PATEL
J: The
1st
and 2nd
applicants are directors of the 3rd
applicant, which operates safari activities in the Zambezi Valley
Area.
The
1st
and 2nd
respondents are directors of the 3rd
respondent, which is also a safari operator.
The
4th
respondent is the National Parks and Wildlife Management Authority
(the Authority) responsible for managing all safari operations in
Zimbabwe.
Background
The
applicants were granted two written concessions to operate hunting
safaris in the Rifa Safari Area for a period of 10 years expiring on
the 31st
of December 2007.
Before
this date, on the 18th
of October 2007, the Authority conducted an auction for a new 5 year
concession in respect of the applicants' concession area. At that
auction, the applicants were prevented from bidding for the
concession because they had failed to furnish the requisite bank
guarantee.
According
to the 1st
applicant, he then approached the 1st
respondent who undertook to bid on behalf of the applicants after
exhausting the respondents' own bidding limit. The 1st
respondent won the final bid for the sum of $750 billion.
The
1st
applicant then thanked him and was congratulated by all present for
having retained the concession.
Subsequently,
on the 20th
of October 2007, the respondents reneged on their arrangement and
sought to retain the concession for themselves.
The
respondents deny the applicants averments.
They
contend that all bidders at the auction were fully aware of the bank
guarantee stipulation, as was clearly stated in the Authority's
prospectus, and that there was no arrangement between the parties
prior to the auction.
They
did subsequently discuss the possibility of sub-letting part of the
concession area to the applicants but nothing concrete materialised
thereafter.
They
further aver that, if their concession agreement with the Authority
were to be cancelled, they would suffer irreparable harm.
The
Authority avers that the application is fatally defective in that it
does not cite the Minister of Environment and Tourism (the Minister)
as required by the Parks and Wildlife Act [Chapter
20:14].
Moreover,
the Act stipulates a maximum period of 10 years for hunting
concessions and, therefore, the Applicants cannot be granted any
further extension.
On
the 19th
of February 2008, the applicants filed an urgent application to
assert their rights and, on the 22nd
of February, they were granted a Provisional Order interdicting the
respondents from evicting the applicants from the Rifa Safari Area
and from interfering with the Applicants' operations in that area.
They
now seek a Final Order confirming the above relief and further
interdicting the respondents from exercising any rights in the
applicants' concession area pending the determination of Case No.
HC891/08.
In
that case, the applicants seek the setting aside of the written
concession granted by the Authority to the respondents in November
2007. The concession agreement was signed by the Minister on the 10th
of January 2008.
Preliminary
Issues
At
the hearing of this matter, counsel for the applicants submitted that
the respondents were in contempt for having acted contrary to the
requirements of the Provisional Order and were therefore barred from
being heard.
Counsel
for the respondents countered this submission on the basis that they
had appealed against the Provisional Order and that the respondents
were therefore not in contempt.
For
the reasons handed down at the hearing, I ruled that in the
circumstances of the case the effect of the Provisional Order was not
purely interlocutory but fairly definitive in terms of the future
conduct of all the parties concerned. It therefore did not preclude
the respondents from appealing against it without the leave of this
Court. Accordingly, the respondents were not in contempt and were
entitled to be heard in these proceedings.
Issues
for Determination
The
issues for determination herein, as I perceive them and as concurred
by counsel, are as follows:
1.
Whether the non-citation of the Minister as a party to these
proceedings is fatally defective.
2.
Whether Chapter 20:14 precludes the grant of hunting concessions to
any safari operator beyond the period of 10 years.
3.
Whether there was a clear agreement between the applicants and the
respondents whereby the 1st
respondent was to bid on behalf of the applicants at the auction.
4.
Whether the agreement between the applicants and the respondents, if
any, was legally binding and enforceable as against the Authority.
5.
Whether the balance of convenience favours the grant or refusal of
the relief sought by the applicants.
Non-citation
of Minister
It
is submitted by Mrs.
Wood
for the applicants that the non-citation of the Minister in these
proceedings is not fatal for two reasons:
(i)
Firstly, she relies upon Rule 87(1) of the High Court Rules 1971,
which stipulates that non-joinder of a party does not preclude the
determination of the issues in dispute.
