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HH586-14 - WELLINGTON TAKAWIRA vs CZI INCORPORATED (PVT) LTD

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Labour Law-viz employment contract re termination iro vested rights of ex employees.
Labour Law-viz termination of contract of employment re vested rights of ex-employees iro retention of company property.
Procedural Law-viz summary judgment re debt.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re counterclaim.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re claim in reconvention.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re counter application.
Law of Property-viz vindicatory action.
Law of Property-viz rei vindicatio.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re concurrent jurisdiction.
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re statutory ousting provisions iro section 89(6) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01].
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re labour proceedings iro section 89 of the Labour Act [Chapter 28:01].
Procedural Law-viz jurisdiction re cause of action jurisdiction.
Law of Contract-viz debt re acknowledgement of debt.
Law of Property-viz vindicatory action re lien pending compensation.
Law of Property-viz rei vindicatio re claim of retention.
Procedural Law-viz pleadings re admissions.

Jurisdiction re: Approach, Concurrent Jurisdiction, Statutory, Procedural and Contractual Jurisdictional Ousting

The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

Jurisdiction re: Labour Proceedings

The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

Jurisdiction re: Monetary, Cause of Action and Domestic Territorial Jurisdiction


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

Debt re: Acknowledgement of Debt or Liquid Document, the Acceptance of Liability and the Claim on Stated Account


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgement should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation.

The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha…, where, in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542=07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter-application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order, the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result, the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.

Summary Judgment: Clear and Unanswerable Claims re: Approach


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgement should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation.

The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha…, where, in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542=07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter-application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order, the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result, the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.

Vindicatory Action or Rei Vindicatio re: Approach, Ownership Rights, Claim of Right, Estoppel and Lien


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgement should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation.

The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha…, where, in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542=07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter-application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order, the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result, the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.

Vindicatory Action or Rei Vindicatio re: Claim of Retention or Lien Pending Compensation and Negotiorum Gestio


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgement should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation.

The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha…, where, in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542=07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter-application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order, the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result, the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.

Employment Contract re: Contractual and Terminal Benefits, Vested Rights of Ex-Employees & Retention of Company Property


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgement should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation.

The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha…, where, in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542=07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter-application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order, the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result, the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.

Pleadings re: Approach to Pleadings, Pre-Trial Proceedings, Disparities with Oral Evidence and Unchallenged Statements


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgement should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation.

The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha…, where, in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542=07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter-application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order, the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result, the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.

Pleadings re: Admissions or Undisputed Facts iro Confessionaries, Confession and Avoidance & Concession and Avoidance


The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter, the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542=07 for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave, and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition, the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542=07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle, an Isuzu KB registration number ABD 4174, to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgement and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of section 89(6) as read with section (1) of the Labour Act [Chapter 28.01] which provides as follows;

“(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) Hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) Hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) Referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) Appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) Exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) Doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on the respondent's counter application, counsel for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal, or matter referred to in subsection 1.”

In this case, both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other, this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95-11 CHEDA J, dealing with a similar situation, said;

“It is my respectful view, that, while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt, even if it arises from a contract of labour, is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application for summary judgment can be applied for.”

The respondent's point in limine is therefore dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgement should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation.

The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha…, where, in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14, she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542=07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter-application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order, the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Counsel for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result, the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.


UCHENA J: The applicant was the respondent's employee. He resigned from, employment by letter dated 1 October 2013. The respondent accepted his resignation by letter dated 6 January 2014. Through the same letter the respondent acknowledged that it owed the applicant US$32,542.07, for salaries, pension refunds, cash in lieu of leave and medical refunds and promised to pay him as follows;

  1. 1st instalment by 7th February 2014 - $10,000-00

  2. 2nd instalment by 28 February 2014 - $ 3,757-00

  3. 3rd instalment by 31st March 2014 - $ 3,757-00

  4. 4th instalment by 30th April 2014 - $ 3,757-00

  5. 5th instalment by 31st May 2014 - $ 3,757-00

  6. 6th instalment by 30th June 2014 - $ 3,757-00

  7. 7th instalment by 31st July 2014 - $ 3,757-00

In addition the respondent asked the applicant to handover the company vehicle by the 31st December 2013 which was his last working day. The respondent did not pay the applicant as promised. The applicant did not handover the company motor vehicle as directed.

