Bail
pending appeal
MAFUSIRE
J:
This
was a second application for bail pending appeal by the applicant in
a space of two months. The first had been dismissed by TAGU J on 8
July 2015. So, on this second occasion, the applicant, naturally, had
to show “changed circumstances” as envisaged by proviso (ii) to
section 123(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act,
[Cap
9:07]
(“the
CP & E Act”).
That provision, in my own words, permits the admission to bail, of a
person convicted and sentenced by a Magistrate's Court, and whose
appeal is pending before this court, provided that where his
application has previously been determined, he can only come back on
new facts which would not have been considered in the previous
application by reason of those facts having arisen, or having been
discovered, after the determination of the previous application.
The
facts were these.
(a)
Charge, conviction and sentence
The
applicant, and one Grace Nyaradzayi Pfumbidzayi (hereafter referred
to as “Pfumbidzayi”
or “the
applicant's co-accused”),
were jointly charged in the Magistrate's Court for criminal abuse
of duty as
public officers
whilst they were still employed by Air Zimbabwe Holdings (Private)
Limited (hereafter referred to as “Air
Zimbabwe Holdings”
or “the
airline”).
They were accused of having procured insurance brokerage services
from a certain insurance broking firm, Navistar Insurance Brokers
(Private) Limited (“Navistar”),
without having gone to tender or without affording other insurance
companies the chance to bid for those services, allegedly in
contravention of section 174(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Codification
and Reform) Act, [Cap
9:23]
(“the
Criminal Code
or “Code”).
That section reads, with portions highlighted by myself:
“174 Criminal
abuse of duty as public
officer
(1)
If a public
officer,
in the exercise of his or her functions as such, intentionally -
(a)
does anything that is contrary to or inconsistent with his or her
duty as a public
officer;
or
(b)……………………………
for
the purpose of showing
favour
or disfavour to any person, he or she shall be guilty of criminal
abuse of duty as a public
officer
and liable to a fine not exceeding level thirteen or imprisonment for
[a] period not exceeding fifteen years or both” (my underlining)
The
applicant and his co-accused were also charged with an alternative
offence, namely, that of having procured the aforesaid insurance
services from Navistar without having sought the approval of the
State Procurement Board, allegedly in contravention of section 30 of
the Procurement Act, [Cap
22:14],
as read with section 5(4)(a)(2) and section 35 of the Procurement
Regulations, SI 171 of 2002.
The
charges against the applicant and his co-accused were being preferred
some five years or so after the incident giving rise to them, and
some years after the applicant had since left the employ of the
airline. At the time he had been the Group Chief Executive Officer.
Pfumbidzayi had been the Company Secretary and Legal Manager.
The
applicant and his co-accused pleaded not guilty to both charges.
After a full trial, they were convicted of the main charge, and
acquitted of the alternative one. They were sentenced to ten years
imprisonment of which three years were suspended. Currently they are
serving.
(a)
Appeal
The
applicant appealed to this court against both conviction and
sentence. The appeal is still pending. It is long winded and
convoluted. But, in substance, it attacks the findings of the court a
quo.
Among other things, the applicant criticises the trial magistrate for
having based her conviction on the evidence of, inter
alia,
Pfumbidzayi, which, he said, was not credible. Of one of the other
witnesses for the State, Charles Nyakabau, the applicant brands him
in his notice of appeal as just a hired gun.
On
the sentence, the applicant criticises the court a
quo
for patent mis-directions by, among other things, failing to
appreciate that the penal section under which they had been convicted
provided for both custodial and non-custodial sentences and that, as
such, the court ought to have seriously considered the non-custodial
option. The court is also criticised for having failed to give due
weight to the mitigating features, such as that the applicant was a
first offender who was a suitable candidate for community service.
Thus,
on appeal, the applicant seeks the wholesale setting aside of the
conviction, or, in the alternative, the reduction of the sentence to
two years imprisonment, with one year conditionally suspended, and
the other commuted to community service.
(b)
First bail application pending appeal
Two
months after his conviction and sentence, the applicant filed his
first bail application. The learned judge found no prospects of
success of the appeal and dismissed it. He also considered that the
applicant could abscond. On the propriety of the sentence imposed by
the trial court, the learned judge noted that it might have been on
the higher side, but that it did not induce such a sense of shock as
to warrant interference by the Appeal Court. He also considered that
even if the sentence was to be reduced on appeal, it was inevitable
that a custodial portion would still remain, given the gravity of the
offence.