(ii)
Secondly, she argues that the applicants are not presently seeking
the grant of any concession from the Minister and that, in any event,
the Minister is simply required to concur with the grant of a
concession by the Authority in respect of a specific area and is not
concerned with the identity of the grantee.
As
regards the non-joinder and misjoinder of parties, Rule 87(1)
provides as follows:
“No
cause or matter shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or
nonjoinder of any party and the court may in any cause or matter
determine the issues or questions in dispute so far as they affect
the rights and interests of the persons who are parties to the cause
or matter.”
Section
37 of Chapter 20:14 empowers the grant of leases and hunting rights
in safari areas as follows:
“The
Authority, with the concurrence of the Minister, may —
(a)
lease sites in a safari area to such persons and for such purposes as
it deems fit;
(b)
grant hunting or other rights over or in a safari area to such
persons as he deems fit; subject to such terms and conditions as he
may impose:
Provided
that —
(a)
the period of a lease in terms of paragraph (a)
shall not exceed twenty-five years;
(b)
the period of hunting or other rights in terms of paragraph (b)
shall not exceed ten years;
(c)
a grant of hunting or other rights in terms of paragraph (b)
shall not prohibit persons from entering into the safari area
concerned for purposes other than those for which the rights have
been granted.”
While
I accept that the non-joinder of a party is not necessarily and
invariably fatal to the continuance or determination of any matter,
it is trite that Rule 87(1) does not absolve a litigant of the
obligation to cite all relevant parties.
The
discretion of the Court in this regard must be exercised so as to
ensure that all persons who might be affected by its determination of
the issues in dispute be afforded the opportunity to be heard before
that determination is actually made.
Turning
to section 37(b) of the Act, it is abundantly clear that the
concurrence of the Minister is an essential statutory sine
qua non
to the grant of any hunting rights in a safari area.
Although
it is the Authority that actually administers and grants such hunting
rights, it can only do so “with
the concurrence of the Minister” and “subject to such terms and
conditions as he may impose”.
This
is clearly
recognised not only in the concession granted to the 1st
applicant in 2003 but is also explicitly declared in the preamble to
the concession agreement concluded with the 3rd
respondent in 2007.
In
short, the Minister's direct and personal involvement in the
approval of any hunting concession cannot be obviated.
By
the same token, where the Minister has already approved the grant of
hunting rights, he must of necessity be concerned with any dispute
concerning the exercise or non-exercise of such rights.
In
the instant case, the applicants seek an order interdicting their
eviction from the Rifa Safari Area and any interference with their
operations in that area as well as an order interdicting the
respondents from exercising any rights in the same concession area.
In
essence, the relief that they seek impinges upon rights previously
conferred upon the 1st
applicant in 2003 and those granted to the 3rd
respondent in 2007.
In
both instances, the determination of this Court will impact upon and
interfere with decisions already taken by the Minister.
In
my view, he is undoubtedly a highly relevant party to these
proceedings with a very direct interest in the outcome and
determination thereof.
It
follows that the failure to cite the Minister in this matter is fatal
and that the application should be dismissed simply on that
preliminary basis.
However,
given the possibility that my conclusion in this regard is incorrect,
I shall proceed to consider and determine the merits of this case.
Maximum
Period of Hunting Concessions
At
the hearing of this matter, Adv.
de Bourbon
did not persist with this point but Adv.
Fitches
reiterated the Authority's stance that the applicants were
precluded by section 37 of the Act from being granted any hunting
concession beyond the limit of 10 years.
Proviso
(b) to section 37 stipulates that “the
period of hunting or other rights in terms of paragraph (b)
shall not exceed ten years”.
What
this clearly means is that any single hunting concession granted
under the section cannot exceed the period of 10 years. It may at any
one time be granted for the maximum period of 10 years or for any
shorter period.
However,
the provision does not, in my view, preclude the grant of a further
concession to a prior holder who has held one or more concessions
amounting to 10 years, so long as the new concession does not exceed
the maximum period prescribed.
It
follows that the Authority's contention in this regard cannot be
sustained and that the applicants are therefore not barred from being
granted further hunting rights under the Act.
