PATEL JA:
After hearing argument from
counsel, the court decided that the appeal should be allowed with no
order as to costs. We further indicated that reasons for judgment
would be handed down in due course. Those reasons are as follows:-
The
Parties
This
is an appeal against the decision of the High Court granting an
urgent Chamber Application filed by the first respondent. The
appellant is the Judicial Service Commission, a Constitutional
Commission established in terms of section 189 of the Constitution of
Zimbabwe. It is enjoined by section 180 of the Constitution to invite
candidates for appointment to judicial office, including that of
Chief Justice, to conduct public interviews of prospective candidates
and, thereafter, to prepare and submit a list of three qualified
nominees for consideration and appointment by the President.
The
first respondent is a final year law student at the University of
Zimbabwe.
The
second respondent is the President of Zimbabwe, while the third
respondent is the Vice President who is also responsible for the
Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs.
The
first and third respondents are opposed to this appeal. However, as
will be adverted to later, the first respondent has declined to file
his heads of argument in the matter.
The
fourth respondent was the incumbent Chief Justice and Chairman of the
Judicial Service Commission. He was due to retire at the end of
February 2017.
The
fifth, sixth and seventh respondents are incumbent judges of both the
Constitutional and Supreme Courts of Zimbabwe. They applied as
candidates for appointment to the office of Chief Justice and were
subsequently interviewed for that position.
The
eighth respondent is the Judge President of the High Court of
Zimbabwe, who also applied for appointment as Chief Justice but did
not attend the public interviews conducted for that purpose.
None
of these respondents participated in the proceedings before the court
a quo or in this Court.
Prior
to the commencement of proceedings in the main appeal, the Court was
seized with three separate applications for intervention in the
matter.
The
first and second applications were lodged by Beatrice Mtetwa, a
registered legal practitioner, and the Law Society of Zimbabwe,
respectively. They were both for admission as amici curiae to assist
the Court in its determination of this appeal. The third application
was lodged by the Abammeli Bamalungelo Abantu, a network of human
rights lawyers, for leave to intervene in the matter.
All
three applications were granted by consent without any opposition
from the other parties to this appeal.
Conduct
of the First Respondent
Before
outlining the background to this matter, it is necessary to comment
on the conduct of the first respondent, and, in particular, that of
his attorneys and counsel.
A
few weeks after the matter had been set down for hearing, the first
respondent's attorneys wrote two letters to the Registrar, dated 26
January and 2 February 2017. In those letters, they intimated that
the set down was unlawful, irregular and palpably tainted and,
therefore, they demanded an undertaking that the matter would be
removed from the roll.
Their
reasons for taking that view were not entirely clear, but the overall
tenor of both missives was not only brusque and overbearing but also
contumelious towards the Registrar and, by necessary implication,
contemptuous of this Court. This is a matter of grave concern and may
well invite judicial censure of the legal practitioner concerned in
the event of any similar conduct recurring in the future.
At
any rate, what also emerged from these letters was that the first
respondent was not willing or prepared to file his heads of argument.
Following his failure to do so timeously, he was clearly barred in
these proceedings and remained barred until such time as he sought
and obtained the upliftment of that bar.
Undaunted
by the obvious absence of any right of audience, the first
respondent's counsel had the temerity to appear at the hearing of
this appeal to ventilate his client's supposed claim to have the
matter postponed on a variety of specious grounds.
Among
these was the request to file heads of argument in response to those
filed by the three interveners, and the need to file a written
application on oath from his client for the purpose of uplifting the
bar.
Crucially,
despite being afforded the opportunity to do so, counsel was unable
to proffer any explanation that might have justified upliftment of
the bar.
In
response, counsel for the appellant argued that the application for
postponement was not timeous or bona fide and simply designed to
delay proceedings to the appellant's prejudice.
Having
considered all of these submissions, the Court was of the unanimous
view that the extant bar against the first respondent remained in
operation and that, having had ample time to have the bar removed
before the hearing and having inexplicably failed to do so, he was
not entitled to apply for any postponement of the proceedings.
The
Background
As
already indicated, the fourth respondent was due to retire from the
office of Chief Justice at the end of February 2017. The fact of his
impending retirement was duly communicated to all the relevant
functionaries. Thereafter, in conformity with its constitutional
mandate, the appellant set in motion the prescribed processes for
interviewing prospective candidates for appointment to that esteemed
office.
