Law Portal
Zimbabwe

Welcome To Law Portal

Welcome, Guest!
[Help?]

HB03-13 - AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF ZIMBABWE T/A AGRIBANK vs PRITCHARD ZHOU and PERSEVIARANCE ZHOU

  • View Judgment By Categories
  • View Full Judgment


Procedural Law-viz summary judgment re debt.
Law of Contract-viz debt re contractual debt.
Law of Contract-viz debt re debt security iro immovable property.
Procedural Law-viz citation re jounder iro financial interest.
Procedural Law-viz rules of evidence re admissions.
Procedural Law-viz citation re joinder iro proprietary interest.
Law of Conttract-viz essential elements re condition precedent.
Procedural Law-viz declaratory order re declaration of debt security specially executable.
Procedural Law-viz declaratur re declaration of debt security to be specially executable.
Procedural Law-viz costs re contractual.
Law of Contract-viz essential elements re intent iro proprietory interest parties.
Law of Contract-viz essential elements re intent iro financial interest parties.

Summary Judgment: Clear and Unanswerable Claims re: Approach

This is an application for a summary judgment.

The applicant is a duly registered commercial Bank carrying on a business under the name and style of Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe t/a Agribank. The first and second respondents are farmers carrying on business from sub-division 4 of Lot 4 of Sherwood, Kwekwe.

On or about the 27th October 2009, at the special instance and request of the first and second respondents, the applicant advanced a sum of $52,827= to the respondents under the following terms and conditions:

(1) The advanced loan was a sum of $52,827=;

(2) It was to be used as working capital for farming operations;

(3) The loan was to be repaid on or before the 30th June 2012;

(4) The prescribed rate of interest was to be paid only in the event of the respondents' failure to repay the said loan in full by the 30th June 2012;

(5) The loan was to be secured by a Mortgage Bond in favour of the applicant over a certain piece of land situate over Stand No.697 Ruwa Township of Stand 659 Ruwa Township situate in the district of Goromonzi held by the defendants under Deed Transfer No.3198/96 dated 7 May 1996.

(6) In the event that the respondents breached the agreement and/or failed to pay the instalment due, the whole amount outstanding would immediately become due and payable. In that event, the respondents would be liable to pay the costs of recovering the amounts on an attorney and client scale as well as collection commission….,.

The respondents have since breached the Loan Agreement. On the 29th April, the applicant issued out summons against the respondents which summons they defended on the 17th May 2011.

It is that defence which has led to the present application.

The respondents opposed the application. 

The basis of the opposition is that their failure to repay the loan was due to the fact that one of the integral parties, that is the Grain Marketing Board, was to avail the inputs which should be purchased through funds from the applicant. It is their further assertion that the Grain Marketing Board failed to avail inputs timeously resulting in the respondent's failure to purchase the inputs in time for that cropping season, consequently the 2009 and 2010 cropping season was a complete write-off.

Intent or Animus Contrahendi re: Proprietory, Financial Interest and Nominal Parties

The crux of the respondent's argument is that the Grain Marketing Board failed to timeously avail its inputs to them. 

This, indeed, may be a valid argument, but, what comes into sharp focus is whether or not the Grain Marketing Board was part of the Loan Agreement. If it was, then, the respondents should have applied for their joinder on the basis of either financial or proprietary interest, such as joint owners, joint contractors or partners. See Morgan and Another v Salisbury Municipality 1935 AD 167…, and Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 AD…,.

Upon perusal of the Loan Agreement, the Grain Marketing Board does not feature, therefore, it is clear that it was not part of the Agreement. Indeed, Clause 2 of the Agreement refers to the purpose of the purchase for the facility being solely for the procurement of agricultural inputs.

However, there is no mention, reference or direction to purchase the said inputs from a specific supplier, in particular the Grain Marketing Board. In the absence of such reference or direction, it is only reasonable to conclude that the respondents were at liberty to purchase them from any supplier as the loan had been advanced to them. Their failure to purchase the inputs from any supplier, when they had resources to do so, solely, firmly, and securely, rests with them.

