This is an urgent application in which the applicant sought a provisional order in the following terms:“Terms of Final Order SoughtIt is ordered that;4.1 That Puwayi Chiutsi be and is hereby is struck off from the roll of legal practitioners.4.2. That Puwayi Chiutsi and the Sheriff of Zimbabwe each paying ...
This is an urgent application in which the applicant sought a provisional order in the following terms:
“Terms of Final Order Sought
It is ordered that;
4.1 That Puwayi Chiutsi be and is hereby is struck off from the roll of legal practitioners.
4.2. That Puwayi Chiutsi and the Sheriff of Zimbabwe each paying the other, the other to be absolved pays costs of suit on a scale as between attorney and client.
4.3. The applicant's legal practitioners be and is hereby given leave to serve the copy of this order to the Registrar of Deeds.
Terms of Interim Order Sought
Pending the final determination of this matter, at the return date, the applicant is granted the following relief;
(i) That, Deed of Transfer No.708/19, issued in the name of Tendai Mashamhanda in respect of a piece of land in the district of Salisbury called the remainder of Subdivision C of Lot 6 of Lot 190,191, 192, 193, 194 and 195 Highlands Estate of Welmoed measuring 4,377 square metres be and is hereby cancelled.
(ii) That, forthwith the Law Society of Zimbabwe must place the law firm of Puwayi Chiutsi under curatorship in terms of the Legal Practitioners Act.
(iii) Puwayi Chiutsi be and is hereby suspended from the practise of the legal profession.”
On 28 February 2019 I heard submissions on the issue of urgency.
The first respondent argued that the matter was not urgent.
In an ex tempore ruling, I ruled that the matter was not urgent in so far as it relates to the relief sought to compel the Law Society to place the law firm of Puwayi Chiutsi under curatorship and in respect to the suspension of Puwayi Chiutsi from practice as a legal practitioner.
This was, in my view, a cause which can be pursued in an ordinary application since no irreparable harm was shown to be suffered by the applicant if the matter was not treated as urgent.
Furthermore, that the second part of the relief sought could by no means meet the requirements of urgency as set out in case law; see Kuvarega v Registrar General and Anor 1998 (1) ZLR 188....,.
Counsel for the applicant applied for the amendment of the Provisional Order by removal of that part of the prayer for which the court had ruled could not proceed on urgency.