(c)
Second bail application pending appeal
This
second bail application before me is based on alleged changed
circumstances. The applicant is saying, in my own words, and as I
understood counsel's submission, he was not
a public officer. He should never have been charged with the offence
of contravention of section 174(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Air
Zimbabwe was none of those entities envisaged by the Criminal Code.
His conviction is a nullity.
This
aspect was completely overlooked by both the prosecution and the
defence. It was overlooked in the first bail application. It has
never been addressed at any stage before. It is an aspect that was
recently discovered by counsel on being briefed to give advice on the
way forward after the dismissal of the first bail application. It is
also a legal point. It goes to the root of the validity of the
conviction. It brings a completely different complexion to the whole
issue of applicant's prospects of success on appeal. The applicant
has filed a notice of amendment to his previous grounds of appeal to
incorporate this new point.
In
a nutshell, that was the applicant's argument before me.
In
response, the State at first took a technical objection and steered
clear of the merits. In substance, the objection was that no changed
circumstances exist. It argued that what the applicant had purported
to do by filing the amended grounds of appeal was to bring in
extraneous issues that had never been considered before. It was not a
mere amendment, but a wholesome addition to the old notice of appeal.
This was in violation of the Supreme Court (Magistrates Courts)
(Criminal Appeals) Rules, 1979, (SI 504 of 1979).
The
State also argued that the fact that the applicant was a public
officer had never been put in issue, either at the trial, or in the
first bail application. It is not an issue in the only notice of
appeal that is properly before the court. The applicant is indeed a
public officer. Air Zimbabwe is indeed a State company.
I
interrupted the State counsel on the argument about Air Zimbabwe
being a State company. He was straying into the merits of the case
about which he had, at that stage, not filed any proper response.
After
argument I dismissed the State's preliminary objection and called
for argument on the merits. My reasons for dismissing the preliminary
objection by the State appear below.
(d)
Changed circumstances
The
most elementary enquiry pertaining to the charge with which the
applicant faced was whether he was a public
officer
as envisaged by section 174(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. Corollary to
that, was Air Zimbabwe Holdings such an entity as envisaged in the
Code?
The
applicant says in his application, it was only when counsel had been
briefed to give advice on the way forward that it was discovered that
he was wrongly convicted. Thus the nub of the preliminary objection
by the State was whether the discovery by counsel of the supposed
anomaly constituted changed circumstances, and whether the notice of
amendment of the grounds of appeal by the applicant was proper.
I
was satisfied that the discovery, even at that late stage, that the
applicant may not have been a public officer, and therefore may have
been wrongly charged and wrongly convicted, constituted changed
circumstances.
The
actual wording of the CP & E Act on the point, with portions
underlined by myself for emphasis, reads:
“123
Power to admit to bail pending appeal or review
(1)
Subject to this section, a person may be admitted to bail or have his
conditions of bail altered –
(a)…………………………………………...
(i)…………………………………..
(ii)…………………………………..
(b)
in the case of a person who has been convicted and sentenced by a
magistrate's court and who applies for bail -
(i)………………………………….
(ii)
pending the determination by the High Court of his appeal; or
(iii)………………………………….
by
a judge of the High Court or by any magistrate within whose area of
jurisdiction he is in custody:
Provided
that -
(i)………………………………..
(ii)
where an application in terms of this subsection is determined by a
judge or magistrate, a further application in terms of this
subsection may
only be made,
whether to the judge or magistrate who has determined the previous
application or any other judge or magistrate, if
such application is based on facts which were not placed before the
judge or magistrate who determined the previous application
and which have arisen or
been discovered after the determination.”
Thus,
a subsequent bail application is irregular if it is based on the same
set of facts that founded the previous one. It is regular if it is
based on facts that had not been placed before the judicial officer
in the previous application. Those facts ought to have arisen after
the determination of the previous application. Alternatively, they
ought to have been discovered
after the previous application.
Mr
Mpofu,
for the applicant, said the fact that the applicant was not a public
officer was discovered
(by himself) after the determination of the previous bail
application. As such, he argued, that constituted changed
circumstances. Mr Muchini,
for the State, argued that there was no such discovery. This was a
fact that was always in existence right from the beginning. It had
never been an issue.
It
may be that mere remissness or negligence or lack of diligence in
failing to place all relevant facts before the court would not
ordinarily amount to new facts, or changed circumstances, where a
person, or somebody on his behalf, eventually wisens up to those
facts. In my view, if with the exercise of due diligence such facts
would have been made available, the court should not too readily
accept them as new facts amounting to changed circumstances.
