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HB169-13 - ABEL MUPATI and ROSEMARY MUPATI vs M.B.C.A. BANK LIMITED

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Procedural Law-viz stay of execution re Rule 348A.
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re High Court Rules iro Rule 348A.
Procedural Law-viz High Court Rules re Rule 348A iro stay of execution.
Law of Contract-viz debt re debt security iro co-principal debtor.
Procedural Law-viz condonation.
Procedural Law-viz stay of execution re Rule 347.
Procedural Law-viz rules of court re High ourt Rules iro Rule 347.
Procedural Law-viz High Court Rules re Rule 347 iro stay of execution.

Condonation or Judicial Indulgence re: Approach, Time-Barred Proceedings, Extension of Time and Interests of Justice

This is an application for condonation for the late noting of an application for a stay of execution in terms of Rule 348A.

In their application, the applicants explain that they were of the view that the debt to the respondents was being serviced by the principal debtor. They are co-principal debtors in the matter. The first applicant states that the writ of execution in the matter was served on the 5th of December 2012 and the application for stay of execution in terms of Rule 348 was made on 2 August 2013.

In terms of the Rule, the application should have been made within ten days after the service upon the execution debtor of the notice in terms of Rule 347. That would mean the application to stay execution should have been made in December 2012. The application was only made in August 2013. The applicant's founding affidavit does not explain what then happened between December 2012 and August 2013, the period of the delay, he simply states that the principal debtor and the respondent have always engaged each other in an attempt to solve the matter. He also says he had always been assured by the principal debtor that the matter was under control. He alleges that he thus did not wilfully neglect to make the application within the prescribed time limits. Of particular importance is that nothing of substance turns on the applicant's averments. The explanation for the delay must be reasonable, and reasonableness can only be ascertained from the circumstances of the case. There is nothing reasonable that the applicant purportedly did upon being served with the Notice of Attachment. From his own affidavit, the applicant fails to proffer a reasonable explanation for the delay.

It is trite law that in an application for condonation the court has to consider the reasonableness of the explanation for the delay and the defence offered on the merits of the case. Such was the finding of the court in the case of Forestry Commission v Moyo, the learned CHIEF JUSTICE GUBBAY…, stated thus:

“One only has to have regard to the broad factors which a court should take into account in deciding whether to condone such non-compliance to appreciate the substantive application to be made. They are:- 

1) That the delay involved was not inordinate, having regard to the circumstances of the case. 

2) That there is a reasonable explanation for the delay.

3) That the prospects of success should the application be granted are good, and the possible prejudice to the other party should the application be granted.

None of the above principles have been addressed in the applicant's affidavit.

The applicant does not tell the court what precluded him from applying for the suspension of the sale in execution from December 2012 to August 2013. Neither does he proffer a repayment plan to convince the court that the respondent's dues will indeed be paid so that the court can be in a view to assess the reasonableness of the offer, as this has a bearing on applicant's prospects of success, as well as weighing the prejudice likely to be suffered by the respondent. Not only does the applicant fail to explain the delay but he, further, fails to make an offer towards the liquidation of the debt to enable the court to appreciate that the applicant is indeed interested and committed to settling the amount owing to the respondent.

It is my view, therefore, that the application for condonation does not meet the test applied in such cases and is thus devoid of merit. 

I accordingly dismiss the application with costs.

MOYO J:  This is an application for condonation for the late noting of an application for a stay of execution in terms of rule 348 A.  In their application, the applicants explain that they were of the view that the debt to the respondents was being serviced by the principal debtor.  They are co-principal debtors in the matter.  1st Application states that the writ of execution in the matter was served on the 5th of December 2012 and the application for stay of execution in terms of rule 348 was made on 2 August 2013. 

            In terms of the rule the application should have been made within ten days after the service upon the execution debtor of the notice in terms of rule 347.  That would mean the application to stay execution should have been made in December 2012.  The Application was only made in August 2013.  Applicant's founding affidavit does not explain what then happened between December 2012 and August 2013, the period of the delay, he simply states that the principal debtor and the Respondent have always engaged each other in an attempt to solve the matter.  He also says he had always been assured by the principal debtor that the matter was under control.  He alleges that he thus did not wilfully neglect to make the application within the prescribed time limits.  Of particular importance is that nothing of substance turns on the Applicant's averments.  The explanation for the delay must be reasonable, and reasonableness can only be ascertained from the circumstances of the case.  There is nothing reasonable that applicant purportedly did upon being served with the notice of attachment.  From his own affidavit applicant fails to proffer a reasonable explanation for the delay.  It is trite law that in an application for condonation the court has to consider, the reasonableness of the explanation for the delay and the defence offered on the merits of the case.  Such was the finding of the court in the case of Forestry Commission Vs Moyo, the learned Chief Justice Gubbay as he then was stated thus: 

One only has to have regard to the broad factors which a court should take into account in deciding whether to condone such non-compliance, to appreciate the substantive application to be made. 

They are:- 

1)         that the delay involved was not inordinate, having regard to the circumstances of the case, 

2)         that there is a reasonable explanation for the delay. 

3)         That the prospects of success should the application be granted are good, and the possible prejudice to the other party should the application be granted. 

None of the above principles have been addressed in Applicant's affidavit.  Applicant does not tell the court what precluded him from applying for the suspension of the sale in execution from December 2012 to August 2013.  Neither does he proffer a repayment plan to convince the court that Respondent's dues will indeed be paid so that the court can be in a view to assess the reasonableness of the offer, as this has a bearing on applicant's prospects of success, as well as weighing the prejudice likely to be suffered by the Respondent.  Not only does applicant fail to explain the delay, but he further fails to make an offer towards the liquidation of the debt to enable the court to appreciate that the applicant is indeed interested and committed to settling the amount owing to the Respondent. 

            It is my view therefore that the application for condonation does not meet the test applied in such cases and is thus devoid of merit.  I accordingly dismiss the application with costs. 

 

Dube-Banda, Nzarayapenga & Partners,applicant's legal practitioners

Calderwood, Bryce Hendrie & Partners,respondent's legal practitioners
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