, Mashonaland Central Province. A
directive was issued by a District Administrator in the then Ministry
of Rural Development, Promotion and Preservation of National Culture
and Heritage which was addressed to primary and secondary schools in
Guruve. It read:
“APPEAL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS
TOWARDS MASH CENTRAL PRESIDENTIAL YOUTH INTERFACE
The
office of the District Administrator together with ZANU (PF) Youth
League is appealing for your contributions towards the Presidential
Youth Interface rally on a date to be announced soon.
You
are aware that His Excellency the President Cde R G Mugabe is on a
nationwide tour meeting the youths and from Gweru on 1 September his
next destination will be Bindura here in Mashonaland Central. We are
requesting for your contributions to buy food and ferry 12,000 party
supporters to Bindura.
The
committee agreed that every civil servant should contribute $1-00
towards this memorable event.
The
deadline for the contributions is 6 September 2017.
For
any further information contact Mr Machobeni on 0782003702 or the
undersigned on 0773022151.”
(iv)
During
elections, teachers are treated as illiterate voters in need of
assistance in the casting of the ballot.
(v)
At
All Souls Mission School in Mutoko in Mashonaland Central Province
the school head forced teachers to create a political party cell and
declare the names of such of their children and relatives as had
reached the voting age.
(vi)
On
1 June 2018 the first respondent held a rally at Chegutu in
Mashonaland West Province. It was a Friday, a school day. Many
schools in the surrounding areas were closed in order to facilitate
the attendance of school children. A journalist present at the rally
took pictures of children clad in the first respondent's party
regalia carrying placards with political messages, and of a school
bus that had been used to ferry supporters. He filed a supporting
affidavit.
(vii)
Another
political rally was held by the first respondent on 9 June 2018 at a
primary school called Chinzanga in Mashonaland East Province.
(viii)
Yet
another rally was held by the first respondent on Friday, 15 June
2018 in Masvingo. All provincial and district sporting activities
scheduled for that day were postponed indefinitely. A screenshot of
the “WhatsApp” message dispatched by the Provincial Education
Director for the province to members of the first applicant two days
before the rally read:
“Afternoon
colleagues. Be advised that all provincial and district competitions
set for Friday 15/06/18 have been postponed to a date tba since His
Excellence the President of Zimbabwe will be visiting the province.
Please note that your buses may be requested for the function.
Thanks.”
[5] The
applicants averred that they had a reasonable apprehension these
violations were set to continue, especially as the country was
heading for the general elections on 30 July 2018. The violations
were said to be continuing despite the new dispensation obtaining in
Zimbabwe. In this regard, I take judicial notice of the seismic
changes in the top leadership of the first respondent, and of
Government in November 2017 when the then first secretary of the
first respondent and sitting President of the Republic – Mr Robert
Gabriel Mugabe – resigned after an uninterrupted thirty seven years
in power since the country's independence from Britain in 1980. He
was replaced by one of the Vice-Presidents – Mr Emmerson Dambudzo
Mnangagwa.
[6] The
applicants further averred that the violations were continuing
despite the recommendations by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission
in its report. The key recommendation was that political parties in
Zimbabwe should adopt a code of conduct the provisions of which
should include the following:
(i)
The
prevention of misuse and manipulation of school children at political
rallies and ensuring that their attendance is free, safe and well
protected.
(ii)
Keeping
school premises free of political meetings and other activities and
desisting from the practice of coercing school children to
participate in any political gatherings and demonstrations.
(iii)
Desisting
from abusing school property such as buses and furniture in
furtherance of private political interests unconnected to the
schools, the teachers, the children and their parents.
[7] The
applicants argued that their application was a classic case for an
interdict. They said it met all the requirements for that sort of
remedy. These requirements are:
-
a
prima
facie
right, even if it be open to some doubt;
-
a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the relief is not
granted;
-
that
the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interim
interdict;
-
that
there is no other satisfactory remedy;
See
Setlogelo
v
Setlogelo.
[8] The
applicants said the matter was urgent. The respondents' actions
violated constitutional rights. The violations were on-going. With
the elections drawing closer the violations were set to escalate and
become intense. Children were being exposed to hate speech and
inflammatory language. The need to act was now, not later.
Accompanying the application was a certificate of urgency by a legal
practitioner vouching for the urgency of the matter.
[9] The
second respondent did not oppose the application. He promised to
abide by the decision of the court. The first respondent did oppose.
Its grounds were multiple. It first raised technical preliminary
objections. It then answered the applicants' case on the merits.