Agency
Agreement between the Parties
The
affidavit evidence filed by the parties is markedly conflicting as to
what precisely transpired during the bidding process at the auction
held in October 2007. Nevertheless, the applicants' version of
events is strongly supported by the affidavits deposed to by several
independent individuals who were present on the day.
These
corroborating affidavits (by Messrs. Evans, Jolliffe, Fundira,
Townsend, Dziya and Duckworth) confirm, firstly, that the 1st
applicant and the 1st
respondent had concluded some arrangement for the latter to bid on
behalf of the former and, secondly, that the 1st
applicant was congratulated by those present for having retained his
concession.
Having
regard to the foregoing evidence, the applicants' version in this
respect is more credible than that of the respondents.
Accordingly,
on a balance of probabilities, it is reasonably clear that there was
an agreement between the parties the effect of which was that the 1st
respondent would act as agent for the applicants in the bidding
process at the auction.
Whether
Agreement Legally Binding and Enforceable
In
terms of the prospectus governing the auction conducted in October
2007, the conditions for participation which are presently pertinent
were as follows:
(i)
Firstly, only citizens or representatives of wholly owned Zimbabwean
companies with no relevant criminal records would be permitted to
bid.
(ii)
Secondly, all current hunting concession holders “with the
exception of the current concession lessee” (viz. the 1st
applicant) were not allowed to participate.
(iii)
Thirdly, bidders were required to submit proof of funds by way of a
bank guarantee to be furnished to the Authority two hours before the
auction; prospective bidders who failed to do so would not be allowed
to bid.
(iv)
Fourthly, the Authority reserved to itself the right to vet all
bidders.
It
is also necessary to consider the concession conditions of sale set
out in the prospectus. These conditions directed all participants to
obtain auction participation forms on payment of the prescribed fee
and to pay a refundable participation deposit of $20 million. At the
conclusion of the auction, “the highest accepted bidder will be
declared the purchaser, subject to the reserve price [and] further
vetting” and immediate payment of a surety deposit of $5 billion
followed by payment for the concession itself within 14 days.
Although
the registration status of the 3rd
applicant was questioned by Adv.
de Bourbon,
by dint of a typographical error in the founding affidavit, I am
satisfied that the 3rd
applicant is not a South African entity but a company registered in
terms of the laws of Zimbabwe.
What
is more relevant in
casu
is the applicants' contention that they were assured by the
Authority that they would not be required to provide any bank
guarantee in order to be able to bid at the auction.
Apart
from this bald assertion, there is no documentation to support this
contention. Moreover, the above-cited conditions for participation
make it clear that all prospective bidders, including the 1st
applicant qua
current concession holder, were obliged to provide the requisite bank
guarantee, failing which they would not be allowed to bid at the
auction.
Equally
significantly, the applicants have proffered no evidence whatsoever
that they paid the stipulated auction participation deposit.
Notwithstanding
these deficiencies, Mrs.
Wood
submits that the 1st
respondent was duly qualified to bid not only for himself but also as
agent for the 1st
applicant.
Since
there was nothing to prevent the 1st
respondent from bidding or participating as an agent, it is his
status rather than that of the 1st
applicant which must be considered for present purposes.
As
already indicated, the Authority reserved the right to vet all
bidders before the auction in order to ensure, inter
alia,
that they were citizens or representatives of local companies and
that they had no criminal record for any of the offences specified.
More importantly, at the end of the auction, even the successful
bidder was subject to further vetting to ascertain his suitability as
a hunting concession holder before the concession could be granted.
These
vetting requirements clearly demonstrate that the identity and
attributes not only of the winning bidder but also of the grantee are
crucial to the selection of the concession holder.
The
appointment of an agent to bid on behalf of the prospective grantee
would clearly subvert and negate the vetting and selection process
since it is the agent rather than his principal who would have been
subjected to full scrutiny. Although the bidding agent might be a
local citizen and otherwise suitably qualified, his principal might
well be a foreigner or even a convicted fraudster or perpetrator of
parks and wildlife offences.