Four
candidates applied and the requisite logistical arrangements were
duly put in place for the conduct of public interviews scheduled to
be held on 12 December 2016.
The
urgent chamber application under consideration was filed in the High
Court on 7 December 2016. The gist of the first respondent's
averments was that the conduct of interviews as arranged was “not
feasible, not transparent and not fair” and that the long term
solution was to amend the Constitution to “allow the appointing
authority unfettered powers to appoint persons to the post of Chief
Justice”.
His
application was successful. The interim order granted by the court a
quo interdicted the appellant from conducting the scheduled
interviews for the purpose of submitting names to the President for
his consideration in appointing the new Chief Justice. The final
order sought on the return date was to suspend the aforesaid
interview process set in motion by the appellant pending the
finalisation of the proposed amendment to section 180 of the
Constitution.
The
impugned interim order was granted on 11 December 2016. The appellant
noted the present appeal against that order on 12 December 2016, the
effect of which appeal was to suspend the order.
The
learned judge a quo handed down his very detailed reasons for
judgment (16 pages in all) later that same day.
High
Court Judgment
Before
determining the merits of the matter before it, the court a quo
attended to several preliminary objections raised by the appellant
herein. These related to the questions of urgency and the certificate
of urgency, recusal of the judge, citation of the wrong parties,
locus standi of the applicant, and the need for leave to sue some of
the respondents.
All
of the objections raised were duly dismissed by the court, with
detailed reasons, which are not of direct relevance to the
disposition of this appeal.
The
court below held that the applicant had demonstrated a prima facie
right to a fair and transparent process culminating in any
appointment to public office. Relying on the values embedded in the
preambular provisions of the Constitution as having been designed to
attain higher democratic ideals, the court accepted that the
executive functionaries assigned to administer peace would promote
appropriate legislation to deal with the exigencies of any possible
infraction of the peace not anticipated by the Legislature.
In
the instant case, there was a public perception of possible bias
emanating from the close relationship between the Chief Justice and
the candidates for appointment to that office. That being so, the
responsible Minister had decided to amend section 180 of the
Constitution in the interests of the integrity of the appointment
process. This was a policy issue that he was equipped to address in
order to deal with an unforeseen eventuality.
The
courts are required to take notice of such executive intention and
must allow elected representatives to safeguard liberal values and
objectives. They must also take into account the relevant historical,
economic, social, cultural and political context and interpret the
Constitution in a manner that advances the rule of law and
contributes to good governance. Thus, the judiciary must be
politically accountable as regards its selection, tenure and
conditions of service and in relation to inter-branch relations. In
similar vein, the Judicial Service Commission must be independent but
also politically accountable to the elected representatives of the
people by dint of the prevailing social contract. This was a
necessary precondition for its legitimacy in a democratic society.
In
the case at hand, the court a quo noted that the responsible Minister
had revealed an intention to canvass the public for a change in the
law through his draft memorandum to the Cabinet. The appellant herein
was bent on a process challenged by the policymaker, entailing a
possible but unnecessary conflict between two arms of the State.
Consequently, the court could not disregard the intentions of the
policymaker and the probable infringement of the applicant's prima
facie right. Moreover, the balance of convenience favoured the
applicant because the relief that he sought was not opposed by the
responsible Minister.
Accordingly,
the court granted the interim order with no order as to costs.
Grounds
of Appeal and Relief Sought
The
stated grounds of appeal herein relate to the merits of the judgment
a quo. They may be summarised as follows:
1.
The court a quo had no authority or power to interdict the appellant
from carrying out a lawful process authorised by section 180 of the
Constitution.
2.
The Constitution cannot be abrogated, superseded or suspended by
intended executive action relating to its provisions.
3.
The first respondent did not establish a prima facie case on the
facts and at law to justify the grant of the interdict sought.
In
the event of the appeal succeeding, the appellant prayed that the
order granted by the court a quo be set aside and substituted with an
order dismissing the urgent application with costs.
Supremacy
of the Constitution
It
is axiomatic that Zimbabwe is a constitutional in contradistinction
to a parliamentary democracy. See Biti & Anor v Minister of
Justice Legal and Parliamentary Affairs & Anor 2002 (1) ZLR 177
(S) at 190A-B. This fundamental principle and its concomitant legal
ramifications and obligations are codified in s 2 of the Constitution
as follows:
“(1)
This Constitution is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and any law,
practice, custom or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid to the
extent of the inconsistency.