[10] The
first respondent's first technical objection was that the
application was fatally defective for want of compliance with the
Rules of the High Court, particularly Rule 241[1]. This is the rule
that prescribes that Form No 29B shall accompany chamber
applications, unless the chamber application is one to be served on
interested parties, in which case Form No 29 is to be used, but with
appropriate modifications. These forms are set out in the Schedule of
Forms at the back of the Rules.
[11] The
dichotomy between Form 29B and Form 29 is a thoroughly weather beaten
path: see Marick
Trading [Pvt] Ltd v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company of Zimbabwe Ltd
& Anor;
Zimbabwe
Open University v Mazombwe;
Base
Minerals Zimbabwe [Private] Limited & Anor v Chiroswa Minerals
[Private] Limited & Ors.
[12] Form
29B accompanies ordinary chamber applications. One of its important
features is that the substantive grounds for the application should
be stated on the face of the application in summary fashion. On the
other hand, Form 29 should accompany chamber applications that
require to be served. The grounds of the application need not be set
out on the face of the application. An important aspect of this Form
is that it sets out a plethora of procedural rights that, among other
things, notify the respondent of the application; his right to
oppose, and the consequences of a failure to file opposing papers
timeously. The minimum period or dies
induciae
given the respondent to file any opposing papers is ten [10] days,
failing which the matter proceeds on an uncontested basis. But in
urgent cases appropriate modifications have to be done to the Form to
cut short the dies
induciae.
[13] In
casu
it was plain the applicants had used Form 29B. Thus no dies
induciae
were given on the face of the application. The first respondent's
point was that since the chamber application was one to be served, it
had to be accompanied by Form 29, not 29B, with appropriate
modifications. That not having being done, the argument concluded,
the application was not only bad, but it was incurably bad. You
cannot put something on nothing and expect it to stay there. It will
collapse: see McFoy
v
United Africa Co Ltd.
[14] I
did not agree with the first respondent. Raising this point was just
a mandatory ritual: see Rufasha
v Bindura University of Science Education & Ors.
The point was a 'sterile dispute' about forms: see Mazombwe,
supra.
The first respondent's authorities, particularly Marick
Trading
and Mazombwe
above, were inapposite. Where the courts have dismissed an
application for want of form it is usually because the application
would have been accompanied by neither Form 29B nor Form 29, but by
something else completely alien to the Rules. This was not the case
with the applicants' application herein. Therefore, I condoned
their use of Form 29B, or their failure to modify Form 29.
[15] Furthermore,
and at any rate, in terms of Rule 229C, the use of one form instead
of another, i.e. of Form 29B instead of Form 29, does not in itself
constitute sufficient grounds for dismissing an application. It is
necessary for a court or judge to conclude that an interested party
has thereby suffered prejudice. In
casu,
Mr Mushangwe,
for the first respondent, had no choice but to concede that the first
respondent had suffered no discernible prejudice by the applicants'
use of Form 29B, instead of Form 29. Among other things, the first
respondent had filed an elaborate notice of opposition and eloquently
placed its case before the court.
[16] The
first respondent's second ground of objection was that the
certificate of urgency was palpably defective in that it was bereft
of essential averments and replete with typographical errors.
[17] A
certificate of urgency is the sine
quo non
for an application being heard on an urgent basis: see General
Transport & Engineering [Pvt] Ltd & Ors v
Zimbabwe
Banking Corporation [Pvt] Ltd;
Chidawu
& Ors v
Shah
& Ors;
UZ
– UCSF Collaborative Research Programme v Husaiwevhu and Ors
and Odar
Housing Development Consortium v Sensene Investments [Pvt] Ltd &
Ors.
As an officer of the court, a legal practitioner, having carefully
applied his mind to the matter, certifies it to be one of urgency.
Even though the judge eventually dealing with the matter has to
decide whether or not it is urgent, he is entitled, in the initial
instance, to rely on the opinion of the legal practitioner.
[18] In
the instant case, there was certainly an apparent lack of skill and
precision in the drafting of the certificate of urgency. For example,
in one portion it referred to a rally planned for “… tomorrow
15th
June 2018
…” when the certificate itself was only executed on 18 June 2018.
In other portions the certificate confused applicants for
respondents. In yet other portions whole words or phrases were
missing. In this regard the first respondent picked on a sentence
that read: “This
is a matter of great importance as it directly
[?] the
rights of children as well as the freeness and fairness of the 2018
elections.”
Plainly the word “… affects
…” after “… directly…”
was omitted.