The
test whether in a subsequent bail application there are changed
circumstances or not, may be compared to an application for leave to
introduce fresh evidence on appeal. The factors to consider should
include whether or not the fresh evidence could reasonably lead to a
different verdict, and whether there is a reasonable explanation why
such facts were not placed before the court. Learned authors LANSDOWN
& CAMPBELL in South
African Criminal Law and Procedure
state that
in exceptional cases, relief may be granted if the court is satisfied
that a reasonable probability exists that a conviction would not
stand if the further evidence were accepted. In reference to a
violation of constitutional rights in civil proceedings, NGCOBO J, in
Bel
Porto School Governing Body v Premier Western Cape
said:
“It
is true, a litigant should not be allowed to litigate in piecemeal
fashion. But this right ought not to be allowed to obstruct the
course of justice. In my view, the Court should only decline to
receive further evidence where it would not be in the interests of
justice to do so. The ultimate determinant therefore is the interests
of justice.”
I
associate myself with such sentiments.
In
S
v Augustine
the accused had been charged with murder. He had been convicted of
culpable homicide. Fresh evidence emerged before sentence was passed.
It was to the effect that the person whom the accused had stabbed had
not died but was still alive. The trial court had been in error in
accepting that the person stabbed to death was the person stabbed by
the accused. The fresh evidence was accepted. The case was remitted
to the trial court.
In
casu,
if the applicant was not a public officer, and if Air Zimbabwe
Holdings was not one of the entities as envisaged by the Code, then
such finding will strike at the heart of the conviction in the court
a
quo.
The
consideration of whether or not the discovery, late in the day, of
the fact that the applicant may not have been a public officer, or
his former employer not the State or a State corporation, was
intrinsically linked to the question whether the applicant's
amended grounds of appeal were proper. Mr Muchini
said they were improper because they were not a mere amendment, but
rather a completely new ground of appeal. He said to “amend”
is to make minor improvements to a document or proposal. He argued
that what the applicant had purported to do was to make wholesome
changes to his original notice of appeal to bring in a completely new
ground.
The
applicant's amended grounds of appeal, filed of record a day before
the second bail application was launched, read as follows:
“TAKE
NOTICE that appellant applies to amend the grounds of appeal
contained in the notice and grounds of appeal filed on the 21st
of April 2015 by
adding to the grounds appearing in the said notice”
(underlining by myself).
I
find that “add”
is a synonym of “amend”.
Other synonyms are, “alter”,
“adjust”,
“modify”,
“revise”,
“change”,
“improve”,
“correct”,
etc. The applicant was not substituting a new ground of appeal in
place of the old ones as implied by the State. In his application,
and throughout the hearing, he stressed that he still stood by his
old grounds of appeal and implored the court to reconsider his
prospects of success in the light of the additional ground of appeal
which he felt lent a different complexion altogether to his
situation.
Undoubtedly,
if the applicant was bringing a new bail application purely and
solely on the same set of facts as those considered previously, that
would have been irregular and in violation of section 123 of the CP &
E Act. But he was bringing the second bail application on the basis
of a new point which, in my view, was both a point of fact and a
point of law. He said he had recently discovered
it. In his view, the new point struck at the propriety of his
conviction in the court a
quo.
On that basis, he was urging the court to reconsider his prospects of
success anew. I thought he had a point.
In
its objection, the State relied on section 6 of the Supreme Court
(Magistrates Courts)(Criminal Appeals), Rules. That provision reads:
“6.
Amendment of notice of appeal
(1)
The Attorney-General or an appellant …. may amend his notice of
appeal by lodging a notice in duplicate with the Registrar setting
out clearly and specifically the amendment to the grounds of appeal -
(a)
in the case of an appeal against conviction or conviction and
sentence, as soon as possible and in any event not later than twenty
days after the noting of an appeal;
(b)
in the case of an appeal against sentence only, as soon as possible
and in any event not later than ten days after the noting of the
appeal.
(2)
A copy of the notice of appeal lodged in terms of subrule (1) shall,
at the same time as the lodging of such notice, be served on the
other party to the appeal.
(3)
An amendment to a notice of appeal in terms of subrule (1) shall not
delay the preparation and lodging with the Registrar of the record of
the case to which the appeal relates.”