(2)
The obligations imposed by this Constitution are binding on every
person, natural or juristic, including the State and all executive,
legislative and judicial institutions and agencies of government at
every level, and must be fulfilled by them.”
Section
3 of the Constitution enshrines the founding values and principles of
Zimbabwe. In its relevant parts it provides that:
“(1)
Zimbabwe is founded on respect for the following values and
principles —
(a)
supremacy of the Constitution;
(b)
the rule of law;
(c)
fundamental human rights and freedoms;
(d)
…;
(e)
…;
(f)
…;
(g)
…;
(h)
good governance; and
(i)
….
(2)
The principles of good governance, which bind the State and all
institutions and agencies of government at every level, include —
(a)
…;
(b)
…;
(c)
…;
(d)
…;
(e)
observance of the principle of separation of powers;
(f)
respect for the people of Zimbabwe, from whom the authority to govern
is derived;
(g)
transparency, justice, accountability and responsiveness;
(h)
…;
(i)
…;
(j)
…;
(k)
…; and
(l)
….”
By
virtue of the foregoing principles, the Constitution demands strict
compliance with its substantive provisions and all laws enacted under
its aegis. It also demands meticulous adherence to the procedures and
processes prescribed under the Constitution. These principles bind
everyone, including the appellant which, as an executive institution,
is expressly bound to comply with the substantive and procedural
requirements of the Constitution.
Authority to Interdict
Lawful Constitutional Process
The
critical provision of the Constitution for present scrutiny is s 180,
which provides for judicial appointments as follows:
“(1)
The Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Judge President of
the High Court and all other judges are appointed by the President in
accordance with this section.
(2)
Whenever it is necessary to appoint a judge, the Judicial Service
Commission must —
(a)
advertise the position;
(b)
invite the President and the public to make nominations;
(c)
conduct public interviews of prospective candidates;
(d)
prepare a list of three qualified persons as nominees for the
office; and
(e)
submit the list to the President;
whereupon,
subject to subsection (3), the President must appoint one of the
nominees to the office concerned.
(3)
If the President considers that none of the persons on the list
submitted to him or her in terms of subsection (2)(e) are suitable
for appointment to the office, he or she must require the Judicial
Service Commission to submit a further list of three qualified
persons, whereupon the President must appoint one of the nominees to
the office concerned.
(4)
The President must cause notice of every appointment under this
section to be published in the Gazette.”
(I note that section 180 was
amended in September 2017, some seven months after the decision in
this matter was handed down in February 2017. However, this
amendment clearly does not affect the applicability of s180 in its
original form at that time or the reasoning of the Court in arriving
at that decision).
In
the instant case, the appellant duly invited nominations to fill the
vacancy in the office of Chief Justice. The nominees were then
invited to attend public interviews. In short, it is common cause
that the appellant fully complied with its obligations under the
Constitution. It is therefore difficult to perceive what wrong the
appellant can be said to have committed or how the first respondent's
rights have been violated so as to justify the issuance of an
interdict against the appellant from conducting the interviews as
scheduled in terms of a valid and binding constitutional provision.
A
court of law simply has no power to interdict a constitutional body
from performing its constitutional obligations.
It
cannot be doubted that the courts are bound not only to respect the
provisions of the Constitution but also to enforce them insofar as
they dictate substantive and procedural requirements to be fulfilled
by constitutional bodies. In the absence of any constitutional fiat
to do so, it is clearly not within the ambit of the power or
authority of a judge of the High Court to override or purport to
suspend or limit the operation of an unambiguous provision of the
Constitution under the pretext of pending executive action.
As
was lucidly enunciated in The State v Mabena & Anor [2006] SCA
132 (RSA) at para 2:
“The
Constitution proclaims the existence of a State that is founded on
the rule of law. Under such a regime legitimate State authority
exists only within the confines of the law, as it is embodied in the
Constitution that created it, and the purported exercise of such
authority other than in accordance with the law is a nullity. That is
the cardinal tenet of the rule of law. It admits of no exception in
relation to the judicial authority of the State. Far from conferring
authority to disregard the law the Constitution is the imperative for
justice to be done in accordance with the law. As in the case of
other State authority, the exercise of judicial authority otherwise
than according to law is simply invalid.”