[19] However,
in spite of the evidence of sloppy drafting, I did not consider the
defects fatal. In The
Sheriff of the High Court v Majoni & Ors
I said that silly and harmless typing errors should not impede the
determination of the real dispute between the parties: see also
Zimbabwe
Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Transport & Ors.
In the present case, the defects in the certificate of urgency that
the first respondent complained of were inconsequential. I pardoned
them.
[20] In
substance, the certificate of urgency informed why the matter had to
be heard on an urgent basis given that the perceived abuse of the
rights of children and their teachers at the hands of the respondents
was said to be on-going and disruptive of school life. Mr
Coltart,
for the applicants, explained the problems associated with preparing
court documents in a hurry, particularly given that the certificate
of urgency in question had been executed by a legal practitioner from
another law firm.
[21] The
first respondent's third point in
limine
was that the matter was not urgent. It was argued that the mainstay
of the applicants' complaint was the report by the Zimbabwe Human
Rights Commission the findings of which had been based on events
almost a year old. Mr Mushangwe's
point was that the need to act had arisen when the perceived
violations had occurred way back then. For support, he referred to
the well-known and oft quoted case of Kuvarega
v
Registrar-General & Anor,
particularly the following seminal statement by CHATIKOBO J, at p 193
F -G:
“What
constitutes urgency is not only the imminent arrival of the day of
reckoning; a matter is urgent, if at the time the need to act arises,
the matter cannot wait. Urgency which stems from a deliberate or
careless abstention from action until the dead-line draws near is not
the type of urgency contemplated by the rules. It necessarily follows
that the certificate of urgency or the supporting affidavit must
always contain an explanation of the non-timeous action if there has
been any delay.”
[22] Mr
Mushangwe
argued that there was no explanation for the apparent delay by the
applicants in bringing the urgent chamber application and that
therefore there was no reason at all why it should be given priority
ahead of all other matters pending before the courts. He submitted
that the last of the incidents complained of had been more than 18
days old. Despite the founding affidavit having been commissioned on
14 June 2018, it was not until 19 June 2018 that the application had
finally been filed. The application was no more than political
grandstanding designed to attract media coverage.
[23] In
Triple
C Pigs & Anor v
Commissioner-General
– Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
GOWORA J, as she then was, said that every litigant would want to
have their matters heard urgently. The longer it takes to obtain
relief, the more it seems that justice is delayed and thus denied.
But the courts, in order to ensure the delivery of justice, endeavour
to hear matters as soon as is reasonably practicable. In order to
dispense justice fairly, a distinction is necessarily made between
those matters that ought to be heard urgently and those to which some
delay would not cause harm which would not be compensated by the
relief that is eventually granted to such litigant.
[24] Mr
Mushangwe's
argument that the application largely hinged on the report by the
Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission, or that there had been an
unexplained delay in bringing the matter to court conveniently
glossed over the sorrowful lamentation by the applicants that the
violations were continuing. The application was a compilation of
disparate grievances by disparate teachers from the disparate
districts of Zimbabwe on the manifold wrongful activities by the
respondents. The abuses were said to be on-going. Thus each one of
them gave rise to a cause of action. Practically, it would have taken
time to put it all together. That was Mr Coltart's
explanation. It made sense.
[25] I
considered that any breach of the rights accorded by the Constitution
should not be allowed to subsist for any day longer. The courts would
be failing in their constitutional duty if they were to remain
unmoved in the face of reports of such flagrant abuse. They cannot
carry on with 'business as usual'. They should be so concerned as
to set aside all other business in order to deal with the situation.
That is the essence of an urgent chamber application. Therefore, I
once again dismissed the argument that the matter was not urgent.
[26] The
first respondent's last point in
limine
was that the draft order was defective in that the interim relief
sought was almost identical to the final order prayed for. The
argument was that the applicants were seeking a final remedy on an
urgent basis and that if the interim relief was granted there would
be no need for a return day.
[27] Again
the dichotomy between an interim relief and a final order in an
urgent chamber application is a well-trodden path. It has been stated
time and again that the object of an urgent chamber application is to
get interim protection. Because of the urgency that may be manifest
on the papers, the application is allowed to jump the queue of cases
awaiting determination at the courts. But the issues are not
interrogated to any great depth. As long as an applicant shows a
prima
facie
right, even if this be open to some doubt; a well-grounded
apprehension of an irreparable harm; that the balance of convenience
favours the granting of an interim interdict; that there is no other
satisfactory remedy; and that there are reasonable prospects of
success in the merits of the main case, the applicant should be
entitled to relief.