The applicant issued summons claiming the sum of US$32,542.07 from the respondent. The respondent entered appearance to defend. The applicant applied for summary judgment.

The respondent opposed the applicant's application and counter applied for an order that the applicant handover the company vehicle an Isuzu KB Registration number ABD 4174 to the respondent.

At the hearing of the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application, the respondent in the application for summary judgment raised a point in limine challenging the jurisdiction of this court on the basis of s89(6) as read with ss (1) of the Labour Act (Cap 28.01), which provides as follows;

(1) The Labour Court shall exercise the following functions —

(a) hearing and determining applications and appeals in terms of this Act or any other enactment; and

(b) hearing and determining matters referred to it by the Minister in terms of this Act; and

(c) referring a dispute to a labour officer, designated agent or a person appointed by the Labour Court to conciliate the dispute if the Labour Court considers it expedient to do so;

(d) appointing an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators referred to in subsection (6) of section ninety-eight to hear and determine an application;

(d1) exercise the same powers of review as would be exercisable by the High Court in respect of labour matters;

(e) doing such other things as may be assigned to it in terms of this Act or any other enactment.

(6) No court, other than the Labour Court, shall have jurisdiction in the first instance to hear and determine any application, appeal or matter referred to in subsection (1).”

The applicant submitted that this court has jurisdiction because there is no dispute the Labour Court can hear and determine as the respondent admits and acknowledged its indebtedness to the applicant.

Commending on respondent's counter application Mr Mandevere for the applicant said the applicant is holding the respondent's motor vehicle as a lien for the acknowledged debt.

He is agreeable to this court ordering the respondent to pay the sum owed and his client being ordered to handover the motor vehicle to the respondent. It is therefore clear that both parties have no defence to the other party's claim against them.

There is therefore no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

The Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction does not apply where a party has admitted its indebtedness arising from a labour relationship which amicably ended with the rights of both parties clearly spelt out and admitted by the other.

Section 89(6) of the Labour Act applies where the Labour Court has “to hear and determine any application, appeal or matter referred to in subsection 1”.

In this case both parties admit their liability to the other leaving no dispute to be determined by the Labour Court.

Where a party acknowledges his indebtedness to the other this court has jurisdiction to determine whether or not to grant summary judgment.

In the case of Madinda Ndhlovu v Highlanders Football Club HB95/11 CHEDA J dealing with a similar situation said;

It is my respectful view that while it was the intention of the legislature to oust the jurisdiction of the courts from adjudicating on matters involving labour disputes, an acknowledgment of debt even if it arises from a contract of labour is not what the legislature intended to mean. An acknowledgment of debt is nothing but a liquid document which is covered by the rules of this court, for which an application, for summary judgment can be applied for”.

The respondent's point in limine is therefore be dismissed.

The applicant's application for summary judgment should be granted as the amount claimed is acknowledged in the letter in which the respondent accepted the applicant's resignation. The debt is further admitted in the opposing affidavit of Nozipho Guzha on p14 of the record, where in paragraphs 12, 13, and 14 she clearly admits that the respondent owes the applicant the sum of US$32,542.07, but has delayed the promised payments due to financial problems the respondent is facing.

The counter application should also be granted because the applicant admits that the motor vehicle belongs to the respondent, but was holding it as a lien.

On the granting of the court order the need for a lien falls away as the applicant can execute the court order to be granted.

Mr Mandevere for the applicant submitted that his client is not opposed to the order sought in the respondent's counter claim being granted.

In the result the applicant's application for summary judgment and the respondent's counter application for the handing over of its motor vehicle, are granted in terms of their respective draft orders as amended.







Kadzere, Hungwe & Mandevere, applicant's legal practitioners

Tamuka Moyo Attorneys, respondent's legal practitioners

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