The purpose of a summary judgment procedure is designed to enable a plaintiff whose claim falls within a certain class of claims to obtain judgment without the necessity of going to trial in spite of the fact that the defendant has filed a defence. See HERBSTEIN and VAN WINSEN, The Civil Practice of the Superior Courts in SA 3rd ed. 1979….,.. The remedy, therefore, is an extraordinary one and very stringent as it does not permit the respondent to successfully raise its defence on the basis that the plaintiff's case would have been, in the opinion of the court, unanswerable. See Schoeman v New Mark 1919 CPD 55; Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) 418 (AD); and Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) BPK 1976 (2) SA 226 (T).

The applicant has proved that indeed there exists a loan agreement between itself and the respondents. Further, that the respondents have breached a major and material condition of the contract, namely, by its failure to pay back the loan by the agreed date. The respondents, on the other hand, not in so many words, admit that they failed to pay back the loan, but, however, have sought to justify their failure on the basis of their inability to purchase their agricultural inputs from the Grain Marketing Board. This argument cannot be legally sustained. What the respondents have failed to come to terms with is that the issue of the Grain Marketing Board was not a condition precedent to their own fulfilment of their obligation towards the applicant.In any case, any variation, amendment or alteration of the Loan Agreement was to be in accordance with the said clause which further clearly sets out the procedure to be adopted to effect that change. 

This fact makes the applicant's case an unanswerable one.

I entertain no reasonable doubt, whatsoever, that the applicant's claim is properly before the court and is, above all, clear and in that regard unanswerable by the respondents. The respondents' defence that the applicant was aware that they failed to access agricultural inputs timeously thereby rendering their inability to pay back the loan is unconvincing and not valid at law. It is, therefore, not bona fide and should fail. In conclusion, the following order is made:

Order

(a) Respondents shall pay of the sum of US$33,127=41 to the applicant;

(b) Pay interest on the said sum at the prescribed rate calculated from the 1st of July 2011 to the date of payment.

Debt re: Security, Executable Assets, Jus In re Aliena, Parate Executie or Summary Execution and Pactum Commissorium

In compliance with the Loan Agreement, the respondents agreed that Stand No.697 Ruwa Township of Stand 659 Ruwa Township situate in the district of Goromonzi held by the respondents under Deed of Transfer No.3198/96, dated 7 May 1997, was specially hypothecated by a Note of Hand from the applicant;….,.

(a) …,.

(b) …,.

(c) That the piece of land, Stand No.697 Ruwa Township of Stand 659 Ruwa Township situate in the district of Goromonzi, held by the first respondent under Deed of Transfer No.3198/96 dated the 7th May 1996 be and is hereby declared to be specially executable.

Costs re: Consensual, Consent Orders or Orders By Consent, Tender of Costs and Contractual

(a) …,.

(b) …,.

(c) …,.

(d) That the respondents shall pay the cost of suit on an attorney client scale plus collection commission.


CHEDA J:         This is an application for a summary judgment.

Applicant is a duly registered commercial Bank carrying a business under the name and style of Agricultural Development Bank of Zimbabwe t/a Agribank.

First and second respondents are farmers carrying on business from sub-division 4 of Lot 4 of Sherwood, Kwekwe.

On or about the 27th October 2009 at the special instance and request of first and second respondents, applicant advanced a sum of $52827-00 to the respondents under the following terms and conditions:

(1)        the advanced loan was a sum of $52827;

(2)        it was to be used as working capital for farming operations;

(3)        the loan was to be repaid on or before the 30th June 2012;

(4)        the prescribed rate of interest was to be paid only in the event of respondents' failure to repay the said loan in full by the 30th June 2012;

(5)        the loan was to be secured by a Mortgage Bond in favour of applicant over a certain piece of land situate over stand No. 697 Ruwa Township of Stand 659 Ruwa Township situate in the district of Goromonzi held by defendants under Deed Transfer No. 3198/96 dated 7 May 1996.

(6)        In the event that the respondents breached the agreement and/or failed to pay the instalment due, the whole amount outstanding would immediately become due and payable.  In that event the respondents would be liable to pay the costs of recovering the amounts on an attorney and client scale as well as collection commission.