[28] In
Kuvarega
above, CHATIKOBO J said:
“The
practice of seeking interim relief which is exactly the same as the
substantive relief sued for, and which has the same effect, defeats
the whole object of interim protection. In effect a litigant who
seeks relief in this manner obtains final relief without proving his
case. That is so because interim relief is normally granted on the
mere showing of a prima
facie
case. If the interim relief is identical to the main relief and has
the same substantive effect, it means that the applicant is granted
the main relief on proof merely of a prima
facie
case. This, to my mind, is undesirable where, as here, the applicant
will have no interest in the outcome of the case on the return day.”
See
also Women
& Law in Southern Africa & Ors v Mandaza & Ors
[29] In
casu,
it is true that the interim relief sought in the original draft order
was almost identical to the final order sought on the return day. In
essence this relief was the interdict to restrain the respondents
from continuing with the activities complained of. But my view is
that the principle or requirement that the interim relief in an
urgent chamber application should not be the same as the final relief
to be sought on the return day is not cast in stone. Every case
depends on its own facts. In appropriate situations it may be that
the relief sought in the interim may be all that an applicant was
concerned with yesterday, today and tomorrow. He may want it today on
an urgent basis. That does not stop him from wanting it again on a
permanent basis on the return day. If it is granted today on an
interim basis, all he may want on the return day is its confirmation.
All he shows in the interim, among other things, is an actual or
perceived infringement of a
prima
facie
right,
even if that right be open to some doubt. On the return day he must
prove, on
a balance of probabilities,
an actual or perceived infringement of a
clear right.
It is not altogether uncommon for the court to grant interim relief,
only to discharge it on the return day. Thus, I found the first
respondent's objection a moot point and lacking in merit.
[30] All
in all, I considered that none of the first respondent's technical
objections aforesaid, individually or collectively, could block the
determination of the matter on the merits seeing that the applicants'
complaint was a breach of fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined
in the Constitution. Section 85 of the Constitution says the fact
that a person has contravened a law does not debar them from
approaching a court for relief. It also says the rules of every court
must ensure that they fully facilitate the right of every person to
approach the court; that formalities relating to the proceedings are
kept to a minimum, and that the court, whilst observing the rules of
natural justice, is not unreasonably restricted by procedural
technicalities. The Constitution is of course, the supreme law of
Zimbabwe [section 2]. Any law, practice, custom or conduct
inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.
[31] On
the grounds above, I dismissed all the first respondent's points in
limine
and directed argument on the merits. In summary, the mainstay of the
first respondent's argument on the merits was:
-
The
events complained of, even if true, were 'a thing of the past'.
The first respondent and Zimbabwe are now in a new dispensation
under President Mnangagwa. The violations were probably rife under
the then President Mugabe. Not anymore.
-
The
report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission was one-sided. It
contained none of the first respondent's views. As such it lacked
balance.
-
The
applicants had conflated the functions of the first respondent with
those of the second respondent. It is not the policy of the first
respondent to require children and teachers to attend its rallies.
The first respondent has a large support base and it does not need
school children and teachers to bolster numbers. But for the second
respondent, the new schools curricula require the preservation of
traditional culture. This is done through the compulsory teaching of
visual performing arts and mass displays, components of which
involve children showcasing traditional dances like “jerusarema”,
“mbende”,
“muchongoyo”,
and the like, at mass gatherings such as rallies.
-
Some
parents sometimes take their children to the first respondent's
rallies out of necessity if there is no one at home to leave them
with.
-
The
event at Chinzanga School in Mashonaland East Province on 9 July
2018 was not a rally but an occasion for the President to donate
computers and therefore one which the school children had to attend.
-
There
was no evidence placed before the court by the applicants to show
that the first respondent had not paid for the buses and lorries
used in ferrying communities to its political gatherings or that the
equipment; furniture and other property used at such gatherings had
not been donated willingly by the owners or the school/parents
associations.
[32] In
his submissions, Mr Mushangwe
stressed that the first respondent was not at all involved in the
perverse conduct complained of, that if it was the second respondent
doing it, then it was unfair to include the first respondent in the
interdict.
[33] Sloppy
drafting aside, the application was well supported by very strong
evidence of abuse by the respondents in the form of sworn statements
by eye witnesses; pictures; media reports; documents; correspondence,
and the like. Undoubtedly, the first respondent's defence was wool
over eyes.
