Law Portal
Zimbabwe

Welcome To Law Portal

Welcome, Guest!
[Help?]

HB28-11 - JOHN MAFANATO and FAINOS MOYO and HAPAZANI PARADZAI vs MS MUDAVANHU, CIVIL MAGISTRATE, GWERU and COURTNEY SHIELDS FERGUSON

  • View Judgment By Categories
  • View Full Judgment


Procedural Law-viz citation re party acting in an official capacity.
Procedural Law-viz urgent chamber application.
Procedural Law-viz postponement of proceedings.
Procedural Law-viz ex parte application re material non-disclosures.
Procedural Law-viz provisional order re alternative remedy.
Procedural Law-viz interim interdict re alternative remedy.
Procedural Law-viz urgent application re urgency iro alternative remedy.

Interim Interdict Pendente Lite and Stay of Execution re: Approach

The applicants seek a provisional order in the following terms:

Terms of final order sought

That the respondents show cause, if any, to this honourable court why:-

1. The proceedings in case number 51/11 Gweru Magistrates' Court should not remain postponed sine die pending determination of the review application in case number HC190/11.

2. The operation of the interim part of the rule nissi in Gweru Magistrates' Court case number 51/11 should not be suspended pending the determination of review application number HC190/11.

3. The costs of this chamber application should not be costs in the cause in the review application.

Interim Relief Granted

Pending final determination of this chamber application applicants are granted the following relief:

1. Proceedings in Gweru Magistrates' Court under case number 51/11 remain postponed sine die.

2. The operation of the interim part of the rule nissi in Gweru Magistrates' Court number 51/11 is suspended.”

The background facts are the following.

On 10 January 2011, the applicants were served with an order granted ex parte on 7 January 2011 in favour of the second respondent and an application therefore by the first respondent, the rule nissi in which was returnable on 19 January 2011. On 17 January 2011, the applicants served the second respondent with a Notice of Opposition to the application for the rule nissi, and their affidavits in opposition, seeking a discharge of the rule nissi on the grounds, inter alia, that:-

(a) The court had no jurisdiction over the matter;

(b) The order granted ex parte was void at law; and

(c) The second respondent herein had breached the requirement of utmost good faith in approaching the court through his non-disclosure of an amended putative contract.

At the hearing on the return day, the second respondent applied for a postponement of the hearing, allegedly for the purpose of delivering a replying affidavit on the factual issues which were not disclosed. The latter application was opposed by the applicants. The parties' legal practitioners made submissions. After argument, the first respondent indicated to the parties that the ruling will be given “before lunch.” Later, on enquiry through the first respondent's Clerk, the parties were informed that the ruling will be given at 2pm. In the afternoon, the second respondent and his legal practitioner did not return. When the matter was called, the first respondent directed the applicant's legal practitioner to the Clerk of the Court where he would find the written ruling. The ruling was in favour of the second respondent's application for postponement. The applicants were not amused by the turn of events.  They speculate that the reason why the second respondent and his legal practitioner did not come to court in the afternoon is that there was private communication between the first respondent and the second respondent's legal practitioner in the absence and outside the hearing of the applicants and their legal practitioner.

It is for this reason that they made an application for review on the basis of bias by the first respondent. The applicants also made this application to stay the proceedings and the operations of the rule nissi.

In casu, there is alternative remedy available to the applicants before filing this application under a certificate of urgency. Immediately after the granting of the postponement, the applicants should have applied for recusal of the first respondent and another magistrate would have been appointed. The applicants decided to forego that route and made this urgent application to arrest the proceedings.  On this ground alone, the application should fail.

Accordingly, I dismiss the application with costs.


NDOU J:          The applicants seek a provisional order in the following terms:

            “Terms of final order sought

            That the respondents show cause, if any, to this honourable court why:-

1.      The proceedings in case number 51/11 Gweru magistrates' court should not remain postponed sine die pending determination of the review application in case number HC 190/11.

2.      The operation of the interim part of the rule nissi in Gweru magistrates' court case number 51/11 should not be suspended pending the determination of review application number HC 190/11.

3.      The costs of this chamber application should not be costs in the cause in the review application.

Interim Relief Granted

Pending final determination of this chamber application applicants are granted the following relief:

1.      Proceedings in Gweru magistrates' court under case number 51/11 remain postponed sine die.

2.      The operation of the interim part of the rule nissi in Gweru magistrates' court number 51/11 is suspended.”

The background facts are the following.  On 10 January, 2011 applicants were served with an order granted ex parte on 7 January 2011 in favour of the 2nd respondent and an application therefore by 1st respondent, the rule nissi in which was returnable on 19 January 2011.  On 17 January 2011 applicants served the 2nd respondent with a notice of opposition to the application for the rule nissi and their affidavits in opposition, seeking a discharge of the rule nissi on the grounds, in alia that:-

(a)   The court had no jurisdiction over the matter;

(b)   The order granted ex parte was void at law; and

(c)    The 2nd respondent herein had breached the requirement of utmost good faith in approaching the court through his non-disclosure of an amended putative contract.

At the hearing on the return day 2nd respondent applied for a postponement of the hearing allegedly for the purpose of delivering a replying affidavit on the factual issues which were not disclosed.  The latter application was opposed by the applicants.  The parties' legal practitioners made submissions.  After argument, 1st respondent indicated to the parties that the ruling will be given “before lunch”.  Later on enquiry through 1st respondent's clerk the parties were informed that the ruling will be given at 2p.m.  In the afternoon the 2nd respondent and his legal practitioner did not return.  When the matter was called, 1st respondent directed the applicant's legal practitioner to the clerk of the court where he would find the written ruling.  The ruling was in favour of the 2nd respondent's application for postponement.  The applicants were not amused by the turn of events.  They speculate that the reason why the 2nd respondent and his legal practitioner did not come to court in the afternoon is that there was private communication between the 1st respondent and the 2nd respondent's legal practitioner in the absence and outside the hearing of the applicants and their legal practitioner.  It is for this reason that they made an application for review on the basis of bias by the 1st respondent.  The applicants also made this application to stay the proceedings and the operations of the rule nissi.  In casu, there is alternative remedy available to the applicants before filing this application under a certificate of urgency.  Immediately after the granting of the postponement, the applicants should have applied for recusal of the 1st respondent and another magistrate would have been appointed.  The applicants decided to forego that route and made this urgent application to arrest the proceedings.  On this ground alone, the application should fail.

            Accordingly I dismiss the application with costs.

 

 

 

T Khumalo & Co applicants' legal practitioners

Danzinger & Partners 2nd respondent's legal practitioners
Back Main menu

Categories

Back to top