The
principal argument posited on behalf of the third respondent (the
Minister) was that the majority of the interviewing panellists would
have little or no knowledge of the law as compared to the candidates
to be interviewed. Thus, so it was argued, the public's expectation
of good institutional governance cannot be met where a prospective
Chief Justice is subjected to public interview by persons who are
junior in terms of experience and the prevailing hierarchy.
It
was further argued that there is no timeframe prescribed in the
Constitution to fill any vacancy for the post of Chief Justice. Given
that s181(1) of the Constitution expressly provides for the Deputy
Chief Justice to act in place of the Chief Justice during such
vacancy, there was no need for the appellant to insist on conducting
interviews in light of the constitutional amendment proposed by the
executive.
What
these arguments overlook is the paramount need to strictly adhere to
constitutionally prescribed procedures.
Where
a constitutional body has a positive duty to carry out certain
functions and processes and fails to do so, its omission would
constitute a violation of the Constitution attracting judicial
censure.
In
this case, the Constitution prescribes how the vacancy in the office
of Chief Justice is to be filled and the governing provisions have
been duly adhered to. In these circumstances, no interdict can
possibly arise against a constitutional body performing its
constitutionally prescribed mandate.
As
regards the supposed absence of any specified timeframe for filling
the vacancy, the third respondent's argument is palpably untenable
in light of the peremptory injunction embodied in s 324 of the
Constitution which demands that:
“All
constitutional obligations must be performed diligently and without
delay.” (my emphasis)
The
plain wording of section 324 is clear and unequivocal. In the present
context, the appellant was duty-bound to carry out its functions
under section 180 to fill the impending vacancy, not only diligently
but also without delay. This is so notwithstanding the transitional
filling of that vacancy in an acting capacity in terms of s 181.
A
court of law has no power to stop the lawful and diligent performance
of a constitutional process or constitutional obligation imposed upon
the appellant on the basis of an alleged intention of the executive
to amend the Constitution.
Generally
speaking, it is not permissible for a court to interdict the lawful
exercise of powers conferred by statute. See Gool v Minister of
Justice & Anor 1955 (2) SA 682 (CPD) at 688F-G. This approach
applies a fortiori where a court is called upon to interdict the
lawful and bona fide performance of a constitutional duty.
In
the instant case, the court a quo failed to assess whether or not it
was “constitutionally appropriate to grant the interdict”. See
National Treasury & Ors v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance &
Ors 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at para 66. In so doing, it failed to
observe the time honoured doctrine of separation of powers.
As
was underscored in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the
National Assembly & Ors 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para 37:
“Courts
must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the
Constitution's design to leave certain matters to other branches of
government. They too must observe the constitutional limits of their
authority. This means that the judiciary should not interfere in the
processes of other branches of government unless to do so is mandated
by the Constitution.”
This
principle was also clearly articulated in International Trade
Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA
618 (CC) at para 95:
“Where
the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific powers
and functions to a particular branch of government, courts may not
usurp that power or function by making a decision of their
preference. That would frustrate the balance of power implied in the
principle of separation of powers. The primary responsibility of a
court is not to make decisions reserved for or within the domain of
other branches of government, but rather to ensure that the concerned
branches of government exercise their authority within the bounds of
the Constitution. This would especially be so where the decision in
issue is policy-laden as well as polycentric.”
To
conclude on this aspect of this case, there can be no doubt that the
decision of the court a quo to interdict the scheduled public
interview process was fundamentally flawed for the following reasons.
Firstly,
there was no cogent allegation by the respondents of any breach or
violation of the Constitution. The allegation that the public
interview process is unfair, lacks transparency, is contrary to the
precepts of good governance, and is therefore unjust, has no factual
or legal basis and is entirely unsustainable. Secondly, there was no
finding by the court that the appellant either breached any provision
of the Constitution or otherwise violated the first respondent's
rights. Indeed, the court accepted that the appellant was carrying
out a legitimate constitutional process. In effect, it purported to
interdict the appellant in a legal vacuum.
In
short and with all due respect, the reasoning and judgment of the
court a quo defy logic and all established tenets of constitutional
law.