[34] I
was satisfied that the respondents were guilty of the blatant abuse
of the rights and freedoms of the school children; their schools and
their teachers as set out in the application. Among others the
respondents' conduct infringed on a number of the rights of
children as set out in the Constitution, such as the following:
-
the
right to education [section 75 and section 81(1)(f)];
-
the
right not to be compelled to take part in any political activity
[section 81(1)(h)];
-
the
right not to perform work or provide services that are inappropriate
for the children's ages [section 19(3)(b)(i)];
-
the
right not to perform work or provide services that place at risk the
children's well-being, education, physical or mental health or
spiritual, moral or social development [section 19(3)(b)(ii)];
[35] The
respondents' conduct infringed on the rights of the applicants'
members as set out in the Constitution, such as the following:
-
the
right to freedom of assembly and association, and the right not to
assemble or associate with others [section 58(1)];
-
the
right not to be compelled to belong to an association or to attend a
meeting or gathering [section 58(1)];
-
[in
relation to school premises and assets under their occupation,
custody or control] the right to hold, occupy and use property, and
the right not to be compulsorily deprived of same [section 71(2) and
(3)].
[36] Evidence
placed before me was that the Chinzanga Primary School event was a
political rally by the first respondent at which school children had
been forced to attend. The evidence also showed that it was rampant
practice by the first respondent, either directly, or through the
agency of officials of the second respondent's ministry or other
government agencies, to commandeer school premises, buses and other
vehicles, and to requisition other school assets such as desks,
chairs and sofas for use at its rallies. The argument that the first
respondent might have paid for them was puerile. The first respondent
is free to hire these from private hire companies and leave school
assets alone.
[37] The
High Court is the upper guardian of all minor children in Zimbabwe.
No one tramples on their rights and freedoms and expects the court to
look the other way. It will not. A report that grade 4 to 7 children
walked 11 kilometres to and 11 kilometres from a rally should invoke
outrage in any right thinking member of society. Section 81[2] of the
Constitution says a child's best interests are paramount in every
matter concerning the child.
[38] Some
events at political rallies are plainly inimical to the safety,
social development and moral well-being of children. There was
evidence that violence often flared up at first respondent's
rallies. People would get injured. Children are impressionable. The
deponent to the first respondent's affidavit admitted an incident
where abusive language was uttered at a rally attended by children,
but said the incident was now only relevant for historical purposes
because the first respondent, under the new dispensation, is now, as
it were, a new creature. I did not agree. Evidence placed before me
showed that the first respondent was still the same old creature and
still perpetrating the same old abuses.
[39] I
found the report by the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission most
credible. It was balanced. Among other things, it made comparisons of
rallies by the first respondent and those by one of the main
opposition political party. No children were being compelled to
attend rallies of opposition political parties. I also found that
before it published its report, the Commission had invited the first
respondent to comment, but that nobody did.
[40] I
was satisfied the application met all the requirements for an interim
interdict. It was on that basis that at the end of the hearing I
granted the relief sought in the draft order as follows:
“Pending
the final determination of this present case and/or the conclusion of
the 2018 election cycle, including any run-off election, whichever
comes first, it is hereby ordered:
(i) The
first respondent is interdicted and restrained from asking,
encouraging or forcing children at schools to attend or to
participate in political rallies or activities or causing the closure
of schools for any of its political rallies or activities.
(ii) The
first respondent is interdicted and restrained from compelling
teachers to attend political rallies, wear party regalia, prepare
performances for children to deliver at rallies or make contributions
towards rallies whether in cash or kind.
(iii) The
first respondent is interdicted and restrained from using school
property including school premises, buses, furniture, classrooms or
any other property that belongs to the school, the Government or
School Development Associations for any political rally or any other
political purpose.
(iv)
The second respondent and/or any employees of his Ministry are
interdicted and restrained from assisting the first respondent to do
any of the restrained activities above or allowing the first
respondent to use schools for political purposes.”
16
July 2018
Mtetwa
& Nyambirai, legal
practitioners for the applicants
Mushangwe
& Company,
legal practitioners for the first respondent
Civil
Division of the Attorney-General's Office, legal
practitioners for the second respondents
1.
1914 AD 221
2.
2015 [2] ZLR 243 [H]
3.
SC12-13
4.
HH559-14
5.
[1963] 3 All ER 1169 (PC), at p 11721
6.
HMA15-16
7.
1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H)
8.
SC12-13
9.
HH260-14
10.
HH709/15
11.
HH689-15
12.
2014 [2] ZLR 44 [H]
13.
1998 [1] ZLR 188 [H]
14.
2007
[1] ZLR 27 [H]
15.
2003 [2] ZLR 452 [H]