Mr
Muchini's
major concern was the potential violation of the time limits as set
out in section 6 above. Mr Mpofu
countered by invoking section 5 of the same Rules. It reads:
“5.
Departure from the Rules
A
judge of the Supreme Court or the High Court, or the Supreme Court of
(sic) the High Court, may direct a departure from these rules in any
way where this is required in the interests of justice, and,
additionally or alternatively, may give such directions on matters of
practice or procedure as may appear to him to be just and expedient.”
I
felt I did not have to concern myself too seriously with whether the
applicant's amended grounds of appeal were proper or not, or
whether I could grant condonation or not. For me, those were aspects
for determination by the appeal judges. Before me was a second
application for bail pending appeal based on alleged changed
circumstances. Before me was an amended ground of appeal
incorporating an aspect, recently discovered as a fact or a point of
law, which seemed so fundamental to the prospects of success of the
applicant's appeal. On examining that new aspect, I found it to be
so profound as to strike at the root of the very conviction in
respect of which the applicant was serving time.
Section
6 of the appeals regulations does not distinguish between a
substantial or wholesome amendment from a minor amendment. Before me,
the applicant made out a case of changed circumstances. On that
basis, I dismissed the preliminary objection by the State.
The
State then sought an adjournment to allow the filing of a proper
notice of opposition on the merits. It was granted.
(e)
Applicant's prospects of success on appeal
In
an application for bail pending appeal, it is not the function of the
judicial officer to satisfy himself beyond any measure of doubt
whether or not the grounds of appeal are doomed to fail. If the
applicant has some fighting chance on appeal, then all the other
relevant factors being neutral, the applicant must be entitled to
relief.
In
casu,
counsel for both parties accept the test laid out in S
v Hudson.
The question is not whether the appeal will succeed. The standard is
much lower. It is whether
the appeal is free from predictable failure.
If that conclusion is reached, the applicant should be entitled to
relief.
In
Shah
v Air Zimbabwe Corporation,
a judgment of this court by KUDYA J, and Air
Zimbabwe (Private) Limited & Anor v Stephen Nhuta & Ors,
a judgment by myself, the finding was that both Air Zimbabwe Holdings
and Air Zimbabwe (Private) Limited are private companies formed by
shares and registered in terms of the Companies Act, [Cap
24:03].
Air Zimbabwe (Private) Limited was designated as the successor
company to the defunct Air Zimbabwe Corporation (“the
Corporation”).
It was the Corporation that was the statutory body. It had been
designated as such by the Air Zimbabwe Corporation Act, then [Cap
13:02].
But it unbundled in 1998. Chapter 13:02 was repealed by the Air
Zimbabwe Corporation (Repeal) Act, No 4 of 1998. Air Zimbabwe
Holdings was formed in 2005.
Briefly,
the history of this airline is this.
It
started off as the Central African Airways Corporation during the
days of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. In 1968 the name
was changed to Air Rhodesia Corporation. It became Air Zimbabwe
Rhodesia Corporation during the days of Zimbabwe Rhodesia. After
Zimbabwe's independence in 1980 the airline became Air Zimbabwe
Corporation. Throughout all these phases, it was a statutory
corporation. But that Corporation was dissolved in 1998. Air Zimbabwe
(Private) Limited which had been incorporated by shares and
registered as a private company in 1997, was nominated as the
successor company. In my judgment in the Nhuta
case above, I held that there was only one successor company, namely
Air Zimbabwe (Private) Limited, not Air Zimbabwe Holdings.
That judgment was upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court in Air
Zimbabwe (Private) Limited & Anor v Stephen Nhuta & Ors.
In
the present case, the State has conceded that Air Zimbabwe Holdings
is a private company. The concession is well made. One would think
that that would be the end of the matter. It was not. The State has
argued further that the applicant was properly found guilty because
as Group Chief Executive Officer for Air Zimbabwe Holdings, he was de
facto
“a
person holding or acting in a paid office in the service of the State
….”
as defined by section 169 of the Criminal Code. As such, he was “a
public officer”
within the meaning of section 174(1)(a) of that Code.
The
State argued that the situation on the ground was that the State is a
major stakeholder in Air Zimbabwe Holdings; that the Board that
administers its affairs is appointed by the Government; that major
decisions of the company have to be made in consultation with the
line ministry; and that the contracts of employment of senior staff
have to be approved by the State.
Finally,
the State made the point that in certain circumstances the State does
run private companies and that employees in such companies are
obviously in the service of the State.