            In compliance with the loan agreement Respondents agreed that,

            Stand No. 697 Ruwa Township of Stand 659 Ruwa Township situate in the district of Goromonzi held by Respondents under Deed of Transfer No. 3198/96 dated 7 May 1997 was specially hypothecated by a Note of Hand from Applicant;

            Respondents have since breached the loan agreement.  On the 29th April applicant

issued out summons against respondent which summons they defended on the 17th May 2011.

It is that defence which has led to the present application.

            Respondents opposed the application.  The basis of the opposition is that their

 failure to repay the loan was due to the fact that one of the integral parties, that is the Grain Marketing Board [hereinafter referred to as “GMB”] was to avail the inputs which should be purchased through funds from applicant.  It is their further assertion that GMB failed to avail inputs timeously resulting in respondent's failure to purchase the inputs in time for that cropping season, consequently the 2009 and 2010 cropping season was a complete write-off.

            The crux of respondent's argument is that GMB failed to timeously avail its

inputs to them.  This indeed may be a valid argument, but, what comes into sharp focus is

whether or not GMB was part of the loan agreement.  If it was, then, respondents should have

applied for their joinder on the basis of either financial or proprietary interest, such as joint  owners, joint contractors or partners, see Morgan and another v Salisbury Municipality 1935AD 167 at 171 and Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour

1949 (3) SA 637 AD at 656-57.

            Upon perusal of the loan agreement, GMB does not feature, therefore, it is clear that it was not part of the agreement.  Indeed Clause 2 of the agreement refers to the purpose of the purchase for the facility, being solely for the procurement of agricultural inputs. 

However, there is no mention, reference or direction to purchase the said inputs from a specific supplier, in particular GMB.  In the absence of such reference or direction, it is only reasonable to conclude that respondents were at liberty to purchase them from any supplier as the loan had been advanced to them.  Their failure to purchase the inputs from any supplier when they had resources to do so solely, firmly and securely rests with them.

            The purpose of a summary judgment procedure is designed to enable a plaintiff whose claim falls within a certain class of claims to obtain judgment without the necessity of going to trial inspite of the fact that the defendant has filed a defence, see Herbstein and Van Winsen, The Civil practice of the Superior courts in SA 3rd ed. 1979. P302.  The remedy, therefore, is an extra ordinary one and very stringent as it does not permit the respondent to successfully raise its defence on the basis that plaintiff's case would have been in the opinion of the court unanswerable see Schoeman v New Mark 1919 CPD 55; Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) 418 (AD) and Breitenbach v Fiat SA (Edms) BPK 1976 (2) SA 226 (T).

            Applicant has proved that indeed there exists a loan agreement between itself and respondents.  Further that, respondents have breached a major and material condition of the contract namely by its failure to pay back the loan by the agreed date.  Respondents on the other hand, not in so many words, admit that they failed to pay back the loan, but, however, have sought to justify their failure on the basis of their inability to purchase their agricultural inputs from GMB.  This is argument can not be legally sustained.  What respondents have failed to come to terms with is that the issue of GMB was not a condition precedent to their own fulfilment of their obligation towards applicant.  

 In any case any variation, amendment or alteration of the loan agreement was to be in accordance with the said clause which further clearly sets out the procedure to be adopted to effect that change.  This fact makes applicant's case an unanswerable one.

            I entertain no reasonable doubt, whatsoever, that applicant's claim is properly before the court and is above all clear and in that regard unanswerable by the respondents.  Respondents' defence that applicant was aware that they failed to access agricultural inputs timeously thereby rendering their inability to pay back the loan is unconvincing and not valid at law.  It is, therefore, not bona fide and should fail.

             In conclusion the following order is made:

Order

(a)        Respondents shall pay of the sum of US$33, 127.41 to applicant;

(b)        pay interest on the said sum at the prescribed rate calculated from the 1st of July 2011 to the date of payment.

(c)        that the piece of land Stand No. 697 Ruwa Township of Stand 659 Ruwa Township situate in the district of Goromonzi, held by the 1st Respondent under Deed of Transfer NO. 3198/96 dated the 7th May 1996 be and is hereby declared to be specially executable.

(d)        that respondents shall pay the cost of suit on an attorney client scale plus collection

 commission.

 

  

Coghlan and Welsh, applicant's legal practitioners

Shenje and company, respondents' legal practitioners
Back Main menu

Categories

Back to top