Opposed
Application
MATHONSI
J: This summary
judgment application graphically illustrates that a trend is fast
developing among business people in this country to borrow huge sums
of money from financial institutions and when the time to pay comes,
to pay as little as possible or better still, not to pay at all. A
pattern is manifesting itself where business people will stop at
nothing in avoiding to pay legitimate claims and in the process play
havoc to investor confidence.
BARTLETT
J put it very succinctly in Industrial
Equity Ltd v Walker
1996 (1) ZLR 269 (H) 308C when he said:
“Things
that go round come round. Walker has had a merry dance. But he would,
to my mind, be well advised to realise that the music has stopped and
the time has come to pay the piper. Although with Walker's
determination to divest himself of all things executable, I fear that
the dance is not yet over – and that it won't be long before the
pipes are calling again and the last waltz begins.”
On
19 July 2011 the applicant extended an overdraft facility to the
first respondent which was signed for by the second and third
respondents in terms of which the first respondent would be advanced
a sum not exceeding US$50,000-00.
The
second, third and fourth respondents signed unlimited guarantees
binding themselves as sureties in
solidium for
the due and punctual repayment on demand of all sums of money due by
the first respondent.
Although
money was drawn in terms of the facility to the tune of $51,500.45
the first respondent failed to service it resulting in the applicant
terminating the facility and demanding immediate payment of the
amount due.
In
response to the demand the first respondent, again represented by the
second, third and fourth respondents, wrote 2 letters acknowledging
indebtedness. In the letter of 5 March 2012 they stated:
“REF:
BancABC FACILITY NUMBER A13766 FOR USD50,000.00
We
acknowledge the above facility and would want you to note that P.W.C.
Motors p/l is willing to and able to pay US$1,000.00 (one thousand
United state dollars) per month towards the balance that we owe
BancABC.”
The
respondent wrote another letter acknowledging the debt on 12 March
2012. They stated as follows:
“REF:
BancABC FACILITY NUMBER A13766 FOR USD50,000.00
We
acknowledge the above facility and would like to assure you of our
commitment to pay it off as urgently as we can. Our Managing director
has put up his residential property (with deeds) for sale and
proceeds from that will be used to offset our debt with the bank. We
are very keen to maintain our business with BancABC and we will
channel all our transactions through them. We thank them for their
continued support and we apologise for our account's
non-performance but we trust that they will be patient with us
regarding this matter.
Yours
faithfully
P.
Mare – Managing Director
W.
Mare – Director
C.
Mare – Director”
It
would appear that the respondents underwent some dramatic
metamorphosis from the position proclaimed in the above
correspondence because when the applicant issued summons claiming the
outstanding sum of $47,460-00, they promptly entered appearance to
defend and requested a whole array of further particulars.
Believing
that the respondents did not have a bona
fide defence
to the claim in light of the provisions of the facility document they
signed and the obviously unequivocal acknowledgement of indebtedness
contained in the letters I have cited above, the applicant filed this
court application for summary judgment.
In
his founding affidavit, Luckson Pfukwa, the Head of Credit of the
applicant stated that the facts are within his personal knowledge and
that he is duly authorised to depose to the affidavit on behalf of
the applicant.
He
confirmed the cause of action as being the overdraft facility and the
mortgage bond registered against Stand 5246 Mutare Township.
The
application is opposed by the respondents.
They
took issue with the applicant's failure to attach a resolution
showing that Luckson Pfukwa is authorised to represent the applicant.
On
the merits, they insisted that there are material disputes of fact
which should be determined at the trial. They demanded that the
applicant must prove the actual amount due, the legality of the
interest claimed and also justify the fees levied.
The
respondents also insisted that certain amounts of money were paid to
the applicant which were not taken into account in arriving at the
amount claimed. They attached receipts totalling $830-00 for payments
of $100-00 instalments made between 2 March and 31 March 2012.
At
the hearing of the application Mr Goba, for the respondents took a
point in
limine that
the deponent of the founding affidavit has not shown that he has
authority to represent the applicant.
He
submitted that Luckson Pfukwa does not have locus
standi to
bring the action.
A
summary judgment application is made in terms of Rule 64 of the High
Court of Zimbabwe Rules, 1971. The requirement for a supporting
affidavit is contained in subrule (2) of Rule 64 which provides;
“A
court application in terms of subrule (1) shall be supported by an
affidavit made by the plaintiff or by any other person who can swear
positively to the facts set out therein, verifying the cause of
action and the amount claimed, if any, and stating that in his
belief, there is no bona
fide
defence to the
action.”
To
my mind, the affidavit of Pfukwa meets all the requirements of Rule
64 and he fell within the category of persons who could swear
positively to the facts; Bubye
Minerals (Pvt) Ltd &
Anor
v Rani International Ltd
2007 (1) ZLR 22 (S)
25B.
I
am aware that there is authority for demanding that a company
official must produce proof of authority to represent the company in
the form of a company resolution; South
Africa
Milling
Company (Pvt) Ltd v Reddy 1980 (3) SA 431; South African Allied
Workers Union & Others v De Klerk N.O. & Others
1990 (3) SA 425.