In
my view, the question who is a public officer, or which types of
entities are State bodies for the purposes of section 174(1)(a) of
the Criminal Code, was not left to mere conjecture. It is clearly set
out.
In
section 169, the Criminal Code defines “a
public officer”
to mean:
(a)
a Vice-President, Minister or Deputy Minister; or
(b)
a Governor …………………………………………
(c)
a member of a council, board, committee or other authority which is a
statutory body or local authority or which is responsible for
administering the affairs or business of a statutory body or local
authority; or
(d)
a person holding or acting in a paid office in the service of the
State,
a statutory body or a local authority; or
(e)
a judicial officer;”
The
argument by the State is fallacious.
It
purports to read into the Code words that are not there. The section
does not refer to Government-controlled entities. It refers to
persons holding office in the service of the State. To say the Chief
Executive Officer of Air Zimbabwe Holdings, a private company, is the
same thing as “a
paid office in the service of the State”
is absurd. The Government is merely a shareholder in the airline. It
is not the employer. In my view, the person referred to in that
section is a civil servant who is employed directly by the State and
paid directly by it.
It
is true that the State may sometimes run its affairs indirectly
through statutory corporations. But the definition of “public
officer”
caters for that. Section 169 defines a “statutory
body”
to mean, among other things, “… any
body corporate established directly by or under an Act for special
purposes specified in that Act”.
An example that quickly comes to mind is that of the National Social
Security Authority which is established by its own Act of Parliament,
namely, the National Social Security Authority Act, [Cap
17:04].
Of course, there are many others. But Air Zimbabwe Holdings is a
private company formed by shares and registered in terms of the
Companies Act. It is not a statutory corporation. It was not even the
successor company to the old corporation which the Government
consciously and purposefully dismantled in 1998.
Mr
Muchini
argued that because the Government has direct shareholding in the
airline and literally runs its day to day affairs, it means that any
person employed by such an entity must be deemed to be holding or
acting in a paid office in the service of the State, within the
meaning of section 169(d) of the Criminal Code and section 332 of the
Constitution. He argued that the intention behind the creation of the
offence in 174(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was to protect public
funds
and public
property
as defined in section 308 of the Constitution.
In
terms of this section “public
funds”
and “public
property”
include any money, or any property owned, or held by the State, or
any institution, or agency of Government, statutory bodies and
Government-controlled entities
(emphasis by State Counsel).
Such
a definition, the argument concluded, manifestly covers Air Zimbabwe
Holdings.
Such
a tortuous construction is unwarranted. The applicant was not charged
with any offence whose elements required the importation of
definitions from the Constitution. He was charged with contravention
of a specific provision of the Criminal Code. That provision is not
at all in conflict with any provision of the Constitution. On the
contrary, the definition of “public
officer”
in the Constitution, for example, is almost identical to that in the
Criminal Code. What is more, the language of the Code is quite plain.
It is unambiguous. The ordinary and grammatical meaning is clear.
There is no need to resort to aids of construction.
In
my view, the applicant was not a public officer. In my view, the
Appeal Court is likely to find that the applicant was wrongly
convicted. But if I be wrong on this, the two judges of appeal will
correct it. For, now I find that the prospects of the applicant's
appeal are “free
from predictable failure”.
If he is not a flight risk, it is in the interests of justice that he
be freed on bail pending appeal.
But
the State was not finished.
Mr
Muchini
argued that even if I find that the applicant was not “a
public officer”
within the meaning of section 174(1)(a) of the Criminal Code as read
with section 332 of the Constitution, there is a competent verdict
under the same Code which he could have been found guilty of on the
same facts as canvassed at the trial. This competent verdict was said
to be section 172 of the Criminal Code, the heading of which is
“Corruptly
concealing a transaction from a principal”.
In particular, the State was relying on sub-section (1)(b)(ii). In
terms thereof it is an offence for any person to assist an agent to
carry out any transaction in connection with the affairs or business
of the agent's principal, knowing that the agent does not intend to
disclose to the principal the full nature of the transaction. Such a
person shall be guilty of corruptly
concealing
a transaction from the principal. The penalty is a fine up to, or
exceeding, level fourteen, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding
twenty years, or both.
It
was argued that the evidence established that the applicant and his
co-accused awarded the insurance business in question without
following the provisions of the Procurement Act and that this was
concealed from the Board of the airline. It was further argued that
section 172 covers a situation where one may not be a public officer.