Suspension
of Constitutional Provisions by Intended Executive Action
I
have already adverted to this aspect in passing in the preceding part
of this judgment. However, it remains necessary to ventilate and
address it more fully for the purposes of this appeal.
In
doctrinal terms, the amendability of constitutional provisions has
been theorised in recent judicial and academic discourse within the
framework of the implicit limits doctrine or the basic structure
doctrine. The gravamen and implications of both doctrines, as I
comprehend them, are essentially the same insofar as concerns the
juridical conclusions to be derived from them.
It
is generally accepted that the present Constitution was prepared
after a prolonged and rigorous people-centred constitution making
process. It was the result of extensive consultations and
negotiations in striking an appropriate balance of constitutional
values, systems and structures chosen by the people of Zimbabwe. It
may therefore aptly be characterised as being autochthonous (albeit
not entirely original in formulation or content) and as an exercise
of the so-called constituent power.
On
that premise, where an act is performed in proper exercise of the
constituent power's mandate, a court cannot properly stay that
conduct on the basis that a constituted power, i.e. the legislature,
may eventually decide to approach the matter differently. It would
follow that to stay the choice of the people in enacting s 180 of the
Constitution, pending a proposed contrary view by the legislature,
would be to stultify the greater voice of the people so that a lesser
power that they have constituted may be exercised.
It
was contended on behalf of the third respondent that the court below
was correct in granting the impugned interdict pending the proposed
amendment of the Constitution. No reasonable judge, so it was argued,
could have ignored evidence from the executive indicating its
intention to rectify an alleged defect in the Constitution.
With
all due deference to the overarching political role of the executive,
this argument is not only startling but patently outlandish in its
disdain for the established norms of constitutionalism. It postulates
the very antithesis of the rule of law. One of the objectives of a
constitutional democracy is to rein in the unbridled abuse of State
power and resources. To that end, the introductory remarks of MOGOENG
CJ in Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly &
Others [2016] ZACC 11 at para 1, are very pertinent:
“To
achieve this goal, we adopted accountability, the rule of law and the
supremacy of the Constitution as values of our constitutional
democracy. For this reason, public office bearers ignore their
constitutional obligations at their peril. This is so because
constitutionalism, accountability and the rule of law constitute the
sharp and mighty sword that stands ready to chop the ugly head of
impunity off its stiffened neck.”
It
is trite that constitutional order hinges on the rule of law. For
that reason, the learned Chief Justice opines, at para 75, that:
“The
rule of law requires that no power be exercised unless it is
sanctioned by law and no decision or steps sanctioned by law may be
ignored based purely on a contrary view we hold. It is not open to
any of us to pick and choose which of the otherwise effectual
consequences of the exercise of constitutional or statutory power
will be disregarded and which given heed to.”
The third respondent's conduct, in seeking to have the operation of
a constitutional provision suspended on the basis of a proposed
constitutional amendment is obviously inconsistent with his
obligations in terms of s 2(2) of the Constitution. For a court to
grant the privilege that he seeks would be tantamount to condoning a
violation of those obligations thereby posing a serious threat to the
rule of law enshrined in s 3(1)(b) of the Constitution.
In
light of the constitutional imperative to maintain the rule of law,
the judiciary is obliged to give effect to the provisions of the
Constitution that are in force at any given time. Consequently, it is
not open to the judiciary to pander to the whims of the executive by
granting an interdict on the basis of a proposal to amend an extant
law.
A
constitutionally mandated process, which is binding and being
carried out in terms of the law, cannot be suspended on the back of
a mere spes that there might be an amendment in the future the full
effect of which is unknown. In other words, a court of law cannot
ignore a valid and binding provision of the Constitution in order to
effectuate the mere intention of one arm of the State to tinker with
that provision, particularly when the process of tinkering is in
itself fraught with legal uncertainty.
As
counsel for the appellant quite aptly phrased it, a constitutional
Bill is no “walk in the park”.
In
terms of s 328 of the Constitution, the precise terms of the Bill
must be gazetted at least 90 days before it is presented in the
Senate or the House of Assembly. Additionally, members of the public
must be invited to express their views on the proposed Bill through
written submissions and public meetings.