However,
it occurs to me that that form of proof is not necessary in every
case as each case must be considered on its own merits. Mall
(Cape) (Pvt) Ltd v Merino KO-Oprasie Bpk
1957 (2) SA 345 (C).
All
the court is required to do is satisfy itself that enough evidence
has been placed before it to show that it is indeed the applicant
which is litigating and not an unauthorised person.
To
my mind the attachment of a resolution has been blown out of
proportion and taken to ridiculous levels.
Where
the deponent of an affidavit states that he has the authority of the
company to represent it, there is no reason for the court to
disbelieve him unless it is shown evidence to the contrary. Where no
such contrary evidence is produced the omission of a company
resolution cannot be fatal to the application.
I
therefore reject the point in
limine.
On
the merits the applicant is standing on firm ground having produced
the facility document signed by the respondents and the mortgage bond
which is, itself, an acknowledgement of debt. In addition, letters
written by the respondents admitting liability have been produced.
In
order to succeed in defeating a summary judgment application the
respondents must disclose a defence and material facts upon which
that defence is based with sufficient clarity and completeness so as
to persuade the court that if proved at the trial such facts will
constitute a defence to the claim: Hales
v Doverick Investments (Pvt) Ltd
1998 (2) ZLR 235 (H) 239 A-B.
As
stated by ZIYAMBI JA in Kingstons
Ltd v L.D. Ineson (Pvt) Ltd
2006 (1) ZLR 451 (S) 458 F-H and 459A:
“Not
every defence raised by a defendant will succeed in defeating a
plaintiff's claim for summary judgment. Thus what the defendant
must do is to raise a
bona fide
defence – a 'plausible case' – with 'sufficient clarity and
completeness to enable the court to determine whether the affidavit
discloses a
bona
fide defence'.
He must allege facts which, if established 'would entitle him to
succeed.' See Jena
v Nechipore
1986 (1) ZLR 29 (S); Mbayiwa
v Eastern Highlands Motel (Pvt) Ltd S
139-86; Rex
v Rhodian
Investments
Trust (Pvt) Ltd
1975 R & N 723 (SR).
If
the defence is averred in a manner which appears in all circumstances
needlessly bald, vague or sketchy that will constitute material for
the court to consider in relation to the requirement of bona
fides.
See Breitenbach
v Fiat SA (Edms) Bpk
1976 (2) SA 226 (T)
at 228D-E.
The
defendant must take the court into his confidence and provide
sufficient information to enable the court to assess his defence. He
must not content himself with 'vague generalities and conclusory
allegations not substantiated by solid facts' see District
Bank
Ltd
v Hoosain & Others
1984 (4) SA 544 (C) at 547G-H; Mbayiwa
v Eastern Highlands
Motel
(Pvt) Ltd
– supra;
Hales v Doverick Investments (Pvt) Ltd
1998 (2) ZLR 235 (H)”.
The
respondents do not even begin to satisfy the criteria set out above.
All
that they have done in the opposing affidavit of the second
respondent, is place in issue, without more, the actual amount
claimed and indeed the penalty fees. Yet all the claims have been
supported by documentation including the facility document and the in
duplum
schedule showing how the amount claimed is arrived at.
The
respondents signed an agreement allowing the applicant to charge the
interest that is being claimed.
Without
disputing the terms of the instrument of debt, the respondents want
the interest rate to be referred to trial. They do not show why they
should not be bound by what they agreed. These are the same
respondents who wrote 2 letters acknowledging the debt and asking for
time to pay.
In
my view, no defence whatsoever has been shown by the respondents.
Mr
Musimbe for the applicant made reference to the remarks of ROBINSON J
in Intercontinental
Trading (Pvt) Ltd v Nestle Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd
1993 (1) ZLR 21 (H) 37, which I subscribe to, where the learned Judge
said:
“Businessmen
beware. If you fail to honour your contracts then don't start
crying if, because of your failure, the other party comes to court
and obtains an order compelling you to perform what you undertook to
do under your contract.”
I
find it utterly deplorable that business people are very quick to
receive money from banks undertaking to repay on certain terms. When
they have expended the money and enjoyed the benefits they cry foul
when the lender demands its dues. We cannot allow a situation where
business people grab loans and then refuse to pay. As they say, the
time to pay the piper has come.
I
have taken into account the sum of $830-00 paid after computation of
the debt. In the result I make the following order; that
1.
Summary judgment be and is hereby entered in favour of the applicant
against the respondents, jointly and severally, the one paying the
others to be absolved, in the following;
(a)
The sum of US$46,630-00 being the balance on the overdraft facility
entered into between the parties on 19 July 2011.
(b)
Interest on the sum of US$46,630-00 at the rate of 44% per annum from
5 June 2012, the date of service of summons to date of payment.
(c)
Costs of suit on the legal practitioner and client scale together
with collection commission to the extent that such commission is
permissible in terms of the Law Society of Zimbabwe By Laws.
2.
The immovable property known as Stand 5246 Mutare Township situate in
the District of Umtali registered in the name of the first respondent
be and is hereby declared specially executable.
Bere
Brothers,
applicant's legal practitioners
Makombe
& Associates,
respondent's legal practitioners