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HB41-14 - ITYAI NKOMO and 2 OTHERS vs T.M. SUPERMARKETS (PVT) LTD

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Procedural Law-viz final orders re dismissal of a matter for want of prosecution iro Rule 236(4)(b).
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re High Court Rules iro Rule 236(4)(b).
Procedural Law-viz High Court Rules re Rule 236(4)(b) iro application for dismissal of a matter for want of prosecution.
Procedural Law-viz affidavits re founding affidavit iro affidavit of collegiality.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re findings of fact iro assessment of evidence.

Final Orders re: Principle of Finality to Litigation iro Dismissal of a Matter For Want of Prosecution

The applicants in this matter filed a chamber application in terms of Order 32 Rule 236(4)(b) of the High Court Rules which recites that:

“Where the applicant has filed an answering affidavit in response to the respondent's opposing affidavit but has not, within a month thereafter, set the matter down for a hearing, the respondent, on notice to the applicant may either –

(a) Set the matter down for hearing in terms of rule 223; or

(b) Make a chamber application to dismiss the matter for want of prosecution, and the Judge may order the matter to be dismissed with costs or make such other order on such terms as he thinks fit.”…,.

The applicants averred that T M Supermarkets (Pvt) Ltd, Lobengula Street, Bulawayo was granted an interim order by this court under case number HC202/13 on 24 January 2013 staying an order granted on 15 January 2013 in case number HC4108/12.

They filed their notice of opposition on 1 February 2013. 

They alleged that the respondent had not taken any steps to have the matter heard and finalised since then. In their view, the respondent seemed to have no intention of taking any steps to finalise the matter which was now seven months old. The applicants further alleged that since the respondent's application had been based on the judgment of the Labour Court which had been set aside by this court it had become ipso facto baseless and without foundation and stands to be dismissed. They finally concluded that the latest judgment, which was granted in their favour, nullified all other judgments that went against them.

By letter dated 25 July 2013, the respondent's legal practitioners pointed out to the applicants that their interpretation of the judgment was erroneous and advised them that the setting aside of the Labour Court judgment did not change anything as the execution of the arbitral award had been stayed by an order of this court on 24 January 2013. The respondent vehemently submitted that the applicant's application was without any merit as there was no truth in the assertion that it had no intention of wanting to finalise the matter and had done nothing in that regard. 

It then chronicled what it had done so far.

The applicants filed their notice of opposition under case number HC2021/13 on 1 February 2013. The respondent filed its answering affidavit on 12 February 2013. The applicants filed their heads of argument on 1 March 2013 while the respondent did so on 11 March 2013. The respondent went on to bind and paginate the record and applied for hearing dates by filing blank notices of set-down with the Registrar of this court on 12 April 2013. But no hearing date was allocated. Since no hearing date was allocated, the respondent proceeded to file fresh blank notices of set down again with the Registrar. The record had already been bound and paginated and all that was left was the allocation of trial dates by the Registrar in consultation with a Judge who was going to hear the matter. The respondent submitted that there was nothing it could have done thereafter as it was the Registrar only who had the responsibility to allocate trial dates to litigants. No litigant has the authority to do so. 

The respondent submitted that the applicants had failed to appreciate and accept that the allocation of trial dates is a domain of the Registrar of this court. They further failed to appreciate that matters are set down on a first come first served basis. It was, accordingly, not true and correct for the applicants to allege that the respondent was doing nothing about the matter when it had, in fact, done all that was expected of it.

The respondent further submitted that it was also not true and correct to suggest that the application under case number HC202/13 was based on the judgment of the Labour Court which had been set aside.

The correct position was that the respondent filed its notice of opposition against the chamber application for the registration of the arbitral award on 11 December 2012. The respondent raised therein points in limine. However, when the court granted the order of 15 January 2013, which the applicants were seeking to enforce, it made no reference at all to the notice of opposition and the points in limine raised therein. It was clear that the court had not been appraised of the notice of opposition with its points in limine. The respondent argued that there was no way in which the court would have dealt with an opposed matter like an unopposed one if it had been aware of the opposing papers from the respondent. If it had been made aware it would have given reasons for rejecting the points in limine raised in the opposing papers. Having held a strong view that the court had not had sight of the opposing papers, the respondent applied for and was granted a provisional order for stay of execution. 

This court finds that it was indeed not true and correct to suggest that the application for stay of execution was solely based on the Labour Court judgment which was set aside.

This court further holds that the assertion that judgment HB113-13 nullified all other judgments is without any foundation. The order clearly stipulated that;–

“The order granted by the Honourable S. M. Nare, President of the Labour Court on the 10th January 2013 be and is hereby set aside.”

And nothing further. 

The order is not ambiguous and means what it says. It would be improper to alter or add any contents to the court order. See Baron v George 1994 (2) ZLR 141 (SC)….,.

In the result, the application fails and is dismissed with costs on the ordinary scale.

Founding, Opposing, Supporting and Answering Affidavits re: Deponent, Representative Authority & Affidavit of Collegiality


The first applicant, Ityai Nkomo, is the one who deposed to the founding affidavit which was adopted by the second applicant, Nicholas Khumbula Tshili, and Thembinkosi Nyathi, the third applicant.