The
alternative argument by the State on the so-called competent verdict
is contradictory and unfair to the applicant in several respects. It
glosses over an important element of the offence, namely corruption.
That had not been the State's case in the court a
quo.
The case that the applicant faced in the court a
quo
was that he had shown
favour
to Navistar in the awarding of the insurance business without going
to tender, allegedly thereby depriving other competitors the same
chance. That is hardly the same thing as saying he was being corrupt.
There was no suggestion, let alone any evidence of corruption led.
Mr
Muchini
argued that once there was evidence of concealment, then a
presumption operated that the concealment had been in the furtherance
of the corruption. For support, he referred to section 17 as read
with section 13 of the Criminal Code.
But,
in my view, this was a long and desperate shot. None of these
provisions are relevant. Section 17 says that where the word
“corruptly”,
among others, is used with respect to the commission of a crime, then
section 13 shall apply to the determination of the state of mind of
the person accused of committing that crime. One then goes to section
13. Its heading is “Intention”.
It says where intention is an element of any crime, the test is
subjective. It is whether or not the person whose conduct is in issue
intended to engage in the conduct or to produce the consequences he
or she did. Sub-section (2) says motive is immaterial to intention,
except in those situations provided for by the Code.
With
respect, there is nothing new in section 17 and section 13 of the
Criminal Code. That has always been the state of our law, even before
codification. The Code does not say that where concealment is proved,
corruption is presumed and that the onus then shifts to the accused
person. I do not think that the Appeal Court is likely to find that
the applicant corruptly
concealed
any transaction from anyone. I do not think that it is likely to find
that section 172 of the Criminal Code was a competent verdict, or
that the facts in the court a
quo,
disclosed a contravention of section 172.
Furthermore,
the applicant was acquitted of the alternative charge of contravening
the Procurement Act that governs the procurement of goods and
services by permission of the Procurement Board. Thus, even under
this alternative argument by the State, the applicant has, in my
view, more than a fighting chance on appeal.
(f)
Risk of absconding
In
the previous application for bail pending appeal the applicant was
adjudged to be a flight risk. But given that with the new ground of
appeal, the conviction is likely to be set aside on appeal, I see no
inducement for him to abscond. On the contrary, it seems reasonable
to assume he will want to go through the appeal process and be
vindicated. He is 60 years old. He is a man of substance. He is said
to have at one time or other made international connections. But he
makes the point that he is now too old to run away and re-invent
himself in another country. At any rate, the State conceded that the
argument that he has international connections was mere conjecture.
The record discloses no such fact. The allegation was based on the
mere fact that he was once the Chief Executive Officer of an airline
that flies to international destinations and that therefore he must
be assumed to have made international connections! With respect, we
are courts of justice.
The
applicant was said to be the head of a Christian ministry at the time
of his incarceration. He owns real estate in this country. His roots
are here. Taking all the factors into account, I see no grave risk of
him skipping bail that may not be mitigated by stringent conditions.
In
the circumstances, I find the applicant a suitable candidate for bail
pending appeal.
DISPOSITION
It
is hereby ordered as follows:
1.
The applicant shall be admitted to bail pending appeal.
2.
The following shall be the conditions attaching to the applicant's
admission to bail:
2.1
The applicant shall deposit with
the
Clerk of Court at
Harare
Magistrate's Court bail in the sum of two thousand dollars
(USD2,000-00);
2.2
The applicant shall surrender the title deeds for the property known
as Stand 17135 Harare Township of Salisbury Township situate in the
District of Salisbury, otherwise known as No. 2 Zebra Close,
Borrowdale West, Harare;
2.3
The applicant shall surrender all his travel documents to the Clerk
of Court at Harare Magistrate's Court.
2.4
The applicant shall continue to reside at No.2 Zebra Close,
Borrowdale West, Harare until his appeal is finalised.
2.5
The applicant shall report at Borrowdale Police Station every Friday
of the week between the hours of 6:00 hours and 18:00 hours.
9
September 2015
Rubaya
& Chatambudza,
applicant's legal practitioners
National
Prosecuting Authority,
respondent's legal practitioners
1.
Vol. V, Juta & Co Ltd, 1982
2.
At p 646
3.
2002 (3) SA 265
4.
At para 252
5.
1980 (1) SA 503 (A)
6.
1996
(1) SACR 431 (W)
7.
2010 (2) ZLR 94 (H)
8.
HH129-13
9.
SC65/14