It
is therefore undoubtedly irrational to suspend the operation of a
constitutional provision by way of an interdict pending the
completion of such an arduous process. Indeed, as counsel for the
third respondent was eventually constrained to concede, Parliament is
not a mere rubberstamp. Thus, there was no certainty that, after
having debated the matter, Parliament would necessarily accept the
draft Bill and enact it into law without any alteration. In the
interim, the office of Chief Justice would have remained vacant, in
clear contravention of the appellant's obligation under s 324 to
implement the requirements of s 180 by filling that vacancy
“diligently and without delay”.
The
inescapable conclusion to be drawn from all of the foregoing is
abundantly clear. It is that the Constitution cannot under any
circumstances be abrogated, superseded or suspended by intended
executive action relating to the prospective amendment of its
provisions.
Whether
Applicant Established Prima Facie Case for Grant of Interdict
This
question has been rendered somewhat academic by the conclusions
already made upholding the principal grounds of appeal. Nevertheless,
it may be necessary and instructive to deal with it for the sake of
completeness.
Apart
from this, the other issues raised in the appellant's heads of
argument, relative to the lack of urgency of the application, the
defective certificate of urgency, and the absence of leave to sue the
President and judges of the High Court, are all ancillary matters
that do not warrant determination for the purposes of this appeal.
The
requirements for the grant of interim or temporary interdicts are
trite.
The
applicant must establish a prima facie right, a well-grounded fear of
irreparable injury, the absence of any other remedy, and that the
balance of convenience favours the applicant. See ZESA Staff Pension
Fund v Mushambadzi SC 57/2002, at p 4 of the cyclostyled judgment.
Insofar
as concerns the first requirement, it is settled in principle that
the grant of an interdict is based upon the existence of a right
which in terms of the substantive law is sufficient to sustain a
cause of action. To sustain such cause of action, the applicant must
prove a legal and not merely a moral right and that this right is
being infringed or threatened with infringement. Where the alleged
interference is in terms of an admittedly legal process, no legal
right is established unless the applicant shows a right not to be
disturbed in terms of such process. This is so because a party cannot
have a right, whether prima facie or clear, contrary to the law.
Thus, an interdict cannot ordinarily be granted where the allegedly
offending conduct is properly premised on statutory authority. This
principle must apply with even greater force where the conduct in
question is, as it is in casu, predicated upon and mandated by the
Constitution itself.
The
court a quo appears to have proceeded upon the basis that the first
respondent had a right to good governance which precluded the
application of s 180 of the Constitution. This approach was highly
questionable in the absence of any assertion or finding that s 180
was either internally inconsistent or otherwise constitutionally
impeachable. Accordingly, the court could not have found the
existence of any prima facie right or valid cause of action
justifying the grant of an interdict.
In
essence, the first respondent's case in the court below was founded
upon his imagined fears and facile opinion on what would occur if the
scheduled public interviews were to proceed in terms of s 180 in its
prevailing state. The application was an abstract one, driven by
surmise and conjecture, and which sought to invoke the jurisdiction
of the court on imagined factual circumstances without any cogent
foundational basis. In other words, the first respondent had no
right, whether prima facie or otherwise, to have the unequivocal
provisions of the Constitution applied in a manner that might have
accorded with his distorted perception of how they should have been
applied.
It
follows that the court a quo gravely and grossly misdirected itself
in finding that the first respondent had any prima facie or other
right and by consequently granting the interim relief sought by him.
Disposition
For
the foregoing reasons, the Court was of the unanimous view that the
appeal should be allowed. It was accordingly ordered that:
1.
The appeal be and is hereby allowed with no order as to costs.
2.
The judgment of the court a quo is set aside and substituted as
follows:
“The
application be and is hereby dismissed with costs.”
In
light of the detailed substantive principles expounded in this
judgment, it seems unnecessary and otiose to grant the various
declaraturs prayed for by the intervener in the draft order
accompanying its application to intervene in this matter.
HLATSHWAYO JA: I
agree.
ZIYAMBI AJA: I
agree.
Kantor &
Immerman, appellant's legal practitioners
Venturas &
Samukange, 1st respondent's legal practitioners
Civil Division of
the Attorney-General's Office, 3rd respondent's legal
practitioners
Mtetwa &
Nyambirai, legal practitioners for the 1st amicus curiae
Law Society of
Zimbabwe, legal practitioners for the 2nd amicus curiae
Phulu & Ncube,
intervener's legal practitioners