Costs re: Punitive Order of Costs or Punitive Costs

The respondent moved that the applicants be ordered to pay punitive costs. 

I cannot accede to that request because in the exercise of my discretion I hold the view that this is not a proper case to award punitive costs. 

Party and party costs would be appropriated.

KAMOCHA J:   The applicants in this matter filed a chamber application in terms of Order 32 Rule 236 (4) (b) of the High Court Rules which recites that:

“Where the applicant has filed an answering affidavit in response to the respondent's opposing affidavit but has not, within a month thereafter, set the matter down for a hearing, the respondent, on notice to the applicant may either –

(a)   Set the matter down for hearing in terms of rule 223; or

(b)   Make a chamber application to dismiss the matter for want of prosecution, and the Judge may order the matter to be dismissed with costs or make such other order on such terms as he thinks fit.”

The first applicant Ityai Nkomo is the one who deposed to the founding affidavit which was adopted by the second applicant Nicholas Khumbula Tshili and Thembinkosi Nyathi the third applicant.

            They averred that T M Supermarkets (Pvt) Ltd Lobengula Street, Bulawayo was granted an interim order by this court under case number HC 202/13 on 24 January 2013 staying an order granted on 15 January 2013 in case number HC 4108/12.

            They filed their notice of opposition on 1 February 2013.  They alleged that respondent had not taken any steps to have the matter heard and finalised since then.  In their view, the respondent seemed to have no intention of taking any steps to finalise the matter which was now seven months old.

            The applicants further alleged that since the respondent's application had been based on the judgment of the Labour Court which had been set aside by this court it had become ipso facto baseless and without foundation and stands to be dismissed.  They finally concluded that the latest judgment which was granted in their favour nullified all other judgments that went against them.

            By letter dated 25 July 2013 respondent's legal practitioners pointed out to the applicants that their interpretation of the judgment was erroneous and advised them that the setting aside of the Labour Court judgment did not change anything as the execution of the arbitral award had been stayed by an order of this court on 24 January 2013.

            The respondent vehemently submitted that the applicant's application was without any merit as there was no truth in the assertion that it had no intention of wanting to finalise the matter and had done nothing in that regard.  It then chronicled what it had done so far.

            The applicants filed their notice of opposition under case number HC 2021/13 on 1 February 2013.  The respondent filed its answering affidavit on 12 February 2013.

            The applicants filed their heads of argument on 1 March 2013 while respondent did so on 11 March 2013.

            The respondent went on to bind and paginate the record and applied for hearing dates by filing blank notices of set-down with the registrar of this court on 12 April 2013.  But no hearing date was allocated.

            Since no hearing date was allocated the respondent proceeded to file fresh blank notices of set down again with the registrar.  The record had already been bound and paginated and all that was left was the allocation of trial dates by the registrar in consultation with a Judge who was going to hear the matter.  The respondent submitted that there was nothing it could have done thereafter as it was the registrar only who had the responsibility to allocate trial dates to litigants.  No litigant has the authority to do so.  Respondent submitted that the applicants had failed to appreciate and accept that the allocation of trial dates is a domain of the registrar of this court.  They further failed to appreciate that matters are set down on a first come first served basis.  It was accordingly not true and correct for the applicants to allege that the respondent was doing nothing about the matter when it had in fact done all that was expected of it.

            The respondent further submitted that it was also not true and correct to suggest that the application under case number HC 202/13 was based on the judgment of the Labour Court which had been set aside.

            The correct position was that the respondent filed its notice of opposition against the chamber application for the registration of the arbitral award on 11 December 2012.  Respondent raised therein points in limine.

            However, when the court granted the order of 15 January 2013, which the applicant were seeking to enforce, it made no reference at all to the notice of apposition and the points in limine raised therein.  It was clear that the court had not been appraised of the notice of opposition with its points in limine.  Respondent argued that there was no way in which the court would have dealt with an opposed matter like an unopposed one if it had been aware of the opposing papers from respondent.  If it had been made aware it would have given reasons for rejecting the points in limine raised in the opposing papers.  Having held a strong view that the court had not had sight of the opposing papers the respondent applied for and was granted a provisional order for stay of execution.  This court finds that it was indeed not true and correct to suggest that the application for stay of execution was solely based on the Labour Court judgment which was set aside.

            This court further holds that the assertion that judgment HB-113-13 nullified all other judgments is without any foundation.  The order clearly stipulated that – “The order granted by the Honourable S. M. Nare, President of the Labour Court on the 10th January 2013 be and is hereby set aside” and nothing further.  The order is not ambiguous and means what it says.  It would be improper to alter or add any contents to the court order.  See Baron v George 1994 (2) ZLR 141 (SC).

            The respondent moved that the applicants be ordered to pay punitive costs.  I cannot accede to that request because in the exercise of my discretion I hold the view that this is not a proper case to award punitive costs.  Party and party costs would be appropriated.

            In the result the application fails and is dismissed with costs on the ordinary scale.

 

 Coghlan & Welsh, respondent's legal practitioners
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