I
am fortified in this view by having regard to the terms and
conditions incorporated in the concession agreements in
casu.
Clause
23 of the 1st
applicant's expired concession agreement is virtually identical to
clause 23 of the 3rd
respondent's current agreement. This latter clause recognises that
“the right to operate on the Concession has been given to the right
holder and to no other person solely in consideration of the right
holder's successful bid of the right to hunt”. It then stipulates
that, in the case of a corporate right holder, no shares may be
issued or transferred and no new director may be appointed without
the Authority's prior written approval. Additionally, the clause
prohibits in absolute terms any cession or assignment of any right or
obligation under the agreement or of the right holder's annual
quota of animals. It also prohibits any sublease or sub-occupation or
any hypothecation or encumbrance of the concession without the prior
written consent of the Authority.
All
of this reaffirms the critical significance of the grantee's
identity and the fact that the rights conferred and obligations
imposed under the concession are personal and peculiar to the
grantee.
Taking
all of the foregoing into account, I am of the firm opinion that any
agency agreement of the nature presently under review would operate
to circumvent the Authority's vetting requirements and the clear
objective behind those requirements. Any such arrangement, even if it
were not contrived as a deliberate subterfuge, cannot be utilised to
dilute the obvious privity of contract envisaged between the
successful bidder-cum-grantee on the one hand and the Minister and
the Authority on the other.
It
follows that the agency agreement in
casu,
whatever its legal implications and consequences as between the
applicants and the respondents, is not legally binding on the
Authority and cannot be enforced as against it.
It
also follows that the applicants have failed to establish the
infraction of any clear right entitling them to the interdictory
relief that they seek.
Balance
of Convenience
The
above conclusion renders it unnecessary for me to consider the final
issue relating to the balance of convenience as between the parties.
However, for the sake of completeness, I deem it appropriate to
dispose of this aspect as well.
As
regards the applicants, the withdrawal of the hunting concession has
obviously entailed the loss of profit and will necessitate the
removal of their assets from the concession area. However, their
losses are not irreparable and could be redressed by a claim for
damages in respect of lost profits and future hunting rights.
Moreover,
in terms of clause 14 of the 1st
applicant's concession agreement, he was given ample time to remove
his improvements and is entitled to compensation from the Authority
in respect of those improvements that are retained in
situ
by agreement.
Insofar
as concerns the respondents, almost two years have elapsed since the
3rd
respondent was granted its hunting concession. If this subsisting
concession agreement were to be cancelled or temporarily suspended,
the respondents would incur huge losses in terms of moneys already
expended on the auction and concession area and the withdrawal of
firm contracts with foreign clients amounting to US$350,000.
Moreover,
the practical effect of the final order sought by the applicants
would be to suspend all operations in the concession area until the
action in Case No. HC891/08 is finalised.
As
is apparent from questions put to counsel, the time frame for the
final determination of that matter is presently uncertain.
As
for the Authority, the suspension of hunting operations in the Rifa
Safari Area will result in the substantial loss of revenue by way of
hunting fees payable under the subsisting concession agreement. Any
such suspension will also involve a diminution in other income
generated from foreign and local tourists within the concession area.
All
in all, I am abundantly satisfied that the balance of convenience
does not favour the applicants. The granting of the relief sought in
this matter would cause greater harm and inconvenience to the
respondents and the Authority than the harm and inconvenience that
the refusal of that relief would cause to the applicants.
Disposition
I
have found that there was an agreement between the applicants and the
respondents whereby the 1st
respondent was to bid as agent for the applicants at the auction
conducted on behalf of the Authority in October 2007. However, in my
view, this agreement is not legally binding and enforceable as
against the Authority and the applicants have therefore failed to
establish any clear right apropos the relief that they seek.
In
any event, even if it were to be shown that some right of the
applicants has been infringed, the balance of convenience clearly
favours the refusal of the order sought by the applicants.
In
the result, the application is dismissed with costs.
Venturas
& Partners,
applicants' legal practitioners
Costa
& Madzonga,
1st,
2nd
and 3rd
respondents' legal practitioners
Chinamasa,
Mudimu, Chinogwenya & Dondo,
4th
respondent's legal practitioners